The role of the cooperation in From an inspiring testing ground to a tool for executing integration?

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van

Author: R.J.H. Flipse Student number: 10340335

Main supervisor: Dr. R.J. de Bruin Second supervisor: Dr. S. Rajagopalan

December 2017 Table of contents Introduction ...... 3 1. Theoretical framework ...... 6 The Benelux as sub-regional cooperation ...... 6 The Benelux compared to the Visegrad Group ...... 8 The debate on the Benelux and its relevance ...... 12 2. The historical Benelux ...... 16 The start of cooperation ...... 16 Working towards the customs union ...... 18 The pre-union agreement as the next step ...... 20 The genuine start of interaction with the European project ...... 22 The Benelux solution to Europe in crisis ...... 26 The creation of the Benelux Economic Union ...... 29 The Benelux in the 1960s – A less effective pioneer? ...... 33 The ...... 34 Conclusion ...... 36 3. The contemporary Benelux ...... 38 The new Benelux Treaty ...... 38 The 2013-2016 work programme...... 40 2013: the annual plan ...... 42 2013: the annual report ...... 44 2016: the annual plan ...... 46 2016: the annual report ...... 51 Future prospects and conclusion ...... 54 4. Conclusion ...... 57 Discussion ...... 58 Limitations and suggestions for further research ...... 60 Bibliography ...... 61

2

Introduction

Belgium, The and have a long history of cooperation. During the early 20th century several attempts were made to bring these countries closer together, which at first resulted in an economic union between and Luxembourg. During World War II the three countries agreed to start cooperating with each other more closely by a customs agreement. After the war this cooperation continued and expanded as the Benelux, and developed over the following decade into a real community. In 1958 the Benelux Treaty was signed. This created the Benelux Economic Union, and a leap forward was made in economic integration. Since the Benelux was ahead of other methods of integration it was seen as a pioneer. During this decade, and with great support for the aims of integration, the European project also began. The 1957 created the European Economic Community, and the idea of working towards an integrated union of European countries was also envisaged. The pioneering Benelux Treaty could be seen as a testing ground for European integration as well as a source of inspiration for it.

However, although the economic integration of the Benelux continued over the following decades, along with the development of Benelux institutions, there was no high level of political integration. The Benelux remained an inter-governmental union that focused on connecting the economies of the Benelux countries. The European project, however, continued with the establishment of the common market, the and the monetary union. Because of this deep economic integration at the European level, much of the function of the Benelux seemed to be replaced by it. As its formerly pioneering and inspiring role was called into question, a debate emerged centred on the relevance of the Benelux. In 2008 a new Benelux Treaty was signed, in which its competences were expanded to areas such as sustainability and legal affairs.1 As this would take the Benelux cooperation project beyond any solely economic union, the name was changed to the Benelux Union. Nevertheless this change did not result in an end to the debate, as the relevance of the Benelux remained an unresolved issue. A motion was even presented to abolish the Benelux Union. Although this did not result in any real abolition, it serves to symbolize how the Benelux struggles with its role and how its relevance is being questioned.

1 Benelux, ‘Nieuw Benelux-Verdrag’ http://www.benelux.int/nl/benelux-unie/nieuw-benelux-verdrag, accessed November 16, 2017. 3

From this debate on the relevance of the Benelux Union, it would be interesting to discover whether the role has indeed changed over the years. Originally the Benelux was seen as a way of inspiring European integration through pioneering and by being ahead of the European project in integration. However, currently many of the Benelux policies, for instance those on economic topics, seem to be based on, or heavily influenced by, European policy. This could therefore indicate that the Benelux now has a role in actually executing European integration rather than inspiring it.

In this study the role of the Benelux will be further examined by looking at it both historically and through the present perspective. To do so historical and contemporary documents will be used to analyse its functioning and to gain insight into the interaction between both the Benelux and the European projects during the past and the present. When these roles become evident a comparison will be made in order to see whether a change in functioning has occurred and how this can be explained. The insights that follow from this can be useful for several reasons. First, a valuable contribution to the debate on the relevance of the Benelux will have been made. To this day little research has been done on the Benelux within such a timeframe, and the research that does exist focuses more on its history, or examines specific contemporary issues. Therefore the multidisciplinary approach of this thesis that connects political theory, history and policy analysis could shed new light on the Benelux cooperation and give greater insight into its role in its interaction with the EU.

Furthermore, this thesis could help in the debate on the future of both the Benelux and the EU. As the EU engages in an ongoing discussion on the future of the European Union, the Benelux becomes more topical. A Europe integrating at different speeds, or a Europe of regions, means that the Benelux, as an integrated bloc, could attract more interest. This study on the role and functioning of the Benelux could help us gain greater understanding of how the Benelux currently acts and how it ended up with such a role. Furthermore, it can also help us to gain insights into what can be expected from the relationship between the Benelux and the EU, and to discover whether more ambitious goals can be justified.

The thesis is structured as follows. First, a theoretical framework for the research will be given. For this the Benelux will be explored as an example of sub-regional cooperation. This phenomenon will be examined by looking at the various methods of such cooperation and the functions that it can have. This can help to understand the meaning of the Benelux role

4 and why it is important for its relevance. Next, the debate on the Benelux will be further explored to show more of the research and the scientific basis that the thesis is built on. Together this forms a good framework for the central part of the study.

In the second chapter the historical Benelux will be examined by considering its major historical cruxes. For this, World War II will be taken as a starting point. Thereafter the development of the Benelux will be explored until the establishment of the Benelux Economic Union in the early 1960s. During this period the role of the Benelux will be examined by focusing on the 1944 customs agreement and the 1955 Benelux memorandum, two major pioneering, and inspiring, events. These have been also been referred to by the economist Max Weisglas. Third, the Schengen Agreement, a significant event during the 1980s, often mentioned by the Benelux itself, will also be examined. These three points will create a good overview of the functioning of the Benelux and will give an insight into its historical role, thus providing the first part of the comparison.

The third chapter will focus on the contemporary Benelux after the new Benelux Treaty entered into force in 2012. This Treaty brought a new structure to the Benelux with annual plans and reports. By analysing these documents over recent years the Benelux strategies will become visible, thus leading to insight into its contemporary role. When this role has become clear a comparison can be made with its historical role from the previous chapter. This will then lead to the conclusion that the mixed Benelux may have lost its dominant pioneering role, but still has potential, especially when this loss of role becomes fully accepted.

5

1. Theoretical framework

In order to explore the role of the Benelux in its interaction with European integration and to discover whether this role has changed, it is necessary to build a research framework. This will not only provide a good starting point, but also an overview of research so far undertaken in this area. A good approach for this is to start with a broad focus on what the Benelux is: a form of sub-regional cooperation in Europe. By exploring examples of sub- regional cooperation and their functioning in general, some idea of the value of such cooperation can be gained. The model can then be applied to the Benelux in order to see how it works within this wider context. The contemporary debate on the relevance of the Benelux, which will be discussed later, suggests that either its original purpose or meaning is no longer fully sufficient, or that its function could and perhaps should now change. This brings us to the final part of the theoretical framework and provides the starting-point for the main research of the study.

The Benelux as sub-regional cooperation In contrast to the little research that has been done on the Benelux itself, a range of literature can be found on general sub-regional cooperation in Europe. Neighbouring countries working together is quite a common phenomenon within the EU. According to political scientist Martin Dangerfield, sub-regional cooperation, which is defined as a process of economic and political interaction among a group of neighbouring states, is initiated because of advantages that result from working together. For instance, sub-regional cooperation can stimulate economic development, but can also enhance security or border management. From the various examples of cooperation four categories can be distinguished: pioneer, substitute, complement/pre-accession instrument and involuntary alternative/substitute. Pioneer means a group of countries that are gaining ground on a larger regional cooperation project and can influence the integration of the latter. Substitute, the second category, means that for various reasons cooperation is created as an alternative to other integration projects. The third is complement/pre-accession instrument, in which sub-regional cooperation is founded in order to work together towards the accession of a larger integration project, such as the EU. The last group, involuntary

6 alternative/substitute means a group that has been brought together because the relevant countries are unable, albeit temporarily, to join the larger integration project.2

When these categories described by Dangerfield are applied to the Benelux, it becomes clear that it is part of the pioneer group. As we have seen, this group is characterized by a higher level of integration than larger projects and tends to influence the latter. When looking at the early Benelux it can indeed be seen that it achieved deeper economic integration than the European Community in the 1950s and 1960s, while it was also considered a testing ground. Thus it was intended to inspire European integration. The position of the Benelux in the pioneer group therefore becomes clear not only from its age, but also from its relationship with the wider European project.

When neighbouring countries engage in sub-regional cooperation, various rationales can be considered, mainly those that seem quite obvious. As neighbours, the countries may share a geographical region, culture and history. It would therefore be logical and easy to become partners economically and politically. However, according to economist András Inotai, these incentives do not always result in cooperation or support. In his research he claims that a common geographical region does not necessarily make countries natural economic partners.3 There are several examples in the world in which neighbouring countries do not focus on each other for trade. There are also neighbouring countries that have not cooperated but that have only recently decided to commence cooperation. For Inotai this shows that geographical proximity does not automatically result in a natural partnership.

Furthermore, Inotai agrees that a shared history can support cooperation, but at the same time it may also hamper the process. Such a shared element can make it easier to cooperate, but there may be instead a history of suffering and conflict. In case of the latter it can hinder cooperation instead of stimulating it. Nevertheless, such complex circumstances of history and culture can still result in countries working together. Inotai gives the Benelux as an example. Although it can fairly be claimed that the Benelux has similarities in history and culture, Inotai emphasizes the differences in religion and language. He calls it a “difficult

2 M. Dangerfield, ‘The Viségrad Group in the Expanded European Union: From Preaccession to Postaccession Cooperation’, East European Politics & Societies, no. 3 (2008), pp. 632-634. 3 A. Inotai, ‘Correlations between European Integration and Sub-Regional Cooperation: Theoretical Background, Experience and Policy Impacts’, Russian & East European Finance and Trade, no. 6 (1998), p. 4. 7 heritage”. If the shared history and culture aspect were a major influence, then this could make cooperation complex. Nevertheless there has been Benelux cooperation for a long time.4 This is one of the examples that brings Inotai to his first conclusion on sub-regional cooperation: the true rationale of strengthening and enhancing cooperation can often be found in common economic and political priorities. When neighbouring countries share such priorities for dealing with global or regional challenges, it is likely that they will cooperate in order to achieve better results in this. If the opposite situation occurs, in which countries develop different political strategies, then it can take a long time for cooperation to get started and to succeed, even when those countries have many other things in common.5

The common political and economic priorities can also be found in the rationale of the Benelux countries to engage in sub-regional cooperation, as shown by Inotai. He states that openness and strong economic development were the main factors that stimulated these countries to integrate, long before the European Community was created.6 The creation of several international bodies after World War II stimulated the Benelux to work even closer together by taking a common position in such international organisations. This can even be seen today in the joint memoranda on various international topics that, for instance, are sent to conferences.7 Together, this shows how common interests from similar political and economic strategies brought the countries together to cooperate.

The Benelux compared to the Visegrad Group In order to gain greater insight into sub-regional cooperation in Europe, it can be useful to look at other forms of such cooperation. An interesting one in this regard is the Visegrad Group. As Dangerfield shows, this cooperation initiative between Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia came into existence in the 1990s. The Visegrad Group was created in order to work together to join the European project. Following the fall of communism these countries wished for rapprochement with the European Community, and later the European Union. By cooperation and a synchronisation of politics it became easier to work towards better relationships, and towards membership of the EU and NATO. To do this the countries

4 A. Inotai, ‘Correlations between European Integration and Sub-Regional Cooperation: Theoretical Background, Experience and Policy Impacts’, Russian & East European Finance and Trade, no. 6 (1998), pp. 18-19. 5 Ibidem, pp. 19-20. 6 Ibidem, pp. 20-21. 7 Ibidem, p. 26. 8 followed a path that was the opposite of the pioneering Benelux: they focused on economic, political and security integration within European structures. Until these countries became members of the EU in 2004, the Visegrad Group worked closely together to reach these goals. After the accession the Visegrad Group shifted its focus more towards the Central European region itself. As the goals of NATO and the EU were achieved, the countries have since been trying to stimulate intra-Visegrad cooperation.8

When considering the Visegrad Group and comparing it with the Benelux several differences can be seen. A major difference is found in the institutional structures. Although both the Benelux and Visegrad are examples of intergovernmental sub-regional cooperation in Europe, the Benelux is the only one that has fully institutionalized its cooperation. The Visegrad Group does not have any genuine institutions or institutional framework; the cooperation is solely based on intergovernmental meetings with a rotating presidency. According to Inotai this can be explained by, on the one hand, the fear of creating a framework that would resemble the former communist structure, while on the other hand institutionalisation could delay integration into Western Europe.9 Therefore the functioning methods of the Visegrad Group and the Benelux are entirely different.

In addition, another difference can be found when both groups are placed in the categories proposed by Dangerfield. As previously mentioned, the Benelux belongs to the pioneer category. The Visegrad Group easily slots into the category of complement/pre-accession instrument, as its main goal was to prepare the members of the group for EU membership. However, when examining the goal to stimulate intra-Visegrad cooperation, which had a larger focus after the EU accession goals were achieved, that particular category no longer seems fully adequate. Nevertheless, the other categories can be excluded because their characteristics are not consistent with those of the Visegrad Group. Hence, as outlined by Dangerfield, the Visegrad Group can indeed be placed in the complement/pre-accession

8 M. Dangerfield, ‘The Contribution of the Visegrad Group to the European Union’s ‘Eastern’ Policy: Rhetoric or Reality?’, Europe-Asia Studies, no. 10 (2009), pp. 1737-1738. 9 A. Inotai, ‘Correlations between European Integration and Sub-Regional Cooperation: Theoretical Background, Experience and Policy Impacts’, Russian & East European Finance and Trade, no. 6 (1998), pp. 28-29. 9 group, but with some differences to the regular groups of sub-regional cooperation that also occupy that category.10

It would be easy to say that these differences in character indicate a different rationale for the Benelux and the Visegrad Group engaging in cooperation. While the Benelux began focusing on economic topics, the Visegrad Group aimed at moving towards Western Europe. Yet when Inotai’s conclusion is applied, in which similarities in political and economic priorities are the main reason to cooperate, this can be seen in both groups. The Benelux had both the economic similarities and the wish to work together for gaining economic advantages from integration, while all the Visegrad countries wanted to shed the old Soviet influences and turn their focus towards Western Europe.11 This shows that although the Visegrad and Benelux groups can be placed in different categories of sub-regional cooperation, and seem to differ in their reasons for such cooperation, they are driven by the political will of a joint course of direction.

