DOCSLIB.ORG

Future of the Yemen Conflict After the Withdrawal of Emirati Forces

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Future of the Yemen Conflict After the Withdrawal of Emirati Forces Situation Assessement | 16 July 2019 Future of the Yemen conflict after the Withdrawal of Emirati Forces Unit for Political Studies Future of the Yemen conflict after the Withdr wal of Emirati Forc Series: Situation Assessement 16 July 2019 Unit for Political Studies The Unlt for Powltlcal Stutlec is the Center’c tep rtment tetlc tet to the ctuty of the reglon’c moct pressing current ffairc. An lntegral nt vltal p rt of the ACRPS’ ctlvltlec, lt offerc c temlcally rlgorouc nalysis on issuec th t re rewev nt nt ucefuw to the pubwlc, c temlcc nt powlcy-m kerc of the Ar b reglon nt beyont. The Unlt for Powltlcal Stutle traws on the collabor tlve effortc of number of ccholarc baset withln nt outclte the ACRPS. It protucec three of the Center’c pubwlc tlon cerlec: Assessment Report, Powlcy Analysis, nt Case Analysis reportc. Copyright © 2019 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. The Ar b Center for Rece rch nt Powlcy Stutlec is n lntepentent rece rch lnctltute nt thlnk t nk for the ctuty of history nt cocial cclencec, with p rtlcular emphasis on the ppwlet cocial cclencec. The Center’c p r mount concern is the tv ncement of Ar b cocletlec nt ct tec, thelr cooper tlon with one nother nt issuec concernlng the Ar b n tlon ln general. To th t ent, lt ceekc to ex mlne nt diagnoce the cltu tlon ln the Ar b rorwt - ct tec nt communltlec- to nalyze cocial, economlc nt cuwtural powlclec and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. The Center publishec ln both Ar blc nt fnglish ln orter to m ke ltc rork ccessibwe to both Ar b nt non- Arab researchers. The Ar b Center for Rece rch nt Powlcy Stutlec Aw-T rf Street, Wadi Aw B n t Aw-D y en, Q t r PO Box 10277, Doh +974 4035 4111 www.tohainctltute.org Future of the Yemen conflict after the Withdr wal of Emirati Forc Series: Situation Assessement Table of Contents 16 July 2019 Strength nt Concentr tlon of UAf Forcec . 1 The iliM t ry nt Securlty Forcec Supportlng the UAf Precence . 1 Unit for Political Studies Security Belt Forces 1 Elite Forces 2 The Unlt for Powltlcal Stutlec is the Center’c tep rtment tetlc tet to the ctuty of the reglon’c moct pressing current ffairc. An lntegral nt vltal p rt of the ACRPS’ ctlvltlec, lt offerc c temlcally rlgorouc nalysis on issuec th t re Combined forces 2 rewev nt nt ucefuw to the pubwlc, c temlcc nt powlcy-m kerc of the Ar b reglon nt beyont. The Unlt for Powltlcal Stutle traws on the collabor tlve effortc of number of ccholarc baset withln nt outclte the ACRPS. It protucec The N ture nt C ucec of the UAf Withtrawal . 2 three of the Center’c pubwlc tlon cerlec: Assessment Report, Powlcy Analysis, nt Case Analysis reportc. The Impwlc tlonc of the UAf Withtrawal . 3 Implications on the Ground 4 Copyright © 2019 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. The Repercussions for the Saudi - UAE Alliance 4 Conclusion . 