USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 792, 16 March 2010

Articles & Other Documents:

Obama And Medvedev Talk About Arms Treaty Reports Shine Light On Nuclear Weapons Vigilance

Kremlin Says Russia, U.S. Near Setting Date To Sign Russia To Float Out New Nuclear Sub On May 7 New START Pact Burmese Reactors Close To Completion: Military Debate Grows On Nuclear Containment Of Iran Sources

Nato Will Treat Nuclear Iran As Threat, Chief Warns Pakistani Scientist Khan Describes Iranian Efforts To Buy Nuclear Bombs Iran 'Tried To Buy Nuclear Weapons From Pakistan' Pakistan Rejects U.S. Daily Report On Iran Nuclear Iran Rejects Allegations Over Earlier Nuclear Program By Help Of Pakistan India Continues Work On WMD Defense, Missile Systems Report: NKorea To Rejoin Nuclear Talks In April China Provided Nuke Weapon Blueprint To Pakistan S. Korea Must Lead In Resolving N. Korean Nuclear Standoff: Minister Anthrax Threat To British Troops

Woes Could Spark N.Korea Regime Collapse: Think- CBP Deploys Radiation Detection Portals At Port Tank Hueneme

US Cautious On Removing Nuclear Arms From Europe The NPT: Still ‗Knotty‘ At Forty

Washington Mulls Modernization Of Aging Bombs The Deadly Current Toward Nuclear Arms

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

New York Times 13 March 2010 Obama And Medvedev Talk About Arms Treaty By PETER BAKER WASHINGTON — President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia moved closer to agreement Saturday on a long-stalled arms control treaty that would slash the active nuclear arsenals of both countries by more than one-quarter, officials from both countries said. Mr. Obama and Mr. Medvedev spoke for 30 minutes by telephone to try to resolve remaining differences and set the stage for an accord before a nuclear summit meeting in Washington next month. In a statement, the Kremlin suggested that the two sides were ready to plan a signing ceremony for the treaty, which would replace the expired Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991, or Start. ―It is now possible to talk about specific dates for the submission of the draft Start treaty for signing by the heads of state,‖ the Kremlin statement said. The White House was more cautious, with its spokesman, Mike Hammer, saying the leaders ―had a good conversation‖ about ―the progress and consensus reached‖ in Geneva negotiations. ―The results of their talks are encouraging, and both leaders are committed to concluding an agreement soon,‖ Mr. Hammer added. Other administration officials, who insisted on anonymity to discuss delicate negotiations, said the call was initiated by Mr. Medvedev to confirm agreement on a set of issues in the treaty reached by negotiators in Geneva in recent days. They said the two sides must now hash out technical issues related to monitoring and verification, but they sounded more optimistic than they have in weeks. ―We‘re not ready to declare victory,‖ one official said, ―but we think it was a good step forward.‖ Asked about missile defense, an issue that has deeply divided the two sides, another official said, ―We‘re getting close to an understanding on that point.‖ The two countries have been haggling over the new treaty for nearly a year and missed their self-imposed deadline of finishing by the time the original Start accord expired in December. While most of the substance has been settled for months, missile defense and verification have proved hard to resolve. Moscow has long opposed American plans to build a missile defense system in Europe and remains suspicious even of Mr. Obama‘s reconfigured version, but the American side has refused to agree to any limitations in the treaty. To bridge the differences, the two sides have been drafting nonbinding language for the preamble to the treaty recognizing Russian interests in addressing defensive weapons as well as offensive weapons without actually binding the United States. The dragged-out negotiations have frustrated Obama administration officials who, when they took office 14 months ago, had hoped to agree relatively quickly to a generally straightforward replacement for Start as a way to begin improving Russian-American relations. With the agreement fostering new trust, they hoped they could then move on to harder issues. Instead, it has been a on-and-off process that always seems close to finale without getting there. At one point last month, the American side thought it was close enough to a deal that a phone call was set up between Mr. Obama and Mr. Medvedev. But the Russian leader wound up raising issues that the Americans had thought were settled and Mr. Obama hung up the phone frustrated that there was more work to be done than he had anticipated, American officials have said. Given that, White House officials were wary of setting up another call with Mr. Medvedev until they were confident the two were genuinely closer to a deal. ―A very good week in Geneva,‖ as one official termed it, encouraged them that perhaps Moscow has made a decision to bring the talks to a close. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton is heading to Moscow in the coming week. Both sides have incentives to finish and sign a treaty by the time Mr. Obama and Mr. Medvedev join other world leaders at a summit meeting on nuclear nonproliferation in Washington in April. But the White House has been careful not to call that a deadline, saying it would not rush just to have it done by then. The new treaty, if it is signed and ratified by the Senate and the Russian Parliament, would require each side to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads to roughly 1,600, down from 2,200, American officials have said. It would also force each side to reduce its strategic bombers and land- and sea-based missiles to below 800, down from the old limit of 1,600. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/world/europe/14start.html (Return to Articles and Documents List) RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency 13 March 2010 Kremlin Says Russia, U.S. Near Setting Date To Sign New START Pact The Russian and U.S. presidents discussed on Saturday the negotiations on a new strategic arms reductions treaty and said it was possible to talk about a date for the deal to be signed, the Kremlin said. "The heads of state have, by an already established tradition, held a regular exchange of views on the situation in the final stages of preparation of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Both sides expressed satisfaction with the high level of agreement in the major provisions of the draft treaty. It was underlined that it is now possible to talk about specific dates for the submission of the draft START treaty for signing by the heads of state," the Kremlin press service said in a statement. It added that presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama agreed during their telephone conversation to give additional instructions to the negotiating teams and discussed plans for bilateral contacts in the near future. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is due in Moscow on Thursday and is expected to discuss the arms reduction pact with her Russian counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Lavrov and Clinton will attend Friday's meeting of the Quartet of international mediators in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Russia and the United States have been negotiating a replacement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty since Medvedev and Obama met in April last year, but finalizing a document has dragged on, with U.S. plans for missile defense in Europe a particular sticking point. START 1, the cornerstone of post-Cold War arms control, expired on December 5. Lavrov has repeatedly made statements suggesting that a new nuclear arms cuts deal should be linked to Washington's missile plans in Eastern Europe. Many experts believe, however, that the Russian demand will probably not be satisfied as the U.S. Senate is unlikely to ratify any document containing a formal linkage between the arms cuts and the missile shield. Obama scrapped plans last year for interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic pursued by his predecessor as protection against possible Iranian strikes in an apparent move to ease Russian security concerns. In February, however, Romania and Bulgaria said they were in talks with the Obama administration on deploying elements of the U.S. missile shield on their territories from 2015, triggering an angry reaction from Moscow. MOSCOW, March 13 (RIA Novosti) http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100313/158187455.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

