Washington, D.C. 20505
17 March 2020
Mr. John Greenewald, Jr. The Black Vault 27305 W. Li ve Oak Road Suite #1203 Castaic, CA 91384
Reference: EOM-2019-00973
This is a final response to your correspondence of 5 August 2019, submitted on behalf of The Black Vault, requesting an Executi ve Order 13526 mandatory declassification review of the following document:
The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations Document Number (FOIA)IESDN (CREST): 006122556
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Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com C05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199
-iet.e, Nofom EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs EO 13526 Threat Perception, Scare Tactic, or False Alarm? 6.2(d) The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations (S NF) Ben B. Fischer
N('vn. pahaps. in Ih( postwar d(catUs -The Soviet War Scare WI7S I/'( sirualion in rh( woriJ as (Xple 1il'r. and hmct. mort difficult and Such rhetoric was the consequence unfovorablr. as in rh( first halfofrh( rather than the cause of tension, but 19801. frightening words masked teal fears. The Hirler analogy was 'more than Mikhail Gorbachro. an insult and may have been a Freud F(bruary 1986 ian slip, because war was on the , minds of Soviet leaders. Moscow was in the midst ofa "war scare" that had US-Soviet relations had come full twO distinct phases and twO different circle in 1983. Europeans were dimensions--one concealed in the Reagan was repeatedly declaring the outbreak of a Cold world ofclandestine intelligence compared to Hider and War II. and President Mitterrand " operations ~ince 1981. and [he other compared the situation to ~he 1962 accused of"fanning the revealed in the Soviet media twO Cuban crisis and the 1948 Berlin , years later. (U) flames 0 f war" -a more blockade. Such fears were exagger sinister image than ated. Nowhere in the world were the superpowers squared off in a 1.4(c) Andropov as a Red Darth conflict likely to erupt into war. Bue a modern-day Rip Van Winkle Vader. prepare an esumate t at In e ect waking up that year would not have concluded that the USSR was losing noticed much change in the interna the Cold War. Expressed in Soviet tional political landscape or realized , terms. the KGB projected that the that a substantial period of detente M corrc:lation of forcc:s~ between the " _had come and gone while he slept. USSR and the United Staces was (u) turning irreversibly against the former. This was profoundly differ The second Cold War was mainly a ent from optimistic assessments made war of words. In March, President in the 197.0s. when Kremlin leaders Reagan referred to the Soviet Union boasted that no international prol> as the "focus of evil in the world," as _lems could be solved without their an "evil empire." Generdl Secrerary participation or against their will and Andropov suggeSted Reagan was evcn threatened to replace [he Mon insane and a liar. Then things gor roe Doctrine with Brezhnev's by nasty. Following Andropov's lead declaring their governmer.[ would and no doubt his direction. the "not permit another Chile." I Marxist Soviet media launched a verbal offen theorists claimed that the 1970's cor Ben 8. Fischer is in CIA's Center for sive of a kind not seen since Stalin relarion was historically ordained and .the Study of Intelligence. that far surpassed Reagan's broad . scientifically established. but by the sides. Reagan was repeatedly early 1980s it was clear that Soviet compared to Hider and accused of successes in the international arena 6.2(d) "f~nning the flames of war"-a more owed more co US diversions. divi sinister image than Andropo\' as a sions, and defeats during the 1970s Rcd Darth Vader: (c) than co Soviet efforcs. (s NF)
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Geesel fQ'oJDffl War Scare
~d, for the first time since 1953, a Soviet" leader was telling the Soviet people The KGB assessment was more of a that the world was on the Andropov's remarks were unprece storm warning than a hurricane alerl. dented. He violated a longstanding Bu t Politburo forecasters reached a verge of a nuclear taboo by describing US nuclear weap stark polirical judgment: the chances holocaust. ons' numbers and capabilities in the of a nuclear war, including a US sur mass media. He referred to Soviet prise nuclear attack, were higher weapons and capabilities-also than at any time during the entire highly unusual-and s,1id explicitly Cold War. In May 1981, General that the USSR had. at best. only par Secretary Brezhne\' and then KGB " iry with the United States in strategic chief Andropov briefed the Politburo in rtlarion TO Tht aCliviry ofIht weaponry. And. for the: first time assessmenno a closed KGB confer adllmary's armtdform. (u) since 1953. a Soviet leader was tell ence. Then Andropov took the ing the Soviet people that the world podium to tell the assembled intelli Moscow's urgency was linked to the was on the verge of a nuclear holo gence managers and officers that the impending US deployment of Persh caust. If candor is a sign of sinceriry. KGB and the GRU were being ing II intermediate-range missiles in Moscow was worried. (u) placed on a permanent intelligence West Germany. Very accurate and watch (0 monitor indications and with a flight time under 10 minutes, warning of US war-planning and these missiles could-destroy hard tar The War Scare as an Intelligence preparations. Codenamed RYAN, Issue gets. including Soviet command and this alert was the largest Soviet peace control bunkers and missile: silos. . time intelligence effort. (u) The Soviet war scare posed (WO ques with little or no warning. Guidance' tions for the Intelligence Communiry: cables referred to RYAN's critical During 1982, KGB Center assigned w~ it genuine, that is, did the Soviet importance to Soviet military strat