Download Full Text (Pdf)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Master of Arts Thesis Euroculture University of Uppsala, Sweden University of Göttingen, Germany The impossible homecoming? A Study of the Evolution of the French Government’s Discourses on French ISIS returnees between 2017 and 2020. Submitted by: Hannah Bieber Contact details (telephone/email): [email protected] Supervised by: Uppsala University: Andreaz Wasniowski Göttingen University: Lars Klein The Hague, 25/07/2021 MA Programme Euroculture Declaration I, Hannah Bieber hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “The impossible homecoming? A Study of the Evolution of the French Government’s Discourses on French ISIS returnees between 2017 and 2020”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography. I declare that the written (printed and bound) and the electronic copy of the submitted MA thesis are identical. I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture. Signed …………………………………………………………..... 25/07/2021 Date ……………………………………………………………… 1 Abstract Over 5,000 European citizens joined the ranks of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the early 2010s. Since the rollback of the terrorist organization in 2016, European Union (EU) member states have had to decide whether or not to repatriate these individuals who were made prisoners mainly by Iraqi, or Kurdish authorities. France, the EU country that saw the highest number of its citizens join ISIS was also directly targeted by terrorist attacks orchestrated by ISIS returnees. From 2017 to 2019, it relied heavily on a non-repatriation approach, a measure which was welcomed by the general public but criticized by human rights and legal experts. However, in 2019, the withdrawal of US troops and the Turkish offensive in North-East Syria have further destabilized the region and pushed the French government to adapt its strategy. This study aims at understanding how the Macron administration legitimized the measures it implemented to tackle the ISIS returnees phenomenon and whether its approach has evolved. Through critical discourse analysis (CDA) and by drawing from the securitization theory, this research investigates the official communications of the French government between 2017 and 2020. The data will reveal that the “low-probability, high impact” threat posed by ISIS returnees has been over-securitized. This might lead an over-perception of this threat, which could threaten the social cohesion of the country and make measures bargaining with human rights and the rule of law acceptable for the public opinion. While many contributions have analyzed the policies and laws related to the issue of ISIS returnees in the EU, few have investigated how states responded to it in their official communications. With a focus on the EU country that has been the most concerned by this phenomenon, this study will help to bridge this gap in knowledge and will have broader implications for discursive practices regarding ISIS returnees and terrorism in Europe and the West. Keywords: ISIS returnees, Foreign Fighters, Securitization, France, Counterterrorism Wordcount: 26,256 words 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgements 5 List of Figures & Tables 6 List of Abbreviations 6 Introduction 7 Chapter 1 : Understanding the ISIS Returnees Phenomenon in the EU 10 1.1) Semantic discussion: ‘Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters’, ‘Jihadists’ and ‘Returnees’ 10 1.2) ISIS Returnees in the EU: Threats & Challenges 12 1.3) Returning Pathways 16 Chapter 2: The EU’s and France’s Response to the ISIS Returnees Phenomenon 18 2.1) The EU’s Attempt to Build a Common Framework 18 2.2) Northwestern Member States’ Response to the ISIS Returnees Phenomenon 19 2.3) France’s Response to the ISIS Returnees Phenomenon 22 Chapter 3: Research Design 25 3.1) Securitization Theory: Beyond the Copenhagen School 25 3.2) Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 28 3.3) Data Collection & Analysis 30 Chapter 4: The Securitization of French ISIS Returnees 33 4.1) Constructing Returnees as a Threat 33 4.1.1) Enemies of the State 33 4.1.2) A Life-Threatening Risk for French Citizens 34 4.1.3) The Use of a Security Grammar 37 4.2) The Response to ISIS Returnees 37 4.2.1) The Non-Repatriation Doctrine 38 4.2.2) The Criminalizing Approach 41 4.2.3) An Evolution in the Discourses? 43 Chapter 5: Influencing Variables, Indirect Securitization & Spillover Effect 47 5.1) Age & Gender as Influencing Variables 47 5.1.1) Gender as an influencing variable 47 5.1.2) The Special Treatment of Children 49 5.2) Indirect Securitization & Spill-over Effect 51 5.2.1) Indirect Securitization 51 5.2.2) Spill-over Effect 53 3 Chapter 6: Discussion 57 6.1) The Over-Securitization of a “Low-Probability High-Impact” Threat? 57 6.2) Turning a blind-eye on human rights? 