A similarity between the two can be found in their interaction with the EU. Like the Benelux, the Visegrad Group also had a debate on its relevance. When its original goal, becoming a NATO and EU member, was close to achievement, the question arose of the continuing function of the Visegrad Group. As Dangerfield shows, the real discussion began in 2002, when the accession negotiations were completed. Internal tensions between the Visegrad countries were visible, which made it questionable whether a new form of cooperation would be found. Nevertheless in 2004 a new document on cooperation was presented. The Visegrad Group would henceforward focus on the Central European Region. This meant a strengthening of intra-Visegrad cooperation and a focus on the neighbouring countries to the East within the European Neighbourhood Policy.12

This shift in the aims of the Visegrad Group shows how both its role and cooperation methods changed. Here another similarity with the Benelux can be seen. Both were influenced by the EU, which would eventually ask for a change in their roles and functioning. In the Visegrad Group the influence can be seen in the EU accession. Although this was a

10 M. Dangerfield, ‘The Viségrad Group in the Expanded European Union: From Preaccession to Postaccession Cooperation’, East European Politics & Societies, no. 3 (2008), pp. 634-635. 11 Ibidem, p. 638. 12 M. Dangerfield, ‘The Contribution of the Visegrad Group to the European Union’s ‘Eastern’ Policy: Rhetoric or Reality?’, Europe-Asia Studies, no. 10 (2009), pp. 1737-1738. 10 goal in itself, the accession made Visegrad cooperation in this form rather unnecessary. Therefore, thanks to European integration, its role was completely changed. The Benelux focused initially on economic integration and acted quite successfully in this, as will be shown in the next chapter. However, as Inotai shows, the Benelux Economic Union as a separate entity soon lost its central relevance because the European Economic Union more or less replaced it.13 Hence, the Benelux also had a debate on its relevance and its functioning, which brings us to the topic of role changes.

The debate on relevance, which both groups experienced, and is still going on for the Benelux, can be brought back to the categories of sub-regional cooperation. These categories not only distinguish the various forms, but also give some meaning to cooperation by showing its role or rationale. One could say that as soon as any developments cause the cooperating entity to begin losing its purpose within its group, a relevance debate can be initiated. For the Visegrad Group this would be the moment of accession to NATO and the EU, while for the Benelux it is the moment when it can no longer fulfil its pioneering role. To find meaning once more the ambitions or the sub-regional cooperation method could be changed. For the Benelux and Visegrad the interesting difference is that in the case of the latter the debate and the decision on a new cooperation method took place briefly, and with clarity, before the EU accession occurred. This is in contrast to the Benelux, which had a long ongoing debate on its relevance before expanding its competences by the new Benelux Treaty of 2008. Since the old treaty was about to expire, the reason for this decision seemed more for securing continuing cooperation rather than resulting from the debate on its changed role and relevance.

The differences in debate and in changes can of course be explained by the fact that the Visegrad goal of accession is more concrete than the Benelux ambition to inspire and to be a pioneer. It may therefore be easier to have a debate over new cooperation methods. As far as the Benelux is concerned the debate did not end by creating a new treaty and expanding the Benelux competences beyond an economic union. As will soon be outlined, a few years after the new Benelux Treaty was signed there was even a study made on the relevance of the Benelux. When it is considered that the potential new functioning was inadequate, this

13 A. Inotai, ‘Correlations between European Integration and Sub-Regional Cooperation: Theoretical Background, Experience and Policy Impacts’, Russian & East European Finance and Trade, no. 6 (1998), p. 30. 11 makes it even more interesting to examine the role of the Benelux and to examine to what extent it has changed over time.

The debate on the Benelux and its relevance Before this role can be adequately explored, however, a closer examination of the Benelux debate is required. Since this thesis focuses on contemporary role changes, the most suitable approach would be to consider a contributing study that was made after the new Benelux Treaty was presented. In 2012 the IOB, a Dutch inspection group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published the previously mentioned study on the Benelux in order to evaluate Benelux cooperation from a Dutch perspective. In the final report on the history of the Benelux, the new Benelux Treaty and contemporary challenges are discussed. However, since the study is focused more on evaluating the current Benelux Union, the Benelux history is only briefly referred to in order to introduce the Benelux and to place cooperation in the relevant context by showing its historical path. The report illustrates how cooperation began after World War II and how this led to the Benelux Treaty. The beginnings of European integration and relations with the Benelux are shown, as well as the special status that the Benelux had achieved in the Treaty of Rome. An interesting detail is how the IOB report places emphasis on the advantages of this status as far as integration of the Benelux is concerned. This status not only guarantees the functioning of the Benelux independently of the European project, but also gives the Benelux the opportunity to integrate more fully and more speedily than the wider European Community.14

Furthermore, the IOB report explores how the new Benelux Treaty in 2008 came into existence and gives an explanation of this new treaty. As the report was made from a Dutch perspective, it shows how the Dutch discussion of the treaty took place. In 2007, one year before it was signed, an advisory council presented a recommendation for the treaty negotiations. As with the Dutch government, this recommendation was positive concerning cooperation and stated that it should be continued. However, several criticisms were also presented which should be taken into account. On the one hand, the original goals of economic integration were either achieved or replaced by European integration. On the other hand, the Benelux had in the last years unofficially expanded its policy areas to, for

14 IOB Evaluatie, Relaties, resultaten en rendement – Evaluatie van de Benelux Unie-samenwerking vanuit Nederlands perspectief, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2012, pp. 35-36. 12 instance, transport and legal affairs. This resulted in a level of cooperation that was not clear, and gave rise to the question of to what extent the Benelux was still relevant. Together with a decline of public support for the Benelux and the political tensions between the Benelux countries, its cooperation could simply be terminated following the expiry date of the original treaty. The Dutch government argued that a new treaty was needed to solve these problems, which should cover the various areas of cooperation and set main priorities for easing the functioning of the Benelux.15

In the new Benelux Treaty it can indeed be seen to show a widening of the cooperation areas rather than focusing on the Benelux Economic Union. The Treaty had a framework setting. This may sound contradictory, as the new treaty was supposed to provide a better structure to the functioning of the Benelux. A framework setting could still allow the Benelux to have a vague and unclear function. Yet this setting was seen as flexible in allowing the Benelux to achieve greater integration with more ease. In addition, the new treaty introduced a minimum number of obligatory meetings and created annual strategies to ensure its adequate functioning. Although the Treaty entered into force in 2012, after some delay had prevented its entry in 2010, several elements had been set at an earlier date. It can be seen that annual plans based on the main priorities, and the regular meetings had been already introduced shortly after the treaty was signed.16 This may indicate the enthusiasm and support within the Benelux for the outcomes of the new treaty.

When looking, on the one hand, at the criticisms made before the negotiations on the new Benelux Treaty started, and while considering, on the other hand, how this treaty was received, it seems that the problems that emerged from the debate had been solved. However, it is still arguable whether the functioning of the Benelux has indeed been improved. The main uncertainty in the IOB report is whether or not this has worked out satisfactorily since the new Benelux Treaty was presented, and what the advantages of Benelux cooperation are. One of the unanswered questions is, indeed, whether the Benelux inspires European integration at the forefront of the integration process. Unlike this thesis,

15 IOB Evaluatie, Relaties, resultaten en rendement – Evaluatie van de Benelux Unie-samenwerking vanuit Nederlands perspectief, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2012, pp. 37-40. 16 Ibidem, pp. 47-48. 13 the report does not compare contemporary Benelux to the historical one of the 1950s and 1960s, but rather focuses on how it is currently performing.17

According to the IOB the new treaty has created new structures to enhance the functioning of the Benelux. It can be seen that ambitions such as presenting the annual plans and having regular meetings do indeed take place. However, this has not yet brought about any significant results, which may indicate an ongoing lack of political commitment. Furthermore, the structure of setting priorities and of flexibility towards potential new areas of cooperation is still rather vague. Therefore this new treaty seems simply to have put this broad and highly flexible functioning, that has emerged over the years, into a framework rather than genuinely enhancing the cooperation process.18

As far as inspiring integration is concerned, the IOB concludes that there are no recent examples of policies in which the Benelux has been a testing ground for European integration. Nevertheless, inspiring integration is considered in broader terms than this. Since the Benelux countries are working more closely together than other EU Member States, they can certainly inspire others in doing the same. In some policy areas, such as transport, the Benelux projects were later joined by neighbouring countries such as and Germany. This can also be seen as a way to inspire integration. Furthermore, the Benelux countries often work together to implement EU legislation. While one could say that this is precisely an example of executing integration instead of inspiring it, the results gained from joint implementation can also help in stimulating European countries to engage in closer cooperation.19

Notwithstanding the criticism of the results of the new Benelux Treaty, the IOB seems to be positive concerning the Benelux Union, which they see as complementary to the EU and an actor in the system of multi-level governance.20 Yet the IOB report was used by the Dutch MPs and Arnold Merkies of the Socialist Party to present the motion on abolishing the Benelux Union. According to them, the report showed how the Benelux had become unnecessary, something which the new Benelux Treaty had not been able to solve.

17 IOB Evaluatie, Relaties, resultaten en rendement – Evaluatie van de Benelux Unie-samenwerking vanuit Nederlands perspectief, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2012, p. 14. 18 Ibidem, pp. 75-76. 19 Ibidem, pp. 150-151. 20 Ibidem, p. 16. 14

When institutions lose their relevance, they should be abolished, including the Benelux.21 Some of the authors and researchers who worked on the IOB report responded to the motion by stating that it was not their intention to call for an abolishment of the Benelux Union. The report was critical, but wanted to offer recommendations for improving cooperation.22

Although the motion to abolish the Benelux was not adopted and the Benelux Union continued, it shows how its relevance can still be questioned and how rigorously the debate proceeds. This may indicate that the previously mentioned pioneering category is no longer suitable. A changing role in the process of European integration, in which interaction between the EU and the Benelux has changed over time, could explain why a new strategy and meaning was requested. The new Benelux Treaty, to the extent it had the intention to solve this question, was inadequate for finalising the debate. This could mean that its pioneering role of inspiring European integration is currently lacking, and may possibly have been transformed into a role of actually executing integration. Nevertheless, the IOB report shows that the initial Benelux function of inspiring integration can still be met, albeit in a different, less direct way. On the other hand, Inotai states that the Benelux might have lost its classical pioneering role of being at the forefront of the European project, but admits nonetheless that it is difficult to provide a comprehensive answer to this hypothesis.23 Hence, together with the IOB statement, the role of the Benelux remains vague and unclear. In order to provide deeper insight, more research into comparisons of the historical role with the contemporary is required. This will be taken up in the next chapter.

21 Overheid.nl, ‘Kamerstuk 33414 nr. 11: Motie van de leden Van Bommel en Merkies over het opheffen van de Benelux Unie’, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33414-11.html, accessed April 23, 2017. 22 J. Rood, ‘Wie de schoen past…!’, Internationale Spectator, no. 6 (2013), p. 50. B. Limonard & J. Stöger ‘De Benelux Unie naar waarde schatten’, Internationale Spectator, no. 6 (2013), p. 57. 23 A. Inotai, ‘Correlations between European Integration and Sub-Regional Cooperation: Theoretical Background, Experience and Policy Impacts’, Russian & East European Finance and Trade, no. 6 (1998), pp. 81- 82. 15

2. The historical Benelux

Before the main research on the changing role in the contemporary Benelux can begin, a view at the historical Benelux is required. This second chapter will further outline the historical aspects of Benelux cooperation and analyse its interacting role in the European project. To do this the first decades of the functioning of the Benelux will be examined, focusing on three major events. Economist Max Weisglas clearly stated that the special role of the Benelux was most visible in the customs agreement of 1944 and its common memorandum in 1955.24 These will be the first two events to focus on. Furthermore, the 1958 Benelux Treaty and how this worked out in practice alongside the developing European Economic Community will be explored. The third and final major event is the 1985 Schengen Agreement. This is not mentioned by Weisglas, but is perceived by the Benelux itself as another main example of how the Benelux Union can function as a testing ground, hence inspiring European integration. Together these three events will help to create a clear view of the Benelux as a pioneer.

This pioneering and inspiring role of the Benelux will be examined by exploring and analysing several documents from this period. The contemporary Benelux has a tightly structured functioning in presenting its strategy plans and annual reports. During the historical period examined in this chapter, these were absent, yet many reports and notes from meetings, negotiations and agreements that brought the Benelux countries together and formed its policy can nevertheless be found. From these documents a good overview of the intentions behind this sub-regional cooperation, and how it interacted with the developing European project, can still be formed. As this will provide insight into the historical role of the Benelux and its functioning during its first decades, it will give us a good starting point from which to progress to the contemporary situation.

The start of cooperation The beginning of the Benelux, for this thesis and also for the first major event, was in 1944 with the customs agreement. Before this agreement there were some other initiatives to bring these countries into working partnerships. Belgium and Luxembourg formed the

24 J. Busschaert & Th. Grosbois, ‘Gesprek met Prof. Dr. M. Weisglas’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 74. 16

Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) in the early 1920s, which created economic cooperation. Another example is the Oslo States and the Ouchy agreement in the 1930s. During the economic depression Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as the Scandinavian countries signed a trade agreement to stimulate their economies, and also to act as ‘guide countries’ in cooperation. The Oslo States were also formed by an agreement; however, this was not ultimately successful.25 Disagreements amongst other countries led to Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg signing the Ouchy agreement, which expanded the original trade agreement.26 Yet political developments in the 1930s caused instability and such cooperation as there was did not result in success.27 Therefore, although earlier attempts were made, the 1944 customs agreement can be seen as the one genuine and successful beginning of economic cooperation in the Benelux.