RYAN a high, but not overriding, leadership actually believe that the egy and the need for advance prioriry. Then, on 17 February United States might attack? Ifso. why warning "to take retaliatory mea 1983, KGB residents already on alerr had the Kremlin reached that conclu sures." But Soviet leaders were less received "eyes only" cables telling sion! If the alarm was not genuine. interested in retaliation than in pre them that it had "acquired an espe then what purpose did it serve? (U) cial degree of urgencyn and was "now emption and needed RYAN data as of particularly grave importance." strategic warning to launch an attack By and large. the Communiry played They were ordered to organize a per on the new US missile sites. (u) down both the intelligence alert and manent watch using their entire: the war-scare propaganda as evidence operational staff, recruit new agents, The overt war sCire erupted twO of an authentic threat perception. It and redirect existing ones to RYAN years later. On 23 March 1983. Presi did so in part because the informa requirements. A circular message dent Reagan announced a program tion reaching it about the alert came from the Moscow Center to all KGB to develop a ground- and space primarily from British intelligence residencies put on alen Slaws stated: based, laser-armed. anti-ballistic-mis and was fragmentary, incomplete. and ambiguous. Moreover. the Brit sile shield designated Strategic ish protected the identiry of the ThtT~fort Ollt ofT/it chitfdim Defense Iniriative (SOl) bur quickly source-KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky. Tions for T/it activiT), ofTht KGB's dubbed "Star Wars" by the media. number (Wo in the London resi Four days larer-and in direct .fortigll stn'ia is To orgol/iu dencv- and his bona fides could dntction and a.russmwt ofsigm response-Andropov lashed out. He nor be independently established. US ofprtparaTionfor RYAN ill all accused the United States of prepar intelligence did have partially corrob fossiblt artas, i.t., political. tCO ing a first-strike attack on the USSR orating information from a nomic. and miliTary UClOrs. cilli/ and asserred that Reagan was "invent Czechoslovak inrelligence officer. dtftnu and Ilu: acrillit)' ofSft ing new plans on how to unleash a but apparently it was not detailed cial urvias. Our miliTary nuclear war in the best way, with the ' enough or considered reliable ntighbor! ftht CRUj drt hope of winning it." The war scare enough co confirm what was coming activt/y mgagtd ill similar work had joined th'e intelligence alen. (u) from Gordie\'sky. (u)
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Seelet ~'o1Di" War Scare
Searching for an explanation"of the war scare, intelligence ana1ysts The Intelligence Communiry contin and other interested budgets and missions grow at 3 time ued (0 scoff at the war scare even when the competition for resources after Gordievsky defected-actually. observers offered three 'was fierce: Or the war scare might after MIG exfiltrated him from rhe answers: propaganda, have been connected in some way- USSR-and was made a\'ailable for a debate over foreign and defense pol 1 debriefing. But intelligence analysts paranoia, and politics. icy~-to a succession struggle that were not alone in their skepticism. was continuing despite. or because For example. one critic who of, Andropov's poor health. Explana auribu'tes many of the problems in tions were plenriful. but evidence US-Soviet relations to the Reagan was scarce. (u) administration concluded 10 yt!arJ Some observers." however. believed laur and with the benefit of hind that the campaign was inwardly. not Although quite different. these expla sight: "Above a". the idea that the outwardly. directed toward the nations had much in common. Each new American administration might starred from the premise, whether Soviet people. There was evidence (0 actually auack the Soviet Union support this interpretation. articulated or nOt, that there: was no seems too far out of touch with real AndropO\' had launched an anricor objective threat of a US surprise ity to have been given credence:) A ruption and discipline campaign to attack on the USSR; therefore. [he 'Soviet emigre scholar who wrote the get the long-suffering proletariat to war scare was all smoke and mirrors. most perceptive article on Soviet war . a false alarm being used for some work harder. drink less. and sacrifice scare propaganda found the analytic more while cUHing down on the other purpose. In most instances. task so daunting that he refused to [heft ofstate properry. War scares outside observers did not give the speculate on u.hy the Kremlin had had been used in [he past to prepare war scare credence, refusing [Q imag adopted this line or 10 whom ·the mes ine that the Soviet leadership could people for bad times. and. with ideol sage was directed-West European view the United States as the poten ogy dead and consumer goods in governments. the US electorate. or tial aggressor in an unprovoked short supply. the Kremlin was [rot the Soviet people. 