58 Samuel S. Kim

51. Selden, "China, Japan and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia," 313. 52. Robert Legvold, "Sino-Soviet Relations: The American Factor," in China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War, ed. Robert S. Ross (Armonk, NY; M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 87. 53. Kang, "Hierarchy in Asian International Relations," 174. Chapter Three 54. Cohen, East Asia at the Center, 480. 55. Harold James, A German Identity, 1770-1990 (New York: Routledge, 1989). 56. For a cogent analysis challenging the applicability of power-transition balance of Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR power theory in today's Asia, see Steve Chan, Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, AMITAV ACHARYA 2012). 57. See David Shambaugh, ed.. Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berke­ ley: University of California Press, 2005); David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chi­ nese Power: Might. Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); and Samuel S. Kim, "China and Globalization: Confronting Myriad Challenges and Opportunities," Asian Perspective 33, no. 3 (2009): 41-80. 58. Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?," International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003/2004): 164. See also Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," International Any discussion of theoretical perspectives on the international relations (IR) Organization 58 (Spring 2004): 239-75; Samuel S. Kim, "Regionalization and Regional­ in Asia confronts the paradox that much of the available literature on the sub­ ism in East Asia," Journal of East Asian Studies 4, no. 1 (January-April 2004): 39-67; ject had, until quite recently, remained largely atheoretical. Whether from and Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama, eds., East Asian Multilateralism: Prospects within or outside the region, many analysts of Asia were largely unconvinced for Regional Stability (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). that theory was either necessary or useful for studying Asian international 59. Kim, "Regionalization and Regionalism in East Asia," 43. relations.' Although interest in it is growing in the region, particularly in 60. For the text of the speech, see UN Doc. A/60/PV.5, September 15, 2005, 19-20. 61. Kim, "China and Globalization," 54-56. China,^ where efforts to develop a "Chinese School" of IR are gathering 62. Gilbert Rozman, ed., East Asian National Identities: Common Roots and Chinese steam, theory is still seen as too abstract or too divorced from the day-to-day Exceptionalism (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012). concerns of governments and peoples to merit serious and sustained pursuit. 63. Jae Ho Chung, "East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations," Moreover, theory is criticized by many in Asia as too "Western." Thus, Pacific Affairs 82, no. 4 (Winter 2009/2010): 659. even among those writers on Asian IR who are theoretically oriented, dis­ 64. Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?," Interna­ agreement persists as to whether IR theory is relevant to studying Asia given tional Security 16, no. 3 (Winter 1991/92): 39-45. its origin in, and close association with, Western historical traditions, intellec­ tual discourses, and foreign policy practices. International relations theory, like the discipline itself, remains, an "American social science," to quote Stanley Hoffman.' The recent advances made by the "English School" and continental Euro­ pean Constructivism have not made IR theory "universal ; indeed, they have \ further entrenched and broadened the Western theoretical dominance. The question of how relevant IR theory is to the study of Asian security has evoked strikingly different responses. On the one hand, David Kang has seized upon the non-realization of Realist warnings of post-war Asia being "ripe for rivaky" to critique not just Realism, but Western IR theory in general, for "getting Asia wrong."'' In analyzing Asian regionalism, Peter Katzenstein comments, "Theories based on Western, and especially West

59 60 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 61

European experience, have been of little use in making sense of Asian region­ and important dimension of the debate on, and analysis of, Asian IR. In the alism."^ Although Katzenstein's remarks specifically concern the study of sections that follow, I examine three major perspectives on Asian interna­ Asian regionalism, they can be applied to Asian IR in general. And it is a tional relations: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism, along with some view widely shared among Asian scholars. On the other side, John Hcenberry reflections on the merits of "analytical eclecticism"' (see table 3.1). and Michael Mastanduno defend the relevance of Western theoretical frame­ None of these theories are coherent, singular entities. Each contains a works in studying the international relations of Asia. David Shambaugh's range of perspectives and variations, some of which overlap with those of the introduction to this volume also illustrates the partial applicabihty of various others, although this complexity is seldom acknowledged in academic IR theories—^but the impossibihty of any single one—to explain international relations in the region. While intra-Asian relationships might have had some distinctive features historically, this distinctiveness had been diluted by the Table 3.1. Three Perspectives on International Relations progressive integration of the region into the modem international system. The international relations of Asia have acquired the behavioral norms and Realism Liberalism Constructivism attributes associated with the modern interstate system that originated in Main Actors States States, multinational States, transnational Europe and still retains many of the features of the Westphalian model. corporations, and knowledge Hence, the core concepts of international relations theory such as hegemony, international communities, and organizations moral entrepreneurs the distribution of power, international regimes, and political identity are as relevant in the Asian context as anywhere else.® Primary Goals of Pursuit of national Cooperation and Community building To this observer, this debate is a healthy caveat, rather than a debilitating States interest; power coordination to through interactions constraint, on analyzing Asian international relations with the help of an maximization achieve collective and shared normative admittedly Western theoretical literature. To be sure, theoretical paradigms (offensive Realism); goals; world peace frameworks developed from the Western experience do not adequately capture the full survival and security (defensive Realism) range of ideas and relationships that drive international relations in Asia. But IR theories and approaches—Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and ana­ Preferred A balance of power A collective security Global and regional lytic eclecticism—are relevant and useful in analyzing Asian IR, provided International Order system underpinned system underpinned security communities they do not encourage a selection bias in favor of those phenomena (ideas, by self-help and by free trade, liberal forged through shared events, trends, and relationships) that fit with them and against those that do alliances to maintain democracy, and norms and collective international order institutions identity not. IR scholars should feel free to identify and study phenomena that are either ignored or given scarce attention by these perspectives. They should Primary Mode of Strategic interaction Two-level (domestic Socialization through also develop concepts and insights from the Asian context and experience not Interaction between backed by causal and international) principled ideas and just to study Asian developments and dynamics, but also other parts of the Units ideas and military and bargaining backed by institutions world. In other words. Western IR theory, despite its ethnocentrism, is not to economic power causal ideas; trade and other forms of be dismissed or expunged from Asian classrooms or seminars, but universal­ functional ized with the infusion of Asian histories, personahties, philosophies, trajecto­ institutionalization ries, and practices. To do so, one must look beyond the contributions of those who write in an A Major Variation Neo-Realism: Neo-Liberal Critical overtly theoretical fashion, explicitly employing theoretical jargon and mak­ distribution of power institutionalism: Constructivism: decides outcome international system challenges the state- ing references to the theoretical literature of IR. A good deal of empirical or anarchic, but centric policy-relevant work may be regarded as theoretical for analytical purposes institutions created by Constructivism of because it, like the speeches and writings of policy makers, reflects mental or states in their self- Wendt social constructs that side with different paradigms of international relations.' interest do constrain To ignore these in any discussion of theory would be to miss out on a large anarchy 60 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 61

European experience, have been of little use in making sense of Asian region­ and important dimension of the debate on, and analysis of, Asian IR. In the alism."^ Although Katzenstein's remarks specifically concern the study of sections that follow, I examine three major perspectives on Asian interna­ Asian regionalism, they can be applied to Asian IR in general. And it is a tional relations: Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism, along with some view widely shared among Asian scholars. On the other side, John Hcenberry reflections on the merits of "analytical eclecticism"' (see table 3.1). and Michael Mastanduno defend the relevance of Western theoretical frame­ None of these theories are coherent, singular entities. Each contains a works in studying the international relations of Asia. David Shambaugh's range of perspectives and variations, some of which overlap with those of the introduction to this volume also illustrates the partial applicabihty of various others, although this complexity is seldom acknowledged in academic IR theories—^but the impossibihty of any single one—to explain international relations in the region. While intra-Asian relationships might have had some distinctive features historically, this distinctiveness had been diluted by the Table 3.1. Three Perspectives on International Relations progressive integration of the region into the modem international system. The international relations of Asia have acquired the behavioral norms and Realism Liberalism Constructivism attributes associated with the modern interstate system that originated in Main Actors States States, multinational States, transnational Europe and still retains many of the features of the Westphalian model. corporations, and knowledge Hence, the core concepts of international relations theory such as hegemony, international communities, and organizations moral entrepreneurs the distribution of power, international regimes, and political identity are as relevant in the Asian context as anywhere else.® Primary Goals of Pursuit of national Cooperation and Community building To this observer, this debate is a healthy caveat, rather than a debilitating States interest; power coordination to through interactions constraint, on analyzing Asian international relations with the help of an maximization achieve collective and shared normative admittedly Western theoretical literature. To be sure, theoretical paradigms (offensive Realism); goals; world peace frameworks developed from the Western experience do not adequately capture the full survival and security (defensive Realism) range of ideas and relationships that drive international relations in Asia. But IR theories and approaches—Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and ana­ Preferred A balance of power A collective security Global and regional lytic eclecticism—are relevant and useful in analyzing Asian IR, provided International Order system underpinned system underpinned security communities they do not encourage a selection bias in favor of those phenomena (ideas, by self-help and by free trade, liberal forged through shared events, trends, and relationships) that fit with them and against those that do alliances to maintain democracy, and norms and collective international order institutions identity not. IR scholars should feel free to identify and study phenomena that are either ignored or given scarce attention by these perspectives. They should Primary Mode of Strategic interaction Two-level (domestic Socialization through also develop concepts and insights from the Asian context and experience not Interaction between backed by causal and international) principled ideas and just to study Asian developments and dynamics, but also other parts of the Units ideas and military and bargaining backed by institutions world. In other words. Western IR theory, despite its ethnocentrism, is not to economic power causal ideas; trade and other forms of be dismissed or expunged from Asian classrooms or seminars, but universal­ functional ized with the infusion of Asian histories, personahties, philosophies, trajecto­ institutionalization ries, and practices. To do so, one must look beyond the contributions of those who write in an A Major Variation Neo-Realism: Neo-Liberal Critical overtly theoretical fashion, explicitly employing theoretical jargon and mak­ distribution of power institutionalism: Constructivism: decides outcome international system challenges the state- ing references to the theoretical literature of IR. A good deal of empirical or anarchic, but centric policy-relevant work may be regarded as theoretical for analytical purposes institutions created by Constructivism of because it, like the speeches and writings of policy makers, reflects mental or states in their self- Wendt social constructs that side with different paradigms of international relations.' interest do constrain To ignore these in any discussion of theory would be to miss out on a large anarchy w

62 Amitav Acharya debates. Using even these broad categories is not that simple because most q; writings on Asian IR are generated by area specialists, who are unlikely to 5) g -2 o c ^ o 00 TO '4_> pigeonhole themselves into Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist slots. So theo­ ^ o -CUD c c ~o B _Q I rizing Asian IR necessarily involves generalizing from a thin conceptual base 5 '1^ -Si "gi O ^ DO TO 3 g 8 c ^ £ tj and making arbitrary judgments about who and what belongs where. ^ 5 m TO DO-O lo TO s' 3- 2 TO *-> •l-s o S ^ — £ tfi •—0 Although theories of IR are built around a set of assumptions and argu­ tj ^ .5-s: '> ™ •IfOJ c TO j:: ~ 00 > ^ y ^ c ments that are broad in scope and supposed to apply to every region, in real­ i < DO c op -i o 12 ^ S5 2 "o .2 *c ity, theoretical debates about the intemational relations of regions often ^3 ^ Z < £ U < ilZ u - rr X C 1 I § I o S _Q OJ TO CQ V) Q. E vt .E c opments in Asian intemational relations. Theory does not exist in a vacuum. Both at the global level and in the region, theoretical work responds to major events and changes occurring within and outside (at the global level) the -O TO •D - —^ -oc REALISM n03 1 c2 t3 TO _TO it ^ — ^ O ^ TO .y c Q. Q_(D 0)4) T3q; Reahsts take the intemational system to be in anarchy (no authority above ^ n 1 § I c; I o 0) E 5 flj O> 3I- .E^ a>> the state), in which states, as the main actors in intemational relations, are U Q "3< D.": a. LU C ^ > i guided mainly by considerations of power and the national interest. Intema­ "o a> 0) 0) c -S E ^ tional relations is seen as a zero\um game in which states are more con­ cu 'ob SP "O U tn 0) c TO C cemed with their relative gains rather than absolute gains (how much one o0) TO a. o 0) to gains vis-a-vis another is more important than the fact that everybody may _c ^ o o ^ .i 1 o u tj > TO "O -S

1 w

62 Amitav Acharya debates. Using even these broad categories is not that simple because most q; writings on Asian IR are generated by area specialists, who are unlikely to 5) g -2 o c ^ o 00 TO '4_> pigeonhole themselves into Realist, Liberal, and Constructivist slots. So theo­ ^ o -CUD c c ~o B _Q I rizing Asian IR necessarily involves generalizing from a thin conceptual base 5 '1^ -Si "gi O ^ DO TO 3 g 8 c ^ £ tj and making arbitrary judgments about who and what belongs where. ^ 5 m TO DO-O lo TO s' 3- 2 TO *-> •l-s o S ^ — £ tfi •—0 Although theories of IR are built around a set of assumptions and argu­ tj ^ .5-s: '> ™ •IfOJ c TO j:: ~ 00 > ^ y ^ c ments that are broad in scope and supposed to apply to every region, in real­ i < DO c op -i o 12 ^ S5 2 "o .2 *c ity, theoretical debates about the intemational relations of regions often ^3 ^ Z < £ U < ilZ u - rr X C 1 I § I o S _Q OJ TO CQ V) Q. E vt .E c opments in Asian intemational relations. Theory does not exist in a vacuum. Both at the global level and in the region, theoretical work responds to major events and changes occurring within and outside (at the global level) the -O TO •D - —^ -oc REALISM n03 1 c2 t3 TO _TO it ^ — ^ O ^ TO .y c Q. Q_(D 0)4) T3q; Reahsts take the intemational system to be in anarchy (no authority above ^ n 1 § I c; I o 0) E 5 flj O> 3I- .E^ a>> the state), in which states, as the main actors in intemational relations, are U Q "3< D.": a. LU C ^ > i guided mainly by considerations of power and the national interest. Intema­ "o a> 0) 0) c -S E ^ tional relations is seen as a zero\um game in which states are more con­ cu 'ob SP "O U tn 0) c TO C cemed with their relative gains rather than absolute gains (how much one o0) TO a. o 0) to gains vis-a-vis another is more important than the fact that everybody may _c ^ o o ^ .i 1 o u tj > TO "O -S