Officially, this agreement is a bilateral one, as it was made between two entities: The Netherlands and the BLEU. First outlined during the war, the agreement clearly showed that it wanted to facilitate the reconstruction of Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxemburg and their economies. The liberation was under way in the south of Belgium and there was the strong prospect that the whole of the Benelux area would soon regain its sovereignty. Cooperation by a Benelux customs union could stimulate the reconstruction of the countries.28 In the agreement no other rationale is mentioned, nor any prospects for further cooperation. In addition, the idea of taking the agreement to a European level, or of expanding the customs union, was not foreseen either. Since the agreement itself is rather short, with a detailed description of goods, one could say that only such a short outline of the customs union rationale was needed, making it an unsuitable document for presenting European ambitions. Nevertheless, the idea of a Benelux customs union was created with a focus on realism, genuinely working on reconstructing and revitalising the Benelux economies.29 From the negotiations it also becomes clear that the agreement would not be a step to European

25 G. van Roon, ‘Great Britain and the Oslo States’, Journal of Contemporary History, no. 4 (1989), pp. 657-658. 26 G. van Roon, Kleine landen in crisistijd – Van Oslostaten tot Benelux, 1930-1940, Amsterdam: Elsevier 1985, p. 100. 27 Ibidem, pp. 372-373. 28 Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden – 1944 E. 77, Londen: 9 September 1944. 29 M. Conway, ‘Legacies of Exile: The Exile Governments in London during the Second World War and the Politics of Post-war Europe’, in: M. Conway and J. Gotovitch (eds.), Europe in Exile, New York: Berghahn Books 2001, p. 267. 17 cooperation. Notwithstanding the few supporters of a European federation, most politicians just focused on the Benelux cooperation.30

Any genuine sign of interaction with the potential European integration project could not be expected, as that project had not yet begun. Nevertheless, the idea of European countries working together had been existing for long and all three Benelux countries would eventually be among the initiators of the first genuine move into European cooperation. In the same years as the agreement was made European countries were working together with the United States to create a new monetary system, eventually resulting in the Bretton Woods Agreement.31 Although the Benelux countries were also part of these negotiations, this method of economic cooperation was neither inspired nor stimulated from the customs agreement.

This shows that it was not all a matter of differences in time, but that the early Benelux was simply not yet seen as a testing ground in this matter. In another way, however, it could be perceived as such. By agreeing on the customs union, the Benelux was the first in Europe to create such a form of sub-regional cooperation. Therefore the documents could be called revolutionary.32 The Benelux was a pioneer, and as such it set an example for future forms of sub-regional cooperation. Hence, although at the moment of signing it was not anticipated, we can be fully justified in claiming that this agreement was among the three major events for inspiring European cooperation.

Working towards the customs union The customs union agreement entered into force in January 1948. However, in the years leading up to this several Benelux conferences were held to discuss cooperation. Here, not only intra-Benelux issues on the functioning of the customs union were arranged, but explanations on cooperation were also given to other European countries, which shows just how the Benelux inspired other countries. France had been interested in a customs union

30 Th. Grosbois, ‘De onderhandelingen van Londen voor een Benelux Douane-unie (1941-1944)’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 64. 31 W.H. Weenink, Bankier van de wereld, Bouwer van Europa – Johan Willem Beyen 1987-1976, Amsterdam: Prometheus 2005, pp. 242-246. 32 A.E. Kersten, ‘Politieke aspecten van de Benelux-samenwerking: wisselwerking tussen interne opbouw en internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 79. 18 with the Benelux for a long time and tried to bring this to the discussion.33 The Benelux could be combined with France and , making a customs union called Fritalux, or Finebel.34 In 1947 European countries founded a European Customs Union Study Group. The Benelux delegation was invited in order to explain to this group how the Benelux customs union was founded in 1944 and how its functioning was arranged.35 However, most of these aims were not successful in the end. Disagreements on excluding the post-war German economy led in the case of Fritalux/Finebel to a failure.36 Nevertheless, this does show that in various ways countries were seeking for European cooperation. The Benelux countries were also helping and studying this matter, but on their own there was no real integration topic, as this was integral to working out the customs union. A possible explanation for this is that the countries did not have the same opinion of European integration, and differed in their enthusiasm for the matter. Therefore the negotiations were not held by a Benelux delegation, nor with common statements.37

As the Benelux customs union was developing, the countries realized that more integration was necessary to enhance cooperation. Several detailed agreements were successfully made on relevant issues for the customs union. However, the different Benelux economies would still hamper any smooth working union. Therefore, in June 1948, the countries agreed to create an economic union before 1950.38 This was a very ambitious idea and criticism soon arose. In The Netherlands Dutch ministers discussed this ambition in a meeting. However, they did not criticize the Benelux cooperation itself. On the contrary, cooperation was seen as a good way to draw closer politically and economically. But since the Western European economies were still vulnerable, especially the Dutch when compared to the Belgian- Luxembourg economy, it would remain questionable whether such a swift initiative with an

33 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Comité Exécutif, 04-08-1947’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/G00417.pdf, pp. 1- 3. 34 R. Griffiths and F. Lynch, ‘L’échec de la Petite Europe: les négociations Fritalux/Finebel, 1949-1950’, Revue Historique, no. 1 (1985), p. 160. 35 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief en nota studiegroep Europese Douane-Unie, 28-10-1947’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00733.pdf, pp. 1-5. 36 E. Bloemen, ‘De economische integratie van West-Europa 1945-1957’, NEHA-Bulletin, no. 1 (1990), p. 13. 37 A.E. Kersten, ‘Politieke aspecten van de Benelux-samenwerking: wisselwerking tussen interne opbouw en internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 84. 38 J.M.M.J. Clerx, ‘Beneluxsamenwerking in het slop’, Politieke Opstellen, no. 1 (1994), p. 45. 19 economic union could be successful. According to the criticising ministers, more time was needed to stabilize the economy and build such a union.39

Notwithstanding the criticism, steps were made to create a Benelux economic union. However, as the economic situation did not improve very much, the fear of failure remained. This became visible in a Dutch minister’s document commenting on a customs union report of January 1949. Again, the use of an economic union in such a fragile economic situation was questioned, especially since sacrifices had to be made in working towards such a union.40 Furthermore, a new reason for the high pressure was given: the purpose of the Benelux for the international community. According to the document the Benelux project was seen by the three countries as an economic project. However, the other Western European countries as well as the United States gave the project a political meaning. The developing Benelux was being closely followed in the context of an ambitious and more cooperating Europe. This step taken towards an economic union made the pressure of succeeding even higher. Because of this, the failure of such a union would mean very serious damage for the Benelux countries, both in European cooperation and in the international community.41

This statement on the international pressure is rather special, since it is the first in which the inspiring Benelux role is made explicit. Although in the minister’s document it is shown how the Benelux intentions were only economic, the minister realized how the rest of Europe had forced the Benelux into the more political role of a testing ground. Even though this was not an ambition of the cooperation initiative, the Benelux now had some responsibility to make the economic union successful.

The pre-union agreement as the next step In order to enhance the preparation of the economic union it was decided to create a pre- union in July 1949, one year before the actual economic union would enter into force. The rationale behind this was to make it easier to introduce the changes that would lead to

39 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 25-08-1948’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00084.pdf, p. 11. 40 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Opmerkingen rapport Voorzitters der Raden van de Belgisch-Nederlands-Luxemburgse Douane-overeenkomst, 28-01-1949’ http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00171.pdf, p. 4. 41 Ibidem, pp. 1-2. 20 liberation.42 Working towards this pre-union would indicate that good progress was being made. However, disagreements between Belgium and The Netherlands on the economic side-effects of the economic union caused some delay during the following months. The pre- union agreement was not reached in July, but was postponed for some a few months. It became clear that without solving the conflicts a pre-union could not be formed.43 Eventually the discussions were resolved and an agreement reached. The United States, which supported the reconstruction of European countries by the Marshall Plan, agreed to give extra financial support. This can be seen as an indication of the significance the Benelux had for the USA. As a testing ground it was vitally important that the economic union should succeed.44

Although Benelux cooperation was seen by others as an example for European cooperation, the Benelux countries themselves did not state it as such, nor did they connect the Benelux to the European project. This became clear from the statements of Belgian minister Van Zeeland, made during the negotiations that were expected to find a solution for the pre- union agreement. Van Zeeland stated that he was in favour of the Benelux on the one hand, but on the other supported the economic liberalisation at a European level. This statement was discussed at a Dutch minister’s meeting because there was some anxiety that Belgium would choose a European cooperation over the Benelux.45 Such discussions not only show the difference in vision and opinion between the Benelux countries and others, but also that European cooperation was seen as distinct from Benelux cooperation.

In October 1949 the pre-union agreement was finally reached. In the agreement preparations were outlined for working towards the Benelux economic union. The intention to start one year later, initially in July 1950, was stated in the agreement.46 However, since the agreement did not enter into force until 1 January 1950 it is doubtful whether the

42 Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden – Jaargang 1953 No. 55, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1953, p. 48. 43 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 08-06-1949’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00092.pdf, p. 7. 44 J.M.M.J. Clerx, ‘Beneluxsamenwerking in het slop’, Politieke Opstellen, no. 1 (1994), pp. 51-52. 45 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 24-08-1949’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00095.pdf, p. 3. 46 Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden – Jaargang 1954 No. 18, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1954, p. 2. 21 countries were fully convinced that the economic union would indeed be created on that date. It transpired that the late signing of the agreement did not really delay the creation of an economic union; instead even larger problems hampered a smooth transition process. It would eventually take more than eight years to arrive at the Benelux Treaty, which resulted in the founding of the Benelux Economic Union in 1960.

When looking at the events of the period following the signing of the pre-union agreement, a few issues can be noticed. First, those of connecting the Benelux markets continued for a long time. Disagreements between Belgium and The Netherlands, especially concerning agriculture, remained unsettled.47 Some of the relevant politicians expressed opposing views to that of liberalising the integration of the Benelux, preferring a policy of protectionism, or were heavily influenced by the agricultural lobby, resulting in ongoing negotiations.48 The integration process was thus delayed continuously.49 Furthermore, the beginning of European cooperation caused the attention of the countries to shift to the European level. For a smooth distribution of American financial aid from the Marshall Plan, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was created, which was also seen by the USA as a way to stimulate European integration.50 However, for cooperation between the Benelux countries this did not all work out beneficially. There were even signs that these countries worked against each other’s interests. Because of this The Netherlands claimed that the Benelux project could fail.51

The genuine start of interaction with the European project In addition to these problematic negotiations other developments in European cooperation, such as the presentation of the Schuman Plan, also created distraction from the Benelux process. However, it was soon realised that the European project would also have consequences for Benelux cooperation. These thoughts stimulated the Benelux countries to

47 Th. Grosbois & J. Busschaert, ‘Gesprek met D. Spierenburg’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 95. 48 Th. Grosbois, ‘Het Belgische besluitvormingsproces inzake Benelux (1945-1951)’, in: F. Boekema, H. van Houtum & K. Veraghtert (eds.), Benelux, Quo Vadis?, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff 1994, pp. 95-96. 49 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 05-01-1951’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00127.pdf, p. 4. 50 P. van der Eng, De Marshall-hulp – Een perspectief voor Nederland 1947-1953, Houten: De Haan/Unieboek bv 1987, p. 20. 51 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief Stikker aan Drees, 16-06-1950’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00409.pdf, p. 7. 22 continue the talks and to find agreement on a treaty to create the Benelux economic union.52 Hence it seems that even with these problems, the good will was sufficient to find a solution and quickly form an economic union. In a Dutch minister’s meeting of November 1950 the idea of founding a Benelux parliament had been proposed in order to stimulate cooperation. On the other hand, it was stated that this could not be expected to result in a treaty before the end of the year. Nevertheless, no long delay was mentioned and it still seemed as if the agreement on a treaty would soon be made. 53

When considering wider European developments in the light of the Benelux role, it once again becomes clear how the Benelux countries did not see a connection. European cooperation events and initiatives were not linked to the Benelux project, nor discussed on possible interaction. The focus was thus placed firmly on the consequences of European events on Benelux cooperation, and even on contrasting national interests, which indeed showed a lack of cooperation. In the immediate post-war years the enforced responsibility of the Benelux to become a successful testing ground was evident, and was created by the perceptions of other countries. However, during this time this matter was not clear. A possible explanation for this could be that with clearer European developments the weight of responsibility was somehow eased. However, a more plausible reason would be that the perception itself was changed by a lack of progress. Since the Benelux countries increasingly failed to integrate and to form an economic union, the attention and the expectations of other countries deteriorated.54 Together with the shift towards developments in European cooperation, international pressure to turn the Benelux into a form of successful sub- regional cooperation decreased. Nevertheless, it would be premature to claim that a strong change in role was already occurring. A more accurate description would be that the inspiring role as testing ground was less evident during these years.

52 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Summary Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 26-07-1950’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/europeseintegratie/en/doc/D00117, accessed November 16, 2017. Ibidem, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 26-07-1950’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00117.pdf, p. 13. 53 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 27-11-1950’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00116.pdf, pp. 13-14. 54 Th. Grosbois & J. Busschaert, ‘Gesprek met D. Spierenburg’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 95. 23

Over the next few years a small shift in Benelux cooperation occurred. The Schuman Plan and efforts towards realising the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) stimulated the Benelux countries to engage in greater political cooperation by proposing to work on common statements on the development of the European project.55 This could also bring new inspiration as well as pressure to Benelux cooperation. To gain more power in the international community, successful cooperation and, eventually, formalising the Benelux economic union could be of great help. The Benelux integration could help European integration, but European integration could also help the Benelux. Since the Benelux was still struggling to connect its markets and to deal with relevant economic problems, the risk of failure was still present.56

From this, two interesting things can be noticed. First, a connection between Benelux and European cooperation can be made. Instead of a completely separate entity, the European project was now also seen as a way to stimulate the process of Benelux integration. The two are not only connected in this matter, but taking Benelux cooperation to a European level is also proposed. This idea is not completely new, but in earlier scenarios it had been presented more as cooperation on a specific topic rather than structural cooperation and integration. Furthermore, the pressure for being a successful Benelux returned. However, this was quite different from early Benelux cooperation in the 1940s when international pressure was applied to the Benelux to succeed. Now it seemed to be coming more from the consciences of the Benelux countries themselves. In explaining this pressure, broader effects were mentioned. The success of the Benelux project was seen as vital for its members’ power at the European level. This resembles the previous situation, with pressure for having powerful influence in the international community, albeit this time in a European context. However, since the Benelux participated in the European project, the question of having such a powerful role seemed of much more importance than it was in the previous situation. The internal economic consequences that would result from failure are shown by this. These consequences had already been noted a few times, but now a new light was shed on them.

55 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum samenwerking Benelux-landen buitenlandse politiek, 22-09-1951’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00246.pdf, p. 3. 56 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum Nederlands-Belgische samenwerking, 22-09-1951’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00246.pdf, pp. 5-6. 24

As economic integration is expected to result from European cooperation, it is seen as crucial and obvious that integrating the Benelux economically has a participating role in this. If the Benelux integration were to fail, the economic consequences could be even greater when adding to this the consequences from the European level. All this again shows that the Benelux and European projects were interacting, and outlining this process makes it clear how the sub-regional and European effects of success or failure were closely interwoven.