4 (u) . nuclear war, because they themselves , ring OUt a tried and true , could not imagine the United States mobilization gimmick. (u) Searching for an explanation of the in that role:. This idea was "too far war scare. intelligence analysts and our of touch with reality." Reagan other interested observers offered A second explanation argued that the was not Hider, and America doe:s three answers: propaganda. paranoia. war scare was clearly bogus but not do Pearl Harbors. (u) and politics. (u) potenrially dangerous because it was rooted in Soviet leadership paranoia. US perceptions of [he US-Soviet bal The consensus view regarded RYAN Paranoia is a catchall explanation for ance of strategic power also weighed and the war scare as grist for the Russian/Soviet externallx:havior that against the idea that the war scare KGB disinformation mill-a sophis goes back to early tsarist times. Bur it could indicate ge:nuine. even if ticated political-psychological scare was given credence. This was how gread)' exaggerated. concern on Mos tactic operation. \X'ho was the KGB Gordievsky 'explained the war scare, cow's part. The United States was in and the advanced age and poor trying (0 scare? Answers differed. the midst of the larges[ military Most agreed that the Soviets wanted health of Andropov and the rest of buildup in its history whose aim was to frighten the \X'est Europeans and the gerontocracy suggested that the to close a perceived "window of vul abo\'e all the nervous West Germans leadership's debilitation might be nerability~ in the mid-1980s created into backing out of an agreemenr to mcnral aswell as physical. (U) by US I~ss of superiority in delivery deploy US inrermediate-range Persh vehicles and then counterforce capa ing II and cruise missiles on their The third explanation held that the bilities. The buildup had begun terrirory. Besides. Moscow was war scare was rooted in internal during the previous administration, engaged in an all-out. go-for-broke hureaucratic or succession politics. bur was greatly accelerated during propag:mda and COvert aCTion pro The military and intelligence services Reagan's first term in the belief that gram that was flagging and needed a might be using it as a form of hureau the USSR might exploit a temporary boost. (U) cratic turfbuilder to make their advantage-appropriately called a
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SEcrEt No/orl'l War Scare
window ofopportunit}'-ro engage c~hles that describe [he alert and col 1.4(c) in adventuresome beha"ior, use lection requirements. No one in the nuclear blackmail. or even perhaps US, British, or Sevier/Russian intelli arrack the United States. Moreover, gence communities has questioned Soviet claims about the "irreversibil these documents, so silence is tanta iry" of changes in rhe "correlation of mount to authentication. (U) forces" in the ] 970s-a reference ro both Soviet gains in the Third 1.4( c) World and achievement of "robusr pariry" in srrategic power with rhe US--did little ro allay US concerm. (u)
US observers were half righr in dis missing rhe war scare as groundless. but also half wrong in \'iewingit as artificially conrrivcd. Moscow appar enrly was worried abour something. (u)
Evidence From the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
For a long time. Gordievsky was the only publicly acknowledg'i"-'-,lllJJ..U."'--~ of information on RYAN 1.4( c)
Meanw i c, ormer Sovier '-Am...----.--- a-ss-a--.-"or to (he United Statcs Anatoly Dobryinin and ex-KGB officers Oleg Kalugin and Yuriy Shvets have published ~emoirs that dovetail with Gordievskv's account. We know a lot more th~n we did abour the war scare, e"cn though a complete understanding is stili elu sive. (5 :-JF)
Gordievsky, the original source. is also the most prolific. Almost a decade after he arrived in London, he and British coauthor ChriStopher Andrew published a sheafof KGB
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~ecri!t lUdlam War Scare
a small circle of\Xfhite House and 1.4(c) Pentagon aides-and, ofcourse, the Kremlin. "It ~as very sensitive," recalls former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklc:. ~ Nothing was writ ten down about it, so there would be no papet trail." 6 (u)
The PSYOP was calculated to play on what the White House perceived as a Soviet image of the President as a "cowboy" and reckless practitioner of nuclear politics. US purpose was not to signal intentions so much as keep the Soviets guessing what might happen next:
"Som~tim~s w~ would smd Spooking the Russians bombas ova th~ North Pou. and th~ir radars would click During the first Reagan administra on, .. rualls G~'i . Jack Chain th~ tion, US policy toward the Soviet fonntr Strat~gic Air Command Union was conducted on cwo tracks. command(r. "Oth(r tim(s The first encompassed normal diplo matic relations and arms control fighttT-bombm w()uld prob~ negotiations. The second was a th~ir Asian or £urop~an ptTiph covert political-psychological elTort "y. " Duringp~ak tim~s. th~ to attack Sovier vulnerabilities and optTation would includ~ s~/I~ral undermine the system. According (0 mannlV~rs a wuk. Thq would a recent account based on interviews com~ at irr~gulAr inurvals to with Reagan-era policymakers, it was mak~ th~ ~ffict all th~ mor~ a Usecret offensive on economic, geo unsmling. Th~n. as quickly as strategic, and psychological fronts th( unannounad flightJ b(gan. designed (0 roll back and weaken thq u10rtld stop. only to b~in a Soviet power . "~ For mosr of 1981 ftw wuks lAta. 7 (u) 83, there were more trains running on the second track than on the first. Another panicipant echoes this (U) assessment:
RYAN may have been a response to "It r(ally got to th~m, .. r(calis the first in a series of US military Dr. William Schn~itkr. UntUr probes along Soviet borders initiated in rhe Reagan administration's first S(cmary o/StIl/( for Military months. These probes- s~ 65 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 C05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 9ecii#1,Quloffl War Scare Andropov's advisers urged him not to" overreact, but overreact he did, accusing light up and ul/its would go on the President of 1983 Through the War-Scare Prism a/ut. Thm.at th~ last minuu. thl'squndron would puL offand "deliberately lying" about Despite their private assessment. rnurn hom~. "8 Soviet military power to Soviet leaders maintained a public pos ture of relative calm during 1981-82. The Navy played an even bigger role justify SOl. Even Reag;m's ersrwhile Secrerary of rhan SAC after Presidenr Reagan State Alexander Haig gave them authorized ir in March 1981 to oper credit. saying "[t]he Soviets stayed are