NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
CREDIT CRISES, PRECAUTIONARY SAVINGS, AND THE LIQUIDITY TRAP
Veronica Guerrieri Guido Lorenzoni
Working Paper 17583 http://www.nber.org/papers/w17583
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 November 2011
We thank Bob Hall and John Leahy for their useful discussions and for numerous exchanges. For helpful comments, we are grateful to Andy Atkeson, Chris Carroll, V. V. Chari, Vasco Curdia, Greg Kaplan, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Thomas Philippon, Valery Ramey, Rob Shimer, Nancy Stokey, Amir Sufi, Gianluca Violante, Iván Werning, Mike Woodford, Pierre Yared, and numerous seminar participants. Adrien Auclert and Amir Kermani provided outstanding research assistance. Guerrieri thanks the Sloan Foundation for financial support and the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for its hospitality. Lorenzoni thanks the NSF for financial support and Chicago Booth and the Becker Friedman Institute for their hospitality. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.
© 2011 by Veronica Guerrieri and Guido Lorenzoni. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Credit Crises, Precautionary Savings, and the Liquidity Trap Veronica Guerrieri and Guido Lorenzoni NBER Working Paper No. 17583 November 2011 JEL No. E2,E4
ABSTRACT
We study the effects of a credit crunch on consumer spending in a heterogeneous-agent incomplete-market model. After an unexpected permanent tightening in consumers’ borrowing capacity, some consumers are forced to deleverage and others increase their precautionary savings. This depresses interest rates, especially in the short run, and generates an output drop, even with flexible prices. The output drop is larger with nominal rigidities, if the zero lower bound prevents the interest rate from adjusting downwards. Adding durable goods to the model, households take larger debt positions and the output response may be larger.
Veronica Guerrieri University of Chicago Booth School of Business 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue Chicago, IL 60637 and NBER [email protected]
Guido Lorenzoni MIT Department of Economics E52-251C 50 Memorial Drive Cambridge, MA 02142-1347 and NBER [email protected] 1 Introduction
How does an economy adjust from a regime of easy credit to one of tight credit? Suppose it is relatively easy for consumers to borrow and the economy is in a stationary state with a stable distribution of borrowing and lending positions. An unexpected shock hits the financial system and borrowing gets harder in terms of tighter borrowing limits and/or in terms of higher credit spreads. The most indebted consumers need to readjust towards lower levels of debt (delevaraging). Since the debtor position of one agent is the creditor position of another, this also means that lenders have to reduce their holdings of financial claims. How are the spending decisions of borrowers and lenders affected by this economy-wide financial adjustment? What happens to aggregate activity? How long does the adjustment last? In this paper, we address these questions, focusing on the response of the household sector, using a workhorse Bewley (1977) model in which households borrow and lend to smooth transitory income fluctuations. Since the model cannot be solved analytically, our approach is to obtain numerical results under plausible parametrizations and then to explore the mechanism behind them. The model captures two channels in the con- sumers’ response to a reduction in their borrowing capacity. First, a direct channel, by which constrained borrowers are forced to reduce their indebtedness. Second, a pre- cautionary channel, by which unconstrained agents increase their savings as a buffer against future shocks. Both channels increase net lending in the economy, so the equi- librium interest rate has to fall in equilibrium. Our analysis leads to two sets of results. First, we look at interest rate dynamics and show that they are characterized by a sharp initial fall followed by a gradual adjustment to a new, lower steady state. The reason for this interest rate overshooting is that, at the initial asset distribution, the agents at the lower end of the distribution try to adjust faster towards a higher savings target. So the initial increase in net lending is stronger. To keep the asset market in equilibrium, interest rates have to fall sharply. As the asset distribution converges to the new steady state the net lending pressure subsides and the interest rate moves gradually up. Second, we look at the responses of aggregate activity. Overly indebted agents can adjust in two ways: by spending less and by working more. In our model they do both,
