While Social Movements Such As Those Currently Gaining Momentum

Kristine Goulding UNRISD, Geneva May 2011 Fear the Islamists, and the secularists too? Tunisian women in post-Arab Spring electoral politics Kristine Goulding United Nations Research Institute for Social Development Geneva, Switzerland It’s Pavlovian—invariably, whenever democratization in the Middle East is discussed, the question of the role of women looms large, stirring the passions of the media and politicians alike. The question on everyone’s mind is: will democracy be good for women’s rights? Unfortunately for those who hope for a simple yes or no, the answer is—as always—far more complex. While social movements like those currently gaining momentum in the Middle East and North Africa can help to open the door for democracy, ofttimes revolutions do not universally benefit women’s rights. While politically and socially Arab women doubtless have been crucial intermediaries in the revolutions that have shattered the status quo, their role in the future development of their own countries remains unsure. In contrast to startling—and vivifying—images of flag-waving, photo-burning female protesters taking over Avenue Habib Bourguiba and Tahir Square in January and February, remarkably few women have been included in the transitional governments of Tunisia and Egypt; two in Tunisia (fewer than the number serving under ousted strongman Ben Ali), and none in Egypt. Auspiciously, the most recent winds of revolutionary change appear to be blowing in a favourable direction for Tunisian women. The high commission responsible for planning the elections in July has voted for parity between men and women in the candidate lists for the elections—the first step in establishing a clear-cut position for women to help build a nascent government and constitution. Yet questions still linger regarding the role that different political parties—notably the Islamist al-Nahda party—stand to play in the democratic transition. What will the council’s new decree mean for the rights of women under new (hopefully) democratic leadership? Will the last decade’s positive trends of progressive women’s rights persist, or will the rights of women emerge as a divisive issue that is at best bracketed, placed on a back shelf and left out of the debate? This analysis will focus on the unsettled place of Tunisian women in post-Jasmine Revolution politics, and risks that both Islamist and secularism agendas bring for women’s rights in the upcoming elections. The fear is that Tunisian women will be sucked into an ideological tug-of-war over their rights, reducing the complexities of democratization into a binary secular/non-secular battle. Historical Lessons Learned Valentine Moghadam, an expert in social change and movements in the Middle East and North Africa, describes the first months in post-revolution Tunisia as an example of a “democracy paradox”—a post-protest period of democratic freedom that simultaneously witnessed the disappearance of women’s equality. The lack of female voices in Tunisia’s transitional government seemed to be an early warning sign of a lurking trend of exclusion. Moghadam argued that: "Unless women and women's groups are visible during the negotiations and invited to be part of the new leadership, Kristine Goulding UNRISD, Geneva May 2011 a nation's new sense of freedom may not be shared by all."1 Resolving such inequality would require a dual strategy, involving significant advocacy from women's organizations as well as a push from women already involved in the government. The post-revolution atmosphere in Tunisia, however, has not been especially conducive to such a rosy and clean-cut transition, nor to the participation of either individual women or coalitions; rather, the process has been messy, chaotic and wrought with pitfalls for women and their rights. Massive structural impediments hindered the political mobilization of many women, and it took time for them to catch up to the fast-moving political game. It seemed in the first weeks of independence that, despite the high hopes for nationwide democracy, the recognition of the interests of women was fast slipping away. History has shown alarming numbers of examples of democratic paradoxes, cases in which progress on women’s rights experienced regressions or even full-blown reversals when revolutions occur. Before the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe during the early 1990s, women were guaranteed seats in parliament through a complex quota system established by the Communist party. When the communist governments collapsed, however, women were not supported as candidates in the new democratic elections and the proportion of female officials declined from an average of 30 percent to less than 10 percent—a backlash against mandatory participation that observers have called an "allergy to feminism." 2 Post-revolution Iran witnessed a disastrous truncation of women’s rights, despite the pivotal role that women played throughout the 1970s anti-monarchy protests. Notwithstanding advances in education and vibrant street politics, currently women are nearly non-existent in Iranian state politics. In Algeria, women were active agents in the 1962 revolution, fighting beside men, planting bombs, carrying weapons, and nursing the sick and wounded on the fighting fronts. Yet the dictates of the 1984 Family Code, subsequent conservative amendments, and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism slashed their rights and left them as minors under the law.3 Although women have played important roles in struggles for national independence and have been used as symbols of nationalism in countries from El Salvador to Nicaragua, and from Vietnam to the former Yugoslavia, often they have found that despite progress in the processes of “democratization”, their rights have been left behind. Hopefully, this refractory pattern will not soon be repeated in Tunisia. Thus far, Tunisia has begun to buck the trap of democratic backsliding for its women, and hopes are high both domestically and internationally that Tunisian women will be able to reap the benefits of their struggles. Most recently, the High Commission for the Realization of Revolutionary Goals, Political Reforms and Democratic Transition— the coalition of more than 150 politicians and civil society actors tasked with examining the laws related to political organization to keep with the demands of the revolution—has voted for electoral list parity, with male and female candidates listed in succession and in equal numbers.4 This radical move will in essence guarantee 50 percent female political participation, a fresh kind of revolution for women in the Middle East. The council also provides for the invalidation of the list if parity is not achieved. Surprisingly, the decree was welcomed by all members of the High Commission, including representatives of the Islamist group al-Nahda. Further constitutional guarantees of women’s rights and political representation will be discussed following the elections in July 2011. However, whether there will be a Kristine Goulding UNRISD, Geneva May 2011 constitutionally-mandated universal quota for women candidates, or individual party quotas (as was the case in the past), remains to be seen. Moreover, what these developments mean pragmatically for the future of women’s rights and political participation is still unclear, and stands to be influenced strongly by religion and outside political powers. Tunisian Women, pre- and post-“Arab Spring” Traditionally, the expansion of Tunisian women’s citizenship rights has happened at the whim of the state, with the ruling party acting as the chief agent of change in legislation and administration of gender equality. Rather than relying on popular mandate, the government made a policy of abolishing independent women’s associations, where they existed, instead setting up women’s organizations that were generally docile auxiliaries of the state (as was also the case with all other civil society bodies). The ruling RCD also eliminated the opposition ruthlessly—and none more stringently than grass-roots Islamist opposition movements like al-Nahda. Nonetheless, women’s juridical rights were expanded and their public presence gained greater legitimacy under the banner of national development. As time passed, however, the “state feminisms” that underwrote the developmental agenda of the ruling party’s regime narrowed around an increasingly-restrictive agenda of economic development, secularization and regime re-entrenchment. Women who had previously occupied a broad spectrum of political positions found themselves operating in an increasingly restricted discursive field, faced with an institutionalized fear of the region-wide rise of conservative Islam. The phase of state- led development, nonetheless, left behind cadres of educated, professional women who continued to be active in women’s movements alongside a diverse and savvy younger generation of women, both religious and secular. A final set of perverse incongruities was established when women’s movements encountered the so-called “democracy promotion” agenda of the international donor community (especially the US and France). Compliance with gender conditionalities—such as creating dedicated national machineries inside the state to monitor gender equality or increasing women’s political representation through gender quotas—represented a relatively soft option for Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime, instead of moving towards more genuine democratic participation and a social justice agenda. Progress on women’s rights issues

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