and exercise in areas where the very. very moderate. very, very respon US fleet had rarely--or never-gone sible during [he flrsr three years of rhis before. Major exercises in 1981 and The Intelligence" Community. nor administration. [ was mind-boggled with their patience." But that patience 1983 in the Soviet far northern and clued in to the PSYOP program, wore thin as 1983 wore on. [n Sep far eastern maritime approaches dem could be forgiven for not understand tember, Andropov would officially onstrated US ability to deploy ing the cause-and-dTect relationship. close off an internal debate over the aircraft carrier batrie groups close to This is a reminder ofa perennial causes and consequences of the col sensitive military and industrial areas ptoblem in preparing estimates that lapse ofdetente in an unusual foreign without being detected or chal assess another country's behavior in policy "declaration." In it, he limned lenged.9 Using sophisticated and terms of its interaction with the the outline of the war scare: carefully rehearsed deception and United States and in response co US denial techniques, rhe Navy eluded actions. The impact of (he action- . Th~ Soviet Il'adaship dums it the USSR's massive ocean reconnais reaction-interaction dynamic is often llf:cmn')' to inform th~ Sovin sance system and early-warning overlooked or neglected. not because IO peop&.oth~T p~op/~s. a.nd all systems. Some naval exercises of analytic failure or conceptual inad included "classified" operations in who are r~sponsib/~ for d~tennin equacy, but for the simple reason illg tht policy o/staw. a/its which carrier-launched aircraft man that the intelligence left hand does aged to penetrate Soviet shore-based aSSl'ssml'1/t 0/tht: wurst" puNIli'd not always know what the policy radar and air-defense systems and ill il/un/ational affair; by th~ righr hand is doing. (u) simulate "arracks" on Soviet targets. CU"ml United StnUs adminis Summing up a 1983 Pacific Fleet tratioll. In briif. it is a miLitarist There may have been another prob exercise. the US chief of naval opera course that r('pr~s~nts a urious tions noted that the So\·iets "are as lem in perception that affected thunt to pl'aa.... Ifanyonl' had naked as jaybird there [on the Kam policymakers as well as intelligence any illusions nboutth~ possibilit)' chatka Peninsula]. and they know analysts. \X'hile the US probes ofa" /'L'ollltioll for Ihl' berta in ir." II His remark applied equally to caught the Kremlin by surprise. they th~ policy ofthl' pment Amai the Kola Peninsula in the far north. were nor unprecedented. There was a CflIT ndmillistration. r~ant ('v~nts (u) Cold War antecedent that Soviet hfllJr displ'lIed thnn olla al/d for leaders may have found troubling. all. [emphasis added] Was there a connection between From 1950 to 1969. the Strategic PSYOP and RYAN? There clearly Air Command conducted similar What were those "recenr evenrs"? was a temporal correlation. The first operations, both i ntelligence-ga(her US missions began in mid-February ing and "ferret" missions aimed ar SOl. The SOl announcement came 1981; Andropov briefed RYAN to detecting the location, reaction. and out of the blue for the Kremlin the KGB the following May. More gaps in radar and air-defense installa and mosr of rhe Cabiner. Andropov's over. when top officials first learned tions along the USSR's Eurasian advisers urged him not to overreacr, of RYAN, (hey reportedly connected periphery in preparation for nuclear but overreact he did, accusing [he it to the Soviet border probes, noting war. I.' It is possible, though not prov Presidenr of "deliberately lying" that the Soviets were "increasingly able. that the Soviers remembered about Soviet military power to justify frightened by the Reagan something the American side had SOL He denounced ir as a "bid to administration." ,2 (lJ) already forgotten. (u) disarm the Soviet Union in the face 66 ~ Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 5584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 See; et rio/Olil War Scare ot che:: us nucle::ar chre::ar. ·· Space:: Dt'frnu Minislry, And. for r~a 1.4(c) based detense::. he:: :tdded. SOliS you kllow wt'll. Wt' callnoi '---,;--_-,-Jt e He ouse carne 1I10/l( computrrs widr/y a/lail about the shootdown within a few ... u'ollid opm th~ jloodgaw of obIt' in ora sociny. hours of the event and. with Secre a runou·ay rar~ 0.(all ryprs of tar), of State Shultl taking the lead. strategic amI.<. both o./fo11Sivr and denounced the Soviet act as one of .,' W~ will neva b~ able 10 catch deliberate mass murderof innocent deftllSivt. Such is t"r rral sigllifi up u.il" you in modrm arms calla, th~ Jtfllll,l' silk oj so to civilians. Presiden[ Reagan called it /l1IIil we hav~ al/ tconomic rtvo "an act of barbarism. born of a soci say. ofWashillgto" 's 'd~ftnsil/~ lulion. A"d tlJ( qU~J1ion ;5 cry which wantonly disregards cOf/aption '.... Th~ SOllin Union Il·f,etha Ult' can have an eco individual rights and the value ot . will neva br ctlllght d~ftnselm nomic r~/lolution withoul a human lire and seeks constantly ro by all)' thrrat.. ,. Ellgllging i" political rt'llolution. (u) expand and dominate other na[ions." this is not just iruspollSiblr, it is (u) ;/lSone.... WtlShingtoll Sactions Ogarkov's private rumination is all are putting t"~ entir~ ulorld in the more remarkable because in his Air Force intelligence dissented at j~opardy. (u) public statements he was a hawk's the time of the incident. and eventu ally US intelligence reached a hawk. frequently comparing the SOl had obviously touched a sensi consensus view that the Soviets prob United States co Nui Germany and tive nerve. The Soviets seemed to ably did not know they were warning of the advent of new treat it more seriously than many US deStroying a civilian airliner. The .weapon systems based on entire.ly scientists and