New York Times 12 March 2010 Debate Grows On Nuclear Containment Of Iran By DAVID E. SANGER For a few months in the mid-1960s President Johnson and his aides secretly weighed bombing China‘s nuclear sites — perhaps seeking Soviet help — rather than let Mao get the bomb. Then the costs of starting another war in Asia sank in and they decided to try containment — living with a threatening regime while deterring its most dangerous moves. It worked. Nearly five decades later, more Americans wake up worried about our trillion-dollar debt to China than about China‘s arsenal. China has evolved into a comparatively manageable military competitor, at least for now. Today a version of the same debate about whether containment is the answer is breaking out again, this time about Iran. Prominent strategists like Zbigniew Brzezinski argue forcefully that what worked in the cold war will work with the mullahs. The cover of Foreign Affairs this month is an article titled ―After Iran Gets the Bomb‖; it draws scenarios for dealing with what many believe is inevitable. Meanwhile, the administration races to add antimissile systems and a naval presence in the Gulf — an effort to contain Iran‘s power in the region, officials say, but it sure looks like the building blocks of a nuclear containment policy, a backup in case the next round of sanctions fails to do the trick. The White House denies that nuclear containment is on the table. ―The United States is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, period,‖ Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. said on his testy trip to Israel last week. But to many in the early 1960s, a nuclear China was also unthinkable. More recently, George W. Bush would regularly repeat that America would never ―tolerate‖ a nuclear North Korea. The reality was that during the last six years of his presidency, he tolerated it, then prepared the way for the current containment strategy of intercepting shipments from North Korea to customers for its nuclear know-how. What is striking about the current debate about containing Iran is that neither side seems entirely confident in the solidity of its argument. Those who advocate sanctions acknowledge that three rounds enacted by the United Nations Security Council failed to change Iran‘s behavior. Even if the administration wins new sanctions aimed at the Revolutionary Guard, the advocates admit it will still be a long shot that Iran would hurt enough to stop enriching uranium. Those who argue that a military strike might be needed if sanctions fail have their own doubts. They admit they cannot predict Iran‘s response — from terror strikes to oil cutoffs to confrontations in the Strait of Hormuz. Even the administration seems tentative about when Iran will exceed American tolerance. In the Pentagon and the intelligence agencies, several senior officials complain — though never on the record — that President Obama and his staff have not clearly defined when Iran will gain a ―nuclear weapons capability.‖ Many argue that similar indecision preceded the day in 2006 when Mr. Bush woke up to discover that North Korea had conducted a nuclear test. So what is the argument for containment? Basically, it assumes that if China and Russia changed over decades, so might Iran. And nuclear weapons can handcuff a nation as easily as they can empower it. Last week, at the University of Oklahoma, Mr. Brzezinski argued that either an Iranian bomb or an attack on Iran would be ―a calamity, a disaster.‖ He said containment could work because Iran ―may be dangerous, assertive and duplicitous, but there is nothing in their history to suggest they are suicidal.‖ Nevertheless, in their Foreign Affairs essay, James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh concede that the Iran case differs substantially from the cold war ones, and that a successful strategy today would have to recognize that fact. They urge Mr. Obama to prescribe three explicit no-go zones for the Iranians: ―no initiation of conventional warfare‖ against another nation; ―no transfer of nuclear weapons, materials, or technologies‖; no increase in support for terrorists. The penalty, they argued, would have to include ―military retaliation by any and all means necessary,‖ including the use of nuclear weapons. It is a logical list. But there is a counterargument: Why would Iran believe the threat if the United States, having said it would never allow Iran to get a nuclear capability, then allowed it? In fact, the administration is deep into containment now — though it insists its increases in defensive power in the Gulf are meant to deter a conventional attack by Iran. If Iran‘s threat went nuclear, America might have to extend its nuclear umbrella as well. Defense Secretary Robert Gates carefully stepped around that option last week while in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, trying to reassure leaders who increasingly fear the prospect of an Iranian bomb. Mr. Gates defended the sanctions strategy: ―I think the prospects of success are certainly better than in a lot of other situations where sanctions have been applied,‖ he said. But he spent most of his time explaining the need for ―defensive capabilities‖ against Iranian missiles. Few doubt the missile threat can be contained. Strategists worry more that Iran might slip a crude weapon or nuclear material to terrorists, betting it couldn‘t be traced back to Tehran. (It‘s not a bad bet — the science of ―nuclear attribution‖ is a lot weaker than it seems on ―24.‖ ) Yet another argument against containment comes from Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser under Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. ―The ultimate consequence of trying to contain Iran has little to do with Iran itself,‖ he argues. ―The biggest risk is that it will start an eruption of proliferation‖ around the Gulf, starting with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. They would doubt the American deterrent capability, he said, and the problem would spread to Japan and South Korea. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/14/weekinreview/14sanger.html (Return to Articles and Documents List) Gulf News – U.A.E. 14 March 2010 Nato Will Treat Nuclear Iran As Threat, Chief Warns Nato would consider Iran a threat if it acquired nuclear capability, says Nato Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen By Habib Toumi, Bureau Chief Manama: Nato would consider Iran a threat if it acquired nuclear capability, the organisation's Secretary-General said. "While Nato as such is not involved in the Iran issue, we support international endeavours to find a political and diplomatic solution. But if Iran at a certain stage actually acquires nuclear capability, then we would consider it a threat against the alliance," Anders Fogh Rasmussen told Gulf News. "This is also the reason we are considering the establishment of a missile defence system that we can start to deploy by 2011." Missile defence system The system will be set up in Europe, and will cover all allies of Nato, the world's largest military alliance. "The Americans are of course in the lead, but according to their new approach and plans, the missile defence system will be developed within a Nato framework," he said. Rasmussen who was elected to the top Nato post last year, said he blamed the Taliban in Afghanistan for causing the death of many innocent civilians. "I have to say that a huge majority of the casualties are caused by the Taliban, and I base this on statistics from the United Nations. We know that the Taliban use innocent civilians, women and children, as human shields," he said. The presence of Muslim and Arab troops in Afghanistan is crucial for the alliance. "They play a very important role militarily and on the humanitarian level, financially and also as far as cultural and religious aspects are concerned." "I do believe that active participation of soldiers with a Muslim background makes it visible that what is going on in Afghanistan is not a fight against religion, but against extremism and terrorism," he said. Rasmussen, who as prime minister of Denmark during the issue over the controversial cartoons waded into controversy with Muslim ambassadors, said that "religion and faith should not be divisive and, on the contrary, they should promote peace, forgiveness, mercy and tolerance." http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/bahrain/nato-will-treat-nuclear-iran-as-threat-chief-warns-1.596719 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Telegraph – U.K. 15 March 2010 Iran 'Tried To Buy Nuclear Weapons From Pakistan' Iran attempted to buy nuclear weapons from Pakistan in 1990 but a putative deal was rejected at the last moment by the former head of the Pakistani military, according to an official transcript leaked in Washington. By Damien McElroy, Foreign Affairs Correspondent Iran had struck an agreement with Pakistan's army chief to buy "nuclear bombs" for $10 billion (£6.6 billion) but Pakistani officials pulled out of the offer when an Iranian delegation travelled to Islamabad to collect the material in 1990. Adml Ali Shamkhani, the former Iranian defence minister, attempted to finalise the sale in a meeting with Adml Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey, then chairman of Pakistan's joint chiefs, according to an 11-page statement by Pakistan scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan that has been made public for the first time. It said: "He had come to collect the promised nuclear bombs." The confession was obtained by Simon Henderson, a fellow at the Washington Institute think tank. "This is the first real indication that Iran wanted a nuclear bomb – not just nuclear technology – that has not been plied by intelligence agencies or conspiracy theorists," he said. "It confirms that the legacy of the war with Iraq was that Iran wanted the ultimate deterrent. " Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, the Pakistan Army chief who had reached a deal with the Iranians, was said to have revolted against the decision and demanded that then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto go through with the deal. Pakistan decided to provide a pair of centrifuge machines that refine uranium instead of the bombs. That shipment through a middle man laid the basis for Iran's current nuclear programme which has put the country in violation of UN resolutions. Gen Beg denied he agreed to sell a nuclear weapons to Iran but he has in the past said Iran should have a nuclear deterrent. Pakistan's government said it had not hidden any information it had gathered from Khan, who has been under various forms of house arrest since 2004, from America or its allies. "It is yet another repackaging of fiction, which surface occasionally for purposes that are self-evident," said Abdul Basit, its foreign office spokesman. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/7449806/Iran-tried-to-buy-nuclear-weapons-from- Pakistan.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