1 64 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 65 with power defined primarily in economic and military terms. A later version naval facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, and the dismantling of the US of ReaUsm, developed by Kenneth Waltz and called "neo-Realism," stresses naval and air bases in the Philippines. the importance of the structural properties of the international system, espe­ Questions about a vacuum of power inevitably beg the question of who is cially the distribution of power, in shaping conflict and order, thereby down­ to fill it. Initially, Realist prognosis favored a multipolar contest featuring a playing the impact of human nature (emphasized by classical Realists) or rising China, a remilitarized (thanks partly to US retrenchment) Japan, and domestic politics in international relations. More recently, intra-Realist India (whose potential as an emerging power was yet to be recognized). But debates have revealed differences between "offensive Realists" and "defen­ with the persistence of China's double-digit economic growth matched by sive Reahsts." Offensive Realists such as Mearsheimer argue that states are double-digit annual increases in its defense spending, it was the rise of China power maximizers: going for "all they can get" with "hegemony as their that became the focal point of Realist anxieties (delight?) about Asian insecu­ ultimate goal." Defensive Realists, such as Robert Jervis or Jack Snyder, rity. maintain that states are generally satisfied with the status quo if their own From a "power transition theory" perspective. Realists foresaw an inevita­ security is not challenged, and thus they concentrate on maintaining the bal­ ble confrontation between the status quo power (the United States) and its ance of power. rising power challenger (China). But paving the way for such a confrontation Whether academic or poUcy oriented. Realists view the balance of power was the logic of offensive Realism, which sees an inevitable tendency in ris­ as the key force shaping Asia's post-war international relations, with the ing powers toward regional expansionism. John Mearsheimer likened the rise United States as chief regional balancer.® A major proponent of this view is of China to that of the United States in the nineteenth century, where the Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's senior statesman. Lee ascribes not only Asian aspiring hegemon went on a spree of acquiring adjacent territories and stability, but also its robust economic growth during the "miracle years," to imposed a sphere of influence (Monroe Doctrine) in the wider neighbor­ the US military presence in the region.'" In his view, the US presence and hood.'^ Expansionism occurs not because rising powers are hardwired into an intervention in Indochina secured the region against Chinese and Soviet expansionist mode, but because anarchy induces a concern for survival even expansion and gave the Asian states time to develop their economies." In the among the most powerful actors. In other words, great powers suffer from wake of the communist takeover of South Vietnam in 1975, Seni Pramoj, the survival anxieties no less than weak states, and it is this concern for survival leader of Thailand's Democrat Party, described the US role as the regional that drives them toward regional hegemony. The result is the paradoxical balancer in somewhat different terms: "We have cock fights in Thailand, but logic of "expand to survive." sometimes we put a sheet of glass between the fighting cocks. They can peck Since a balance of power is likely to be either unstable (if multipolarity at each other without hurting each other. Iq the cold war between Moscow emerges) or absent (if Chinese hegemony materializes), is there a role for and Peking, the glass between the antagonists can be Washington."'^ multilateral institutions as alternative sources of stability? During the Cold Until the end of the Cold War, Realist arguments about Asian IR were War, Reahsts paid little attention to Asian regional institutions or dialogues, closer to classical Realism than the neo-Realism developed by Kenneth of which there were but a few: an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Waltz, which stresses the causal impact of the distribution of power. This has (ASEAN) preoccupied with the Cambodia conflict, a severely anemic South changed with the end of the Cold War, which spelled the end of bipolarity. Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and some loose eco­ Thus, a new Realist argument about Asian international relations is the view nomic frameworks such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council that the end of bipolarity spells disorder and even doom for the region. For (PECC). But with the end of the Cold War accompanied by a refocusing of neo-Realists, bipolarity is a more stable international system than multipolar- ASEAN toward wider regional security issues and the emergence of new ity, both in terms of the durability of the system itself and the balance regional institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, between conflict and order that preWs within the system. 1989) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), Realism came under The end of the Cold War would witness the "decompression" of conflicts challenge from "institutionalist" perspectives, that is, those who argued that held in check under bipolar management.'"* Hence, Realism paints a dark pic­ regional norms and institutions, rather than just the balance of power system, ture of Asia's post-Cold War order. In policy debates, the favorite Realist have helped to keep the peace in Cold War Asia and would play a more clich6 in the initial post-Cold War years was the "power vacuum" created by important role in the region's post-Cold War order. Realists responded to this superpower retrenchment, as could be foreseen from the withdrawal of Soviet challenge by targeting Asian regional institutions. Their main preoccupation 64 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 65 with power defined primarily in economic and military terms. A later version naval facilities in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, and the dismantling of the US of ReaUsm, developed by Kenneth Waltz and called "neo-Realism," stresses naval and air bases in the Philippines. the importance of the structural properties of the international system, espe­ Questions about a vacuum of power inevitably beg the question of who is cially the distribution of power, in shaping conflict and order, thereby down­ to fill it. Initially, Realist prognosis favored a multipolar contest featuring a playing the impact of human nature (emphasized by classical Realists) or rising China, a remilitarized (thanks partly to US retrenchment) Japan, and domestic politics in international relations. More recently, intra-Realist India (whose potential as an emerging power was yet to be recognized). But debates have revealed differences between "offensive Realists" and "defen­ with the persistence of China's double-digit economic growth matched by sive Reahsts." Offensive Realists such as Mearsheimer argue that states are double-digit annual increases in its defense spending, it was the rise of China power maximizers: going for "all they can get" with "hegemony as their that became the focal point of Realist anxieties (delight?) about Asian insecu­ ultimate goal." Defensive Realists, such as Robert Jervis or Jack Snyder, rity. maintain that states are generally satisfied with the status quo if their own From a "power transition theory" perspective. Realists foresaw an inevita­ security is not challenged, and thus they concentrate on maintaining the bal­ ble confrontation between the status quo power (the United States) and its ance of power. rising power challenger (China). But paving the way for such a confrontation Whether academic or poUcy oriented. Realists view the balance of power was the logic of offensive Realism, which sees an inevitable tendency in ris­ as the key force shaping Asia's post-war international relations, with the ing powers toward regional expansionism. John Mearsheimer likened the rise United States as chief regional balancer.® A major proponent of this view is of China to that of the United States in the nineteenth century, where the Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's senior statesman. Lee ascribes not only Asian aspiring hegemon went on a spree of acquiring adjacent territories and stability, but also its robust economic growth during the "miracle years," to imposed a sphere of influence (Monroe Doctrine) in the wider neighbor­ the US military presence in the region.'" In his view, the US presence and hood.'^ Expansionism occurs not because rising powers are hardwired into an intervention in Indochina secured the region against Chinese and Soviet expansionist mode, but because anarchy induces a concern for survival even expansion and gave the Asian states time to develop their economies." In the among the most powerful actors. In other words, great powers suffer from wake of the communist takeover of South Vietnam in 1975, Seni Pramoj, the survival anxieties no less than weak states, and it is this concern for survival leader of Thailand's Democrat Party, described the US role as the regional that drives them toward regional hegemony. The result is the paradoxical balancer in somewhat different terms: "We have cock fights in Thailand, but logic of "expand to survive." sometimes we put a sheet of glass between the fighting cocks. They can peck Since a balance of power is likely to be either unstable (if multipolarity at each other without hurting each other. Iq the cold war between Moscow emerges) or absent (if Chinese hegemony materializes), is there a role for and Peking, the glass between the antagonists can be Washington."'^ multilateral institutions as alternative sources of stability? During the Cold Until the end of the Cold War, Realist arguments about Asian IR were War, Reahsts paid little attention to Asian regional institutions or dialogues, closer to classical Realism than the neo-Realism developed by Kenneth of which there were but a few: an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Waltz, which stresses the causal impact of the distribution of power. This has (ASEAN) preoccupied with the Cambodia conflict, a severely anemic South changed with the end of the Cold War, which spelled the end of bipolarity. Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and some loose eco­ Thus, a new Realist argument about Asian international relations is the view nomic frameworks such as the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council that the end of bipolarity spells disorder and even doom for the region. For (PECC). But with the end of the Cold War accompanied by a refocusing of neo-Realists, bipolarity is a more stable international system than multipolar- ASEAN toward wider regional security issues and the emergence of new ity, both in terms of the durability of the system itself and the balance regional institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, between conflict and order that preWs within the system. 1989) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), Realism came under The end of the Cold War would witness the "decompression" of conflicts challenge from "institutionalist" perspectives, that is, those who argued that held in check under bipolar management.'"* Hence, Realism paints a dark pic­ regional norms and institutions, rather than just the balance of power system, ture of Asia's post-Cold War order. In policy debates, the favorite Realist have helped to keep the peace in Cold War Asia and would play a more clich6 in the initial post-Cold War years was the "power vacuum" created by important role in the region's post-Cold War order. Realists responded to this superpower retrenchment, as could be foreseen from the withdrawal of Soviet challenge by targeting Asian regional institutions. Their main preoccupation 66 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 67 is no longer just to higMight the crucial need for a stable balance of power order. This view has been maintained both during the heydays of US hegem­ system, but also to expose the limitations of regional institutions. ony in the 1950s and 1960s, through the course of its relative dechne in the Reahsts dismiss the capacity of regional institutions in Asia to act as a post-Vietnam years, and in the post-Cold War "unipolar moment." In China, force for peace. For them, regional order rests on bilateralism (especially the Realism was the one Western theory of IR that broke the monopoly of US hub-and-spoke system), rather than multilateralism. During the Cold War, Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thought. This would later pave the way for other Reahst scholar Michael Leifer famously described Asian regional security perspectives on international relations, including Liberalism and Constructiv­ institutions as "adjuncts" to the balance of power.'® While institutions may ism. Realism also gave a certain underlying conceptual coherence to a great be effective where great powers drive them (e.g., NATO), Asian institutions deal of atheoretical or policy writings on Asian international relations. are fatally flawed because they are created and maintained by weak powers. During the Cold War, Realism was arguably the dominant perspective on One concession made to Asian institutions by their Realist critics is to accord the international relations of Asia. This was true not just of the academic them a role in smoothing the rough edges of balance of power geopolitics, an realm, but also in the policy world. Although it is difficult to find evidence argument consistent with the English School perspective. Since weak powers for the chche that Asians are instinctively wedded to a Realist worldview and are structurally incapable of maintaining order and achieving security and approach, Asian policy makers (with the exception of some of those who prosperity on their own terms and within their own means (there can be no fought against colonial rule, India's Jawaharlal Nehru in particular), tended such thing as a "regional solution to regional problems"), the best way to to be ReaUst (even Nehru claimed not to have been a "starry-eyed ideahst").^" manage the security dilemma is to keep all the relevant great powers involved Even in communist China, Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations in the regional arena so that they can balance each other's influence. enjoyed a huge popularity in classrooms, matching or exceeding the appeal Such involvement cannot be automatic, however; it has to be contrived, and of Marx or Mao. The same was true of Nehruvian India, where the indigenous this is where regional institutions play their useful role as arenas for strategic idealism Gandhi and Nehru inspired scarcely formed part of IR teaching and engagement. Instead of great powers creating institutions and setting their learning. agenda, as would be normal in a Realist world, weak powers may sometimes But, more recently. Realist perspectives on Asian IR have come under create and employ institutions with a view to engaging those powers that are attack. The predictions of Realists about Asia's post-Cold War insecurity crucial to an equilibrium of power." have yet to materialize.^' Moreover, Realism's causal emphasis on US mili­ But this limited role of regional institutions notwithstanding, Reahsts gen­ tary presence as the chief factor behind Asia's stability and prosperity ignores erally find Asia's international relations to be fraught with uncertainty and the role of other forces, including Asian regional norms and institutions, eco­ danger of conflict due to the absence of conditions in Asia that ensure a multi­ nomic growth, and domestic politics. In a similar vein. Realism's argument polar peace in Europe. In a famous essay, Aaron Friedberg argued that the that the Cold War bipolarity generated regional stability can be questioned. factors that might mitigate anarchy in Europe resulting from the disappear­ China's preeminent Realist scholar of international relations, Yan Xuetong of ance of bipolar stability are noticeably absent in Asia, thereby rendering the Tsinghua University, argues that while Cold War bipolarity might have pre­ region "ripe for rivalry."'® These mitigating factors include not only strong vented war between the superpowers, it permitted numerous regional conflicts regional institutions like the EU, but also economic interdependence and causing massive death and destruction: shared democratic political systems. Some Realists, like Friedberg, have found Asian economic interdependence to be thin relative to what exists in The history of East Asia does not support the argument that the balanced strengths Europe and the interdependence ibetween Asia and the West. Others—like between China and the United States can prevent limited conventional wars in East Barry Buzan, the late Gerald Segal, and Robert Gilpin—argue that economic Asia. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the United States and the interdependence cannot keep peace and may even cause more strife than Soviet Union did prevent them from attacking each other directly in this region, but it failed to prevent wars between their allies or wars between one of them and the order." Ironically, Realists see economic interdependence within Asia to be allies of the other, such as the Korean War in the 1950s. Hence, even if a balance of either scarce or destabilizing, or both at the same time. power existed between China and the United States after the Cold War, we would In terms of its contributions, Realism can take credit for an analytical and still not be sure it had the function of preventing limited conventional wars in this poUcy consistency in highlighting the role of the balance of power in regional region.^^ 66 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 67 is no longer just to higMight the crucial need for a stable balance of power order. This view has been maintained both during the heydays of US hegem­ system, but also to expose the limitations of regional institutions. ony in the 1950s and 1960s, through the course of its relative dechne in the Reahsts dismiss the capacity of regional institutions in Asia to act as a post-Vietnam years, and in the post-Cold War "unipolar moment." In China, force for peace. For them, regional order rests on bilateralism (especially the Realism was the one Western theory of IR that broke the monopoly of US hub-and-spoke system), rather than multilateralism. During the Cold War, Marxist-Leninist and Maoist thought. This would later pave the way for other Reahst scholar Michael Leifer famously described Asian regional security perspectives on international relations, including Liberalism and Constructiv­ institutions as "adjuncts" to the balance of power.'® While institutions may ism. Realism also gave a certain underlying conceptual coherence to a great be effective where great powers drive them (e.g., NATO), Asian institutions deal of atheoretical or policy writings on Asian international relations. are fatally flawed because they are created and maintained by weak powers. During the Cold War, Realism was arguably the dominant perspective on One concession made to Asian institutions by their Realist critics is to accord the international relations of Asia. This was true not just of the academic them a role in smoothing the rough edges of balance of power geopolitics, an realm, but also in the policy world. Although it is difficult to find evidence argument consistent with the English School perspective. Since weak powers for the chche that Asians are instinctively wedded to a Realist worldview and are structurally incapable of maintaining order and achieving security and approach, Asian policy makers (with the exception of some of those who prosperity on their own terms and within their own means (there can be no fought against colonial rule, India's Jawaharlal Nehru in particular), tended such thing as a "regional solution to regional problems"), the best way to to be ReaUst (even Nehru claimed not to have been a "starry-eyed ideahst").^" manage the security dilemma is to keep all the relevant great powers involved Even in communist China, Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations in the regional arena so that they can balance each other's influence. enjoyed a huge popularity in classrooms, matching or exceeding the appeal Such involvement cannot be automatic, however; it has to be contrived, and of Marx or Mao. The same was true of Nehruvian India, where the indigenous this is where regional institutions play their useful role as arenas for strategic idealism Gandhi and Nehru inspired scarcely formed part of IR teaching and engagement. Instead of great powers creating institutions and setting their learning. agenda, as would be normal in a Realist world, weak powers may sometimes But, more recently. Realist perspectives on Asian IR have come under create and employ institutions with a view to engaging those powers that are attack. The predictions of Realists about Asia's post-Cold War insecurity crucial to an equilibrium of power." have yet to materialize.^' Moreover, Realism's causal emphasis on US mili­ But this limited role of regional institutions notwithstanding, Reahsts gen­ tary presence as the chief factor behind Asia's stability and prosperity ignores erally find Asia's international relations to be fraught with uncertainty and the role of other forces, including Asian regional norms and institutions, eco­ danger of conflict due to the absence of conditions in Asia that ensure a multi­ nomic growth, and domestic politics. In a similar vein. Realism's argument polar peace in Europe. In a famous essay, Aaron Friedberg argued that the that the Cold War bipolarity generated regional stability can be questioned. factors that might mitigate anarchy in Europe resulting from the disappear­ China's preeminent Realist scholar of international relations, Yan Xuetong of ance of bipolar stability are noticeably absent in Asia, thereby rendering the Tsinghua University, argues that while Cold War bipolarity might have pre­ region "ripe for rivalry."'® These mitigating factors include not only strong vented war between the superpowers, it permitted numerous regional conflicts regional institutions like the EU, but also economic interdependence and causing massive death and destruction: shared democratic political systems. Some Realists, like Friedberg, have found Asian economic interdependence to be thin relative to what exists in The history of East Asia does not support the argument that the balanced strengths Europe and the interdependence ibetween Asia and the West. Others—like between China and the United States can prevent limited conventional wars in East Barry Buzan, the late Gerald Segal, and Robert Gilpin—argue that economic Asia. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the United States and the interdependence cannot keep peace and may even cause more strife than Soviet Union did prevent them from attacking each other directly in this region, but it failed to prevent wars between their allies or wars between one of them and the order." Ironically, Realists see economic interdependence within Asia to be allies of the other, such as the Korean War in the 1950s. Hence, even if a balance of either scarce or destabilizing, or both at the same time. power existed between China and the United States after the Cold War, we would In terms of its contributions, Realism can take credit for an analytical and still not be sure it had the function of preventing limited conventional wars in this poUcy consistency in highlighting the role of the balance of power in regional region.^^ 68 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 69