The idea of the European project providing the Benelux with a reason to integrate is also clear from other documents. As the pre-union agreement had intended to create an economic union within one year, a special team was engaged to produce a draft for the Benelux Treaty. In a report by this group, it was stated that the lack of achievement is disappointing.57 The founding of a Benelux economic union could go hand in hand perfectly with European integration.58 The report presents an action plan for working towards the economic union and for finding a solution to the problems hampering the process. In addition to the report, it can be seen that the various countries realised that more effort was required for success. It had even been stated, in a Dutch minister’s report, that a supranational structure should be accepted. Although a purely intergovernmental cooperation method would be preferred, supranational institutions might possibly create a breakthrough in the Benelux integration.59

When this idea was proposed to the Belgian and Luxembourg governments they initially gave a sceptical response. Nevertheless they agreed, and a political committee was founded to work on Benelux integration more intensively. A reference to European pressure on the Benelux was made by acknowledging that this pressure can be seen as a clear result of Benelux cooperation.60 This new progress created fresh optimism in the Benelux countries,

57 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Nota economische unie met België en Luxemburg, 27-12-1951’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00441.pdf, p. 4. 58 Ibidem, p. 1. 59 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 09-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00132.pdf, p. 9. 60 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum Permanente Politieke Contact Commissie, 14-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00248.pdf, p. 1. 25 resulting in the prospect of an imminent economic union.61 There were still some minor problems and disagreements, but in general it was clear that all three countries were anticipating the next stage in Benelux integration.62

The Benelux solution to Europe in crisis Because of such good prospects one would expect that this would have had positive effects on European integration also, in the idea of mutual stimulation. However, while the Benelux seemed to have found a solution to the integration problems, and was back on track, European integration entered a crisis period. The Schuman Plan and the creation of the ECSC were expected to be followed by the European Defence Community (EDC) and the Political Community (EPC). This suggested that European integration should show swift progress. Yet disagreements in the European countries resulted in failure.63 Negotiations between the countries proved difficult and were not undertaken with any real enthusiasm.64 The eventual treaty on the EDC was not accepted, which blocked the idea of an EPC. Nevertheless, the Benelux countries now tried to form a common position in the negotiations. There were naturally some minor disagreements between the countries, but in general they proposed the same ideas for European cooperation. One of these ideas was to focus on economic integration, although the proposals had little success at first.65

While European integration was struggling, the endeavour towards the Benelux Economic Union was showing good progress; it was creating, among other things, a coordinated social and economic policy.66 This can be seen from a shift in topics at the Benelux conferences. These had focused on disagreements between Belgium and The Netherlands, emphasising a lack of enthusiasm and a risk of failure of the Benelux project. Now, however, the

61 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief met conceptnota economische unie, 31-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00440.pdf, p. 4. 62 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Ontwerpantwoord op Belgische en Luxemburgse nota’s economische unie, 08-05-1952’ http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00443.pdf, p. 1. 63 A.E. Kersten, ‘Politieke aspecten van de Benelux-samenwerking: wisselwerking tussen interne opbouw en internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 85-86. 64 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 02-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00137.pdf, p. 5. 65 A.E. Kersten, ‘Politieke aspecten van de Benelux-samenwerking: wisselwerking tussen interne opbouw en internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 86-87. 66 A.J. Boekestijn, ‘Soevereiniteit en integratie: de Benelux 1945-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 108. 26 conferences were increasingly focused on the Benelux role at the European level. For instance, the discussion of European economic integration was proposed at the Benelux meetings.67 This could indicate the good will of the Benelux to find a solution to the crisis, which can be seen as an attempt to get a more inspirational role in European integration.

The cooperative role of the Benelux in Europe was again evident at a European conference discussing the European Political Community. The statements of the Benelux countries, in favour of economic integration, clashed with those of the other European countries present.68 The Dutch Beyen-Plan proposing more economic integration was also discussed. Some points were criticized by both Belgium and Luxembourg, while others were received more positively.69 However, it is doubtful whether the inspiring of integration at this point was actually driven by the Benelux, as it seems that the Beyen-Plan was more or less developed by Beyen himself rather than arising from the Benelux meetings.70 The result of the conference shows that even though the discussions were useful, political decisions were required in order to achieve a breakthrough with the integration problem.71

Decisive political steps to find a solution, however, were not taken on the European level, even though the external pressure became greater.72 The Benelux countries then decided in a meeting that they should take the initiative in inviting the ministers of the six European countries to discuss the integration problem.73 A further step can here be seen in the Benelux taking the lead in this integration phase. As attempts by the Benelux to save the EDC and EPC failed, the question arose of what should now be done. Soon the Belgian anxiety over France taking its own integration steps independently of the European project led to a

67 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 01-02-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00250.pdf, p. 6. 68 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Algemene beschouwing economische besprekingen Parijse studieconferentie E.P.G., 06-03-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00565.pdf, pp. 3-4. 69 Ibidem, pp. 5-6. 70 A.E. Kersten, ‘Politieke aspecten van de Benelux-samenwerking: wisselwerking tussen interne opbouw en internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 86. 71 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Algemene beschouwing economische besprekingen Parijse studieconferentie E.P.G., 06-03-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00565.pdf, p. 8. 72 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 21-06-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00265.pdf, p. 10. 73 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 26-06-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00266.pdf, p. 1. 27

Benelux decision. As Belgium wanted to propose greater economic cooperation in Europe, then this idea should be turned into a Benelux proposal. Since all Benelux countries agreed on it, it was thought that this could be a good opportunity.74

By examining the following months, of early 1955, it can be seen how the Benelux discussed proposals to relaunch European integration, and how it tried to create enthusiasm in other countries, for instance Germany.75 The Benelux countries worked on a memorandum for proposing greater economic integration, which they would present to the other European countries and discuss at a forthcoming ECSC meeting in Messina.76 In this memorandum impressive proposals were made for working towards a common market with free movement and an integrated social policy.77 When it was discussed at the European meeting, other countries responded positively and even France wanted to cooperate.78 From this point the memorandum seemed to be successful. Of course, it could still remain a proposal that would not enable any real integration, or begin at a very slow rate. The Benelux itself had shown something similar in previous years. Nevertheless, during the period following the the European countries began to work quickly on economic integration. The Benelux countries tried to remain at the forefront of the process and stimulated swift developments.79 In the negotiations to work out the details of the European Economic Community (EEC), the experiences from the Benelux cooperation were used. Sometimes these were perceived differently by the Benelux countries. For instance, Belgium criticised the lack of a strong supranational institution for the Benelux. Such a power therefore should be created in the European cooperation. However, The Netherlands was not enthusiastic about such an issue.80 It can thus be seen that although the Benelux

74 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum bezoek Baron Snoy d’Oppuers, 20-11-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00916.pdf, p. 1. 75 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief Adenauer aan Bech, 15-04-1955’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01957.pdf, p. 1. 76 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag bespreking Spaak en Beyen over eventueel Benelux-initiatief Europese economische integratie, 23-04-1955’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01176.pdf, p. 1. 77 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum des Pays Benelux aux six pays de la C.E.C.A., 18-05-1955’ http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01654.pdf, p. 1. 78 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 06-06-1955’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00307.pdf, pp. 1-2. 79 F.G. Moquette, Van Bep tot Beb, Leiden: Rijksuniversiteit Leiden 1993, p. 359. 80 S. Nasra & M. Segers, ‘Tussen argwaan en pragmatisme’, in: D. Hellema, R. Coolsaet & B. Stol (eds.), Nederland-België: De Belgisch-Nederlandse betrekkingen vanaf 1940, Amsterdam: Boom 2011, pp. 125-126. 28 had presented the common memorandum on European integration, the following phases were not always negotiated by common statements. Nevertheless, this did not hamper the process or cause delay, as in less than two years after the presentation of the memorandum the Treaty of Rome was signed, which would create the EEC.

When this process and the Benelux initiative is observed, it is only logical that it is seen as one of the three great moments of the Benelux inspiring European integration. It is however different to the other great moments. This one is not about the Benelux functioning as a testing ground, or inspiring by greater integration through their own cooperation. Instead the Benelux pushed European integration to the next level by taking the lead. This can of course be seen as an inspiring role also, and with good results. The memorandum not only began a new phase in European cooperation, but by successfully solving the integration crisis created in previous years, the Benelux strengthened its political power in Europe, as well as its role, in favour of greater European economic integration.81

The creation of the Benelux Economic Union By taking these major steps in European integration the future of the Benelux could be viewed optimistically. However, the Benelux itself was still working on the creation of its own economic union. An attempt was made to sign a Benelux Treaty earlier than a European Treaty.82 However, this did not succeed. One report positively evaluated the progress that had been made by the Benelux countries in coming closer together by stating that the common Benelux market had almost been realised.83 Yet another report showed that the problems which were hampering the Benelux integration, such as agricultural policy, were still there. Even though the countries promised to harmonize these policies, little progress was visible. If no solution was found soon, the consequences could be severe, damaging the

81 A.E. Kersten, ‘Politieke aspecten van de Benelux-samenwerking: wisselwerking tussen interne opbouw en internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 88. 82 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 25-02-1957’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00162.pdf, p. 3. 83 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verhouding verdrag Gemeenschappelijke Markt tot Benelux-verdrag, 28-02-1957’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00551.pdf, p. 3. 29

Benelux. Nevertheless, the report is also positive, since it states that the Benelux results in other are extremely positive.84

Although there were still some aspects of the Benelux integration that required solutions, it was thought that an economic union could finally be realized before very long. As this union would enter into force at the same time as the European Economic Community was being built, the question arose as to how these should interact. It was mentioned that the European Rome Treaty contained an article about the Benelux, stating that European integration should not hamper the Benelux project, and guaranteeing smooth interaction. However, it was furthermore questioned whether the Benelux Economic Union would still be relevant alongside a European union, as the former would be soon replaced by the latter. Nevertheless in this discussion it can be seen that both unions are considered differently. The EEC still had a long way to go before completion. Since the Treaty had only just been signed, the whole process of creating this union and harmonising the European market had yet to begin. The Benelux Economic Union however, was almost completed and therefore far more topical.85

When the draft of the Benelux Treaty was presented this difference in perception was also visible. In the draft notes it was stated how the European and the Benelux treaties had more or less the same goal: creating an economic union. Yet the Benelux Economic Union was expected to enter into force very soon, which gave it a different meaning than the European project, of which it was still uncertain to what extent economic integration would proceed.86 From this statement a few things can be noticed. On the one hand it shows not only the difference of the Benelux, but also its relevance. It becomes completely clear why integration is needed alongside European economic integration. On the other hand, the statement does not indicate any interaction between the Benelux and the European Economic Community as far as the process towards an economic union is concerned. The

84 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Nota Beneluxsamenwerking, 22-11-1958’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/L00049.pdf, p. 1. 85 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 16-05-1957’ http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00151.pdf, p. 2. 86 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Toelichting verdrag Benelux Economische Unie en bijlagen, 21-10-1957’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00257.pdf, p. 1. 30 two projects are described as separate entities that will neither hamper nor overlap each other, hence giving to both their relevance and meaning.

After working further on the draft, the final Benelux Treaty was signed in December 1958. This effectively created the Benelux Economic Union. From that point onwards cooperation was presented as more than that of a mere customs union. At the beginning of the treaty it was stated that the main rationale for cooperation would be that free movement would bring the economies of the three countries closer together. A common economic policy could result in a better standard of living for all of them. Furthermore, the connection to the European Community was immediately made by referring again to the Benelux article in the European Treaty of Rome.87 By showing this in the Benelux Treaty both parties had mentioned that the creation of the European Economic Community should not hamper the development of the Benelux Economic Union.

When looking towards the future this would mean that the European Community could of course partly replace the Benelux Union, although there would still be the possibility for the Benelux to build upon what remained. From this consideration it seems that both the Benelux and the European Community would eventually expect the replacement of sub- regional economic cooperation by the equivalent at the European level. Yet it was far more important that they both showed that the Benelux could integrate more and at a faster pace. However, the link to an interaction with the European project and an inspiring role for the Benelux was not made in this treaty. Again, the European Economic Community is described more as a distinct entity; the purpose of this was to overcome possible integration conflicts between the two. Another explanation for this is that, on the one hand such a detailed description is not suitable for the introduction of a treaty, while on the other hand, by stating such a role, the commitment becomes fixed and both the EEC and the Benelux would need to act as such, leaving less room for flexibility. In order to prevent such situations arising it is clearly sensible to preserve only a general outline.

Nevertheless when reading further into the treaty it can be seen that it has a similar approach towards the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union. Here the same role as that of the Benelux to the European Community is evident: the former is allowed to exist and could

87 Benelux, Verdrag tot instelling van de Benelux Economische Unie, Brussel: Benelux 1958, p. 1. 31 develop ahead of the latter. Eventually, the latter could partly replace the former.88 Of course, all of these cooperating entities can be seen in relation to each other. The small Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union can be replaced by the Benelux Union, which could be merged into the European Community. However, knowing that from the Belgian- Luxembourg cooperation there was no genuine ambition to integrate fully, nor to set an example to the rest of Europe, this makes the idea of interaction between the Benelux and the European community even less viable. The evident similarity however does seem to prevent conflicts between the various levels of cooperation.

Although one might think that the founding of the Benelux Economic Union would be a perfect opportunity to inspire European integration, this was not evident in the treaty. As we will see in the next chapter, the contemporary Benelux Treaty mentions an inspiring role several times. However, in the original treaty this method of interaction is absent. Perhaps this can be explained by the perception that became clear earlier. While the Benelux role was seen more as an inspiring role by others, or this role was only concluded in retrospect, the Benelux strategies and policies were not made with that explicit inspiring role in mind. This is in contrast to the contemporary Benelux strategies. Of course, this could also work the other way around: as there was as yet no real European integration for the Benelux to help execute, there was no need either to include such an interactive relationship in the Benelux Treaty.

Following the signing of the treaty two years would pass before it entered into force. The Benelux Economic Union was now finally realised and further development could take place. Over the following years it can be seen that, on the one hand, the Benelux itself worked towards greater integration, while on the other the European Community began to influence it even more. For instance, the Benelux agricultural policy had caused major debates between the Benelux countries. The final agreement to further harmonise it took its place alongside European agricultural ambitions. However, the Benelux policy was in some cases more liberalising to the agricultural markets than the European policy. For the Benelux itself this would not be a problem, as the treaty guaranteed the possibility for the Benelux to work beyond European policy. In addition, such a situation could provide the opportunity for the

88 Benelux, Verdrag tot instelling van de Benelux Economische Unie, Brussel: Benelux 1958, Art. 94. 32

Benelux to act as a testing ground, or to inspire integration. However, such a role was not to be seen: it was neither stated nor visible in practice, even as Benelux integration in this area was still struggling.89

The Benelux in the 1960s – A less effective pioneer? Although European economic integration was developing alongside the Benelux and could even potentially replace future Benelux policies, it did not all proceed smoothly. In the 1960s the European Economic Community had major disagreements over how to increase integration. As the Empty Chair Crisis, in which France boycotted European institutions, can be considered the worst period, the problems were far more serious than they had ever been for the Benelux cooperation. The question arises as to how the Benelux acted in this conflict. The Benelux Memorandum had solved an earlier crisis in Europe and this role of presenting common proposals for greater integration was also evident in the late 1950s.90 When examining the Empty Chair Crisis it can be seen that a mediating role for the Benelux was proposed by Luxembourg.91 Belgium agreed with it, but The Netherlands was not willing to embrace French demands. This difference in opinion can be explained by the specific interests that Belgium and Luxembourg had with regard to France being part of the European project.92 Therefore, as far as these two countries had a decisive role in solving this conflict, it cannot be linked to the Benelux cooperation, as there was no common strategy. When an even more rigorous examination is made, it becomes clear that only the role of the institutionalized Benelux, i.e. the Benelux Economic Union, should be outlined in this. As this union had now entered into force, from that moment onwards the sub-regional cooperation examined in this thesis was limited to these institutions.