People‘s Daily – China 16 March 2010 Iran Rejects Allegations Over Earlier Nuclear Program By Help Of Pakistan Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast rejected Monday the allegations that Iran has been following the nuclear weaponry program in late 1980s by the help of Pakistan, the official IRNA news agency reported. Referring to western media reports concerning Iran's earlier attempts to avail nuclear weapons by the help of Pakistan, Mehmanparast told IRNA that "Such reports show the United States and the West's failure in an attempt to put pressure on Iran (over its nuclear program)," the report said. "The United States is trying to deprive Iranians from their peaceful nuclear rights which has been acknowledged by the global community," Mehmanparast was quoted as saying. The Washington Post quoted renowned Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan as saying, in the documents obtained by the daily, that Pakistan gave Iran bomb-related drawings, parts for centrifuges to purify uranium and a secret worldwide list of suppliers. Pakistan on Monday rejected the report. Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit said "It is yet another repackaging of fiction." Source: Xinhua http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90854/6920937.html# (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Business Week 13 March 2010 Report: NKorea To Rejoin Nuclear Talks In April By KWANG-TAE KIM, Associated Press SEOUL, South Korea North Korea plans to head back to the bargaining table early next month for talks aimed at ending its nuclear weapons program, a news report said Saturday. The North, believed to have enough weaponized plutonium for at least a half-dozen bombs, quit international disarmament-for-aid negotiations and conducted a second nuclear test last year, drawing tightened U.N. sanctions. The North has said it will only return to the talks -- which involve the U.S., South Korea, China, Russia and Japan -- after the sanctions are lifted and it holds peace talks with the United States on formally ending the 1950-53 Korean War. The U.S. and South Korea have responded that the North must first return to the negotiating table and make progress on denuclearization. An unidentified North Korean official in Beijing said Pyongyang will return to the six-way talks in early April and "present its idea to move forward denuclearization," South Korea's JoongAng Ilbo newspaper reported Saturday. The official said his country will see how the U.S. will react to the North's plan, noting that the next move will be up to Washington. A North Korean diplomat in Beijing who was contacted by The Associated Press said he had not heard of such plans. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to media. A senior South Korean official involved in the nuclear talks also said he did not have information on the North's reported plan, saying he could not predict when the talks would resume. He asked not to be identified, citing the issue's sensitivity. The nuclear talks were last held in Beijing in December 2008. Separately, former U.N. nuclear chief Mohamed ElBaradei called for constructive dialogue and engagement to end North Korea's nuclear ambitions. "The issue involves North Korea's insecurity and need for economic development, and in order for headway to be made, the world should address both these issues," ElBaradei said in a news conference in Seoul on Friday, according to Yonhap news agency. The negotiations to get Pyongyang back to the talks are occurring amid reports of a possible succession movement in North Korea. North Korea plans to distribute portraits of leader Kim Jong Il's youngest son, Kim Jong Un, Yonhap said, citing a Japan-based North Korean human rights group. Lee Young-hwa, head of group RENK, said he got information that North Korea prepared Jong Un's portraits to make sure they can be hung in factories and homes along with those of father Kim Jong Il and his late grandfather, North Korea founder Kim Il Sung. The 68-year-old Kim has not publicly named any of his three sons to succeed him, but is said to favor Jong Un, believed to be in his mid-20s. http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9EDI8AG0.htm (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Yonhap News – South Korea 13 March 2010 S. Korea Must Lead In Resolving N. Korean Nuclear Standoff: Minister SEOUL, March 13 (Yonhap) -- South Korean must play a leading role in resolving the North Korean nuclear standoff, a senior policymaker in Seoul said Saturday. Unification Minister Hyun In-taek said at a gathering here the main reason for the uncertainties surrounding the Korean Peninsula can be found in North Korea's nuclear program. He added that because South Korea has a natural vested interest in what happens on the peninsula, it must push for change. "Because we are directly involved in this matter, it is imperative that Seoul take active steps to deal with the issue," the minister said. He noted that this year marks the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-53), but that the inter-Korean standoff remains fundamentally unchanged. Pyongyang, despite warnings from the international community, detonated two nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009. It has since come under sweeping United Nations-led sanctions. Hyun also said that because developments taking place on Korean Peninsula have international implications, there is a need to expand talks with foreign countries. South Korea is party to the suspended six-nation talks on ending North Korea's nuclear program. Besides the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, Russia and China are also involved in the negotiations. http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2010/03/13/69/0401000000AEN20100313001300320F.HTML (Return to Articles and Documents List) Bangkok Post – Thailand 16 March 2010 Woes Could Spark N.Korea Regime Collapse: Think-Tank By Agence France-Presse (AFP) Tighter international sanctions and a host of domestic problems including chronic food shortages could spark regime collapse in North Korea, an influential think-tank says. The International Crisis Group (ICG), in a report released late Monday, said the communist state's internal problems could have unanticipated implications for regional and international security. While the regime is unlikely to start a war it knows it would lose, it could engage in more dangerous proliferation activities because sanctions on weapons exports have squeezed foreign exchange earnings, the report said. In the absence of traditional purchasers, the nuclear-armed North had a greater incentive to sell weapons to terrorist groups or international crime organisations. "Kim Jong-Il?s political machine requires hard currency to operate, and there are several signs that the regime is increasingly desperate to earn it," the ICG said. The North "is facing several domestic problems that in isolation would each be manageable but together could threaten regime survival," said Daniel Pinkston, the group's northeast Asia deputy project director. "The North Korean government has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to survive, but the regime is under extreme pressure when it must also deal with looming succession issues." The 68-year-old Kim, who suffered a stroke in August 2008, has apparently chosen his third son Jong-Un as eventual successor. But it is unclear whether the son has the personal qualities or support to tackle "unprecedented" challenges, the report said. In the short term, a smooth transition was likely. But if the successor could not improve the economy or tackle other crises, there could be a violent power struggle resulting in an army takeover or regime collapse, the Brussels-based ICG said. The report said foreign exchange sources are drying up as UN sanctions crimp lucrative weapons exports and as joint business projects with South Korea founder amid worsening relations. Humanitarian aid which feeds millions has declined due to political factors and donor fatigue, despite "chronic" food shortages and other economic deprivation. The North is also trying to cope with pressures arising from its disastrous currency revaluation last November 30 and a collapsed public health system, the ICG said. In spite of the pressures on the regime, the state security apparatus makes a popular revolution impossible, the ICG said. "But despite the loyalty of elites in the party and the military, a sudden split in the leadership, although unlikely, is not out of the question." Robert Templer, the ICG Asia programme director, said instability, a coup or even regime collapse would not be observable from the outside until well under way. But "any of these scenarios could create a humanitarian emergency that might require international intervention". http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/171716/woes-could-spark-n-korea-regime-collapse-think-tank (Return to Articles and Documents List)