1 so, for a given interest rate, the credit shock would lead to a reduction in consumer spending and to an increase in labor supply. Whether a recession follows depends on the relative strength of these two forces and on the interest rate elasticity of consumption and labor supply. In our baseline calibration, the consumption side dominates and out- put declines. As for the case of interest rates, the contraction is stronger in the short run, when the distribution of asset holdings is far from its new steady state and some agents are far below their savings target. A tightening of the credit limit that reduces household debt-to-GDP by 10 percentage points generates a 1% drop in output on impact. We then add nominal rigidities to the model. In presence of nominal rigidities, the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate means that the central bank may be unable to achieve the real interest rate that replicates the flexible price allocation. Moreover, with nominal rigidities, aggregate activity is purely driven by the response of consumer demand. Therefore, when the zero lower bound is binding the households’ net saving pressure translates into a larger output drop. Finally, we generalize the model to include durable consumption goods, which can be used as collateral. In this extension, households face a richer portfolio choice as they can invest in liquid bonds or in durable goods. To make bonds and durables imperfect substitutes, we assume a proportional cost of re-selling durables, so that durables are less liquid. After a credit crunch, net borrowers are forced to delevarage and have to reduce consumption of durable and non-durable goods. On the other hand, the pre- cautionary motive induces net lenders to save more by accumulating both bonds and durables. Durable purchases may increase or decrease, depending on the strength of these two effects. In our calibration, the net effect depends on the nature of the shock. A pure shock to the credit limit affects only borrowers close to the limit, so the lenders’ side dominates and durable purchases increase. A shock to credit spreads, on the other hand, affects a larger fraction of borrowers, leading to a contraction in durable purchases. Here the output effects can be large, leading to a 4% drop in consumption following a transi- tory shock that raises the spread on a one year loan from 1% to 3.8%. The consumption drop can be as large as 10% if prices are fixed and the zero lower bound is binding. Our paper focuses on households’ balance sheets adjustment and consumer spend- ing and is complementary to a growing literature that looks at the effects of credit shocks
2 on firms’ balance sheets and investment spending.1 Hall (2011a, 2011b) argues that the response of the household sector to the credit tightening is an essential ingredient to ac- count for the recent U.S. recession. Mian and Sufi (2011a, 2011b) use cross-state evidence to argue that the contraction in households’ borrowing capacity, mainly driven by a de- cline in house prices, was responsible for the fall in consumer spending and, eventually, for the increase in unemployment. Our model aims to capture the effects of a similar contraction in households’ borrowing capacity in general equilibrium. In modeling the household sector, we follow the vast literature on consumption and saving in incomplete market economies with idiosyncratic income uncertainty, going back to Bewley (1977), Deaton (1991), Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), Carroll (1997).2 Our approach is to compute the economy’s transitional dynamics after a one-time, un- expected aggregate shock. This relates our paper to recent contributions that look at transitional dynamics after different types of shocks.3 Much work on business cycles in economies with heterogenous agents and incomplete markets, follows Krusell and Smith (1998) and looks at approximate equilibria in which prices evolve as functions of a finite set of moments of the wealth distribution. Here, we prefer to keep the entire wealth distribution as a state variable at the cost of focusing on a one time shock, be- cause our shock affects very differently agents in different regions of the distribution.4 Midrigan and Philippon (2011) take a different (and complementary) approach to mod- eling the effects of a credit crunch on the household sector. They use a cash-in-advance model to explore the idea that credit access, as money, is needed to facilitate transac- tions. Finally, our model with durables is related to Carroll and Dunn (1997), an early paper that uses an heterogenous agent, incomplete market model with durable and non- durable goods to look at the dynamics of consumer debt and spending following a shock
1Classic models of the role of firms’ balance sheets are Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Recent contributions include Jermann and Quadrini (2009), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Khan and Thomas (2010), Buera and Moll (2011), Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2011), Cagetti, De Nardi, and Bassetto (2011). Goldberg (2011) is a model that combines financial frictions on both the firms’ and the households’ side, but focuses on steady states. 2Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009) offer an excellent review. 3For example, Mendoza, Rios Rull and Quadrini (2010) look at the response of an economy opening up to international asset trade. 4Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009) point out that the nature of the shock is important in determining whether or not an heterogenous agent economy behaves approximately as its representative agent counterpart.
