Late Marriage and Less Marriage in Japan Author(S): Robert D

Late Marriage and Less Marriage in Japan Author(s): Robert D. Retherford, Naohiro Ogawa, Rikiya Matsukura Source: Population and Development Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 65-102 Published by: Population Council Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2695155 . Accessed: 12/10/2011 10:15

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Population Council is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Population and Development Review.

http://www.jstor.org Late Marriage and Less Marriage in Japan

ROBERT D. RETHERFORD NAOHIRO OGAWA RIKIYA MATSUKURA

FOLLOWINGWORLD WAR II, themean age at marriagein Japan(as measuredby thesingulate mean age at marriage)remained fairly stable until 1975, when it suddenlybegan to increase.Between 1975 and 1995,singulate mean age at marriageincreased from 24.5 to 27.7 yearsfor women and from27.6 to 30.7 yearsfor men, makingJapan one of the latest-marryingpopulations in the world.Over the same period, the proportion who willnever marry, calculated fromage-specific first-marriage probabilities pertaining to a particularcalendar year,increased from 5 to 15 percentfor women and from6 to 22 percentfor men-a farcry from the universal-marriagesociety of earlieryears. While ofgreat interest in theirown right,these marriage trends have gained attentionalso because theyaccount for more than halfof Japan'sresumed fertilitydecline since 1973 (Ogawa and Retherford1993b). This fertilitydecline has been substantial.Between 1975 and 1999 the total fertilityrate fell from 1.9 to 1.3 childrenper woman. That fertilityis now well below replace- mentlevel and stillfalling has causedmuch public concern in Japan. The trendtoward late marriageand less marriagehas come about because of a confluenceof interrelatedeconomic, social, and culturalchanges, includingremarkable educational gains by women,massive increases in the proportionof women who workfor pay outsidethe home, major changes in thestructure and functioningof the marriage market, extraordinary increases in theprevalence of premarital sex, and far-reachingchanges in valuesrelating to marriageand familylife. In thisarticle we describethese changes and assess theireffects on age at marriageand theproportion never marrying in Japan.

Marriagetrends in Japan

Table 1 and Figure 1 show the marriage trends that we wish to explain. Table 1 shows, forwomen and men separately,trends in age-specificpro-

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 27(1):65-102 (MARCH 2001) 65 o oNoo ->c ct\ 00 O C\ \0 N

C\ \0 I 0 U- Oh t \0 C\ tq rq Lr m C\

L^ O V, |\ o: c r- _ t oo tt x0 ? 0 r- VIun \0 Lt _ I

I o C\ oo M C\ \o t bOe E e al O O P\ N, Vo C;_ o ou nt u

E e > ~~C\?0 ,,I, C\ \0 ?OVIO\Or- VI t m m t N

CN \ Nm Ll C\ ,fl ? o6 _o ?j _

= ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~t ~~~~- V. V. U-N h t o' -

o; 1 ? co c > oo t m m N oo I ch ~~~0?Oco0N N oom IIr

u EP'\ E '\ _\ ',0 tN\? 00 (l-e)m f f 0 0 0 f |S > Q W ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 67

FIGURE 1 Trend in the singulate mean age at marriage (SMAM) and lifetime celibacy rate (LCR), by sex: Japan, 1950-95 32 10

31 - 9

30 -

; 28 Men (LCR) S~ ~ ~~~Mn( 227 4u 26-WoeL3

25 - Women (SMAM) 2

24 - 1

23 l l l l l 0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year

SOURCE: Base data are from Statistics Bureau, Population Census of Japan (various years).

portionsnever married(i.e., single),the singulatemean age at marriage (calculatedfrom age-specific proportions single), the lifetimecelibacy rate (calculatedas the averageof the proportionssingle at ages 45-49 and 50- 54), and the syntheticlifetime celibacy rate (the syntheticproportion still singleat age 50, calculatedby lifetable methodsfrom first-marriage rates fora particularcalendar year based on numbersof first marriages and num- bers of singlepersons by age and sex') since 1920. Figure 1 also presents the trendsin singulatemean age at marriageand the lifetimecelibacy rate forwomen and men since 1950,which is theperiod on whichour analysis focuses. The singulatemean age at marriagewas alreadyfairly high in Japan in 1920-21.2 forwomen and 25.0 formen-mainly because of problems ofland subdivisionoccurring in thecontext of economic development, population growth,and a stem familysystem that requirednoninheriting siblings to startnew householdsat the time of marriage(Dixon 1978). For men, it rose graduallyto 27.2 in 1940, fellto 26.2 in 1950 (as a consequence of demobilizationafter the war), remainedfairly constant at about 27.5 between1960 and 1975,and subsequentlyrose steeply to 30.7 in 1995. For women, the singulatemean age at marriagerose graduallyto 25.0 in 1960 withno dip afterthe war, declinedslightly to 24.5 in 1975, and subsequentlyrose steeplyto 27.7 in 1995. Duringthe same period, 1920-95, the proportionnever marrying,as measuredby the lifetimecelibacy rate, remainedvery low at 1-3 percentuntil 1970 forwomen and 1980 formen. It then began to rise,especially for men. By 1995, the celibacyrate was 5 68 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN percentfor women and 9 percentfor men. Between 1975 and 1995 the syntheticlifetime celibacy rate rose from5 to 15 percentfor women and from6 to 22 percentfor men. We wish to explainnot onlythe long-termincreases in the singulate mean age at marriageand the proportionnever marrying but also the levelingoff and dip in the formerbetween 1960 and 1975 and the rapidand sustainedincreases in bothsingulate mean age at marriageand thepropor- tionnever marrying after 1975.

Causes oflater marriage and risingrates of lifetimecelibacy 'in Japan

Marriage squeeze on men

The considerablygreater rise since 1975 in lifetimecelibacy among men than among women suggestsa marriagesqueeze on men with respectto availabilityof potentialspouses. Figure2 supportsthis hypothesis to some extent.The figureshows the trend in theratio of men aged 2 5-29 to women aged 22-26. Thisratio reflects, albeit roughly, the ratioof men in the marriageableages to potentialspouses threeyears younger-three years being the approximatedifference in singulatemean age at marriagebetween men and women in recentdecades. The ratioincreased sharply between 1973

FIGURE 2 Trend in the marriagesqueeze, as measured by the ratio of men aged 25-29 to women aged 22-26: Japan, 1950-99 1.3

1.2 -

1.1

' 1.0 X

0.9 -

0.8

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Year

SOURCE: Base data are fromStatistics Bureau, PopulationCensus of Japan (various years). Population values foryears between censuses are fromStatistics Bureau, CurrentPopulation Estimates (various years). ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 69 and 1976. This occurredbecause men who were 25-29 in 1975 were born duringthe period 1945-49, whichcoincided with Japan's brief baby boom of 1947-49. The baby boom was followedby a verysteep fertilitydecline, so thatmen in the relativelylarge boom birthcohorts were disadvantaged in findingspouses among the relativelysmall cohortsof women that followed. The squeeze was briefand disappearedby 1987,when theratio again droppedbelow 1; thismay explain why the rise in singulatemean age at marriagewas somewhatsteeper for men than forwomen between 1975 and 1985, as shownFigure 1. Singulatemean age at marriagefor men continued to increasealmost as steeplyafter 1985 as beforethen, however, indicatingthat other, apparently more important factors were also operat- ingto increaseage at marriagefor men. The squeeze on men who were aged 25-29 in 1975 of course continued as theygrew older. In Table 1, one can followthis cohort down a di- agonal as faras 1995 when its memberswere 45-49. The sequence is 48 percentsingle at 25-29, 22 percentat 30-34, 14 percentat 35-39, 12 percent at 40-44, and 11 percentat 45-49. At each of these ages (except20- 24, forreasons that are not clear),the percentagesingle is unusuallyhigh comparedwith its value at the same age fiveyears earlier in time.The next cohort-those aged 25-29 in 1980-was also affectedby the squeeze, but not nearlyas much, as indicatedin Figure2 by the steep fallin the ratio after1977. Ifthe squeeze were the onlyfactor affecting marriage trends for men, one would expect age-specificproportions single to fallin the next cohort.But a comparisonof the two cohortsindicates just the opposite: age-specificproportions single rose at everyage in the second cohort,and continuedto risein followingcohorts, which were not squeezed at all. This continuingupward trendin age-specificproportions single is furtherevidence thatfactors considerably more important than the marriagesqueeze affectedmarriage rates for men after1975. The largeincreases in age-specificproportions single for men in Table 1 have startlingimplications for the futuretrend in lifetimecelibacy for men. Readingdown cohortdiagonals in Table 1, we see thatthe proportion single formen does not changemuch after age 35-39. Therefore,projecting along incompletecohort diagonals in the table,we can anticipatewith some certaintythat the proportionof men stillsingle at 45-49 willbe about 15 percentin the 2000 census,about 18 percentin the 2005 census,and about 20 percentin the 2010 census. (The situationwill be even more extremein major metropolitanareas such as Tokyo,where the proportionof men still singleat 35-39 had alreadyreached 32 percentin 1995.) Remarkably,duringthe 35 yearsbetween 1975 and 2010, Japanwill have gone froma situation wherealmost all men marryto a situationwhere approximately one- fifthof men nevermarry. The marriagesqueeze on men that emergedbriefly around 1975 workedin the oppositedirection on women by makingit easierfor them to 70 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN marry.But the singulatemean age at marriageand the lifetimecelibacy ratewent up insteadof down forwomen, again indicatingthat factors con- siderablymore importantthan the marriagesqueeze were affectingmar- riagetrends after 1975. Table 1 shows that,after remaining fairly constant between 1955 and 1975, the proportionof women singleat 20-24 jumped from69 to 78 percentbetween 1975 and 1980 and thenincreased at a slower rate,reaching 87 percentin 1995. At olderages overthe same period,1975- 95, the proportionsingle jumped from21 to 48 percentat 25-29, from8 to 20 percentat 30-34, and from5 to 10 percentat 35-39. Reading down diagonals,it is apparentthat the likelihoodof marryingafter age 35-39 is even smallerfor women than formen. Only about a thirdof women still singleat 30-34 marryafter that age. Bearingthese patternsin mind and again projectingalong cohortdiagonals, we can anticipatewith a degreeof certaintythat the proportionof women stillsingle at 45-49 will be about 7 percentin the 2000 census,about 8 percentin the 2005 census,and at least 10 percentin the 2010 census.2The increasein lifetimecelibacy is not as steepfor women as it is formen, but it is stillremarkable. The projectedproportions single at ages 45-49 ofabout 20 percentfor men and at least 10 percentfor women in 2010 are broadlyconsistent with the S50values of 22 percentfor men and 15 percentfor women in 1995, which are also shown in Table 1. S50is the proportionstill single at age 50 in a hypothetical,or synthetic,cohort of men or women who live out their lives experiencingthe first-marriagerates that obtained in a particularcalendar year, in this case 1995. Thus S50 tells us what the proportionstill singleat age 50 would be if currentfirst-marriage rates were to continue unchangedin the future.3

