DOCSLIB.ORG

Recent Constitutional Reforms in Kazakhstan: a Move Towards Democratic Transition?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Recent Constitutional Reforms in Kazakhstan: a Move Towards Democratic Transition? review of central and east european law 42 (2017) 294-324 brill.com/rela Recent Constitutional Reforms in Kazakhstan: A Move towards Democratic Transition? Zhenis Kembayev kimep University, Almaty, Kazachstan <[email protected]> Abstract This article aims at examining the major principles and provisions of the constitu- tional structure of Kazakhstan in the context of the amendments introduced to the Constitution of Kazakhstan on 10 March 2017. In doing so, it provides an analysis of the fundamentals of Kazakhstan’s constitutional system as well as major constitutional provisions underlying the status of the capital, the status of individuals, the Kazakh- style strong presidency and weak parliament. The article provides background to Ka- zakhstan’s constitutional development and elections. It pays particular attention to the relationship between the President, the Parliament and the Government, but also expounds the influence of the President on the Constitutional Council and judicial bodies. Finally, it summarizes and demonstrates major features and problems of Ka- zakhstan’s constitutional system in order to provide an answer as to whether the recent constitutional reforms constitute a move towards the country’s democratic transition. Keywords Kazakhstan – Constitution of Kazakhstan – Nazarbayev – president of Kazakhstan – parliament of Kazakhstan – government of Kazakhstan – Constitutional Council of Kazakhstan – Astana 1 Introduction Speaking at a ceremony dedicated to the 25th anniversary of Kazakhstan’s in- dependence in December 2016, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev pro- posed to amend the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which had © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2017 | doi 10.1163/15730352-04204002Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 02:45:35AM via free access <UN> Recent Constitutional Reforms in Kazakhstan 295 been adopted by all-nation referendum on 30 August 1995,1 and ordered to create a special commission with the purpose of working out proposals on “re- distribution of powers between the President, the Parliament and the Govern- ment” and of transferring some presidential powers to the Government and the Parliament.2 The commission was created early the next year and already on 25 January 2017, President Nazarbayev unveiled a package of draft consti- tutional changes that was submitted for a one-month nationwide discussion.3 The elderly leader said this would deliver “democratization of the political sys- tem as a whole”.4 In fact, the words of the Kazakh President are of particular importance, as Kazakhstan is consistently classified as “not free”5 and “authoritarian”.6 In difference to the first Constitution of independent Kazakhstan of 28 January 1993,7 which gave strong competences to legislative and judicial bodies, en- abling them to effectively balance and control the executive branch headed by the President,8 the current Constitution granted extensive powers to the 1 See Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan (30 August 1995), available at <http://online.zakon. kz/Document/?doc_id=1005029> (hereinafter “Constitution of Kazakhstan” or “Constitu- tion”). Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Russian and German into English in this work are by the author of the present article. 2 “Kazakhstan mozhet vnesti izmeneniia v Konstitutsiiu”, Sputnik International (15 December 2016), available at <https://ru.sputniknews.kz/politics/20161215/1218211/kazahstan-mozhet- vnesti-izmeneniya-v-konstituciyu.html>. 3 See Rasporiazhenie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan “O vsenarodnom obsuzhdenii pro- ekta Zakona Respubliki Kazakhstan o vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiiu Re- spubliki Kazakhstan” (25 January 2017) No.141, available at <http://www.kazpravda.kz/fresh/ view/rasporyazhenie-prezidenta-respubliki-kazahstan3>. 4 “Kazakh President Nazarbayev plans to give certain powers to parliament” (25 January 2017), available at <http://www.dw.com/en/kazakh-president-nazarbayev-plans-to-give-certain-po wers-to-parliament/a-37274430>. 5 See “Kazakhstan: Profile”, available at <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/ kazakhstan>. 6 See “Democracy Index 2016”, available at <http://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index>. 