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Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-49398-7 — Oracles, Heroes Or Villains George E Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-49398-7 — Oracles, Heroes or Villains George E. Shambaugh Index More Information Index ABSPP. See asset-backed securities prelude to, 61–72 purchase programme Economic Emergency Law, 51, 85 Alderete, Carlos, 48 economic liberalism in, 219–220 Alfonsín, Ricardo Luis, 88 economic markets in, 60, 72, 97 Alfonsín Foulkes, Raúl Ricardo, 43–50, 57, recovery of, 89–94 99 economic policy in Final Point Law, 48 historical analysis of, 40–42 Flexibilization plan, 47 market behavior as influence on, 60, Law of Due Obedience, 48 72, 97 Alogoskoufis, Georgios, 85 economic recovery in, 72–98 Álvarez, Carlos, 66–67 in global markets, 89–94 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act IMF role in, 74–76 (ARRA), US (2009), 126–127 political consolidation as factor in, 83–89 AMLF. See Asset-Backed Commercial prudence in, 94–96 Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Final Point Law, 48 Liquidity Facility fixed exchange rates in, 212 APP. See asset purchase programme Flexibilization plan in, 47 Arafat, Yasser, 78 IMF and, 68, 90, 101 Arend, Anthony, 29 economic recovery and, 74–76 Argentina. See also Alfonsín Foulkes, Raúl sanctions by, 84 Ricardo; Duhalde, Eduardo; inflation battles in, from 1983-1996, Fernández de Kirchner, Cristina; 42–61, 44, 42–61, 43 Kirchner, Néstor; Menem, Carlos economic liberalism as influence on, Austral Plan in, 37, 99 43–50 economic market management under, economic uncertainty and, 51–54 216–217 economic victory over, 54–59 economic success of, 46, 60–61 Great Inflation Battle, 62 private sector liquidity under, 13 Great War as influence on, 59–61 Bonex Plan, 53 neo-liberalism as influence on, 54–59 Convertibility Plan, 13, 31, 57–58, Law of Due Obedience, 48 99–100, 219–220 Lock Law, 80, 86–87 debt obligations of, 79–80, 89–90 net foreign investment in, 62 Rights upon Future Offers (RUFO) Olivos Pact, 57–58 clauses, 92 populism in, resurgence of, 72–98 deference in, 32–33 private sector liquidity in, 13–14 Dirty War and, 44, 52 Austral Plan, 13 DNUs in. See Decrees of Necessity and Convertibility Plan, 13, 31 Urgency Repsol YPF, 67–68, 90–91 economic crises in, xiii, 18, 65, 98–102 nationalization of, 88 constitutive power as influence on, 72 RIC in, 59–60, 63–64 liability dollarization, 63 Spring Plan, 49 pre-crisis risks, 69 State Reform Law, 51 248 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-49398-7 — Oracles, Heroes or Villains George E. Shambaugh Index More Information Index 249 Washington Consensus and, 40 Binner, Hermes Juan, 88 during Menem presidency, 52–53 Blejer, Mario, 78–79 White Knights in, 66–71 Bloom, Nick, 144 Armedáriz, Alejandro, 48 Boehner, John, 120 ARRA. See American Recovery and Bonex Plan, 53 Reinvestment Act Bordón, José Octavio, 78 Asmussen, Jörg, 187, 199, 201, 217–218 Born, Brooksley, 112–113 asset purchase programme (APP), 3–4, Boudou, Amando, 88 196–197. See also asset-backed Brodersohn, Mario, 49 securities purchase programme Burns, Arthur, 31, 148–151 Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Bush, George W., 18–32, 78, 123, 128–129 Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Greenspan and, 115–116 Facility (AMLF), 135 September 11, 2001 terror attacks, asset-backed securities purchase 114–116 programme (ABSPP), 196–197 tax cuts under, 114–116 Austral Plan, in Argentina, 37, 99 economic market management under, Cameron, David, 178, 201 216–217 Caputo, Nicolás, 49–96 economic success of, 46, 60–61 Carrió, Elisa, 83 private sector liquidity under, 13 Carville, James, 109–110 authority, economic Cavallo, Domingo, xiii–xv, 13, 31, 36, 38 of ECB, 197–205 as anti-inflationary hero, 69–71 with OMT program, 200–205 concentration of authority by, 72 RIC and, 30 economic liberalism promoted by, under Treaty of Lisbon, 199–205 219–220 two pillar strategy of, 197–199 economic policy strategies, 55–56, of economic markets, 209–210, 218–220 99–100 elements of, 30 investors’ expectations under, 41 predictions of economic policy and, Menem and, 53–54, 59, 61 34–38 CBPP. See covered bond purchase in RIC, 29–30 programme of ECB, 30, 197–205 central banks, 5–6 of Federal Reserve, 30 CFTC. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Bachrach, Peter, 214 check and balances, within US government, Bair, Sheila, 134 xii–xiii Baker, Scott, 144 CJEU. See Court of Justice of European banks Union central banks, 5–6 Clinton, Bill, 31, 36, 66 cross-border banking, 17 economic policy under, 105–125 inter-bank lending, 17 prioritization of, 108–116 Baratz, Morton, 214 Greenspan and, 109, 111–112, 148–149 Barnett, Michael, 214 1993 Economic Plan Barroso, José Manuel, 200 deference in, 110–112 Bastasin, Carlo, 167, 169, 173 success of, 110–112 Baucus, Max, 118 validation of, 110–112 bazooka theory, of economics, 1–2, 68, 162, Republican Revolution and, 119 203 Clinton, Hillary, 111 Bentsen, Lloyd, 110 Cobos, Julio, 83, 85 Berlusconi, Silvio, 32, 184–185, 221 Commercial Paper Funding Facility Bernanke, Ben, xiv, 103, 108–150. See also (CPFF), 135 Federal Reserve Commodity Futures Modernization Act, TARP, 37, 126–127, 129 US (2000), 108, 112, 219 Bernstein, Jared, 31 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Bignone, Reynaldo, 44 (CFTC), 112–113, 134 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-49398-7 — Oracles, Heroes or Villains George E. Shambaugh Index More Information 250 Index Concepción, Juan, 47 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Congress, US Consumer Protection Act, US Federal Reserve and, authority of, (2010), 126–127 116–123 Draghi, Mario, xiii–xiv, 2, 37, 152, 154, ESF financing and, 117–119 184, 189, 199, 218, 221. See also IMF loans and, 116–117 European Central Bank 1995 budget battles, 119–123 OMT program, 2–3, 174–175, 200–205 Plan B and, 116–119 Dromi, José Roberto, 53 during financial crisis of 2008, 135–138 Duhalde, Eduardo, 56, 66–71, 74–75 Consumer Fear Index, 144–145 Corrales on, 75 Consumer Sentiment Index, 144–145 economic policy under, 74–76 Contract with America Advancement Act, Duisenberg, Willem, 197–198 US (1996), 123 Dujovne, Nicolás, 95–96 Convertibility Plan, in Argentina, 13, 31, Duvall, Raymond, 214 57–58, 99–100, 219–220 corporate sector purchase programme East Asian financial crisis, 18 (CSPP), 196–197 EC. See European Commission Corrales, Javier, 54–56, 130 ECB. See European Central Bank on Duhalde, 75 economic authority. See authority Corrigan, Gerry, 58, 219 economic crises, xii–xiv. See also Eurozone; Court of Justice of European Union specific countries (CJEU), 154 activism by economic institutions, 4–5 covered bond purchase programme bazooka theory, 1–2, 68, 162, 203 (CBPP), 196–197 causes of, xv–xvi Cox, Christopher, 122–123 central banks’ role in, 5–6 CPFF. See Commercial Paper Funding in East Asia, 18 Facility in Eurozone, 18 cross-border banking, 17 national governments’ response to, 18 Cruz, Ted, 129, 142 Tequila Crisis, 18 CSPP. See corporate sector purchase Economic Emergency Law, Argentina, 51, programme 85 Economic Growth and Tax Relief D’Alema, Massimo, 185–186 Reconciliation Act, US (2001), D’Amato, Alfonse, 118 114–115 Davis, Steven, 144 economic liberalism debt ceiling crisis, 121–123 in Argentina, 43–50, 219–220 Decrees of Necessity and Urgency (DNUs), Cavallo’s promotion of, 219–220 51 Greenspan’s promotion of, 218–219 deference economic markets in Argentina, 32–33 actor threats in, 220–221 of economic markets, 210, 214–220 in Argentina, 60, 72, 97 in Eurozone, 163–165 economic recovery for, 89–94 during financial crisis of 2008, under Austral Plan, 216–217 132–135 authority of, 209–210, 218–220 during Greek economic crisis, 163–165 deference of, 210, 214–220 predictions of economic policy and, during financial crisis of 2008, 143 34–36, 38 fortune in, role of, 221–223 in RIC, 31–33 implementation capacity of, 210, in Argentina, 32–33 218–220 in U.S economic policy, 105–125 management of, 213–221 Dijsselboem, Jeroen, 192–193 by ECB, 171 Dirty War, 44, 52 through political authority, 215–218 Discount Rate, 107 through power of institutions, 215–218 DNUs. See Decrees of Necessity and OMT programs and, 217–218 Urgency RIC and, 210–212 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-108-49398-7 — Oracles, Heroes or Villains George E. Shambaugh Index More Information Index 251 risk for, 24 market behavior and, 171 second-order power of, 208–210 through policy changes, 171 under SGP, 215–216 economic power dynamics of, 153 uncertainty and, 24, 207–223 ELA program, 4, 27 Economic Plan of 1993, in US, 36 EONIA, 159 economic policy. See also authority; ESTER, 159 economic markets; specific countries inflation control by, 159–163 in EU, 152–155 intervention risks and, 205 Federal Reserve role in, xiii investor risks and, 152–153, 205 Risk Intervention Curve, xiii–xiv LTROs and, 158–159, 166–169, 196 Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, 155–157 monetary aggregates, 161–162 economic technocrats, xiii MROs and, 159–166 EFSF. See European Financial Stability OMT program, 2–3, 174–175, 200–205 Facility in Germany, 201–205 EFSM. See European Financial private sector liquidity interventions, 15 Stabilization Mechanism QE and, 3–4 ELA program. See emergency liquidity REPO contracts, 159–160 assistance program SMP, 179 Emanuel, Rahm, 31 TLTROs and, 3–4, 27, 195–196 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, US European Commission (EC), 15 (2001), 129 European Financial Stability Facility emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) (EFSF), 174, 179, 183 program European Financial Stabilization ECB and, 4, 27 Mechanism (EFSM), 174, 179, in Greece, 4, 191–194 183 sovereign debt crisis and, 174 European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM), in Ireland, 181–182, 220–221 174, 179 EONIA.
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