Effectsof socioeconomic variables on marriagetrends

Ifthe marriage squeeze does not explainthe dramaticincreases in singulate mean age at marriage,lifetime celibacy rate, and proportionstill single at age 50 in Japanafter 1975, what does? And what explainsthe levelingoff (and even slightdecline for women) ofthe singulatemean age at marriage thatoccurred between 1960 and 1975? The reasonsfor this leveling off are of considerableinterest, because identifyingthem may shed lighton the relativeimportance of the variousfactors affecting marriage trends. Most indexesof economic and socialdevelopment thought to affectmarriage tend to change in the same directionover time,so thatit is difficultto sortout theirrelative importance. But ifsome of these indexes followedthe same irregulartrajectory over time as the singulatemean age at marriage,that would suggestthey are primecausal factors,especially if thereare strong theoreticalreasons indicating their importance. Two socioeconomicvariables known to influenceage at marriageand the proportionnever marrying are urban-ruralresidence and educational ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 71 attainment.An obvious way to begin an analysisof theireffects on marriagetrends is to tabulatesingulate mean age at marriageand the lifetime celibacyrate by categoriesof thesetwo variablesfor consecutive censuses. The necessarydata by urban-ruralresidence are available fromall recent censuses,and the necessarydata by educationare available fromthe 1990 census.Table 2 presentstabulations of singulatemean age at marriageand the lifetimecelibacy rate for each sex separatelyby residencefor 1960 and 1990, and by educationfor 1990. The table shows thatsingulate mean age at marriagewas about one year higherin urbanareas than in ruralareas forboth women and men in 1960, but only 0.6 yearhigher for women and 0.2 year higherfor men in 1990. The lifetimecelibacy rate, on the otherhand, was the same in urban and ruralareas forboth women and men in 1960, but was 2 percentage pointshigher in urban areas forboth women and men in 1990. Thus, for women and men,the urban-ruraldifference in singulatemean age at mar- riagedecreased between 1960 and 1990 while the urban-ruraldifference in the lifetimecelibacy rate increased. Throughout this period, urban-rural differenceswere quite small compared with concurrent increases in singulate mean age at marriageand the lifetimecelibacy rate, indicating that continued urbanizationof the populationbetween 1960 and 1990 (from63 to 77 percenturban) cannotaccount for much of the increasesin singulatemean age at marriageand the lifetimecelibacy rate in the countryas a whole over thisperiod.

TABLE 2 Singulate mean age at marriage and lifetime celibacy rate (percent), by urban-rural residence, education, and sex: Japan, 1960 and 1990

Characteristic SMAM LCR and census year Women Men Women Men

Residence 1960 Urban 25.3 27.8 2 1 Rural 24.3 26.7 2 1 1990 Urban 27.0 30.4 5 6 Rural 26.4 30.2 3 4 Education 1990 Juniorhigh school or less 24.6 30.3 4 8 Senior high school 25.9 29.9 4 4 Juniorcollege 27.4 30.3 6 4 University 28.1 30.7 9 3

SOURCE: Base data are fromthe 1960 and 1990 population censuses of Japan. A specifiedlevel of education, such as senior high,means thatpersons classified at thatlevel graduatedthat level. 72 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

The patternof differentialsin singulatemean age at marriageand the lifetimecelibacy rate by educationin 1990, in the lower partof the table, differsconsiderably by sex. For women,singulate mean age at marriageis 3.5 yearshigher for those with a universityeducation than for those with a junior higheducation, and the lifetimecelibacy rate is 5 percentagepoints higherfor those with a universityeducation than forthose with a junior higheducation. These differentialssuggest that increases in women's educationalattainment have been contributingto increasesin thesingulate mean age at marriageand the proportionnever marryingamong women (and perhapsalso among men, the linkingmechanism being thatmen tend to marrywomen about three years youngerthan themselves). For men, singulatemean age at marriageis somewhatlower forthose with a senior high school educationthan forthose at othereducational levels, but the differencesare quite small.The proportionnever marrying is 5 percentage pointslower formen witha universityeducation than for men witha junior higheducation. And whereas university-educated women have a relativelyhigh lifetimecelibacy rate, university-educated men have a relativelylow rateof nevermarrying. The oppositeeffects of education on thelifetime celibacy rate for women and men and the relativelyhigh singulatemean age at marriagefor men witha junior higheducation suggest that men preferwomen who are less educatedthan they are, or womenprefer men who are moreeducated than they are, or both-making it relativelydifficult for poorly educated men and highlyeducated women to findspouses. Further evidence of such pref- erencesis providedby Figure3, whichplots, for Japan's 47 prefectures,the male lifetimecelibacy rate againstthe femalerate at each of fourlevels of education.In the plot forthose with a junior high school education,the lifetimecelibacy rate tends to be considerablyhigher for men than for women, indicatingthat at thislevel of educationmen have considerably more difficultyfinding a spouse than women do. The oppositepattern is observedin theplot for university graduates, and thepatterns for graduates of seniorhigh schools and junior collegesare in between.These findings suggestan education-inducedmarriage squeeze that tends to drive up singulatemean ages at marriageand proportionsnever marrying for both women and men.This squeeze maybe growingmore acute as women catch up withmen in education,and it undoubtedlyhas contributedto the increasesin singulatemean age at marriageand the lifetimecelibacy rate that have occurredfor both women and men since 1975. We also examine the effectsof educationon marriagetrends while controllingfor potentially confounding variables that are correlatedwith education.We are able to do thisfor women only,using pooled data from fiverounds of the NationalSurvey on FamilyPlanning between 1990 and 2000 thatincluded single women among the respondents,with childhood residenceand year of surveyas controls.4The partof Table 3 labeled "full ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 73

FIGURE 3 Lifetime celibacy rates (percent) for men plotted against rates for women in 47 prefectures, by education: Japan, 1990

20 Juniorhigh school or less 20 Senior high school

15 *15 -

?10 10

5 5

0 0~~~~~~~~0.

0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20 Women Women

Juniorcollege 0University

15 -15 -

10 - 201

5 *50

0 0 0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20 Women Women

SOURCE: Rates are expressedas percentages.Base data are fromthe 1990 population census of Japan.

model" shows predictedvalues of the mean age at marriageand the proportionof women stillsingle at age 40 by education,childhood residence, and year of survey,derived from a proportionalhazard model with these threevariables as predictors.5The effectsshown forany one of thesevari- ables are net ofthe effectsof the othertwo variables;that is, the othertwo variablesare held constantby settingthem equal to theirmean values in the underlyinghazard regressionwhen using this regressionto compute predictedvalues of mean age at marriageand the proportionstill single at age 40. The tableindicates that the net effect of a universityeducation, rela- tiveto a juniorhigh education, is to raisethe mean age at marriageby about 74 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

TABLE 3 Model estimates of women's mean age at marriage and the proportion of women still single at age 40, by education, childhood residence, and year of survey: Japan, 1990-2000 Model without education Full model and childhood residence Percent Percent Mean age at stillsingle Mean age at stillsingle Predictorvariable marriage at age 40 marriage at age 40 Education Juniorhigh school or lesst 24.4 3 Senior high school 25.0* 5* Juniorcollege 2 5.8* 12* University 26.3* 20* Childhood residence Urban 25.6* 11* Ruralt 24.9 5 Year of survey 1990t 25.0 6 25.1 5 1994 25.3* 8* 25.5* 9* 1996 25.5* 10* 25.7* 10* 1998 25.6* 11* 25.9* 12* 2000 25.9* 13* 26.2* 16*

NOTES: In the fullmodel, the predictedvalues of mean age at marriageand the predictedpercentages of single 16-year-oldwomen who will marryby age 40 were computedfrom a proportionalhazard model with education, childhood residence,and year of surveyas predictorvariables. All of the predictorvariables are representedby sets of dummyvariables in the underlyinghazard regression.The percentagesin any given panel of the table,such as the panel foreducation, control for all the otherpredictor variables in the model by setting them at theirmean values. The second model is the same as the fullmodel, except thateducation and childhood residenceare omittedas predictorvariables. The models were estimatedonly forwomen who were at least 22 years old when theywere interviewed,so thattheir education was completedin most cases. See Retherfordand Choe (1993) fora more detailed discussionof methodology. t Indicates a referencecategory in the underlyinghazard regression. * Indicates thatthe variable coefficientin the underlyinghazard regressiondiffers significantly from zero at the 5 percentlevel. SOURCE: Computed frompooled data fromthe 1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 rounds of the National Surveyon FamilyPlanning conducted by the Mainichi Newspapersof Japan.

two years and the proportionstill single at age 40 from3 percentto 20 percent.Large effects of women's educationon marriage,after controlling forother factors, have also been foundin an earlierstudy that compared marriagetrends in Japanand Italy(Dalla Zuanna et al. 1998). As also shownin Table 3, theeffect of urban childhood residence, rela- tiveto rural,is to raise the mean age at marriageby 0.7 year and the proportionstill single at age 40 from5 to 11 percent.The estimatesby year of surveyin the tablecan be interpretedas the trendin the mean age at marriageand the proportionstill single at age 40 thatwould have occurredif, hypothetically,education and childhoodresidence had remainedconstant at theirmean values as calculatedfrom pooled data fromthe fivesurveys. This adjustedor "net" trendindicates that, with educationand childhood ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 75 residenceheld constant,the mean age at marriagewould have increased from25.0 in 1990 to 25.9 in 2000, and the proportionstill single at age 40 would have increasedfrom 6 to 13 percent. This adjusted trendcan be comparedwith the unadjustedtrend ob- tainedfrom a modifiedmodel thatexcludes education and childhoodresidence as predictorvariables, as shownin the righthalf of Table 3. Compar- ing estimatesfrom the full and truncatedmodels, we see thatthe mean age at marriageand theproportion still single at age 40 increasealmost as much when educationand childhoodresidence are held constantas when they are not. This findingindicates that changes in levels of educationand ur- banizationover theperiod 1990-2000 explainvery little of the increasesin the mean age at marriageand the proportionstill single at age 40 thatoc- curredover the same period. .Furtherevidence that risingeducational attainment is not the main proximatedeterminant driving recent marriage trends is providedby Fig-