The ReaUst explanation of Asia's Cold War stability, while having the vir­ 2. RepubUcan Liberalism, or the "democratic peace" argument, which tue of consistency, actually contradicts a key element of its foundational assumes that Liberal democracies are more peaceful than autocracies, logic, which sees power balancing as a universal and unexceptionable law of or at least seldom fight one another. intemational politics (even if Reahsts disagree whether it is an automatic law 3. Liberal institutionalism, which focuses on the contribution of intema­ of nature or has to be contrived). The notion of balance of power in Asia as tional organizations in fostering collective security, managing conflict, understood from a Realist perspective is actually a fig leaf for US primacy, and promoting cooperation. or even preponderance. Hence, what should be anathema for a classical Real­ ist^—the discernible absence of balancing against a hegemonic power—has A modem variant of Liberal institutionahsm is neo-Liberal institutional­ acquired the status of an almost normative argument about Asian regional ism. Unlike classical Liberalism, which took a benign view of human nature, order in Realist writings on Asia. This contradiction cannot be explained by neo-Liberal institutionalism accepts the Realist premise that the intemational simply viewing the United States as a benign power which can escape the system is anarchic and that states are the primary, if not the only, actors in logic of balancing. If Realism is trae to one of its foundational logics, then intemational relations. But it disagrees with neo-ReaUsm's dismissal of inter­ any power (benign or otherwise) seeking hegemony should have invited a national institutions. Neo-Liberals maintain that intemational institutions, countervailing coalition. The fact that the United States has not triggered broadly defined—including regimes and formal organizations—can regulate such a coalition is a puzzle that has not been adequately explained. Adding a state behavior and promote cooperation by reducing transaction costs, faciU- qualifier to their causal logic (benign powers are less likely to be balanced tating information' sharing, preventing cheating, and providing avenues for against than mahgn ones) only lends itself to the charge, raised powerfully peaceful resolution of conflicts. by John Vasquez, of ReaUsm as a "degenerative" theoretical paradigm.^ While ReaUsm as a theory of intemational relations is preoccupied with Nonetheless, Realists would see the recent case of Chinese "assertiveness" issues of security and order, Liberalism is more concemed with the nature in the South China Sea and East China Sea as vindication of their arguments and dynamics of the intemational political economy. Liberal perspectives on about the coming instability in Asia. The scenario of a Chinese Monroe Doc­ Asia's intemational relations are no exception. For Liberals, the foundations trine over Asia as imagined by the offensive Realists may appear closer to of the post-war intemational relations of Asia were laid not by the region's realization with China's growing miUtary prowess, its 2009 publication of a distinctive geography or culture, or by security threats facing the region, but new map claiming much of the South China Sea, its foot-dragging in con­ rather by the post-World War n intemational economic system under Ameri­ cluding a binding code of conduct for the South China Sea with ASEAN, and can hegemony. The United States was central to the creation of intemational its coercive tactics against Vietnam and the Philippines (which are parties to the South China Sea territorial disputes). And Resists would see the advent institutions such as the Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, of the US "pivot" (also known as "rebalancing") strategy as proof that power and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which played a balancing, rather than institutional engagement, would be the predominant cmcial role in diffusing the norms of economic Liberalism. In Asia, the force shaping the intemational order of Asia. This argument is bolstered by United States served as a benign hegemon providing the collective goods of the view held by many in China that the US pivot is a form of "containment" security against coinmunist expansion and free access to its vast market by of China. Whether these ReaUst claims are exaggerated or not, oil whether Asia's early industrializers, even at a cost to itself (in terms of incurring huge Chinese assertiveness is really anything new,^' they certainly menc careful deficits). The outcome was rapid economic growth in a number of Asian examination and need to be judged gainst the mitigating forces that Liberal economies, which created "performance legitimacy" for the region's auto­ and Constmctivist perspectives clainr to find in Asia today. cratic mlers, thereby stabilizing their domestic politics. At the same time, the region witnessed a growing interdependence resulting from the pursuit of market-driven and market-friendly economic growth strategies, which fur­ LIBERALISM thered the prospects for regional stability and security. Liberal conceptions of the intemational relations of Asia have particularly Traditional Liberalism rests on three pillars: stressed the role of expanding interdependence as a force for peace.^® The 1. Commercial Liberalism, or the view that economic interdependence, interdependence argument was advanced with ever more vigor with the end especially free trade, reduces the prospect of war by increasing its costs of the Cold War and the rise of Chinese economic power. Liberals, both West- to the parties. em and Asian (including many of them within China itself), came to view it 68 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 69