e\'cn some White:: charge should have been criminally House:: aides did at the time. There "new physical principles." The dual negligent manslaughter, not premedi were two reasons. FirSt. the Soviets, ity. even dichotomy. between tated murder. But the official US despite the::ir boasting in the 1970s. Ogarkov's public stance calling ror position never deviated from the ini had practically unlimited taith in US continuation of the Cold War and tial assessment. The incident was technical capability. Second. SOl his private acknowledgment that the used to keep up a noisy campaign in had a protound psychological impact USSR could not compete may have the UN and to spur worldwide that reinforced the trend predicted been rypical of other Soviet leaders effortS to punish the USSR with com by the computer-based "correlation and contributed to their frustration mercial boycotts. law suits. and of forces" model. In a remarkable and anxiety. (u) denial of landing rights for Aeroflot tete-a-tere wirh a US journalist and airliners. These various efforts former arms comrol orficial. Marsh~1 KAL 007_ Ar 3:26 a.m. Tokyo time focused on indicting the Soviet sys Nikolai Ogarkov. first depury on 1 September 1983, a Sovier Su-15 tem itself and rhe top leadership as defense minisrer and chief of rhe gen intercepror fired two air-to-air mis being ultimately responsible. (u) eral staff. assessed the svmbolic siles at a Korean Boeing 747 airliner. Moscow's public response ro the inci significance orSDI: . destroying the aircraft and killing all denr came more than a week later on 269 crew and passengers. Soviet'air 9 September in the form ofan ... \fIr ronnot equal tllr quality defense units had been tracking KAl unprecedented two-hour iive press ofUniud Stall'S an1/! for a genn Flight 007 tor more than an hour as conference conducted by Marshal otion or 111'0. J~lodrm mililary it first entered and then left Soviet air Ni.kolai Ogarkov with suppOrt from pown is baud Oil ucfmoiogy. space over the Kamchatka Peninsula. .' Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi and uc/molog:f is basrd on The order to destroy the aircraft was Kornienko and Leonid Zamyatin. compurrrs, given as the airliner was about ro chief of the Central CommiTTee's leave Soviet airspace for the second International Information Depart In tht' Unitt'd Stous. slnoll chil time after overflying Sakhalin Island. ment. The fIve-Star spin-docror's drm . ..pla,l' with compuurs .. .. The ill-fated Boeing 747 was proba goal was to prove-despite 269 bod Hf'r~. u·t' don't ('1!/'11 1,,1Z'~ bly downed in international airspace. ies ro [he contrary-that the Soviet computers in (,111'T)' offiu oftht' (U) Union had behaved rationally in ~t 67 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 C05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 ..SeC~8t ;','010111 War Scare deciding to destroy Flight 007. At with Andropov once again taking [he for up to 20 minutes each time. I' As first, Ustinov said the regional Soviet lead rather than remaining silent. He a result, the Soviet air-defense organi air detense unit had identified the air moved quickly to exploit KAL 007, zation was put on alert tor rhe rest ot craft as a US intelligence platform, like SDI before it, for US-baiting the spring and summer-and per an RC-13 5 ot the type that routinely propaganda. Asserting thaI an "outra haps longer-and some seniot pertormed intdligence collection geous military psychosis" had officers were rransterred, repri operations along a similar Aightpath. overtaken the United States, he manded, or dismissed. (ll) Jn any event, Ogarkov asserted, declared that: whether an RC-135 or a 747. the 1.4(C) plane was unquestionably on a US or Tht Rtagan administration, in f-\ndropov himself joint US-Japanese intelligence mis its imptrial ambitions, gotS so '-;i'-ss-u-e:-d'a---;C"'d-ra...Jconian" order that readi sion, and the local Soviet for that ont btgins to doubt ness be increased and that any commander had carried out the cor whnha Washington has IIny aircraft discovered in Soviet airspace rect order. The real blame fo~ the bra/us at all prtvmting ;t.from be shot down. Air-defense command tragedy. he argued, lay with the crossing tht poilll at which any ers were warned that it they refused United States, not the USSR. (u) to execute Andropov's order, they sobtr-m;ndtd ptrson must stop. would be dismissed. There is corrob [emphasis added] Remarkably, a classified memoran orating information for this trom a dum coordinated by the Ministry of curious source-an apparent KGB Defense and the KGB shows that pri disinformation project executed in 1.4(C) vately the Soviet leadership took Japan and then fed back into the pretty much the same view as their USSR. A Novoui news agency pam public pronouncement on KAL 007. air-de ense cornman phler entitled Pmidmt's Cr;mt: Released in 1992, the secret memo est, though serious. error because the Who Ordutd tht Espionagt Flight of randum was sent to Andropov by emire air-def~nse system was on high KAL 007? revealed that cwo impor Ustinov and KGB Chairman Che alert and in a state ofanxiety. He tant changes- 68 ~et Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 :05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 Sec; ei JVbJorn War Scare The Soviets were familiar with Able nucl~ar abyss during Op~ration 1984 by CIA DirtCtor \'(Iilliam Archer from previous years, but (he RYAN. But durillg A bit Archa Casry. bas~d in part 011 r~ports 1983 version included several 83 it had, Il.Iithout rtalizing it. from th~ doub/~ agtllt Gordi changes. First, in the original scenario comt frightmillg~)' clos~-ca tvsky, had a mon sobaing 4foct. that was later changed, (he exercise tain/y dour than at any timt Rtagan uti/ltd IIl1characttristi was to involve high-level officials, silla th~ Cuban missik crisis of cally grnvt afm r~adil1g tlu including the Secretary of Defense 1962. [emphasis added) (u) rtport and aslud McFarlan~, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs "Do you suppose. thry r~ally ofStaff in major roles with cameo British and US journalists with btlirot that?"