From such a rigorous examination it becomes clear that there was no mediating role for the Benelux Economic Union in this conflict. It seems that the institutions of the Benelux focused more on their own economic integration, which is of course reasonable given their areas of

89 Th.E. Mommens, ‘Het landbouwprobleem in de vorming van de Benelux’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 192. 90 Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum Beneluxlanden over EEA, 21-04-1959’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01506.pdf, pp. 1-3. 91 E. Deschamps, More than ‘honest brokers’? Belgium, Luxembourg and the ‘empty chair crisis’ (1965 1966), Luxembourg: Virtual Resource Centre for Knowledge about Europe (CVCE) 2016, p. 4. 92 Ibidem, pp. 8-9. 33 policy. Nevertheless this indicates the end of inspiring European integration or of having a role as the testing ground. In 1968 the customs union of the European Economic Community was completed. In this it could be said that the Benelux equivalent had been replaced. However, the detailed economic integration within the Benelux went beyond that of the European. Yet as there were no giant leaps forward that could inspire Europe, nor any attempts to push European integration forward, it is clear why this period is sometimes seen as one that had no major Benelux events.

The founding of the Benelux customs union and the memorandum at the Messina conference were the two major events described by Weisglas. Now that these two have been shown within their context and against their aftermath, a conclusion would be the expected thing, especially as the 1960s showed that the inspiring role of the Benelux was on the wane. Nevertheless two decades later another event occurred that can be seen as a major one. In 1985 the Benelux was part of the Schengen Agreement on the abolition of internal border checks. Weisglas did not state this as a significant moment; this can be explained by the fact that the Weisglas statement was made in the early 1990s. Apart from Weisglas’s historical focus, this made it too early to consider the Schengen Agreement. Nevertheless Schengen is currently used by the Benelux to show its inspiring role in history. As we will see in the next chapter on the contemporary Benelux, the Schengen Agreement is mentioned as a clear example of the Benelux as a testing ground and of how it can inspire European integration.93 From this consideration the question arises as to how the Benelux acted in this agreement, and whether its pride can really be justified, which brings us to the final part of this chapter.

The Schengen Agreement When focusing on the development of the Schengen Agreement it can be seen that it was founded by France and . In 1984 these countries came to an agreement to liberalise their border controls. They soon asked the Benelux to join them in expanding this liberalised area. These successful talks led to the Schengen Agreement in 1985.94 It could be claimed, however, that the Benelux was only invited as a partner, while the real initiative

93 Benelux, Politieke verklaring van de Benelux regeringen, Brussel: Benelux 2008, p. 1. 94 Ph. Golenvaux, ‘Het vrije personenverkeer’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 335. 34 came from France and West Germany. Although this is in fact quite true, it would be too rash to make that a point of conclusion, as the Benelux already had its own system of liberalising border controls.

When the Benelux Treaty was signed in 1958 it was already clear that its countries were ambitious for liberalisation. In the treaty it also becomes clear that those countries would have needed have to work towards a free movement of people.95 Already by 1960 the internal border controls in the Benelux had been abolished and over the following decades this system was further developed by, for instance, outlining visa rules.96 Hence, when the French-German initiative was taken, the Benelux already had nearly 25 years of experience in this area. The Schengen Agreement shows similarities with the Benelux agreement, although compared to the latter the Schengen achieved greater cooperation and integration, especially on migration and related issues, in which the Benelux could not attain compromise.97

While more research is needed in order to examine in depth the extent to which the Schengen Agreement was influenced and inspired by the Benelux agreement, the role of the Benelux can more easily be shown. This is especially so following the signing, when the system had to be developed further and prepared for entering into force; an inspirational role was quite clear at this point. The Benelux used its experience on free movement in the negotiations to help create the Schengen Area. In the case of migration, and on the issue of asylum, this was very useful also in creating the Dublin Regulation, from which the testing ground role can be readily seen. Although this was not intended, nor seen as a testing ground at the time, the Benelux could use its experiences in order to create greater European integration, as if this were a pilot phase. The success of this role, the development of a working Schengen system and the contribution of the Benelux to greater European integration thus make it justifiable for the Benelux to be proud of the results.

Yet the question remains of whether this really does justify of such pride, although the good results would seem to conform this. However, when taking into account the fact that the

95 Benelux, Verdrag tot instelling van de Benelux Economische Unie, Brussel: Benelux 1958, p. 2. 96 Ph. Golenvaux, ‘Het vrije personenverkeer’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 331-334. 97 Ibidem, pp. 335-336. 35

Benelux participated in the project and probably did not have a very inspiring role at first, that question still persists, especially when compared to the other major events, for instance the Benelux Memorandum. It was not really the Benelux that drove integration forward in this case, but rather France and West Germany. During the 1970s and 1980s there were no other examples of the kind of inspiration provided by the Benelux for European integration. It seems therefore likely that this one instance of success would have been noticeable anyway, and thus heavily used to be still able to show progress. To conclude on this topic, it can be said that the Benelux used its experience and its inspiring role in the process, but it remains questionable whether this can be applied to the Schengen as a whole and regarded as a major event.

Conclusion By outlining these three major events the historical role of the Benelux can be examined. All of these major events differ, although they had in common the fact that European integration was inspired by the Benelux. The customs union created by the agreement of 1944 was not intended by the Benelux to be a moment of inspiration, nor meant as a testing ground for Europe. Nevertheless it can be still considered a major events, since this role was forced upon it by other European countries, as well as the United States, which closely watched the process in order to discover whether sub-regional cooperation in Europe could be successful. Although the Benelux did not plan this role, the effects of it were still clearly noticeable. A few years later, with the memorandum of 1955, the reverse attitude from the Benelux was apparent. Here it was clearly intended to push European economic integration forward and to inspire it by the common statement. While not many inspiring events for the Benelux are noticeable during the 1960s and 1970s, the Schengen Agreement in 1985 again shows a real attempt in this role to inspire. Although the Benelux did not initiate this agreement, it used its experience as an unintended testing ground to ease the development of the Schengen Area. Thus this was again a moment in which the Benelux had the opportunity to play its classic role, stimulated by other countries.

It can therefore be said that the Benelux had an inspiring role in European integration. Although this pioneering interaction with the European project was not stated as a strategy, the Benelux stimulated European integration at certain crucial periods. It is thus justified to see itself as having a vital role in the development of European cooperation. In retrospect

36 this inspiring role becomes even clearer. However, as the last major event, albeit a questionable one, was during the 1980s, it becomes interesting to discover what happened afterwards. After the 1980s European integration progressed quickly, for instance by the creation of the European Union and the Euro. It is precisely during this period that the integration of the Benelux became overshadowed by the European project, as the latter replaced it in several ways. During this process there was no major role for the Benelux, so far as is known. Neither the literature, nor the Benelux itself presents anything of a pioneering example of this period. This brings us to the next chapter, and the question of whether the Benelux still has a role of inspiring integration in an expanding European Union, or whether a shift can be seen towards the Benelux becoming a mere tool for the execution of European integration.

37

3. The contemporary Benelux

As was shown in the previous chapter, the historical Benelux had a pioneering role towards European cooperation, with the last major event in 1985. For the contemporary Benelux, and the second part of this thesis, we move to 2008. In this year the new Benelux Treaty was signed. As mentioned earlier, this treaty brought a new structure to the Benelux and expanded its competences, seeking to give more meaning to the cooperation. In order to analyse the possibly changed role of the Benelux in the European project it would be logical to begin with this new treaty. As it outlines the new Benelux and its aims, the treaty can provide a good picture of how the contemporary role of the Benelux has been officially stated. Following this the four-year work programme and the annual plans of the Benelux can be explored. In the Benelux Treaty it was agreed by the Benelux institutions to present structured annual plans and strategies for a better cooperation. It is useful to look at several of these plans to see how cooperation and the ambitions are depicted. The analysis also includes the evaluation reports that are presented at the end of each year. This provides the opportunity to examine not only the ambitions and goals, but also to see the achievements of the Benelux and how its relationship with the EU is working out in practice.

A comparison between the 2013 and 2016 reports enables an even closer look at this relationship. While 2013 was still the beginning of the new Benelux structure, the 2016 reports show ambitious progress, especially with the Dutch EU presidency of that year. This presidency was seen as a way to enhance cooperation between the Benelux and the EU, which resulted in specific strategies and report on this interaction also. Taken together these documents provide an overview of the interaction between the Benelux and the EU in detailed policy fields, and hence provide insight into the contemporary role of the Benelux. The recent developments this new structure can also serve to clarify how the role of the Benelux has been changing in recent years. Thus these newest documents can shed some light on the future as well.

The new Benelux Treaty The new Benelux Treaty was signed in 2008 and entered into force in 2012. Its most obvious emphasis is on the three main priorities: economic integration, sustainable development and cooperation on legal and internal affairs. Hence the expanded functioning beyond economic areas becomes immediately clear. The treaty outlines the functioning of the Benelux and

38 includes a few articles that relate to the role of European integration. The relationship with the European Union is mentioned already in the second article. Apart from strengthening its sub-regional cooperation, the Benelux Union aims to continue its role of being at the forefront of European integration and also of inspiring it.98 This not only shows how the European Union and the Benelux are connected, but also the importance of this connection. Furthermore, the idea of continuing the role of inspiring integration implies that the Benelux Union has been fulfilling this role since it came into existence. It thus does not need to be re- introduced but simply to be continued. Hence, according to the treaty the inspiring role of the Benelux has not changed over the years.

One of the ways of maintaining and enhancing its role in the European project is stated in Article 24. The treaty emphasises that more cooperation with neighbouring regions and other European sub-regional organisations should be developed. This would not only be helpful in European integration, but also in achieving the other goals of the Benelux Union.99 For this there are several possible explanations: a better relationship with the other sub- regional organisations makes it easier to spread ideas for integration. Furthermore, it can strengthen the position of sub-regional organisations in the EU, which can be used to obtain more influence over European policy.

Apart from these two articles, the Benelux Treaty provides no information on the relationship with the European Union. It focuses on the basic aims and functioning, which means that an in-depth analysis is required to gather more information. For instance, the document on political declarations of the Benelux countries in this new treaty explain the new treaty as a modern way of enhancing cooperation. The customs union and the Schengen Area are mentioned as historical achievements of the Benelux, as they demonstrate the potential of this sub-regional cooperation. The new treaty could help to continue and strengthen this cooperation. As regards the interaction between the European Union and the Benelux, it is stated that the treaty allows for closer cooperation in the area of the EU concerned with Common Foreign and Security Policy. In order to gain more influence over European decision-making, the Benelux countries need to present common statements.

98 Benelux, Verdrag tot herziening van het op 3 februari 1958 gesloten verdrag tot instelling van de Benelux Economische Unie, Brussel: Benelux 2008, art. 2. 99 Ibidem, art. 24. 39

The enhancement of the relationship with other sub-regional organisations is further outlined in the declaration document by stating that the Visegrad Group and the Baltic States could also be examples of such. Together the treaty can help the Benelux to deal with the challenges of a changing world and with the struggle for European integration.100

The new Benelux Treaty is not presented as a shift to a new role in integration. Compared to the Visegrad Group, which presented a statement of new goals after the accession was completed, the Benelux adheres to its aim to inspire European integration. Nevertheless, the other rationale mentioned concerning the struggling EU is interesting, as it contrasts with the previously discussed rationales. Instead of giving new meaning to the Benelux, or incorporating the new competences beyond economic integration, the treaty is connected to the challenges that Europe is facing. It can stimulate the Benelux to work on innovative solutions to integration problems. According to the declaration, the Benelux should stimulate the implementation of the European Lisbon Treaty and help preserve the European project. Thus the Benelux is not only trying to inspire European integration, but also its execution. This phenomenon was already shown in the IOB report, and seems to reflect a changing role for the Benelux towards having a mixture of inspiring and executing European integration.

The 2013-2016 work programme As became clear in the official guidelines of the Benelux, an important part of cooperation is on ways to focus on stimulating and inspiring European integration. Hence it seems that the key role of the Benelux in the European project has not changed over the years. Although the competences have been extended and the European Union has since developed, the Benelux still sees itself as an example that can be at the forefront of integration. However, it is questionable whether such an inspiring role is really working out in practice. In order to examine this one can first explore the four-year work programme of 2013-2016, which was presented after the treaty entered into force in 2012. In the programme strategies are outlined for the achievement of the three main goals that were set in the treaty.101 These comprise seven policy areas: ‘Energy’, ‘Environment’, ‘Social cohesion’, ‘Economy and Knowledge’, ‘Mobility’, ‘Safety and Movement of Persons’ and ‘Fraud Prevention’. Together

100 Benelux, Politieke verklaring van de Benelux regeringen, Brussel: Benelux 2008, pp. 1-2. 101 Benelux, Gemeenschappelijke werkprogramma 2013-2016, Brussel: Benelux 2013, p. 3. 40 they indicate how the Benelux should act in the forthcoming years. Depending on specific policy area, both the aspect of inspiring integration as well as its execution have been envisaged. For instance, in the ‘Energy’ area the Benelux tries to integrate the three countries into a common market. Since the energy markets of Germany, Austria and France are already connected to those of the Benelux, a deeper level of cooperation by the Pentalateral Energy Forum could eventually result in greater integration.102 This shows how the Benelux can inspire European integration by first developing its own integrated system, after which it is spread across other European countries.

