On to Bigger and Better Things: the Behavioral Consequences of Ambition in the Us House of Representatives
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ON TO BIGGER AND BETTER THINGS: THE BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF AMBITION IN THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY CHERA A. LAFORGE DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2012 Urbana, Illinois Doctoral Committee: Associate Professor Tracy Sulkin, Chair and Director of Research Professor William Bernhard Assistant Professor Kristina Miler, University of Maryland-College Park Professor Jeffery Mondak ABSTRACT This dissertation explores how progressive ambition—or the pursuit of a higher office— affects the behavior of members of the United States House of Representatives. Drawing upon a wide variety of legislative and campaign activities (including roll call votes, introductions and cosponsorships, amendments, and campaign contributions), I examine whether ambitious legislators increase the levels of their activity, modify the content of their agendas, and spend more time and effort fundraising. Overall, I find that the decision to pursue a higher office alters legislative and campaign behavior. Legislators who display progressive ambition shirk their current responsibilities by missing more roll call votes. At the same time, they increase both the number of introductions offered and the number of issues they address as part of their policy agenda. Progressively ambitious legislators also raise and spend more money than others within the House of Representatives. These same legislators also maintain a larger campaign war chest in anticipation of an expensive higher office run. My results show that ambition shapes the representative-constituency relationship and policy-making outputs of Congress. I also provide multiple measures of ambition—both expressed and nascent—to further our understanding of ambition as a concept. I find ambition is common, but it is not universal. In reality, legislators hold different levels of ambition. Many legislators are happy with the power and prestige afforded to them by their position in the House of Representatives. Some have no interest in running for a higher office if there are costs or risks are involved. Others are nascently ambitious, seriously considering another political office, but never running because of the costs and risks involved in the process. Finally, many are expressly ambitious and actively pursue a seat in the Senate, governorship, or presidency. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In the process of completing a dissertation, the writer often feels isolated and alone. However, hindsight shows that this is never the case, as a finished dissertation requires the help, support, and encouragement of dozens of people. While I thank only a handful below, please know that there are many others who are not included, but were just as important. Like any good academic, I should acknowledge that any and all errors that follow are the result of the author and not those who helped guide her. First and foremost, I need to thank Tracy Sulkin for being a terrific mentor, role model, and advisor. It is impossible to put into words the amount of encouragement and support she gave me as I finished my dissertation. If I become even half the academic and educator she is I will consider my career a success. The other members of my dissertation committee also deserve special thanks for a host of different reasons. I do not think I would have made it through graduate school if I had not taken Kris Miler’s proseminar my first semester, which inspired my love of Congress and legislative behavior. I also thank her for being a caring and inspiring teacher. I thank Bill Bernhard for being calming and supportive throughout my time at the University of Illinois and Jeff Mondak for providing invaluable advice on how to be an academic. This dissertation was partially supported by funds from the Dirksen Congressional Center and I thank them for their support. I would also like to thank my research assistant, Bianca Roby, for her hard work and meticulous attention to detail. Her assistance allowed this dissertation to proceed on schedule. Chris Lewis also provided programming assistance during data collection. Portions of this dissertation greatly benefited from the comments and suggestions iii provided by MPSA discussants and audience members. In addition, I thank everyone who read drafts and provided comments, especially Kelly Larmour for her editing skill. It is often said that friends are the family we choose for ourselves and I have an amazing graduate school family. From the first week of graduate school, Andrea Kent was always there to commiserate when things went bad and to celebrate when things went well. A special thanks goes to her husband, Gordon Kent, for putting up with political science talk over the past six years. I would also like to thank Megan Remmel for being a great proofreader and an even better friend. I apologize to her for any and all grammatical errors that follow. While our friendship started in graduate school, I am positive it won’t end there. Finally, no acknowledgement would be complete without mentioning the love and support of my parents. Growing up, they never said no when I asked for a new book. Thank you for instilling a love of learning in me, I hope to never lose it. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Ambition and Politics .....................................................................................................1 Chapter 2: Identifying and Measuring Ambition ...........................................................................16 Chapter 3: Who Are the Nascently Ambitious? ............................................................................39 Chapter 4: Legislative Behavior and Progressive Ambition ..........................................................68 Chapter 5: Campaign Fundraising and Progressive Ambition ....................................................102 Chapter 6: The Behavioral Consequences of Progressive Ambition ...........................................134 References ....................................................................................................................................144 v Chapter 1: Ambition and Politics Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL), was not born into a political dynasty. The son of railroad employees, Durbin grew up in Illinois’s East St. Louis, but left to attend undergraduate and law school in Washington D.C. His brush with the Capitol would translate into early work as a legislative intern for Senator Paul Douglas (D-IL) and later as a staffer for Senator Paul Simon (D-IL). It would not take long for Durbin to tire of the behind the scenes world of politics, however, and he launched a duo of unsuccessful campaigns for state senate (in 1976) and lieutenant governor (in 1978). His first successful race would begin with the biggest of risks. In 1982, Paul Findley, a Republican, held the 20th congressional district in which Durbin lived, and had held it since 1961. Findley had catered strongly to his district’s agricultural interests for years, but his popularity and stranglehold on the position was faltering as the district began to change substantially due to population growth and redistricting. Sensing an opportunity, Durbin, a young lawyer, entered the race and beat the popular incumbent by the slimmest of margins. Durbin’s activities once elected to Congress, like Findley’s before him, were pitch- perfect for his relatively rural, Southern Illinois district. In his first term, he obtained a position on the Agriculture Committee, which oversees issues important to the district’s vast farmland. As he amassed seniority, Durbin moved on to a position on the powerful Appropriations Committee. Again, he chose to focus on the concerns of his constituents by seeking out and obtaining the chairmanship of the Agricultural Appropriations subcommittee. As one of the powerful “College of Cardinals,” Durbin worked to obtain funding for research projects in the state capital of Springfield, as well as government contracts for ethanol and soybean producers in downstate Illinois (Barone and Ujifusa 1995, 465). His cultivation of constituent interests and 1 focus on bringing funds back to the district secured him a safe spot in the House of Representatives for more than ten years. After upsetting Findley in 1982 by less than one percent, he won by margins greater than 22 percent in the next four elections.1 However, things began to change at the beginning of the 1990s. Stymied by spending restraints and limitations set up by the Appropriations Committee and Congress as a whole, Durbin could not tackle issues important to both his district and his own political interests. Legislation on rural infrastructure, flood control, and low-cost housing moved to the back burner as Durbin sought to cut government expenditures (Barone and Ujifusa 1995, 465). In addition, Durbin’s district was not immune from political forces buoying Republican challengers around the country. Magnifying these national forces was redistricting, which added new and unfamiliar territory to the district in 1992. That year, Durbin’s winning margin slipped to 13 percent. It fell again to 9.6 percent in 1994 as the Republicans took back the House with their Contract with America. Durbin faced a difficult choice. He could remain in the House of Representatives as a minority party member, continue to face tough Republican challengers, and see his winning margins dwindle or even evaporate or he, like his famous