FIGURE 4 Trend in the proportion of persons aged 20-29 who have completed junior college or university, by sex: Japan, 1967-98

30 ~~~~30 ~ ~ ~ ~ oe

~20- Mear

0 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Year

NOTE: Proportionsof persons aged 20-29 who completedjunior college or universitywere calculated using census data by age and sex (using estimatedpopulation forintercensal years) and annual iiunubersof junior college and universitygraduates by sex obtainiedfrom Ministry of Education, SchoolBasic Survey (various years). The method of calculationinvolved following particular age-sex cohortsover time.Numerators and denominatorsof proportionswere initiallycalculated forsingle yearsof age and time and then aggregated over ages 20-29 beforedividing to obtain the proportionsfor each calendar year. 76 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

ure 4, whichshows, for both women and men, trendsin the proportionof personsaged 20-29 (the main marriageableages) who have graduatedat juniorcollege or at university.This proportion climbed steeply for both sexes between 1967 and the early 1980s. For women,the proportionleveled off during1985-88, thenresumed increasing. For men,the proportion peaked in 1985,dropped off fairly steeply until 1993, and thenresumed increasing. By 1998, the proportionwho had graduatedat junior collegeor at univer- sitywas greaterfor women thanfor men. If changesin educationalattain- mentwere the main proximatedeterminant of the recenttrend in mean age at marriage,one would have expectedsingulate mean age at marriage to followthe same trendas educationalattainment-for women, a steep risebetween 1967 and the early1980s, followed by a briefleveling off and renewedincrease; for men, a substantialfall followed by renewedincrease. In factthe trendof singulate mean age at marriagewas quite different. The educationtrends in Figure4, puzzlingat firstsight, reflect trends in enrollmentratios at thejunior collegeand universitylevels some years earlier,as shown in Figure5. Startingin 1960, enrollmentratios increased rapidlyat thejunior collegelevel forwomen (but not formen) and at the universitylevel for both women and men.After 1975 enrollmentratios suddenly leveled offfor several years at both levels forwomen, while they declinedsteeply for men. At the universitylevel, the ratiosresumed their steep upwardclimb in 1986 forwomen and in 1990 formen. The leveling offfor women and the dip formen occurredbecause ofa new government policy,instituted in the mid-1970s, to cap enrollmentsin highereducation,

FIGURE 5 Trends in enrollmentratios in junior colleges and universities: Japan, 1955-99 Juniorcollege University

45 -45-Me 40450 - 40350/ < t 35 -35- "u 30- "u 30- Cl,25 Women Cl,25

.2 20-. 20 15 - 0 15Woe 10 10 5 Men 5 0 0 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 Year Year

NOTE: The Ministryof Education calculates enrollmentratios at the junior college and universitylevels by dividingthe numberof newly matriculatedstudents at the specifiedlevel by the numberof personswho graduatedjunior high school (i.e., who completed ninthgrade) threeyears earlier.In Japan, more than 99 percentof childrencomplete junior highschool. SOURCE: Base data are fromMinistry of Education, SchoolBasic Survey (various years). ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 77 as a consequence of the studentunrest and turmoilin highereducation that occurredin the late 1960s and early 1970s. Withadmissions capped and with many more women applyingfor admission than before,admission gainsfor women were moreor less balancedby admissiondeclines for men. The relativegains for women occurredalso because ofpolicies aimed at increasingwomen's enrollment.The caps were liftedduring a seriesof policy changes introducedin the second half of the 1980s. Althoughthe timingof the cap on admissionscoincided approximately with the timingof the renewedincrease in singulatemean age at marriagein 1975, the fluc- tuationsin enrollmenttrends and in marriagetrends are mostlyunrelated. At present,the expectationis thatenrollment ratios for both sexes will continueto riserapidly for some time, because recent cohorts of young adults are shrinkingas a resultof the post-1975 resumption of fertility decline in Japan, so thatmany universities (except the elite ones) are activelyseeking students. Ofcourse, education also has indirecteffects on age at marriagethrough itsinfluence on thelabor force participation of women. The entryof women into paid employmentin Japanhas resultedfrom their rising educational qualificationsas well as fromlabor shortages,associated wage increases, and structuralchanges in the labor market,including rapid growth of the servicesector. Previous research has shownthat in Japanthe economic gains fromeducation (wage gainper additional year of education) have been even greaterfor women than formen, and thatthese wage gainshave been an importantfactor drawing women intopaid employment(Ogawa and Clark 1995; Ogawa and Ermisch1996). Conversely,one reasonwhy enrollment ratioshave been increasingfaster for women than formen in recentdecades is thatthe economicreturns to educationhave been much higherfor women.The averagemonthly wage differencebetween junior high school and universitygraduates, for example, has been about60 percentfor women but onlyabout 43 percentfor men (Clark and Ogawa 1992;Ogawa and Clark1995). Figure6 shows trendsin labor forceparticipation rates for women in five-yearage groups.In everyage group,the ratesdeclined prior to 1975 (or adjacentyear, in some cases) and increasedsubsequently. The similar- itybetween the shape of the trendsin labor forceparticipation rates and the trendsin singulatemean age at marriagesuggests that trendsin the formerwere the main forcedriving age at marriageupward after 1975. But caution must be exercisedin drawingsuch a conclusion,because of the possibilityof reversecausality. Not only may women delay marriagebe- cause theyare working,but women may work because theydelay marriage.Another reason for caution is thatthe curvesin Figure6 pertainto all women, regardlessof maritalstatus, rather than singlewomen, who are the ones actuallyavailable for marriage. The factthat, in Figure6, the labor forceparticipation rate increased fasterafter 1975 forwomen aged 25-29 thanfor women in otherage groups indicatesthat some reversecausality is reflectedin the trendat 25-29. The 78 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

FIGURE 6 Trends in labor force participation rates for women, by age: Japan, 1960-99 80

C,40

30 -

lo II

1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 Year

SOURCE: StatisticsBureau, AnnualReport of the Labor Force Survey (various years).

mechanismis relatedto the risingproportion of women in the 25-29 age groupwho are single.Between 1975 and 1995, singulatemean age at marriagefor women increasedfrom 24.5 to 27.7, entailinga majorupward shift in the proportionsingle in the 25-29 age group,as seen earlierin Table 1. Because singlewomen in Japanare much more likelyto work than marriedwomen at the same age (in 1975, forexample, the labor forcepartici- pationrate at ages 25-29 was 82 percentfor single women and 32 percent formarried women), the rise in the proportionsingle at 25-29 tended to driveup the labor forceparticipation rate at ages 25-29 independentlyof otherfactors that were also drivingup thisrate. It is clearfrom the trendin the proportionsingle at ages 20-24 in Table 1 thatthe trendin the labor forceparticipation rate forwomen aged 20-24 is also influencedby this typeof reverse causation. At olderages, however, the effectof reversecau- sationon thetrends in laborforce participation is less evident.For example, theproportion of single women aged 30-34 did not startto riserapidly until 1985, and the proportionsingle at 35-39 did not startto riserapidly until 1990, yetthe laborforce participation rates at both of theseages started increasingin 1975. ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 79

Figure7 breaksdown the trendin women's labor forceparticipation rate at ages 25-29 by typeof work.The typesof work distinguishedare self-employed,paid employee,and familyworker. Also depictedas white space directlybelow the curvefor the overalllabor force participation rate is the unemploymentrate (the proportionof women in the age groupwho are not workingbut lookingfor work), which appears as the differencebetween the sum of the participationrates for the threetypes of workerand the overallparticipation rate forwomen aged 25-29. Figure7 shows that between 1962 and 1975 therewas a majorcontraction in theproportion of women aged 25-29 who were employedas familyworkers, and thatthis contractionwas not completelyoffset by increasesin the proportionof women workingas paid employees.As a result,the overalllabor force participationrate at 25-29 declinedbetween 1962 and 1975. After1975, the continuingincrease in the proportionworking as paid employeescame to dominatethe trendin the overalllabor force participation rate for women in thisage group.The patternis muchthe same forthe otherage groups. The shrinkingnumbers of familyworkers during the 1960s and early 1970s occurredmainly because of rapidgrowth of the urbanindustrial sec- torand majorproductivity gains in agriculture,which together resulted in

FIGURE 7 Trend in the labor forceparticipation rate forwomen aged 25-29, according to type of work: Japan, 1962-99 100

90 _

80 - Laborforce particiption rate - 70 Notemployed but lookingfor work 60- Selfe ployed : 50

P 40

0 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 Year

SOURCE:Statistics Bureau. Annual Report of the Labor Force Survey (various years). 80 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN a heavystream of migration from the countryside to thecities (Ogawa, Jones, and Williamson1993). Many youngrural women migratedto nearbycit- ies, eitherto work in factoriesin the boomingmanufacturing sector or to getmarried. Between 1960 and 1975,real GNP per capita in Japanincreased by 175 percent,and the proportionof the populationclassified as urban increasedfrom 63 to 76 percent.Despite dislocations caused by large-scale migration,the patternof nearlyuniversal marriage continued. Geographic separationof potentialspouses was not a major problem,because a large fractionof marriageswere arrangedby relatives,friends, and matchmak- ers. Amongwomen who grewup in ruralareas theproportion whose marriageswere arrangedwas 50 percentin 1963 and 40 percentin 1975.6 The greatmajority of those who were not successfulin findinga love match could stillresort to an arrangedmatch and evidentlywere willingto do so. AlthoughFigures 6 and 7 are informative,it is pertinentto look also at trendsin labor forceparticipation rates for single women, since theyare the ones who are actuallyavailable formarriage. Unfortunately, trends in laborforce participation rates for single women are availableonly since 1972, the year thatJapan's Labor Force Surveystarted publishing such ratesby maritalstatus. Figure 8 shows the trendin thelabor force participation rate

