Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Volume 41 Article 7 Issue 3 Spring 2010 2010 A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Strategy Allan Fels The Australia & New Zealand School of Government Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons Recommended Citation Allan Fels, A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Strategy, 41 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 489 (2010). Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol41/iss3/7 This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Strategy Allan Fels* I. INTRODUCTION There is a great deal of literature concerning the law and economics of antitrust, but relatively little concerning its application and strategic management by regulators. There is even less literature that considers antitrust within a broad and systematic framework of analysis. Such a framework needs to take account of the following factors: (1) the character and goals of antitrust law; (2) the political environment; (3) the operating capabilities and limitations of the regulator; (4) the relationship of the agency to other organizations; and (5) the relationship of all these factors. Strategic management involves the fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organization is, what it does, and why it does it. It requires a broad approach that emphasizes an organization's mission and the means of attaining that mission, while being aware of the future implications of present decisions.