(CFSP) 2017/399 of 7 March 2017 Implementing Decision 2010/788/CFSP Concerning Restrictive Measures Against the Democratic Republic of the Congo
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The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments
The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments Ted Dagne Specialist in African Affairs February 4, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40108 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress The Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments Summary In October 2008, the forces of the National Congress for the Defense of the Congolese People (CNDP), under the command of General Laurent Nkunda, launched a major offensive against the Democratic Republic of Congo Armed Forces (FARDC) in eastern Congo. Within days, the CNDP captured a number of small towns and Congolese forces retreated in large numbers. Eastern Congo has been in a state of chaos for over a decade. The first rebellion to oust the late President Mobutu Sese Seko began in the city of Goma in the mid-1990s. The second rebellion in the late 1990s began also in eastern Congo. The root causes of the current crisis are the presence of over a dozen militia and extremist groups, both foreign and Congolese, in eastern Congo, and the failure to fully implement peace agreements signed by the parties. Over the past 14 years, the former Rwandese armed forces and the Interhamwe militia have been given a safe haven in eastern Congo and have carried out many attacks inside Rwanda and against Congolese civilians. A Ugandan rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), is also in Congo, despite an agreement reached between the LRA and the Government of Uganda. In November 2008, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon appointed former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo as his envoy to help broker a peace agreement to end the crisis in eastern Congo. -
Democratic Republic of the Congo INDIVIDUALS
CONSOLIDATED LIST OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS TARGETS IN THE UK Last Updated:18/02/2021 Status: Asset Freeze Targets REGIME: Democratic Republic of the Congo INDIVIDUALS 1. Name 6: BADEGE 1: ERIC 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: --/--/1971. Nationality: Democratic Republic of the Congo Address: Rwanda (as of early 2016).Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):DRC0028 (UN Ref): CDi.001 (Further Identifiying Information):He fled to Rwanda in March 2013 and is still living there as of early 2016. INTERPOL-UN Security Council Special Notice web link: https://www.interpol.int/en/notice/search/un/5272441 (Gender):Male Listed on: 23/01/2013 Last Updated: 20/01/2021 Group ID: 12838. 2. Name 6: BALUKU 1: SEKA 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. DOB: --/--/1977. a.k.a: (1) KAJAJU, Mzee (2) LUMONDE (3) LUMU (4) MUSA Nationality: Uganda Address: Kajuju camp of Medina II, Beni territory, North Kivu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (last known location).Position: Overall leader of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) (CDe.001) Other Information: (UK Sanctions List Ref):DRC0059 (UN Ref):CDi.036 (Further Identifiying Information):Longtime member of the ADF (CDe.001), Baluku used to be the second in command to ADF founder Jamil Mukulu (CDi.015) until he took over after FARDC military operation Sukola I in 2014. Listed on: 07/02/2020 Last Updated: 31/12/2020 Group ID: 13813. 3. Name 6: BOSHAB 1: EVARISTE 2: n/a 3: n/a 4: n/a 5: n/a. -
Public Annex
ICC-01/04-01/10-396-Anx 02-09-2011 1/6 CB PT Public Annex ICC-01/04-01/10-396-Anx 02-09-2011 2/6 CB PT I. General contextual elements on the recent FLDR activities in the KIVUS: 1. Since the beginning of 2011, the FARDC conducted unilateral military operations under the “AMANI LEO” (peace today) operation against the FDLR and other armed groups in North Kivu, mainly in Walikale and Lubero territories, and in South Kivu, mainly in Fizi, Uvira and Shabunda territories. 1 2. The UN Group of Experts in its interim report on 7 June 2011 states that the FDLR remain militarily the strongest armed group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.2 3. The UN Secretary-General further reported on 17 January 2011 that “the FDLR military leadership structure remained largely intact, and dispersed”.3 The FDLR established their presences in remote areas of eastern Maniema and northern Katanga provinces 4 and have sought to reinforce their presence in Rutshuru territory.5 4. The UN GoE reported as late as June 2011 on the FDLR’s continued recruitment 6 and training of mid-level commanders 7. The FDLR also 1 Para 5, page 2 S/2011/20, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 17 January 2011 (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/20 ), Para 32, page 9, S/2011/345 Interim report of the Group of Experts on the DRC submitted in accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1952 (2010), 7 June 2011 (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/345 -
Rwanda's Support to the March 23 Movement (M23)