4 The Ar b Center for Rece rch nt Powlcy Stutlec is n lntepentent rece rch lnctltute nt thlnk t nk for the ctuty of history nt cocial cclencec, with p rtlcular emphasis on the ppwlet cocial cclencec. The Center’c p r mount concern is the tv ncement of Ar b cocletlec nt ct tec, thelr cooper tlon with one nother nt issuec concernlng the Ar b n tlon ln general. To th t ent, lt ceekc to ex mlne nt diagnoce the cltu tlon ln the Ar b rorwt - ct tec nt communltlec- to nalyze cocial, economlc nt cuwtural powlclec and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. The Center publishec ln both Ar blc nt fnglish ln orter to m ke ltc rork ccessibwe to both Ar b nt non- Arab researchers. The Ar b Center for Rece rch nt Powlcy Stutlec Aw-T rf Street, Wadi Aw B n t Aw-D y en, Q t r PO Box 10277, Doh +974 4035 4111 www.tohainctltute.org Future of the Yemen conflict after the Withdr wal of Emirati Forc On 8 Juwy 2019, the Unltet Ar b fmlr tec nnouncet ltc lntentlon to retuce nt retepwoy ltc forcec ln Yemen, as p rt of ltc tr ncltlon from “milit ry firct” to “pe ce firct” ctr tegy. The tecision raiset quectlonc bout ltc lmpwlc tlonc on the grount, nt the f te of the Ar b alliance, rhlch has alre ty chrunk to juct S utl Ar bia nt the Unltet Ar b fmlr tec, nt the future of the conflct ln Yemen betreen the UN sanctlonet government, reprecentet by Precltent Abtr bbuh M ncur H tl, nt the te f cto uthorlty ln S n ’ , Ansar Allah (the Houthis). Strength and Concentration of UAE Forces Some courcec ectlm te th t there re bout 5000 fmlr tl cowtlerc p rtlclp tlng ln the war ln Yemen.(1) They re woc tet t thelr orn milit ry basec nt comm nt nt trainlng centerc ln ceveral coastal reas rount the Guwf of Aten nt the Ret Se , with the exceptlon of the S rawah base woc tet ln the northern governor te of M rlb. Thece basec re Breg ln al-Buraiq distrlct, Aten governor te, rhlch is the main center for fmlr tl forcec ln Yemen,(2) Aw-Rly n (Aw-Rly n Mukalla airport) ln H tr mout (S hew), Balh f ln the Sh bwa Governor te, al-M kh (or Moch ) port ln Taiz nt al-Khokh ln the Hoteida Governor te. Llmltet numberc of UAf troopc re tepwoyet ln p rtc of Aten, L hj, Sh bwa, H tr mout, Aw M hr h nt reas of the eect Coast.(3) The islant of Socotr ln the Indian Oce n, rhere the UAf has built milit ry b rr ckc, is be free of ny Houthl milit ry ctlvlty. The Military and Security Forces Supporting the UAE Presence The rowe of the UAf forcec is to comm nt nt controw the rmet form tlonc ect blishet nt cupportet turlng the b ttwec with the Houthis ln the couthern governor tec of 2015 nt 2016, as they become cornerctone of the UAf cecurlty ctr tegy ln Yemen.(4) The rowe of the Sudanece forcec emerget ln the b ttwec of the eect Coast, along with other rmet form tlonc ect blishet by the UAf for this purpoce, nt later c me to be knorn as the “Jolnt Forcec”.(5) The moct lmport nt of thece form tlonc re: Security Belt Forces Southern cecurlty form tlonc cpre t rount the governor tec of Aten, L hj, Aby n nt Dhale. A number of them re p rtlclp tlng ln cecont group of tt cklng forcec on the eect Coast, cuch 1 Declan Walsh & D vlt D. Klrkp trlck, “U.A.f. Pulls Moct Forcec from Yemen ln Bwor to S utl War fffort,” The New York Times, 11/7/2019, ccesset on 15/7/2019, t: httpc://nytl.mc/2JM RX 2 “Moh mmet bln Rashlt nt Moh mmet bln Z yet greet the UAf cowtlerc ln Yemen - wlve Eid al-Ath bro tcast”, YouTube, 1/9/2017, ccesset 15/7/2019, t: http://blt.wy/2Obg6cH 3 “Flnal report of the P new of fxpertc on Yemen m ndatet by p r gr ph 6 of Securlty Council recowutlon 2342 (2017)”, UN Securlty Council, 26/1/2018, ccesset 15/7/2019, t httpc://www.untocc.org/en/S/2018/68/Corr.1; “On Yemen: Pillarc nt H rvect,” Abb t Stutlec nt Rece rch Center, 23/9/2018, ccesset 15/7/2019, t: http://blt.wy/2Ne4UQL 4 “Flnal report of the P new of fxpertc on Yemen m ndatet by p r gr ph 6 of Securlty Council recowutlon 2342 (2017)” 5 “Flnal report of the P new of fxpertc on Yemen m ndatet by p r gr ph 6 of Securlty Council recowutlon2402 (2018)”, UN Securlty Council, 25/1/2019, ccesset 15/7/2019, t: httpc://www.untocc.org/en/S/2019/83 1 Situation Assessement | 16 July 2019 as the 20th brlg te, nt the 3rt brlg te b ck-up nt cupport. The b ck-up nt cupport forcec re the comblnet entlty of the cecurlty bewt forcec nt other cupport brlg tec. Horever, the co- callet cecurlty bewt forcec h ve been callet “b ckup nt cupport forcec” tue to the promlnent fiewt ctlvlty of the bewt forcec. Elite Forces Thece re couthern milit ry form tlonc, n met the “urb n ewlte” cpre t rount H tr mout coast nt the “Sh bwaan ewlte” cpre t rount the governor te of Sh bwa. Attemptc to form ewlte forcec ln M h r nt Socotr h ve failet; they h ve remainet wlnket to wegltlm te government forcec. Combined forces Thece forcec re compocet of lntepentent unltc, mainwy couthern nt northern militias, rhlch lncwute both the Giantc brlg tec, the resist nce brlg tec, nt the repubwlc n gu rds. It is woc tet on the rect coast of the Ret Se , ln the re ctretchlng from the B b al-M ndab Strait to Hoteida Alrport. It was merget unter the cupervision of S utl commlttee, unter unlfiet Yemenl we terchlp, following the tep rture of the UAf comm nt, rhlch lt cuperviset until the ent of the firct reek of Juwy 2019.(6) There re other forcec callet the “Abu Abbas Brlg tec”, ln relatlon to ltc founter nt we ter, Atew ‘Abu Abbas’ Abtu F ree.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Yemen's Salafi Network(S): Mortgaging the Country's Future
    VERSUS Workshop 4 July 2019 — 1st Draft Yemen’s Salafi Network(s): Mortgaging the Country’s Future Thanos Petouris Introduction The takeover of the Yemeni capital Sanaʿa by the Huthi forces in September 2014 and their subsequent coup of February 2015 that led to the ousting of the incumbent president ʿAbd Rabbu Mansur Hadi and his government signify the beginning of the current Yemeni civil war. The restoration of president Hadi’s rule is also the ostensible primary aim of the direct military intervention by the Saudi and Emirati-led Arab coalition forces, which is also intent on defeating the Huthi movement. The rise of the Huthis, or Ansar Allah as they call themselves, has been inextricably linked with the rise and activities of Salafi activists in the northern Yemeni heartland of the Zaydi Shiʿa sect and has been depicted as a response, in part, both to the doctrinal challenge and social pressure exerted over the Zaydi community by Salafism.1 Since the beginning of the Yemeni civil war Salafi militiamen, either individually or as leaders of larger groups, have participated in numerous military operations mostly under the control of the Arab coalition forces.2 Their active involvement in the conflict marks a significant departure from the doctrinal tenets of Yemeni Salafism, which are generally characterised by a reluctance for participation in the politics of the land.3 Today, more than four years into the conflict, what can be termed as Yemen’s Salafi Network is conspicuous by its established presence both within local political movements (Southern Transitional Council; hereafter STC), and as part of coalition-led military units (Security Belt forces, local Elite forces, Giants Brigades etc).