FIGURE 8 Trend in the labor forceparticipation rate forsingle women aged 25-29, according to type of work: Japan, 1972-99 100 Labor force 90 - Not employed but participationrate lookingfor work __ 80

:. 50

X 40

1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Year

SOURCE: StatisticsBureau, AnnualReport of the Labor Force Survey (various years). ROL ERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 81 forsingle women aged 25-29, accordingto typeof work. Between 1972 and 1999 thisrate increased fairly steadily from 81 to 92 percent.Already by 1972,most of this labor force participation consisted of paid employment. Because the graph startsin 1972, it cannot answer the question of whetherthe labor forceparticipation rate forsingle women fellbetween 1960 and 1975 beforerising subsequently, although the factthat it did not fallbetween 1972 and 1975 suggeststhat it may not have fallenbetween 1960 and 1972 either.Fortunately, findings from the National Surveyon FamilyPlanning, shown in Figure9, shed lighton thisquestion. Figure 9 shows the trendin the proportionof marriedwomen who workedbefore marriage,by year of marriage.The curvesdepicting the proportionwho workedat all beforemarriage and the proportionwho workedas paid employees beforemarriage rose steeplyand continuouslybetween 1960 and 1975. AlthoughFigure 9 pertainsonly to women who eventuallymarried and lacks informationon the ages at which women workedbefore marriage,the steep,continuous rise of these curves strongly suggests that labor forceparticipation rates increased rapidly at all ages ofsingle women and at

FIGURE 9 Trends in the proportionof marriedwomen who worked beforemarriage, who worked forpay beforemarriage, who graduated junior college or universityand worked forpay beforemarriage, who worked beforemarriage and quit workingwhen theymarried, and who worked beforemarriage and quit workingwhen theyhad a first birth,by year of marriage:Japan, 1955-98 100 Worked beforemarriage_ _ 90 Workedfor pay

80 Worked forpaybeforemarriage - / \ r ~~~~~~~~~~(amongwomen who graduated / \\/ } ~~~~~~~~~~juniorcollege or university) v 70 _//Quit workingat marriage X / g 7 ~~~~~~~~(amongwomen who worked

o 60

0 50 50 o Quit workingat firstbirth (among women who workedbefore 40 marriage)

30-

I I I I I I I 20 l l 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year of marriage

SOURCE: Three-yearmoving averages,based on pooled data forcurrently married women aged 15-49 from various rounds of the National Survey on FamilyPlanning between 1986 and 2000. 82 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN all timesbetween 1960 and 1975. Thus the trendsin labor forceparticipation ratesfor single women, unlike those forall women, indicatethat the trendin women's laborforce participation cannot explain the dip in mean age at marriagethat occurred between 1960 and 1975. As alreadyseen in Figure8, thelabor force participation rate for single women aged 25-29 increasedgradually between 1972 and 1999. The level of 81 percentin 1972 was alreadyhigh and alreadyconsisted mainly of paid employment.This raises the questionof whether the increasefrom 81 to 92 percentis largeenough to accountfor much of the sustainedupward trendin mean age at marriagefor women thatbegan in 1975. We cannot conclusivelyanswer this question, but the effectof the increasefrom 81 to 92 percentmay have been somewhatlarger than is apparentat firstsight, becausethe educational qualifications and wagesof single women were rising rapidlyat the same timeas theirlabor force participation rate was increasing. For example,the full-timehourly wage gap betweenmen and women below 30 yearsof age, as measuredby the ratioof women's wage to men's wage, narrowedfrom 0.74 to 0.89 between1973 and 1999.The risingwages ofsingle women implysubstantial increases in the opportunitycost of quit- tingone's job to marryand have children. Of course,if women continueto work aftermarriage, this tends to reducethe opportunitycost of getting married. Figure 9 also showsthat the proportionof women who were workingbefore marriage and quit when theymarried has been decliningsteadily over time,from 80 to 38 percent between 1965 and 1998. On theother hand, the proportion of women who were workingbefore marriage and quit when theyhad theirfirst child increased from29 to 54 percentbetween 1965 and 1998. Overall,among workingwomen who had a firstbirth by the timeof the survey,the proportionwho quit eitherwhen theymarried or when theyhad theirfirst child declinedonly moderately,from 86 to 70 percentbetween 1965 and 1998.7 Thus,as late as 1998, seven out of ten women quit workingwhen theymarried, or shortlyafterward when theyhad theirfirst child. On balance, it appears that the job-relatedopportunity costs of gettingmarried have risensubstantially for the largemajority of single women, virtually all of whom workbefore marriage. It thereforeseems likelythat increases in labor forceparticipation rates forsingle women have contributedsignifi- cantlyto the increasesin women's singulatemean age at marriagesince 1975. Althoughthe proportionof women who continueto workafter marriageand firstbirth increased slowly from 14 to 20 percentbetween 1965 and 1995, it increasedmuch fasterfrom 20 to 30 percentbetween 1995 and 1998 and may continueto increaseas women's educationalqualifica- tionscontinue to rise and more women entercareer jobs. The movement of women into careerjobs may accelerateas the influenceof the 1992 Pa- ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 83 rentalLeave Law continuesto exertitself. This law allows one year of pa- rentalleave forthe mother after a birth(initially uncompensated but revised to 25 percentpay in 1995 and currentlyproposed by the governmentto be revised again to 40 percent)with return rights after the leave. Continuingto worksoon afterthe first birth would weaken the causal link between women's laborforce participation and age at marriageand couldbring about a declinein thesingulate mean age at marriage. Regardingthe problemof two-waycausation in the relationshipbe- tweenlabor force participation trends for single women and marriagetrends, we believe thatcausality runs mainly from trends in labor forceparticipation ratesto marriagetrends and not the otherway around. One piece of evidence supportingthis view is thatlabor forceparticipation rates for all women (singleand marriedcombined) fell and thenrose not only in younger age groupsbut also in older age groups,among which labor forcetrends could not have been influencedappreciably by marriagetrends. This suggeststhat trends in laborforce participation rates were beingdriven mainly by factorsunrelated to marriage.Another piece of evidenceis the simultaneous timingof the upturnof theselabor forceparticipation rates in 1975 regardlessof age group.This simultaneous timing appears to have occurred primarilyas a resultof the 1973-75 recession(discussed in moredetail later), which was followedby a periodof slowereconomic growth, rather than a resultof marriagetrends. Further evidence is thatlabor forceparticipation rates forsingle women have increasedcontinuously since 1960 and have not trackedfluctuations in marriagetrends, again suggestingthat economic forces,not marriagetrends, have been the main factordriving labor force participationrates upward for single women. Yet anotherpiece ofevidence is the changingcomposition of the femaleworkforce by type of worker, whichis not caused by marriagetrends. Althoughthey appear to have had a substantialimpact on marriage trends,the increases in laborforce participation rates for single women that continuedmore or less unabatedbetween 1960 and 1999 cannot,as noted earlier,explain the dip in mean age at marriagefor women thatoccurred between 1960 and 1975. Amongthe explanatoryfactors that remain, the most likelyone is the extraordinarilyrapid growthof per capita income thatoccurred in Japanbetween the late 1950S and 1973.This income growth is graphedin Figure10. Between 1955 and 1973, theannual growthrate of real GNP per capitaaveraged 8.1 percent,resulting in an overallincrease of 304 percentin real GNPper capitaover this period.8 The substantialincome gain that occurredeach year undoubtedlymade marriageseem more affordableto many.This positiveincome effecton the decisionto marryof- fersthe mostplausible explanation of why the trendin mean age at mar- riageleveled offfor men and turnedslightly downward for women during thisperiod, as seen earlierin Figure1. 84 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

FIGURE 10 Trendsin mean age at marriagefor women and men compared with the two-year-laggedtrend in the annual growthrate of real GNP per capita: Japan, 1955-99

15 29 Mean age at marriagefor men

| \ / \ | 27 / ~~~~~Annual growthrate of GNP per

-5 l l l l l l l ll 263

25 0 24 Mean age at marriagefor women

-5 23 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year of marriage

NOTE: Annual growthrates of real GNP per capita were calculated fromdata in Economic PlanningAgency, Annual Reporton NationalAccounts (various years). Mean ages at marriagefor women and men are from Ministryof Health and Welfare,Vital Statistics (various years).

