Defining Omniscience: a Feminist Perspective
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The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good Linda
© Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 34, Nos. 1/2, January 2003 0026–1068 THE SEARCH FOR THE SOURCE OF EPISTEMIC GOOD LINDA ZAGZEBSKI ABSTRACT: Knowledge has almost always been treated as good, better than mere true belief, but it is remarkably difficult to explain what it is about knowledge that makes it better. I call this “the value problem.” I have previously argued that most forms of reliabilism cannot handle the value problem. In this article I argue that the value problem is more general than a problem for reliabilism, infecting a host of different theories, including some that are internalist. An additional problem is that not all instances of true belief seem to be good on balance, so even if a given instance of knowing p is better than merely truly believing p, not all instances of knowing will be good enough to explain why knowledge has received so much attention in the history of philosophy. The article aims to answer two questions: (1) What makes knowing p better than merely truly believing p? The answer involves an exploration of the connection between believing and the agency of the knower. Knowing is an act in which the knower gets credit for achieving truth. (2) What makes some instances of knowing good enough to make the investigation of knowledge worthy of so much attention? The answer involves the connection between the good of believing truths of certain kinds and a good life. -
The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance
Philosophical Review The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance. by John E. Hare Review by: Linda Zagzebski The Philosophical Review, Vol. 108, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 291-293 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2998307 . Accessed: 21/03/2014 15:30 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.15.14.53 on Fri, 21 Mar 2014 15:30:07 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BOOK REVIEWS ThePhilosophical Review, Vol. 108, No. 2 (April 1999) THE MORAL GAP: KANTIANETHICS, HUMAN LIMITS, AND GOD'S AS- SISTANCE. ByJOHN E. HARE. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, Claren- don Press, 1996. Pp. x, 292. The titleof Hare's book refersto the gap between the demand that mo- ralityplaces on us and our natural capacity to live by it. Such a gap is paradoxical if we accept the "'ought' implies 'can"' principle. The solu- tion, Hare argues, is that the gap is filled by the Christian God. -
God's Omniscience and Wisdom
God’s Omniscience and Wisdom This is part of a series on God’s attributes. Feel free to use this as a devotional or lesson. Definition of Omniscience Omniscience comes from the Latin words omni, meaning “all,” and scire, meaning “to know.” So omniscient means, “all-knowing.” God knows everything—even things in the past, present, and future. He’s aware of every detail of every being. He’s never surprised or disappointed, nor does He wonder about things. God’s wisdom relates to His omniscience. Wisdom means “applied knowledge.” Not only does God know everything, but He also knows the best way to use that knowledge. Bible Passages Teaching God’s Omniscience Psalm 147:5—God’s knowledge can’t be measured. Isaiah 40:13—God never received counsel or teaching from anyone. Psalm 139:1–6; Jeremiah 29:11—God knows everything about us. Matthew 10:29–30—God even knows the details about things we consider insignificant. God’s Title of Omniscience Read Genesis 16. When Hagar—badly mistreated by Abraham and Sarah—ran to the wilderness, God appeared and made a promise to her. In return, she called God El Roi, the God Who Sees. Even in a deserted, out-of-the-way place, God still knew Hagar’s actions and what would happen to her in the future. God’s Works of Omniscience Jesus knew people’s thoughts (Matt. 9:4; Luke 5:22; 9:47; Mark 2:8) Jesus knew what would happen to Him (Luke 22:37; John 6:70; 13:3; 19:28 God made prophecies and fulfilled them (Deut. -
“Grounding and Omniscience” (PDF)
Grounding and Omniscience Abstract I’m going to argue that omniscience is impossible and therefore that there is no God.1 The argument turns on the notion of grounding. After illustrating and clarifying that notion, I’ll start the argument in earnest. The first step will be to lay out five claims, one of which is the claim that there is an omniscient being, and the other four of which are claims about grounding. I’ll prove that these five claims are inconsistent. Then I’ll argue for the truth of each of them except the claim that there is an omniscient being. From these arguments it follows that there are no omniscient beings and thus that there is no God. §1. Stage Setting The best way to get a grip on the notion of grounding – or more exactly, for our purposes, the notion of partial grounding - is by considering examples. (By “partial grounding” I mean “at-least-partial grounding”, just as mereologists mean “at-least-part of” by “part of”.) The first example hearkens back to Plato’s Euthyphro. Suppose that a theorist claims that as a matter of metaphysical necessity, a given act is morally right if and only if it is approved of by God. At first blush at least, it is plausible that this theorist owes us an answer to following question: when acts are right, are they right because God approves of them, or does he approve of them because they are right? We all understand this question right away, right when we first hear it. -
