LUDWIK FLECK E a HISTORIOGRAFIA DA CIÊNCIA Diagnóstico De Um Estilo De Pensamento Segundo As Ciências

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LUDWIK FLECK E a HISTORIOGRAFIA DA CIÊNCIA Diagnóstico De Um Estilo De Pensamento Segundo As Ciências Márcia Maria Martins Parreiras LUDWIK FLECK E A HISTORIOGRAFIA DA CIÊNCIA diagnóstico de um estilo de pensamento segundo as Ciências da Vida Dissertação apresentada ao Programa de Pós-graduação em História da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, como requisito parcial à obtenção do título de Mestre em História. Linha de pesquisa: Ciência e Cultura na História Orientador : Prof. Dr. Mauro Lúcio Leitão Condé Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais Belo Horizonte Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da UFMG 2006 Dissertação defendida e aprovada, em 05 de dezembro de 2006, pela banca examinadora constituída pelos professores: ______________________________________________________________ Prof. Ms. Ricardo Fenatti ______________________________________________________________ Prof. Dr. José Carlos Reis ______________________________________________________________ Prof. Dr. Mauro Lúcio Leitão Condé - Orientador Dedico esse trabalho ‘a minha querida família Parreiras Sonia, Expedito, Patrícia e Elaine. AGRADECIMENTOS Gostaria inicialmente de agradecer a meus pais, Expedito e Sônia, por estarem juntos comigo incondicionalmente, tanto nos períodos de tranqüilidade e principalmente naqueles bem difíceis ao longo desse tempo. Pelo mesmo motivo, agradeço a minhas queridas irmãs, Patrícia e Elaine, um equilíbrio bom em minha vida: Paty, firme e objetiva; Nane, prestativa e carinhosa. Agradeço ainda às professoras que contribuíram com seu exemplo profissional e pessoal em minha formação, com as quais, hoje, felizmente, mantenho uma especial relação de admiração, carinho e amizade, sendo elas: Ana Cristina Ribeiro Vaz Rezende (Centro Pedagógico da UFMG), Iria Melgaço (Centro Pedagógico da UFMG) e Rosilene Siray Bicalho (COLTEC /UFMG). Meu muito obrigada também ao grupo de professores da segunda turma do Curso de Especialização em História da Ciência , em especial, Betânia Figueiredo, Bernardo Jefferson, José Carlos Reis, Ricardo Fenatti e Regina Horta, os quais contribuíram para que eu começasse a perceber e a questionar mais sistematicamente meu próprio posicionamento frente à Ciência. Como parte dessa equipe e em especialíssimo lugar, agradeço ao professor Mauro Lúcio Leitão Condé, por seu profissionalismo, coerência, amizade, ensino. Sobretudo, obrigada pela oportunidade. Agradeço ainda à professora e amiga Chinthya, por ser catalisadora dessa conquista; à querida, sempre e fiel amiga Cidy; aos colegas da Escola Municipal Padre Henrique Brandão; aos amigos de Alvo da Mocidade e da Comunidade Cristã do Caminho , cujos nomes são muitos, muitos... obrigada por terem contribuído para que eu alcançasse esse objetivo. Principalmente sou grata a Deus, Senhor de todas as coisas, pela graça em Jesus Cristo. Por fim, deixo minha gratidão aos funcionários do Departamento de História, particularmente, Walteir, Kelly, Magda e Alessandro. Obrigada ela educação, paciência, bom humor, discrição e pela torcida silenciosa por nós – os loucos, corajosos e, por não poucas vezes, desesperados, alunos da pós-graduação. Finalmente, gostaria de salientar que, assim como LudwiK FlecK, autor aqui analisado, considera que o desenvolvimento científico é fundamentalmente elaborado mediante um esforço coletivo e histórico, essa dissertação, como exposto nas entrelinhas acima, também se constitui enquanto um produto assim caracterizado. Assim, refiro-me à presença de uma coletividade e historicidade não só pelo fato desse trabalho ter-se constituído como o resultado de esforços investigativos e reflexivos desenvolvidos na Academia, mas, caminhando para além desse significado assumido por FlecK, faço aqui um paralelo com tais termos buscando explicitar que na ausência das pessoas então referidas, bem como das omitidas, ao longo de minha própria história, tal conquista jamais teria se concretizado. Sinceramente, meu muito obrigada a todos. SUMÁRIO RESUMO .............................................................................................................i INTRODUÇÃO .................................................................................................01 CAPÍTULO I SOBRE “ARTEFATOS”, “REPIQUES” E “MEIOS DE CULTURA” - UMA APRESENTAÇÃO DO CONTEÚDO E REPERCUSSÃO DA OBRA EPISTEMOLÓGICA DE LUDWIK FLECK 1. CONSIDERAÇÕES INICIAIS ..........................................................................09 2. FASES DE UM CÉTICO ...................................................................................14 3. COMO EMERGE E SE DESENVOLVE UM FATO CIENTÍFICO ................18 3.1 Do anonimato dos anos trinta ao patriarca da sociologia da ciência nos anos oitenta ...........................................................18 3.2 Estrutura e conteúdo da obra magna FlecKiana ............................................33 3.2.1 O estilo de pensamento ..............................................................................39 3.2.2 As comunidades de pensamento ...............................................................60 4. OS FATOS CIENTÍFICOS ................................................................................75 5. CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS ............................................................................ 