The ReaUst explanation of Asia's Cold War stability, while having the vir­ 2. RepubUcan Liberalism, or the "democratic peace" argument, which tue of consistency, actually contradicts a key element of its foundational assumes that Liberal democracies are more peaceful than autocracies, logic, which sees power balancing as a universal and unexceptionable law of or at least seldom fight one another. intemational politics (even if Reahsts disagree whether it is an automatic law 3. Liberal institutionalism, which focuses on the contribution of intema­ of nature or has to be contrived). The notion of balance of power in Asia as tional organizations in fostering collective security, managing conflict, understood from a Realist perspective is actually a fig leaf for US primacy, and promoting cooperation. or even preponderance. Hence, what should be anathema for a classical Real­ ist^—the discernible absence of balancing against a hegemonic power—has A modem variant of Liberal institutionahsm is neo-Liberal institutional­ acquired the status of an almost normative argument about Asian regional ism. Unlike classical Liberalism, which took a benign view of human nature, order in Realist writings on Asia. This contradiction cannot be explained by neo-Liberal institutionalism accepts the Realist premise that the intemational simply viewing the United States as a benign power which can escape the system is anarchic and that states are the primary, if not the only, actors in logic of balancing. If Realism is trae to one of its foundational logics, then intemational relations. But it disagrees with neo-ReaUsm's dismissal of inter­ any power (benign or otherwise) seeking hegemony should have invited a national institutions. Neo-Liberals maintain that intemational institutions, countervailing coalition. The fact that the United States has not triggered broadly defined—including regimes and formal organizations—can regulate such a coalition is a puzzle that has not been adequately explained. Adding a state behavior and promote cooperation by reducing transaction costs, faciU- qualifier to their causal logic (benign powers are less likely to be balanced tating information' sharing, preventing cheating, and providing avenues for against than mahgn ones) only lends itself to the charge, raised powerfully peaceful resolution of conflicts. by John Vasquez, of ReaUsm as a "degenerative" theoretical paradigm.^ While ReaUsm as a theory of intemational relations is preoccupied with Nonetheless, Realists would see the recent case of Chinese "assertiveness" issues of security and order, Liberalism is more concemed with the nature in the South China Sea and East China Sea as vindication of their arguments and dynamics of the intemational political economy. Liberal perspectives on about the coming instability in Asia. The scenario of a Chinese Monroe Doc­ Asia's intemational relations are no exception. For Liberals, the foundations trine over Asia as imagined by the offensive Realists may appear closer to of the post-war intemational relations of Asia were laid not by the region's realization with China's growing miUtary prowess, its 2009 publication of a distinctive geography or culture, or by security threats facing the region, but new map claiming much of the South China Sea, its foot-dragging in con­ rather by the post-World War n intemational economic system under Ameri­ cluding a binding code of conduct for the South China Sea with ASEAN, and can hegemony. The United States was central to the creation of intemational its coercive tactics against Vietnam and the Philippines (which are parties to the South China Sea territorial disputes). And Resists would see the advent institutions such as the Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, of the US "pivot" (also known as "rebalancing") strategy as proof that power and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which played a balancing, rather than institutional engagement, would be the predominant cmcial role in diffusing the norms of economic Liberalism. In Asia, the force shaping the intemational order of Asia. This argument is bolstered by United States served as a benign hegemon providing the collective goods of the view held by many in China that the US pivot is a form of "containment" security against coinmunist expansion and free access to its vast market by of China. Whether these ReaUst claims are exaggerated or not, oil whether Asia's early industrializers, even at a cost to itself (in terms of incurring huge Chinese assertiveness is really anything new,^' they certainly menc careful deficits). The outcome was rapid economic growth in a number of Asian examination and need to be judged gainst the mitigating forces that Liberal economies, which created "performance legitimacy" for the region's auto­ and Constmctivist perspectives clainr to find in Asia today. cratic mlers, thereby stabilizing their domestic politics. At the same time, the region witnessed a growing interdependence resulting from the pursuit of market-driven and market-friendly economic growth strategies, which fur­ LIBERALISM thered the prospects for regional stability and security. Liberal conceptions of the intemational relations of Asia have particularly Traditional Liberalism rests on three pillars: stressed the role of expanding interdependence as a force for peace.^® The 1. Commercial Liberalism, or the view that economic interdependence, interdependence argument was advanced with ever more vigor with the end especially free trade, reduces the prospect of war by increasing its costs of the Cold War and the rise of Chinese economic power. Liberals, both West- to the parties. em and Asian (including many of them within China itself), came to view it 70 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 71 as a crucial factor in making China's rise peaceful. Yet the argument also invited much criticism, especially, as noted earher, from Reahsts, who often but didn't more people die in the transition to authoritarian mle in that coun­ take the failure of European economic interdependence to prevent the First try in the 1960s than from it? In South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, the Philip­ World War as a severe indictment of the "if goods do not cross borders, sol­ pines, and Thailand, democratic transitions have not caused serious intemal sfrife or interstate conflict. On the contrary, it might be argued that such tran­ diers wiU" logic. Defending against such charges. Liberals stress differences sitions have often yielded a "cooperative peace dividend," whereby the new between nineteenth-century and contemporary patterns of economic interde­ democratic govemments have pursued cooperative strategies toward their tra­ pendence. The former was based on trade and exchange, while the latter is ditional rivals. Examples include Thailand's "battlefields to marketplaces" rooted in trans-national production, which is more "costly to break" and pohcy in the late 1980s that helped to break the stalemate in the Cambodia which has a deeper and more durable impact on national pohtical and security autonomy. conflict, Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy, and Indonesia's ASEAN Security Community initiative. Pakistan's democratic breakdown under Musharraf The argument about economic interdependence in Asia as a force for peace might have led to improved prospects for peace with India, but this was is tested by the recent escalation of the Sino-Japanese rivahy over issues such induced by a strong extemal element, the 9/11 attacks and the US-led war on as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and visits to Yasukuni terror. Democratization fueled demands for Taiwanese independence, thereby Shrine by Japanese leaders, despite nearly $350 billion worth of bilateral challenging East Asian stability, but democratization has also created popu­ trade (in 2012) between the two countries.^' On the other hand, there is a list countervailing pressures on Taiwan's pro-independence govemments clearer sense that economic interdependence in the more important dyad, US- from going over the brink in inviting a Chinese military response. At the very China, would be far costlier for either side to break. That interdependence is least, there is not much evidence from Asia to support the critics' view that underpinned not only by over half a trilhon US dollars in bilateral trade (ris­ democratic transitions intensify the danger of war, or even domestic strife. ing from US$5 bilhon in 1981 to US$536 bilhon in 2012), but also by China The impact of the third element of the Liberal paradigm. Liberal institu­ holding some US$1.3 trillion worth of US debt (in bonds and notes, July tionalism, on Asian IR discourses is both easier and harder to estabhsh. On 2013 figures), amounting to a third of China's 3.5 trilhon worth of foreign the one hand, the growth of regional institutions in Asia allows greater space reserves.^® to Liberal conceptions of order-building through institutions. But the Liberal The second strand of Liberalism—democratic peace theory—has found understanding of how institutions come about and preserve order overlaps very little expression in writings on Asian IR. This need not be surprising considerably with social Constmctivist approaches. Indeed, institutionahsm since historically Asia has had few democracies to test the claims of this the­ (the study of the role of intemational institutions) is no longer a purely Lib­ ory meaningfully. Moreover, Asia's democracies tend to be of the "illiberal eral preserve; in Asia at least, it has been appropriated by Constmctivists who variety," making it more plausible for us to speak of an "illiberal peace" in have both deepened and broadened the understandings of what institutions the region (especially in Southeast Asia), whereby a group of authoritarian are and how they impact on Asia's intemational relations. and senu-authoritanan states avoid conflict by focusing on economic growth, Classical Liberal institutionalism was identified with both collective secur­ performance legitimacy, and sovereignty-preserving regional institutions. ity and, to a lesser extent, regional integration theory, which was closely Critics of democratic peace in the West, such as Jack Snyder and Ed Mans­ derived from early West European integration during the 1950s and 1960s. field, have also questioned the normative claims of democratic peace by high­ But neither type of Liberal institutionahsm has had a regional application in lighting the danger of war associated with democratic transitions. In Asia, the Asia, where there has been no collective security (even if one stretches the Liberal/democratic peace argumenl^has found more critics than adherents, term to include collective defense) or supranational institutions. The newest but in general it has not been an important part of the debate over the region's Liberal institutionalism, neo-Liberal institutionalism, narrowed the scope of intemational relations. investigation into institutional dynamics (how institutions affect state behav­ The neglect is as unfortunate as the criticism of democratic peace is mis­ ior) considerably. It shared the Reahst conception of anarchy while disagree­ placed. Contrary to a popular perception, democratic transitions in Asia have ing with Realism on the importance of institutions as agents of cooperation never led to interstate war and only occasionally to serious domestic instabil­ and change. But it gave an overly utihtarian slant to the performance of insti­ ity. The case of Indonesia post-Suharto might be an exception to the latter. tutions. Institutions may (but not always or necessarily) induce cooperation because they can increase information flows, reduce transaction costs, and 70 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 71 as a crucial factor in making China's rise peaceful. Yet the argument also invited much criticism, especially, as noted earher, from Reahsts, who often but didn't more people die in the transition to authoritarian mle in that coun­ take the failure of European economic interdependence to prevent the First try in the 1960s than from it? In South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, the Philip­ World War as a severe indictment of the "if goods do not cross borders, sol­ pines, and Thailand, democratic transitions have not caused serious intemal sfrife or interstate conflict. On the contrary, it might be argued that such tran­ diers wiU" logic. Defending against such charges. Liberals stress differences sitions have often yielded a "cooperative peace dividend," whereby the new between nineteenth-century and contemporary patterns of economic interde­ democratic govemments have pursued cooperative strategies toward their tra­ pendence. The former was based on trade and exchange, while the latter is ditional rivals. Examples include Thailand's "battlefields to marketplaces" rooted in trans-national production, which is more "costly to break" and pohcy in the late 1980s that helped to break the stalemate in the Cambodia which has a deeper and more durable impact on national pohtical and security autonomy. conflict, Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy, and Indonesia's ASEAN Security Community initiative. Pakistan's democratic breakdown under Musharraf The argument about economic interdependence in Asia as a force for peace might have led to improved prospects for peace with India, but this was is tested by the recent escalation of the Sino-Japanese rivahy over issues such induced by a strong extemal element, the 9/11 attacks and the US-led war on as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and visits to Yasukuni terror. Democratization fueled demands for Taiwanese independence, thereby Shrine by Japanese leaders, despite nearly $350 billion worth of bilateral challenging East Asian stability, but democratization has also created popu­ trade (in 2012) between the two countries.^' On the other hand, there is a list countervailing pressures on Taiwan's pro-independence govemments clearer sense that economic interdependence in the more important dyad, US- from going over the brink in inviting a Chinese military response. At the very China, would be far costlier for either side to break. That interdependence is least, there is not much evidence from Asia to support the critics' view that underpinned not only by over half a trilhon US dollars in bilateral trade (ris­ democratic transitions intensify the danger of war, or even domestic strife. ing from US$5 bilhon in 1981 to US$536 bilhon in 2012), but also by China The impact of the third element of the Liberal paradigm. Liberal institu­ holding some US$1.3 trillion worth of US debt (in bonds and notes, July tionalism, on Asian IR discourses is both easier and harder to estabhsh. On 2013 figures), amounting to a third of China's 3.5 trilhon worth of foreign the one hand, the growth of regional institutions in Asia allows greater space reserves.^® to Liberal conceptions of order-building through institutions. But the Liberal The second strand of Liberalism—democratic peace theory—has found understanding of how institutions come about and preserve order overlaps very little expression in writings on Asian IR. This need not be surprising considerably with social Constmctivist approaches. Indeed, institutionahsm since historically Asia has had few democracies to test the claims of this the­ (the study of the role of intemational institutions) is no longer a purely Lib­ ory meaningfully. Moreover, Asia's democracies tend to be of the "illiberal eral preserve; in Asia at least, it has been appropriated by Constmctivists who variety," making it more plausible for us to speak of an "illiberal peace" in have both deepened and broadened the understandings of what institutions the region (especially in Southeast Asia), whereby a group of authoritarian are and how they impact on Asia's intemational relations. and senu-authoritanan states avoid conflict by focusing on economic growth, Classical Liberal institutionalism was identified with both collective secur­ performance legitimacy, and sovereignty-preserving regional institutions. ity and, to a lesser extent, regional integration theory, which was closely Critics of democratic peace in the West, such as Jack Snyder and Ed Mans­ derived from early West European integration during the 1950s and 1960s. field, have also questioned the normative claims of democratic peace by high­ But neither type of Liberal institutionahsm has had a regional application in lighting the danger of war associated with democratic transitions. In Asia, the Asia, where there has been no collective security (even if one stretches the Liberal/democratic peace argumenl^has found more critics than adherents, term to include collective defense) or supranational institutions. The newest but in general it has not been an important part of the debate over the region's Liberal institutionalism, neo-Liberal institutionalism, narrowed the scope of intemational relations. investigation into institutional dynamics (how institutions affect state behav­ The neglect is as unfortunate as the criticism of democratic peace is mis­ ior) considerably. It shared the Reahst conception of anarchy while disagree­ placed. Contrary to a popular perception, democratic transitions in Asia have ing with Realism on the importance of institutions as agents of cooperation never led to interstate war and only occasionally to serious domestic instabil­ and change. But it gave an overly utihtarian slant to the performance of insti­ ity. The case of Indonesia post-Suharto might be an exception to the latter. tutions. Institutions may (but not always or necessarily) induce cooperation because they can increase information flows, reduce transaction costs, and 72 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 73 prevent cheating. But institutions are not really transformative; their end the new norms of Liberal intemationahsm that challenge state sovereignty product may be an intemational regime rather than a security community especially humanitanan intervention and the responsibility to protect. Third' where the prospect of war is unthinkable. In Asia, APEC has been the one both countries, along with other emerging powers such as Brazil, desire a regime/institution that neo-Liberals have been most attracted to. But even retorm of the existing institutions created and maintained by the Liberal there, and certainly in the case of the more ASEAN-centric institutions (e.g., hegemonic order with a view to acquiring a greater voice in their decision ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Fomm, ASEAN -I- 3, and the East Asia Sum­ making. Until these refonns are earned out, resistance, rather than co-option mit), Constmctivism (with its stress on the culture- and identity-derived may^be a more likely element of their attitude toward existing global mstitu- notion of the "ASEAN Way") has been a more popular mode of analysis than neo-Liberalism or classical Liberalism (collective security and regional integration). In general, then. Liberal perspectives have made little impact on the study CONSTRUCTIVISM of Asia's intemational relations. This need not have been, or remain, the case. Liberalism is more notable as a causal theory of peace, just as Realism For Constmctivists, international relations is shaped not just by material focuses on the causes of war. In a traditionally Realist-dominated field of forces such as power and wealth, but also by subjective and intersubjective Asian intemational relations, and with the region's domestic politics land­ factors—mcludmg ideas, nomis, history, culture, and identity. Constmctiv­ scape marked by a durable (if changing) authoritarian pattern. Liberal con­ ism takes a sociological, rather than "strategic interaction," view of interna­ ceptions of peace and democracy have found few adherents. But as noted tional relations. The interests and identities of states are not pre-ordained or above, the criticisms of Liberal notions of interdependence and democracy given but emerge and change through a process of mutual interactions and on the one hand and peace and stability on the other are often rooted in mis­ sociahzation. Conditions such as anarchy and power politics are not penna- placed historical analogies and selective empirical evidence. Liberalism has a nent or 'organic" features of intemational relations, but are socially con- brighter future in the analysis of Asia's intemational relations as the region's stmcted. State interests and identities are in important part constituted by historical (post-World War II) combination of economic nationalism, security these social stmctures rather than given exogenously to the system by human bilaterahsm, and pohtical authoritarianism unravels and gives way to a more nature or domestic pohtics. Norms, once established, have a life of their own- complex picture where economic Liberalism, security multilateralism, and they create and redefine state interests and approaches. For Constmctivists' democratic pohtics acquire force as determinants of regional order and form intemational institutions exert a deep impact on the behavior of states; they the basis of an "Asian universalism" in IR theory. not only regulate state behavior but also constitute state identities. Through The Liberal perspective on Asian security has taken a new tum with grow­ interaction and sociahzation, states may develop a "collective identity" that ing attention to the role of "rising powers" and the renewed debate over would enable Aem to overcome power pohtics and the security dilemma. "American dechne" in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that centrally Constmctivism is stmgghng to acquire the status of a "theory" of intema­ featured the United States. John Dcenberry has argued that despite the US tional relations comparable to Realism or Liberalism. Some critics view it as decline, the "American-led Liberal hegemonic order" would persist. This a social theory that has no basis in IR. Constmctivists are also accused of argument has special resonance for A^ia, because it is this reason that is the acfang middle-range theory and not pursuing serious empirical research locus of the global power shift. Dcenberry suggests that the rising powers, (although this cnticism would be increasingly hard to sustain as more empiri­ like China and India, that are potential challengers to US hegemony, have cal studies emerge employing a Constmctivist framework); some Constmc­ benefited so much from the Liberal order, including the free trade regime tivists themselves acknowledge that, like rational choice theory, it is more of and intemational institutions, that they would refrain from revisionism and a method than a theory per se.'" would be co-opted into that order.^' Yet this optimism is questionable. Rising But Consttuctivism has helped to answer a number of key puzzles about powers such as China and India were not really "present at the creation" of Asian secunty order. While Constmctivism is essentially a post-Cold War the Liberal order; indeed until their economic reforms (China's since 1979 theory, it has been employed to explain key puzzles of Asian intemational and India's since the early 1990s), they pretty much stayed out of or even relatwns during the Cold War period. Constmctivists stress the role of collec­ opposed it. Second, both India and China are uncomfortable with some of tive identities in the foundation of Asia's post-war intemational relations. In 72 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 73 prevent cheating. But institutions are not really transformative; their end the new norms of Liberal intemationahsm that challenge state sovereignty product may be an intemational regime rather than a security community especially humanitanan intervention and the responsibility to protect. Third' where the prospect of war is unthinkable. In Asia, APEC has been the one both countries, along with other emerging powers such as Brazil, desire a regime/institution that neo-Liberals have been most attracted to. But even retorm of the existing institutions created and maintained by the Liberal there, and certainly in the case of the more ASEAN-centric institutions (e.g., hegemonic order with a view to acquiring a greater voice in their decision ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Fomm, ASEAN -I- 3, and the East Asia Sum­ making. Until these refonns are earned out, resistance, rather than co-option mit), Constmctivism (with its stress on the culture- and identity-derived may^be a more likely element of their attitude toward existing global mstitu- notion of the "ASEAN Way") has been a more popular mode of analysis than neo-Liberalism or classical Liberalism (collective security and regional integration). In general, then. Liberal perspectives have made little impact on the study CONSTRUCTIVISM of Asia's intemational relations. This need not have been, or remain, the case. Liberalism is more notable as a causal theory of peace, just as Realism For Constmctivists, international relations is shaped not just by material focuses on the causes of war. In a traditionally Realist-dominated field of forces such as power and wealth, but also by subjective and intersubjective Asian intemational relations, and with the region's domestic politics land­ factors—mcludmg ideas, nomis, history, culture, and identity. Constmctiv­ scape marked by a durable (if changing) authoritarian pattern. Liberal con­ ism takes a sociological, rather than "strategic interaction," view of interna­ ceptions of peace and democracy have found few adherents. But as noted tional relations. The interests and identities of states are not pre-ordained or above, the criticisms of Liberal notions of interdependence and democracy given but emerge and change through a process of mutual interactions and on the one hand and peace and stability on the other are often rooted in mis­ sociahzation. Conditions such as anarchy and power politics are not penna- placed historical analogies and selective empirical evidence. Liberalism has a nent or 'organic" features of intemational relations, but are socially con- brighter future in the analysis of Asia's intemational relations as the region's stmcted. State interests and identities are in important part constituted by historical (post-World War II) combination of economic nationalism, security these social stmctures rather than given exogenously to the system by human bilaterahsm, and pohtical authoritarianism unravels and gives way to a more nature or domestic pohtics. Norms, once established, have a life of their own- complex picture where economic Liberalism, security multilateralism, and they create and redefine state interests and approaches. For Constmctivists' democratic pohtics acquire force as determinants of regional order and form intemational institutions exert a deep impact on the behavior of states; they the basis of an "Asian universalism" in IR theory. not only regulate state behavior but also constitute state identities. Through The Liberal perspective on Asian security has taken a new tum with grow­ interaction and sociahzation, states may develop a "collective identity" that ing attention to the role of "rising powers" and the renewed debate over would enable Aem to overcome power pohtics and the security dilemma. "American dechne" in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that centrally Constmctivism is stmgghng to acquire the status of a "theory" of intema­ featured the United States. John Dcenberry has argued that despite the US tional relations comparable to Realism or Liberalism. Some critics view it as decline, the "American-led Liberal hegemonic order" would persist. This a social theory that has no basis in IR. Constmctivists are also accused of argument has special resonance for A^ia, because it is this reason that is the acfang middle-range theory and not pursuing serious empirical research locus of the global power shift. Dcenberry suggests that the rising powers, (although this cnticism would be increasingly hard to sustain as more empiri­ like China and India, that are potential challengers to US hegemony, have cal studies emerge employing a Constmctivist framework); some Constmc­ benefited so much from the Liberal order, including the free trade regime tivists themselves acknowledge that, like rational choice theory, it is more of and intemational institutions, that they would refrain from revisionism and a method than a theory per se.'" would be co-opted into that order.^' Yet this optimism is questionable. Rising But Consttuctivism has helped to answer a number of key puzzles about powers such as China and India were not really "present at the creation" of Asian secunty order. While Constmctivism is essentially a post-Cold War the Liberal order; indeed until their economic reforms (China's since 1979 theory, it has been employed to explain key puzzles of Asian intemational and India's since the early 1990s), they pretty much stayed out of or even relatwns during the Cold War period. Constmctivists stress the role of collec­ opposed it. Second, both India and China are uncomfortable with some of tive identities in the foundation of Asia's post-war intemational relations. In Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 75 74 Amitav Acharya an important contribution, Chris Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein explain the and process-centric conception of the latter. That the European-derived crite­ puzzle of "why there is no NATO in Asia" by examining the differing per­ ria should not be used to judge the performance and effectiveness of Asian ceptions of collective identity held by US policy makers in relation to Europe institutions has been a key element in Constructivist arguments about Asian and Asia.'' American policy makers in the early post-war period "saw their regionalism." potential Asian alhes ... as part of an alien and, in important ways, inferior Apart from conceptualizing the distinctive nature and performance of community."'^ This was in marked contrast to their perception of "their Asian regional institutions, which are either dismissed (by Reahsts) or inade­ potential European alhes [who were seen] as relatively equal members of a quately captured (by neo-Liberal or rationahst institutionahsm), Constmctiv­ shared community." Because the United States recognized a greater sense of ists have also stepped into the debate over Asia's emerging and future a transatlantic community than a transpacific one, Europe rather than Asia security order by frontally challenging the "ripe for rivahy" scenario pro­ was seen as a more desirable arena for multilateral engagement—hence there posed famously and controversially by Aaron Friedberg.'® David Kang, not­ was no Asian NATO. While this explanation stresses the collective identity of ing that Realist scenarios such as Friedberg's have failed to materialize, calls an extemal actor, another Constmctivist perspective highlights the normative for examining Asian security from the perspective of Asia's own history and concerns of Asian actors themselves, especially Asia's nationalist leaders, culture. He raises the notion of a hierarchical regional system in Asia at the who delegitimized collective defense by viewing it as a form of great power time of China's imperial dominance and the tributary system. Asia was intervention through thek interactions in the early post-war period, culminat­ peaceful when China was powerful; now, with the (re-)emergence of China ing in the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955." as a regional and global power, Asia could acquire stability through band- Constmctivism also explains why a different form of regionahsm was pos­ wagoning with China (which in his view is occurring)." While for Mears­ sible in Asia, one that was more reflective of the normative and cultural heimer, Europe's "back to the future" means heightened disorder of the type beliefs of the Asian states and their collective identities as newly independent that accompanied the rise of Germany in the late nineteenth century, for states seeking national and regional autonomy. This explains the origins and Kang, Asia's "back to the future" implies a retum to hierarchy and stabihty evolution of ASEAN, Asia's first viable regional grouping. ASEAN's estab- under Chinese preeminence. hshment in 1967, Constmctivists argue, cannot be explained from a Reahst Kang's thesis presents one of the most powerful Constructivist challenges perspective, in the absence of a common extemal threat perception, or from to the Reahst orthodoxy in Asian IR. But his argument has been controver­ a Liberal one, which would assume substantial interdependence among its sial, even among Constmctivists," who have questioned its claim about the members. Neither of these conditions marked the relationship among peaceful nature of the old tributary system, whether China's neighbors are ASEAN's founding members at its birth. Instead, regionalism in Southeast actually bandwagoning with China, and the structural differences between Asia was a product of ideational forces, such as shared norms, and social­ Asian regional systems during the tributary system^—especially the absence ization in search of a common identity. Shared norms—including non­ of other contenders for hegemony that can now be found in the United States, intervention, equality of states, and avoidance of membership in great power Russia, Japan, and India, and the continuing importance of sovereignty to mihtary pacts—were influential in shaping a dehberately weak and relatively both China and its neighbors that militates against hierarchy (see Samuel non-institutionalized form of regionalism that came to be known as the Kim's chapter in this volume). "ASEAN Way." Constmctivism has acquired a substantial following among not only West- Regional institutions have thus been at the core of Constmctivist under­ em but also Asian scholars of Asian IR." A key factor behind this is the standing of Asia's post-war international relations. It is through Asian institu­ growing interest in the study of Asian regionalism with the proliferation of tions that Constmctivists have attempted to project and test their notions regional institutions and dialogues in Asia in the post-Cold War period. In about the role of ideas (for example, common and cooperative security); iden­ China, aside from regional institutions, local discourses about China's tity ("Asian Way," "ASEAN Way," "Asia-Pacific Way"); and socializa­ "peaceful rise" play an important role behind the emergence of Constmctiv­ tion.''* The influence of Constmctivism is especially visible in attempts to ism as the most popular IR theory among younger-generation academics. differentiate between European and Asian regionahsm—stressing the formal, Constmctivism has given an alternative theoretical platform to Chinese schol­ legalistic, and bureaucratic nature of the former and the informal, consensual. ars wary of Realist (power transition) perspectives from the West (as well as Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 75 74 Amitav Acharya an important contribution, Chris Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein explain the and process-centric conception of the latter. That the European-derived crite­ puzzle of "why there is no NATO in Asia" by examining the differing per­ ria should not be used to judge the performance and effectiveness of Asian ceptions of collective identity held by US policy makers in relation to Europe institutions has been a key element in Constructivist arguments about Asian and Asia.'' American policy makers in the early post-war period "saw their regionalism." potential Asian alhes ... as part of an alien and, in important ways, inferior Apart from conceptualizing the distinctive nature and performance of community."'^ This was in marked contrast to their perception of "their Asian regional institutions, which are either dismissed (by Reahsts) or inade­ potential European alhes [who were seen] as relatively equal members of a quately captured (by neo-Liberal or rationahst institutionahsm), Constmctiv­ shared community." Because the United States recognized a greater sense of ists have also stepped into the debate over Asia's emerging and future a transatlantic community than a transpacific one, Europe rather than Asia security order by frontally challenging the "ripe for rivahy" scenario pro­ was seen as a more desirable arena for multilateral engagement—hence there posed famously and controversially by Aaron Friedberg.'® David Kang, not­ was no Asian NATO. While this explanation stresses the collective identity of ing that Realist scenarios such as Friedberg's have failed to materialize, calls an extemal actor, another Constmctivist perspective highlights the normative for examining Asian security from the perspective of Asia's own history and concerns of Asian actors themselves, especially Asia's nationalist leaders, culture. He raises the notion of a hierarchical regional system in Asia at the who delegitimized collective defense by viewing it as a form of great power time of China's imperial dominance and the tributary system. Asia was intervention through thek interactions in the early post-war period, culminat­ peaceful when China was powerful; now, with the (re-)emergence of China ing in the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955." as a regional and global power, Asia could acquire stability through band- Constmctivism also explains why a different form of regionahsm was pos­ wagoning with China (which in his view is occurring)." While for Mears­ sible in Asia, one that was more reflective of the normative and cultural heimer, Europe's "back to the future" means heightened disorder of the type beliefs of the Asian states and their collective identities as newly independent that accompanied the rise of Germany in the late nineteenth century, for states seeking national and regional autonomy. This explains the origins and Kang, Asia's "back to the future" implies a retum to hierarchy and stabihty evolution of ASEAN, Asia's first viable regional grouping. ASEAN's estab- under Chinese preeminence. hshment in 1967, Constmctivists argue, cannot be explained from a Reahst Kang's thesis presents one of the most powerful Constructivist challenges perspective, in the absence of a common extemal threat perception, or from to the Reahst orthodoxy in Asian IR. But his argument has been controver­ a Liberal one, which would assume substantial interdependence among its sial, even among Constmctivists," who have questioned its claim about the members. Neither of these conditions marked the relationship among peaceful nature of the old tributary system, whether China's neighbors are ASEAN's founding members at its birth. Instead, regionalism in Southeast actually bandwagoning with China, and the structural differences between Asia was a product of ideational forces, such as shared norms, and social­ Asian regional systems during the tributary system^—especially the absence ization in search of a common identity. Shared norms—including non­ of other contenders for hegemony that can now be found in the United States, intervention, equality of states, and avoidance of membership in great power Russia, Japan, and India, and the continuing importance of sovereignty to mihtary pacts—were influential in shaping a dehberately weak and relatively both China and its neighbors that militates against hierarchy (see Samuel non-institutionalized form of regionalism that came to be known as the Kim's chapter in this volume). "ASEAN Way." Constmctivism has acquired a substantial following among not only West- Regional institutions have thus been at the core of Constmctivist under­ em but also Asian scholars of Asian IR." A key factor behind this is the standing of Asia's post-war international relations. It is through Asian institu­ growing interest in the study of Asian regionalism with the proliferation of tions that Constmctivists have attempted to project and test their notions regional institutions and dialogues in Asia in the post-Cold War period. In about the role of ideas (for example, common and cooperative security); iden­ China, aside from regional institutions, local discourses about China's tity ("Asian Way," "ASEAN Way," "Asia-Pacific Way"); and socializa­ "peaceful rise" play an important role behind the emergence of Constmctiv­ tion.''* The influence of Constmctivism is especially visible in attempts to ism as the most popular IR theory among younger-generation academics. differentiate between European and Asian regionahsm—stressing the formal, Constmctivism has given an alternative theoretical platform to Chinese schol­ legalistic, and bureaucratic nature of the former and the informal, consensual. ars wary of Realist (power transition) perspectives from the West (as well as 76 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 11