... I don't su how appearances by .the President and Vice inside access to Whitehall and the thry could btlitv~ that-but it s President. Second, the exercise White House have repeated the same somtthing to think about, .. included a practice drill that took story.16 Three themes run through it. Rtagan rtpll·td. In a muting NATO forces from the use of conven The United States and USSR came that samt day, R~agan spok~ tional forces through a full-scale mock close to war as a result of Kremlin about th~ biblical prophtey of rc:lease of nuclear weapons. (lJ) overreaction; only Gordievsky's Armagtddon. a final world-md timely warning to Washington via ing b4tt/~ bttwun good and ~/)il. The Story of Able Archer has ~en MI6 kept things from going too far; a topic that fas(inat~d tht Pusi told many times, growing and chang and Gordievsky's information was an dmt. M(Faritzll~ though it was ing with each retelling. The original epiphany for Presidem Reagan, who not accidmtal that A rmagttJd01l version came from Gordievsky, who ' was shaken by the idea that the was on R~agan's mind. 17 claims that on the night of8 or 9 Soviet Union was fearful of a US sur November-he cannot remember prise attack. According to US For all its drama, however, Able which-Moscow sene a flash c..able journalist Don Oberdorfer: Archer seems to have made more of from the Center advising, incorrectly, an impression on the White House that US' forces in Europe had been Within a ftw wuks 4ft~r.. .Abk than on the Kremlin. A senior Soviet PUt on alert and that troops at some Archa 83, th~ London CIA sta affairs expert who queried Soviet US bases were being mobilized. The tion r~porud, pmumably on th~ political and military leaders c..able reportedly said that the alert reported that none had heard of Able may have been in response to the basis ofinformation obtaiMd by th~ British from GorditvSky, that Archer, and all denied that it had recent bombing attack on a US reached the Politburo or even the tht Sovi~ts h4d bun aitzrmtd Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. upper levels of the defense minis about tht rtal possibility that th~ or related [Q impending US Army try.18 The GRU officer cited above Uniud StattS was pr~paring a maneuvers, or rhe US may have said that watch officers were con nucltar attack against th~m. A begun the countdown to a surprise cerned over the exercise. Tensions nuclear war. Recipients were asked to simi14r r~port (amt foom a w~l/ were high as a result of the KAL 007 c:valu3re these hypotheses. At twO air connuud Ama;(an who had incident, and Soviet intelligence bases in East Germany and Poland, h~ard it from unior officials in always worried that US military Soviet fighters were put on alert-for an East Europtal/ (ountry clouly movementS might indicate war, espe the first and last time during the Cold al/itd to Moscow. McFaritzm, cially when conducted during major War. As Gordie"sk)' described it: who r~aiv~d th~ r~porIJ at th~ holidays. I? Other than that, he saw Whit~ HouJt, initially dis nothing unusual about Able Archer: In th~ tr1l.!~ atl>/osphtr~ gmtr (oullttd thrm as Sovitt s(art aud b} th~ cris~s and rhnoric of tactio rath~r than ~/)itUnct of ih~ past ftw monrhs, th~ KGB nal (on urn about Amaican The Iron Lady and the Great conclud~d that Amtrican foras intmtionJ, and told Rtagan of Communkator had bUll p/Aad on altrt-and his vi~w ill pr~Jtnting t"~m to might ~vm hal/~ b~gun th~ count tht Prtsidmt. But a mor~ tXUn Did Gordievsky's reporting, espe down to ulflr.... Th~ world did sivt survry ofSovitt attitud~s ciall)' his account of the KGB not quit( reach tht ~dgt oftht smt to th~ Whit~ Houu ~arly in Center's reaction to Able Archer, ~69 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 C05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 Be" el iV%m War Scare Stalin's heirs decided that it is better to" look through a glass darkly than through influence US 3rriwdes toward the RYAN and the Soviet Pearl Harbor Soviet Union? Gordin'sky and coau rose-colored glasses. thor Andrew believe so and have A Czechoslovak intelligence officer repeared rhe srory dozens of rimes in who worked closely with the KGB books. articles. and interviews. The on RYAN noted that his counter British agent's informarion. Andrew " parts were obsessed with the noted. "was of enormous importance ... t/'~ mmu ofth~ IThatc/'a historical parallel between 194\ and in providing warning of the almost R~aganJ partnaship at this st.ag~ 1983. He believed this feeling was paranoid fear within some sections of was tharlh~ two govt:rnmf'n/s almost visceral. not inrellectual. and deeply affected Soviet thinking. (u) the Reagan leadership that President wt:r~ basing rht:ir dt:cisiom on Reagan was planning a nuclear first much thf' samf' t:vidmu and on The German invasion was the Sovie:t strike against the Soviet Union.' · ~o (u) sharl'd asst:ssmmrs al proftssional Union's greatest military disaster. {sic} It:v~l. In particular. both similar to--but much more trau But did the British go further and govalllnmrs would hav~ had rht: matic than-Pearl Harbor. It began put their own spin on the reponing saml'illlt:lligenu. A critical con with a surprise attack that could have in an effort to influence Reagan? Ana rriburion in this fil'ld was matU been anticipated and countered. but lysts who worked with the oVl'r a paiod ofy~ars by Olt:g was not because of an intelligence Gordie\'sky file during the war scare Cordimlti Isic}... . 