3 to unemployment risk. The modern monetary policy literature has pointed out that at the roots of a liquidity trap there must be a shock that sharply reduces the ”natural“ interest rate, that is, the interest rate that would arise in a flexible price economy (Krugman, 1998; Woodford and Eggertsson, 2001). In representative agent models, the literature typically generates a liquidity trap by introducing a shock to intertemporal preferences, which mechanically increase the consumer’s willingness to save (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011). Our model shows that in a heterogenous agent environment, shocks to the agents’ borrowing capacity can be the underlying force that pushes down the natural rate, by reducing the demand for loans by borrowers and by increasing the supply of loans by lenders. This is consistent with the fact that, historically, liquidity trap episodes have always followed disruptions in credit markets. Two independent recent papers, Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Eggertsson and Krugman (2011), draw related connections between credit crises and the liquidity trap. The main difference is that they work with a representative borrower and a representative lender and mute wealth dynamics to aim for analytical tractability.5 This implies that there is no precautionary effect on the lenders’ side and that there is no internal dynamics associated to the wealth distribution. As we shall see, in our model the dynamics of the wealth distribution play an important role in generating large swings in the natural interest rates. Two papers that explore the effects of precautionary behavior on business cycle fluc- tuations are Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2009) and Challe and Ragot (2011). Both papers, derive analytical results under simplifying assumptions that eliminate the wealth dis- tribution from the problem’s state variables. In this paper we take a computational approach, to study how the adjustment mechanism works when the wealth distribution evolves endogenously. Another related paper is Chamley (2010), a theoretical paper which explores the role of the precautionary motive in a monetary environment and focuses on the possibility of multiple equilibria. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our model and charac- terize the steady state. In Section 3, we perform our main exercise, that is, we analyze
5Iacoviello (2005) is an early paper that studies monetary policy in a two-types model where house- holds borrow to finance housing purchases, facing a collateral constraint similar to that in our durable section.
4 the equilibrium transitional dynamics after an unexpected permanent tightening of the borrowing limit. Section 4 explores the role of nominal rigidities. Section 5 studies the effects of fiscal policy. Section 6 presents the results of the extended model with durable consumption goods. Section 7 concludes. In the appendix, we describe our computa- tional strategy.
2 Model
We consider a model of households facing idiosyncratic income uncertainty, who smooth consumption by borrowing and lending. The model is a standard incomplete markets model in the tradition of Bewley (1977), with endogenous labor supply and no capi- tal. The only asset traded is a one-period risk-free bond. Households can borrow up to an exogenous limit, which is tighter than the natural borrowing limit. We first analyze the steady state equilibrium for a given borrowing limit. Then, we study transitional dynamics following an unexpected, one time shock that reduces this limit. There is a continuum of infinitely lived households with preferences represented by the utility function " ∞ # t E ∑ β U(cit, nit) , t=0 where cit is consumption and nit is labor effort of household i. Each household produces consumption goods using the linear technology
yit = θitnit, where θit is an idiosyncratic shock to the labor productivity of household i, which fol- lows a Markov chain on the space θ1,..., θS . We assume θ1 = 0 and interpret this realization of the shock as unemployment. For the moment, there are no aggregate shocks. The household budget constraint is
qtbit+1 + cit + τ˜it ≤ bit + yit, where bit are bond holdings, qt is the bond price and τ˜it are taxes. Tax payments are as follows: all households pay a lump sum tax τt and the unemployed receive the unem-
5 6 ployment benefit υt. That is, τ˜it = τt if θit > 0 and τ˜it = τt − υt if θit = 0. Household debt is bounded below by the exogenous limit φ, that is, bond holdings must satisfy
bit+1 ≥ −φ. (1)
The interest rate implicit in the bond price is rt = 1/qt − 1.