PHILOSOPHY of RELIGION Philosophy 185 Spring 2016
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Philosophy 185 Spring 2016 Dana Kay Nelkin Office: HSS 8004 Office Hours: Monday 11-12, Friday 11-12, and by appointment Phone: (858) 822-0472 E-mail: [email protected] Web site: www.danakaynelkin.com Course Description: We will explore five related and hotly debated topics in the philosophy of religion, and, in doing so, address the following questions: (i) What makes something a religion? (ii) Is it rational to hold religious beliefs? Should we care about rationality when it comes to religious belief? (iii) Could different religions be different paths to the same ultimate reality, or is only one, at most, a “way to God”? (iv) What is the relationship between science and religion? (v) What is the relationship between morality and religion? Must religious beliefs be true in order for morality to exist? As we will see, the philosophy of religion leads naturally into just about every other area of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and the history of philosophy, and into particular central philosophical debates such as the debate over the nature of free will. This means that you will gain insight into many fundamental philosophical issues in this course. At the same time, the subject matter can be difficult. To do well in the course and to benefit from it, you must be willing to work hard and to subject your own views (whatever they may be) to critical evaluation. Evaluating our conception of ourselves and of the world is one of the distinguishing features of philosophy. Requirements: Short reading responses/formulations of questions (150-200 words for each class meeting; 20 out of 28 required) 30% 1 paper in two drafts (about 2200 words) o first draft 10% (Due May 13) o second draft, revised after comments 25% (Due May 23) 1 take-home final exam (35%) (Due June 4, 11 am) up to 5% extra credit for participation in class group assignments and discussion. -
European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION VOLUME 6 NUMBER 4 WINTER 2014 ARTICLES C.A.J. COADY Communal and Institutional Trust: Authority in Religion and Politics 1 John COTTINGHAM Authority and Trust: Reflections on Linda Zagzebski’s Epistemic Authority 25 Duncan PRITCHARD & Shane RYAN Zagzebski on Rationality 39 Trent DOUGHERTY Zagzebski, Authority, and Faith 47 Arnon KEREN Zagzebski on Authority and Preemption in the Domain of Belief 61 Jacek WOJTYSIAK Zagzebski on Models of Revelation 77 Charity ANDERSON Epistemic Authority and Conscientious Belief 91 Benjamin MCMYLER Epistemic Authority, Preemption, and Normative Power 101 John SCHWENKLER Tradition as Transmission: A Partial Defense 121 Matthew A. BENTON Believing on Authority 133 Damian LESZCZYŃSKI Inconsistency, Uncertainty and Epistemic Authority 145 Joshue OROZCO & Nathan L. KING Conscientious Self-reflection to the Rescue? 155 Linda ZAGZEBSKI Epistemic Authority and Its Critics 169 BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES Paolo Diego Bubbio & Philip Andrew Quadrio (eds). The Relationship of Philosophy to Religion Today Reviewed by Mark Manolopoulos 189 Justin Barrett. Born Believers: The Science of Children’s Religious Belief Reviewed by Aku Visala 193 Charles Taliaferro, Dialogues about God Reviewed by Ulrich Schmidt 199 Fraser Watts (ed.). Creation: Law and Probability Reviewed by Graham Wood 205 COMMUNAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST: AUTHORITY IN RELIGION AND POLITICS C.A.J. COADY University of Melbourne Linda Zagzebski’s book on epistemic authority is an impressive and stimulating treatment of an important topic.1 I admire the way she manages to combine imagination, originality and argumentative control. Her work has the further considerable merit of bringing analytic thinking and abstract theory to bear upon areas of concrete human concern, such as the attitudes one should have towards moral and religious authority. -
1 Knowledge and the Motive for Truth Linda Zagzebski 1. the Motive For
Knowledge and the Motive for Truth Linda Zagzebski 1. The motive for truth in our epistemic lives I assume that a self-conscious being is both conscious of the world and conscious of itself being conscious of the world. Because we are self-conscious, we reflect upon our own conscious states, not because we are especially interested in ourselves, but because we think that in doing so we can monitor and improve the connection between those states and their objects in the world. The material upon which we reflect is what we find in our pre- reflective consciousness--our memories, pre-reflective beliefs, and emotions. It also includes trust in the natural attunement of our faculties to reality. Trust is as much a part of our basic endowment as our faculties of perception and reasoning. Our pre-reflective trust is one of the things upon which we reflect when we attempt to monitor the relation between our conscious states and the world. When we reflect, we realize that we have no non-circular way to tell that our faculties have anything to do with the way the world is, so either we turn our pre-reflective trust into reflective trust, or we become skeptics. My view is that the right response to epistemic circularity is to trust reflectively. The point of reflection is to increase the trustworthiness of our faculties, but we can only do that by using those same faculties in an especially careful and directed way. Reflection makes the connection between our faculties and the world more accurate by increasing the coherence of the outputs of those faculties. -