Other parts of Asia), which see the rise of China as a major threat to intema­ on norms at the expense of material forces), and unreformed state-centrism tional stability. (ignoring the role of civil society actors). While critics see the degree of Con­ Constmctivism has advanced the understanding of Asia's international stmctivist optimism about Asia's future to be as misconceived as Realist pes­ relations in important ways. Their focus on the role of ideational forces— simism, in reality, Constmctivist optimism has been more guarded than what such as culture, norms, and identity—enriches our understanding of the the critics portray. More serious are the criticisms of Constmctivism's ten­ sources and determinants of Asian regional order compared to a purely mate­ dency to ignore domestic pohtics (how domestic interactions change identity rialistic perspective. Second, Constmctivists have challenged the uncritical and interests) and its self-serving moral cosmopolitanism (bias toward "uni­ acceptance of the balance of power system posited by Reahst and neo-Realist versal" ideas and global norm entrepreneurs at the expense of preexisting scholars as the basis of Asian regional order by giving greater play to the local beliefs and local agents). Constmctivist perspectives on Asian intema­ possibihty of change and transformation driven by socialization. Third, Con­ tional relations have been criticized on the ground that Asian regional institu­ stmctivist writings have introduced greater theoretical diversity and opened tions have yet to, and are unlikely ever to, become more than "talk shops." space for debate in the field and have helped to hnk the insights of the tradi­ These criticisms are not new but have acquired greater force in recent years tional area studies approach to Southeast Asia to the larger domain of intema­ tional relations theory."" over signs of Chinese assertiveness and other developments. For example, Moreover, perhaps more so than Realism and Liberalism, Constmctivist ARF is yet to move beyond a confidence-building stage to a more action- writings drawing upon the Asian experience have challenged and enriched oriented preventive diplomacy role. The entry of the United States into the the wider theoretical literature on Constmctivism. Kang's invocation of hier­ EAS m 2011 creates the danger of it being undermined by US-China compe­ archy as a defining feature of Asia's once and future interstate relations may tition. The unity of ASEAN shows signs of being frayed by intramural con­ be debatable (especially insofar as the future is concemed), but there is httle flicts, such as the armed clashes in 2011 between Thai and Cambodian forces question that it poses a frontal challenge to Realism and Liberahsm by point­ near the Preah Viehar Temple, and differences over how to deal with Chinese ing to altematives to the Westphalian model. Another example can be found territorial claims. The latter was evident in July 2012 when the meeting of in the hterature on norms, a central part of Constmctivist theory. The first- ASEAN foreign ministers in Cambodia failed for the first time to issue a joint wave hterature on norm diffusion was essentially about "moral cosmopoli­ communique owing to disagreements over the South China Sea conflict. tanism" of Westem transnational advocates, which transformed "bad" local These episodes suggest that sociahzation in Asia remains incomplete, and ideas and practices in the non-Westem world. These writings paid little atten­ that while Asian institutions as claimed by the Constmctivists may be tion to the agency of norm-takers, mainly non-Westem actors, who were rele­ regarded as distinctive, the "ASEAN Way" may no longer work and may gated to being the "passive recipients" of global norms. But the experience need to be reinvented or replaced with a more institutionahzed and legahstic of the diffusion of ideas and norms from an Asian backdrop (classical and form of regional cooperation. modem) suggests that local actors do not simply act as passive recipients but as active players in norm diffusion, and they not only contest, modify, and localize global norms, but also universalize locally constmcted norms. These ANALYTICAL ECLECTICISM insights have had a major impact on Constmctivist theory and have been applied to explain norm diffusion globally and in other regions of the world."" It is quite obvious that the lines separating the three theoretical perspectives But the growing visibility of Constmctivism in Asian IR has invited criti­ on Asian intemational relations have never been neat. As David Shambaugh's cism of the "new Constmctivist orthodoxy." Despite having begun as a dis­ introduction to this volume reminds us, "no single IR theory explains all." senting view, side by side with other critical perspectives on intemational This brings us to the question of what Katzenstein and Sil have called "ana­ relations, Constmctivism is now bracketed as a "mainstream" perspective. lytic eclecticism.""^ The usefulness of analytic eclecticism lies in producing This is ironic, because Constmctivism is also dismissed by some as a fad, a middle-range theoretical arguments as well as in addressing "problems of passing fancy of a handful of intellectuals, which will fade into obscurity as wide scope that, in contrast to more narrowly parsed research puzzles the optimism generated by the end of the Cold War dissipates. Equally uncon­ designed to test theories or fill in gaps within research traditions, incorporate vincing are accusations leveled against Constmctivism for uncritically emu­ more of the complexity and messiness of particular real-world situations.""' lating their rationahst foes, of normative determinism (too much emphasis This is especially relevant to the analyses of "mixed scenarios" of conflict 76 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 11

