The Paradoxes of Autonomy and Centralization in the Local Administration of Hungary Under Dualism

The paradoxes of autonomy and centralization in the local administration of Hungary under dualism Pál Csaba Szabó In the nineteenth century Europe one of the most important aspects of the strengthe ning and modernization of the civilian state was formed by the relations between the existing local autonomies and the state centralization just being completed. In countries where the capitalist market economy being organized within the frames of state-power and nation-state altered, integrated or actually eliminated the fe udal, territorial and local autonomies, successful models of modernization were built, however, in places where this was only partly realized, significant tendenci es of anti-modernization were observed. The most difficulties caused to the practice of administration in Hungary under the whole period of dualism were the distinct levels of local administra tion (small and big parishes, plains, peripheries, notary public services, districts, district courts, local tax administrations, the integration of suburbs, towns with ordered councils, boroughs), particularly the renewal and modernization of pa rish administration. The package of question above has an obvious nexus with the unbalance of the economic, township structural and gentilitial characteristics and development of the country, which statutorily put both the possible and imaginary political risk of the alteration of the local administration to the fore, highlighting and enlarging it. However, the basic and necessary reforms were eventually not realized in that crucial half a century neither for Hungary itself nor for the Hungarian statehood, although, regarding its constitutional law, democratic point of view and admi nistration, Hungary is quite significant. "The government knows very well that... the basis and conditions of a healthy state life are to find in strong municipal administration, and it is also aware of the requirements that this makes along with the notion of political science." Nevert heless, the power of the relations given is stronger than the theory itself. Given the fact that the unique and supreme autonomy of the public legislative authority was dominant, there was almost nothing that could have been done regarding civil pa rishes but "coding life itself" reads the governmental axiom of the "antireform" of 188 Pá l C s a b a Szabó the municipal administration to hold for the whole period, found already in the first municipal law of 1871 justified by the minister.1 Forming the foundation stone of local administration, the civil municipal ad ministration under dualism not only grew out from the administration for villains in feudal Hungary, but its legislation also preserved several elements of it and, in some parts, the logic of feudal ruling. Following the organization of copy-holding - while legislating most of the former municipal practice as well - it was the Act IX from 1836 to deal with the issue of the organization of municipal administration in the most elaborated way, summarizing and systematizing it. The election of judges and notaries public were ruled by law that also dictated the rules for making budget and statement and taking measures about the obliga tion of the public estrangement of municipal commons and the possibility of the municipal surtaxation. It appointed the authority of country gentleman in power and, through his mediation, the county, the body of supervision and control. The rating in order to cover the municipal needs also required the approval of the aut hority of country gentlemen. The law strengthened the right of the country gent lemen to appoint judges, but - altering the former practice, which had not been steady anyway - "only those who owned a house or other properties in the place or at its border" were allowed to participate in the election of judge, not the whole village as it was the case before. The legislation of 1848 and the freeing of villain land from squirely legislation meant a root change in the issue of municipal administration. As a result of the ceasing of the squirely power the parishes became the only local bodies of the mu nicipalities self-supporting and right under the level of county administration. Ac cording to the Act XXIV, §3 it was the counties that took measures provisionally and made rules and policies in all parishes without a law court. Parish municipa lity was also supported by the Act XVI in 1848 allowing the parishes to take part in the county general assembly.2 3 Following the revolution the scope of Austrian parish law of 1849 was not ext ended to Hungary. In 1851 only the general principles of the renewal of the orga nization of the administration was recorded by the law-maker. The first regulation of the civil relations of parishes took part in 1859. The sovereign patent issued on 24 April 1854 was not only the first law allowing self-supporting for the parishes, but, regarding its main features it formed a foundation stone for the posterior reg ulation of parish household and municipality under dualism.1 The patent differen tiated two main basic types of the parish assets, namely the ones possessed and en joyed naturally by the inhabitants of parishes and those the takings of which were incoming right into the communal treasury, respectively those assigned to certain 1 Képviselőházi Irományok 1869-1872. [Writings of the House of Representavtives, 1869- 1872] Vol. 6:198. 2 '... apart from those authorized by law all those have a right to vote who are ordered by the county from each parish to participate in assemblies. ' 1848. Act. XVI. l.§ b) Magyar Törvénytár 1836-1868. [Hungarian legislative recordsl836-1868] Budapest 1896,237. 3 A summary of high standard of the packet of question: Z. Kérészy, Községi közigazgatásunk alaptörvényének (1871: XVIII. t.c.) előzményei. [Precedents of the village fundamental municipal law] Budapest 1942. 1 89 T he p a r a d o x e s o f a u t o n o m y a n d centralization ... expenses. The parishes and their institutes were required to make cost estimates on their annual incomes and outcomes and, at points where certain parts of the pa rishes preserved their judiciary separateness, own budgets were made. Moreover, the incomes and outcomes serving certain social groups were included in unique cost estimates detached from the municipal ones. There was a possibility to take loans or make different 'ratings' in cases when the realization of some municipal tasks happened to be unaffordable by the village itself. The patent listed four different ratings serving communal needs: the charges allowing one's admittance for the communal bonds and providing access for the parish assets, communal work, allowances related to direct tax and excise and ot her taxes forborne by the state. Final accounts were made in every two months following the end of the year and it was a compulsory to compile the estimate of the new account year at the very latest three months before the beginning of the new budget year. It was the communal body of representatives to decide about budgets and final accounts, which were set before the state appointed civil servants by the municipal ma gistrate. The patent ruled the election of parish chief (judge) so that amongst the three candidates chosen by the village it was the parish/state authority to appoint the magistrate and the elected parish jurymen could take up their posts only by the confirmation of the authority. The patent also ordered the establishment of bodies of representatives, half of which were elected by the inhabitants of the village owning a property, while the other half was made up of those paying the most tax. However, the imperial patent from 1859 never came into force de facto, but the next year, following the issue of the "October Diploma", without considering the orders of the patent, in most villages of the country renewal of society leadership/ officers partly took place by completely free election and partly by assigning the newly appointed administrative magistrates. In 1861, by the return of the absolute government, besides setting back the ap pointment system the Royal Council of Governor only let the country gentlemen' authority's right of election prevail with rare exceptions. The legislation, which was partly conflicting resulted in the operation of the most possible diverse forms of the Hungarian parish administration in the 1860s. Part of the villages elected their magistrates according to the law of 1836, others did it according to the order of the Royal Council of Governor from 1861 while some counties carried out their elections without appointments or by the mixed system of elections. What made the situation more complicated was the persistence of the privileged self-govern ments of the patrician villages directly connected to the counties, and there were the so called plains4 becoming more and more dominant remaining outside of the parish administration while forming and preserving the autonomic form of far ming and administration of the manors. Following the restoring of the constitutionality in 1867, it was the county again in full-scale to determine the scope of parish administration. The period of territo 4 About the role of plains and patrician parishes: Z. Horváth, "A községi önkormányzat és a parasztság," [Village self-government and the peasantry] in I. Szabó, ed. A parasztság a kapitalizmus korában 1848-1914, Budapest 1972, Vol. 2: 565-615. 1 90 Pá l C s a b a Sz a b ó rial ruling in most counties was built on the parish regulatory act of Arad accep ted in 1869. The regulatory act provided election right for all the inhabitants of the village, paying taxes de facto to elect judges and magistrates. The elections were carried out by public voting by the moderation of local administrative leaders.

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