    [Show full text]
  • The Two Yemens
    1390_A24-A34 11/4/08 5:14 PM Page 543 330-383/B428-S/40005 The Two Yemens 171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen1 Washington, February 27, 1969, 1710Z. 30762. Subj: US–PRSY Relations. 1. PRSY UN Perm Rep Nu’man,2 who currently in Washington as PRSYG observer at INTELSAT Conference, had frank but cordial talk with ARP Country Director Brewer February 26. 2. In analyzing causes existing coolness in USG–PRSYG relations, Ambassador Nu’man claimed USG failure offer substantial aid at time of independence and subsequent seizure of American arms with clasped hands insignia3 in possession of anti-PRSYG dissidents had led Aden to “natural” conclusion that USG distrusts PRSYG. He specu- lated this due to close US relationship with Saudis whom Nu’man al- leged, somewhat vaguely, had privately conveyed threats to overthrow NLF regime, claiming USG support. Nu’man asserted PRSYG desired good relations with USG and hoped USG would reciprocate. 3. Recalling history of USG attempts to develop good relations with PRSYG, Brewer underlined our feeling it was PRSYG which had not re- ciprocated. He reviewed our position re non-interference PRSY internal affairs, regretting publicity anti-USG charges (e.g. re arms) without first seeking our explanation. Brewer noted USG seeks maintain friendly relations with Saudi Arabia as well as PRSYG but we not responsible for foreign policy of either. 4. Nu’man reiterated SAG responsible poor state Saudi-PRSY con- tacts. Brewer demurred, noting SAG had good reasons be concerned over hostile attitude PRSYG leaders.
    [Show full text]
  • Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014
    United Nations A/HRC/39/43* General Assembly Distr.: General 17 August 2018 Original: English Human Rights Council Thirty-ninth session 10–28 September 2018 Agenda items 2 and 10 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General Technical assistance and capacity-building Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights containing the findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts and a summary of technical assistance provided by the Office of the High Commissioner to the National Commission of Inquiry** Summary The present report is being submitted to the Human Rights Council in accordance with Council resolution 36/31. Part I of the report contains the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen. Part II provides an account of the technical assistance provided by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the National Commission of Inquiry into abuses and violations of human rights in Yemen. * Reissued for technical reasons on 27 September 2018. ** The annexes to the present report are circulated as received, in the language of submission only. GE.18-13655(E) A/HRC/39/43 Contents Page I. Findings of the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen ....................... 3 A. Introduction and mandate ....................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 2021 03 08 USG Yemen Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #2
    Fact Sheet #2 Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Yemen – Complex Emergency March 8, 2021 SITUATION AT A GLANCE 30.8 20.7 4 16.2 137,479 MILLION MILLION MILLION MILLION Population People in Need IDPs in Projected Acutely Refugees and of Yemen of Humanitarian Yemen Food- Insecure Asylum Seekers Assistance Population in Yemen UN – February 2021 UN – February 2021 UN – February 2021 IPC – December 2020 UNHCR – February 2021 The USG announced nearly $191 million in additional humanitarian assistance at a High-Level Pledging Event for the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen on March 1. Escalating conflict across Marib Governorate continues to generate displacement and compound humanitarian needs, including straining limited resources at IDP sites. Approximately 2.3 million children younger than five years of age are projected to face wasting—the deadliest form of malnutrition—during 2021, according to a February IPC Report. On February 16, the USG officially revoked the designation of Ansarallah—also known as Al Houthis— as an FTO and SDGT entity due to adverse effects on the humanitarian situation in Yemen. TOTAL U.S. GOVERNMENT HUMANITARIAN FUNDING USAID/BHA1 $336,760,221 For the Yemen Response in FY 2021 2 State/PRM $13,500,000 For complete funding breakdown with partners, see detailed chart on page 6 Total $350,260,221 1 USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/BHA). 2 U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM). 1 KEY DEVELOPMENTS USG Announces $191 Million at Humanitarian Pledging Conference The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the governments of Sweden and Switzerland virtually hosted a High-Level Pledging Event for the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen on March 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Delineating and Calculating the Length of Yemen's Mainland
    International Journal of Alternative Fuels and Energy Research Article 2021 │Volume 5│Issue 1│1-9 Open Access Delineating and Calculating the Length of Article Information Yemen's Mainland Shoreline Received: February 20, 2021 * Accepted: March 29, 2021 Hisham M. H. Nagi Published: April 30, 2021 Department Environmental Sciences, Faculty of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Sana'a Keywords University, Sana’a, Yemen. Shoreline, Coast of Yemen, Abstract: Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, The Republic of Yemen is one of the countries gifted with a long coastal line. The Arabian Sea, coastal zone is rich with biodiversity and a wide range of coastal ecosystems, which GIS. is vital to the livelihood of the coastal communities. Despite the fact that several Authors’ Contribution studies have described its coastal characteristics, there are still obvious variations in HMHN designed and performed the experiments. HMHN wrote and stating the actual length of its shoreline. In many reports and research studies, the revised the paper. coastline length of Yemen's mainland has been reported with different figures such How to cite as 1,906, 2,000, 2,100, 2,200 2,300, 2,350, and 2,520 km. This research paper aims Nagi, H.M.H., 2021. Delineating to substantiate the actual shoreline length of Yemen, in addition, to calculate the and Calculating the Length of length of each coastal governorate and district using GIS tools. This study showed Yemen's Mainland Shoreline. Int. J. Altern. Fuels. Energy., 5(1): 1-9. that the total length of Yemen's mainland shoreline is about 2,252 km, with approximately 770 km overlooks the Red Sea and 1,482 km of the southern *Correspondence Hisham M.
