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The Philosophical Works of A. J. Ayer The Philosophical Works of A. J. Ayer 1930 Review of The Art of Thinking by Dimnet, in Oxford Outlook. 1933 'Atomic Propositions', Analysis, vol. 1, no. I, pp. 2-6. 1934 'The Genesis of Metaphysics', Analysis, vol. I, no. 4, pp. 55-8, repr. in M. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy and Analysis. 'On Particulars and Universals', Proceedings of the Aristote­ lian Society, vol. XXXIV, pp. 51-62. 'Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics', Mind, vol. XLIII, no. 171, pp. 335-45, repr. in P. Edwards and A. Pap (eds), A Modern Introduction to Philosophy (Glencoe, Illinois Free Press; London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957). 1935 'Internal Relations', Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristo­ telian Society, vol. XIV, pp. 173-85. 'The Criterion of Truth', Analysis, vol. 3, nos I and 2, pp. 28-32. 'The Analytic Movement in Contemporary British Philos­ ophy', in Histoire de Ia logique et de Ia philosophie scienti.fique (Paris: Hermann). 1936 Language, Truth and Logic (London: Gollancz). 'The Principle of Verifiability, Mind, vol. XLV, no. 178, pp. 199-203. 'Concerning the Negation of Empirical Propositions', Erkenntnis, vol. 6, pp. 260--3. 'Truth by Convention', Analysis, vol. 4, nos 2 and 3, pp. 17-22. 'Freedom of the Will', The Aryan Path. Reviews of M. M. Lewis, Infant Speech; R. Aaron and A. Jocelyn Gibbs (eds), An Early Draft of Locke"s Essay; Alfred Noyce, Voltaire; all in the Spectator. 1937 'Verification and Experience', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XXXVII, pp. 137-56. 'Does Philosophy Analyse Common Sense?', Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XVI, pp. 162-76. Review of 'Die Sogennanten Definitionen durch Abstraction' by H. Scholtz and H. Schweitzen, in Mind, vol. XLVI, no. 182, pp. 244-7. Bibliography 335 1938 'On the Scope of Empirical Knowledge: A Rejoinder to Bertrand Russell', Erkenntnis, vol. 7, pp. 267~74. 1940 The Foundations ofEmpirical Knowledge (London: Macmillan). 1944 'The Concept of Freedom', Horizon, vol. 9, no. 52, pp. 228~37. 1945 'The Terminology of Sense-Data', Mind, vol. LIV, no. 216, pp. 289~312, (repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954). 'Jean Paul Sartre', Horizon, vol. 12, no. 67, pp. 12~26. 'Deistic Fallacies', Polemic, no. 1. 'Secret Session' (on J.-P. Sartre), Polemic, no. 2, pp. 60~3. 1946 'Freedom and Necessity', Polemic, no. 5, pp. 36~44. (repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954). 'Other Minds', Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. xx, pp. 188~97. 'Contemporary British Philosophers', the Listener. 'Albert Camus', Horizon, vol. 13, no. 75, pp. 155~68. 1947 'The Claims of Philosophy', in Polemic, no. 7, pp. 18~33. and Reflections on Our Age (Unesco). 'Phenomenalism', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XLVII, pp. 163~96, (repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954). Thinking and Meaning, University College London Inaugural Lecture (Athlone Press). 1948 'The Principle of Utility' in G. W. Keeton and G. Schwarzen­ berger (eds), Jeremy Bentham and the Law (repr. in Philosophi­ cal essays, 1954). 'Portrait of a Victorian Liberal: J. S. Mill', the Listener. 'Science and Philosophy', the Listener. 'Some Aspects of Existentialism', Rationalist Annual. 'Discussion: Philosophy without Science', Philosophy, vol. 23, no. 84, pp. 65~6. 'What Can Logic Do for Philosophy', Supplementary Pro­ ceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XXII, pp. 167~ 78. 1949 'On the Analysis of Moral Judgements', Horizon, vol. 20, no. 117, pp. 171~84. 'Mr. Koestler's New System', the New Statesman. 'Uber die Gedankenfreiheit', Der Monat. 'Ockham's Razor and Modern Philosophy', the Listener. 'There is no Mystery', the Listener. 1950 'Basic Propositions' in M. Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press; repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954), pp. 60~75. 'J.-P. Sartre's Definition of Liberty', the Listener. 'Religion and the Intellectual', Partisan Revue. 1951 'Statements About the Past', Proceedings of the Aristotelian 336 Perception and Identity Society, vol. LII, pp. i-xx (repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954). 'On What There Is', Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristo­ telian Society, vol. xxv, pp. 137-48 (repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954). 'The Physical Basis of Mind', BBC talks (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 'The Philosophy of Science', in A. Heath ( ed. ), Scientific Thought in the 20th Century. 1952 British Empirical Philosophers, ed. with R. Winch (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). 'Individuals', Mind, vol. LXI, no. 244, pp. 441-57 (repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954). 'Negation', Journal of Philosophy, vol. 49, no. 26, pp. 797-815 (repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954). 1953 'Cogito Ergo Sum', Analysis, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 27-31. 'To See the World Rightly', 20th Century. 