The government chooses the aggregate supply of bonds Bt, the unemployment ben- efit υt and the lump sum tax τt so as to satisfy the budget constraint:
Bt + υtu = qtBt+1 + τt, where u = Pr (θit = 0) is the fraction of unemployed agents in the population. For now, we assume that the supply of government bonds and the unemployment benefit are kept constant at B and υ, while the tax τt adjusts to ensure government budget balance. In Section 5, we consider alternative fiscal policies. In the model, the only supply of bonds outside the household sector comes from the government. When we calibrate the model, we interpret the bond supply B broadly as the sum of all liquid assets held by the household sector. The main deviation from Aiyagari (1994) and the following general equilibrium literature is the absence of capital in our model. The standard assumption in models with capital is that firms can issue claims to physical capital that are perfect substitutes for government bonds and other safe and liquid stores of value. This would not be a satisfactory assumption here, since we are trying to capture the effects of a credit crisis. A more general model of a credit crisis would have to include the effects of the crisis on the ability of firms to issue finan- cial claims and on their accumulation of precautionary reserves, and it would have to allow for imperfect substitutability between different assets.7 Here, we choose to focus on the household sector and we close the model by taking as given the net supply of liq- uid assets coming from the rest of the economy, B. In Section 6, we enrich the household portfolio choice by allowing households to accumulate both bonds and durable goods, which are a form of capital directly employed by the households. In that setup, we will introduce imperfect substitutability between the two assets. In our baseline model, the only motive for borrowing and lending comes from in- come uncertainty. In particular, we abstract from life-cycle considerations and from
6The presence of the unemployment benefit ensures that the natural borrowing limit is strictly positive. 7Along the lines of models such as those mentioned in footnote 1.
6 other important drivers of household borrowing and lending dynamics, like durable purchases, health expenses, educational expenses, etc. Moreover, we assume that there is a single interest rate rt, which applies both to positive and negative bond holdings, so that household can borrow or lend at the same rate. In Section 6, we address some of these limitations, by modeling durable purchases and introducing a spread between borrowing and lending rates.
2.1 Equilibrium
Given a sequence of interest rates {rt} and taxes {τt}, let Ct (b, θ) and Nt (b, θ) denote the optimal consumption and labor supply at time t of a household with bond holdings bit = b and productivity θit = θ. Given consumption and labor supply, next period bond holdings are derived from the budget constraint. Therefore, the transition for bond holdings is fully determined by the functions Ct (b, θ) and Nt (b, θ).
Let Ψt (b, θ) denote the joint distribution of bond holdings and current productivity levels in the population. The household’s optimal transition for bond holdings together with the Markov process for productivity yield a transition probability for the individ- ual states (b, θ). This transition probability determines the distribution Ψt+1, given the distribution Ψt. We are now ready to define an equilibrium.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a sequence of interest rates {rt}, a sequence of consumption and labor supply policies {Ct (b, θ) , Nt (b, θ)}, a sequence of taxes {τt}, and a sequence of dis- tributions for bond holdings and productivity levels {Ψt} such that, given the initial distribution
Ψ0:
(i) Ct (b, θ) and Nt (b, θ) are optimal given {rt} and {τt},
(ii) Ψt is consistent with the consumption and labor supply policies,
(iii) the tax satisfies the government budget constraint,
τt = υu + rtB/ (1 + rt) ,
(iv) the bonds market clears, Z bdΨt (b, θ) = B.
7 The optimal policies for consumption and labor supply are characterized by two optimality conditions. The Euler equation
Uc(cit, nit) ≥ β (1 + rt) Et [Uc(cit+1, nit+1)] , (2) which holds with equality if the borrowing constraint bit+1 ≥ −φ is slack. And the optimality condition for labor supply
θitUc(cit, nit) + Un(cit, nit) = 0, (3) if θit > 0 and nit = 0 otherwise. As we will see below, a tightening of the borrowing limit makes future consumption more responsive to income shocks, so that agents face higher future volatility. With prudence in preferences, this implies that the expected marginal utility on the right- hand side of (2) is higher, by Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, for a given level of interest rates, consumption today falls, as if there was a negative preference shock reducing the marginal utility of consumption today. In this sense, a model with precautionary savings provides a microfoundation for models that use preference shocks to push the economy in a liquidity trap.
2.2 Calibration
We will analyze the model by numerical simulations, so we first need to specify pref- erences and choose parameter values. We assume the utility function is separable and isoelastic in consumption and leisure − c1−γ (1 − n)1 η U(c, n) = + ψ . 1 − γ 1 − η Our baseline parameters are reported in Table 1. The time period is a quarter. The discount factor β is chosen to yield a yearly interest rate of 2.5% in the initial steady state. The coefficient of risk aversion is γ = 4. Clearly, this coefficient is crucial in determining precautionary behavior, so we will experiment with different values. The parameter η is chosen so that the average Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 1. The parameter ψ is chosen so that average hours worked for employed workers are 40% of their time endowment, in line with the evidence in Nekarda and Ramey (2010).8
8Figure 1 in their paper shows about 39 weekly hours per worker in 2000-2008. Subtracting 70 hours per week for sleep and personal care from the time endowment, we obtain 39/98 = 0.40.