Opinion Beyond the Single Story: Rwanda’s Support to the March 23 Movement (M23) Alphonse Muleefu* Introduction Since the news broke about the mutiny of some of the Congolese Armed Forces - Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in April 2012 and their subsequent creation of the March 23 Movement (M23), we have been consistently supplied with one story about the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A story that puts much emphasis on allegations that the government of Rwanda and later to some lesser extent that of Uganda are supporting M23 against the government of the DRC. This narrative was reinforced when the UN Group of Experts for the DRC (GoE) issued an Addendum of 48 pages on June 25, 20121 making allegations similar to those already made in Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) report of June 3, 20122, that the government of Rwanda was providing direct support in terms of recruitment, encouraging desertion of FARDC soldiers, providing weapons, ammunitions, intelligence, political advice to the M23, violating measures concerning the freezing of assets and collaborating with certain individuals. In response, the government of Rwanda issued a 131-page rebuttal on July 27, 2012, in which it denied all allegations and challenged the evidence given in support of each claim.3 On November 15, 2012, the GoE submitted its previously leaked report in which, in addition to the allegations made earlier, it claimed that the effective commander of M23 is Gen. James Kabarebe, Rwanda’s Minister of Defence, and that the senior officials of the government of Uganda had provided troop reinforcements, supplied weapons, offered technical assistance, joint planning, political advice and external relations.4 The alleged support provided by Ugandan officials was described as “subtle but crucial”, and the evidence against Rwanda was described as “overwhelming and compelling”. -
Of the United Nations Mission in the DRC / MONUC – MONUSCO
Assessing the of the United Nations Mission in the DRC / MONUC – MONUSCO REPORT 3/2019 Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Copyright: © Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2019 ISBN: 978-82-7002-346-2 Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. Tey should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Te text may not be re-published in part or in full without the permission of NUPI and the authors. Visiting address: C.J. Hambros plass 2d Address: P.O. Box 8159 Dep. NO-0033 Oslo, Norway Internet: effectivepeaceops.net | www.nupi.no E-mail: [email protected] Fax: [+ 47] 22 99 40 50 Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00 Assessing the Efectiveness of the UN Missions in the DRC (MONUC-MONUSCO) Lead Author Dr Alexandra Novosseloff, International Peace Institute (IPI), New York and Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo Co-authors Dr Adriana Erthal Abdenur, Igarapé Institute, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Prof. Tomas Mandrup, Stellenbosch University, South Africa, and Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen Aaron Pangburn, Social Science Research Council (SSRC), New York Data Contributors Ryan Rappa and Paul von Chamier, Center on International Cooperation (CIC), New York University, New York EPON Series Editor Dr Cedric de Coning, NUPI External Reference Group Dr Tatiana Carayannis, SSRC, New York Lisa Sharland, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra Dr Charles Hunt, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) University, Australia Adam Day, Centre for Policy Research, UN University, New York Cover photo: UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti UN Photo/ Abel Kavanagh Contents Acknowledgements 5 Acronyms 7 Executive Summary 13 Te effectiveness of the UN Missions in the DRC across eight critical dimensions 14 Strategic and Operational Impact of the UN Missions in the DRC 18 Constraints and Challenges of the UN Missions in the DRC 18 Current Dilemmas 19 Introduction 21 Section 1. -
Democratic Republic of Congo
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 350 Fifth Ave 34 th Floor New York, N.Y. 10118-3299 http://www.hrw.org (212) 290-4700 Vol. 14, No. 6 (G) – August 2002 I counted thirty bodies and bags between the dam and the small rapids, and twelve beyond the rapids. Most corpses were in underwear, and many were beheaded. On the bridges there were still many traces of blood despite attempts to cover them with sand, and on the small maize field to the left of the landing the odors were unbearable. Human Rights Watch interview, Kisangani, June 2002. A Congolese man from Kisangani covers his mouth as he nears the Tshopo bridge, the scene of summary executions by RCD-Goma troops following an attempted mutiny. (c) 2002 AFP WAR CRIMES IN KISANGANI: The Response of Rwandan-backed Rebels to the May 2002 Mutiny 1630 Connecticut Ave, N.W., Suite 500 2nd Floor, 2-12 Pentonville Road 15 Rue Van Campenhout Washington, DC 20009 London N1 9HF, UK 1000 Brussels, Belgium TEL (202) 612-4321 TEL: (44 20) 7713 1995 TEL (32 2) 732-2009 FAX (202) 612-4333 FAX: (44 20) 7713 1800 FAX (32 2) 732-0471 E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] August 2002 Vol. 14, No 6 (A) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO WAR CRIMES IN KISANGANI: The Response of Rwandan-backed Rebels to the May 2002 Mutiny I. SUMMARY...........................................................................................................................................................2 II. RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................................................3 -