New York Times 15 March 2010 US Cautious On Removing Nuclear Arms From Europe By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS WASHINGTON (AP) -- The U.S. is taking a go-slow approach on one of the touchiest and least discussed national security issues: whether to remove the last remaining Cold War-era U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Some officials in Germany and other U.S. allies in Europe are advocating a withdrawal, citing President Barack Obama's call last year for a nuclear-free world. But the U.S. is putting off an early decision, preferring to consult within NATO, starting at a meeting of foreign ministers in April that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton plans to attend, according to several Obama administration officials. The officials discussed the matter on condition of anonymity because details are secret and the administration is in the midst of an internal review of the role and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The estimated 200 weapons in Europe are a fraction of that total. Results of the review, originally due to Congress in December, have been delayed repeatedly and now aren't expected before April. The study, known as the Nuclear Posture Review, is expected to call for a reduced role for nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, as reflected in the substantial reductions being negotiated with Russia in a replacement for the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START. That negotiation does not apply to the U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, which are categorized as ''nonstrategic'' because they are short-range bombs designed to be launched by fighter jets based in Europe -- including by NATO members' jets. Ivo Daalder, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, said on Feb. 23 that the review ''will not make any decisions that preclude any option with respect to nuclear weapons and NATO.'' The START negotiations aim to reduce U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear weapons, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles carried on submarines. Talks have bogged down for months. The White House said Obama on Saturday had an ''encouraging'' telephone conversation with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev about prospects for an early end to the arms negotiations. The bombs in Europe are a sensitive subject because they reflect a long-standing U.S. military and political commitment to the defense of its European allies, who have relied on the U.S. nuclear ''umbrella'' as an alternative to developing their own nuclear weapons. Washington has a similar commitment to Asian allies, including Japan and South Korea, but it has maintained that role with U.S.-based long-range nuclear weapons. Asia-based U.S. nuclear arms were withdrawn in the early 1990s by President George H.W. Bush. The U.S. government as a matter of policy will not confirm the location of U.S. nuclear weapons, but it is well known that the sites in Europe are in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey. The U.S. has had nuclear arms in Europe since the 1950s. Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, which advocates nuclear arms control, believes the administration is inclined to remove the nuclear weapons from Europe but wants to take a cautious approach. ''The Obama administration came in with a strong pledge to mend ties with the allies, and so the last thing it wants to be seen to do is to make a decision over the heads of the allies,'' he said in an interview Sunday. ''The U.S. would move these weapons tomorrow if this were just its own decision.'' One apparent impediment to an early withdrawal of the weapons is the view of newer members of NATO -- those closer to Russia, such as the Baltic states. They see the U.S. weapons as an important symbol of a NATO guarantee of their territorial integrity. Older NATO members see it differently. Five of them -- Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway -- in February called for consultations on the question of a U.S. nuclear withdrawal, and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said this month that ''a hot issue like our nuclear posture'' will be on the agenda, beginning at the April foreign ministers meeting. The consultations are likely to last for months, possibly into 2011. Parliament members from several European NATO countries are circulating a letter to be sent to Obama stating that the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe is an urgent matter and should be addressed once the U.S. and Russia complete their START treaty. ''It is the sincere wish of the majority of people in Europe that tactical nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Europe and eliminated,'' the letter says, according to a copy published by the Global Security Institute, an international group that advocates nuclear disarmament. The traditional U.S. view of the nuclear bombs in Europe is that they are a pillar of NATO unity and that they link U.S. and NATO security. Even so, they are not targeted at any specific country and their aircraft used to launch them are not as ready for combat as in years past. An in-depth study of the issue by an expert panel assembled by Defense Secretary Robert Gates, made public one month before Obama took office, said that since 1995 the aircraft's ability to go into combat with the bombs ''is now measured in months rather than minutes.'' That study also revealed internal NATO divisions, saying that some senior U.S. officials at NATO's military command headquarters in Mons, Belgium, do not support having U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. It quoted one unnamed U.S. general as saying that the weapons are not needed because the American role of deterring a nuclear attack on its allies can be performed with weapons outside Europe. http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/03/15/us/politics/AP-US-Nuclear-Weapons-Europe.html?_r=1 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Der Spiegel – Germany 15 March 2010 Washington Mulls Modernization Of Aging Bombs The Nuclear Arsenal in Europe By Otfried Nassauer Germany's foreign minister has called for the removal of Cold War legacy nuclear weapons being stored here, but some in Washington may have other plans. The US Department of Energy is requesting a budget of close to $2 billion to modernize the country's oldest models of nuclear weapons, including those being kept in Germany. In a move that could have an impact on the future of nuclear weapons stored in Germany and other parts of Europe, the United States Department of Energy has included requests in its latest budget proposal for funding to modernize parts of the country's aging nuclear arsenal -- a move that would seem to contradict the vision of a nuclear weapons- free world President Barack Obama announced last year. From 2011 to 2015, the agency wants to allocate close to $2 billion to push forward plans to modernize its arsenal of B-61 nuclear bombs. Some of these weapons are being kept in Europe, including some at storage facilities at the German air force base in Büchel. In total, the US Air Force still has around 150 strategic B-61 bombs in its active arsenal as well as around 400 non-strategic models and a reserve of around 200 further non-strategic bombs. The weapons are leftovers of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War in Europe. The German government is currently seeking the removal of the bombs through consultations in NATO. The coalition contract between Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats and Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's business-friendly Free Democratic Party (FDP) explicitly states that the government will push for the weapons' removal. Indeed, Westerwelle's public stance for removing the nuclear weapons has led to some alienation in Washington. Germany and four other NATO states are expected to discuss the withdrawal of the approximately 200 nuclear weapons that are still being stored in Europe at a summit of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn at the end of April. Should the budget request be approved, it could mean further hurdles to getting the weapons removed. In the US, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible for the development, construction and modernization of nuclear weapons. The semi-autonomous agency is part of the Department of Energy. It closely coordinates its plans with the Pentagon. NNSA administrator Thomas d'Agostino and Defense Secretary Robert Gates both back a comprehensive modernization of US nuclear weapons as well as the industrial infrastructure supporting them. They already served under former President George W. Bush and have sponsored both the modernization of older nuclear weapons as well as the development of a new generation, the so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). Feasibility Study The NNSA's budget proposal first envisions a feasibility study into the modernization options for the "oldest nuclear weapons in the enduring stockpile," the B-61s. The study is expected to look into the possibilities for a "life extension" of the bombs' "nuclear and non-nuclear" components -- as well as for "re-using" the "pit," the bomb's core nuclear components. In addition, the weapons -- which are carried by dual capable European Tornado or American F-15E and F-16 C/D fighter bomber aircraft -- would be adapted to make them compatible with the next generation of nuclear-capable fighter jets, such as the US Joint Strike Fighter. After completion of the feasibility study and the selection of components for the modernization, their development and the Life Extension Program would begin. The program is the single biggest line-item for the proposed 2011 NNSA budget. It is expected to end with the development of what would largely be a new nuclear weapon: the B-61, modification 12. The plan isn't entirely new. Congress has already approved an initial $32.5 million in the NNSA budget for 2010. The money allows for initial study work on the modernization of the B-61. But Congress also set conditions for the approval of any sums in excess of that amount and made clear that it reserved the final decision on any work to modernize the nuclear components. One year later, NNSA is now following up. The preliminary work has now been transformed into the proposal for a multibillion dollar project that is being given the highest priority. From 5 Bomb Varieties to 2 Modern Ones It's a deft move by the supporters of a modernization of America's nuclear weapons. Currently, there are five versions of the B-61 nuclear bomb. Two are used as weaponry for strategic bombers: the Mod 7 and the nuclear bunker buster, the Mod 11. Three others are tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons that are also deployed in European NATO countries. The weapons stored in Europe are the oldest models, the B-61 Mod 3 and 4 as well as the newer B-61 Mod 10, which is used as a reserve and deployed in the US. The latter are modified warheads built after the Pershing II missiles were destroyed as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Under the modernization program, the five existing models would be transformed into two modern modifications of the weapon -- the bunker-busting B-61 Mod 11 and the newer nuclear multi-purpose Mod 12. This largely new weapon could be used from about 2018 onward by both strategic bombers as well as tactical fighter aircraft. The project, though, has yet to be approved. First, US President Barack Obama must make the final decision as part of his "Nuclear Posture Review." The Obama administration is currently finalizing the report and will soon submit it to Congress. It will outline President Obama's plans for the future nuclear weapons policy of the United States. Heavy Wrangling Recent weeks have been marked by contentious debate over the report in Washington. Both the Departments of Defense and Energy both want to keep the doors open for a comprehensive modernization of the nuclear arsenal and possibly even for the construction of new weapons. They are currently in a fierce dispute with Vice President Joe Biden over the extent to which the report should include practical steps aimed at underscoring Obama's vision of a nuclear weapons-free world and whether the president will still leave open the possibility of widely modernizing existing weapons nonetheless. Ultimately it will be a question of whether the Obama administration publicly rules out the development of new nuclear weapons and of what the president believes constitutes a "new" weapon. Hans Kristensen, head of the nuclear information project at the Federation of American Scientists believes the budget demands by the Energy Department are also part of a poker game for money. "In Washington, you have to demand a lot from Congress if you want to get the money approved for your most important priorities after all the usual compromises," he said. Kristensen sees the budget proposal from the Energy Department as an opening shot for the next round of the battle for money. He said it would be highly interesting to see, "whether the modernization of the B-61 bombs will be approved in the end. ... It's controversial. Last year Congress already noted that the plan could also 'keep open the door to new nuclear weapons.'" http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,683682,00.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Washington Post 16 March 2010 Reports Shine Light On Nuclear Weapons Vigilance By WALTER PINCUS

