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The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations Document Number (FOIA)IESDN (CREST): 006122556

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The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations Document Number (FOIA)IESDN (CREST): 006122556 Washington, D.C. 20505 17 March 2020 Mr. John Greenewald, Jr. The Black Vault 27305 W. Li ve Oak Road Suite #1203 Castaic, CA 91384 Reference: EOM-2019-00973 This is a final response to your correspondence of 5 August 2019, submitted on behalf of The Black Vault, requesting an Executi ve Order 13526 mandatory declassification review of the following document: The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations Document Number (FOIA)IESDN (CREST): 006122556 We have completed a thorough search of our records and determined that the document may be released in sanitized form. We have deleted material that must remain classified on the basis of Section 1.4(c) of the Order. Additional information must be withheld because withholding is authorized and warranted under applicable law as provided by Section 6.2(d) of the Order. Enclosed is a copy showing our deletions and citing our exemptions. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel in my care, within 90 days for the date of this letter. Should you choose to do this, please include the basis of your appeal. To contact CIA directly or to appeal the To contact the Office of Government CIA's response to the Agency Release Information Services (OGIS) for Panel: mediation or with questions: Central Intelligence Agency Office of Government Information Washington, DC 20505 Services Information and Privacy Coordinator National Archives and Records (703) 613-3007 (Fax) Administration (703) 613-1287 - CIA FOIA Public 8601 Adelphi Road - OGIS Liaison / FOIA Hotline College Park, MD 20740-6001 (202) 741-5770 (877) 864-6448 (202) 741-5769 (Fax) [email protected] This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military. Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com C05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 -iet.e, Nofom EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs EO 13526 Threat Perception, Scare Tactic, or False Alarm? 6.2(d) The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations (S NF) Ben B. Fischer N('vn. pahaps. in Ih( postwar d(catUs -The Soviet War Scare WI7S I/'( sirualion in rh( woriJ as (Xple­ 1il'r. and hmct. mort difficult and Such rhetoric was the consequence unfovorablr. as in rh( first halfofrh( rather than the cause of tension, but 19801. frightening words masked teal fears. The Hirler analogy was 'more than Mikhail Gorbachro. an insult and may have been a Freud­ F(bruary 1986 ian slip, because war was on the , minds of Soviet leaders. Moscow was in the midst ofa "war scare" that had US-Soviet relations had come full twO distinct phases and twO different circle in 1983. Europeans were dimensions--one concealed in the Reagan was repeatedly declaring the outbreak of a Cold world ofclandestine intelligence compared to Hider and War II. and President Mitterrand " operations ~ince 1981. and [he other compared the situation to ~he 1962 accused of"fanning the revealed in the Soviet media twO Cuban crisis and the 1948 Berlin , years later. (U) flames 0 f war" -a­ more blockade. Such fears were exagger­ sinister image than ated. Nowhere in the world were the superpowers squared off in a 1.4(c) Andropov as a Red Darth conflict likely to erupt into war. Bue a modern-day Rip Van Winkle Vader. prepare an esumate t at In e ect waking up that year would not have concluded that the USSR was losing noticed much change in the interna­ the Cold War. Expressed in Soviet tional political landscape or realized , terms. the KGB projected that the that a substantial period of detente M corrc:lation of forcc:s~ between the " _had come and gone while he slept. USSR and the United Staces was (u) turning irreversibly against the former. This was profoundly differ­ The second Cold War was mainly a ent from optimistic assessments made war of words. In March, President in the 197.0s. when Kremlin leaders Reagan referred to the Soviet Union boasted that no international prol>­ as the "focus of evil in the world," as _lems could be solved without their an "evil empire." Generdl Secrerary participation or against their will and Andropov suggeSted Reagan was evcn threatened to replace [he Mon­ insane and a liar. Then things gor roe Doctrine with Brezhnev's by nasty. Following Andropov's lead declaring their governmer.