Virunga Landscape
23. Virunga Landscape Th e Landscape in brief Coordinates: 1°1’29’’N – 1°44’21’’S – 28°56’11’’E – 30°5’2’’E. Area: 15,155 km2 Elevation: 680–5,119 m Terrestrial ecoregions: Ecoregion of the Afroalpine barrens of Ruwenzori-Virunga Ecoregion of the Afromontane forests of the Albertine Rift Ecoregion of the forest-savannah mosaic of Lake Victoria Aquatic ecoregions: Mountains of the Albertine Rift Lakes Kivu, Edward, George and Victoria Protected areas: Virunga National Park, DRC, 772,700 ha, 1925 Volcans National Park, Rwanda, 16,000 ha, 1925 Rutshuru Hunting Domain, 64,200 ha, 1946 added Bwindi-Impenetrable National Park situ- ated a short distance away from the volcanoes in southwest Uganda. Th is complex functions as a single ecosystem and many animals move across the borders, which permits restoration of the populations1. Physical environment Relief and altitude Th e Landscape is focused on the central trough of the Albertine Rift, occupied by Lake Figure 23.1. Map of Virunga Landscape (Sources: CARPE, Edward (916 m, 2,240 km²), and vast plains DFGFI, JRC, SRTM, WWF-EARPO). at an altitude of between 680 and 1,450 m. Its western edge stretches along the eastern bluff of Location and area the Mitumba Mountain Range forming the west- ern ridge of the rift. In the northeast, it includes he Virunga Landscape covers 15,155 km² the western bluff of the Ruwenzori horst (fault Tand includes two contiguous national parks, block) with its active glaciers, whose peak reaches Virunga National Park in DRC and Volcans a height of 5,119 m and whose very steep relief National Park in Rwanda, the Rutshuru Hunting comprises numerous old glacial valleys (Figure Zone and a 10 km-wide strip at the edge of the 23.2). -
Rwanda | No 4| July to August 2007
Rwanda | No 4| July to August 2007 RWANDA | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation As in previous years the government of Rwanda placed little emphasis on 1 July (the 45th anniversary of Independence) but focused more on 4 July that marks the 13th anniversary of the fall of Kigali and the end of the genocide. The event was highlighted with medals of merit awarded by the Rwandan army, with President Paul Kagame receiving the highest distinction. On 20 August, Kagame attended the sixth Summit of the EAC Heads of States, which discussed options to strengthen the regional structure and potential future cooperation with the EU. Rwanda’s consolidated anchorage Eastward is further highlighted by anti-global terrorism training workshops for National Police, Army and Airforce officers, as well as the planned participation as an observer in the forthcoming Commonwealth meeting in Kampala. As a response to the President’s encouragement, diverse groups of people such as students, MPs, Muslim followers and businessmen, Rwandan and other, have displayed empathy with the victims of the genocide by visiting and making monetary contributions to the national genocide Memorial of Gisozi, in the district of Gasabo. However, such ‘acts of patriotism’ are often organized institutionally, thus do not necessarily represent spontaneous demonstrations of empathy. The finding on 31 July, of a mass grave of 136 Tutsi victims in Nyagatovu, district of Huye, after a repenting genocide perpetrator admitted his role in the killings 13 years after the events, demonstrates the slowness of the process of remorse and reconciliation in the country. Another case is that of 70-year-old Nyagahutu of the district of Musanze who was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for genocide ideology as he was found with leaflets which conveyed disapproval of genocide memorials. -
Mapping Conflict Motives: M23
Mapping Conflict Motives: M23 1 Front Cover image: M23 combatants marching into Goma wearing RDF uniforms Antwerp, November 2012 2 Table of Contents Introduction 4 1. Background 5 2. The rebels with grievances hypothesis: unconvincing 9 3. The ethnic agenda: division within ranks 11 4. Control over minerals: Not a priority 14 5. Power motives: geopolitics and Rwandan involvement 16 Conclusion 18 3 Introduction Since 2004, IPIS has published various reports on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Between 2007 and 2010 IPIS focussed predominantly on the motives of the most significant remaining armed groups in the DRC in the aftermath of the Congo wars of 1996 and 1998.1 Since 2010 many of these groups have demobilised and several have integrated into the Congolese army (FARDC) and the security situation in the DRC has been slowly stabilising. However, following the November 2011 elections, a chain of events led to the creation of a ‘new’ armed group that called itself “M23”. At first, after being cornered by the FARDC near the Rwandan border, it seemed that the movement would be short-lived. However, over the following two months M23 made a remarkable recovery, took Rutshuru and Goma, and started to show national ambitions. In light of these developments and the renewed risk of large-scale armed conflict in the DRC, the European Network for Central Africa (EURAC) assessed that an accurate understanding of M23’s motives among stakeholders will be crucial for dealing with the current escalation. IPIS volunteered to provide such analysis as a brief update to its ‘mapping conflict motives’ report series. -
