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Free Will and Divine Omniscience Tina Talsma Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2012 Free Will and Divine Omniscience Tina Talsma Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES FREE WILL AND DIVINE OMNISCIENCE By TINA TALSMA A dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2012 Tina Talsma defended this dissertation on March 2nd, 2012. The members of the supervisory committee were: David McNaughton Professor Directing Dissertation Philip Bowers University Representative Randolph Clarke Committee Member John Roberts Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the dissertation has been approved in accordance with university requirements. ii To Jake, for your patience, support and encouragement; and to Owen, for your unconditional love and a smile that lights up my world. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Without the assistance, support, love, encouragement and inspiration of many different individuals, I would have never completed this dissertation. I am particularly grateful for all the wonderful teachers that I have had along the way. To Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Morris – in your classes I discovered love not only of philosophy, but of wisdom and life-long learning. To my professors at SIUE, especially Peg Simons, Rachel Singpurwalla, Judy Krane and Greg Fields – you gave me the skills and the confidence to pursue philosophy as a career and helped foster in me a love of the discipline. To my committee: David McNaughton, Randy Clarke, John Roberts and Phil Bowers. Truly, without your support I would not have finished. David, you have believed in me from the very beginning and you have taught me to have confidence in myself as a philosopher and an academic. Over the past 6 years, I have treasured your council and your friendship. Randy, I value the time and energy you have put into serving as a member on every one of my committees through the years. Your pointed comments and quiet reassurance have meant a great deal to me. John, I appreciate not only your willingness to serve as a committee member, but the cheerful hello in the morning and the much-need child-care advice and recommendations you have been quick to offer. And Phil, I have enjoyed getting to know you better over the past few months; without your help, I certainly could not graduate. Furthermore, I would like to thank several additional members of the FSU staff: Piers Rawling, for all of the opportunities that you have given me in the years spent here at FSU; Michael McKenna, for all of your encouragement in those first, anxious, years of graduate school; Jeremy Johnson, Rachel Baker and Doug Bowen, for your friendship and willingness to deal with all of my questions and demands; and finally, Karen Foulke – you have been like family to me and I will always be grateful for our heart-to-hearts and for the time you’ve spent with Owen. Some of the best teachers have been my fellow graduate students. I am thankful for the friends that I have made while at FSU. In particular I am thankful to my good friends Ali Brown and Katy Guin for the hours spent discussing our lives, our work, our triumphs, our fears and for our friendships that have transcended our connection as philosophers; to John Carpenter and Lacey Anderson, for sharing common interests outside of the classroom and inviting us out to many a Florida State game; to Daniel Haas for our morning chats and your words of encouragement and advice; to Amirah Albahri, for your quiet courage and for inspiring me to be iv a better friend; and to the many other students with whom I have shared a drink, a movie or a philosophical discussion. In addition to the friends I have made in Tallahassee, I would like to thank my friends who have supported me, loved me and inspired me. Rachel Vis, Yvonne Verkuyl, Corey Marks, and Allison Buss, you truly are my kindred spirits. In you I know I have friends for life. And to my friends who have gone on before: Kindra Westendorf and Rachel VanHartingsveldt. Kindra – you always recognized my stress and frustration and knew what to say or do to help. You are one of the best people I have ever known. Rachel – I miss your smile every day. I always loved the time that we spent together and wish we had so much more of it. You truly were like a sister to me. And finally, to my family: I thank God every day for you. To my grandparents, aunts and uncles, in-laws, cousins and nieces: the times spent with you have been some of the best in my life. Eric, Ryan and Kirsten, you truly are the best siblings one can have. Mom and dad, your love and support have been a source of great strength and joy for me. Thank you for believing in me and allowing me to pursue my dreams. Jake, your gentle but continuous pushing has been instrumental in helping me finish on time. Thank you for supporting me in my academic endeavors, even though it has not yet paid well. And Owen, you inspire me every day to do better, love deeper and smile more. I love you with all my heart. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... vi 1. THE FOREKNOWLEDGE DILEMMA ................................................................................1 1.1 The Problem ...................................................................................................................2 1.2 The Boethian Solution ...................................................................................................9 1.3 The Ockhamist Solution ..............................................................................................15 1.4 The Molinist Solution ..................................................................................................22 1.5 Where We Go From Here ............................................................................................31 2. REDEFINING FREE WILL .................................................................................................34 2.1 Frankfurt-Style Cases...................................................................................................34 2.2 The Sourcehood Condition and Incompatibilism ........................................................42 2.3 Sourcehood as a Response to the Foreknowledge Dilemma .......................................48 3. SOURCE INCOMPATIBILISM AND THE FOREKNOWLEDGE DILEMMA ...............51 3.1 Source Incompatibilism: Two Views...........................................................................51 3.2 The Source Incompatibilist Solution ...........................................................................60 3.3 Robust Alternatives ......................................................................................................64 3.4 Where We Are .............................................................................................................77 4. DIVINE FREEDOM .............................................................................................................79 4.1 Freedom and God’s Nature ..........................................................................................81 4.2 Source Incompatibilism and Divine Freedom .............................................................87 4.3 Salvaging Divine Freedom ..........................................................................................91 5. THE BEST SOLUTION ........................................................................................................96 5.1 Summary ......................................................................................................................96 5.2 Open Theism ..............................................................................................................102 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................115 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................................121 vi ABSTRACT A traditionally difficult problem in the Philosophy of Religion is the one that divine omniscience, particularly divine foreknowledge, poses for free will. If God knows in advance how we will act, it looks as if we cannot act freely because we cannot act other than in accordance with God’s foreknowledge. Thus, it looks like God’s full omniscience and free will are incompatible. But this is problematic precisely because both God’s full omniscience and human and divine free will are very important in Christian theology. In this dissertation, I discuss this dilemma and attempt to find the best solution available to the Christian theist. In Chapter 1, I introduce and discuss the problem, which I refer to as “the foreknowledge dilemma.” I then consider and ultimately reject three of the most commonly offered solutions. These solutions are the Boethian solution, which attempts to solve the foreknowledge dilemma by arguing that God does not exist within the temporal order and so cannot have knowledge prior to our actions, the Ockhamist solution, which argues that God’s past beliefs are soft facts about the past and so rely upon the future in a way that many past facts do not, and the Molinist solution, which
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