7 See Konstitutsiia Respubliki Kazakhstan (28 January 1993), available at <https://online.za- kon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1010212#pos=0;147> (ceased to be in force, hereinafter “Constitu- tion of 1993”). See an English translation in Rett R. Ludwikowski, Constitution-Making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance (Duke University Press, Durham, 1996), 443ff. 8 As a result, however, tensions flared between Nazarbayev and the legislature over the pace of market-oriented reforms, the scope of privatization and also the timeframe of the reloca- tion of the Kazakh capital (see infra Section 3). Those tensions led to the dissolutions of the Parliament in December 1993 and March 1995 and eventually to the adoption of the new Constitution by all-nation referendum on 30 August 1995. See, e.g., Zhenis Kembayev, “The Rise of Presidentialism in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Example of Kazakhstan”, in Rainer review of central and east european law 42 (2017)Downloaded 294-324 from Brill.com09/27/2021 02:45:35AM via free access <UN> 296 Kembayev President, putting him in a superior position within Kazakhstan’s political system. In particular, in his capacity of guarantor of the inviolability of the Constitution,9 who is entitled to play an (almost) exclusive role in the pro- cess of initiating any amendments or additions to the Constitution, the Presi- dent may choose whether he pursues the constitutional changes through the Parliament,10 which would have to approve them by a three-fourths majority in both chambers,11 or through conducting a nationwide referendum, which can be initiated by the President along with the Parliament or the Govern- ment, but endorsed only by the President.12 In Kazakhstan’s constitutional history there were two referendums; the first, held on 29 April 1995, extended the authority of the President for five years and practically allowed him to start the process of fundamentally changing the country’s political system, while the second, organized on 30 August 1995, approved the new Constitution. Thereafter, however, no referendums were conducted in Kazakhstan; in particular, also not in the case of three previous constitutional amendments introduced on 7 October 1998,13 21 May 200714 and 2 February 2011,15 which were approved by the Parliament. Based on his powers and following the established practice, President Naz- arbayev decided to make constitutional amendments through the Parliament. Accordingly, on 3 March 2017, the President submitted to the Parliament a draft law introducing amendments to the Constitution. Even though more than 6,000 proposals were made on how to change the Constitution during Grote and Tilmann Röder (eds.), Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries: Between Upheaval and Continuity (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011), 438. 9 Constitution of Kazakhstan, op.cit. note 1, Art.40(2). 10 Ibid., Arts.53(1), 91(1). 11 Ibid., Art.62(3). 12 Ibid., Arts.44(10), 91(1). 13 See Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan “O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiiu Respubliki Kazakhstan” (7 October 1998) No.284-i, available at <http://online.zakon.kz/ Document/?doc_id=1010769#pos=0;151> (hereinafter “Constitutional Amendment Law of 1998”). 14 See Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan “O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Konstitutsiiu Respubliki Kazakhstan” (21 May 2007) No.254-iii, available at <http://online.zakon.kz/ Document/?doc_id=30103613#pos=0;0> (hereinafter “Constitutional Amendment Law of 2007”). 15 See Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan “O vnesenii dopolneniia v Konstitutsiiu Respubliki Ka- zakhstan” (2 February 2011) No.403-iv, available at <http://online.zakon.kz/Document/? doc_id=30925295> (hereinafter “Constitutional Amendment Law of 2011”). review of central and east europeanDownloaded law from 42 Brill.com09/27/2021 (2017) 294-324 02:45:35AM via free access <UN> Recent Constitutional Reforms in Kazakhstan 297 the one-month nationwide discussion,16 the submitted draft had only a few (though substantial) modifications from the initial package.17 Already on 6 March, the Parliament adopted the draft envisaging 26 amendments to 19 ar- ticles of the Constitution and submitted the draft to the President for sign- ing into law. On the same day, Nazarbayev sent the draft to the Constitutional Council18 to check its compliance with the fundamentals of Kazakhstan’s constitutional system. Receiving a positive resolution of the Constitutional Council,19 on 10 March, the President signed the draft into law, which immedi- ately came into effect.20 This article aims at examining the major principles and provisions of the constitutional structure of Kazakhstan in the context of recent constitutional amendments introduced to the Constitution of Kazakhstan and at providing an answer as to whether those amendments constitute a move towards the country’s democratic transition. For these purposes, the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an analysis of the fundamentals of Kazakhstan’s constitutional system and argues that the major goal of the recent constitu- tional amendments was to strengthen the existing constitutional values and tenets aiming primarily at safeguarding political stability and promoting con- solidation of the country. Section 3 explains the role of Kazakhstan’s capital in the process of the country’s consolidation as well as recent amendments
Load more

Recommended publications
  • President Addresses First Joint Session of New Kazakh Parliament