    [Show full text]
  • Yemen Country Office
    Yemen Country Office Humanitarian Situation Report ©UNICEF Yemen/2020 Reporting Period: 1 – 28 February 2021 Situation in Numbers (OCHA, 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview) Highlights • February witnessed a spike in the intensity of conflict on the Marib front 11.3 million despite ongoing peace talks and cessation of hostilities amongst conflicted children in need of parties in the country. Thousands fled conflict-affected parts of north-western humanitarian assistance Al Jawf, and southwestern and north-eastern Marib. The deteriorating security situation in these areas is leading to mass displacement and exacerbating 20.7 million already widespread needs. people in need • A total of 190,858 children over one year old were vaccinated against cholera (94 per cent coverage); among them, 188,850 received the second dose and 1.58 million 2,008 were reached with the first dose of the Oral Cholera Vaccine (OCV). children internally displaced • The Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) assessment on (IDPs) COVID-19 was conducted in three districts in Aden to assess knowledge and risk perception of the project beneficiaries, as well as to identify information needs and effective communication channels for engaging them. These findings will guide the COVID RCCE for shielding messaging and interventions in the targeted districts. UNICEF Appeal 2021 UNICEF’s Response and Funding Status1 $576.9 M Measles vaccination 3% Health Funding status 6% Humanitarian funds Other resources SAM admissions 6% $11.5M $44.5M Funding status Nutrition 13% MHPSS access 6% Child Funding status 16% Protection Education access 2% Carry-forward Funding status 42% $94.5M Education Safe water access 24% WASH Funding status 22% Funding gap HH with cash transfer 0% $426.4M Cash Funding status Transfer 28% Behavior change 8% C4D Funding status 51% RRM Kits 8% RRM Funding status 51% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 1 Please refer to the narrative for details.