60 6.3) A Political Response 63 6.4) A Manifestation of the “Culture of Fear”? 64 Conclusion 66 Answers to the Research Questions 66 Limitations & Suggestions for further research 68 Findings Implications 69 References 71 Secondary Sources 71 Primary Sources 76 4 Acknowledgements This Master’s thesis is the result of several months of reflection and work, but I would never have been able to complete it on my own. I would hereby like to express my gratitude to those who have helped me throughout this journey. I would firstly like to thank my supervisors, Andreaz Wasniowski at Uppsala University and Lars Klein at the University of Göttingen, who have been instrumental throughout the whole process of writing this thesis. Their thought-provoking comments and feedback helped me to reflect critically on my work. I am also thankful to Inés Bolaños Somoano who helped me pinpoint my focus and who provided me with crucial resources which laid the ground for this research. Tack, Gracias, Grazie and merci to Justine, Carola, Alex, Laure and Francesca for helping me find a healthy balance between my work and social life and making Uppsala my second home once again. I am also grateful to those who were present despite the distance: Fatima for your wise tips and pure soul, Salomé and Justine for being the best support system since 2015 and Klaudia for empowering me all the time. João and Alicia, thank you for all the calls and your daily messages and for being there through the hardship and the happiness. Quentin, thank you for listening and for always brightening my horizons. I also want to take this opportunity to thank my family who has always been an incredible source of support for as long as I can remember. Papa, Maman, merci de votre soutien au cours de ces deux années et de ces derniers mois. Merci de m’avoir appris à être attentive et sensible au monde qui m’entoure et à toujours observer les choses d’un œil critique. Finally, I would like to express my utmost gratitude to Pavel and Alicia who have accepted to proofread this work and give me their honest and constructive criticism. I could not have dreamt of more detail-oriented proof-readers and their help has been immensely appreciated. 5 List of Figures & Tables Figure 1. Mapping of EU ISIS departees’ returning pathway……………………………………………………………..17 Figure 2. Mapping of the securitization process..……………………………………………………………………………..28 Table 1. Coding framework…………………………………………………………………………………………………….………..32 Figure 3. Mapping of the securitization of French ISIS returnees by the French government between 2017 and 2020….………………………………………………………………………………………….……………………………….…58 List of Abbreviations CDA Critical Discourse Analysis EU European Union FF Foreign Fighters FTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters ISIS Islamic State of Syria and Iraq MEAE Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Etrangères (Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs) PNR Passenger Name Record RAN Radicalisation Awareness Network UN United Nations USA/US United States of America/United States 6 Introduction With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the ranks of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attracted some 30,000 foreigners, among whom 5,000 were European Union (EU)i citizens.1 France was the country that was the most concerned by this phenomenon, with over 1,000 cases of departure. On the other hand, from 2014 to 2016, the perpetrators of three lethal terrorist attacks in France and Belgium were returning FF who had received training in Iraq and Syria before coming back to Europe. As a consequence, the potential threat represented by these individuals if they were to return to EU soil was taken very seriously by member states and public opinions. This issue became more pressing from 2016 when ISIS started losing its strongholds due to the military intervention of the international coalition. The majority of EU citizens who had joined the organization were either killed or captured by local forces, which prompted a lot of debates. What should be done with these people? Were they dangerous? How could the potential threat they represented be mitigated? While most EU member states considered repatriating their citizens, France openly showed its preference for letting local authorities, such as the Kurdish forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces and Iraqi authorities try French prisoners. This approach seemed to be approved by the public opinion, as two surveys conducted in 2018 (Ifop 2018) and 2019 (Odoxa 2019) revealed that over 80% of French people agreed that French ISIS departees should be tried where they committed their crimes – namely Syria and Iraq. The 2019 survey revealed that 89% of French people were worried at the idea that some of these individuals could return to France and 67% were in favor of not repatriating children either.