Other parts of Asia), which see the rise of China as a major threat to intema­ on norms at the expense of material forces), and unreformed state-centrism tional stability. (ignoring the role of civil society actors). While critics see the degree of Con­ Constmctivism has advanced the understanding of Asia's international stmctivist optimism about Asia's future to be as misconceived as Realist pes­ relations in important ways. Their focus on the role of ideational forces— simism, in reality, Constmctivist optimism has been more guarded than what such as culture, norms, and identity—enriches our understanding of the the critics portray. More serious are the criticisms of Constmctivism's ten­ sources and determinants of Asian regional order compared to a purely mate­ dency to ignore domestic pohtics (how domestic interactions change identity rialistic perspective. Second, Constmctivists have challenged the uncritical and interests) and its self-serving moral cosmopolitanism (bias toward "uni­ acceptance of the balance of power system posited by Reahst and neo-Realist versal" ideas and global norm entrepreneurs at the expense of preexisting scholars as the basis of Asian regional order by giving greater play to the local beliefs and local agents). Constmctivist perspectives on Asian intema­ possibihty of change and transformation driven by socialization. Third, Con­ tional relations have been criticized on the ground that Asian regional institu­ stmctivist writings have introduced greater theoretical diversity and opened tions have yet to, and are unlikely ever to, become more than "talk shops." space for debate in the field and have helped to hnk the insights of the tradi­ These criticisms are not new but have acquired greater force in recent years tional area studies approach to Southeast Asia to the larger domain of intema­ tional relations theory."" over signs of Chinese assertiveness and other developments. For example, Moreover, perhaps more so than Realism and Liberalism, Constmctivist ARF is yet to move beyond a confidence-building stage to a more action- writings drawing upon the Asian experience have challenged and enriched oriented preventive diplomacy role. The entry of the United States into the the wider theoretical literature on Constmctivism. Kang's invocation of hier­ EAS m 2011 creates the danger of it being undermined by US-China compe­ archy as a defining feature of Asia's once and future interstate relations may tition. The unity of ASEAN shows signs of being frayed by intramural con­ be debatable (especially insofar as the future is concemed), but there is httle flicts, such as the armed clashes in 2011 between Thai and Cambodian forces question that it poses a frontal challenge to Realism and Liberahsm by point­ near the Preah Viehar Temple, and differences over how to deal with Chinese ing to altematives to the Westphalian model. Another example can be found territorial claims. The latter was evident in July 2012 when the meeting of in the hterature on norms, a central part of Constmctivist theory. The first- ASEAN foreign ministers in Cambodia failed for the first time to issue a joint wave hterature on norm diffusion was essentially about "moral cosmopoli­ communique owing to disagreements over the South China Sea conflict. tanism" of Westem transnational advocates, which transformed "bad" local These episodes suggest that sociahzation in Asia remains incomplete, and ideas and practices in the non-Westem world. These writings paid little atten­ that while Asian institutions as claimed by the Constmctivists may be tion to the agency of norm-takers, mainly non-Westem actors, who were rele­ regarded as distinctive, the "ASEAN Way" may no longer work and may gated to being the "passive recipients" of global norms. But the experience need to be reinvented or replaced with a more institutionahzed and legahstic of the diffusion of ideas and norms from an Asian backdrop (classical and form of regional cooperation. modem) suggests that local actors do not simply act as passive recipients but as active players in norm diffusion, and they not only contest, modify, and localize global norms, but also universalize locally constmcted norms. These ANALYTICAL ECLECTICISM insights have had a major impact on Constmctivist theory and have been applied to explain norm diffusion globally and in other regions of the world."" It is quite obvious that the lines separating the three theoretical perspectives But the growing visibility of Constmctivism in Asian IR has invited criti­ on Asian intemational relations have never been neat. As David Shambaugh's cism of the "new Constmctivist orthodoxy." Despite having begun as a dis­ introduction to this volume reminds us, "no single IR theory explains all." senting view, side by side with other critical perspectives on intemational This brings us to the question of what Katzenstein and Sil have called "ana­ relations, Constmctivism is now bracketed as a "mainstream" perspective. lytic eclecticism.""^ The usefulness of analytic eclecticism lies in producing This is ironic, because Constmctivism is also dismissed by some as a fad, a middle-range theoretical arguments as well as in addressing "problems of passing fancy of a handful of intellectuals, which will fade into obscurity as wide scope that, in contrast to more narrowly parsed research puzzles the optimism generated by the end of the Cold War dissipates. Equally uncon­ designed to test theories or fill in gaps within research traditions, incorporate vincing are accusations leveled against Constmctivism for uncritically emu­ more of the complexity and messiness of particular real-world situations.""' lating their rationahst foes, of normative determinism (too much emphasis This is especially relevant to the analyses of "mixed scenarios" of conflict 78 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 79 and cooperation, which is perhaps more apt for Asia than the extremes of that institutions and norms induce strategic restraint and promote cooperative "ripe for rivahy" and "security community." I would add that such eclecti­ behavior. cism is needed not just between theoretical paradigms but also within them Thus defined, the conditions or the stabihty mechanisms of a CSO draw (intraparadigm and interparadigm). Prospects for Asia's future cannot be from multiple theoretical lenses: defensive Realism (balance of power). Lib­ ascertained from tightly held paradigmatic frameworks, but from synthesis eralism (especially economic interdependence and institutions), and Con­ between and within them. stmctivism (socialization and cooperative security norms), thereby creating This chapter has suggested a considerable overlap between Liberalism and an eclectic framework for the study of the Asian security order. The stabihty Constructivism (which in tum has significant English School foundations), mechanisms of a CSO can be mutually reinforcing. Balancing prevents hege­ especially when it comes to the study of Asian regional institutions and to monic orders, whether that of a single power, duopolies, or concerts. Elite countering Realist pessimism about Asia's future intemational order. But the restraint fosters shared leadership in multilateral institutions. These, along Realist-favored notion of balance of power can also be seen as having its with interdependence, encourage "soft balancing" and discourage outright basis in normative and social foundations, as evident in notions such as "soft containment approaches that might aggravate the security dilemma and rival­ balancing" or "institutional balancing." ries. These mechanisms do not make war "unthinkable," but they do inhibit The idea of a Consociational Security Order developed by this author rep­ actors from engaging in behavior that might lead to a system collapse. Com­ resents an example of the application of analytical eclecticism to Asian secur­ petition is controlled, and outright war is avoided for the sake of common ity."" "A consociational security order (CSO) is a relationship of mutual survival. accommodation among unequal and culturally diverse groups that preserves The CSO framework offers a novel and dynamic approach to conflict and each group's relative autonomy and prevents the hegemony of any particular stability in Asia. Going beyond existing perspectives that rely on single theo­ group/s.""^ The emergence of a CSO depends on four conditions: interdepen­ retical lenses, it captures a wider range of determinants of Asia's security. It dence, equilibrium, elite restraint, and institutions and norms. First, interde­ emphasizes the regional context of the implications of China's rise instead of pendence among states helps to offset the centrifugal elements of cultural focusing on great power (especially US-China) relationships, as in many difference and animosity within consociations and contributes to the impera­ existing perspectives on the issue. It represents a mixed scenario of conflict tive of common survival and well-being. This view accords with Liberal and stabihty, presenting an altemative between the extremes of anarchy that theory, which has for long pointed to the pacific effects of economic inter­ represent Europe's past as Asia's future on the one hand and a security com­ dependence. Second, stabihty in a consociation comes from equilibrium. munity that renders war unthinkable on the other (Europe's present as Asia's Unlike offensive Reahsts who argue that states go for "all they can get," with future). While not necessarily predictive, it offers an analytic device for eval­ hegemony as their ultimate goal, defensive Reahsts maintain that states are uating trends and directions in Asian security by identifying the conditions— generally satisfied with the status quo if their own security is not challenged interdependence, equilibrium, institutions, and elite restraint—that can and thus concentrate on maintaining a balance of power. Groups in a CSO produce order (understood as the absence of system-destroying war rather engage in coalitional politics to deny hegemony to any particular group. This than of small-scale conflicts), and their absence, disorder. While no single assumption echoes defensive Realism. Third, a CSO relies on institutions, condition is sufficient by itself to ensure order, together they may go a long although consociational institutions promote the softer norms of cooperative way in preventing catastrophic conflict in Asia. security rather than the conventional forms of collective security or collective While the debate between Reahst "pessimism" and Liberal/Constmctivist defense. CoUective security and collective defense systems are usuaUy geared "optimism" about the future of Asia's security order remains far from set­ to deterring and punishing aggression ("security against" an adversary) and tled, it should not be forgotten that debates over Asian intemational relations require hard power or mihtary action that only the great powers can provide. can also be intraparadigmatic, such as the Kang-Acharya Constmctivist By contrast, cooperative security stresses reassurance ("security with" a debate and between offensive and defensive Realists. Moreover, the debate competitor or adversary) and relies primarily on conflict management (both over Asia's future security order is less about whether it will feature some within a consociation and with outsiders), confidence-building measures, and type of cooperative mechanism (rather than approximating a pure Hobbesian political-diplomatic norms. FinaUy, a CSO reUes on "elite restraint," which anarchy) than which type of cooperation/accommodation (concert, commu­ borrows from both Liberal institutionahsm and Constmctivism, which argue nity, soft balancing, or hierarchy) will be feasible. And in this context, while 78 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 79 and cooperation, which is perhaps more apt for Asia than the extremes of that institutions and norms induce strategic restraint and promote cooperative "ripe for rivahy" and "security community." I would add that such eclecti­ behavior. cism is needed not just between theoretical paradigms but also within them Thus defined, the conditions or the stabihty mechanisms of a CSO draw (intraparadigm and interparadigm). Prospects for Asia's future cannot be from multiple theoretical lenses: defensive Realism (balance of power). Lib­ ascertained from tightly held paradigmatic frameworks, but from synthesis eralism (especially economic interdependence and institutions), and Con­ between and within them. stmctivism (socialization and cooperative security norms), thereby creating This chapter has suggested a considerable overlap between Liberalism and an eclectic framework for the study of the Asian security order. The stabihty Constructivism (which in tum has significant English School foundations), mechanisms of a CSO can be mutually reinforcing. Balancing prevents hege­ especially when it comes to the study of Asian regional institutions and to monic orders, whether that of a single power, duopolies, or concerts. Elite countering Realist pessimism about Asia's future intemational order. But the restraint fosters shared leadership in multilateral institutions. These, along Realist-favored notion of balance of power can also be seen as having its with interdependence, encourage "soft balancing" and discourage outright basis in normative and social foundations, as evident in notions such as "soft containment approaches that might aggravate the security dilemma and rival­ balancing" or "institutional balancing." ries. These mechanisms do not make war "unthinkable," but they do inhibit The idea of a Consociational Security Order developed by this author rep­ actors from engaging in behavior that might lead to a system collapse. Com­ resents an example of the application of analytical eclecticism to Asian secur­ petition is controlled, and outright war is avoided for the sake of common ity."" "A consociational security order (CSO) is a relationship of mutual survival. accommodation among unequal and culturally diverse groups that preserves The CSO framework offers a novel and dynamic approach to conflict and each group's relative autonomy and prevents the hegemony of any particular stability in Asia. Going beyond existing perspectives that rely on single theo­ group/s.""^ The emergence of a CSO depends on four conditions: interdepen­ retical lenses, it captures a wider range of determinants of Asia's security. It dence, equilibrium, elite restraint, and institutions and norms. First, interde­ emphasizes the regional context of the implications of China's rise instead of pendence among states helps to offset the centrifugal elements of cultural focusing on great power (especially US-China) relationships, as in many difference and animosity within consociations and contributes to the impera­ existing perspectives on the issue. It represents a mixed scenario of conflict tive of common survival and well-being. This view accords with Liberal and stabihty, presenting an altemative between the extremes of anarchy that theory, which has for long pointed to the pacific effects of economic inter­ represent Europe's past as Asia's future on the one hand and a security com­ dependence. Second, stabihty in a consociation comes from equilibrium. munity that renders war unthinkable on the other (Europe's present as Asia's Unlike offensive Reahsts who argue that states go for "all they can get," with future). While not necessarily predictive, it offers an analytic device for eval­ hegemony as their ultimate goal, defensive Reahsts maintain that states are uating trends and directions in Asian security by identifying the conditions— generally satisfied with the status quo if their own security is not challenged interdependence, equilibrium, institutions, and elite restraint—that can and thus concentrate on maintaining a balance of power. Groups in a CSO produce order (understood as the absence of system-destroying war rather engage in coalitional politics to deny hegemony to any particular group. This than of small-scale conflicts), and their absence, disorder. While no single assumption echoes defensive Realism. Third, a CSO relies on institutions, condition is sufficient by itself to ensure order, together they may go a long although consociational institutions promote the softer norms of cooperative way in preventing catastrophic conflict in Asia. security rather than the conventional forms of collective security or collective While the debate between Reahst "pessimism" and Liberal/Constmctivist defense. CoUective security and collective defense systems are usuaUy geared "optimism" about the future of Asia's security order remains far from set­ to deterring and punishing aggression ("security against" an adversary) and tled, it should not be forgotten that debates over Asian intemational relations require hard power or mihtary action that only the great powers can provide. can also be intraparadigmatic, such as the Kang-Acharya Constmctivist By contrast, cooperative security stresses reassurance ("security with" a debate and between offensive and defensive Realists. Moreover, the debate competitor or adversary) and relies primarily on conflict management (both over Asia's future security order is less about whether it will feature some within a consociation and with outsiders), confidence-building measures, and type of cooperative mechanism (rather than approximating a pure Hobbesian political-diplomatic norms. FinaUy, a CSO reUes on "elite restraint," which anarchy) than which type of cooperation/accommodation (concert, commu­ borrows from both Liberal institutionahsm and Constmctivism, which argue nity, soft balancing, or hierarchy) will be feasible. And in this context, while 80 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 81 traditional conceptions of regional order in Asia revolved around the relation­ have been neglected thus far, might assume greater prominence, but perhaps ship of competition and accommodation among the great powers, how the not as a justification for the persistence of the American-led Liberal Hege­ great powers relate to weaker states has become especially crucial for a monic Order. region in which the weaker states drive regional cooperation and institution More importantly, with the growing interest in theorizing Asia's intema­ building. tional relations, the debate over the relevance of Westem theory to analyze Asia has intensified. Perspectives that view IR theory as a fundamentally eth­ nocentric enterprise that does a poor job of analyzing Asian IR are becoming CONCLUSION: commonplace in Asian writings on the region's IR. And this view is shared FROM EXCEPTIONALISM TO UNIVERSALISM by a number of leading Westem scholars. This debate has also led to a search for an "Asian IR theory," akin to the English School or the Copenhagen IR theory is increasingly used in classrooms and writings on Asian IR in School. But there is little movement in the direction of an Asian IR theory in Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Southeast and South the regional sense. This is not surprising, given Asia's sub-regional and Asia. It should be noted that a good deal of "theory" that might be helpful national differences."® There is a great scope for national perspectives, even in broadening the scope of IR remains "hidden" due to language barriers, in a highly contested manner."' For example, many Chinese scholars are lack of resources in Asian institutions, and the dominance of Westem schol­ attempting to develop a "Chinese School of IR," derived either from Chinese arly and policy outlets. But this is changing with the infusion of new scholar­ historical practices, such as the Warring States Period and the tributary sys­ ship and the broadening intellectual parameters of theoretical discourses. tem, or from the metaphysical Chinese worldview."' As elsewhere and in other points of history, theoretical arguments and An equally vocal group of Chinese scholars rejects this approach, insisting claims about Asian IR closely approximate shifts in global and regional inter­ that IR theory must have a universal frame. According to this group, attempts national relations. The growing popularity of Liberalism and Constmctivism to develop IR theory should be guided by "scientific" universalism, rather in Asian IR is thus closely related to the end of the Cold War and the emer­ than cultural specificity."® Going by this immensely helpful and exciting gence of new regional institutions in Asia. While events drive theoretical debate, the chahenge, then, is to broaden the horizons of existing IR theory shifts, to some extent theories have offered rationahzation of event-driven by including the Asian experience, rather than either to reject IR theory or to policy perspectives and approaches. Thus, Sino-US tensions over Taiwan and develop a Chinese or Asian School that will better capture and explain other East Asian security issues have given a fresh impetus for Reahst pessi­ China's or Asia's unique historical experience, but have httle relevance else­ mism, while the end of the Cambodia conflict, the South China Sea Code of where, even though such universalism would still require deeper investiga­ Conduct, and the emergence of the ARF and East Asia Summit (EAS) have tions into Asian history. given a fillip to Liberal and Constmctivist optimism. There is thus a growing space for an Asian universalism in IR theory. I use What next in the theoretical evolution of Asian IR studies? Realism retains the term "Asian universalism" since it is in direct juxtaposition to the Asian a dominant, if no longer hegemonic, position. Realist arguments such as exceptionalism found in the extreme form in the notion of Asian values, an "power transition," "back to the future," "ripe for rivalry," and "offensive Asian conception of human rights, and Asian democracy, or in a more moder­ Reahsm" have often provided the starting point of debate over Asia's emerg­ ate strain in claims about an Asian form of capitalism, or an Asian mode of ing and future intemational order. But newer approaches, especially Liberal globalization. Asian exceptionalism, especially in its extreme form, refers to and Constmctivist perspectives, are enriching academic and policy debates the tendency to view Asia as a unique and relatively homogenous entity that on Asian IR. Realism, especially eri^pirical Realism (i.e., academic and policy rejects ideas, such as human rights and democracy, that lay a claim to univer­ writings that reflect the philosophical assumptions of Realism without being sality but which are in reality constmcted and exported by the West. Such self-consciously framed in theoretical jargon), will remain important, but so ideas are to be contested because of theur lack of fit with local cultural, histor­ will Constmctivism. While Constmctivism has been criticized as a fad, it is ical, and pohtical realities in Asia. Asian universalism by contrast refers to likely to retain a central place in writings on Asian IR because its focus on the fit, often constmcted by local idea entrepreneurs, between extemal and issues of culture and identity resonate well with Asian thinkers and writers. Asian ideas and practices with a view to giving a wider dissemination to the And Liberal perspectives, such as democratic peace and institutions, which latter. This involves the simultaneous reconstmction of outside ideas in 80 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 81 traditional conceptions of regional order in Asia revolved around the relation­ have been neglected thus far, might assume greater prominence, but perhaps ship of competition and accommodation among the great powers, how the not as a justification for the persistence of the American-led Liberal Hege­ great powers relate to weaker states has become especially crucial for a monic Order. region in which the weaker states drive regional cooperation and institution More importantly, with the growing interest in theorizing Asia's intema­ building. tional relations, the debate over the relevance of Westem theory to analyze Asia has intensified. Perspectives that view IR theory as a fundamentally eth­ nocentric enterprise that does a poor job of analyzing Asian IR are becoming CONCLUSION: commonplace in Asian writings on the region's IR. And this view is shared FROM EXCEPTIONALISM TO UNIVERSALISM by a number of leading Westem scholars. This debate has also led to a search for an "Asian IR theory," akin to the English School or the Copenhagen IR theory is increasingly used in classrooms and writings on Asian IR in School. But there is little movement in the direction of an Asian IR theory in Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Southeast and South the regional sense. This is not surprising, given Asia's sub-regional and Asia. It should be noted that a good deal of "theory" that might be helpful national differences."® There is a great scope for national perspectives, even in broadening the scope of IR remains "hidden" due to language barriers, in a highly contested manner."' For example, many Chinese scholars are lack of resources in Asian institutions, and the dominance of Westem schol­ attempting to develop a "Chinese School of IR," derived either from Chinese arly and policy outlets. But this is changing with the infusion of new scholar­ historical practices, such as the Warring States Period and the tributary sys­ ship and the broadening intellectual parameters of theoretical discourses. tem, or from the metaphysical Chinese worldview."' As elsewhere and in other points of history, theoretical arguments and An equally vocal group of Chinese scholars rejects this approach, insisting claims about Asian IR closely approximate shifts in global and regional inter­ that IR theory must have a universal frame. According to this group, attempts national relations. The growing popularity of Liberalism and Constmctivism to develop IR theory should be guided by "scientific" universalism, rather in Asian IR is thus closely related to the end of the Cold War and the emer­ than cultural specificity."® Going by this immensely helpful and exciting gence of new regional institutions in Asia. While events drive theoretical debate, the chahenge, then, is to broaden the horizons of existing IR theory shifts, to some extent theories have offered rationahzation of event-driven by including the Asian experience, rather than either to reject IR theory or to policy perspectives and approaches. Thus, Sino-US tensions over Taiwan and develop a Chinese or Asian School that will better capture and explain other East Asian security issues have given a fresh impetus for Reahst pessi­ China's or Asia's unique historical experience, but have httle relevance else­ mism, while the end of the Cambodia conflict, the South China Sea Code of where, even though such universalism would still require deeper investiga­ Conduct, and the emergence of the ARF and East Asia Summit (EAS) have tions into Asian history. given a fillip to Liberal and Constmctivist optimism. There is thus a growing space for an Asian universalism in IR theory. I use What next in the theoretical evolution of Asian IR studies? Realism retains the term "Asian universalism" since it is in direct juxtaposition to the Asian a dominant, if no longer hegemonic, position. Realist arguments such as exceptionalism found in the extreme form in the notion of Asian values, an "power transition," "back to the future," "ripe for rivalry," and "offensive Asian conception of human rights, and Asian democracy, or in a more moder­ Reahsm" have often provided the starting point of debate over Asia's emerg­ ate strain in claims about an Asian form of capitalism, or an Asian mode of ing and future intemational order. But newer approaches, especially Liberal globalization. Asian exceptionalism, especially in its extreme form, refers to and Constmctivist perspectives, are enriching academic and policy debates the tendency to view Asia as a unique and relatively homogenous entity that on Asian IR. Realism, especially eri^pirical Realism (i.e., academic and policy rejects ideas, such as human rights and democracy, that lay a claim to univer­ writings that reflect the philosophical assumptions of Realism without being sality but which are in reality constmcted and exported by the West. Such self-consciously framed in theoretical jargon), will remain important, but so ideas are to be contested because of theur lack of fit with local cultural, histor­ will Constmctivism. While Constmctivism has been criticized as a fad, it is ical, and pohtical realities in Asia. Asian universalism by contrast refers to likely to retain a central place in writings on Asian IR because its focus on the fit, often constmcted by local idea entrepreneurs, between extemal and issues of culture and identity resonate well with Asian thinkers and writers. Asian ideas and practices with a view to giving a wider dissemination to the And Liberal perspectives, such as democratic peace and institutions, which latter. This involves the simultaneous reconstmction of outside ideas in Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 82 Amitav Acharya 83 accordance with local behefs and practices and the transmission and diffusion distinction between what is European and what is Asian, theoretical perspec­ of preexisting and localized forms of knowledge beyond the region. Whereas tives on Asian regionahsm should explore commonahties that are quite sub­ Asian exceptionalism is relevant only in analyzing and explaining local pat­ stantial and would constitute the core of a universal corpus of knowledge tems of IR, Asian universalism would use local knowledge to understand and about regionalism in world politics.®" A final word of this chapter concems the question whether die theoretical explain both local and foreign IR. The impetus for Asian universalism comes from several sources. The first writings on Asia would challenge or enrich the broader corpus of IR theory, is a historical shift from economic nationalism, security bilateralism, and which has been derived from Westem or transatlantic ideas, experiences, and authoritarian politics in the post-war period to economic interdependence, writings. As stated, I am not a fan of Asian exceptionalism. Nor do I think security multilaterahsm, and democratic politics of the post-Cold War era. theories derived from Asia would entirely displace the existing corpus of IR This shift is far from linear, but it is occurring and having a substantial impact theory. But I also do not think existing IR theories are sufficient, as Ikenberry and Mastanduno have argued, with minor adjustments, to explain the major on studies of Asian IR. This need not be seen as a purely or mainly Liberal developments in the intemational relations of Asia. And I am more confident trend, as it would be mediated by local historical, cultural, and ideational than Johnston®® appears to be about the possibihty of Asia offering a robust frameworks that have their roots in local conceptions of power politics, utUi- challenge to many deeply held assumptions of the three mainstream IR theo­ tarianism, and normative transformation. This shift challenges the distinction ries, namely, Realism, Liberalism, and Constmctivism. Johnston sets the bar between Asian and universal knowledge claims and expands the scope for too high by holding that for theoretical contributions to IR focusing on Asia grafting outside theoretical concepts onto Asian local discourses. (whether by Asians or non-Asians) to succeed, they would need to "resolve The region also abounds in historical forms of local knowledge with a uni­ major controversies, lead to breakthroughs, and drive theory development." versal reach. Examples include the ideas of Asian thinkers such as Rabindra- He is not sure if this will ever happen. While I cannot be certain if Asia can nath Tagore's critique of nationalism, Nehm's neutralism and non-alignment, resolve major controversies (especially those that originally emerged in West­ and Gandhi's satyagraha.'" There are many Japanese writings that were em contexts, often with limited relevance for Asia), I could see the possibihty developed either in association with, or in reaction against, Westem concepts of theoretical contributions to IR focusing on Asia in time producing break­ of nationalism, intemationahsm, and intemational order.®' Although some of throughs and driving theory development, especially by offering new con­ these Indian and Japanese contributions were either critiques of Westem ideas cepts and approaches drawing on Asian ideas, history, and practice.®® This is (like nationahsm) or were borrowed forms of Westem ideas (such as Gan­ already evident in works on Asian regionahsm, conceptualizations of histori­ dhi's borrowing of passive resistance), they were sufficiendy infused widi cal interstate systems (Kang), and the aforementioned work on norm diffu­ local content to be deemed a form of local knowledge. Moreover, the out­ sion. come of this interaction between Westem and Asian ideas was constitutive While the distinctive aspects of Asia's history, ideas, and approaches will in the sense that it redefined both the Westem ideas and the local identities. condition the way Westem theoretical ideas are understood and make their And while the localization of Westem ideas might have been originally impact, elements of the former will find theur way into a wider arena, influ­ intended for domestic or regional audiences, the resulting concepts and prac­ encing global discourses about intemational order in the twenty-first century. tices did possess a wider conceptual frame to have relevance beyond Asia. The challenge for theoretical writings on Asian IR is to reflect on and concep­ Such ideas deserve a place alongside existing theories of IR. Historical tualize this dynamic, whereby scholars do not stop at testing Westem con­ pattems of interstate and intercivihzational relations in Asia, including the cepts and theories in the Asian context, but generalize from the latter in order tributary system, also have their place if they can be conceptualized in a man­ to enrich a hitherto Westem-centric IR theory.®' ner that would extend their analytical utility and normative purpose (present in any theory) beyond Chma or East Asia.'^ Asian practices of intemational relations are another rich source of Asian NOTES universalism in IR dieory." Asian regionalism, which manages the balance of power and expands die potential for a regional community, also provides I wish to thank Muthiah Alagappa, David Shambaugh, and Michael Yahuda for their a good potential avenue for such universalism. Instead of drawing a sharp helpful suggestions for this chapter. Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 82 Amitav Acharya 83 accordance with local behefs and practices and the transmission and diffusion distinction between what is European and what is Asian, theoretical perspec­ of preexisting and localized forms of knowledge beyond the region. Whereas tives on Asian regionahsm should explore commonahties that are quite sub­ Asian exceptionalism is relevant only in analyzing and explaining local pat­ stantial and would constitute the core of a universal corpus of knowledge tems of IR, Asian universalism would use local knowledge to understand and about regionalism in world politics.®" A final word of this chapter concems the question whether die theoretical explain both local and foreign IR. The impetus for Asian universalism comes from several sources. The first writings on Asia would challenge or enrich the broader corpus of IR theory, is a historical shift from economic nationalism, security bilateralism, and which has been derived from Westem or transatlantic ideas, experiences, and authoritarian politics in the post-war period to economic interdependence, writings. As stated, I am not a fan of Asian exceptionalism. Nor do I think security multilaterahsm, and democratic politics of the post-Cold War era. theories derived from Asia would entirely displace the existing corpus of IR This shift is far from linear, but it is occurring and having a substantial impact theory. But I also do not think existing IR theories are sufficient, as Ikenberry and Mastanduno have argued, with minor adjustments, to explain the major on studies of Asian IR. This need not be seen as a purely or mainly Liberal developments in the intemational relations of Asia. And I am more confident trend, as it would be mediated by local historical, cultural, and ideational than Johnston®® appears to be about the possibihty of Asia offering a robust frameworks that have their roots in local conceptions of power politics, utUi- challenge to many deeply held assumptions of the three mainstream IR theo­ tarianism, and normative transformation. This shift challenges the distinction ries, namely, Realism, Liberalism, and Constmctivism. Johnston sets the bar between Asian and universal knowledge claims and expands the scope for too high by holding that for theoretical contributions to IR focusing on Asia grafting outside theoretical concepts onto Asian local discourses. (whether by Asians or non-Asians) to succeed, they would need to "resolve The region also abounds in historical forms of local knowledge with a uni­ major controversies, lead to breakthroughs, and drive theory development." versal reach. Examples include the ideas of Asian thinkers such as Rabindra- He is not sure if this will ever happen. While I cannot be certain if Asia can nath Tagore's critique of nationalism, Nehm's neutralism and non-alignment, resolve major controversies (especially those that originally emerged in West­ and Gandhi's satyagraha.'" There are many Japanese writings that were em contexts, often with limited relevance for Asia), I could see the possibihty developed either in association with, or in reaction against, Westem concepts of theoretical contributions to IR focusing on Asia in time producing break­ of nationalism, intemationahsm, and intemational order.®' Although some of throughs and driving theory development, especially by offering new con­ these Indian and Japanese contributions were either critiques of Westem ideas cepts and approaches drawing on Asian ideas, history, and practice.®® This is (like nationahsm) or were borrowed forms of Westem ideas (such as Gan­ already evident in works on Asian regionahsm, conceptualizations of histori­ dhi's borrowing of passive resistance), they were sufficiendy infused widi cal interstate systems (Kang), and the aforementioned work on norm diffu­ local content to be deemed a form of local knowledge. Moreover, the out­ sion. come of this interaction between Westem and Asian ideas was constitutive While the distinctive aspects of Asia's history, ideas, and approaches will in the sense that it redefined both the Westem ideas and the local identities. condition the way Westem theoretical ideas are understood and make their And while the localization of Westem ideas might have been originally impact, elements of the former will find theur way into a wider arena, influ­ intended for domestic or regional audiences, the resulting concepts and prac­ encing global discourses about intemational order in the twenty-first century. tices did possess a wider conceptual frame to have relevance beyond Asia. The challenge for theoretical writings on Asian IR is to reflect on and concep­ Such ideas deserve a place alongside existing theories of IR. Historical tualize this dynamic, whereby scholars do not stop at testing Westem con­ pattems of interstate and intercivihzational relations in Asia, including the cepts and theories in the Asian context, but generalize from the latter in order tributary system, also have their place if they can be conceptualized in a man­ to enrich a hitherto Westem-centric IR theory.®' ner that would extend their analytical utility and normative purpose (present in any theory) beyond Chma or East Asia.'^ Asian practices of intemational relations are another rich source of Asian NOTES universalism in IR dieory." Asian regionalism, which manages the balance of power and expands die potential for a regional community, also provides I wish to thank Muthiah Alagappa, David Shambaugh, and Michael Yahuda for their a good potential avenue for such universalism. Instead of drawing a sharp helpful suggestions for this chapter. Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 84 Amitav Acharya 85