Page - A17 While public attention is focused on a new arms-control treaty between Russia and the United States, the slow, dull work of keeping nuclear warheads and weapons-grade uranium and plutonium protected from terrorists goes on almost unnoticed. But two new reports have shed light on the subject. A fascinating study on China's system of securing its nuclear weapons was published last week. Two days earlier, an update on the multiyear U.S. effort to secure Russian nuclear sites, and those of other countries, was presented to the House Appropriations subcommittee on energy and water, which has jurisdiction over funding for the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Mark A. Stokes's study of Beijing's nuclear weapons for the Project 2049 Institute, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization focused on Asia, describes where the Chinese are storing their warheads and how they are protecting them. Stokes, who served 20 years in the Air Force, also worked in the Defense Department's office of international security affairs, where he handled China, Taiwan and Mongolia. Stokes writes that "under its declaratory no-first-use policy, the PRC's [People's Republic of China's] nuclear deterrent has relied upon quantitative and geographic ambiguity," while the Chinese Communist Party's Central Military Commission "maintains strict control over China's operational nuclear warheads." In peacetime its warheads stock is managed "through a system that is separate and distinct" from the People's Liberation Army's Second Artillery missile bases. This includes warheads for use by the air force and the navy but separate from China's civilian-controlled fissile materials. Stokes identifies an independent organization called 22 Base as the prime group "responsible for storing and managing most of the Second Artillery's warhead stockpile." The storage complex is in central China near Taibai Mountain, one of the highest peaks in the country. Tunnels have been dug deep into the mountain, and rail lines enable constant movement of nuclear weapons in and out of the 22 Base complex. "China's warhead and handling system is designed to survive a first strike and retain sufficient operational capability for retaliation," Stokes writes. Stokes concludes that "22 Base's physical protection system appears to be founded upon more than 'guns, gates, and guards,' " which often mark the U.S. system. While a dedicated security battalion and a cavalry company patrol the 400-square-kilometer security zone, a technical support battalion works on safekeeping warhead components. The report points out, however, that China's warheads are "most vulnerable" during their constant transport between storage and launch sites -- the movement that Beijing counts on to make itself less vulnerable to a first strike. Securing other countries' nuclear warheads and materials is a focus of President Obama's fiscal 2011 budget, with a $2.7 billion request for nuclear nonproliferation efforts, up 26 percent from the current year's spending. Steven Black, who runs those programs for the National Nuclear Security Administration, defended the increase before the House committee last week as he laid out the variety of efforts to secure nuclear warheads and vulnerable fissile material. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative program, Black told lawmakers, is working to remove 530 kilograms of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium from countries such as South Africa, Mexico, Serbia, Ukraine and Belarus. (It takes about 20 kilograms of HEU to make a bomb.) "We cannot parachute into a country in the middle of the night and send special ops teams to secure this material. It is all cooperative work," he said. In addition, Black is working to convert 10 research reactors in foreign countries from using HEU to using low- enriched uranium, which cannot be used for weapons. Seven countries have signed cooperative agreements for the switchover, but South Africa and the Ukraine are two of the holdouts. "We're fairly confident the new president of Ukraine will be receptive to the work," Black said. Another task carried out in Russia has been upgrading security at 210 of 229 facilities that contain nuclear materials. Upgrades also have been done at 73 warhead sites. Nineteen other buildings are being worked on, but, Black said, it is difficult to open discussions with the Russians about their deficiencies in facing the newer "insider threat," a subject he deferred to a closed congressional setting. Black said the largest part of his budget, about $1 billion, is being spent on programs to dispose of surplus plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Beyond that, he said, "our priority is to create multiple layers of defense, such as deploying radiation-detection monitors at critical transit points so we can intercept this dangerous material as far from our shores as possible." He said Russia's Federal Customs Service has agreed to equip all of the country's approximately 350 border crossings by 2011 with radiation-detection devices and to split the cost with the United States. The United States will pay for 55 similar devices in 19 other countries and four foreign seaports. One Russian agency that has been less cooperative, Black said, is the State Atomic Energy Corporation, called Rosatom. The civilian side is somewhat less open than the military side, he said, adding, "We will probably never get access to the most secret sites, the warhead production facilities." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/15/AR2010031502996.html (Return to Articles and Documents List) RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency 15 March 2010 Russia To Float Out New Nuclear Sub On May 7 A new Russian nuclear-powered multipurpose attack submarine will be floated out on May 7, a shipyard spokesman said on Monday. Construction of the Severodvinsk, a Project 885 Yasen (Graney) class submarine, began in 1993 at the Sevmash shipyard in the northern Russian city of Severodvinsk but has since been dogged by financial setbacks. "A floating out ceremony for Russia's new Severodvinsk nuclear submarine at the Sevmash shipyard has been scheduled for May 7," the official said. Graney-class nuclear submarines combine the ability to launch a variety of long-range cruise missiles (up to 3,100 miles or 5,000 km) with nuclear warheads, and effectively engage submarines, surface warships and land-based targets. The submarine's armament includes 24 cruise missiles, including the 3M51 Alfa SLCM, the SS-NX-26 Oniks SLCM or the SS-N-21 Granat/Sampson SLCM. It will also have eight torpedo launchers, as well as mines and anti- ship missiles such as SS-N-16 Stallion. Severodvisk is expected to enter service with the Russian Navy by late 2010. Last year, work started on the second sub in the series, the Kazan, which will feature more advanced equipment and weaponry. Russia's Navy commander, Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky, has said that the construction of new-generation nuclear- powered ballistic missile and attack submarines was a top priority for the Russian Navy. MOSCOW, March 15 (RIA Novosti) http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100315/158201700.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Irrawaddy News Magazine – Thailand 13 March 2010 Burmese Reactors Close To Completion: Military Sources By MIN LWIN Burma's ruling junta has finished construction work on three nuclear reactors in the country's north and will soon be ready to put them into operation, according to military sources at the elite Defense Services Academy (DSA) in Maymyo, Mandalay Division. The nuclear reactors, which the regime claims are for research purposes, are located at Kyauk Pa Htoe, a village in Thabeikkyin Township, northern Mandalay Division; Maymyo Fifty Miles, an area some 80 km from the setting of the DSA; and Pon Taung Pon Nya, a mountainous area on the border between Magwe and Sagaing divisions. ―They [military leaders] chose Pon Taung Pon Nya because it is a safe distance from highly populated cities,‖ said a military official in Maymyo, also known as Pyin Oo Lwin. According to local residents, the site is about 30 km from the village of Kyaw in Gantgaw Township, situated on the Pakokkuu-Kalay railway line in Magwe Division. ―Since the project started in 2007, there have been many foreigners who look like they might be Chinese coming and going,‖ said a local source living in Kyaw. ―We are not allowed to go anywhere near this area built for military use,‖ the source added. Although there has been confirmation that construction work on the projects has been completed, it remains unclear how soon the reactors will be ready to go online. However, a recent flurry of activity, including high-level visits by senior members of the ruling regime, suggests that the reactors will soon be ready for use, according to military sources. The sources say that Vice Sen-Gen Maung Aye, the junta's No. 2, has made frequent trips to the DSA in Maymyo in recent months to meet with Maj-Gen Sein Win, the head of the Directorate of Defense Services Science and Technology Research, which is responsible for Burma‘s nuclear program. According to Ye Htet, a former lieutenant who defected from the Burmese military while studying for a graduate degree at the DSA, the regime has invested heavily in the project with an eye to early completion. He said the junta has sent around 6,000 military officials to Russia to study nuclear technology. ―The project is at least half finished,‖ said Ye Htet, who fled to Mae Sot, on the Thai-Burmese border, earlier this year. The technology for Burma‘s nuclear research project was provided by Russia‘s Federal Atomic Energy Agency (RFAEA), which agreed in May 2007 to help design and build a 10-megawatt light-water reactor using 20 percent enriched uranium-235 fuel. However, the Russian agency has since distanced itself from the Burmese nuclear program. This has led to fears that the regime has turned to North Korea for assistance in achieving its nuclear ambitions. http://www.irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=18036 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Washington Post 14 March 2010 Pakistani Scientist Khan Describes Iranian Efforts To Buy Nuclear Bombs By R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