Another area in which the Benelux could inspire the EU is ‘Fraud Prevention’. The internal market and free movement within Europe have made the EU vulnerable to fraud. According to the work programme European countries are struggling to combat such fraud and cannot do this on their own. The Benelux has been working together on fraud prevention for ten years with good results. In the forthcoming period this cooperation should be increased and be an example to the rest of Europe. It is stated that even greater Benelux integration in this area could inspire the EU to take fraud prevention to a European level.103

Together these examples show how the Benelux can inspire the EU to integrate several policy areas. Nevertheless, other areas presented in the work programme demonstrate that the Benelux bases its policy on existing European integration. This is for instance the case in the ‘Environment’ area, which is based on European directives and on EU2020. In this area the Benelux would only work on the execution of European policy. In this context the role of the Benelux is to pay special attention to cross-border effects and to discuss the implementation of EU legislation.104 The same can be seen in the areas of ‘Mobility’ and ‘Safety and Movement of Persons’. Here the Benelux also functions as executor of European policy, as it tries to stimulate implementation and uses this to create more cooperation.105

When looking at all seven Benelux policy areas it becomes clear that only two of them focus on inspiring European integration, while three are based on executing European policy. The other two areas, which deal with social cohesion and the knowledge economy, show more

102 Benelux, Gemeenschappelijke werkprogramma 2013-2016, Brussel: Benelux 2013, p. 7. 103 Ibidem, p. 14. 104 Ibidem, p. 8. 105 Ibidem, pp. 11-13. 41 internal Benelux integration. Although the Benelux promotes its ongoing role of being an example to the EU and of inspiring European integration, this seems minor when set against the wider work programme, given that this is only reflected in two out of seven policy areas. Nevertheless, cooperation with the neighbouring German state North-Rhine Westphalia, which is also mentioned in the programme, shows that the Benelux is ambitious to take integration into other regions.106 Therefore, to indicate a changed role by using this programme only is not enough. Although the programme shows that many Benelux policies are based on executing European policy, the ongoing aim of inspiring integration is heavily emphasized. Thus, the combination of inspiration and execution is again evident.

From this the question arises of whether this combination can also be seen in practice. Although the documents show the aim of inspiring integration, it would be interesting to examine whether this can also be seen in the achievements of the Benelux. It is possible that this goal is only an idea, or a stated aim in the documents, while in practice there are achievements to be seen only in the executing areas. This question is made even clearer when considering how the debate on the relevance of the Benelux continued after the new structure entered into force. This suggests that even with the new structure there is still a lack of working examples of the inspiring role, rendering the functioning of the Benelux unsatisfactory.

2013: the annual plan Greater insight into this can be gained when focusing on the next level. Based on the four- year work programme, annual plans are developed. When looking closely at such a work plan a more detailed strategy can be seen. The first annual plan based on the work programme was presented for 2013. The plan is structured along the three main priorities set in the Benelux Treaty. Like the working programme, the plan also shows some types of inspiring integration in the policy areas. The ‘Energy’ area is again promoted as an example, which needs to be expanded.107 The same can be said about the policy on ‘Environment’. More cooperation in this area could consolidate the role of the Benelux to become an example to the EU.108 However, apart from this, no explicit policy goals are mentioned.

106 Benelux, Gemeenschappelijke werkprogramma 2013-2016, Brussel: Benelux 2013, p. 15. 107 Benelux, Jaarplan 2013, Brussel: Benelux 2013, p. 10. 108 Ibidem, p. 22. 42

However, the area of ‘Fraud Prevention’ shows a difference. In the work programme this was presented as an area in which the Benelux could inspire the EU. Yet, in the annual plan, which outlines the strategy on tackling fraud, there are no clear signs of this inspiring role. On the contrary, the detailed strategy in the plan is based on the implementation of European policy and on following the developments at the European level.109

Another ambition in the programme was to cooperate with other sub-regional organisations and neighbouring regions. In the annual plan the example of North-Rhine Westphalia with some specific areas for cooperation is shown. However, this seems more likely to be integration at a low level rather than the ambitious spread of integration across the rest of Europe. Furthermore, apart from the German region, no other regions are mentioned. In the outline of the specific strategy it is only stated that the Benelux should cooperate with other organisations. Because of this it is questionable whether such cooperation will be achieved, since one would assume that a deeper strategy than this is required. From this lack of any further outlining of the inspiring aspects, and from the plans that were shown in other policy areas based on the execution of European integration, an interesting thought arises. The ambitious role of the Benelux to inspire does not seem to materialise adequately in the detailed strategies from the annual plan, while the role of executing integration certainly does. This seems to indicate that inspiring the EU is more of a noble ambition, while in practice the Benelux cooperation is more about the execution of European policy.

This phenomenon seems to become clearer when looking at economic cooperation in the annual plan. Here the mixed role in the declaration is presented as inspiring the execution of the EU Lisbon goals on growth and jobs. As the Benelux can assist in achieving these goals, this aim is set to be at the forefront of this realisation.110 At first this seems to present the mixed role of the Benelux once again. Instead of integration being an example to the rest of Europe, or using Benelux cooperation to enable the easier execution of European policy, a combination of these elements is promoted. By this means the Benelux could become an example for implementing European policy. However, although this seems to be a mixture of inspiration and execution, it can be seen as a shift towards the latter. By working together integration can be executed, which gives a clear result for half of the mixed role. However,

109 Benelux, Jaarplan 2013, Brussel: Benelux 2013, pp. 34-35. 110 Ibidem, p. 14. 43 only then can the second phase begin, in which the Benelux inspires other EU Member States through this execution. It does not only take longer before this will lead to success, but it is also questionable whether it can really succeed, as exactly how to inspire is not explained. Hence this clearly shows how in these few areas in which the Benelux ultimately wishes to inspire, it is in fact operating as a tool for the implementation of European policy.

2013: the annual report The annual plan of course still only states its intentions. It could be that the achievements and results at the end of the year are very different from what was proposed in this plan. The balance between the way this ambition to inspire was presented in detailed plans and the eventual result can vary greatly. More of this can be examined from the annual report. The report is presented at the end of each year in order to consider the Benelux achievements. At the end of 2013 it evaluated the first year of the Benelux in the new treaty structure. The first things seen in the report are the main achievements that the Benelux institutions have made during the year. For the Committee of Ministers all things mentioned concern cooperation on implementing EU legislation, although this is again presented as the mixed role of inspiring the execution of European integration, and shows that the Benelux is indeed working on this role.111

Next the achievements in the known policy areas are shown. This initially deals with the ‘Energy’ area. Here it becomes clear that the Benelux worked in 2013 on several projects for building a common energy market. The plan was presented as an example of how the Benelux could inspire the EU and spread integration. As the report shows progress in the plan, it can be fairly claimed that this common energy market is not just an ambition without any results. According to the report, various discussions took place on completing this energy market. In addition to this, the Benelux policies on energy were linked to their other ambition of cooperating more with neighbouring regions. The collaboration with North- Rhine Westphalia is mentioned in the field of electric transport. This seems to show that the Benelux is working towards its inspiring ambitions and is about to complete a level of integration that can be an example to the rest of Europe.112

111 Benelux, Jaarverslag 2013, Brussel: Benelux 2014, p. 7. 112 Ibidem, pp. 9-10. 44

Yet when a closer look is taken a few criticisms arise. Firstly, the only progress presented is on meetings that took place, but without showing any actual results. This would indicate that no achievements have yet been made in this area and that one cannot speak of the Benelux as genuinely working on its role of inspiring integration. However, in order to gain a better understanding of this a longer timeframe is needed. This could provide real insights into the results. Such a view will be given later in this chapter. Nevertheless, the lack of any real achievements is not the only criticism that can be made. In the report it can be seen how the meetings described and the projects that were launched by the Benelux were mainly stimulated by European policy. Several meetings that were mentioned were used to bring the Benelux countries together in order to work out a joint strategy for implementing European legislation. Even the main completed project, on energy efficiency, was based on European policy. Furthermore, it was mentioned in the report that the has rejected another Benelux energy project; this means that other ways for funding this project need to be found.113 This possibly indicates the dependence of the Benelux on EU funding. On the one hand this could mean that it is difficult for the Benelux to commence new projects, hence making further integration complex. On the other hand such dependency could result in some EU influence in the projects, from which the assumption can be made that the EU can easily use the Benelux as a tool for executing its integration.

In other policy areas the execution of European integration dominates. Several meetings were organized to discuss the interpretation of European directives.114 However, as far as ‘Fraud Prevention’, which is the other Benelux policy area that was presented as one that could inspire European integration, is concerned the report mentions progress. In 2013 the Benelux countries proposed a common risk analysis that should be shared amongst other European countries. Since this project had only just been presented, there is not very much more to be outlined. In the report it is stated that this analysis project needs to be further developed in order to persuade other EU countries to participate.115 This therefore needs to be examined once more, but in the longer timeframe in order to appreciate the real achievements of these projects and just how the Benelux inspired the EU.

113 Benelux, Jaarverslag 2013, Brussel: Benelux 2014, pp. 9-10. 114 Ibidem, pp. 13-14. 115 Ibidem, p. 35. 45

Aside from the fraud aspect, the measures discussed in the report do not seem to have inspired European integration. It is more revealing how the Benelux has been used as a tool to implement European policy. Nevertheless the report’s final chapter recommends focusing on the role of the Benelux as a testing ground for Europe. In this chapter one would expect to see just what has been achieved through this testing ground role over the last year. However, much of the chapter focuses on the cross-border projects of the Benelux countries, and with North-Rhine Westphalia. For the latter this concerns, for instance, the movement of workers as well as security topics.116 Yet it also shows more about how cooperation and integration with this German region is taking place. Unfortunately, what this means and how it could inspire the EU is not discussed in the report. It can therefore be said that the report’s chapter focusing on the pioneering role in fact does not do so very much. As it focuses on projects without showing the meaning of the Benelux role, this shows again a lack of inspiration in the role.

The final part of the report makes clear that additional methods of cooperation took place. Apart from the positive results at the European energy meetings, the North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative is mentioned. This initiative attempts to develop a grid to connect the renewable energy sources of the North Sea. Together with OECD cooperation on green growth in the Benelux, this shows how it is trying to achieve its ambitions on sustainability.117 Again, the meaning of this with regards to inspiring Europe is not mentioned, but cooperation with other European countries shows the development of the Benelux ambitions across the rest of Europe. One could see this as a good example of being an inspiring pioneer. However, as the results are not clear no judgement can yet be given. To understand how this development continued the Benelux documents of the following years can be examined.

2016: the annual plan The annual plan of 2016 can give greater insight into the development of these ambitions. As the final year covered by the four-year work programme that was presented in 2013, it can be helpful to examine this plan and compare it with what was discussed in the 2013 plan. In the introduction of the 2016 annual plan it can be seen that the Benelux emphasizes its

116 Benelux, Jaarverslag 2013, Brussel: Benelux 2014, p. 39. 117 Ibidem, p. 40. 46 inspiring role in the European project. The various crises that hit Europe, such as the financial and the migration crises, are mentioned as stimulators of greater European integration and regional cooperation. For the Benelux this offers the opportunity of strengthening its level of cooperation and of maintaining its foremost position regarding integration. Furthermore, the annual planning is regarded as successful in deepening cooperation and of being a testing ground for Europe. For closing the four-year period and developing a new work programme, the year 2016 could be used to enhance the Benelux interaction with Europe even more.118

Like the other annual plan, that of 2016 is also structured by showing the ambitions in each policy area of the Benelux. In 2013 it was shown how the areas of ‘Energy’ and ‘Fraud Prevention’ were the main fields of Benelux cooperation, in which the inspiring role for Europe was visible. In the 2016 plan the ‘Energy’ part begins with the challenges facing the Benelux. The goals of sustainable development and renewable energy cause the Benelux countries to question just how to reach these goals. According to the Benelux, this challenge provides the opportunity to become a testing ground in energy transition, as this process takes place all over Europe and even beyond. The Dutch EU presidency will focus on this transition and could help the Benelux to master this.119

In addition, the Benelux is still working on the Pentalateral Energy Forum. Between 2013 and 2016 several agreements were reached between the participating European countries. Currently the Benelux wants to strengthen these agreements with testing the energy market. Energy transition with renewable sources as well as with the North Sea Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative can all be included in this strategy for gaining control of integration and working on the European energy union.120

As far as the other inspiring area, ‘Fraud Prevention’, is concerned, the plan shows that the strategy has been successful over the years.121 The ideas proposed for this year seem to be more focused on the Benelux itself. Measures on very specific types of fraud in trade and

118 Benelux, Jaarplan 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2016, p. 5. 119 Ibidem, p. 8. 120 Ibidem, pp. 9-11. 121 Ibidem, p. 50. 47 welfare systems are mentioned.122 It thus looks as if the ambitious idea of inspiring the EU in fraud prevention has now been subordinated. Nevertheless, the European aspect in this area is also shown. The Benelux does try to influence the EU by proposing measures to combat fraud. The more important part of this however is in cooperation with the European Commission. The Benelux developed the Social Network Analysis, a method for fraud prevention. This was presented to the Commission and now together they will attempt to introduce the Social Network Analysis to the rest of the EU.123 If the spread of this analysis is successful, it can be presented as a typical example of the Benelux inspiring the EU. The long-term ambition to be a testing ground and to inspire was already presented in the four- year strategy. Since the European Commission is also working on this distribution, it can be considered a very positive result.

In 2013 the other areas of the plan did not show the Benelux ambition to inspire European integration. These focused more on intra-Benelux cooperation, and even on executing European integration. When examining these areas once more it can become clear if they still retain this function. Furthermore, this will provide insight into the possible difference from the extent to which the Benelux is used to execute integration.

The area of ‘Social Cohesion’ had an intra-Benelux focus in 2013 and still has this in 2016. The ambitions presented are those of working towards cohesion in the Benelux. Yet the other intra-Benelux area, ‘Economy and Knowledge’, now clearly shows elements of all functions: intra, inspiring and executing European integration. The European Commission introduced a package of legislation for creating a digital internal market. The implementation of this package could be stimulated by the Benelux, making the execution easier. The Benelux policies could be adapted to this European legislation.124 In addition, the Benelux can strengthen its own integration by building upon these European plans. On the one hand this will enhance the functioning of the Benelux itself, while on the other it can inspire the EU to integrate even more.125 Hence this area seems to be a perfect example of a mixed Benelux, poised between inspiring and executing, and having good cooperation with

122 Benelux, Jaarplan 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2016, p. 53. Ibidem, p. 56. 123 Ibidem, p. 51. Ibidem, p. 55. 124 Ibidem, p. 26. 125 Ibidem, p. 29. 48 the EU. However, these plans to inspire by building upon European integration are still just ambitions. The other part of the mixture, on executing integration, seems more solid, as the European legislation has already been approved. However, from this annual plan it cannot yet be said whether this area will really function as a mixture, or will remain in the intra and executing position, with the latter being the only visible difference to 2013.