8 Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Explanation Value Target/Source β Discount factor 0.9713 Interest rate r = 2.5% γ Coefficient of relative risk aversion 4 η Curvature of utility from leisure 1.88 Average Frisch elasticity = 1 ψ Coefficient on leisure in utility 12.48 Average hours worked = 0.4 (Nekarda and Ramey, 2010) ρ Persistence of productivity shock 0.967 Persistence of wage process in Flo- den and Linde´ (2001)
σε Variance of productivity shock 0.017 Variance of wage process in Floden and Linde´ (2001)
πe,u Transition to unemployment 0.057 Shimer (2005)
πu,e Transition to employment 0.882 Shimer (2005) υ Unemployment benefit 0.10 40% of average labor income φ Borrowing limit 1.04 Debt-to-GDP ratio of 0.18 B Bond supply 1.60 Liquid-assets-to-GDP ratio of 1.78
Note: The quantities υ, φ and B are expressed in terms of yearly aggregate output. See the text for details on the targets.
The process for θit is chosen to capture wage and employment uncertainty. We as- sume that, when positive, θit follows an AR1 process in logs with autocorrelation ρ and 2 2 variance σε . The parameters ρ and σε are chosen to match the evidence in Floden and Linde´ (2001), who use yearly panel data from the PSID to estimate the stochastic pro- cess for individual wages in the U.S. In particular, our parameters yield a coefficient of autocorrelation of 0.9136 and a conditional variance of 0.0426 for yearly wages, match- ing the same moments of the persistent component of their wage process.9 The wage process is approximated by a 12-state Markov chain, following the approach in Tauchen (1986). For the transitions between employment and unemployment we follow Shimer (2005), who estimates the finding rate and the separation rate from CPS data. At a quar-
9See Table IV in Floden and Linde´ (2001). The relation between quarterly and annual parameters 1/4 (denoted by the subscript a) is ρ = ρa and
8 1 − ρ2 σ2 2 = ε,a σε 2 3 2 . 2 + 3ρ + 2ρ + ρ 1 − ρa
9 terly frequency, we then choose transition probabilities equal to 0.057 from employment to unemployment and equal to 0.882 from unemployment to employment. When first employed workers draw θ from its unconditional distribution. For the unemployment benefit υ, we also follow Shimer (2005) and set it to 40% of average labor income. Finally, we choose values for the bonds supply B and the borrowing limit φ to reflect U.S. households’ balance sheets in 2006, before the onset of the financial crisis. Defining liquid assets broadly as the sum of all deposits plus securities held directly by house- holds, the liquid assets to GDP ratio in 2006 was equal to 1.78.10 We choose B to match this ratio, computing liquid assets as the sum of households’ positive bond holdings. Second, we match debt in our model to consumer credit, which was 18% of GDP in 2006.11 We choose φ to match this ratio, computing debt as the sum of households’ neg- ative bond holdings. The value of φ that we obtain in this way is equal to about 1 year of the average income. At this stage, we are leaving aside two important elements of the households’ balance sheet: housing wealth and mortgage debt. The model with durable goods in Section 6 will bring these elements back into the picture.
2.3 Steady state
To conclude this section, we briefly describe the household policies in steady state. Fig- ure 1 shows the optimal values of consumption and labor supply as a function of the initial level of bond holdings, for two productivity levels: θ = 0.346, the lowest positive level in our grid (solid blue line), and θ = 1.101, which is the average value (dashed green line). Different responses at different levels of bond holdings are apparent. At high levels of b, consumer behavior is close to the permanent income hypothesis and the consump- tion function is almost linear in b. For lower levels of bond holdings, the consumption function is concave, as is common in precautionary savings models (Carroll and Kim- ball, 1996). The optimality condition for labor supply implies that the relation between bond holdings and labor supply mirrors that of consumption, capturing an income ef- fect. In particular, at low levels of b a steeply increasing consumption function translates
10Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds (Z.1) table B.100, sum of lines 9, 16, 19, 20, 21, 24, and 25. 11Also in table B.100, line 34, which essentially corresponds to total household liabilities minus mort- gage debt.