Page - A14 The father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program has written an official account that details an Iranian attempt to buy atomic bombs from Pakistan at the end of the 1980s. Bombmaker Abdul Qadeer Khan states in documents obtained by The Washington Post that in lieu of weapons, Pakistan gave Iran bomb-related drawings, parts for centrifuges to purify uranium and a secret worldwide list of suppliers. Iran's centrifuges, which are viewed as building blocks for a nuclear arsenal, are largely based on models and designs obtained from Pakistan. Khan's narrative calls into question Iran's long-standing stance that it has not sought nuclear arms. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said last month that "we won't do that because we don't believe in having them." The account also conflicts with the Pakistani government's assertion that Khan proliferated nuclear know-how without government approval. Pakistan has never disclosed Khan's written account. A summary of interrogations of Khan and four others in 2004, conducted by Pakistan's intelligence service and later provided to U.S. and allied intelligence officials, omitted mention of the attempt to buy a nuclear bomb. But Pakistan's former top military official in 2006 publicly hinted at it. In interviews, two military officers whom Khan links to the bargaining with Iran denied that finished nuclear weapons were ever on the table. Spokesmen for Iran's mission to the United Nations and the Pakistani Embassy in Washington did not respond to requests to comment. However, a top Pakistani government official at the time said Ali Shamkhani, the senior Iranian military officer named by Khan, came to Islamabad, Pakistan, seeking help on nuclear weapons. The former official also said Khan, acting with the knowledge of other top officials, then accelerated a secret stream of aid. The U.S. ambassador to Pakistan at the time, Robert Oakley, separately said in an interview that he thinks Pakistan's top military officer urged and approved Khan's bomb-related assistance to Iran. Who directed the deal? Khan is a controversial figure, and he has complained bitterly about long-standing restrictions on his movements by Pakistan's government, which says it seeks to ensure he does not restart his nuclear dealings. Several U.S. experts have noted that as a result, Khan is eager to depict others as more culpable than he was in those dealings. Most observers now think Khan's work for Iran was directed by "senior elements of Pakistan's military, if not by its political leaders," said Leonard S. Spector, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "Khan is clearly out to vindicate his reputation, but the issues remain murky enough that you can't be certain when he is telling the truth and when he is embellishing." Khan's 11-page narrative, prepared in 2004 during his initial house arrest, states that "at no time did I seriously believe that they [Iranians] were capable of mastering the technology." But Western intelligence officials say his assistance was meaningful and trace its roots to a deal reached in 1987. Pakistan has said little about that deal. Iran later told international inspectors that a Pakistani "network" in 1987 offered a host of centrifuge-related specifications and equipment, and turned over a document detailing how to shape enriched uranium for use in a bomb. Pakistan's intelligence service sought to explain the cooperation partly by noting that "due to religious and ideological affinity, Pakistanis had great affection for Iran." But Khan also cited Iran's promise of financial aid, as well as the government's ambition of forever thwarting Western pressure on both countries. "It was a deal worth almost $10 billion that had been offered by Iran," Khan wrote. Khan's account and related documents were shared with The Post by former British journalist Simon Henderson, now a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The Post had no direct contact with Khan, but it independently verified that he wrote the documents. The intelligence service's summary said Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, a former army chief of staff who was arguably Pakistan's most influential figure, was "in favour of very close cooperation [with Iran] in the nuclear field in lieu of financial assistance promised to him toward Pakistan's defense budget." Khan's written statement to Henderson states that after Shamkhani's arrival in Islamabad on a government plane, he told the chairman of Pakistan's Joint Chiefs of Staff committee that "he had come . . . to collect the promised nuclear bombs." When the chairman, Adm. Iftikhar Ahmed Sirohey, proposed to discuss other matters first and then "see how Pakistan could assist the Iranians in their nuclear program," Shamkhani reportedly became irate, Khan wrote. He reminded Sirohey that "first Gen. Zia [ul Haq, the Pakistani president until 1988] and then Gen. Beg had promised assistance and nuclear weapons and he had specifically come to collect the same." Such a transfer was theoretically feasible. Although Pakistan exploded no nuclear bombs until 1998, the U.S. intelligence community concluded it had the capability to make weapons by 1986. Shamkhani, a founding leader of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, was long active in the country's nuclear program, according to U.S. officials. A longtime defense minister and presidential candidate in 2001, he now runs a Tehran think tank. The Iranian mission in New York did not respond to questions about him. Khan said that after hearing Shamkhani's demand for three finished weapons, Sirohey demurred and that other ministers backed him up. But Beg pressed then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her top military aide "to honour [Beg's] . . . commitment," Khan wrote. Under pressure, the aide asked Khan to "get components of two old (P-1) discarded machines and pack them into boxes with 2 sets of drawings," which were passed to Iran through an intermediary, he said. P-1 is the designation for the centrifuge model used in Pakistan. Asked to comment, Sirohey said he did not recall the meeting "or ever hearing about a deal to sell nuclear weapons to Iran." In an interview, Beg denied bartering nuclear weapons for cash. He said that when an Iranian delegation "asked me about nuclear technology" in 1988, he advised discussing it with Bhutto. A 2006 Associated Press article reported Beg's recollection of a 1990 visit by an Iranian delegation: "They asked, 'Can we have a bomb?' My answer was: By all means you can have it but you must make it yourself." But on a Pakistani television program in June, Beg said he has "always" urged the transfer of nuclear arms to Iran. The former Pakistani official said, "Shamkhani thought he had a deal when he came to Pakistan." Various top officials, the former official said, were aware that Beg told the Iranians, "You have the money, we have the technology. Beg saw this as a win-win . . . a way to take care of the Army's endless budget problems." 'The supply network' U.S. intelligence officials say Khan's initial exports of disassembled P-1 centrifuges disappointed his Iranian counterparts; the International Atomic Energy Agency states that Iran reported a 2003 offer of new parts by "the supply network." In his narrative, Khan states that his next direct contact with Iranian officials was at a meeting in 1994 or 1995, when some Iranian scientists complained about their lack of progress. Khan said in a note to Henderson that he subsequently agreed to send centrifuge parts to Iran. The IAEA says Iran admitted that Khan's network in 1996 also turned over the design for a more advanced centrifuge that Pakistan had constructed, known as P-2. Malaysian police reported in 2004 -- based on interrogations of a Khan associate -- that the parts were shipped aboard an Iranian-owned ship after first passing through Dubai. In return, the associates were paid $3 million. The Pakistani intelligence service report differs slightly: It said Iran paid $5 million for drawings of equipment used in enriching uranium. Some funds were deposited in a Dubai bank account controlled by Khan and two associates under the name "Haider Zaman," the report said. Khan used that name in a government-issued passport to conceal some foreign travel. Khan has told Henderson that the funds went to associates and that he never retained any, which some U.S. officials consider implausible. Khan also said in a separate note that he supplied "the names and addresses of suppliers" to the Iranians. Western officials say that act could have given Tehran access to companies that possessed drawings of Pakistani bomb parts and to components of the more advanced P-2 centrifuges used by Pakistan. Iran last month promised to install such advanced centrifuges, which it calls IR-2s, at two sites this year. Warrick reported from Islamabad. Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/13/AR2010031302258.html (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Xinhua News – China 15 March 2010 Pakistan Rejects U.S. Daily Report On Iran Nuclear ISLAMABAD, March 15 (Xinhua) -- Pakistan on Monday rejected a report in a U.S. newspaper about the renowned Pakistani nuclear scientist and Iran nuclear development. The Washington Post claimed that Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan states, in the documents obtained by the daily, that Pakistan gave Iran bomb-related drawings, parts for centrifuges to purify uranium and a secret worldwide list of suppliers, in lieu of weapons. "It is yet another repackaging of fiction, which surface occasionally for purposes that are self-evident," said Abdul Basit, Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman. A.Q Khan is a closed chapter, the spokesman said, adding that Pakistan's non-proliferation credentials are second to none and its export controls are foolproof. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-03/15/c_13211711.htm (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Jakarta Post - Indonesia Global Security Newswire 15 March 2010 India Continues Work On WMD Defense, Missile Systems India's Defense Research Development Organization is continuing development of WMD defense technology and the nation's newest long-range missile, the Express News Service reported Friday (see GSN, Feb. 12). W. Selvamurthy, a scientist and chief controller at the organization, reaffirmed the government's intention to test the Agni 5 missile by early next year. The three-stage missile would have a flight range of about 3,000 miles and could carry a conventional or nuclear payload weighing 1.5 metric tons, he said. The extended range of the weapon makes it essentially an ICBM, according to Selvamurthy. The Indian army's planned deployment of the Agni 3 missile is still pending, the scientist said. That missile is designed to fly nearly 2,200 miles and could carry nuclear payloads. Selvamurthy commented on India's possible induction of antisatellite technology. "DRDO has not taken up an antisatellite space program. But if required, it is well prepared to develop and design such a mechanism," he said. Meanwhile, the science organization has also made significant moves to protect Indian military personnel from biological, chemical or nuclear agents, Selvamurthy said. ―The DRDO has invented a ‗portable gas chromatograph‘ which can detect chemical warfare agents. This has been converted into a three chemical paper which will be placed on the uniform and any change in color will enable the soldiers to detect chemical contamination,‖ he said. The organization has also developed a system for diagnosing diseases such as anthrax, plague and H1N1 influenza, along with remotely operated vehicles that could be used to identify chemical and radiation contamination, Selvamurthy said (Express News Service, March 12). http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100312_9401.php (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Indian Express – India 16 March 2010 China Provided Nuke Weapon Blueprint To Pakistan Washington: It is China which provided Pakistan with the blueprint to build a nuclear weapon, in early 1980s, a small, reliable armament that could be delivered on India by attack aircraft or missile, according to a new book. The blueprint was delivered as the desperate Pakistani nuclear scientists led by A Q Khan were unable to build the weapon they wanted, said the book by David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector. "The best it (Pakistan) could hope for was a bomb weighing a few thousand pounds, akin to what the United States detonated over Japan. Once again, Pakistan would rely on the technological advances of another country for help, but this time it would use diplomacy instead if espionage," says the book. The book "Peddling Peril: The Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies" that hit the stands today gives an in- depth account of how the maligned A Q Khan network through espionage and stealing build the nuclear plant and finally weapon for Pakistan, the secret technology of which was later passed to several rogue States. Albright, founder and president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, in his book offers an uneven expose on the "illicit trade in nuclear technology" and the threats it poses to American security. According to the documents assessed by Albright and referred in the book, the United States came to know about the secret China-Pak ties on the nuclear technology; but the then Carter Administration opted to ignore it as it apparently did not wanted this to affect its ties with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This despite the fact that there were mounting stack of circumstantial evidence of their collusion. "For Pakistan and A Q Khan, cooperating with China quickly provided to be a boon. The Chinese provided Pakistan with blue prints for building a nuclear weapon, most likely the Chic-4, first tested as a missile warhead in 1966 and detonated above ground, with an explosive force of twelve kilotons, equivalent to 12,000 tons of TNT. "They also provided 50 kilogrammes of weapon-grade uranium," Albright writes in his book. "Pakistan now had the blueprint of a proven weapon. In 1981, A Q Khan sent his procurement agents detailed drawings of weapons component with orders to buy them from European companies," the book says. Noting that China's deal with Pakistan was dramatic there was little consensus among US government officials over what ultimate agenda it served, the book says China provided Pakistan with nuclear assistance to bolster its security. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china-provided-nuke-weapon-blueprint-to-pakistan/591559/0 (Return to Articles and Documents List)