    +5° / +1°C WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2016 No 6 (96) www.astanatimes.com President Addresses First Exit Poll Says Nur Otan Joint Session of New Kazakh Wins Overwhelmingly as Parliament, Sets Priorities Mazhilis Retains Previous Makeup greens Birlik (Unity) grabbed mea- By Galiaskar Seitzhan ger 0.35 percent. This outcome is basically a virtual repetition of the ASTANA – President Nursultan previous parliamentary election in Nazarbayev-led Nur Otan Party January 2012, which ended with won 82 percent of the popular vote very similar results. in the parliamentary election in Turnout, however, proved strong- Kazakhstan, according to exit poll er this time setting a new record in results announced at midnight on the country’s electoral history and March 21. beating the result from four years The survey also showed the ruling ago when 75.45 percent of regis- party will be opposed by the same tered voters showed up at the polls. parties in the new convocation of Yulia Kuchinskaya, head of the President Nursultan Nazarbayev (at the speaking rostrum) addresses the first joint session of the Senate and the Mazhilis on March 25. the Mazhilis (the national legisla- Astana-based Institute of Democ- ture’s lower chamber) as it was the racy sociological survey company pro-business Ak zhol Democratic According to Kazakhstan’s Cen- niversary of independence with Nazarbayev recalled that the omy of Kazakhstan. Various social Party and leftist Communist Peo- tral Election Commission Chair- By Malika orazgaliyeva the newly elected parliament. 25th anniversary of Kazakhstan’s problems grow even in relatively ple’s Party again barely crossed the man (CEC) Kuandyk Turgankulov, Three parties and nine members independence coincided with a prosperous countries, he noted.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Religion and the Courts 1790-1947 Leslie C. Griffin When the Framers
    Religion and the Courts 1790-1947 Leslie C. Griffin* When the Framers drafted the United States Constitution in 1787, the only mention of religion was the remarkable text of Article VI, which states “no Religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” That groundbreaking language marked a shift from prior practice in Europe and the states. At the time of the Constitution’s drafting, most states had religious qualifications for government officials, following the pattern in Britain, where the monarch was required to be a member of the Church of England. In Europe the guiding principle was cuius regio, eius religio: the religion of the people is determined by the religion of the ruler. Many of the Framers, especially James Madison, believed that the new Constitution protected liberty of conscience by creating a government of enumerated and separate powers that gave Congress no authority over religion. During the ratification process, however, constitutional critics demanded greater protection of individuals from the power of the government. In order to secure the Constitution’s ratification, the new Congress drafted a Bill of Rights that protected religious freedom in the following language: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Upon ratification by the states in 1791, the language about religion became the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 The two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment are known as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Although Madison suggested that the standard protecting liberty of conscience should apply to state as well as federal governments, the language of the First Amendment—“Congress 1 shall”—applied only to the federal government.
    [Show full text]
  • CASC Newsletter #2
    Newsletter College of Social Sciences, KIMEP University # 2, Spring 2016 Dear friends, Contemporary Eurasia: Between It is our pleasure to present to you the second issue of Greater Europe and Greater Asia KIMEP CASC newsletter! International conference summary with links to full-length session videos, page 3 Here you can find information about theevents that we had in Fall 2015 and early Spring 2016. We held a series of public lectures on a variety of topics ranging from the IMF economic outlook for the region of Central Asia to new cinema language in Kazakhstan (pages 2–3). Together with one of the top international think tanks, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), we co-organized an international workshop on the economics of the Silk Road Economic Belt (page 6). This newsletter features interviews with workshop participants from Kazakhstan, China, and Russia The Gumbez of Manas, Karakol bazaar, (pages 7–9). archaeological excavations at Boschekul We continue our fruitful partnership with Friedrich Ebert Photos from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, pages 10–11 Foundation (FES) in Kazakhstan. With the support of FES we launched our own CASC YouTube channel, and now you can watch the videos of our joint events, including the 5 recent publications roundtables on legal culture in Kazakhstan and gender in by KIMEP College of Social Sciences faculty, last page contemporary Kazakhstan, and those of the international conference “Contemporary Eurasia: Between Greater Eu- rope and Greater Asia” (page 3). The conference gathered 329-page infographics-rich report prominent scholars from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, by the World Bank on the prospects for and Russia who discussed geopolitical and political trends healthy, active and prosperous in the Eurasian space.
