Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Ha’azinu

Good Condition

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Dayan Yehoshua Grunwald

September 17, 2021

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On the first two days of Sukkos, one must own the arba’ah minim in order to fulfill the mitzvah of taking them. Those who do not own their own arba’ah minim generally use someone else’s set via matanah al menas lehachzir (giving a gift on the condition that it is returned afterward). But it is not clear whether tenai kaful (a double condition, i.e., where both the “if” and “if not” possibilities are expressed), which is necessary for conditions in other areas of halacha, is required here.

According to the Smag, one must make a tenai kaful when giving a matanah al menas lehachzir for arba’ah minim. The Mordechai disagrees and notes that Rishonim debate whether a tenai kaful is necessary for conditions outside of gittin and kidushin (such as for mamonos). The Mordechai states that the halacha follows the Rashbam that it is unnecessary for mamonos. The Bais Yosef (O.C. 658) cites this machlokes and rules that we follow the Mordechai with regard to arba’ah minim.

Although the Bais Yosef elsewhere (E.H. 38) cites both opinions and does not rule definitively like the Rashbam, the case of esrog may be more lenient for a number of reasons. These include the fact that perhaps there is a clear umdena that one wants the tenai to be valid even without the tenai kaful (Tosafos Kidushin 6b); tenai kaful may be unnecessary for metaltelin (Nesivos Hamishpat C.M. 207); and that even if the tenai kaful is needed but not performed, the recipient will still own the arba’ah minim (just that the condition of al menas lehachzir is invalid and it will not revert back to the owner) (Remach).

Some Acharonim are machmir that a tenai kaful should be added when borrowing arba’ah minim (Bikurei Yaakov; the Brisker Rav, cited in Mo’adim Uzmanim). However, the Kaf Hachaim rules that it is not needed, and it would seem that due to the considerations above, this is the basic halacha.

Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Vayeilech

Child Benefit

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Dayan Yitzhak Grossman

https://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/DEV81_009_Vayeilech_Hakhel_Chil dren_and_the_Synagogue.mp3

Assemble the people: the men, the women, and the children, and your stranger in your cities, in order that they hear, and in order that they learn and fear Hashem, your G-d, and they will observe to do all the words of this Torah.

Devarim 31:12

The Gemara (Chagigah 3a) explains that the only reason this pasuk says to bring children to hakhel is to provide reward for those that bring them. It would seem from this formulation that Chazal interpreted the reference to children to mean very young children who cannot understand the proceedings, which consisted of the king reading portions of Sefer Devarim. Since they will not understand, the only reason to bring them is to receive reward. The Maharal in Gur Aryeh notes that it is difficult to understand why the Torah would require the bringing of young children for this reason alone. He therefore holds that the mitzvah applies only to older children, who can understand, and he interprets the statement of Chazal differently.

Most commentators (including the Maharsha, Ramban, and Or Hachaim), assume that Chazal do indeed apply the mitzvah to young children. The Ramban nevertheless concedes that he would have theoretically understood the pasuk to include only older children.

Although the mitzvah of hakhel does not apply today, Tosafos comments that the custom to bring children to shul stems from this Gemara. The Or Zarua writes similarly and adds that bringing young children to shul instills in them yiras shamayim.

R’ Menachem de Lengzano of Italy (quoted by the Shelah, Magein Avraham, and Mishnah Brurah) argues strongly against this practice. He writes that today, parents who bring young children to shul will not receive reward but be punished. He explains that children do not act appropriately in shul but are disruptive, so they must be kept at home. One may only bring older children who can sit quietly and participate in the davening.

Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Nitzavim

Undo

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Rav Moshe Zev Granek https://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/DEV81_008_Nitzavim_Come_Back_ The_Mitzvah_of_Teshuva.mp3

For this mitzvah that I command you today is not concealed from you and it is not far away.

Devarim 30:11

According to many Rishonim, including the Ramban and Rabeinu Yonah, “this mitzvah” means the mitzvah to do teshuvah for one’s aveiros. In their view, the mitzvah includes the entire process of teshuvah: charatah (regret), azivas hacheit (ceasing to commit the sin), vidui (confession), and kabalah al he’asid (resolving not to do it again). The Rambam (Sefer Hamitzvos Asei 73 and Hilchos Teshuvah 1:1) counts reciting vidui as a mitzvah but does not include the rest of the teshuvah process.