80 CAPÍTULO II VIDA E PRINCIPAIS INTERFERÊNCIAS CONTEXTUAIS SOBRE O PENSAMENTO FLECKIANO 1. CONSIDERAÇÕES INICIAIS ..........................................................................82 2. PERCALÇOS, QUESTÕES E INSPIRAÇÕES DE LUDWIK FLECK ...........84 3. A ESCOLA POLONESA DE FILOSOFIA E MEDICINA ..................................99 3.1. Autores relevantes e principais idéias da Escola Polonesa de Filosofia e Medicina ........................................................105 4. CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS ...........................................................................115 CAPÍTULO III MICRÓBIOS, EVOLUÇÃO, IMUNOLOGIA E EPISTEME 1. CONSIDERAÇÕES INICIAIS ........................................................................119 2. INTERSEÇÕES ENTRE O FILÓSOFO E O CIENTISTA .............................124 2.1 O papel da microbiologia e da imunologia sobre o pensamento flecKiano 124 2.2 Relações com o evolucionismo darwiniano ................................................135 2.3 As Influências do Pensamento Médico .......................................................152 3. PARALELOS ENTRE AS CIÊNCIAS DA VIDA E A FÍSICA COMO MODELOS HISTORIOGRÁFICOS ...............................................................157 4. CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS ..........................................................................182 CONCLUSÃO .......................................................................................................185 REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ...............................................................190 RESUMO A partir da análise dos principais artigos filosóficos do médico e microbiologista polonês LudwiK FlecK e, mais especificamente, de sua principal obra, o livro Emergência e Desenvolvimento de um Fato Científico , 1935, além de investigações das particularidades do contexto em que viveu, pretende-se compreender a gênese e o desenvolvimento de suas idéias, e, em particular, discutir de que maneira sua formação no campo das Ciências da Vida interferiu sobre seu pensamento filosófico. Além disso, é nosso objetivo estabelecer uma comparação entre a proposta de FlecK e a elaborada por Thomas Kuhn, já que os conceitos de estilo de pensamento , pensamento coletivo e pré-idéias , bem como os pressupostos flecKianos fundamentados em um entendimento evolucionário do desenvolvimento científico, parecem oferecer alternativas aos problemas encontrados pelas premissas Kuhnianas de revolução científica , paradigma e incomensurabilidade . Em termos gerais, esse estudo levou-nos à compreensão de que FlecK, ao desenvolver seus trabalhos filosóficos, foi influenciado pelo ambiente interdisciplinar de sua cidade natal, Lvóv, e, ainda, pelo Círculo de Viena, num sentido de oposição, e pela Escola Polonesa de Filosofia e Medicina , num sentido de acordo. FlecK, porém, ampliou as análises desenvolvidas pela Escola Polonesa para o conhecimento em geral, sistematizando suas reflexões e propondo a chamada “Epistemologia Comparativa”. Concernente à formação de FlecK no campo das Ciências da Vida , ele, por assumir uma perspectiva holística em relação ao fenômeno patológico e, ainda, o entendimento de que as teorias na microbiologia e na imunologia tendiam a alterar-se ao longo do tempo, desenvolveu uma teoria epistemológica tendo como ponto de vista esses pressupostos, ou seja, uma oposição ao reducionismo e à idéia de “verdade” imutável/fixa dos conceitos científicos. Além disso, a formação biológica de FlecK permitiu que ele desenvolvesse um olhar evolutivo sobre o desenvolvimento da ciência. Assim, seus conceitos impregnam-se de um caráter mais flexível, maleável, contrariamente ao conceito hermético Kuhniano de paradigma. Além disso, a idéia de incomensurabilidade de Kuhn, que pressupõe a ausência de comunicação entre tradições distintas, bem como sua associação com a noção de revolução científica, parecem não se apresentar muito pertinentes quando se analisam diversos eventos da história da ciência, tanto do campo da medicina e biologia, quanto da física e da química. A teoria de FlecK, por ser mais plástica, maleável, parece adequar-se melhor aos eventos históricos, na medida em que o conceito de estilo de pensamento não assume um caráter hermético por completo, mas é somente ligeiramente rígido, permitindo tanto um desenvolvimento vertical do referido campo do desenvolvimento, quanto a possibilidade de
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