    [Show full text]
  • 2019/2610(Rsp
    European Parliament 2014-2019 TEXTS ADOPTED P8_TA(2019)0203 Human rights situation in Kazakhstan European Parliament resolution of 14 March 2019 on the human rights situation in Kazakhstan (2019/2610(RSP)) The European Parliament, – having regard to its resolution of 12 December 2017 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part1 and to its resolution of 10 March 2016 on Freedom of Expression in Kazakhstan2, – having regard to its legislative resolution of 12 December 2017 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part3, – having regard to its previous resolutions on Kazakhstan, including those of 18 April 20134 and 15 March 20125, and that of 17 September 2009 on the case of Yevgeny Zhovtis in Kazakhstan6, – having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) signed in Astana on 21 December 2015, – having regard to its resolutions of 15 December 2011 on the state of implementation of the EU Strategy for Central Asia7, and of 13 April 2016 on implementation and review of the EU-Central Asia Strategy8, 1 OJ C 369, 11.10.2018, p. 2. 2 OJ C 50, 9.2.2018, p. 38. 3 OJ C 369, 11.10.2018, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Institutional Reforms Within the Framework of Central Asian Political Consolidation
    Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Diplomasi Dergisi/Journal of International Relations and Diplomacy Cilt/Volume: 3 Sayı/Issue: 1 Mart/March 2020 ss./pp.24-43 INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CENTRAL ASIAN POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION * Asst. Prof. Kaan DİYARBAKIRLIOGLU ABSTRACT Stagnation in the Soviet Union that began in the 1970s could not be prevented despite all the reform efforts (perestroika and glastnost) made by Gorbachev who came to power in 1985, and the Soviet Union has entered a process of disintegration after 1987. After that, Central Asian Republics gained their independence and attempted to make a change and transformation in their institutional structures in order to integrate into the international system. This study focus on the examples of Kyrgyzstan, which has a political development that is unique to Central Asia, Kazakhstan, which has a pioneering role with the rapid transformations it creates in both political and economic institutions, Turkmenistan, which has been isolated from the outside World, Uzbekistan, which performs this transformation progressively and Tajikistan that have a distinct character due to the civil war it has been through. As a result of this study, it can be stated that these Central Asian states are not ready for a parliamentary form of government due to existing national, ethnic and religious divisions, which can lead to destabilization of the political system and prevailing of dominant clans. However, they need a stable presidential power, which will allow to avoid crises like the revolutions of 2005 and 2010 in the future. Key Words: Soviet Union, Central Asia, Political Institutions, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan JEL Codes: F55, N45, H77 ORTA ASYA’DA SİYASİ KONSOLİDASYON ÇERÇEVESİNDE KURUMSAL REFORMLAR ÖZET 1970'lerde başlayan Sovyetler Birliği'ndeki durgunluk, 1985'te iktidara gelen Gorbaçov'un yaptığı tüm reform çabalarına (perestroika ve glastnost) rağmen engellenemedi ve Sovyetler Birliği 1987'den sonra bir dağılma sürecine girdi.