U.K. Express – U.K. 14 March 2010 Anthrax Threat To British Troops By Marco Giannangeli BRITISH troops in Afghanistan may be facing a new threat after claims by Taliban commanders that home-made bombs are being loaded with anthrax. So far there is no evidence of biological weapons being used by insurgents. But one of Britain‘s leading terrorism experts warned last night that Taliban extremists linked with Al Qaeda would have the technology to produce the deadly disease. An ITV camera crew filmed a bomb-making factory last week in caves at Tora Bora on the Afghan-Pakistan border. One bomb maker, identified as regional commander Mullah Doud, said: ―We use anthrax so when a bomb explodes it produces a toxic cloud.‖ A drug user in Blackpool last week became the 10th person in Britain to die of anthrax-tainted heroin, thought to have been produced in Afghanistan. Professor Paul Wilkinson, of the Centre for Terrorism Studies at St Andrews University, said: ―Anthrax is an effective weapon and producing it needs only basic levels of biology and chemistry. ―There are certainly extreme elements within the Taliban, those loyal to Al Qaeda, who would not think twice about this method. However, there is a wide chasm between producing anthrax and using it effectively in home-made bombs. ―Japanese terrorists had intended to use anthrax on the Tokyo metro in 1995. They experimented with it extensively but in the end opted for the nerve agent sarin. This shows that it is not an easy substance to control.‖ Professor Wilkinson said the only safeguard against anthrax was anti-nuclear, biological and chemical warfare equipment. Unlike in Iraq, where coalition soldiers regularly donned the suits, troops in Afghanistan do not wear them, though they are believed to have access to them if necessary. Colonel Richard Kemp, former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, said: ―It would not be unusual for extremist forces to use dirty bombs. In Iraq chlorine was the flavour of choice. ―However, most Taliban sympathisers, the farmers and villagers, use materials they can get their hands on, like fertiliser and car parts, and would not risk experimenting with substances like anthrax.‖ http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/162872/Anthrax-threat-to-British-troops (Return to Articles and Documents List)

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Public Affairs News Release 11 March 2010 CBP Deploys Radiation Detection Portals At Port Hueneme High-Tech Devices Detect Radiological and Nuclear Emissions

Port Hueneme, Calif. — U.S. Customs and Border Protection announced today the deployment of Radiation Portal Monitors at Port Hueneme to prevent terrorists from attempting to smuggle radiological materials used in nuclear and radiological dispersal devices. ―This advanced technology enhances our capabilities in keeping the flow of legitimate trade critical to the U.S. economy, while protecting our country from terrorists and their weapons of mass destruction,‖ said Todd Hoffman CBP port director of Los Angeles/Long Beach seaport complex who oversees Port Hueneme. RPMs are detection devices that provide CBP officers with a passive, non-intrusive means to screen containers, vessels and vehicles for the presence of nuclear and radiological materials. The deployment of portal monitors is an important component of CBP's multi-layered strategy. These systems do not emit radiation but are capable of detecting various types of radiation emanating from nuclear devices, dirty bombs, special nuclear materials, natural sources and isotopes commonly used in medicine and industry. They are completely safe for anyone passing by them, including children and pregnant women. Last year Port Hueneme processed more than 200 vessels discharging more than 80,000 new cars as well as more than 3.5 million cases of produce. During fiscal year 2009, CBP deployed 179 new radiation portal monitors throughout the nation‘s ports of entry, bringing the number of RPMs to 1,354 at the nation‘s land and sea ports of entry. U.S. Customs and Border Protection is the unified border agency within the Department of Homeland Security charged with the management, control and protection of our nation's borders at and between the official ports of entry. CBP is charged with keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the country while enforcing hundreds of U.S. laws. http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/local/03112010_6.xml (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Khaleej Times – U.A.E OPINION 14 March 2010 The NPT: Still ‘Knotty’ At Forty By Michael Krepon