[ would and no doubt his direction. the "not permit another Chile." I Marxist Soviet media launched a verbal offen­ theorists claimed that the 1970's cor­ Ben 8. Fischer is in CIA's Center for sive of a kind not seen since Stalin relarion was historically ordained and .the Study of Intelligence. that far surpassed Reagan's broad­ . scientifically established. but by the sides. Reagan was repeatedly early 1980s it was clear that Soviet compared to Hider and accused of successes in the international arena 6.2(d) "f~nning the flames of war"-a more owed more co US diversions. divi­ sinister image than Andropo\' as a sions, and defeats during the 1970s Rcd Darth Vader: (c) than co Soviet efforcs. (s NF) ~t 61 - ....-- -.- -_.. _------ .. -- --~ .---- ----- .. ­ Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 =05584199 Approved for Release: 2020103/11 C05584199 Geesel fQ'oJDffl War Scare ~d, for the first time since 1953, a Soviet" leader was telling the Soviet people The KGB assessment was more of a that the world was on the Andropov's remarks were unprece­ storm warning than a hurricane alerl. dented. He violated a longstanding Bu t Politburo forecasters reached a verge of a nuclear taboo by describing US nuclear weap­ stark polirical judgment: the chances holocaust. ons' numbers and capabilities in the of a nuclear war, including a US sur­ mass media. He referred to Soviet prise nuclear attack, were higher weapons and capabilities-also than at any time during the entire highly unusual-and s,1id explicitly Cold War. In May 1981, General that the USSR had. at best. only par­ Secretary Brezhne\' and then KGB " iry with the United States in strategic chief Andropov briefed the Politburo in rtlarion TO Tht aCliviry ofIht weaponry. And. for the: first time assessmenno a closed KGB confer­ adllmary's armtdform. (u) since 1953. a Soviet leader was tell­ ence. Then Andropov took the ing the Soviet people that the world podium to tell the assembled intelli­ Moscow's urgency was linked to the was on the verge of a nuclear holo­ gence managers and officers that the impending US deployment of Persh­ caust. If candor is a sign of sinceriry. KGB and the GRU were being ing II intermediate-range missiles in Moscow was worried. (u) placed on a permanent intelligence West Germany. Very accurate and watch (0 monitor indications and with a flight time under 10 minutes, warning of US war-planning and these missiles could-destroy hard tar­ The War Scare as an Intelligence preparations. Codenamed RYAN, Issue gets. including Soviet command and this alert was the largest Soviet peace­ control bunkers and missile: silos. time intelligence effort. (u) The Soviet war scare posed (WO ques­ with little or no warning. Guidance' tions for the Intelligence Communiry: cables referred to RYAN's critical During 1982, KGB Center assigned w~ it genuine, that is, did the Soviet importance to Soviet military strat­ RYAN a high, but not overriding, leadership actually believe that the egy and the need for advance prioriry. Then, on 17 February United States might attack? Ifso. why warning "to take retaliatory mea­ 1983, KGB residents already on alerr had the Kremlin reached that conclu­ sures." But Soviet leaders were less received "eyes only" cables telling sion! If the alarm was not genuine. interested in retaliation than in pre­ them that it had "acquired an espe­ then what purpose did it serve? (U) cial degree of urgencyn and was "now emption and needed RYAN data as of particularly grave importance." strategic warning to launch an attack By and large. the Communiry played They were ordered to organize a per­ on the new US missile sites. (u) down both the intelligence alert and manent watch using their entire: the war-scare propaganda as evidence operational staff, recruit new agents, The overt war sCire erupted twO of an authentic threat perception. It and redirect existing ones to RYAN years later. On 23 March 1983. Presi­ did so in part because the informa­ requirements. A circular message dent Reagan announced a program tion reaching it about the alert came from the Moscow Center to all KGB to develop a ground- and space­ primarily from British intelligence residencies put on alen Slaws stated: based, laser-armed. anti-ballistic-mis­ and was fragmentary, incomplete. and ambiguous. Moreover. the Brit­ sile shield designated Strategic ish protected the identiry of the ThtT~fort Ollt ofT/it chitfdim­ Defense Iniriative (SOl) bur quickly source-KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky. Tions for T/it activiT), ofTht KGB's dubbed "Star Wars" by the media. number (Wo in the London resi­ Four days larer-and in direct .fortigll stn'ia is To orgol/iu dencv- and his bona fides could dntction and a.russmwt ofsigm response-Andropov lashed out. He nor be independently established. US ofprtparaTionfor RYAN ill all accused the United States of prepar­ intelligence did have partially corrob­ fossiblt artas, i.t., political.
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