    [Show full text]
  • Observation of the Early Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan (20 March 2016)
    http://assembly.coe.int Doc. 14061 12 May 2016 Observation of the early parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan (20 March 2016) Election observation report Ad hoc Committee of the Bureau Rapporteur: Mr Jordi XUCLÀ, Spain, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Contents Page 1. Introduction............................................................................................................................................... 1 2. Legal framework and political context....................................................................................................... 2 3. Administration of elections, registration of voters and candidates............................................................. 3 4. Election campaign and media environment...............................................................................................4 5. Election day.............................................................................................................................................. 5 6. Conclusions and recommendations.......................................................................................................... 6 Appendix 1 – Composition of the ad hoc committee..................................................................................... 7 Appendix 2 – Programme of the observation of the early parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan.................8 Appendix 3 – Statement by the International Election Observation Mission................................................10 1. Introduction 1. The Republic
    [Show full text]
  • Supermajority Voting Requirements for Tax Increases: Evidence from the States
    Journal of Public Economics 76 (2000) 41±67 www.elsevier.nl/locate/econbase Supermajority voting requirements for tax increases: evidence from the states Brian G. Knight* Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA Received 1 April 1998; received in revised form 1 September 1998; accepted 1 September 1999 Abstract This paper measures the effect of state-level supermajority requirements for tax increases on tax rates. Unobserved attitudes towards taxation tend to in¯uence both the adoption of supermajority requirements and tax policy. Consequently, one cannot distinguish between the effect of these requirements and their correlation with these unobserved attitudes. A model is presented in which legislatures controlled by a pro-tax party adopt a supermajority requirement to reduce the majority party agenda control. The propensity of pro-tax states to adopt supermajority requirements results in an underestimate of the true effect of these requirements on taxes. To correct this identi®cation problem, the paper ®rst uses ®xed effects to control for unobserved attitudes and then employs instruments that measure the dif®culty of amending state constitutions. The paper concludes that supermajority require- ments have signi®cantly reduced taxes. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. Keywords: Budget institutions; State and local public ®nance; Majority voting JEL classi®cation: H72; D72 1. Introduction In each of the years between 1996 and 1999, the US Congress voted on a proposed constitutional amendment to require a two-thirds supermajority legisla- *Tel.: 11-608-262-5353. E-mail address: [email protected] (B.G. Knight) 0047-2727/00/$ ± see front matter 2000 Elsevier Science S.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Legislative Chambers: Unicameral Or Bicameral?
    Legislative Chambers: Unicameral or Bicameral? Legislative Chambers: Unicameral or Bicameral? How many chambers a parliament should have is a controversial question in constitutional law. Having two legislative chambers grew out of the monarchy system in the UK and other European countries, where there was a need to represent both the aristocracy and the common man, and out of the federal system in the US. where individual states required representation. In recent years, unicameral systems, or those with one legislative chamber, were associated with authoritarian states. Although that perception does not currently hold true, there appears to be a general trend toward two chambers in emerging democracies, particularly in larger countries. Given historical, cultural and political factors, governments must decide whether one-chamber or two chambers better serve the needs of the country. Bicameral Chambers A bicameral legislature is composed of two-chambers, usually termed the lower house and upper house. The lower house is usually based proportionally on population with each member representing the same number of citizens in each district or region. The upper house varies more broadly in the way in which members are selected, including inheritance, appointment by various bodies and direct and indirect elections. Representation in the upper house can reflect political subdivisions, as is the case for the US Senate, German Bundesrat and Indian Rajya Sabha. Bicameral systems tend to occur in federal states, because of that system’s two-tiered power structure. Where subdivisions are drawn to coincide with other important societal units, the upper house can serve to represent ethnic, religious or tribal groupings, as in India or Ethiopia.
    [Show full text]
  • Federalism, Bicameralism, and Institutional Change: General Trends and One Case-Study*