11 (U) failure. The connection between sur think so. and rheir suspicions are sup prise attack and inadequate warning ported. if nor confirmed. in British British intelligence sources confided was never forgotten. (u) accounts. Prime Minister Thatcher ro a US journalist that London used was engaged in an effon to moderate the Gordievsky material to influence The historical e:xample of Operacion US policy toward the USSR. con Barbarossa may account for the Reagan. because his hardline policy vinced rhat the US hard line had urgency. even alarm. that field intelli was strengthening Soviet hawks: become counterproductive. even gence officers like: Gordievsky and risky. and was threatening to under Shve{s attributed ro Kremlin para mine the NATO consensus on INF Since KGB reporting is thoughr noia. This gap in perceptions may deployments. She also was mindful ro bt: aimt:d ar confirming vit:ws have reflected a generation gap. The of the growing strength of the peace alr~ady h~ld in Moscow-to bol Brezhnev-Andropov generarion had movement in Britain and especially SUr rht: current lint:-tht: British ~perienced the war firsthand as the in West Germany. (u) worrit:d that tht: impacr on Mos formative experience of their political cow ofrht: blllJur in Washington lives; for younger Soviets. it was his tory rather chan living memory. (u) Thatcher launched her campaign ro would b~ enlargt:d by rh~ KGB modify US policy. appropriately irst:/f Tht:)' had caus~ to worry. 12 The intc:lligence Ufailure" of 1941 was enough, in Washingron at the (u) a failure of analysis. not collection. 2J annual dinner of the Churchill Foun Stalin received multiple detailed and darion Award on 29 September. The question is: how much spin did timely warnings of the impending where her remarks were cerrain to MIG usc? Unfortunately, Gordievsky attack from a variety ofopen and clan reach the \X'hite House and amact did not include the KGB Center's destine sources. Bur he gave the data US media coverage. Her theme flash message on Able Archer in his a best case or not-so-bad case interpre "we live on the same planer and otherwise comprehensive collection tation. assuming-incorreccly-that must go on sharing it"-was a plea ofcables published in \992. Gordi Hitler would not arrack without issu for a more accommodating alliance evsky's claim to fame for innuencing ing an ultimatum or fight a two-front policy that she repeated in s'ubse- . White House perce:ptions of Soviet war while still engaged in the West. quent addressees. As her biographer "paranoia" is probably justifi~d. but Stalin erred in part because he notes. Thatcher did not make an .his assertion that a paranoid Kremlin deceived himself and in part because urgent plea or sudden flight to Wash almost went to war by overreacting German counterintc:lligence: also ington to press her views. rather: to Able Archer is questionable. (u) deceived him. Stalin's heirs de:cided 70 -ieeret Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 C05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 ~ War Scare What the Soviets feared most was "that they were losing the Cold War and that it is bnter (Q look through a glass the technological arms race As one historian nored. even under darkly than through rose-colored the tsars Russian strategists were glasses. This was probably one reason with the US. often quite fearful when confronted why RYAN employed an explicit by superior Western military technol worst case methodology. (u) ogy, but their fears, while exaggerated, were scarcely insane.15 RYAN appears to ha\'e incorpo Dobrynin claims that Andropov wor rated--<>r misappropriated-another "to ried because President Reagan was residency was told visit meat-pack lesson from 1941 . Despite the prow ing plants. looking for signs of"mass "unpredictable." But this places tOO ('ss of his intelligence services. the slaughter of catrle and puning of much weight on a single personality. ever-suspicious Stalin ironically dis meat into long cold storage" in prep What the Soviets feared most was trusted clandestinely acquired aration for RYAN . The parallel with what their "correlation of forces" cal intelligence. including agent report 1941 is so close as to suggest that culations told them-that they were ing and even communications and some of the RYAN requirements losing the Cold War and the techno signals intercepts. He did so because were dug out of the NKYD and logical arms race with the US~ (U) he belie\'ed that all sources could be GRU files. (u) controlled by the enemy and cor The real war scare almOSt cerrainly rupted by disinformation. leading was not the one the KremlIn envi Finally. there is another plausible. him to reject both accurate and inac sioned. The presumed threat of a US but unprovable. lesson learned from curate information. As a corrective. surprise nuclear attack was nonexist 1941 . The prewar intelligence failure he insisted that Soviet intelligence .. em. The possibility of Sovier was Stalin·s. but he blamed the·intc:l sdect indirect indicators of war plan preemptive strike may have been ligence services. This left an indelible ning thac could not be concealed or more likely. Well-informed observers stain on Soviet intelligence that manipulated, His ch ief of military like Gyula Horn, the last Commu Andropov. as KGB chief and later intelligence had the idea of surveying nist foreign minisrer and current party chief. may have been deter mutton prices in Nazi-occupied Prime Minister of Hungary, revealed mined not to let happen again. Europe. arguing that the Germans in' his memoirs that Soviet marshals. Soviet intelligence certainly had a would need sheepskin COatS for win fortified with a little vodka, openly vested interest in promoting a dire ter campaigning in Russia. and. by advocated an arrack on the West threat assessment of US intentions. buying up available livestock supplies "before the imperialists gain superior but bureaucratic sc:lf-interest may for skins. they would flood the mar ity in every sphere. n