10 Figure 1: Optimal Consumption and Labor Supply in Steady State
consumption labor supply 0.35 0.8 θ = 0.346 0.7 θ = 1.101
0.3 0.6
0.5 0.25 0.4
0.3 0.2 0.2
0.1 0.15
0
0.1 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 b b
Note: Consumption and bonds are in terms of steady state yearly aggregate output.
into a steeply decreasing labor supply function, making it convex. For most levels of b the substitution effect dominates the income effect and higher wages are associated to higher labor supply. For very low levels of b, however, the income effect dominates and low wage households supply more hours than high wage households.
3 Credit Crunch
We now explore the response of our economy to a credit crunch. We consider an econ- omy that at t = 0 is in steady state with the borrowing limit φ = 1.04. We then look at the effects of an unexpected shock at t = 1 that gradually and permanently decreases the borrowing limit to φ0 = 0.58. The size of the shock is chosen so that the debt-to-GDP ratio drops by 10 percentage points in the new steady state.
Starting at t = 1, the borrowing limit φt follows the linear adjustment path
0 φt = max φ , φ − ∆t , and households perfectly anticipate this path. We choose ∆ so that the adjustment lasts 6 quarters. Since all debt in the model has a one-quarter maturity, a sudden adjustment
11 Figure 2: Bond Market Equilibrium in Steady State
4
3.5
3 initial steady state 2.5
2
interest rate 1.5 new steady state 1
0.5 bond supply
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 aggregate bond holdings
Note: Interest rate is in annual terms. in the debt limit would require unrealistically large repayments by the most indebted households. An assumption of gradual adjustment of the debt limit is a simple way of capturing the fact that actual debt maturities are longer than a quarter, so that after a credit crunch households can gradually pay back their debt. An adjustment period of 6 quarters ensures that no household is forced into default. Default and bankruptcy are clearly an important element of the adjustment to a tighter credit regime, but we abstract from them. Before looking at transitional dynamics, let us briefly compare the interest rate in the two steady states. In Figure 2 we plot the aggregate bond demand in the initial steady state (solid blue line) and in the new steady state (dashed green line). Two effects contribute to shifting the demand curve to the right in the new steady state. First there is a mechanical effect, as all households with debt larger than φ0 need to reduce their debt. Second there is a precautionary effect, as households accumulate more wealth to stay away from the borrowing limit. As the supply of bonds is fixed at B, the shift in bond demand leads to a lower equilibrium interest rate.
12 Figure 3: Interest Rate and Output Responses
borrowing limit debt−to−GDP ratio 1.5 0.2
0.15 1 0.1 0.5 0.05
0 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25
interest rate output 4 0
2 −0.5
0 −1
−2 −1.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25
Note: Interest rate is in annual terms. Output is in percent deviation from initial steady state.
3.1 Transitional dynamics: interest rate
Figure 3 illustrates the economy’s response to the debt limit contraction. In the top left panel, we plot the exogenous adjustment path for φt. The remaining panels show the responses of the debt-to-GDP ratio (top right panel), of the interest rate (bottom left panel), and of output (bottom right panel). The interest rate drops sharply after the shock, going negative for 6 quarters. The in- terest rate overshooting after a debt contraction is our first main result. From numerical experiments, this result seems a fairly general qualitative outcome of this class of mod- els and not just the consequence of our choice of parameters. To provide some intuition, we now identify some properties of the household policy functions and of the steady state distributions that help explain the result. Let us first look at the policy functions. The top panel of Figure 4 plots the optimal bond accumulation bit+1 − bit (averaged over θ) as a function of the initial bond holdings bit, at the initial steady state (solid blue line) and at the new steady state (dashed green line). The function is very steep at low levels of bond holdings and flatter at higher
13 Figure 4: Bond Accumulation and Distributions in the Two Steady States
bond accumulation 0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
−0.1
−0.2 −2 0 2 4 6 8 b
bond distribution 0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0 −2 0 2 4 6 8 b levels, reflecting the strong incentives to save for households at the left tail of the distri- bution, who want to move away from their borrowing limit. Notice that the convexity of the bond accumulation function follows from the budget constraint, the concavity of the consumption function and the convexity of the labor supply function (see Figure 1). Consider next the stationary bond distributions. The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the marginal density of bond holdings at the initial steady state (solid blue line) and at the new steady state (dashed green line). The two distributions have the same average, as the bond supply is the same in the two steady states, but the new distribution is more concentrated.12 A comparison of the policies in the top panel helps to explain why. At low levels of bond holdings, the precautionary behavior induces agents in the new steady state to accumulate bonds faster. At high levels of bond holdings, the low equilibrium interest rate induces agents to decumulate bonds faster. This makes bond holdings mean-revert faster and makes the stationary distribution more concentrated. We are now ready to put the pieces together. In equilibrium, aggregate net bond accumulation must be zero as the bond supply is fixed. In steady state, this means the
12Formally, the initial distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the new distribution. We checked this property numerically plotting the integral of the CDF of b for the two distributions.