Figure10 also shows trendsin the mean age at marriagefor men and women. Here we have used annual values of the mean age at marriage fromvital statistics in place ofthe singulatemean age at marriage;the latter is available only forcensus yearsand reflectsmarriage behavior in earlier yearsas well as in thereference year, inasmuch as it is calculatedfrom age- specificproportions never married. In contrast,mean age at marriagecal- culated fromvital statistics is available foreach calendaryear and is based onlyon marriagesthat occur in thatcalendar year, so it is moresensitive to annual changesin theeconomic growth rate. Because ofthe different modes of calculation,the shapes of the trendsin mean age at marriagefrom vital statisticsin Figure 10 are differentfrom (though broadly similar to) the shapes ofthe trendsin singulatemean age at marriageshown in Figure1. In Figure 10, the trendin the growthrate of real GNP per capita is laggedby two years,relative to the trendin mean age at marriage,under the assumptionthat it takesabout one year to perceivethat the economy has indeed turnedupward or downwardand anotheryear to plan a wed- ding.The figureshows that the downturn in mean age at marriagebetween 1960 and 1973 coincided with the period of unusually rapid economic ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 85 growth,and thatthe upturnin age at marriageafter 1973 coincidedwith the onsetof a periodof much slower economic growth. It appears,then, that income effectswere the principalcause of the downturnin mean age at marriagebetween 1960 and 1973 and a contrib- utingcause ofthe sudden upturn that occurred after 1973. As alreadymen- tioned, this upturncoincided with the recessionof 1973-75, which was triggeredby the OPEC oil crisisthat began in October1973. The oil shock resultedin major increasesin the priceof oil, a periodof severeinflation, and a sudden slowdownof growthin real GNPper capita.The annual rate ofgrowth of real GNPper capita,which had been runningat about 11 percentper yearin the late 1960s,fell steeply in 1973 and turnednegative in 1974 beforerebounding in 1975. Duringthe remainder of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, economicgrowth continued at a much slowerrate, aver- agingabout 3-4 percentper year (Economic Planning Agency, various years). The recessionand thesubsequent period of slower income growth undoubtedlymade marriageseem less affordableto many,resulting in some postponementof marriages.In such cases, singlewomen worked longer thanpreviously before marriage, and manymarried women soughtjobs in orderto boost familyincome, thereby contributing to the risein laborforce participationrates for both single and marriedwomen. By 1975 theeconomy had recoveredfrom recession, and jobs forwomen, many of which were part-time,were becomingavailable again in largenumbers. They became increasinglyavailable in subsequent years as the service sector of the economycontinued to expand rapidly.Between 1975 and 1999, the proportionof the labor forcein service-industryjobs increasedmore or less continuouslyfrom 52 to 63 percent;it increasedfrom 50 to 57 percentfor men and from56 to 72 percentfor women (StatisticsBureau, AnnualRe- portof the Labor Force Survey, various years). Also contributingto postponementof marriageduring the 1973-75 recessionwas severeprice inflation, which not onlyslowed the growth rate of real GNP per capita but also greatlyreduced the real value of accumu- lated savingsof both young couples and theirparents that were intendedto pay forweddings and the establishmentof new households.Inflation, as measuredby increasesin the consumerprice index,was 11.2 percentin 1973, 23.2 percentin 1974, and 11.7 percentin 1975, resultingin an overall priceincrease of 53 percentin threeyears. The dip in the trendin the mean age at marriagethat occurredbe- tween the late 1950s and the oil shock of 1973 resemblesthe temporary declinein mean age at marriagethat occurred in Westerncountries earlier in the twentiethcentury (United Nations 1990). In both cases, the decline stemmedin largepart from income effects associated with the rapidgrowth of relativelywell-paying urban employmentopportunities, especially for ruralmigrants. In Japan,however, the period of temporary decline was much 86 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN shorterthan in the West. This is not surprising,because the pace of economicgrowth and demographictransition has been much fasterin Japan. In both Japanand in Westerncountries, age at marriagesubsequently re- sumedits upward climb. Contributing to thisupward climb, in additionto rising levels of educationand labor forceparticipation of women,have been changesin values and othercultural factors, which we considernext.

Effectsof cultural change on marriagetrends

We have noted thata major culturalchange in Japanin recentdecades is the declinein arrangedmarriage and the riseof love marriage.Moderniza- tionand the accompanyingrise of individualism have erodedthe extended familyand the local communitynetworks that historically formed the basis forarranged marriage. Figure 11 shows thatbetween 1955 and 1998 the proportionof marriagesthat were arrangedfell from 63 to 7 percent.Be- cause the trendhad alreadybeen steeplydeclining around 1955, the proportionof marriagesthat were arrangedwas undoubtedlyeven higherin earlieryears. The declinein arrangedmarriage appears to be closelylinked to the end of universalmarriage in Japan. As seen in Table 1, as late as

FIGURE 11 Trends in the proportion of marriages that were arranged and the proportion of newly married couples who coresided with parents at the time of marriage: Japan, 1955-98

70 sCoresidedwith parents 6060 +\ \ \ ~~~(amongwomen married to an edstonlyson)l

50 _\+ Coresid/edwithi parents Arranged X40

1'- 30 0Coresided with husband's ;..... X ...... parents

20 20 -

10 _ Coresidedwith wife's parents

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Year of marriage

SOURCE:Three-year moving averages, based on pooleddata for currently married women aged 15-49from ninerounds of the National Survey on FamilyPlanning between 1981 and 2000. ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 87

1960 thelifetime celibacy rate was only2 percentfor women and 1 percent formen. Because the lifetimecelibacy rate lags marriagesby about 20-25 years,these figuresimply that as late as the 1940s the institutionof arranged marriagewas ensuringuniversal marriage among both men and women. The steeppost-World War II declinein arrangedmarriage appears to be an importantpart of the explanationof why the lifetimecelibacy rate startedto risegradually after 1960, and whyit is expectedto risemuch more rapidlyto veryhigh levels in comingyears. Closely relatedto the decline in arrangedmarriage is the decline in the proportionof newlymarried couples who coreside,at least fora time, with parents.Between 1955 and 1998, thisproportion fell from 64 to 23 percent,as shown in Figure11. This fallwas cushionedby the rise in the proportionof sons who are eldestor onlysons, who traditionallycoreside with theirparents. The proportionof sons who were eldest or only sons rose from40 to 72 percentbetween 1957 and 1998, as a consequence of earlierfertility decline. For newlymarried couples among whom the husband was the eldestson, the proportioncoresiding with parentsdeclined from65 to 25 percentbetween 1959 and 1998, somewhatmore steeply than the declinefor all newlymarried couples. By 1998 the likelihoodthat a newly marriedson and his wife coresidedwith parentswas not much higherfor eldest sons (25 percent)than forother sons (15 percent).Figure 11 also shows thatthe traditional dominance of coresidence with husband's parentsrather than wife's parents is disappearing.Extrapolation of the trend in coresidencewith husband's parentsand the trendin coresidencewith wife'sparents suggests that the two curveswill convergein about two dec- ades, at which timethe patternof coresidencewith husband's parents will have disappeared. The year-to-yearfluctuations in the coresidencecurves in Figure 11 are also of interest,because the fluctuationsare associatedto some extent withyear-to-year fluctuations in the economicgrowth rate. Coresidence is more common duringhard times,because it is cheaper to move in with parentsthan to set up a separatehousehold. The upturnsof coresidencein 1967 and 1974-75 followedeconomic recessions that occurreda year or two earlier.This coincidencein timingconstitutes further evidence of income effectson marriagetrends. The precipitousdecline in arrangedmarriage has had largeeffects on both age at marriageand the lifetimecelibacy rate, largely because the decline in arrangedmarriage has not been compensatedby the emergenceof a well-developedmarriage market (Fukutake 1989). In Japan,the development of voluntaryassociations and othersocial institutionswhere single men and womenwith similar interests can readilymeet each otherhas been slow. Contactwith potential marriage partners tends to be limited,often to a smallcircle of colleagues at workor formerschoolmates. The underdevel- 88 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN oped natureof the marriagemarket is reflectedin the high proportionof singlewomen aged 16 and olderwho say theyhave no male friend(nei- thera boyfriendnor any other)whom theyhave seen recently.9This pro- portionwas 43 percentin the 1990 roundof the NationalSurvey on Fam- ilyPlanning and 45 percentin the 1998 round.Even among women who wanted to marrysoon, the proportionwho said theyhad no male friend was 28 percentin the 1998 round. The decline in arrangedmarriage and the rise of love marriageare also reflectedin the changingmanner in whichcouples initially meet. Data fromthe 1994 and 1996 roundsof the National Survey on FamilyPlanning indicatethat the proportionof couples who firstmet at theirplace of work fluctuatedbetween 30 and 40 percentbetween 1970 and 1996, with no cleartrend. During the same periodthe proportion who were introducedto each otherby parentsor otherrelatives declined from 25 to 9 percent,and theproportion who were introducedby friends,office colleagues, or super- visorsincreased from 13 to 28 percent.The proportionwho met in school rose slowlyover time,reaching 1 1 percentby 1996. The proportionwho metin schoolhas been influencedpositively by rising university enrollments, especiallyof women,and negativelyby increasingage at marriage,which lengthensthe intervalbetween leaving school and gettingmarried. Anotherchange associated with later marriage is the increasingpreva- lence ofpremarital sex in Japan.Between the 1990 and 1998 roundsof the NationalSurvey on FamilyPlanning, the proportion of singlewomen aged 16 and older who reportedthat theywere currentlyusing contraception increasedfrom 39 to 53 percent.The figureof 53 percentin 1998 implies that,among the 55 percentof single women who reportedin the same year thatthey had at least one male friend,almost all had engagedin premarital sex. By the timeof the 2000 roundof the National Survey on FamilyPlan- ning,the proportionof single women aged 16 and olderwho reportedthat theywere currentlyusing contraception had increasedto 57 percent.Data fromthe NationalSurvey on Sexual Behaviorof Youth indicatethat, between 1974 and 1993, the proportionof junior collegeand universitystu- dentswho reportedhaving had sexual intercourseincreased from 23 to 57 percentamong men and from11 to 43 percentamong women (Retherford, Ogawa, and Sakamoto1996; JapaneseAssociation for Sex Education1994). The increasedprevalence and social acceptabilityof premaritalsex is also reflectedin the sexuallyexplicit material that commonly appears in many popularpublications, and by the existenceof "love hotels,"which have become commonthroughout Japan in citiesand at highwayinterchanges in the countryside.Typically, a couple can renta roomin a love hotel fortwo hours fora price that rangesfrom about Y2,500 to Y6,000 (about $20 to $50)-easily affordableby Japan'ssingle working men and women, who usuallylive withtheir parents. Thus, in contemporaryJapan, it is easy for ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 8.9

