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The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic

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The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic Binghamton University The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB) The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 12-1977 The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic Gerasimos X. Santas University of California, Irvine, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Santas, Gerasimos X., "The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic" (1977). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 85. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/85 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact [email protected]. S. PT.M:.R, i977 G.RA SIXOS S AT AS UAIV.RSITY OF C LIFO AIA, IRVIA. ThJ Frr a r: :hJ Grrd pn Pl a:r ia RJm ubl pc l "Lrrnpng pn:r :hJ rrb r: lpgh: hJ [Pla:r] aJJa nr:hpn g, bu: hJ pa waraJd and JlJva:Jd." 55 JrwJ:: Ar wrp:Jr haa aadJ :rr :hJ crncJm: r: grrdnJ aa lr::pJr clapaa :han Pla:r aanJa :rr :hJ Frra r: :hJ Grrd pn :hJ apddlJ brrna r: :hJ RJmublpc. WJ arJ :rld :ha: wp:hru: nnrwlJdgJ r: :hJ Frra r: :h J Grrd wJ cannr: nnrw :ha: any:hpng JlaJ pa grrd, and :ha: wp:hru: nnrwlJdgJ r: :hpa Frra all r:hJr nnrw­ lJdgJ wruld bJ r: nr bJnJ:p: :r ua i505A5506:). Fur hJr, :hJ Frra r: :hJ ., Grrd pa ":hJ cauaJ" r: :ru:h and nnrw,ldgJ. Fur:hJr yJ:, :hJ rbjJc:a r: nnrw­ lJdgJ rJcJpvJ ":hJpr bJpng and JaaJncJ" :rra :hJ Frra r: :hJ Grrd :hrugh p: pa nr: Ja aJncJ "bu: a:pll :ranacJnda JaaJncJ pn dpgnp:y and aurmaaapng mrwJr.ii i509A:) Aa p: :hpa pn:rpgupng vpJwa wJrJ nr: maradrxpcal Jnrugh, Pla:r haa Srcra:Ja auggJa: :ha: JvJn :hJ :runda:prna r: aa:hJaa:pca arJ pnaJcurJ unlJaa wJ havJ nnrwlJdgJ r: :hJ Grrdy :hJ bJgpnnpnga r: gJraJ:ry and arp:haJ:pc arJ hym0:hJaJa, nr: nnrwn un:pl :hJ arul can "aacJn:" :rra :hJa :r :hJ Frra r: :hJ Grrd and "dJacJn: " bacn :rra p: :r :hJa. i509:55iiC) ThJaJ darn aaypnga arJ nr: pncpdJ ii :al :r Pla:ria mhplrarmhy. On :hJ crn:rary :hJy arJ :hJ cJn:JrmpJcJ r: canrnpcal Pla:rnpaa, Pla:ria J:hpca, Jmpa:Jarlrgy, and aJ:amhyapca r: :hJ apddlJ mJrprd. ThJ Frra r: :hJ Grrd pa gpvJn :hJ mrpvplJgJd mrap:prny p: pa mrprr, J:hpcally, Jmpa:Jarlrgpcally , and rn:rlrgpcally, :r JvJry:hpng JlaJ pn Pla:ria unpvJraJ. Arr pa :hpa vpJw crn­ :pnJd :r :hJ RJmublpc. I bJlpJvJ :ha: an JxcJllJn: caaJ can bJ aadJ ru: :ha: :hJ :JlJrlrgpcal Jxmlana:prn r: :hJ PhaJdr i mm 97599) and :hJ "crJa:prn" r: :hJ mhyapcal unpvJraJ pn :hJ TpaaJua imm. 28535) mrJaummraJ :hpa mrprrp:y r: :hJ Frra r: :hJiGrrd. Why dpd Pla:r aaapgn auch a aumrJaJ mrap:prn :r :hJ Frra r: :hJ Grrd? Wha: crncJm:prn r: grrdnJaa dpd hJ havJ whpch allrwJd hpa :r :hpnn r: :hJ Frra r : : h J G r r d n r : r n l y a a : h J : p n a l c a u a J r : JvJry: h p ng w J d r b u. :a l a r " : h J cauaJ" r : : h J nnrwabplp:ya n d J v J n r : : h J v J r y b J p n g r : h p a :avrrp:J Jn:p:pJa, :hJ F r r a a? A n d w h a : crnnJc:prnd p d h J a J J bJ:wJJn: h J F r r a r : : h J G r r d a n d aa:hJ­ aa:pca? Aa apgh: wJll bJ JxmJc:Jd, a crnapdJrablJ brdy r: lp:Jra:urJ haa bJJn bupl: arrund :hJ rJlJvan: maaaagJa. I: wruld :anJ a lrng brrn :r dpacuaa adJ­ qua:Jly :hJ pn:JrmrJ:a:prna mu: :rrward pn :hpa cJn:ury alrnJ. YJ: pa pa nr hymJrbrlJ :r aay :ha: wJ havJ nr aa:pa:ac:rry rr wpdJly accJm:Jd anawJra :r rur quJa:prna. A grrum r: JarlpJr wrp:Jra, vJry auba:an:pal Pla:rnpc achrlara pndJJd, dpacuaaJd :hJ rJlJvJn: :Jx:a a: lJng:h, bu: un:rr:una:Jly :hJy dpd nr: havJ :hJ bJnJ:p: r: :hJ JxcJllJn: dpacuaaprna r: Pla:ria aJ:amhaypca :ha: havJ :anJn mlacJ pn :hJ laa: quar:Jr cJn:ury.2 A aJcrnd grrum r: vJry rJcJn: wrp:Jra :ha: havJ dpacuaaJd rur :Jx:a, acu:J mhplrarmhJra pndJJd, dr nr: aJJa ., J �- ... -2- to me to have paid close enough attention to Plato's texts, and, probably as a result, their discussions do not illuminate a great deal what Plato says.3 In this paper I propose to re-examine closely what Plato actually says with the hope of making some progress: I think it can be shown