Hewage Law Group Mailing Address: 2581 River Mist Road, Ottawa, Ontario, K2J 6G1, Canada

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Hewage Law Group Mailing Address: 2581 River Mist Road, Ottawa, Ontario, K2J 6G1, Canada HLG Hewage Law Group Mailing Address: 2581 River Mist Road, Ottawa, Ontario, K2J 6G1, Canada. Telephone: + 1 613 612 7615 | e-mail: [email protected] Neville Hewage, Ph.D. Law Society Ontario License #: P15799 VIA REGISTERED MAIL AND E-MAIL May 26, 2020. Isaiah Thorning Committee Clerk Standing Committee on Regulations and Private Bills 99 Wellesley Street West Room 1405, Whitney Block Queen's Park, Toronto, ON, M7A 1A2. Dear Isaiah, Re: Submission against Bill 104, Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, 2019 Please find enclosed my submission against Bill 104, Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, 2019. According to facts on Bill 104, the Tamil genocide claim has failed against the legal test and should, thus, not be considered for 3rd reading. I request an opportunity to appear before the Standing Committee on Regulations and Private Bills to submit my oral deliberation. Please provide me with more details. I look forward to hearing from you. Yours very truly, Neville Hewage, Ph.D. Research Fellow – Public Policy and Governance International Centre for Interdisciplinary Research in Law Laurentian University Sudbury, Ontario. Enclosed: Submission and Exhibits 1,2,3,4 1 LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY OF ONTARIO STANDING COMMITTEE ON REGULATIONS AND PRIVATE BILLS Submission against Bill 104, Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, 2019 Neville Hewage, Ph.D Research Fellow – Public Policy and Governance International Centre for Interdisciplinary Research in Law Laurentian University Sudbury, Ontario. LSO No. P15799 Mailing address: 2581 River Mist Road Ottawa, ON K2J 6G1 Tel: 613 612 7615 Email: [email protected] Isaiah Thorning Committee Clerk Standing Committee on Regulations and Private Bills 99 Wellesley Street West Room 1405, Whitney Block Queen's Park Toronto, ON M7A 1A2 Tel.: 416-325-3506 Fax: 416-325-3505 email: [email protected] 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS Item Page TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 BACKGROUND AND FINDING FACTS 3 BILL 104 4 LEGAL ISSUES 5 LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND ANALYSIS 6 12 CONCLUSION EXHIBITS 01. Ontario provincial legislature has no jurisdiction to pass Bill 104 Tab 1 02. Excerpts from Sri Lanka constitution Section 1 and 2 Tab 2 03. Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) report Tab 3 04. UK parliament, the House of Lords, Hansard. Subject: Sri Lanka, Question for a Tab 4 short debate on February 05, 2019, Volume 795 2 Background and Finding of Facts 01. Founded in 1976, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a Sri Lankan-based terrorist organization that seeks the creation of an independent homeland called "Tamil Eelam" for Sri Lanka's ethnic Tamil minority living in North and East. Over the years, the LTTE has waged a violent secessionist campaign with the help of ground, air, and naval forces, as well as a dedicated suicide bomber wing. 02. LTTE tactics have included full military operations, terror attacks against civilian centres, and political assassinations, including those of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa. 03. LTTE terrorist activities caused billions of dollars of massive destruction to the Sri Lanka economy. A large number of innocent civilians were killed as results of indiscriminate attacks on civilians' centers across the country. 04. Sinhalese villagers living in North and East district's boundaries were massacred, and, as a part of "ethnic cleansing," Muslims living in Jaffna (North of Sri Lanka) were ordered to quit. At least 30,000 were driven out at just three hours' notice. 05. A program of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), a research center at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies of Stanford University, USA, recorded the most notable attacks and the atrocities of LTTE terrorists.1 06. A responsible government cannot tolerate any longer LTTE brutality and have no option other than destroy the terrorist group. 07. The latest reason for the military action was triggered against the separatist LTTE group as a result of closing the water dam (Marvil Aru), which is providing a lifeline for over millions of people living in neighbouring districts. 1 https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/liberation-tigers-tamil-elam#highlight_text_16261 3 08. LTTE was militarily defeated in May 2009, which ended the civil war by killing a ruthless terrorist leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran on or about May 18, 2009. 09. During the three decades of civil war civilians, all ethnic groups, Sinhalese, Tamils, Moor, Muslims, were affected. 10. The LTTE had an extensive network of fundraisers, political and propaganda officers, and arms procurers operating in Sri Lanka and within the Tamil diaspora in Canada. Although the LTTE was militarily defeated in May 2009, subversion, destabilization, and fundraising continues, particularly within the diaspora. 