Study of BJP's Electoral Performance and Hindu Muslim Riots
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A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Ticku, Rohit Working Paper Riot rewards? Study of BJP's electoral performance and Hindu Muslim riots Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper, No. 19/2015 Provided in Cooperation with: International Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Suggested Citation: Ticku, Rohit (2015) : Riot rewards? Study of BJP's electoral performance and Hindu Muslim riots, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper, No. 19/2015, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122135 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies International Economics Department Working Paper Series Working Paper No. HEIDWP19-2015 Riot Rewards? Study of BJP's Electoral Performance and Hindu Muslim Riots Rohit Ticku The Graduate Institute, Geneva Chemin Eug`ene-Rigot2 P.O. Box 136 CH - 1211 Geneva 21 Switzerland c The Authors. All rights reserved. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. No part of this paper may be reproduced without the permission of the authors. Abstract Do incidents of ethnic polarization influence voter behavior? I address this question through the case study of India, the world’s largest functional democracy. Specifically, I test whether prior events of Hindu-Muslim riots electorally benefit Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), a prominent Hindu nationalist party? The paper contributes to the literature by being the first to establish a causal relationship between Hindu-Muslim riots and BJP’s electoral performance. Results show that riots have a positive and significant effect on BJP’s vote share and are robust to our instrumentation strategy. The party vote share increases between 2.9 to 4.4 percent in response to different riot outcomes. Results seem to back the theory of electoral incentives i.e. parties representing elites among ethnic groups may have an incentive to instigate ethnic conflict to influence the marginal voter. Keywords: Ethnic conflict, Hindu Muslim riots, Electoral performance, Voter behavior, Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP). JEL Classification Numbers: D72, D74. 1 * I would like to thank Nicolas Berman, Jean Louis Arcand, Mathias Thoenig and Dominic Rohner for their valuable suggestions and feedback at various stages of this paper. All errors are mine. “The peace we seek in the world begins in human hearts; it finds its glorious expression when we look beyond any differences in religion or tribe and rejoice in the beauty of every soul. It’s when all Indians, whatever your faith, go to the movies and applaud actors like Shah Rukh Khan. When you celebrate athletes like Milkha Singh, or Mary Kom.” Barack Obama 1 Introduction Do incidents of ethnic polarization affect voting behavior? I test this hypothesis through the case study of India and Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), a prominent Hindu nationalist party of the country. Specifically, I test whether prior events of Hindu-Muslim riots electorally benefit the BJP. I chose India as a case study for two reasons- first for its eminent position as the world’s largest “patronage democracy”1 which exacerbates the use of voting for strategic gains (Chandra, 2009). Second, the supposed realignment of Indian polity towards right wing politics, after 2014 national elections, has necessitated a deeper understanding of the link between ethnic polarization and electoral outcomes.2 The question has to be contextualized within the broader framework of voting behavior i.e. whether decision to vote on ethnic lines is driven by sincerity or strategy (Chandra, 2009). Early research on ethnic mobilization focused on the sincerity of such voter. For example, according to Horowitz (1985) voters in ethnically divided polities stubbornly vote for their representative party, irrespective of its prospect for victory or influence. However, recent literature (Chandra, 2009) has pointed to a strategic interest in voting, even when it is done on ethnic lines. Strategic voting can take place in different forms, for example to signal a preference to the incumbent party, to help the most preferred party to win, or to prevent the least preferred one from being elected (ibid.). However, the underlying aim for each voter is to get individualized benefits from those elected. These benefits may either be material or psychological in the form of higher status or self-esteem (ibid.). The psychological rewards emanate from increased status, from having a co-ethnic in power, in comparison to other ethnicities which are not as well represented. The desire for such psychological rewards should be stronger in the aftermath of ethnically polarizing events. In other words, incidents of ethno-religious conflict should consolidate voting on the lines of ethnicity or religion. The debate on ethno-religious conflict in India has come to fore in the aftermath of BJP’s victory in 2014 national elections.3 The victory was unprecedented as BJP became the first party in three decades, and the only non-Congress one till date, to win a majority on its 1 Patronage democracy is defined as where voters are dependent upon the discretionary powers of those who control the state 2 “Right wing Hinduism surges in India as Obama, Modi meet”, USA Today (24.01.2015) 3 “Is Modi’s India safe for Muslims?”, Foreign Policy (26.06.2015) 2 own.4 This in spite of a relentless campaign by its political adversaries around the suspect role of its prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, in 2002 anti-Muslim riots.5 Statistics on riot incidences were presented as a proof of BJP run states being more communally violent.6 Even a prominent media house like The Economist expressed apprehension of rise in sectarian hatred if a BJP government led by Narendra Modi came to power.7 In the two months after BJP’s electoral victory over 600 “communal incidents” were reported.8 These were located primarily in Uttar Pradesh, where BJP had recently recorded its best ever electoral performance in the national elections.9 Most of these incidents were concentrated in twelve assembly constituencies which were scheduled for the by polls later in the year.10 BJP’s rivals alluded to the party having artificially engineered riots for electoral gains.11 Hindu-Muslim riots again flared up in Delhi’s Trilokpuri in October 2014, a few months prior to the state assembly elections.12 Some saw a common pattern of communal polarization by BJP across Uttar Pradesh and Delhi riot incidences.13 Curiously, BJP fared poorly in both the elections.14 The paper, in this backdrop, explores whether polarization triggered by Hindu Muslim riots causally benefit BJP’s electoral performance. Thus I indirectly test whether BJP has any electoral incentive in “artificially engineering” communal riots. The paper also attempts to identify the sub texts under which ethno-religious polarization, if at all, could turn out to be a successful strategy. I correct for the endogeneity of riots using intuition from climate conflict literature. Specifically, exploiting the idea that higher temperatures induce violent and aggressive behavior, I use district level variation in temperature as an instrument for Hindu-Muslim riots. I also control for agricultural wages to mitigate any effect of temperature variation on riots through change in agricultural productivity. 4 “Narendra Modi and BJP sweep to power in Indian election”, The Guardian (May 16, 2014) 5 “Rahul Gandhi slams NarendraModi's acquittal over 2002 Gujarat riots”, Deccan Chronicle (March 17, 2014) 6 “BJP ruled states more communally violent”, Chunauti.org (February 15, 2014). 7 “Can anyone stop NarendraModi?”, The Economist (April 5, 2014). 8 “Express investigation part-I: Over 600 ‘communal incidents’ in UP since LS results, 60% near bypoll seats”, The Indian Express (August 9, 2014) 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. Representatives of these state constituencies had been elected to the national parliament, necessitating the bypolls. 11 “Uttar Pradesh Riots Engineered? Rahul Gandhi Thinks So, BJP Does Not”, NDTV (August 9, 2014). 12 “Trilokpuri riots may be an attempt to polarise Dalits as Delhi polls seem likely”, Scroll.in (October 27, 2014) 13 “Similarities between Trilokpuri riots and Muzaffarnagar