'The Identity of Indiscernib.les', Proceedings of XIth Inter­ national Congress of Philosophy, vol. III, pp. 124-9 (North Holland Pub. Co., Amsterdam; repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954. 'L'Immutabilite du Passe', Etudes Philosophiques, no. 1, pp. 6-15. 'One's Knowledge of Other Minds', Theoria, vol. XIX, pp. 1-20 (repr. in Philosophical Essays, 1954). 'Truth', Revue internationale de philosophie, vol. 7, pp. 183-200 (repr. in The Concept of a Person and Other Essays, 1963). 1954 Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan). 'Discussion of: "Sur la preuve en philosophie" ', Revue inter­ nationale de philosophie, vol. 8, pp. 92-105, pp. 158-69. 'Can There be a Private Language', Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. XXVIII, pp. 63-76, (repr. in The Concept of a Person, 1963). 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', Encounter. 1955 'What is Communication', Studies in Communic&tion, vol. I (London: Seeker and War burg). 'Philosophy at Absolute Zero', Encounter and Jamtid Ock Framted. 1956 'What is a Law of Nature', Revue internationale de philosophie vol. 10, pp. 144-65 (repr. in The Concept of a Person, 1963). 'The Vienna Circle', BBC Series: The Revolution in Philosophy (London: Macmillan). 'Philosophical Scepticism' in H. D. Lewis (ed.), Contemporary Bibliography 337 British Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.). 'The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell', the Observer. 'Mr. Wilson's Outsider', Encounter. 'Le Memoire expose', Bulletin de Ia societe francaise de philos­ ophie (Paris). The Problem of Knowledge (London: Macmillan; USA: St Martin's Press; UK Penguin Books). 1957 'In Defense of Reason', Encounter. Reviews of: G. H. Von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Ans­ combe, Ludwig Wittenstein: Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics; A. Wood, Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic; Colin Wilson, Religion and the Rebel, in the Spec­ tator. 'Perception', C. A. Mace (ed.), British Philosophy in the Mid- Century (Allen and Unwin). · 'Logical Positivism', debate with Father Copleston in P. Edwards and A. Pap (eds), A Modern Introduction to Philos­ ophy (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd). 'The Concept of Probability as a Logical Relation' in S. Korner (ed.), Observation and Interpretation, Proceeding of 9th Symposium of Colston Research Society (New York: Dover). 1958 'Meaning and Intentionality', Proceedings of Xllth Congress of Philosophy, vol. r, pp. 141-55 (Sansoni Editore: Firenze). 'Philosophie et langage ordinaire', Dialectica. Biographies of Ernst Mach and Moritz Schlick, in Encyclo­ pedia Brittanica. Reviews in the Spectator of G. J. Warnock English Philosophy Since 1900; Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books; and Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir 1959 Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press; London: Allen and Unwin). 'Privacy', British Academy Henriette Hertz Trust Lecture (Oxford: University Press; repr. in The Concept of a Person, 1963). 'Critical Notice of P. F. Strawson's Individuals', Indian Jour­ nal of Philosophy. 'Phenomenology and Linguistic Analysis', Supplementary Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. xxxnr, pp. 111-24. Reviews in the Spectator of K. Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery; Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development; Stuart Hampshire, Thought and Action; Ernest Gellner, Words and Thin~s. 1960 'The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell' in Concise Encyclopedia 338 Perception and Identity of Philosophy and Philosophers (London: Rain bird McLean Ltd). 'Philosophy and Language', Oxford University Inaugural Lec­ ture (Oxford University Press). 'Professor Malcolm on Dreams', Journal of Philosophy, vol. LVII, no. 16, pp. 517-35 (repr. in Metaphysics and Common Sense). 1961 'The Concept of a Person', Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture (repr. in The Concept of a Person, 1963). 'Reply to Mr. Stigen on Problem of Knowledge', Inquiry, vol. 4, pp. 291-304. 'Rejoinder to Professor Malcolm', Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXIII, no. 11, pp. 297-9. Review in Encounter of P. Thody, J.-P. Sartre. Review in Scientific American of E. Nagel, The Structure of Science. 'On the Probability of Particular Events' in Revue internationale de philosophie vol. 15, pp. 336-75 (repr. in The Concept of a Person, 1963). 1962 'Breaching the Dialectical Curtain - Philosophy in Russia', Observer. 'A History of Logic. The Ghost Revives', the New Statesman. 1963 'Impressions of Contemporary Russian Philosophy', Willesden Public Library, lectured and taped. 'The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell', Into the lOth Decade (London: Allen and Unwin). 'Carnap's Treatment of Other Minds' in A. Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap (Evan ton, Illinois, USA: Northwestern University Press). 'Brain, Mind and Memory', the Sunday Times. 'Philosophy and Science' Ratio, vol. v, no. 2, pp. 156-67 (first published in Russian
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