2 11. Many organizations arose in Canada, post-war by militarily defeating LTTE in May 2009, some calling for reconciliation and others professing to continue this struggle for a separate state. 12. Some of them are campaigning to take revenge against Sri Lanka government for the death of their terrorist leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, in recognizing the final phase of the war in May 2009, as a genocide, same as proposed on Bill 104 Tamil Genocide Education Week Act. 13. The war against the LTTE terrorist group should be studied in its entirety and not only during its final months. Bill 104, Tamil Genocide Education Week Act, 2019 14. The Bill 104 states Tamil-Ontarians have families still suffering in their "homeland" in the North and East of the island of Sri Lanka. They have lost their loved ones and have been physically or mentally traumatized by the Genocide that the Sri Lankan state perpetrated against the Tamils during the civil war, which lasted from 1983 to 2009, and especially so in May of 2009. 2 https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#46 4 15. Bill 104 states acts of Genocide against the Tamils started in 1948 after Sri Lanka gained its independence and were perpetrated through Sinhala-Buddhist centric government policies, pogroms, land grabs and ethnic cleansing. 16. Bill 104 states the United Nations Organization estimates that in May 2009 alone, about 40,000 to 75,000 Tamil civilians were killed. Other estimates place the death toll at 146,679 civilians. These figures only reflect the death toll in 2009 leading up to May 18, the day on which the civil war ended. The loss of Tamil civilian lives during the Genocide, which continued for decades in Sri Lanka, is much higher. 17. Bill 104 further states, the Sri Lankan state has systematically disenfranchised the Tamil population of their right to vote and to maintain their language, religion and culture. For example, the Sinhala only Act of 1956 made Sinhalese the official language of Sri Lanka, ignoring the 29 percent of the population whose primary language was Tamil, thereby putting them at a serious disadvantage for participating in the public service of Sri Lanka. 18. Legal Issues Following legal issues arising from the proposed (as claimed) Bill 104 Tamil Genocide Education Week Act ● (1) Is Sri Lanka (state) perpetrated alleged Genocide against the Tamils during the civil war (which lasted from 1983 to 2009), and specifically in May of 2009? ● (2) Is the alleged Genocide against Tamils determined by the International Criminal Court or International Court of Justice? ● (3) Does the Ontario Legislature have jurisdiction to determine the alleged Tamil Genocide? ● (4) Is the ideology of creating a separate state for Tamil living in North and East Sri Lanka "Tamil homeland" root cause to the Civil War? Is there any legal basis for the "Tamil homeland"? 5 ● (5) Bill 104 claims that Genocide against the Tamils started in 1948 through Sinhala- Buddhist centric government policies, pogroms, land grabs and ethnic cleansing. It also states the Tamil population systematically disenfranchised of their right to vote and to maintain their language, religion and culture, e.g. introducing Sinhala Only Act 1956. Are these allegations having a legal basis for determining Genocide? ● (6) Is death total a factor of determining the alleged Genocide? 19. Legal principles and Analysis I wish to submit here, legal reasoning against for the Bill 104, Tamil Genocide Education Week Act. I will address (1), (2) and (3) questions together. (1) Is Sri Lanka (state) perpetrated alleged Genocide against the Tamils during the civil war (which lasted from 1983 to 2009), and specifically in May of 2009? (2) Is the alleged Genocide against Tamils determined by the International Criminal Court or International Court of Justice? (3) Does the Ontario Legislature have jurisdiction to determine the alleged Tamil Genocide? 20. Alleged Tamil genocide claims have not considered for hearing before the International Criminal Court (ICC) or International Court of Justice (ICJ). LTTE sympathizers in the Tamil diaspora failed to proceed alleged genocide claims due to a lack of sufficient evidence. 21. Genocide is the most serious crime on the planet. A bar (threshold) of determining Genocide is higher, and genocide allegations cannot be considered lightly. Also, Genocide has a definite legal meaning, and the Ontario Legislature must not use it arbitrarily. 6 22. Since ICC and ICJ were not convicted of any individuals for alleged genocide claims against Tamils, the Ontario Legislature is required to investigate the validity of alleged genocide claims to pass the legislation Bill 104 Tamil Genocide Education Week Act. 23. If Sri Lanka committed any crimes (Genocide), they would be investigated only by the ICC or ICJ. No other institutions have the legal authority to initiate actions against the sovereign state of Sri Lanka. 24. The Ontario Legislature has no jurisdiction to investigate alleged genocide claims. 25. Furthermore, the proposed, Bill 104, does not pertain to the topics that fall within provincial jurisdiction.
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