that what Plato says about the Form of the Good is coherent and coheres well with what is now known of his metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. I am heavily indebted to a third group of writers who, so far as I know, have not written directly on our passages but who have thrown a flood of light on Plato's thought and have made distinctions of direct relevance to the privileged position of the Form of the Good.4 I divide Plato's discussion into three rounds, or, as they may well b� called, three waves of paradox, and discuss each in turn. I The First Round: Ethics, Politics, and the Form of the Good Plato's discussion of the Form of the Good occurs in a section of Book VI which is concerned with the education of the rulers (SOOff). We are told that it is not sufficient for the rulers to learn what justice, temper­ ance, courage, and wisdom are, according to the definitions established in Book IV. These definitions do not provide a sufficient and exact understanding of these virtues. There is something greater than these virtues, and there is a "longer way".to understanding these things, a way that culminates in "the greatest study": Gl The greatest study is the study of the Form of the Good, by participation in which just things and all the rest become useful and beneficial. (SOSA) G2 If we do not know the·Form of the Good, then even if without such knowledge we know everything else, it (the knowledge of everything else) would be of no benefit to us, just as no possession would be (of benefit) without possession of the Good. (SOSAB) GJ If we know all things without knowing the Good, (this would be of no benefit because) we would not know (thap anything (is) beautiful and good. (SOSB) Next Plato rejects two hypotheses concerning the nature of the Good: (a) The good is knowledge, and (b) the Good is pleasure. The first hypothesis is rejected on the ground that those who hold it are unable to answer the question "Knowledge of what?" except by saying "Knowledge of the Good", thus ending up with the circular and uninformative definition that the Good is knowledge of the Good. The second hypothesis is rejected on the ground that those who hold it admit that there are bad pleasures, and are thus compelled I� ,. - 3 - to admit that the same things (bad pleasures) are both good and bad (presu­ mably a contradiction). Thus: G4 The Good is not (identical with) knowledge or pleasure. (505BCD) Plato concludes this round by asserting two propositions about good things and the Good and by emphasizing the importance of knowledge of the Good for the rulers: GS Many people prefer what appears to be just and honorable but is not, but no one prefers to pursue or possess what appears good but is not. (505DE)5 G6 The Good every soul .pursues and does everything for its sake divining what it is and yet baffled and not having an adequate apprehension of its nature nor a stable opinion about it as it has about other things, and because of this failing to have any benefit from other things. (505E) G7 Our constitution will not be perfectly ordered unless the 1 rulers know how just and honorable things are good and they will not know this unless they know the Good. (506AB) This round is the least paradoxical of the three and the easiest to understand in the general setting of Plato's theory of Forms and his ethics. The main metaphysical and epistemological assertions that Plato makes here about the Form of the Good are simply instances of his general metaphysics and epistemology. Thus the second part of G1 is simply an instance of a general proposition that Plato holds, namely: Fl It is by virtue of participation in the Form F-ness or the F that anything which is F is F .6 And G3 is an instance of the general epistemological proposition that goes together with the theory of Forms, namely: F2 If we do not know F-ness or the F, we do not know that any­ thing is F.7 Thus G3 and the second part of Gl do not assign to the Form of the Good any privileged position over other Forms.
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