The 2013 plan and report show that the areas of ‘Environment’, ‘Mobility’, ‘Safety and Movement of Persons’ were heavily based on executing European integration. In the ‘Environment’ area of the 2016 plan it can be seen that this still focuses on climate change and sustainability in the European context. The general measures presented contribute to the EU2020 strategy, thus helping to execute European integration. The Benelux goal to be at the forefront of this integration initiative is again mentioned. An inspiring role for integrating beyond the European policies is not readily apparent, although the Benelux does attempt to stimulate the execution of this.126 In addition, the Benelux wants to issue a report with recommendations on the transition to a circular economy. In conferences organized by the Benelux, this circular economy was discussed. According to the plan the report will be shared internationally. Hence the Benelux can influence the rest of Europe on the transition towards a circular economy. Although this is still only a starting project, there could be a possibly inspiring role in this for the Benelux in the future.127

In the ‘Mobility’ area the 2016 plan presents ambitions that focus mainly on intra-Benelux mobility, with several European executing elements. For instance, developments in sustainable mobility are consistent with European legislation and the Urban Agenda for the EU. Therefore these measures are partly an implementation of European policies, while on the other hand they are presented as enhancing Benelux mobility.128 For the final area, ‘Safety and Movement of Persons’, the same can be said. This area strongly indicates elements for enhancing safety in an intra-Benelux context. A connection to the implementation of European legislation is made, but the report does not really elaborate on it.129 In cooperating on the fight against terrorism strengthening integration is mentioned. This can build on existing cooperation at the bilateral and European level. However, this is

126 Benelux, Jaarplan 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2016, p. 12. 127 Ibidem, p. 19. 128 Ibidem, p. 35. 129 Ibidem, p. 47. 49 not presented as an example of how the Benelux can inspire the EU to cooperate and to integrate more, but solely as a way to increase the safety of the Benelux.130

Like the other reports, the final part is dedicated to the Benelux as a testing ground for Europe and cooperation with other organisations. The Benelux is very optimistic about cooperation with North-Rhine Westphalia. In recent years very positive results have emerged, which provide a good perspective for sharing cooperation with other regions and countries, thus inspiring Europe.131 As far as the EU is concerned, the first wish of the Benelux is to have more discussions on cooperation. The Dutch EU presidency in 2016 could stimulate such a closer relationship. Another ambition is to pay more attention to European legislation. This could help the Benelux to implement legislation more smoothly. Furthermore, closer cooperation can be useful when creating Benelux legislation and measures. The mixed role of, on the one hand, executing European integration, while on the other building upon existing integration, was already visible in the various areas. The Benelux currently cites both roles as part of its functioning, which can be enhanced by creating a better focus on the EU.132

The mixed role that the Benelux presents at the end of the plan could indicate that it gains a better sense of how it is interacting with the EU. Compared to the 2013 plan the 2016 plan shows a clearer mixture of inspiring and executing, which could be explained by the longer timeframe in the four-year work programme, as the results are now clearer. Although the Benelux still shows many executing elements, there are also some areas in which it tries to inspire the EU. The 2016 plan shows genuine progress on this, although the final result cannot be seen as fully comprehensive. It is questionable whether more time is really needed for results to become more widely apparent, as 2016 was the final year of the four- year work programme. During these four years the mixed role of executing integration in several areas while also trying to inspire seems to have developed. The few inspiring strategies and results so far can therefore be accepted as viable ones for the Benelux. As far as other inspiring ambitions are concerned, it is questionable whether the Benelux, in its current functioning, can really assume that broader pioneering role.

130 Benelux, Jaarplan 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2016, p. 44. 131 Ibidem, p. 64. 132 Ibidem, pp. 60-61. 50

Nevertheless the Benelux was ambitious about cooperation with the EU in 2016. Another reason for this sentiment may be the EU Dutch presidency during the first half of 2016. In an additional document it can be seen how this presidency could help. The Benelux itself also has a rotating presidency. For each presidency the country presents a document with priorities. In 2016 Luxembourg showed in its report that the EU Dutch presidency could help the Benelux to inspire European integration. The experience that Luxembourg gained from its own EU presidency in 2015 could also play a role in this.133 One way to influence this is by creating more common Benelux statements in the EU.134 However, no more details are discussed in the document.

At the end of 2016 Luxembourg presented the key achievements of its presidency. In this report clear examples are shown of the Benelux functioning, but the realisation of these ambitions are not all clear. The Benelux meetings for preparing common statements at EU meetings did take place, as proposed in the priorities report.135 However, the possible effects of this are not shown. Furthermore, cooperation with the Dutch EU presidency is not mentioned at all. Of course, this does not automatically mean that this cooperation did not happen, but apparently it did not result in any clear achievements for presentation in this small report. Nevertheless, cooperation between the Benelux and the European Commission is evident, as the latter is often informed by Benelux documents and recommendations on policies.136 However, it cannot be certain that this will results in a closer relationship between these two. The rapprochement can of course be used for the Benelux to inspire the EU, but on the other hand it could also make it easier for the European Commission to use the Benelux for executing European integration. Hence, as both could profit from this, the eventual effects remain unclear.

2016: the annual report Not very much becomes clear from the final report on the Luxembourgian Benelux presidency, as only the very robust achievements are shown. The results from the ambitious annual plan and the Luxembourgian priorities are therefore not fully visible. A final

133 Benelux, Prioriteiten voor het Luxemburgse Benelux-voorzitterschap van 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2016, p. 1. 134 Ibidem, p. 4. 135 Benelux, Hoogtepunten van de Benelux-samenwerking in 2016 onder Luxemburgs voorzitterschap, Brussel: Benelux 2017, p. 4. 136 Ibidem, p. 1. 51 viewpoint on all of this, together with a second comparison with 2013, could be formed by looking at the 2016 annual report. The annual plan showed, on the one hand, ambitious proposals for the year, while on the other it presented a mixture of inspiring and executing European integration. Hence, it is also interesting to see how this balance is depicted in the final report. Like all documents we have seen before, this report is also structured by the various Benelux policy areas, beginning with ‘Energy’. From this it becomes immediately clear that in this area a mixture of inspiring and of executing occurred. In the meetings of the Pentalateral Energy Forum cooperation between the Benelux and other countries was strengthened. However, one of the members at the meetings was the European Commission, who was present to ensure that the outcomes would be consistent with recent EU proposals.137 This could mean that the forum, which had for the Benelux the ambition of giving inspiring results for integration on energy, now also has a role in executing European energy policies. In other parts of the Benelux Energy policy area the same can be seen. Efficient energy use, the transition to renewable energy and the North Seas Countries’ Offshore Grid Initiative all show the Benelux arranging meetings and projects, but with the European Commission as an influential stakeholder.138 Therefore this can be seen as a balanced mixture, although the idea to be at the forefront of integration is not mentioned, nor are ambitions such as working together with the Dutch EU presidency on the energy transition.

In other Benelux policy areas the mixture between intra-Benelux functioning and executing already became quite clear from the annual plan. Areas such as ‘Economy and Knowledge’ show, apart from strengthening the Benelux economic cooperation, an adaptation to EU legislation.139 These areas seem to fulfil more the ambitions presented in the annual plan: enhancing the functioning and executing European integration, while with areas such as ‘Energy’ no achievements to inspire were made. Nevertheless the area of ‘Safety and Movement of Persons’ also shows the wish to inspire. Benelux cooperation in the fight against terrorism is again mentioned as a testing ground for Europe.140 In 2016 the Benelux and North-Rhine Westphalia presented its recommendations to the EU at the Dutch

137 Benelux, Jaarverslag 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2017, p. 11. 138 Ibidem, p. 12. 139 Ibidem, p. 23. 140 Ibidem, p. 33. 52

Presidency conference. Since the European Commission is enthusiastic about this strategy, and mentioned it as an example for Europe, this can be regarded as a success. With the Benelux working on the next phase of this strategy, inspiring this part of the integration process can continue into the future.141

In addition to the safety strategy the other ambitious area in the 2016 plan was ‘Fraud Prevention’. Here the Benelux also genuinely presented an ambition to inspire integration. The Social Network Analysis would be spread across the rest of the EU. The final report shows that this was also a success. The Analysis was renamed as Transaction Network Analysis (TNA) and brought to an EU meeting. The position of the Dutch EU presidency was used to present the TNA at the meeting. From this it was concluded that EU Member States can participate voluntarily in this strategy. A European team was founded in order to further develop and monitor the TNA. For the Benelux this was again a successful example of how it can function as a testing ground and inspire European integration.142

Just as in the other reports, the final part is about specific EU cooperation. In the 2016 annual plan this was explicitly depicted as a mixed role, which could be enhanced by the EU Dutch presidency. In the final report it can be seen that there was indeed closer cooperation. Meetings took place on the execution of European integration, for instance, in adapting Benelux legislation to EU legislation. In addition, the already mentioned examples of spreading projects across the rest of Europe, hence inspiring integration, shows the other part of the mixed role. Furthermore, the Benelux began to develop a new work programme for the 2017-2020 period. In this the Permanent Representations to the EU of the Benelux countries were consulted for the EU dimension of the programme.143 This suggests that the mixed role might become more highly visible in the future, or that the EU influence in Benelux policy making will be increased.

When carefully considering the 2016 final report it becomes clear that the Benelux can be proud of two achievements of inspiring European integration. It was an ambition to inspire that worked out in these respects. This is an example of successful mixed Benelux functioning. Although in many ways the Benelux successfully executed integration, in some

141 Benelux, Jaarverslag 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2017, p. 37. 142 Ibidem, p. 43. 143 Ibidem, p. 50. 53 areas it succeeded also in creating pioneering projects to inspire European cooperation. Therefore the Benelux proves that it can still have pioneering relevance, albeit in minor areas, instead of the European integration process as a whole.

Although the smaller scale pioneering aspects of the Benelux are shown in the report, execution is also evident in many areas. Of course, this was to be expected in a mixed role, especially as it was predicted and keenly anticipated in the annual plan. However, the mixture of inspiring and executing cannot be said to be in complete balance, as there is greater execution of European integration shown than the Benelux was acting to inspire it. This becomes very clear when comparing the annual plan with the final report. In some areas, such as ‘Energy’, the inspiring topics from the annual plan are either not mentioned in the final report, or they have been used instead to execute European integration. Such a change not only differs from the theoretical ambition to inspire it, but it is also a change from 2013, in which such a difference in practice was not apparent.

An explanation for this change is difficult to provide from these reports alone. One could assume that in 2013 the ambitious projects were still in the starting phase. In 2016 several achievements had been made and the projects were still in progress. When such projects become more developed there will come a moment in which the European influence must be included, as EU legislation plays a role in the Benelux and the EU can be of use in realising more cooperation. If this is the case then it is not surprising that the European Commission is such an important stakeholder in all these projects. Yet this does not fully explain why the EU might use its influence in making the Benelux execute European integration. In this matter a further assumption can be made, which concerns the developments by the EU. In the years between 2013 and 2016 the EU has also worked on integration in those same areas on which the Benelux is focusing. It would be logical for the EU to work together with a related organisation with similar ambitions, especially when European progress is outpacing that of the Benelux.

Future prospects and conclusion The explicitly mixed role of the Benelux and the EU influence in the new four-year work programme suggest a continuation of this method into the future. It is therefore surprising when a brief look at the new four-year work programme shows that this role of both inspiring and executing is more or less absent. The programme is structured into several

54 areas that all show the ambition of the Benelux to be at the forefront of European integration. The general introduction builds upon the few inspiring achievements that we have seen over recent years.144 As the new four-year period only recently began, it is too early to say how this may work out. It was to be expected that the ambitions to inspire would still be present, especially since the achievements of the last year could stimulate this. However, as most of the reports showed that the Benelux was increasingly executing integration and working on its internal functioning, it would certainly be impressive if, over the forthcoming years, the Benelux really could become an inspiring organisation rather than an executing one.

Overall, the documents of this contemporary period show both similarities to and differences from each other. In both years that have been explored a mixed role for the Benelux of inspiring and executing European integration can be seen. While the executing part is quite clear, the inspiring aspects are more complex. In 2013 these were stated more as ambitions than as visible processes. In 2016 a few fairly inspiring achievements are seen, although not all have been fully fulfilled. Some of them had been even changed into executing aspects. Thus it can be said that the contemporary Benelux role is made up of both inspiring and executing integration, and in two ways. On the one hand this can be achieved separately, becoming noticeable only from inspiring ambitions in one area, while executing European policy in another area. On the other hand, changing the inspiring aspects into executing aspects, or stating the ambition to inspire EU Member States by executing European policy, indicates a highly mixed method. However, it can generally be claimed that the truly inspiring part is rather limited compared to those ambitions. The wish to inspire is often stated, and one could even consider this ambition to be disproportionate, or was perhaps only expressed because the Benelux wants to prove its deep wish to inspire. The results are minor, but can still considered as achievements, making the contemporary Benelux a mixture of executing European integration and trying to be a pioneer in specific projects.

When Dangerfield’s categories of sub-regional cooperation, as discussed in the first chapter, are considered, then the contemporary Benelux no longer fits any of them. The pioneering

144 Benelux, Common Work Programme 2017-2020, Brussels: Benelux 2017, p. 5. 55 category is not suitable to this mixed role, in which the Benelux’s pioneering influence is far from dominant in its functioning. This does not however need to be problematic. Sub- regional cooperation can find new meaning when it no longer fits its category, as can be seen with the Visegrad Group. The Benelux, however, does seem to want to remain as a pioneer; this is clear from its statements. In practice this does not really work out, as its pioneering achievements are small. For the Benelux itself it is enough to show its pride in this matter, which can be seen in its new work programme. Instead of trying to gain meaning from a mixed role, the Benelux only reiterates its inspiring function. Yet it remains very questionable whether any future results in either inspiring or being a testing ground will ever really impress. Taking into account what we have seen so far, it could not be expected to rise very far above mediocrity, especially when set against its ambitious goals. It seems clear why the relevance debate still continues; for a supposedly inspiring pioneer the results no longer convince.

56

4. Conclusion

The Benelux cooperation began with the goal of enhancing the economies of the Benelux countries. By integrating, these countries could restructure their economies and improve their welfare. As the Benelux first began when European countries were seeking a way of working together, it was seen as a pioneer. Integrating well before the European project gave the Benelux the opportunity to become a testing ground and to inspire European cooperation. Yet after several decades of ongoing European integration the relevance of the Benelux began to be questioned. European policies had replaced most of those of the Benelux’s, while the latter was no longer visibly integrating in a leading role. Therefore a debate commenced on the functioning and meaning of the Benelux, in which some even called for the abolishment of the Benelux Union.

In order to gain more insight into the functioning of the Benelux and its interaction with the European project, its role has been examined. As seen in the theory of sub-regional cooperation, of which the Benelux is a form of, it was supposed to act as a pioneer for Europe. However, the developments and the current debate indicate that the Benelux is no longer able to fulfil this pioneering role. This could be potentially solved by changing to another meaningful role; to give cooperation a new use and relevance. However, this did not happen. Thus a weakening pioneering role could mean that Benelux interaction simply changed to being used more as a tool for executing European integration, which only complicates the question of its current relevance.