The Meshech Chochmah (in Parshas Vayeilech) questions how the Ramban and Rabeinu Yonah can list teshuvah as a mitzvah, given that Chazal teach that teshuvah erases aveiros. If, for example, someone violated Shabbos intentionally, wouldn’t the prohibition to desecrate Shabbos obligate him to do teshuvah to remove the violation? Why the need for a special mitzvah to do teshuvah? The Meshech Chochmah suggests that this is the reason that the Rambam does not count teshuvah as a mitzvah—it is already included in every mitzvah and aveirah in the Torah. Only vidui (which the Rambam apparently holds wouldn’t otherwise be mandated) can be a separate mitzvah.

How, then, to explain those Rishonim who do count teshuvah as a mitzvah? Perhaps they would argue that teshuvah’s power to erase aveiros exists only because teshuvah is a separate mitzvah.

Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Ki Savo

Money Order

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Rav Yaakov Meir Levi

August 26, 2021 https://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/DEV81_007_Ki_Savo_Charity_Begi ns_at_Home-Tzedaka_Priorities.mp3

When you have finished giving all the tithes of your produce in the third year, the year of the tithe, you shall give [them] to the levi, the stranger, the orphan, and the widow, so that they may eat in your cities and be satisfied.

Devarim 26:12

Chazal derive from this mitzvah of ma’aser ani and other psukim that everyone is obligated in the mitzvah of tzedakah. Although the absolute minimum one must give is a third of a shekel per year, he must give a sum commensurate with his earnings. If he does not have sufficient money for his own household, it takes precedence over others.

There is a halachic hierarchy among tzedakah recipients. For example, relatives take precedence over others. If similar-degree relatives are in need of financial assistance, such as a brother and sister, women are usually given precedence, because it is more embarrassing for a woman to collect door-to-door than for a man.

Precedence also depends upon the need. If two similar relatives require tzedakah, but one needs food and the other clothing, food takes precedence. But relatives take precedence over others even if the non-relative needs food and the relative only clothing.

Aniyei ircha, the poor of one’s own city, come before outsiders. (One who has lived in a city for at least twelve months is considered a local for this purpose.) The poor of Eretz Yisrael take precedence over other outsiders, but not over aniyei ircha. And the poor of Yerushalayim are ahead of those of elsewhere in Eretz Yisrael if they lack similar things.

Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Ki Seitzei

Half and Half Dressing

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by HaRav Yechiel Biberfeld

August 19, 2021 https://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/DEV81_006_Ki_Seitzei_Dress_Like_ a_Mentsch_The_Prohibition_of_Lo_Yilbash-.mp3

A man’s attire shall not be on a woman, nor may a man wear a woman’s garment, because whoever does these [things] is an abomination to Hashem, your G-d.

Devarim 22:5

According to the Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 182), this mitzvah prohibits a woman from wearing a turban or a suit of armor. The Rama adds that even if only one article of the opposite gender’s clothing is worn, and the wearer’s gender is recognizable from the other garments, the prohibition applies.

The Shach (ibid. 7), citing the Bach, writes that two criteria are necessary for the issur to apply: the garment must be made and worn for beauty, and one must be wearing it in order to appear to be of the opposite gender. Therefore, a man may wear a woman’s raincoat to shield himself from the rain or women’s sunglasses to protect his eyes from the sun. The Shach accepts this ruling in the case where the person is wearing only one garment designed for the opposite gender.

The Chochmas Adam challenges the Bach’s leniency from the Gemara in Nazir (59a) that says women may not wear weapons or armor, as these are kli gever. These items are cleary worn for protection, so this Gemara appears to contradict the Bach’s assertion.

We can answer based on R’ Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe 4:75:3), who explains that weapons and armor are intrinsically considered kli gever regardless of the purpose for wearing them, but the status of other clothing depends upon the purpose for which one is wearing it: if for beauty, it is forbidden; if for protection, it is permitted.

Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Shoftim

Holding Court

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Dayan Yosef Greenwald

August 12, 2021

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You shall place judges and law enforcement officials for yourself in all your cities that Hashem, your G-d, is giving you, for your tribes…

Devarim 16:18

The Torah here commands us to build a justice system by establishing a network of batei din. Although the system cannot be implemented fully today because our dayanim lack smicha (ordination in an unbroken chain from Moshe), the Gemara (Gittin 88a) says that dayanim today represent the dayanim of old in Eretz Yisrael and serve as their emissaries. But the Gemara distinguishes in this context among different areas of law. Any judgments that are about punishment—e.g., dinei nefashos (capital cases)—are not adjudicated today, nor are payments that are punitive and assessed as fines (knasos). For example, a burglar may not be compelled to pay keifel (double) today, because this payment exceeds the actual loss.

On the other hand, many cases that are about compensation are adjudicated today. The Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 1:1) writes that this includes common cases of theft and unintentional property damage (though not uncommon cases).[1] This stands in contrast to secular law, where there is a distinction between the criminal (e.g., arson) and non-criminal (e.g., a car accident). The Shulchan Aruch also lists sheves and ripui (compensating an injured party for time lost from work and medical bills),[2] financial obligations between people, and questions of inheritance.

[1] According to the Rama (1:3), not all cases of theft are considered common, and perhaps car theft or pickpocketing would not be included.

[2] Here, too, the Rama (1:2) cites opinions that sheves and ripui are not adjudicated either, because those obligations stem from bodily injury, which he holds to be uncommon.

Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Re’ei

Labor Parting

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Rav Moshe Yitzchok Weg

August 5, 2021

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And when you send him free from you, you shall not send him empty-handed. You shall surely provide him from your flock, from your threshing floor, and from your vat; you shall give him from what Hashem, your G-d, has blessed you. Devarim 15:13-14

According to the Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah 482), the mitzvah of ha’anakah (to give gifts to a Jewish bondsman when he becomes free) also applies to employees. He explains that this is not an absolute halacha, but we derive from ha’anakah that it is the right thing to do.

The Minchas Chinuch suggests that the Rambam disagrees, because the Rambam limits the mitzvah of ha’anakah to a case of mecharuhu bais din (where the court sold a man into servitude because he stole and could not repay), but in a case of mocheir atzmo (a man who sold himself), the mitzvah does not apply. If so, it should not apply to an employee either.

The Steipler (Kehilos Yaakov, Kidushin 23) explains that according to the Rambam, ha’anakah is related to the mitzvah of tzei (verbally declaring to the eved ivri that he should leave), cited by the Rambam in Hilchos Avadim 2:12, where he writes that the mitzvah of tzei is incumbent upon whoever frees the eved. Therefore, the Steipler says that if the master dies, his heirs are subject to the mitzvos of tzei and ha’anakah. It thus seems that according to the Steipler, ha’anakah is about sending out an eved ivri in the right way. If so, it would not apply to an employee, who is neither owned by his boss nor sent away when his work is done.

Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Eikev

Just Desserts

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Rav Ari Stauber

July 29, 2021 https://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/DEV81_003_Ekev_Sweet__Salty_Su gar_Salt__Safek_Brachos.mp3

And you will eat, become satisfied, and bless Hashem your G-d for the good land that He has given you.

Devarim 8:10 According to one stage of the Gemara, this pasuk serves as the source for reciting a bracha rishonah, based on a kal vachomer.[1] In cases of safeik (where the obligation to recite a bracha rishonah is uncertain), the Chayei Adam, Kitzur Shulchan Aruch, and Mishnah Brurah advise to take a sugar cube and recite shehakol over it to exempt the uncertain food.