    brazilianpoliticalsciencereview ARTICLE Federalism, Bicameralism, and Institutional Change: General Trends and One Case-study* Marta Arretche University of São Paulo (USP), Brazil The article distinguishes federal states from bicameralism and mechanisms of territorial representation in order to examine the association of each with institutional change in 32 countries by using constitutional amendments as a proxy. It reveals that bicameralism tends to be a better predictor of constitutional stability than federalism. All of the bicameral cases that are associated with high rates of constitutional amendment are also federal states, including Brazil, India, Austria, and Malaysia. In order to explore the mechanisms explaining this unexpected outcome, the article also examines the voting behavior of Brazilian senators constitutional amendments proposals (CAPs). It shows that the Brazilian Senate is a partisan Chamber. The article concludes that regional influence over institutional change can be substantially reduced, even under symmetrical bicameralism in which the Senate acts as a second veto arena, when party discipline prevails over the cohesion of regional representation. Keywords: Federalism; Bicameralism; Senate; Institutional change; Brazil. well-established proposition in the institutional literature argues that federal Astates tend to take a slow reform path. Among other typical federal institutions, the second legislative body (the Senate) common to federal systems (Lijphart 1999; Stepan * The Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa no Estado
    [Show full text]
  • Doing Business in Kazakhstan
    DOING BUSINESS 2021 IN KAZAKHSTAN Doing Business in Kazakhstan 2021 Baker McKenzie – CIS, Limited Almaty office Samal Towers, 8th Floor 97 Zholdasbekov Street Almaty, Kazakhstan 050051 Phone: +7 727 3 300 500 Facsimile: +7 727 258 40 00 [email protected] www.bakermckenzie.com The information in this brochure is for informational purposes only and it may not reflect the most current legal developments, judgments or settlements. This information is not offered as legal or any other advice on any particular matter. The Firm and the contributing authors expressly disclaim all liability to any person in respect of anything and in respect of the consequences of anything done or omitted wholly or partly in reliance upon the whole or any part of the contents of Baker McKenzie’s “Doing Business in Kazakhstan” brochure. No client or other reader should act or refrain from acting on the basis of any matter contained in this brochure without seeking the appropriate legal or other professional advice on the particular facts and circumstances. Doing Business in Kazakhstan Table of Contents 1 Kazakhstan — an overview ..................................................... 1 1.1 Geography .................................................................... 1 1.2 Population .................................................................... 1 1.3 History.......................................................................... 1 1.4 Government and political system ................................. 2 1.5 Economy .....................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Managed Leadership Succession in Kazakhstan: a Model for Gradual
    MARCH 2020 279 MANAGED LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION IN KAZAKHSTAN A MODEL FOR GRADUAL DEPARTURE? Kristiina Silvan MARCH 2020 279 MANAGED LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION IN KAZAKHSTAN A MODEL FOR GRADUAL DEPARTURE? • In March 2019, Kazakhstan’s authoritarian leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev, stepped down after three decades of rule and yielded power to his nominated successor, Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev. However, Nazarbayev has paradoxically remained the most powerful political actor in Kazakhstan. • Kazakhstan’s model of gradual leadership succession could serve as an example to authoritarian states around the world, but it is particularly significant in the post-Soviet context. • Institutional and constitutional changes that took place in the 1990s were aimed at concentrating power in the presidency. • Modifications initiated by Nazarbayev in the 2000s and 2010s sought to weaken the Kazakh presi- dency while strengthening power vested in himself personally, in order to ensure the continuation of a political status quo and his family’s well-being after the transfer of power. • Despite the careful preparation and Tokayev’s relatively smooth ascension to power, it is still too early to evaluate the success of the transfer due to the vast powers retained by Nazarbayev. The transition of power in Kazakhstan remains an ongoing process and, as such, unpredictable. KRISTIINA SILVAN Research Fellow EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research programme Finnish Institute of International Affairs ISBN 978-951-769-631-9 ISSN 1795-8059 Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen Cover photo: Wikimedia Commons/Ken and Nyett. CC BY 2.0. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is an independent research institute that produces high-level research to support political decisionmaking and public debate both nationally and internationally.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Federation Interim Opinion on Constitutional
    Strasbourg, 23 March 2021 CDL-AD(2021)005 Opinion No. 992/2020 Or. Engl. EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) RUSSIAN FEDERATION INTERIM OPINION ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND THE PROCEDURE FOR THEIR ADOPTION Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 126th Plenary Session (online, 19-20 March 2021) on the basis of comments by Mr Nicos ALIVIZATOS (Member, Greece) Ms Claire BAZY MALAURIE (Member, France) Ms Veronika BÍLKOVÁ (Member, Czech Republic) Mr Iain CAMERON (Member, Sweden) Ms Monika HERMANNS (Substitute Member, Germany) Mr Martin KUIJER (Substitute Member, Netherlands) This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy. www.venice.coe.int CDL-AD(2021)005 - 2 - Contents I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3 II. Scope of the present opinion .......................................................................................... 4 III. Chronology of the preparation and adoption of the constitutional amendments ............. 4 IV. Analysis of the procedure for the Adoption of the Constitutional Amendments .............. 6 A. Speed of preparation of the amendments - consultations ........................................... 6 B. Competence of the Constitutional Court ..................................................................... 7 C. Competence of the Constitutional Assembly .............................................................. 7 D. Ad hoc procedure .......................................................................................................
    [Show full text]