To examine whether its role really has changed from inspiring to executing integration, its historical role can be compared to its contemporary role. For the historical role it can be seen that the Benelux indeed was inspiring European integration, especially by the customs agreement, the memorandum of Messina and the Schengen Agreement. Although this role was not always explicit as a strategy and only becomes clear in retrospect, the interaction between the Benelux and the European project was that of a pioneer. By being at the forefront of integration, the Benelux could function as a testing ground while stimulating European countries to follow the path towards greater cooperation.

The contemporary role, however, is much more complex. As European integration developed over time in many areas, it affected the Benelux. In its current functioning the

57

Benelux tries to integrate in various areas and to continue to inspire Europe. In some areas this ambition is evident by aiming at policy-making ahead of the EU. In other areas, however, the Benelux policy is clearly based on the EU or is concerned with implementing European policy. In this way the Benelux becomes more of a tool for executing European integration. Since both the inspiring and the executing are evident, the contemporary Benelux role is a combination of the two. However, this is not a very clear combination with just as many inspiring as executing aspects to be seen. While the Benelux shows its inspiring ambitions, the executing leads in practice. Although some recent inspiring achievements can still be seen, the effects of implementing European policy are far more noticeable. Furthermore, the mixed method by which the Benelux tries to inspire other countries to stimulate executing European integration makes this combination even more ambiguous.

Hence the question of the extent to which the Benelux role has changed; from the comparison a change is clearly visible. The pioneering interaction with the European project has been transformed into a vague combination of inspiring and executing. Recent events in which the Benelux has pioneered for and inspired Europe cannot be found. In the modern expanded European Union the Benelux only seems able to initiate small projects to inspire, while the other policy areas are influenced by the EU or have merely an intra-Benelux focus. Having limited options but a will to pioneer, the challenge to inspire by executing European integration is understandable and quite rational. However, in the contemporary situation with a dominant EU, the realisation that this cannot restore the pioneering Benelux role has to be acknowledged.

Discussion Through this thesis certain insights into several aspects of the Benelux have been gained. Initially the historical pioneering role was proven. This role is not something that the contemporary Benelux had invented, but became clearly evident over time. By looking at the current contrasting combination of inspiring and executing, the relevance debate becomes more understandable. The functioning that results from the new treaty and structure shows the ongoing struggle of the Benelux with its role. In this way this thesis contributes to the debate through a comparison between history and the present. By connecting the Benelux role to the categories of sub-regional cooperation, the theory on this cooperation and its meaning has been added to the debate. Furthermore, this thesis has also contributed an

58 examination of the very recent functioning of the Benelux to the debate, which had not thus far been performed.

From this thesis prospects for the future can also be suggested. In the theory of sub-regional cooperation it became clear how the Benelux’s pioneering role lessened within the expanded European Union. Instead of inventing a new role, as did the Visegrad Group when its debate took place, the Benelux is still trying to keep its pioneering role, thus prolonging the debate. From this theory one could even say that the Benelux will experience an ongoing struggle with the debate unless and until its role is redefined. Of course, this could be achieved by bringing back a full pioneering interaction, but it is more obvious to begin looking for a new role and a new meaning, and to bring this into a renewed debate.

In 2018 it will be a full decade since the Benelux countries signed the new treaty to continue the Benelux cooperation. It will also be 60 years since the original treaty created the Benelux Economic Union, while the agreement on the customs union goes back 74 years. In this long history of the Benelux many things have developed and changed. The Benelux and its original pioneering role cannot remain an exception to these changes. In the ongoing European integration the Benelux finds itself increasingly as an executing tool, as European policy influences nearly all areas of the Benelux. The debate on relevance is therefore justified, but this does not mean that cooperation is outdated or unnecessary. The mixed role which has been evident on several occasions showed that with good EU collaboration the Benelux can retain both its functioning and its achievements, albeit they are small ones. When focusing on this mixed role, and stating it as such and building from it, the Benelux could become successful once more. As far as integration and cooperation are concerned, this will not end the debate, as differences in vision and in opinions will ensure. Yet a clearly stated mixed focus, proven by its achievements, can constitute a more solid response by the Benelux to the debate than the old pioneering ambitions, which often fell short.

Like the IOB report, which was critical yet positive on the Benelux potential, was trying to show, Benelux cooperation can be useful in this way. Instead of continuing to struggle, or even think about abolishment, the Benelux should take note of and learn from the criticism. After its long history the statements on the mixed role in the 2016 Benelux reports can be seen as signs that the Benelux finally gains the appropriate type of awareness. This could be a turning point, leading the way to a new meaning. Therefore the recently published 2017-

59

2020 Work Programme, which again shows an optimistic strategy full of inspiring ambitions and challenges to become a pioneer once more, is unfortunately inadequate and misguided.

Limitations and suggestions for further research This study has some limitations. First of all, the historical period was based upon three major events. This gives a structure to the research, but can limit the focus. Furthermore, for this period most of the documents used were from The Netherlands. Although the perspectives from Belgium and Luxembourg were often found in these documents, the use of more Belgian and Luxembourgian documents could have enriched the study. As far as contemporary documents are concerned, these were limited to plans and reports. In this way an overview of the Benelux strategies was provided. Nevertheless a deeper examination, using specific documents in the policy areas, might have provided a more detailed view of the interaction with the EU. Unfortunately, that would have exceeded the scope and size of the study, although it might be a good idea for further research.

Another recommendation for building on this research is to look more closely into the historical pioneering role of the Benelux. For the three major events we have seen, the Benelux acted as such a pioneer. However, strictly speaking, this was not the Benelux Union as an institutionalized entity but resulted rather from trilateral cooperation between Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. For the first two events the union did not even exist, while for the 1985 Schengen Agreement the situation becomes more complex. Further research on the actors in these events could shed more light on its pioneering role and on the justification for the pride of the Benelux Union.

For additional recommendations, one could explore the period between 1985 and 2008. This could show in more detail how the Benelux interacted with the European project during the time the latter expanded in terms of the common market, as well as its monetary union and size. A final recommendation for building on this study is to examine the European perspective. As this study has focused on the Benelux viewpoint, examining the perspective of the other entity could be an interesting addition. When this has been achieved for both the historical as well as contemporary situation, then an impressive body of research may begin to emerge, which could have great influence on the Benelux debate.

60

Bibliography

Benelux, Common Work Programme 2017-2020, Brussels: Benelux 2017.

Benelux, Gemeenschappelijke werkprogramma 2013-2016, Brussel: Benelux 2013.

Benelux, Hoogtepunten van de Benelux-samenwerking in 2016 onder Luxemburgs voorzitterschap, Brussel: Benelux 2017.

Benelux, Jaarplan 2013, Brussel: Benelux 2013.

Benelux, Jaarplan 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2016.

Benelux, Jaarverslag 2013, Brussel: Benelux 2014.

Benelux, Jaarverslag 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2017.

Benelux, ‘Nieuw Benelux-Verdrag’ http://www.benelux.int/nl/benelux-unie/nieuw- benelux-verdrag, accessed November 16, 2017.

Benelux, Politieke verklaring van de Benelux regeringen, Brussel: Benelux 2008.

Benelux, Prioriteiten voor het Luxemburgse Benelux-voorzitterschap van 2016, Brussel: Benelux 2016.

Benelux, Verdrag tot herziening van het op 3 februari 1958 gesloten verdrag tot instelling van de Benelux Economische Unie, Brussel: Benelux 2008.

Benelux, Verdrag tot instelling van de Benelux Economische Unie, Brussel: Benelux 1958.

Bloemen, E., ‘De economische integratie van West-Europa 1945-1957’, NEHA- Bulletin, no. 1 (1990), pp. 7-17.

Boekestijn, A.J. ‘Soevereiniteit en integratie: de Benelux 1945-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 99-123.

Busschaert J., & Th. Grosbois, ‘Gesprek met Prof. Dr. M. Weisglas’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 71-76.

Clerx, J.M.M.J. ‘Beneluxsamenwerking in het slop’, Politieke Opstellen, no. 1 (1994), pp 45-57.

Conway, M., ‘Legacies of Exile: The Exile Governments in London during the Second World War and the Politics of Post-war Europe’, in: M. Conway and J. Gotovitch (eds.), Europe in Exile, New York: Berghahn Books 2001, pp. 255-274.

Dangerfield, M., ‘The Contribution of the Visegrad Group to the European Union’s ‘Eastern’ Policy: Rhetoric or Reality?’, Europe-Asia Studies, no. 10 (2009), pp. 1735-1755.

61

Dangerfield, M., ‘The Viségrad Group in the Expanded European Union: From Preaccession to Postaccession Cooperation’, East European Politics & Societies, no. 3 (2008), pp. 630-667.

Deschamps, E., More than ‘honest brokers’? Belgium, Luxembourg and the ‘empty chair crisis’ (1965 1966), Luxembourg: Virtual Resource Centre for Knowledge about Europe (CVCE) 2016.

Eng, P. van der, De Marshall-hulp – Een perspectief voor Nederland 1947-1953, Houten: De Haan/Unieboek bv 1987.

Golenvaux, Ph., ‘Het vrije personenverkeer’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 331-340.

Griffiths R., and F. Lynch, ‘L’échec de la Petite Europe: les négociations Fritalux/Finebel, 1949-1950’, Revue Historique, no. 1 (1985), pp. 159-193.

Grosbois, Th., ‘De onderhandelingen van Londen voor een Benelux Douane-unie (1941-1944)’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 39-69.

Grosbois, Th., ‘Het Belgische besluitvormingsproces inzake Benelux (1945-1951)’, in: F. Boekema, H. van Houtum & K. Veraghtert (eds.), Benelux, Quo Vadis?, Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff 1994, pp. 81-107.

Grosbois, Th., & J. Busschaert, ‘Gesprek met D. Spierenburg’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 93-97.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Algemene beschouwing economische besprekingen Parijse studieconferentie E.P.G., 06-03- 1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00565.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief Adenauer aan Bech, 15-04-1955’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01957.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief en nota studiegroep Europese Douane-Unie, 28-10-1947’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00733.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief met conceptnota economische unie, 31-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00440.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Brief Stikker aan Drees, 16-06-1950’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00409.pdf.

62

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum Beneluxlanden over EEA, 21-04-1959’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01506.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum bezoek Baron Snoy d’Oppuers, 20-11-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00916.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum des Pays Benelux aux six pays de la C.E.C.A., 18-05-1955’ http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01654.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum Nederlands-Belgische samenwerking, 22-09-1951’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00246.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum Permanente Politieke Contact Commissie, 14-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00248.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Memorandum samenwerking Benelux-landen buitenlandse politiek, 22-09-1951’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00246.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Nota Beneluxsamenwerking, 22-11-1958’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/L00049.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Nota economische unie met België en Luxemburg, 27-12-1951’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00441.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Ontwerpantwoord op Belgische en Luxemburgse nota’s economische unie, 08-05-1952’ http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00443.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Opmerkingen rapport Voorzitters der Raden van de Belgisch-Nederlands-Luxemburgse Douane-overeenkomst, 28-01-1949’ http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00171.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Summary Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 26-07-1950’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/europeseintegratie/en/doc/D00117, accessed November 16, 2017.

63

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Toelichting verdrag Benelux Economische Unie en bijlagen, 21-10-1957’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00257.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verhouding verdrag Gemeenschappelijke Markt tot Benelux-verdrag, 28-02-1957’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00551.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag bespreking Spaak en Beyen over eventueel Benelux-initiatief Europese economische integratie, 23-04-1955’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S01176.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Comité Exécutif, 04-08-1947’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/G00417.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 27-11-1950’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00116.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 02-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00137.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 01-02-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00250.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 21-06-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00265.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 26-06-1954’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00266.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 06-06-1955’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/S00307.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Ministerraad, 25-02-1957’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00162.pdf.

64

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 25-08-1948’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00084.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 08-06-1949’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00092.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 24-08-1949’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00095.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 26-07-1950’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00117.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 05-01-1951’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00127.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 09-01-1952’, http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00132.pdf.

Huygens ING, Bronnenpublicatie Nederland en de Europese integratie 1950-1986, ‘Verslag vergadering Raad voor economische aangelegenheden, 16-05-1957’ http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/watermarker/pdf/europa/D00151.pdf.

Inotai, A., ‘Correlations between European Integration and Sub-Regional Cooperation: Theoretical Background, Experience and Policy Impacts’, Russian & East European Finance and Trade, no. 6 (1998), pp. 3-91.

IOB Evaluatie, Relaties, resultaten en rendement – Evaluatie van de Benelux Unie- samenwerking vanuit Nederlands perspectief, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 2012.

Kersten, A.E., ‘Politieke aspecten van de Benelux-samenwerking: wisselwerking tussen interne opbouw en internationale machtsvorming 1944-1958’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, pp. 79-90.

Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden – 1944, E. 77, Londen: 9 September 1944.

Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden – Jaargang 1953 No. 55, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1953.

65

Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden – Jaargang 1954 No. 18, Den Haag: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 1954.

Limonard B. & J. Stöger ‘De Benelux Unie naar waarde schatten’, Internationale Spectator, no. 6 (2013), pp. 52-57.

Mommens, Th. E., ‘Het landbouwprobleem in de vorming van de Benelux’, in: A. Postma & J. Busschaert (eds.), Benelux in de kijker, Tielt: Lannoo 1994, p. 175-199.

Moquette, F.G., Van Bep tot Beb, Leiden: Rijksuniversiteit Leiden 1993.

Nasra, S. & M. Segers, ‘Tussen argwaan en pragmatisme’, in: D. Hellema, R. Coolsaet & B. Stol (eds.), Nederland-België: De Belgisch-Nederlandse betrekkingen vanaf 1940, Amsterdam: Boom 2011, pp. 109-139.

Overheid.nl, ‘Kamerstuk 33414 nr. 11: Motie van de leden Van Bommel en Merkies over het opheffen van de Benelux Unie’, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst- 33414-11.html, accessed April 23, 2017.

Rood, J., ‘Wie de schoen past…!’, Internationale Spectator, no. 6 (2013), pp. 50-51.

Roon, G. van, ‘Great Britain and the Oslo States’, Journal of Contemporary History, no. 4 (1989), pp. 657-664.

Roon, G. van, Kleine landen in crisistijd – Van Oslostaten tot Benelux, 1930-1940, Amsterdam: Elsevier 1985.

Weenink, W.H., Bankier van de wereld, Bouwer van Europa – Johan Willem Beyen 1987-1976, Amsterdam: Prometheus 2005.

66