    [Show full text]
  • The Foreign Military Presence in the Horn of Africa Region
    SIPRI Background Paper April 2019 THE FOREIGN MILITARY SUMMARY w The Horn of Africa is PRESENCE IN THE HORN OF undergoing far-reaching changes in its external security AFRICA REGION environment. A wide variety of international security actors— from Europe, the United States, neil melvin the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia—are currently operating I. Introduction in the region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has experienced The Horn of Africa region has experienced a substantial increase in the a proliferation of foreign number and size of foreign military deployments since 2001, especially in the military bases and a build-up of 1 past decade (see annexes 1 and 2 for an overview). A wide range of regional naval forces. The external and international security actors are currently operating in the Horn and the militarization of the Horn poses foreign military installations include land-based facilities (e.g. bases, ports, major questions for the future airstrips, training camps, semi-permanent facilities and logistics hubs) and security and stability of the naval forces on permanent or regular deployment.2 The most visible aspect region. of this presence is the proliferation of military facilities in littoral areas along This SIPRI Background the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.3 However, there has also been a build-up Paper is the first of three papers of naval forces, notably around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at the entrance to devoted to the new external the Red Sea and in the Gulf of Aden. security politics of the Horn of This SIPRI Background Paper maps the foreign military presence in the Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
    Yemen - Goveronrates 08 March 2010 City Port International Boundary Governorate Boundary Coastline wrl_polbnda_int_1m_uncs >all other values< Terr_Name Yemen Asphalt Road KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA Thamud Majz Al-Talh Sa'ada This space can be used for extended legend if many features are present or can be used for extra textual information if relevant. Jizan Al-Kurah Suq Al Ghinan Hawf Damqawt Damqawt Al-Fatk Haradh Al-Faydami Midi Maydi Al-Matammah Houth Al-Ghaydah Al-Hazm Map Doc Name: Tarim OCHA_SitMap_Template_v4_080117 Hamr Baraqish Al-Mahabishah Shibam Seiyun GLIDE Number: Enter GLIDE Number here Sunah Nishtun Raidah Nishtun Creation Date: Enter dd mmm yyyy here Al-Mu'taridAz Zuhrah Al-Luhayyah Hajjah Projection/Datum: Enter projection/datum here Loheiya Al-Ma'ras Amran Bayt Marran Hiswah Ras Fartak Web Resources: http://ochaonline.un.org/roap Tila Sayqat al Amir Haswayn KaukabanShibam Nominal Scale at A4 paper size: 1:3,569,537 Al-Mahwit Sirwah Marib Qishn Kamaran Island Sana'a Shabwah Az Zaydiyah Itab Kamaran Sahar Saleef Matnah Ghayman 0 50 100 150 kms Kamaran Ad Dahi Jihanah Sayhut Sayyan Sayhut Ras Isa Marine Terminal Manakhah Urj Hutayb Map data source(s): Qusay'ir Place here all map data sources, there are two lines available Qutay' Daf Ras Alkatheeb Zarajah Al-Marawi`ah Tabahla Hami Disclaimers: Hodeidah Mabar Bayhan al Qisab Ghayl ba Wazir Al-Hudaydah The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of Risabah Al-Mansuriyah Hammam Ali Ash Shubaykah the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.
    [Show full text]
  • Hydraulic Interpretation of Direct Velocity Measurements in the Bab Al Mandab*
    NOVEMBER 1999 PRATT ET AL. 2769 Hydraulic Interpretation of Direct Velocity Measurements in the Bab al Mandab* L. J. PRATT Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, Woods Hole, Massachusetts WILLIAM JOHNS Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences, University of Miami, Miami, Florida STEPHEN P. M URRAY Coastal Studies Institute, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana KATSUROU KATSUMATA Department of Earth and Planetary Physics, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan (Manuscript received 5 February 1997, in ®nal form 14 October 1998) ABSTRACT Acoustic Doppler Current Pro®ler velocity measurements in the Bab al Mandab during the period June 1995± March 1996 are used to assess the hydraulic character of the exchange ¯ow. The strait is 150 km long and contains two distinct geometrical choke points: the Hanish sill and Perim narrows. The authors use a three-layer approximation of the monthly mean velocity and density structure at the sill and narrows to calculate the phase speeds of the ®rst and second internal, long gravity waves. The ®rst (second) mode is generally characterized by in-phase (out-of-phase) motions of the two interfaces. The calculations take cross-strait topographic variations into consideration by using a piecewise linear representation of the actual bottom. The resulting phase speeds are used to determine whether the ¯ow is subcritical, supercritical, or critical with respect to the ®rst and second modes. Subcritical (supercritical) means that the two wave pairs corresponding to a given mode propagate in opposite (the same) directions, whereas ``critical'' means that one or both members of a pair has zero phase speed. Critical or supercritical conditions are indications of hydraulic control and imply that signal propagation through the strait associated with a particular mode can occur in only one direction, or perhaps not at all.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 3 Implementation Plan Chapter 3 Implementation Plan
    CHAPTER 3 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN CHAPTER 3 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 3-1 Implementation Plan 3-1-1 Concept for Implementation The Project will be implemented in accordance with the framework of the grant aid scheme of the Government of Japan after the conclusion of the Exchange of Notes (E/N) by both Governments of Japan and Yemen following a cabinet decision on the implementation of the Project by the Government of Japan. The Government of Yemen will then select a Japanese consultant firm as the Consultant for the Project to proceed with the detailed design work on the facilities and equipment. Following finalization of the detailed design documents, a Japanese construction company and a Japanese equipment supplier, selected on a tender basis respectively, will conduct the construction work and the equipment supply and installation. All of the consultancy, construction and equipment supply / installation contracts will become valid once they have been verified by the Government of Japan. The work management system will be established by the Project Implementation Body, the Consultant, the Contractor and the Equipment Supplier under the control of the related organizations of the two governments involved. The basic issues and points to note for the implementation of the Project are described below. (1) Project Implementation Body The responsible agency for the Project on the Yemeni side is the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) which is expected to sign the contract on behalf of the Government of Yemen. Meanwhile, the Health Office of the Aden Governorate will act as the implementation agency and will be responsible for the general coordination of the work during the project implementation period.