14 integral of the solid (dashed) function in the top panel weighted by the solid (dashed) density in the bottom panel is equal to zero. Let us make a “disequilibrium” experiment and suppose the interest rate jumped to its new steady state value at t = 1 and stayed there from then on. Average bond accumulation could then be computed by integrating the dashed function in the top panel weighted by the solid density in the bottom panel. This gives a positive number, because the bond accumulation function is convex and the solid distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the dashed one. Therefore, at the conjectured interest rate path, there is excess demand of bonds and we need a lower interest in the initial periods to equilibrate the bonds market. Intuitively, the economy begins with too many households at low levels of debt, with a strong incentive to save, and this pushes down equilibrium interest rates. As the economy reaches its new steady state, the lower tail of the distribution converges towards higher levels of bond holdings, the saving pressure subsides, and the interest rate adjusts up.
3.2 Transitional dynamics: output
Next, we want to understand what happens to output. The bottom right panel of Figure 3 shows that output contracts by 1% on impact and then recovers, converging towards a level slightly lower than the initial steady state. We will consider below variations leading to larger output responses. But first let us understand the mechanism in our baseline exercise. The output response depends on the combination of consumption and labor sup- ply decisions. To understand the transitional dynamics of output, let us make the same disequilibrium experiment of the last subsection and suppose the interest rate jumped directly to its new steady state level at t = 1. Recall that the consumption and labor supply policies in Figure 1 are, respectively, a concave function and a convex function of bond holdings. Then, given that the initial bond distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the new steady state distribution, average consumption demand is lower than at the new steady state and average labor supply is higher. Therefore, at the conjec- tured interest path, there is excess supply in the goods market, which corresponds to the excess demand in the bond market discussed above. The short-run drop in the interest rate equilibrates the goods market both by increas-
15 ing consumption and by lowering labor supply, via intertemporal substitution channels. The market clearing level of output can then, in general, be above or below its new steady state level, depending on whether the adjustment is more on the consumption side or on the labor supply side. Two sets of considerations determine which side of the goods market dominates the adjustment path: (i) how large are the shifts in con- sumption and labor supply for a given interest rate, and (ii) how interest rate elastic are consumption and labor supply. Our parameters imply that the fall in consumption demand is the dominating factor, and output falls below its new steady state value. Our numerical results show that different workers respond in different ways to the forces just described. In equilibrium, labor supply increases for low-productivity work- ers at the bottom end of the bond distribution, who are closer to the borrowing limit and are least interest-sensitive. At the same time, labor supply drops for high-productivity workers with high bond holdings, who are farther from the limit and are more interest- sensitive. So behind the drop in output there is a misallocation effect and a drop in average labor productivity.13 The top panel of Figure 5 shows the paths for output (solid blue line) and total hours (dashed green line) in our baseline calibration. Hours actually increase following a credit shock, reflecting the responses of the agents at the bottom of the bonds distribution. However, total output drops due to the misallocation effect. The shape of the labor supply policies is crucial in determining the dynamics of hours. In particular, when the labor supply policy is less convex, the labor supply of poor households is less sensitive to a credit crunch. In the bottom panel of Figure 5, we plot output and hours for an alternative calibration in which the labor supply policy is less convex. To plot this figure, we reduce the upper bound on hours per week used to calibrate ψ.14 In this case, the labor supply policy function is actually concave in the rele- vant range. The result is that aggregate employment drops by more than one percentage point and the output drop is larger than 2%. The misallocation effect is still present, so average productivity decreases, although less than in the baseline calibration.