couples to have sex withoutgetting married. The easy availabilityof premaritalsex is anotherfactor that has reducedthe urgencyof gettingmar- riedand contributedto increasesin the mean age at marriage.Indeed, the especiallyrapid rise in theprevalence of premarital sex duringthe 1990s in Japanmay accountfor much of the upwardtrend in the mean age at marriagethat occurred between 1990 and 1998. The possibleinfluence of the sexual revolutionon age at marriagein Japanhas also been notedby Atoh (1985). Table 4 examinesfactors influencing sexual experienceamong never- marriedwomen aged 22 and older,excluding students, based on data from the last fiverounds of the NationalSurvey on FamilyPlanning. The likelihood of havingexperienced sexual intercourserises with age up to age 34 and then fallsoff slightly. Education, occupation, childhood residence, and birthorder do not have statisticallysignificant effects on the likelihoodof havingexperienced sexual intercourse.Never-married women living alone, however,have a significantlyhigher likelihood of having experienced sexual intercoursethan never-married women living in othertypes of households. Even with all these variablesheld constantin the statisticalanalysis, the predictedproportion having experienced sexual intercourse rose sharply since 1990,with the increase concentrated between 1994 and 1996.These findings suggesta continuingacross-the-board shift in valuesrelating to premaritalsex. This apparentshift in values is consistentwith the more generalob- servationthat changes in values oftenoccur in spurtsin Japanin instances where deviationsfrom these values previouslymet with strongsocial dis- approval(Ogawa and Retherford1993a; Retherford,Ogawa, and Sakamoto 1996). Social disapprovalof premaritalsex was strongin Japan untilthe 1980s. When social disapprovalis strong,latent receptivity to value change maygrow for a whileas a consequenceof rising educational levels and other modernizinginfluences. At some pointa new majorityviewpoint emerges, and value change and behavioralchange then diffuserapidly through the populationas the new values takehold and social disapprovalof the previ- ouslyproscribed behavior recedes. The timedelay associated with the build- up oflatent receptivity can be viewedas an aspectof cultural lag. Thiskind of rapid diffusiontends to be more visiblein Japan than in many other countriesbecause Japan is more highlyintegrated in the sense of shared values and good internalcommunication. This integrationstems in large part fromthe high degreeof homogeneityof Japan's populationin such characteristicsas language,ethnicity, and religion. The rapiddiffusion of new values relatedto premaritalsex and theten- dencyof such values to be sharedacross socioeconomic strata in Japanmay explainwhy socioeconomicdifferentials in the prevalenceof premaritalsex tendto be smallor nonexistentin analysesbased on data forparticular time points,as in Table4. (Withdate of survey statistically controlled, the socioeco- 90 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

TABLE 4 Factors influencing sexual experience among never-married women: Japan, 1990-98 Predictedpercentage having Predictorvariable experiencedsexual intercourse Age 22 57* 25 63* 28 67* 31 70* 34 71* 37 70* 40 68* Education Senior high school or lesst 66 Juniorcollege 63 University 59 Occupation Full-timepaid employee 65 Othert 59 Childhood residence Urban 64 Ruralt 64 Birthorder Eldest or only daughter 64 Othert 64 Type of household Livingwith parentsin 2-generationhousehold 61* 3-generationhousehold 63* Other multi-personhousehold 63* One-person householdt 78 Year of survey 1990 56* 1994 60* 1996 66 1998 67 2000t 67

NOTES: Predictedpercentages were computedby logitregression for single women aged 22 and older, excludingstudents. In the logitregression, age is specifiedby two continuousvariables, age and age-squared. tlndicatesa referencecategory. *Indicatesthat the underlyinglogit regression coefficient differs significantly from zero at the 5 percentlevel. In the case of age, the coefficientsof age and age-squared are both significant. SOURCE: Computed frompooled data fromthe 1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000 rounds of the National Survey on FamilyPlanning conducted by the Mainichi Newspapersof Japan. ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 91 nomicdifferentials shown in Table4 are effectivelycross-sectional.) These char- acteristicsof Japanese society also helpus to understandand resolvethe seem- ing paradoxthat socioeconomic differentials in prevalenceof premaritalsex rarelyappear in cross-sectionalanalyses even thoughsocioeconomic changes are drivingthe long-term upward trend in prevalence. Giventhe currenthigh prevalence of premarital sex in Japan,there is surprisinglylittle cohabitation by unmarriedcouples, which untilrecently had been consideredsocially unacceptable. According to the 1998 roundof the National Surveyon FamilyPlanning, only 4 percentof singlewomen were cohabiting at ages 25-29 and 5 percent at 30-34. Attitudesabout cohabitation,however, appear to be changingrapidly. In the 1998 survey,38 percentof singlewomen said cohabitationwas "acceptable,"and another 39 percentsaid itwas "probablyacceptable." Table 5 indicatesthat the likelihood of viewingcohabitation as acceptableor probablyacceptable does not varysignificantly by woman's age, birthorder, occupation, coresidence status,household type, urban-rural residence, or mother'swork status during the respondent'schildhood. The only variableswith a statisticallysig- nificanteffect are educationand previousexperience of sexual intercourse. The lattervariable has the largesteffect. With other variables controlled by settingthem at theirmean values in the underlyinglogistic regression, the predictedproportion viewing cohabitation as acceptableor probablyacceptable was 76 percentamong those who had previouslyexperienced sexual intercourseand 60 percentamong those who had not. The subsampleof singlepersons on whichthe table is based numberedonly 359, however,so thatsome of the othereffects might also have been statisticallysignificant had the size of the subsamplebeen larger.Nevertheless, the findingssug- gest thatan across-the-boardshift in values relatingto cohabitationis oc- curring,similar to thatwhich occurred earlier in the case ofpremarital sex. If so, the percentageof young singles who cohabitcould startrising rapidly in the near future. In Japan,the commonpractice in whichsingle adults continue to live withtheir parents is knownas "parasitesingle," because thesegrown chil- drentend to contributelittle to householdexpenses (Yamada 1996). Among singlewomen aged 22 and older,excluding students, the proportionliving with parents was 95 percent in 1990 and 94 percent in 1998, according to the NationalSurvey on FamilyPlanning. Perhaps this traditional arrange- mentpersists because Japaneseparents, especially mothers, are happy to have theirunmarried adult childrencontinue to live withthem in orderto avoid loneliness,inasmuch as theirhusbands tend to come home late after workand oftenengage in obligatoryafter-work socializing with colleagues. Workingas a singleperson while living with parents and contributing littleto household expenses means thatmost single persons in Japan can afforda carefreeand comfortablelife style. This lifestyle is closelyassoci- 92 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

TABLE 5 Factors influencing acceptability of cohabitation among never-married women: Japan, 1998 Predicted percentage who consider cohabitation "acceptable" Predictor variable or "probably acceptable"

Age 22-24 76 25-29 68 30-34 72 3 5+t 67 Education Senior high school or lesst 63 Juniorcollege 76* University 74 Birthorder Eldest or only daughter 67 Otherbirth ordert 75 Occupation Skilledwhite collart 56 Otheroccupation 74 Not working 77 Had sexual intercourse Yes 76* Not 60 Livingwith parent(s) Yes 68 Not 79 Childhood household type 3-generation 69 Othert 73 Currentresidence Urban 70 Ruralt 77 Mother's work statusin childhood Worked 75 Othert 67

NOTES: Predictedpercentages were computedby logitregression for single women aged 22 and older, excludingstudents. In the logitregression, age is specifiedby age and age-squared. tlndicatesa referencecategory. *Indicatesthat the underlyinglogit regression coefficient differs significantly from zero at the 5 percentlevel. SOURCE: 1998 round of the National Surveyon FamilyPlanning conducted by the Mainichi Newspapersof Japan. ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 93 ated withthe so-callednew singleconcept, which refersto the enjoyment of singlelife without pressure to marry.This concept, which received con- siderablepublicity in the Japanesepress in the late 1980s,was somewhat novel at the time,given traditional pressures to marryearly. The proportion of singlepersons favoring the new singleconcept was, however,alreadyhigh by 1988, suggestingthat considerable value changehad already occurredbefore the conceptsurfaced in the mass media. Surveysindicated thatthe proportionof singlewomen favoringthe new singleconcept was 78 percentin 1988 and 76 percentin 1993. Amongsingle men thispropor- tionwas 59 percentin 1988 and 62 percentin 1993, indicatingvirtually no changebetween the two surveys(Retherford, Ogawa, and Sakamoto1996). The riseof the "parasitesingle" lifestyle and the "new singleconcept" have also contributedto the trendtoward later marriage and less marriage. Table 6 providessome insightinto the factorsinfluencing the desireto marrysoon, based on a questionin the 1998 roundof the NationalSurvey on FamilyPlanning. The desireto marrysoon varieslittle by age between 22 and 34 yearsbut is lower forwomen aged 35 and older,probably because a highproportion of singlewomen have givenup on gettingmarried by the timethey reach 35. Education,work status, current residence, childhood residence,birth order, and numberof siblingshave no statistically significanteffect on wantingto marrysoon; statisticallysignificant effects mighthave emerged,however, had the subsampleon whichthe regression is based been larger.Single women whose fathershelped with child care and houseworkare more likelyto want to marrysoon than are women whose fathersdid not help witheither of these tasks.Apparently women whose fathershelped aroundthe house have a morepositive view of marriage.This finding suggests that, to theextent conjugal relationships evolve in an egalitariandirection, the effectcould be to lower age at marriage. Anotherinteresting finding (of marginal statistical significance, however) is thatwomen whose parentshave an unhappymarriage are more likelyto want to marrythan women whose parentshave a happymarriage. It appears that,among the roughly95 percentof singlewomen who live with theirparents, those whose parentshave an unhappymarriage tend to want to escape an unhappyliving situation by gettingmarried themselves. A risingrate of divorceis anotherfactor making marriage less attrac- tiveto Japanesewomen. A risingdivorce rate signals to women thatmar- riageis increasinglyless likelyto providethem with long-term security. It also signalsthat theyhad betterget a good educationand a good job, in case theirmarriage ends in divorce.Although the divorcerate has been comparativelylow in Japan,it is rising.Between 1960 and 1995 the total divorcerate (the number of divorces that 1,000 newly married women would have by age 50 if theyexperienced this year's age-specificdivorce rates) increasedfrom 81 to 203 (Ogawa and Ermisch1994; Yamamotoand Kojima 94 LATE MARRIAGE AND LEss MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

TABLE 6 Factors influencing the desire to marry soon among never-married women: Japan, 1998 Predicted percentage who Predictor variable want to marry soon Age 22-24 31* 25-29 33* 30-34 35* 35+t 15 Education Senior high school or lesst 26 Juniorcollege 31 University 33 Workstatus Working 30 Not workingt 23 Currentresidence Urban 27 Ruralt 43 Childhood residence Urban 32 Ruralt 18 Birthorder Eldest or only daughter 30 Otherbirth ordert 29 Numberof siblings 1 31 2 30 3 29 Father'scontribution during respondent's childhood Child care 31 Housework 35 Both 41* Neithert 26 Parents'marriage Unhappy 36 Happyt 28