The most common contemporary application involves ices and ice cream. According to the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 177), dessert (kinuach seudah) is not classified as part of the meal, and one recites a separate bracha rishonah on it. However, Acharonim suggest two reasons that one should not recite a bracha on ice cream: First, it is more common to eat dessert today than it was in earlier times, and it has now become part of the meal. Second—cited in the name of R’ Moshe Feinstein—frozen desserts melt in the mouth and thus are swallowed in liquid form as a beverage.[2]

Some people recite shehakol over a piece of candy or chocolate, which certainly require a bracha, thereby exempting the ice cream. One could argue that both the suggestion of the Acharonim to use sugar and the contemporary practice of using chocolate are questionable, due to concerns about the correct bracha on these foods. Some poskim recommend using salt instead, to avoid a safek bracha. But others defend the practice and explain that candy is preferable to salt, from which one generally derives no benefit whatsoever.

[1] The Gemara concludes that simple logic is the true basis for reciting a bracha rishonah.

[2] Some students of R’ Moshe argue that this applies only to ices, which melt into liquid, while others hold that R’ Moshe applies the same principle to ice cream, though it contains other ingredients as well.

Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Va’es’chanan

Loving While Leaving

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by HaRav Chaim Weg

July 22, 2021 https://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/DEV81_002_Vaeschanan_Yoke_of_ Heaven_Krias_Shema__Kiddush_Sheim_Shamayim.mp3

Hear, Yisrael, Hashem is our G-d, Hashem is One.

Devarim 6:1

The Gemara in Brachos (61b) tells how Rabbi Akiva was put to death by the Romans for publicly teaching Torah. The Gemara relates that while he was being killed, Rabbi Akiva fulfilled the mitzvah of reciting Shema at the proper time. His students asked him, “Ad kan (until here)?”—why did he have to recite it while dying? He responded that during his lifetime, he was always pained about when he would be able to fulfill the words bechol nafshecha, meaning that even if Hashem takes one’s life he must still love Him, and now was his opportunity.

R’ Zelig Reuven Bengis wondered why the talmidim questioned Rabbi Akiva’s decision to recite Shema. Shouldn’t a person be obligated to fulfill mitzvos if he is able? R’ Baruch Ber Leibowitz answered him that the talmidim felt Rabbi Akiva should be exempt from reciting Shema due to the principle of osek bemitzvah patur min hamitzvah (one who is involved with one mitzvah is exempt from another). If he is fulfilling the mitzvah of dying al kiddush Hashem, why interrupt to say Shema? Rabbi Akiva responded that kabbalas ol malchus shamayim (accepting the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven) through Shema is the very same mitzvah as sanctifying Hashem’s name by dying al kiddush Hashem. Both involve sanctifying His name, which must be done both in life and in death. This was in fact Rabbi Akiva’s response to the talmidim: He was waiting for the opportunity to be mekabel ol malchus shamayim through death, so of course he should also recite Shema, through which one accepts ol malchus shamayim.

Bais HaVaad on the Parsha, Parshas Devarim

When Tisha B’av Falls on Sunday

Excerpted and adapted from a shiur by Rav Yosef Jacobovits

July 15, 2021 https://baishavaad.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/DEV81_001_Devarim_National_Mo urning_The_Halachos-of_Tisha_BAv.mp3

This year, with Tisha B’Av on Sunday, many unique halachos apply, a few of which are presented here.

One must complete seudah shlishis before shkiah, when the prohibition of eating begins. The other prohibitions begin at tzeis hakochavim.

In Europe, when Tisha B’Av was on Sunday, people generally wore Shabbos clothes at Ma’ariv on motza’ei Shabbos, which was davened at the regular time. But in recent years, many shuls have adopted the practice of davening Ma’ariv a little later, giving people time to go home, change clothes, and drive back to shul. As a result, different minhagim have developed as to whether one removes his Shabbos clothes immediately after Shabbos or wears them for the rest of the evening.

This year, havdalah is not made until Sunday night, because drinking wine is forbidden, but one does recite the bracha of borei m’orei ha’eish after Shabbos. Although there are usually different minhagim about whether to stand or sit for havdalah (based on the question of which is the greater kvius), in this case everyone should sit, because sitting is considered more of a kevius for a single bracha.

One should not fully clean up after Shabbos, because this takes one’s mind off mourning (Aruch Hashulchan O.C. 554). After chatzos hayom, when the mourning is less strict, it is permitted. R’ Shmuel Kamenetsky permits turning on the dishwasher at night.