13This misallocation effect is closely related to the steady state labor misallocation analyzed in Heath- cote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008). 14In particular, we assume that the marginal utility of leisure goes to infinity at 50 hours worked per week instead that at 98 hours. This implies that the ratio of average hours worked to the upper bound is 0.8 instead of 0.4 (see footnote 8).
16 Figure 5: Output and Employment Responses
Baseline calibration 3
2
1
0
−1
−2 0 5 10 15 20 25
Calibration with concave labor supply policy 1
0
−1
−2
−3 0 5 10 15 20 25 output hours
Note: Percent deviations from initial steady state.
Our model is able to generate a recession even with perfectly competitive goods and labor markets. Clearly, adding frictions on the supply side of the model can help in getting a more realistic picture of the effects of a credit crunch on aggregate activity and possibly on unemployment. The introduction of nominal rigidities in the next section is a step in that direction. To further investigate the consumption response, it is useful to experiment with dif- ferent values of γ. Figure 6 shows the behavior of the interest rate and output with γ = 2 (solid blue lines) and, for comparison, in our baseline with γ = 4 (dashed green lines).15 Different effects are at work here. On the one hand, the effect of lower risk aversion is to make the precautionary effect weaker and thus the consumption policy less concave. On the other hand, lower risk aversion also implies that consumers tend to borrow more in the initial steady state, so the initial distribution is more spread out to the left. These two effects go in opposite directions, the first decreasing and the second increasing the initial shift in consumer demand. Finally, a reduction in γ also implies a lower elastic-
15All calibrated parameters are re-calibrated when we change γ.
17 Figure 6: Changing the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion γ
borrowing limit debt−to−GDP ratio 1.5 0.2
0.15 1 0.1 0.5 0.05
0 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25
interest rate output 4 0
2 −0.5
0 −1
−2 −1.5 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 5 10 15 20 25 γ = 2 γ = 4
Note: Interest rate is in annual terms. Output is in percent deviation from initial steady state.
ity of intertemporal substitution, which implies that consumer demand is more interest rate elastic. The overall effect is that we obtain a slightly smaller drop in the interest rate and output. However, since opposing effects are present the relation between γ and the initial drops in the interest rate and output is in general non-monotone.
4 Nominal Rigidities
Under flexible prices, the real interest rate is free to adjust to its equilibrium path to equi- librate the demand and supply of bonds, or—equivalently—the demand and supply of goods. In this section we explore what happens in a variant of the model with nominal rigidities. In presence of nominal rigidities, the central bank can affect the path of the real interest rate by setting the nominal interest rate. However, the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate, together with nominal rigidities, implies that the central bank may not be able to replicate the real interest rate path corresponding to the flexible price equilibrium. Therefore, a credit crisis which produces a large drop in real interest
18 rates under flexible prices can drive the economy into a liquidity trap and into a deeper recession under sticky prices. In order to introduce nominal rigidities, we first enrich the model with monopolis- tic competition. The set up is identical to the baseline, except that output is now pro- duced by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms owned by the households in equal shares. Each firm produces a good j ∈ [0, 1] and consumption is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of these goods. Namely, consumption of household i is given by
ε Z 1 ε−1 ε−1 cit = cit (j) ε dj 0 where cit (j) is household i consumption of good j. We interpret the shock θit as a shock to the efficiency of household i labor. Each firm produces with a linear technology which produces one unit of good with one efficiency unit of labor, that is, θit goods are pro- duced with one hour of work of household i. The labor market is perfectly competitive and wt denotes the nominal wage rate per efficiency unit, so the hourly wage for house- hold i is θitwt. Firms are owned by households, so the budget constraint is
qtbit+1 + ptcit = bit + wtθitnit − τ˜it + πt, where pt is the appropriate price index and πt denotes total nominal profits. Bond hold- ings, bond prices, and taxes are expressed in nominal terms. Solving the consumers’ expenditure minimization problem, it follows that monopolist j faces the demand