1. In this chapter, I use the term theory broadly, focusing on grand theories that have unjust development trajectory. An important recent book applying critical theories of IR paradigmatic status, such as Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. The term theory to Asia is Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald, eds.. Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific. has many different meanings. The American understanding of theory tends to have a (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). Critical IR theory includes, among oth­ social-scientific bias, whereby the general assumptions of a theory must be translated into ers, post-modernism, post-structaralism, Marxism/neo-Marxism, Gramscian approaches, causal propositions that can be rigorously tested and yield some measure of prediction. feminism, and post-colonialism, often in some combination (e.g., post-colonial feminism). Europeans view theory more loosely as any attempt to systematically organize data, struc­ 9. For two well-known perspectives, see Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power ture questions, and establish a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and cate­ in Asia, Adelphi Paper 295 (London: Intemational Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995); gories. Writings on Asian IR remain atheoretical in either sense, but more so in terms of Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Fomm, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: Intemational Instimte for Strategic Studies, 1996). the American understanding than the European one. For further discussion, see Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why Is There No Non-Westem IR Theory: An Introduction," 10. Lee has repeatedly asserted his faith in the balance of power, a typical example being his comments in Canberra in 2007 that "the golden strand [in Australia-Singapore Intemational Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7 (October 2007): 287-312. The special issue relations] is our common strategic view that the present strategic balance in the Asia- also explores the reasons for the lack of interest in theory in the Asian IR literature, one Pacific, with the U.S. as the preeminent power, provides stability and security that enables of the main factors being the dominance of area specialists in the field. all to develop and grow in peace." See "S'pore and Australia Share Common Strategic 2. In visits to China, the author found widespread evidence of a major growth of inter­ View: MM," Straits Times, March 29, 2007, http;//app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp? est in theory among Chinese scholars of intemational relations. This is true not only of View, 6860 (accessed January 25, 2008). "MM" refers to "Minister Mentor." universities such as Beijing, Tsinghua, and Fudan, but also of think tanks such as the Insti­ 11. For a theoretical discussion of Lee's views, see Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, tute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which "Betwixt Balance and Community: America, ASEAN, and the Security of Southeast publishes the leading IR journal of China: World Economics and Politics. It is published Asia," Intemational Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005). For a recent restatement in Chinese. Tsinghua University's Instimte of Intemational Studies has also launched an of Lee's position, see "Excerpts from an Interview with Lee Kuan Yew," International English-language journal published by Oxford University Press, titled Chinese Journal of Herald Tribune, August 29, 2007, http://www.iht.eom/articles/2007/08/29/asia/lee-ex Intemational Relations. For an up-to-date survey of the IR field in China today, see David cerpts.php?page= 1 (accessed September 23, 2007). Shambaugh, "Intemational Relations Studies in China: History, Trends, and Prospects, 12. "Toward a New Balance of Power," Time, September 22, 1975, http://www.time Intemational Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, no. 3 (September 2011): 339-72. .com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,917875,00.html (accessed September 23, 2007). 3. Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: Intemational Relations," Dae­ 13. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of the Bipolar World," Daedalus 93 (Summer dalus 106, no. 3 (1977): 41-60; Ole Waever, "The Sociology of a Not So Intemational 1964): 907; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of Intemational Politics (Reading, MA: Addison- Discipline: American and European Developments in Intemational Relations, Intema­ Wesley, 1979), 171; John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Fumre: Instability in Europe after tional Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 687—727; Robert A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jar- the Cold War," Intemational Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-55. A contrary view vis, eds., Intemational Relations—Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in that stresses the stabilizing potential of multipolarity is Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Intemational Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and Intemational Stability," World Politics 16, no. 3 4. David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," (April 1964): 390-406. Intemational Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57-85. 14. For a discussion and rebuttal of this view in the context of the Third World, see 5. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspec­ Amitav Acharya, "Beyond Anarchy; Third World Instability and Intemational Order after tive," in Network Power: Japan and Asia, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi the Cold War," in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie Neu­ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 5. mann (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 159-211. 6. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, "The United States and Stability in 15. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, East Asia," in Intemational Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry 2001), 41. and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 421-22. 16. Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, 53-54. For a critique of Leifer's view, see 7. Stephen M. Walt, "Intemational Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Amitav Acharya, "Do Norms and Identity Matter? Community and Power in Southeast Policy 110 (Spring 1998): 29-46. \ Asia's Regional Order," Pacific Review 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 95-118. 8. This leaves out critical IR theories such as Marxism, post-modem/post-structural, 17. This shows that Realism is not a homogenous theory as its critics sometimes por­ post-colonial, and feminist perspectives. Some argue that critical theories have been con­ tray and that important differences exist among Realists insofar as the nature and purpose cemed mostly with critiquing their "mainstream" rivals, especially Realism and Liberal­ of intemational institutions are concemed. It also shows a disjuncture between disciplin­ ism, and have made little attempt to offer an altemative conception or trajectory of ary neo-Realist theory and Realist perspectives on Asian institutions. Mearsheimer, a neo- regional order. But the insights of critical perspectives are especially crucial in under­ Realist (but not an Asian specialist), viewed intemational institutions as pawns in the standing and analyzing the impact of globalization on Asian IR, the limitations and abuses hands of great powers. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of Intemational Institu­ of the sovereign state system and the national security paradigm, and Asia's uneven and tions," Intemational Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-1995): 5-49. Michael Leifer took a Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 84 Amitav Acharya 85