As the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty approaches middle age, treaty supporters confront two paradoxes: while the utility of nuclear weapons for major powers is declining, it is growing for outlier states. Likewise, while the contributions to the treaty by four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have never been greater, the weaknesses of the NPT appear to be growing. These paradoxes must be addressed if the NPT is to age gracefully. Over the past two decades, the most impressive treaty gains have been made by the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and France. These gains can be measured by six key indicators of declining nuclear weapons‘ utility: actual battlefield use, threats of battlefield use, overall stockpile size, warheads deployed, nuclear-weapon tests, and fissile material production for weapons. Based on these six indicators, Washington, Moscow, London and Paris have greatly diminished the value they place on nuclear weapons since the Cold War ended. Despite their improved compliance with the NPT‘s core obligations, the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference is in doubt, as is, more importantly, the health and wellbeing of the NPT regime. Threats to the well-being of the NPT regime now lie increasingly in the actions of outlier states, the politicisation of deliberations by the IAEA board of governors, and the reluctance of key non-nuclear-weapon states to step up to their obligations as guardians of the treaty. The most important indicator of the declining utility of nuclear weapons for major powers is the absence of battlefield use. A weapon not used on battlefields loses its military utility. Every year that passes without the use of nuclear weapons in crisis or warfare makes it harder for a political leader to authorise subsequent use, while making the user more of an international pariah. Nuclear weapons also have less political, as well as military, utility for major powers, which now lose standing by brandishing nuclear weapons against each other or against non-nuclear-weapon states. Rare, public threats by British and U.S. leaders in recent decades have been directed only at countries that are not in good standing with the IAEA and are presumed to have weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. A third measure of declining utility of nuclear weapons for the P-5 is stockpile size. Moscow and Washington have reduced their stockpiles by approximately 50,000 warheads below their Cold War peaks. The stockpiles of France and the United Kingdom have been in decline since 1981 and 1992, respectively. Of the P- 5 nuclear arsenals, only China‘s is believed to be growing, albeit modestly, and only Beijing is increasing the number of warheads it deploys. Every test of a nuclear weapon is a declaration of utility. Since 1996, the P-5 have not conducted a single declaration of utility in the form of a nuclear weapon test. And as for fissile material production for weapons, four of the P-5- again, with the exception of China-have officially declared a moratorium on fissile material production. In stark contrast, outliers to the NPT are relying more heavily on nuclear weapons. Three of the four NPT outliers- India, North Korea, and Pakistan-are the only states to have tested nuclear devices since 1996 and are enlarging their fissile material and weapon stockpiles. The record during the last twenty years is clear: states that seek political utility from nuclear weapons during periods of heightened tension now reside primarily outside the NPT. There are many reasons for the NPT regime‘s weaknesses besides the actions of outlier states. Moscow and Beijing have not stepped up to their responsibilities as treaty guardians and as veto-wielding members of the Security Council. Russian and U.S. nuclear stockpiles remain extremely large. The Bush administration did serious harm to NPT norms by championing a civil nuclear deal with India without compensatory steps to shore up the treaty. Meanwhile, Beijing still acts as a free-rider to the NPT regime, rather than taking on responsibilities commensurate with its growing power. Beijing, like Washington, has still not ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon states are also growing contributors to the NPT‘s woes. The IAEA‘s board of governors has not acted consistently and coherently to uphold treaty obligations. Many states resist ―second-generation‖ norms of responsible nuclear stewardship, particularly those associated with strengthened safeguards, materials protection, and accountancy. Israel has not done nearly enough to reinforce the NPT with parallel steps. And, above all, the nuclear program of Iran casts a long shadow over the NPT regime. Even with this litany of woes, the NPT has been a remarkable success. Despite the power and influence nuclear weapons are presumed to possess, the NPT has established nonproliferation as a global norm. States pursuing nuclear weapon programmes after the NPT entered into force have been cast as outliers. The treaty has near- universal membership and compliance. There is a consensus among experts about corrective measures to deal with the NPT‘s weaknesses. Many of these steps will once again be highlighted at the 2010 Review Conference. The treaty will not continue to serve its intended purposes without heavy lifting from many quarters. Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Stimson Center and author of Better Safe than Sorry, The Ironies of Living with the Bomb http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2010/March/opinion_March83.xml§ion=o pinion&col= (Return to Articles and Documents List)

Boston Globe OPINION 15 March 2010 The Deadly Current Toward Nuclear Arms By James Carroll THINK OF Niagara Falls. Think of the onrushing current as the river pours itself toward the massive cascade. Imagine a lone swimmer a hundred yards or so upstream, desperately stroking against the current to keep from being swept over the precipice. That swimmer is President Obama, the river is the world, and the falls is the threat of unchecked nuclear weapons. Henry James used the image of Niagara to describe the rush into World War I: ―. . .the tide that bore us along.‘‘ Hannah Arendt defined the wars of the 20th century as events ―cascading like a Niagara Falls of history.‘‘ Jonathan Schell used Niagara as an organizing metaphor for his indispensable critique of war, ―The Unconquerable World.‘‘ But now the image has entered the lexicon of strategic experts who warn of a coming ―cascade of proliferation,‘‘ one nation following another into the deadly chasm of nuclear weapons unless present nuclear powers find a way to reverse the current. The main burden is on Russia and the United States, which together possess the vast majority of the world‘s nuclear weapons, but President Obama deliberately made himself central to the challenge when he said in Prague, ―I state clearly and with conviction America‘s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.‘‘ Now the Niagara current is taking him the other way. Here are the landmarks that define the swimmer‘s momentum. ■The US-Russia Treaty. Negotiators in Geneva are late in reaching agreement on a nuclear arms treaty to replace START, which expired last December. Obama is threading a needle, having to meet Russian requirements (for example, on missile defense) while anticipating Republican objections in the US Senate (for example, on missile defense). Warning: Bill Clinton was humiliated when the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999. Republicans‘ recalcitrance on health care is peanuts compared to the damage their rejection of a new START treaty would do. ■The Nuclear Posture Review, the Congress-mandated report on how the administration defines nuclear needs today. This, too, is overdue, probably because the White House has been pushing back against the Pentagon on numerous issues. Are nukes for deterrence only? Will the United States renounce first use? Having stopped the Bush-era program to build a new nuclear weapon, will Obama allow further research and development? What nations will be named as potential nuclear threats? Warning: The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review was Clinton‘s Pentagon Waterloo. It affirmed the Cold War status quo, killing serious arms reduction until now. ■Although usually considered apart, the broader US defense posture has turned into a key motivator for other nations to go nuclear. The current Pentagon budget ($5 trillion for 2010-2017) is so far beyond any other country, and the conventional military capacity it buys is so dominant, as to reinforce the nuclear option abroad as the sole protection against potential US attack. This is new. ■In April, a world leaders nuclear summit will be held in Washington, but both nuclear haves and have-nots will be taking positions based on the US-Russia Treaty (and its prospects for ratification) and the Nuclear Posture Review. Warning: if China sees US missile defense as potentially aimed its way, a new nuclear arms race is on. ■In May, the signatories to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty will hold their eighth regular review session in New York. Since the nations that agreed to forego nuclear weapons did so on the condition that the nuclear nations work steadily toward abolition, the key question will be whether Obama has in fact begun to deliver on his declared intention. If not, get ready for the cascade. In truth, the current rushing toward Niagara cannot be resisted. Not seven nuclear nations, therefore, but 17, or, ultimately, 70. But beware an analysis like this. The falls are an analogy, not a fact. Obama warned of such fatalism, calling it in Prague, ―a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.‘‘ Therefore, reject the analogy. Obama is not a lone swimmer, but a voice of all humanity. The nuclear future is not pre-determined. Human choices are being made right now to define it anew. James Carroll is a frequent contributor to the Globe. http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2010/03/15/the_deadly_current_toward_nuclear _arms/ (Return to Articles and Documents List)