The information not have been as important as profes ket with cheap murron.24 This is anecdotal, but there is a certain sional. not to say hurt. pride. (u) deceptively simple indicator turned grim logic to it. . out to be simply deceptive. Hitler bdieved he could defeat the Red The war scare was the last paroxysm Army by fall and did not prepare for Conclusion of the Cold War. It was a fitting wintertime operations. (li) end. (u) RYAN was fo r real. Skeptics should RYAN requirements reveal the same consider Dobrynin's response (Q a kind of unorthodox thinking. For doubting Thomas TV interviewer: NOTES example. the KGB residency in Lon "Make your conclusions from what don was instructed to monitor prices he [Andropovl said in telegrams to I. This was a reference [0 the 1973 paid for blood at urban donor his residentS." The KGB-GRU--<>r overthrow of Marxis( President Salva banks. The Center assumed that more appropriately the joint Warsaw dor Allende. prices would increase on the eve of Pact-alert was a crash effort to war as the banks scurried to srock build a strategic warning system by 2. According to interviews conducted by Murray Marder. "(mlany senior pile supplies. But there was a substituting manpower fot technol administration officials scoff now, as problem: British dOllor banks do not ogy. HUMINT for satellites and rhey did rhen. at (he suggestion thar pay donors. all ofwhom arc volun sensors. Soviet actions were panicky. the Sovier Union was genuinely teers. Another ex.ample: the London but not paranoid or unprecedented. alarmed by US milinry moves or ~ 71 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 C05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 WsrScsre puhlic statements. or that Muscow 6. Ibid. pro"oc~ti\'(' and a chalk·ngc to their had any justification for feel ing sO\'creignty over the islands. H~rsh vulnerable. The "war scare" in the 7. Ibid. notes on p. 18 that the "Navy nt."vcr Soviet Union in 19R2-83 was ddiber publicly acknowled(;cd eithcr me atdy engineered for propaganda B. Ibid. overflight or its error; it abo chose to purposes. these officials maintain-a say nothing ~~rther insiJ", the prctat ro create a siege mentality in governmtnt. the Soviet Union and to frighten the 9. See Gregory L Vistica. Fnllfrom outside world about US intentions. Glory: Th~ M~" Who Sank th~ u.s. I:>. This strange pamphlet was issued by ("Defector Told of Soviet Alert; Nnvy (New York: Simon & a one-room Japanese "publishing" KGB St:ltion Rcponedly Warned Schuster. 1996). pp. 10:>-108.116 firm in editions of 1.000 each in US Would Attack: Washington POJ(. 118. and 129-135, pas5im. English and Japanese. However. 8 August 1986. p. A I.) NOl'mti "reprinted" 100,000 copies 10. Equally important, the Nav), was in Russian. This suggestS twO able to offset the Soviets' ability to 3. Raymond L Garthoff. Th~ Gr~at things: the pamphlet was int<:nded track the fleet by reading naval com Tramirion: Amuican-Sovil!f R~ktriom primarily for the internal Soviet audi municarions. which rhe KGB had and th~ End ofth~ CoM War (\X/ash ence. and rhe Soviet people did not been able to decrypt since the late ingtoo. DC: The Brookings bdi.:ve their government's cxplana 1960s. thanks to ex-sailor John Institution. 1994). p. 60. Garthoff tion of the KAL 007 tragedy. Sce Walker and his spy ring. The FBI carefully considers all the details sur Murray Sayle. "Closing the File on arrested Walker in 1985. rounding Gordievsky's recruirmenr Flight 007." Th~ N~w York~r. Vol. and espionage for British inte1li I.XIX. No. 42 (13 December 1993). gence. his bona fides. and his II. As cired in Seymour Hersh, " T~ pp. 90-101. especially 94-95. defection. but still quesrions whether Targ~t iJ Destroyed": What ReaUy Happnu-d to Flight 007 and What the Soviets could have really believed 16. The [wo British accountS of Gordi in the war-scare scenario. Garthoff Am~ricam R~aUy Knrw About It (~ew York: Random House. 1986), evsky's role and how British stares. wrongly. that'Gordievsky' s p. 18. intelligence used him to influence information on RYAN was given to President Reagan's thinking on US intelligence only after his defec Soviet policy are: Gordon Brook- 12. Schweizer. Victory. p. 190. rion in :--lay 1985. The British Shepherd. The StOrm Birds: Th~ Dra shared the informarion-in sanitized matic Stori~5 ofth~ Top Sovin Spi~s form ro conceal rhe sourcc- 72 ~ Approved for Release : 2020103/11 C05584199 C05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 ~ret OIs(am- War Scare 19. Able Archl"r CClincided with October Re\'olution Da\". the CSSR'~ national holid3·Y. Holidays turned into n4tional drinking binges that incapacitated practically the entire country. Thi~ is an interesting bit of mirror-imaging. h<'cause NATO mili tarv planner~ almnst cc:rtainly did not factor the holiday into Allied war plans. 20. Christopher Andrew. "We Will Always Need Spies." Th~ LonMn Tim~s. 3 March 1994. Fcaturc~. p. 21. Smith. Thauha and RMgan, p. 122. 22. John Newhouse, War and Ptact in th( Nucuar Ag~ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989). p. 338. 23. For a discussion of the wealth of accurate informuion char was avail able to Stalin, see John Costello ana Oleg Tsarev, Dradly lIIusiom: Th( KGB Doss;" Rrwau Stalin j Masur Spy (N<."W York: Crown Publishers, 1993), pp. 85-90. This analysis is bas<:d on declassified Soviet intelli gence report.' from the KGB archi,·c. See also Barton Whaley, Codeword BARIlAR055A (Cambridge. / MA.: MIT Press. 1973), which . details more than 80 indications and warnings receiwd b~ ' So,'iec intelligence. 24 . Viktor Suvoro\,. la:brMktr: Who Slarl~d World \\"far ll.' (London: Hamish Hamihon. 1990), pp. 320-321 . 25. Willi.m J. Fuller. Jr .. Strategy and POW" in RUJJia 1600-/914 (New York: The Free Puss. 1992), p. 12. .seeret 73 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199