1. In this chapter, I use the term theory broadly, focusing on grand theories that have unjust development trajectory. An important recent book applying critical theories of IR paradigmatic status, such as Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism. The term theory to Asia is Anthony Burke and Matt McDonald, eds.. Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific. has many different meanings. The American understanding of theory tends to have a (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007). Critical IR theory includes, among oth­ social-scientific bias, whereby the general assumptions of a theory must be translated into ers, post-modernism, post-structaralism, Marxism/neo-Marxism, Gramscian approaches, causal propositions that can be rigorously tested and yield some measure of prediction. feminism, and post-colonialism, often in some combination (e.g., post-colonial feminism). Europeans view theory more loosely as any attempt to systematically organize data, struc­ 9. For two well-known perspectives, see Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power ture questions, and establish a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and cate­ in Asia, Adelphi Paper 295 (London: Intemational Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995); gories. Writings on Asian IR remain atheoretical in either sense, but more so in terms of Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Fomm, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: Intemational Instimte for Strategic Studies, 1996). the American understanding than the European one. For further discussion, see Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why Is There No Non-Westem IR Theory: An Introduction," 10. Lee has repeatedly asserted his faith in the balance of power, a typical example being his comments in Canberra in 2007 that "the golden strand [in Australia-Singapore Intemational Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7 (October 2007): 287-312. The special issue relations] is our common strategic view that the present strategic balance in the Asia- also explores the reasons for the lack of interest in theory in the Asian IR literature, one Pacific, with the U.S. as the preeminent power, provides stability and security that enables of the main factors being the dominance of area specialists in the field. all to develop and grow in peace." See "S'pore and Australia Share Common Strategic 2. In visits to China, the author found widespread evidence of a major growth of inter­ View: MM," Straits Times, March 29, 2007, http;//app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp? est in theory among Chinese scholars of intemational relations. This is true not only of View, 6860 (accessed January 25, 2008). "MM" refers to "Minister Mentor." universities such as Beijing, Tsinghua, and Fudan, but also of think tanks such as the Insti­ 11. For a theoretical discussion of Lee's views, see Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, tute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which "Betwixt Balance and Community: America, ASEAN, and the Security of Southeast publishes the leading IR journal of China: World Economics and Politics. It is published Asia," Intemational Relations of the Asia-Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005). For a recent restatement in Chinese. Tsinghua University's Instimte of Intemational Studies has also launched an of Lee's position, see "Excerpts from an Interview with Lee Kuan Yew," International English-language journal published by Oxford University Press, titled Chinese Journal of Herald Tribune, August 29, 2007, http://www.iht.eom/articles/2007/08/29/asia/lee-ex Intemational Relations. For an up-to-date survey of the IR field in China today, see David cerpts.php?page= 1 (accessed September 23, 2007). Shambaugh, "Intemational Relations Studies in China: History, Trends, and Prospects, 12. "Toward a New Balance of Power," Time, September 22, 1975, http://www.time Intemational Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, no. 3 (September 2011): 339-72. .com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,917875,00.html (accessed September 23, 2007). 3. Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: Intemational Relations," Dae­ 13. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of the Bipolar World," Daedalus 93 (Summer dalus 106, no. 3 (1977): 41-60; Ole Waever, "The Sociology of a Not So Intemational 1964): 907; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of Intemational Politics (Reading, MA: Addison- Discipline: American and European Developments in Intemational Relations, Intema­ Wesley, 1979), 171; John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Fumre: Instability in Europe after tional Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 687—727; Robert A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jar- the Cold War," Intemational Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-55. A contrary view vis, eds., Intemational Relations—Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in that stresses the stabilizing potential of multipolarity is Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Intemational Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and Intemational Stability," World Politics 16, no. 3 4. David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," (April 1964): 390-406. Intemational Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57-85. 14. For a discussion and rebuttal of this view in the context of the Third World, see 5. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspec­ Amitav Acharya, "Beyond Anarchy; Third World Instability and Intemational Order after tive," in Network Power: Japan and Asia, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi the Cold War," in International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie Neu­ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 5. mann (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 159-211. 6. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, "The United States and Stability in 15. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, East Asia," in Intemational Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry 2001), 41. and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 421-22. 16. Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, 53-54. For a critique of Leifer's view, see 7. Stephen M. Walt, "Intemational Relations: One World, Many Theories," Foreign Amitav Acharya, "Do Norms and Identity Matter? Community and Power in Southeast Policy 110 (Spring 1998): 29-46. \ Asia's Regional Order," Pacific Review 18, no. 1 (March 2005): 95-118. 8. This leaves out critical IR theories such as Marxism, post-modem/post-structural, 17. This shows that Realism is not a homogenous theory as its critics sometimes por­ post-colonial, and feminist perspectives. Some argue that critical theories have been con­ tray and that important differences exist among Realists insofar as the nature and purpose cemed mostly with critiquing their "mainstream" rivals, especially Realism and Liberal­ of intemational institutions are concemed. It also shows a disjuncture between disciplin­ ism, and have made little attempt to offer an altemative conception or trajectory of ary neo-Realist theory and Realist perspectives on Asian institutions. Mearsheimer, a neo- regional order. But the insights of critical perspectives are especially crucial in under­ Realist (but not an Asian specialist), viewed intemational institutions as pawns in the standing and analyzing the impact of globalization on Asian IR, the limitations and abuses hands of great powers. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of Intemational Institu­ of the sovereign state system and the national security paradigm, and Asia's uneven and tions," Intemational Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-1995): 5-49. Michael Leifer took a 86 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 87 more nuanced view. While institutions were not able to take care of the fundamental 26. Ming Wan, "Economic Interdependence and Economic Cooperation," in Asian security of nations, great power intervention in Asia was not inevitable, but only occurred Security Order: Normative and Instrumental Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, when there was a conjunction between great power interests and disputes between or CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "A Liberal Peace in within ASEAN states. Institutions could play a role in the management of regional order Asia?," Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 (2007): 5-27. Goldsmith finds weak empiri­ if regional actors purposively used institutions to engage different great powers so that cal support for the pacific effects of democracy and intemational institutions, but evidence none acquired overriding influence. For example, following the end of the Cold War, for the pacific effects of interdependence is "robust." For further Asian case studies, see Leifer saw the ARF as the means for locking China into a network of constraining multi­ Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds.. Strategic Asia, 2006—07: Trade, Interdepen­ lateral arrangements that would in tum "serve the purpose of the balance of power by dence, and Security (Seattle, WA; National Bureau of Asia Research, 2006). means other than alliance." See Michael Leifer, "The Truth about the Balance of Power, 27. "China Becomes Japan's Largest Trading Partner for Five Consecutive Years," in The Evolving Pacific Power Structure, ed. Derek DaCunha (Singapore; Institute of People's Daily Online, February 21, 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/90778/7735801.ht Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 51.1 am grateful to Michael Yahuda for pointing to this (accessed September 14, 2013). aspect of Leifer's writings. This acceptance that multilateral arrangements can be "con­ 28. Wayne M. Morrison, "China-U.S. Trade Issues," CRS Report for Congress, 7-5700 straining" has much in common with institutionalist scholars like Keohane and Martin. (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July 17, 2013), Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," Intema­ 2; "China's US Treasury Holdings Hit Record $1.3 Trillion," July 17, 2013, http;//rt.com/ tional Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 42; Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance business/china-federal-debt-record-207 (accessed September 14, 2013). of Power in ASEAN and ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 29. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the 18. Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). Intemational Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/1994): 5-33; Aaron L. Friedberg, Europe's 30. Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constmctivist TUm in International Relations Theory," Past, Asia's Future?, SAIS Policy Forum Series 3 (Washington, DC: Nitze School of World Politics 50, no. 2 (January 1998); 324-48. Advanced Intemational Studies, John Hopkins University, 1998). 31. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? 19. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," Survival 36, Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," International Orga­ no. 2 (Summer 1994); 3-21; Robert Gilpin, "Sources of American-Japanese Economic nization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002); 575-607. They reject not only the power disparity Conflict," in Intemational Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry explanation, but also neo-Liberal explanations that would see alliance design as a function and Michael Mastanduno (New York; Columbia University Press, 2003), 299-322. of differing calculations about what would be the most efficient institotional response to 20. See Amitav Acharya, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? The Normative Origins the threat at hand. Europe and Asia differed in this respect: the threat in Europe was a of Asian Multilateralism" (Working Paper 05-05, Weatherhead Center for Intemational massive cross-border Soviet invasion, while the threat in Asia was insurgency and intemal Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2005). conflict. For other explanations (Realist, Liberal, and mixed) of this puzzle, see Donald 21. Muthiah Alagappa, "Introduction," in Asian Security Order: Normative and Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy," Instrumental Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, World Politics 45, no. 4 (July 1993): 501-25; John S. Duffield, "Why Is There No APTO? 2003). Why Is There No OSCAP: Asia Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective," 22. Xuetong Yan, "Decade of Peace in East Asia," East Asia: An Intemational Quar­ Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 2 (August 2001): 69-95; and Galia Press- terly 20, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 31. This view sets limits to Realist optimism found in Robert Bamathan, Organizing the World: The United States and Regional Cooperation in Asia Ross's "The Geography of the Peace; East Asia in the Twenty-First Century," Intema­ and Europe (New York: Routledge, 2003). tional Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999); 81-118. Ross argues that a geopolitical balance 32. Hemmer and Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia?," 575. between the United States as the dominant maritime power and China as the leading conti­ 33. Acharya, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia?" nental power would preserve stability in post-Cold War East Asia. 23. Although not for Gilpin and others who would attribute intemational stability to 34. Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the 'ASEAN the role of a hegemonic power and consider the absence of balancing against such a power Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way'?" Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997); 319-46. Amitav as an indicator of stability. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Cambridge University Press, 1981). \ Change in Asian Regionalism," Intemational Organization 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004); 24. John Vasquez, "Realism and the Study of Peace and War," in Realism and Institu­ 239-75; Tobias Ingo Nischalke, "Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Cooperation; tionalism in Intemational Studies, ed. Michael Breecher and Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor: The 'ASEAN Way,' a Real Spirit or a Phantom?," Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. University of Michigan Press, 2002), 79-94; John Vasquez and Collin Elman, eds.. Real­ I (April 2000): 89-112; Jiirgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Ori­ ism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, NJ; Prentice Hall, gins, Developments and Prospects (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Nikolas Busse, 2003). "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security," Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999): 39-60; 25. Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?," Kamamlzaman Askandar, "ASEAN and Conflict Management: The Formative Years of Intemational Security 37, no. 4 (2013); 7-48. 1967-1976," Pacifica Review (Melboume) 6, no. 2 (1994); 57-69; Amitav Acharya, 86 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 87 more nuanced view. While institutions were not able to take care of the fundamental 26. Ming Wan, "Economic Interdependence and Economic Cooperation," in Asian security of nations, great power intervention in Asia was not inevitable, but only occurred Security Order: Normative and Instrumental Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, when there was a conjunction between great power interests and disputes between or CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "A Liberal Peace in within ASEAN states. Institutions could play a role in the management of regional order Asia?," Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 (2007): 5-27. Goldsmith finds weak empiri­ if regional actors purposively used institutions to engage different great powers so that cal support for the pacific effects of democracy and intemational institutions, but evidence none acquired overriding influence. For example, following the end of the Cold War, for the pacific effects of interdependence is "robust." For further Asian case studies, see Leifer saw the ARF as the means for locking China into a network of constraining multi­ Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds.. Strategic Asia, 2006—07: Trade, Interdepen­ lateral arrangements that would in tum "serve the purpose of the balance of power by dence, and Security (Seattle, WA; National Bureau of Asia Research, 2006). means other than alliance." See Michael Leifer, "The Truth about the Balance of Power, 27. "China Becomes Japan's Largest Trading Partner for Five Consecutive Years," in The Evolving Pacific Power Structure, ed. Derek DaCunha (Singapore; Institute of People's Daily Online, February 21, 2012, http://english.people.com.cn/90778/7735801.ht Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), 51.1 am grateful to Michael Yahuda for pointing to this (accessed September 14, 2013). aspect of Leifer's writings. This acceptance that multilateral arrangements can be "con­ 28. Wayne M. Morrison, "China-U.S. Trade Issues," CRS Report for Congress, 7-5700 straining" has much in common with institutionalist scholars like Keohane and Martin. (Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July 17, 2013), Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," Intema­ 2; "China's US Treasury Holdings Hit Record $1.3 Trillion," July 17, 2013, http;//rt.com/ tional Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 42; Ralf Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance business/china-federal-debt-record-207 (accessed September 14, 2013). of Power in ASEAN and ARF (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 29. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the 18. Aaron Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011). Intemational Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/1994): 5-33; Aaron L. Friedberg, Europe's 30. Jeffrey Checkel, "The Constmctivist TUm in International Relations Theory," Past, Asia's Future?, SAIS Policy Forum Series 3 (Washington, DC: Nitze School of World Politics 50, no. 2 (January 1998); 324-48. Advanced Intemational Studies, John Hopkins University, 1998). 31. Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? 19. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," Survival 36, Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism," International Orga­ no. 2 (Summer 1994); 3-21; Robert Gilpin, "Sources of American-Japanese Economic nization 56, no. 3 (Summer 2002); 575-607. They reject not only the power disparity Conflict," in Intemational Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry explanation, but also neo-Liberal explanations that would see alliance design as a function and Michael Mastanduno (New York; Columbia University Press, 2003), 299-322. of differing calculations about what would be the most efficient institotional response to 20. See Amitav Acharya, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? The Normative Origins the threat at hand. Europe and Asia differed in this respect: the threat in Europe was a of Asian Multilateralism" (Working Paper 05-05, Weatherhead Center for Intemational massive cross-border Soviet invasion, while the threat in Asia was insurgency and intemal Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2005). conflict. For other explanations (Realist, Liberal, and mixed) of this puzzle, see Donald 21. Muthiah Alagappa, "Introduction," in Asian Security Order: Normative and Crone, "Does Hegemony Matter? The Reorganization of the Pacific Political Economy," Instrumental Features, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, World Politics 45, no. 4 (July 1993): 501-25; John S. Duffield, "Why Is There No APTO? 2003). Why Is There No OSCAP: Asia Pacific Security Institutions in Comparative Perspective," 22. Xuetong Yan, "Decade of Peace in East Asia," East Asia: An Intemational Quar­ Contemporary Security Policy 22, no. 2 (August 2001): 69-95; and Galia Press- terly 20, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 31. This view sets limits to Realist optimism found in Robert Bamathan, Organizing the World: The United States and Regional Cooperation in Asia Ross's "The Geography of the Peace; East Asia in the Twenty-First Century," Intema­ and Europe (New York: Routledge, 2003). tional Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999); 81-118. Ross argues that a geopolitical balance 32. Hemmer and Katzenstein, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia?," 575. between the United States as the dominant maritime power and China as the leading conti­ 33. Acharya, "Why Is There No NATO in Asia?" nental power would preserve stability in post-Cold War East Asia. 23. Although not for Gilpin and others who would attribute intemational stability to 34. Amitav Acharya, "Ideas, Identity and Institution-Building: From the 'ASEAN the role of a hegemonic power and consider the absence of balancing against such a power Way' to the 'Asia-Pacific Way'?" Pacific Review 10, no. 3 (1997); 319-46. Amitav as an indicator of stability. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Cambridge University Press, 1981). \ Change in Asian Regionalism," Intemational Organization 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004); 24. John Vasquez, "Realism and the Study of Peace and War," in Realism and Institu­ 239-75; Tobias Ingo Nischalke, "Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Cooperation; tionalism in Intemational Studies, ed. Michael Breecher and Frank P. Harvey (Ann Arbor: The 'ASEAN Way,' a Real Spirit or a Phantom?," Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. University of Michigan Press, 2002), 79-94; John Vasquez and Collin Elman, eds.. Real­ I (April 2000): 89-112; Jiirgen Haacke, ASEAN's Diplomatic and Security Culture: Ori­ ism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, NJ; Prentice Hall, gins, Developments and Prospects (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003); Nikolas Busse, 2003). "Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security," Pacific Review 12, no. 1 (1999): 39-60; 25. Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?," Kamamlzaman Askandar, "ASEAN and Conflict Management: The Formative Years of Intemational Security 37, no. 4 (2013); 7-48. 1967-1976," Pacifica Review (Melboume) 6, no. 2 (1994); 57-69; Amitav Acharya, 88 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 89

"Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power and Prospects for Peace­ 48. Qin Yaqing, "Why Is There No Chinese Intemational Relations Theory?" in "Why ful Change," in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Is There No Non-Westem IR Theory?," 313-40. Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 210-40. 49. Interviews with Chinese scholars: Tang Shiping, formerly of the Chinese Academy 35. Katzenstein, "Introduction; Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective"; Ami­ of Social Sciences, September 8, 2007; Qin Yaqing, vice president of China Foreign tav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds.. Crafting Cooperation: Regional Intema­ Affairs University; Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International Relations at tional Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Tsinghua University; Chu Sulong, director of the Institute of Security Studies at Tsinghua 2007). University; and Wang Zhengyi, professor of Intemational Political Economy, Beijing Uni­ 36. Thomas C. Berger, "Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in versity, all during September 10-13, 2007. East Asia," Review of Intemational Studies 26, no. 3 (July 2000): 405-28; Thomas C. 50. For a review of Indian ideas that might be of theoretical significance, see Navnita Berger, "Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Constructivist Interpretation," in Chadha Behera, "Re-Imagining IR in India," in "Why Is There No Non-Westem IR The­ Intemational Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael ory?" See also George Modelski, "Foreign Policy and Intemational System in the Ancient Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 387-420. Hindu World," American Political Science Review 58, no. 3 (September 1964): 549-60. 37. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong"; David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power and Order 51. Takashi Inoguchi, "Why Are There No Non-Westem Theories of International in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Relations? The Case of Japan," in "Why Is There No Non-Westem IR Theory?" In this 38. Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" These criticisms from Constructivist essay, Inoguchi highlights the theoretical work of three pre-1945 Japanese writers: Nishida scholars suggest that the latter are not a homogenous orthodoxy as some critics allege. Kitaro, a constmctivist with Japanese characteristics"; Tabata Shigejiro, a normative 39. In the words of a Malaysian scholar, "Thinking in the Constructivist vein has been international law theorist placing popular sovereignty (as with Samuel von Pufendorf) about the best gift made available to scholars and leaders in the region." See Azhari before Grotian state sovereignty; and Hirano Yoshitaro, a social democratic internation­ Karim, "ASEAN: Association to Community: Constructed in the Image of Malaysia's alist. Global Diplomacy," in Malaysia's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change, ed. Abdul 52. One notable such attempt is Victoria Hui, "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intema­ Razak Baginda (Singapore: Marshal Cavendish Editions, 2007), 113. tional Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modem Europe," Inter­ 40. Acharya, "Do Norms and Identity Matter?"; Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, national Organization 58 (Winter 2004): 174-205. "Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations: An Introduction," in "Theorizing Southeast 53. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influ­ Asian Relations: Emerging Debates," ed. Acharya and Stubbs, Pacific Review 19, no. 2 ences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). (June 2006): 125-34. 54. Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter: Norms, Power and Institutions in Asian 41. Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread"; Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter: Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); 55. Alastair Iain Johnston, "What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us about Intema­ Amitav Acharya, "Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism and tional Relations Theory?," Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 53-78. Rule Making in the Third World," Intemational Studies Quarterly 55 (2011): 95-123; 56. More on this in Amitav Acharya, "Intemational Relations Theory and the Rise of Asia," in Oxford Handbook of Intemational Relations of Asia, ed. Rosemary Foot, Saadia Amitav Acharya, Civilizations in Embrace: The Spread of Ideas and the Transformation Pekkanen, and John Ravenhill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). of Power (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). 57. In his study of cultural globalization, Aijun Appadurai calls this process "repatria­ 42. Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, "Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analyt­ tion" of knowledge. Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Glob­ ical Eclecticism," in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, ed. alization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford, CA:-Stanford University Press, 2004), 1-33; Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 43. Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, "Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Poli­ tics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions," Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (June 2010): 411-31. 44. Amitav Acharya, "Power Shif^or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerg­ ing Security Order," Intemational Studies Quarterly (2013): 1-16. 45. Acharya, "Power Shift or Paradigm Shift?," 2. 46. Acharya and Buzan, "Why Is There No Non-Westem IR Theory: An Introduction." 47. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Conclusion: On the Possibility of a Non- Westem IR Theory in Asia," in "Why Is There No Non-Westem IR Theory: Reflections On and From Asia," 427-28. 88 Amitav Acharya Thinking Theoretically about Asian IR 89

"Regional Institutions and Asian Security Order: Norms, Power and Prospects for Peace­ 48. Qin Yaqing, "Why Is There No Chinese Intemational Relations Theory?" in "Why ful Change," in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, ed. Muthiah Is There No Non-Westem IR Theory?," 313-40. Alagappa (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 210-40. 49. Interviews with Chinese scholars: Tang Shiping, formerly of the Chinese Academy 35. Katzenstein, "Introduction; Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective"; Ami­ of Social Sciences, September 8, 2007; Qin Yaqing, vice president of China Foreign tav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, eds.. Crafting Cooperation: Regional Intema­ Affairs University; Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute of International Relations at tional Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Tsinghua University; Chu Sulong, director of the Institute of Security Studies at Tsinghua 2007). University; and Wang Zhengyi, professor of Intemational Political Economy, Beijing Uni­ 36. Thomas C. Berger, "Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in versity, all during September 10-13, 2007. East Asia," Review of Intemational Studies 26, no. 3 (July 2000): 405-28; Thomas C. 50. For a review of Indian ideas that might be of theoretical significance, see Navnita Berger, "Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Constructivist Interpretation," in Chadha Behera, "Re-Imagining IR in India," in "Why Is There No Non-Westem IR The­ Intemational Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael ory?" See also George Modelski, "Foreign Policy and Intemational System in the Ancient Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 387-420. Hindu World," American Political Science Review 58, no. 3 (September 1964): 549-60. 37. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong"; David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power and Order 51. Takashi Inoguchi, "Why Are There No Non-Westem Theories of International in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). Relations? The Case of Japan," in "Why Is There No Non-Westem IR Theory?" In this 38. Acharya, "Will Asia's Past Be Its Future?" These criticisms from Constructivist essay, Inoguchi highlights the theoretical work of three pre-1945 Japanese writers: Nishida scholars suggest that the latter are not a homogenous orthodoxy as some critics allege. Kitaro, a constmctivist with Japanese characteristics"; Tabata Shigejiro, a normative 39. In the words of a Malaysian scholar, "Thinking in the Constructivist vein has been international law theorist placing popular sovereignty (as with Samuel von Pufendorf) about the best gift made available to scholars and leaders in the region." See Azhari before Grotian state sovereignty; and Hirano Yoshitaro, a social democratic internation­ Karim, "ASEAN: Association to Community: Constructed in the Image of Malaysia's alist. Global Diplomacy," in Malaysia's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change, ed. Abdul 52. One notable such attempt is Victoria Hui, "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Intema­ Razak Baginda (Singapore: Marshal Cavendish Editions, 2007), 113. tional Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modem Europe," Inter­ 40. Acharya, "Do Norms and Identity Matter?"; Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs, national Organization 58 (Winter 2004): 174-205. "Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations: An Introduction," in "Theorizing Southeast 53. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influ­ Asian Relations: Emerging Debates," ed. Acharya and Stubbs, Pacific Review 19, no. 2 ences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). (June 2006): 125-34. 54. Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter: Norms, Power and Institutions in Asian 41. Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread"; Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter: Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); 55. Alastair Iain Johnston, "What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us about Intema­ Amitav Acharya, "Norm Subsidiarity and Regional Orders: Sovereignty, Regionalism and tional Relations Theory?," Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 53-78. Rule Making in the Third World," Intemational Studies Quarterly 55 (2011): 95-123; 56. More on this in Amitav Acharya, "Intemational Relations Theory and the Rise of Asia," in Oxford Handbook of Intemational Relations of Asia, ed. Rosemary Foot, Saadia Amitav Acharya, Civilizations in Embrace: The Spread of Ideas and the Transformation Pekkanen, and John Ravenhill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). of Power (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). 57. In his study of cultural globalization, Aijun Appadurai calls this process "repatria­ 42. Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, "Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analyt­ tion" of knowledge. Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Glob­ ical Eclecticism," in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, ed. alization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford, CA:-Stanford University Press, 2004), 1-33; Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 43. Rudra Sil and Peter Katzenstein, "Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Poli­ tics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions," Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 (June 2010): 411-31. 44. Amitav Acharya, "Power Shif^or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerg­ ing Security Order," Intemational Studies Quarterly (2013): 1-16. 45. Acharya, "Power Shift or Paradigm Shift?," 2. 46. 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