Walikale Nicholas Garrett Artisanal Cassiterite Mining and Trade in North Kivu June 1, 2008 Implications for Poverty Reduction and Security
Walikale Nicholas Garrett Artisanal Cassiterite Mining and Trade in North Kivu June 1, 2008 Implications for Poverty Reduction and Security 1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This report was prepared by Nicholas Garrett for the Communities and Artisanal & Small-scale Mining initiative (CASM). Nicholas Garrett is a Mining Consultant from the UK Resource Consulting Services Ltd (RSS), and specialising in conflict and post-conflict minerals management and corporate social responsibility in high-risk environments. The contribution of Estelle A. Levin and Harrison Mitchell (RSS) and of those who have reviewed the final report is acknowledged, as well as to everyone who provided support to the author to conduct extensive research on the ground in the DR Congo. Front cover photo: Artisanal cassiterite mining in Bisie, North Kivu/DRC © Nicholas Garrett Disclaimer: The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of CASM or other organizations. 2 CONTENTS List of Acronyms 5 Sections Preface and Methodology 6 Synopsis 7 Background and Context 12 Legal Framework 18 Governance 23 Geography, Physical Access, Infrastructure and Transport 32 Structure of Production 37 Economics of Production 41 Economics of Trade 43 Payments to Authorities 56 Demography and Poverty 63 External Stakeholders and Development Assistance 62 Conclusion and Recommendations 76 Bibliography 87 Fact Boxes Box 1: What is Cassiterite? 13 Box 2: Key Features of Artisanal Mining (AM) in North Kivu 16 Box 3: SAESSCAM 22 Box 4: Workers’ Income in Bisie -
Democratic Republic of the Congo Page 1 of 54
2010 Human Rights Report: Democratic Republic of the Congo Page 1 of 54 Home » Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs » Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor » Releases » Human Rights Reports » 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices » Africa » Congo, Democratic Republic of the 2010 Human Rights Report: Democratic Republic of the Congo BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Report April 8, 2011 The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is a nominally centralized republic with a population of approximately 68 million. The president and the lower house of parliament (National Assembly) are popularly elected; the members of the upper house (the Senate) are chosen by provincial assemblies. Multiparty presidential and National Assembly elections in 2006 were judged to be credible, despite some irregularities, while indirect elections for senators in 2007 were marred by allegations of vote buying. There were many instances in which state security forces acted independently of civilian control and of military command. In all areas of the country, state security forces continued to act with impunity throughout the year, committing many serious abuses, including unlawful killings, disappearances, torture, rape and engaging in arbitrary arrests and detention. Severe and life-threatening conditions in prison and detention facilities, prolonged pretrial detention, lack of an independent and effective judiciary, and arbitrary interference with privacy, family, and home also remained serious problems. Members of the state security forces continued to abuse and threaten journalists, contributing to a decline in press freedom. Internally displaced persons remained a major problem, and the integration of ex-combatants and members of rebel and militia groups (RMGs) into state security forces and governance institutions was slow and uneven. -
South Sudan Situation 16 - 31 October 2017
REGIONAL UPDATE South Sudan Situation 16 - 31 October 2017 2,130,075* 646,444* 278,965 Total South Sudanese refugees South Sudanese refugee arrivals Refugees in South Sudan in the region as of 31 Oct (pre in 2017, based on field reports as and 1.88 million IDPs as of 31 and post Dec 2013 caseload) of 31 October October SOUTH SUDANESE REFUGEES AS OF 31 OCT 2017 Host Countries New Arrivals In 2016 In 2017 Uganda 1,057,809 (Jan to Dec) (as of 31 Oct) CAR 659 414 Sudan 453,258 DRC 61,125 20,718 Ethiopia 418,892 Ethiopia 53,661 73,857 Kenya 22,501 18,055 Kenya 111,040 Uganda 489,234 347,398 DRC 87,019 Sudan 134,370 186,002 TOTAL 761,550 646,444 CAR 2,057 KEY FIGURES* FUNDING (AS OF 27 OCTOBER 2017) 63% USD 883.5 M of the South Sudanese refugee population are children requested for the South Sudan situation (under the age of 18 years old) Funded: 32% 282.4 M 4.29 million Total population of concern (South Sudanese refugees, South Sudanese IDPs and refugees inside South Sudan) Gap: 68% 601.1 M 2,130,500 * The population and arrival figures are based on best available information at South Sudanese refugees are expected to be hosted in the the time of production. UNHCR continues to verify the numbers in all countries region by 31 December 2017 (Revised 2017 RRP Planning and future updates may vary as new information becomes available. figures) www.unhcr.org 1 REGIONAL UPDATE > South Sudan Situation / 1 – 15 October 2017 Regional Highlights ■ Over 11,000 South Sudanese refugees fled South Sudan into neighbouring countries during the month of October.