NOTES: Predictedpercentages were computedby logitregression for single women aged 22 and older, excludingstudents and women who did not live witlhmotlher and fatlherduring childlhood. In the logit regression,age is specifiedby age and age-squared. tlndicatesa referencecategory. *Indicatesthat the underlyinglogit regression coefficient differs significantly froni zero at the 5 percentlevel. SOURCE: 1998 round of the National Surveyon FamilyPlanning conducted by the Mainichi Newspapersof Japan. ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 95

1997), implyingthat approximately 20 percentof marriages will end in divorce.Although more recent estimates of the total divorce rate are not available, estimatesof the crude divorcerate (divorcesper 1,000 population) indicatethat this rate jumped from1.60 to 2.09 per 1,000 between 1995 and 2000 (figuresreleased in January2001 on theMinistry of Health, Labour and Welfare'sweb page). The value of 2.09 exceeds the value of 1.90 for Francein 1996 and is approachingthe value of2.14 in Germanyin 1996. Internationalcomparative survey data on attitudestoward divorce, shown in Table 7, suggestthat the divorcerate in Japanwill continueto increaserapidly in comingyears. The firstpanel ofthe tableshows thepro- portionof women (both marriedand single) aged 20-59 who agree or stronglyagree with the statement"If and when one cannotfind happiness and satisfactionwith a spouse, it is betterto divorce."Between 1982 and 1992, this proportionincreased from 27 to 49 percentin Japan,a much more rapidincrease than in any of the othercountries shown in the table. Between 1992 and 1997, the proportionincreased further to 60 percent. The fifthpanel of the table shows how singlewomen aged 20 and olderresponded to the same statement.The proportionagreeing or strongly agreeingremained constant at 66 percentin 1992 and 1997,almost as high as the figureof 69 percentfor the UnitedStates. Fully two-thirds of single women in Japanare preparedto divorcetheir future husbands if the mar- riagerelationship turns out to be an unhappyone. Table 7 also shows responsesto otherstatements relating to marriage and familylife. Between 1982 and 1997 the proportionof women agreeing or stronglyagreeing with the statement"The husbandshould be thebread- winner,and the wifeshould stay at home" fellfrom 71 to 46 percent(from 42 to 38 percentbetween 1992 and 1997 in thecase ofsingle women). The remainingstatements pertain to changesbetween 1992 and 1997. The proportionof women agreeingwith the statement"Once a woman is married, she should givepriority to the needs ofher familyrather than her personal needs" fellfrom 65 to 58 percent.The proportionof single women agreeing withthe statement"Marriage does not mean thatone musthave children" increasedfrom 52 to 63 percent.On the other hand, the proportionof women agreeingwith the statement"It is good forwomen to have a job, but theyalso should do houseworkand take care of childrenproperly" re- mainedvirtually unchanged at 84-85 percent;and the proportionof single women agreeingwith the statement"All thingsconsidered, women's happinesslies in marriage,so it is betterfor women to marry"was high compared withthe proportionin othercountries and fellonly slightly from 65 to 63 percent.On the whole, the responsesindicate that Japanese women are stilltraditional in theirattitudes toward marriage and family,compared withwomen in mostof the othercountries in the table.But the responses also indicatethat they are rapidlybecoming more egalitarian in outlook.Given 96 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

TABLE 7 International comparisons of values and attitudes toward marriage and family life (percentage of women who agree or strongly agree with each specified statement), selected countries, various years

If and when one cannot findhappiness and satisfactionwith a spouse, it is betterto divorce (all women aged 20-59) Year Japan Korea Philippines US UK France Germany Sweden

1982 27 41 68 79 80 68 1992 49 44 48 69 84 86 82 72 1997 60 -

The husband should be the breadwinner,and the wifeshould stayat home (all women aged 20- 59) Year Japan Korea Philippines US UK France Germany Sweden

1982 71 56 34 26 33 14 1992 51 24 67 20 12 14 21 10 1997 46 -

Once a woman is married,she should give priorityto the needs of her familyrather than her personal needs (all women aged 20+) Year Japan Korea Philippines US UK France Germany Sweden

1992 65 83 94 47 55 66 44 36 1997 58 -

It is good forwomen to have a job, but theyalso should do housework and take care of children properly(all aged 20+) Year Japan Korea Philippines US UK France Germany Sweden

1992 84 71 87 52 64 92 74 62 1997 85 -

the highlyinegalitarian nature of mostJapanese marriages, the findingssug- gestthat Japanese women are becomingincreasingly dissatisfied with tradi- tionalmarriage arrangements. This dissatisfaction is probably contributing to therise in meanage at marriageand theproportion never marrying. Anotherfactor that reduces the attractivenessof marriageand family lifefor Japanese women is the pressurethat parents (especially mothers) and childrenmust endure as childrenmove throughJapan's highly com- petitiveeducational system. In Japan,the top corporationsand government ministriestypically recruit their higher-level staff from a handfulof elite universities.Gaining entry to theseuniversities requires high scores on dif- ficultentrance examinations. In preparingfor these examinations, children ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 97

TABLE 7 (continued)

If and when one cannot findhappiness and satisfactionwith a spouse, it is betterto divorce (single women aged 20+)

Year Japan Korea Philippines US UK France Germany Sweden

1992 66 61 45 69 82 88 82 69 1997 66

Marriage does not mean thatone must have children(single women aged 20+)

Year Japan Korea Philippines US UK France Germany Sweden

1992 52 65 40 89 92 68 66 88 1997 63

The husband should be the breadwinner,and the wifeshould stayat home (singlewomen aged 20+)

Year Japan Korea Philippines US UK France Germany Sweden

1992 42 13 54 9 19 8 12 7 1997 38

All thingsconsidered, women's happinesslies in marriage,so it is betterfor women to marry (single women aged 20+)

Year Japan Korea Philippines US UK France Germany Sweden

1992 65 40 58 10 17 34 14 6 1997 63

NOTE: The response categoriesfor each statementwere "stronglyagree," "agree," "disagree,"and "stronglydisagree." SOURCE: Tokyo MetropolitanGovernment, Bureau of Lifeand Culture 1992; PrimeMinister's Office 1997.

benefitgreatly from having previously attended a seriesof elite schools at lowerlevels that prepare them for admission to the eliteuniversities. These lowerschools also have demandingentrance examinations. As incomeshave increasedand thepercentage of young men and women attendingcolleges and universitieshas risen,the competitionto enterthe elite schools has become intense.This competitionhas givenrise to numerousand expen- sivejuku, or "cramschools," which prepare children for entrance examina- tionsand whichchildren attend after school, on weekends,and duringva- cationperiods. The growthof juku accelerated further when thegovernment capped universityenrollments around 1975; this step contributedto the massivemovement of married women intothe workforceafter 1975, inasmuch as mothers increasinglyworked part-timeto help pay for their children'sjuku and otherprivate educational expenses. 98 LATE MARRIAGE AND LEss MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

Nationwidebetween 1985 and 1993, the proportionattending juku increasedfrom 17 to 24 percentamong elementary school students(grades 1-6) and from45 to 60 percentamong junior highschool students(grades 7-9) (Ministryof Education 1996). Duringthis period, as the competition to enterelite schools intensified, the juku academiccurriculum also became more demanding,further contributing to the academic pressureson children that are commonlyreferred to in Japan as "examinationhell." The jukuphenomenon has imposedincreasing financial and psychologicalstrains on parentsas well. Surveysthat ask parentsabout the advantagesand dis- advantagesof having children show thatthe disadvantages most frequently mentionedare the financialand psychologicalstress of educatingchildren (Retherford,Ogawa, and Sakamoto1996). It seemslikely that the prospect of"examination hell" is yetanother reason why many young women choose to delaymarriage and enjoysingle life longer.

Conclusion

The precedinganalysis reveals a patternof values, institutions,and behavior thathas increasinglypromoted later marriage and less marriagein Ja- pan in recentdecades. A key factorpromoting later marriageand non- marriagehas been the near-completeerosion of the institutionof arranged marriage,which has not been fullycompensated by the emergenceof voluntaryassociations and other social institutionswhere single men and women withsimilar interests can readilymeet each other.The collapse of arrangedmarriage is linkedto the riseof individualism,which stemsfun- damentallyfrom the evolutionof a labor marketthat increasinglytreats personsas individualsrather than as membersof familiesor othergroups. Major increasesin educationalattainment and laborforce participation have been especiallyimportant factors promoting values ofindividualism among Japanesewomen. Over time,structural changes in the labormarket and the rapidlyin- creasingeducational qualifications of singlewomen have greatlyenhanced the positionand wages of such women in the labor market,where almost all ofthose who are not in schoolare employed.Large proportions of single persons,especially women, live with their parents, contribute little to household expenses while earninggood salaries,and are able to enjoy a rela- tivelycarefree and comfortablelife style.These circumstancescontrast sharplywith the prospectof a marriedlife in which the husband rarely returnshome fromwork in timeto join the familyat dinneror to interact with the children,who mustbe guided mainlyby theirmother through yearsof "examinationhell." These changeshave reducedthe attractiveness of marriageto singlewomen, who are also no longerunder any significant financialor social pressureto getmarried. ROBERT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 99