    [Show full text]
  • Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report May 2019
    UNICEF YEMEN HUMANITARIAN SITUATION REPORT MAY 2019 - Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report marginalized community during a cholera prevention session conducted femaleby religious leaders in in Al Hasabah district, Sana’a.in ©UNICEF Yemen/2019/Mona Adel. childA from a Highlights May 2019 • On 16 May, multiple air strikes hit various locations in Amanat Al Asimah and Sana’a 12.3 million governorates, killing children and wounding more than 70 civilians. Seven children # of children in need of humanitarian between the ages of 4 and 14 were also killed on 24 May in an attack on the Mawiyah assistance (estimated) district, in the southern Yemeni city of Taiz. This attack increased the verified number 24.1 million # of people in need of children killed and injured the escalation of violence near Sanaa and in Taiz to 27 in (OCHA, 2019 Yemen Humanitarian Needs only 10 days, but the actual numbers are likely to be much higher. Overview) • The number of Acute Watery Diarrhoea/suspected cholera cases has continued to rise 1.71 million since the start of 2019, with 312 out of 333 districts reporting suspected cases this year # of children internally displaced (IDPs) so far. Since 1 January 2019 to 31 May 2019, there have been 365,223 suspected cases 4.7 million and 638 associated deaths recorded (CFR 0.20 per cent). Children under five represent # of children in need of educational assistance 360,000 a quarter of the total suspected cases. # of children under 5 suffering Severe Acute • UNICEF continues to assess and monitor the nutrition situation in Yemen.
    [Show full text]
  • Yemen Country Office
    Yemen Country Office Humanitarian Situation Report ©UNICEF Yemen/2020 Reporting Period: 1 – 31 March 2021 © UNICEF/2021/Yemen Situation in Numbers (OCHA, 2021 Humanitarian Needs Overview) Highlights 11.3 million • The humanitarian situation in Ma’rib continued to be of concern, and with various children in need of waves of violence during the reporting period, the situation showed no signs of humanitarian assistance improvement. People’s lives remained to be impacted every day by fighting, and thousands were being displaced from their homes and displacement sites. Conflict continued as well as in Al Hodeidah, Taizz, and Al Jawf. 20.7 million • In March, 30,317 IDPs were displaced, with the majority of displacement waves people in need coming from Ma’rib, Al Hodeidah, Taizz and Al-Jawf, as internal displacement within governorates towards safer districts increased. • The Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) reached an additional 3,500 newly displaced 1.58 million families, 2,200 families of which were in Ma’rib (24,500 individuals). Beneficiaries children internally displaced received RRM kits that included food, family basic hygiene kits, and female dignity kits. (IDPs) • As of 5 April 2021, there were 4,798 COVID-19 officially confirmed cases in Yemen, with 946 associated deaths and 1,738 recovered cases (resulting in a 19.7 per cent confirmed fatality rate). 382 suspected cases were health workers, or 4.78 per cent of the total cases. Funding Status UNICEF’s Response and Funding Status 2021 Appeal: $576.9M SAM Admission 15% n Funding status
    [Show full text]