Japan'srising divorce rate further diminishes the attractiveness of marriageto women,inasmuch as marriageoffers them progressively less security.Marriage has also become less importantas a source of sexual gratifi- cationas premaritalsex has become increasinglyacceptable and prevalent. Indeed,the rapidlyincreasing acceptability and prevalenceof premarital sex appear to be a majorpart of the explanationfor continuing increases in the mean age at marriageduring the 1990s. Althoughso farJapanese women do not seem to be highlycareer-oriented, they nevertheless are becoming increasinglywell-educated, outward-looking, and egalitarianin theirviews, and theyare showingsigns of dissatisfaction with traditional husband-wife roles withinthe family.These attitudinalchanges also reduce the attractivenessof marriage. The continuingimprovement in women's educational qualificationsmay resultin furtherincreases in mean age at marriageand the proportionnever marrying.On the otherhand, if the proportionof women who do not stopworking when theymarry and have childrencon- tinuesto increase,the opportunitycosts of marriageand childbearingmay decline,and thiscould lead to a declinein mean age at marriage. The changingnature of women's labor force participation is, however, likelyto continueto exertupward pressure on age at marriageas women increasinglymove intocareer-oriented jobs. The movementof women into such jobs will probablyaccelerate in comingyears, because, accordingto currentpopulation projections, 1998 was thepeak yearfor male laborsup- ply. In subsequentyears, as Japanrecovers from its currentrecession, an increasingshortage of male workersand furtherreductions in workinghours will drawmore women intocareer jobs. In theprocess, the nature of career jobs in Japanesecompanies, which frequently involve mandatory job rota- tionsand transfers,will have to changein orderto accommodatewomen's needs to manageboth work and familyresponsibilities; and familyresponsibilities,in turn,will increasinglyhave to be sharedby husbands. The governmentof Japanis concernedabout the trendstoward later marriageand less marriage,especially because thesetrends are a majorcon- tributingcause ofJapan's very low fertility,about whichthe government is also concerned.Conceivably government action could encouragea reversal of currentmarriage trends, but it is questionablewhether the government will be able to act effectively.As Boling (1998) notes,the governmenthas been inconsistentin itsactions in thisdomain. On the one hand, partlyto relievestrains on familiesthe governmenthas expanded daycarefacilities (the AngelPlan in 1994 and the New AngelPlan in 1999), establishedpa- rentalleave withjob-return rights after a birth,and reducedworking hours in large companies.On the otherhand, it has soughtto cope with strains on the social securitysystem, caused by rapidpopulation aging, by tryingto shiftcosts of caringfor the elderlyback to families(Ogawa and Retherford 1997); at the same time,it has done littleto mitigatethe "examinationhell" 100 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN thatchildrearing currently entails. On balance,the government's actions so far appearto have resultedin littlealleviation of the strains on mothers(especially workingmothers) that contribute to therising trends in themean age at marriageand theproportion never marrying. We concludeby notingthat the mean age at marriageand theproportion never marryingare also increasingrapidly in a numberof otherEast and SoutheastAsian countries(Leete 1994; Jones1997). It seems possible thatJapan's nuptiality transition, extreme though it appears at present,may presagesimilar developments elsewhere in East and SoutheastAsia.

Notes

1 Formethodology, see Feeneyand Saito age at marriagepredicted from the model is (1985). calculatedas the mean age at whichlife table 2 The governmentof Japan's official marriagesoccur, and thepredicted proportion populationprojections, released in 1997 (Na- stillsingle at age 40 is calculatedas the pro- tionalInstitute of Population and SocialSecu- portionof single women at thestart of the life rityResearch 1997), indicatethat the lifetime table(i.e., at age 16) who are stillsingle at age celibacyrate will reach 13.8 percentfor co- 40. The proportionalhazard models fitted here hortsof women born in 1980 or later,imply- are notwithout problems. In the modelsun- ingthat it will not reach 13.8 percentuntil the derlyingTable 3, we foundthat the propor- 2030 census.Our analysis,based on age-spe- tionalityassumption does not hold over the cificproportions single in Table 1,suggests that entireage range16-40. But marriagerates de- thislevel will be reachedsooner. partsubstantially from zero overa muchnar- rowerage rangewhere the proportionality as- 3 Of course,one has to be carefulin in- sumption appears to be acceptable. We terpretingsuch projections of S 50 Ifmarriages undertooksome comparisonsof proportional were increasinglypostponed up to 1995, as hazard modelswith time-dependent hazard seemsto have been the case, such postpone- models,based on verysimple model specifica- mentwould tend to bias upwardthe estimate tions,and obtainedsimilar results with either of S50. One can see thismost easily by consid- model,indicating that violation of the propor- eringwhat would happenif, at thebeginning tionalityassumption is not a seriousproblem ofthe year, all marriageswere suddenly post- in thiscontext. poned by one year.Then the syntheticvalue 6 We calculatedpercentages of marriages ofS50 forthat year would be 100 percent. thatwere arranged from pooled data fromten 4 Childhoodresidence is used in place of roundsof the National Survey on FamilyPlan- currentresidence because proportional hazard ning,conducted by the MainichiNewspapers modelsrequire that a particularwoman's char- ofJapan between 1981 and 2000. acteristics(i.e., her values on thepredictor vari- 7 The proportionp3 who quiteither when ables) do not changeas she getsolder. If her theymarried or when they had theirfirst child characteristicschange, one mustuse a time- was calculatedonly for married women who dependenthazard model instead of a propor- workedbefore marriage and who had at least tionalhazard model. We use thelatter because one birthbefore the survey. Let denotethe the surveysdid not collectthe detaileddata p, probability(among women who workedbe- thatwould be necessaryto estimatea time- foremarriage) of quitting at marriage,and let dependenthazard model with the variables denotethe probabilityof quittingat mar- thatwe wantedto include. pI* riageonly forthose women who had a first 5 A proportionalhazard model can be in- birthby the timeof the survey.Let p2denote terpretedas a multivariatelife table. The mean theprobability of quitting at firstbirth, among ROBBRT D. RETHERFORD / NAOHIRO OGAWA / RIKIYA MATSUKURA 101

thosewho had a firstbirth by thetime of the ing,in orderto be consistentwith the way the surveyand who did notquit when they mar- governmentcalculates the growth rate of GNP. ried.Then, in Figure9, thecurve denoted "quit 9 The questionwas: "Areyou seeingany- workingat marriage"is PI, thecurve denoted bodyat the moment?If you are seeingmore "quitworking at firstbirth" is P2,and p3 is cal- thanone man,answer about the mostrecent culatedas p3 = 1 - [(1 -pP*)(1 -P2)]. Valuesof one."The questionnaireasked the respondent p3 were firstcalculated from unsmoothed val- to choose one of the followingresponse cat- ues ofPI* and P2and thensmoothed by taking egories:(1) "Yes,he is myfiance," (2) "Yes,I three-yearmoving averages. have a boyfriend/lover,"(3) "Yes,but we are 8 The calculationof 8.1 percentassumes justfriends," or (4) "No,I am not." annual ratherthan instantaneous compound-

References

Atoh, M. 1985. "Changes in fertilityand fertilitycontrol behaviour in Japan," in M. Muramatsu and T. Katagiri (eds.), Basic Readings of Population and Family Planning in Japan. Tokyo: Japanese Organisation for International Cooperation in Family Plan- ning. Boling, P. 1998. "Family policy in Japan," Journalof Social Policy27: 173-190. Clark, R. L. and N. Ogawa. 1992. "Employment tenure and earnings profiles in Japan and the United States: Comments," AmericanEconomic Review 82: 336-345. Dalla Zuanna, G., M. Atoh, M. Castiglioni, and K. Kojima. 1998. "Late marriage among young people: The case of Italy and Japan," Genus 54: 187-232. Dixon, R. 1978. "Late marriage and non-marriage as demographic responses," Population Studies 32: 449-466. Economic Planning Agency. Various years. Annual Reporton National Accounts.Tokyo. Feeney, G. and Y. Saito. 1985. Progressionto FirstMarriage in Japan: 1870-1980. NUPRI Re- search Paper Series no. 24. Tokyo: Nihon UniversityPopulation Research Institute. Fukutake, T. 1989. The JapaneseSocial Structure.Tokyo: Universityof Tokyo Press. Japanese Association for Sex Education. 1994. Reporton theFourth Round ofthe National Sur- veyon SexualBehavior of Youth. Tokyo. In Japanese. Jones, G. W. 1997. "The demise of universal marriage in East and South-East Asia," in G. W. Jones, R. M. Douglas, J. C. Caldwell, and R. M. D'Souza (eds.), The Continuing DemographicTransition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 51-79. Leete, R. 1994. "The continuing flightfrom marriage and parenthood among the overseas Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Dimensions and implications," Populationand De- velopmentReview 20: 811-829. Ministryof Education. 1996. EducationPolicies in Japan. Tokyo: Government PrintingOffice. In Japanese. . Various years. School Basic Survey.Tokyo. National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. 1997. Population Projections forJapan: 1996-2100. Research Series No. 291. Tokyo. Ogawa, N. and R. L. Clark. 1995. "Earnings patterns of Japanese women: 1976-88," Eco- nomicDevelopment and CulturalChange 43: 293-314. Ogawa, N. and J. F. Ermisch. 1994. "Women's career development and divorce risk in Ja- pan," Labour 8: 193-219. . 1996. "Family structure,home time demands and the employment patterns of Japa- nese married women," Journalof Labor Economics14: 677-702. Ogawa, N., G. W. Jones, and J. G. Williamson. 1993. Human Resourcesin DevelopmentAlong theAsia-Pacific Rim. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress. 102 LATE MARRIAGE AND LESS MARRIAGE IN JAPAN

Ogawa, N. and R. D. Retherford.1993a. "Care ofthe elderlyin Japan:Changing norms and expectations,"Journal of Marriage and theFamily 55: 585-597. . 1993b. "The resumptionof fertilitydecline in Japan: 1973-92," Populationand De- velopmentReview 19: 703-741. . 1997. "Shiftingcosts of caring for the elderly back to familiesin Japan:Will it work?" Populationand DevelopmentReview 23: 59-94. PrimeMinister's Office 1997. Surveyon GenderEquality. Tokyo: Prime Minister's Office, Of- ficefor Gender Equality. Retherford,R. D. and M. K. Choe. 1993. StatisticalModels for Causal Analysis.New York: JohnWiley. Retherford,R. D., N. Ogawa, and S. Sakamoto. 1996. "Values and fertilitychange in Ja- pan," PopulationStudies 50: 5-25. Updatedversion in R. Leete (ed.). 1999. Dynamicsof Valuesin FertilityChange. Oxford: Oxford University Press. StatisticsBureau. Variousyears. Annual Report of the Labor Force Survey. Tokyo. Variousyears. Current Population Estimates. Tokyo. Variousyears. Population Census of Japan. Tokyo. TokyoMetropolitan Government. 1992. PublicOpinion Survey Regarding Equality of the Sexes. Tokyo:Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Bureau of Lifeand Culture.In Japanese. UnitedNations. 1990. Patternsof First Marriage: Timing and Prevalence.New York. Yamada, M. 1996. The Sociologyof Marriage: Will Marriage Continue to be Delayed? Tokyo: MaruzenLibrary. In Japanese. Yamamoto, C. and H. Kojima. 1997. "Nuptialityand divorcein Japan: 1995," Journalof PopulationProblems 53(3): 45-66. In Japanese.