Richard E. Creel, DIVINE IMPASSIBILITY: an ESSAY in PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Volume 5 Issue 4 Article 8 10-1-1988 Richard E. Creel, DIVINE IMPASSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY Ronald J. Feenstra Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy Recommended Citation Feenstra, Ronald J. (1988) "Richard E. Creel, DIVINE IMPASSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 5 : Iss. 4 , Article 8. DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19885443 Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol5/iss4/8 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. BOOK REVIEWS Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, by Richard E. Creel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Pp. xi and 238. $39.50. RONALD 1. FEENSTRA, Marquette University. The recent revival of interest in philosophical theology has led to renewed attention to a number of features of traditional theism, including such assertions as that God is simple, eternal, immutable, and impassible. Theologians, process thinkers, and analytic philosophers of religion have devoted much effort to determining whether these claims about God are coherent and, if so, whether they are compatible with statements that God is loving, active in history, and responsive to prayer. Richard E. Creel's Divine Impassibility addresses these issues in an impressive and impor tant defense of the doctrine of divine impassibility. -
GOD KNOWS EVERYTHING and IS WISE PSALM 147:5, Et Al
1 GOD KNOWS EVERYTHING AND IS WISE PSALM 147:5, et al Thomas Aquinas, a medieval theologian, created one of the greatest intellectual achievements of Western civilization in his book, “Summa Theologica.” It’s a massive work: 38 treatises, 3,000 articles, 10,000 objections answered. Aquinas tried to gather all that’s true into one coherent collection. Talk about a phenomenal task. He addressed anthropology, science, ethics, psychology, political theory, and theology from a godly perspective. But on December 6, 1273, Aquinas abruptly stopped his work. While participating in a worship service, he apparently had a spiritual experience in which he caught a glimpse of eternity. Suddenly, he knew all his efforts to describe God fell so far short that he decided never to write again. When his secretary tried to encourage Aquinas to do more writing, he said, “I can do no more. Such things have been revealed to me that all I have written seems as so much straw.” Thomas Aquinas didn’t write another word and he died a year later. What is God really like? And what difference does it make to your life or mine? Those are two questions we’re addressing in our current message series: What’s Most Important About You? What You Think About God. Who you believe God to be – or not to be – affects your life profoundly. Today I want you to think with me about the fact God knows everything and, also, that He is wise. If you want to look up for yourself all the Scripture passages I mention, go to our website, click on Stay At Home Resources, click on the Worship tab, and then click on Message Notes. -
ABSTRACT on Science and Atheism: Whether Atheistic Belief Is
ABSTRACT On Science and Atheism: Whether Atheistic Belief is Scientifically Motivated Charles L. Jester Director: Gerald Cleaver, Ph.D. The intent of this paper is to explore the motivation behind the rejection of theistic religious faiths by modern atheist scientists, and whether it is justified to claim that this rejection is scientifically motivated. First, a brief background of the development of the contemporary schism between faith and science is given, noting in particular changes in belief amongst the scientific community. Next, an exposition on the motivations for scientists’ convictions concerning God is laid out, followed by an address to the question of whether atheistic scientists reject all properties of God, or only certain of them. Based on analyses of personal statements, statistical data on beliefs, and developments in twentieth-century physics and mathematics, it is concluded that modern scientists who reject theism are not overwhelmingly motivated by science, and that they in fact do not reject all ideas of God. APPROVED BY DIRECTOR OF HONORS THESIS: _____________________________________________________ Dr. Gerald B. Cleaver, Department of Physics APPROVED BY THE HONORS PROGRAM: _____________________________________________________ Dr. Andrew Wisely, Director DATE: ___________________________ ON SCIENCE AND ATHEISM: WHETHER ATHEISTIC BELIEF IS SCIENTIFICALLY MOTIVATED A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Baylor University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Honors Program By Charles L. Jester Waco, Texas -
Does Ethics Need God?
DOES ETHICS NEED GOD? Linda Zagzebski ntis essay presents a moral argument for the rationality of theistic belief. If all I have to go on morally are my own moral intuitions and reasoning and those of others, I am rationally led to skepticism, both about the possibility of moral knowledge and about my moral effectiveness. This skepticism is extensive, amounting to moral despair. But such despair cannot be rational. It follows that the assumption of the argument must be false and I must be able to rely on more than my own human powers and those of others in attempting to live a moral life. The Christian God has such a function. Hence, if it is rational to attempt a moral life, it is rational to believe in the Christian God. Whenever anyone begins a study of ethics, a natural question to ask is why should we undertake such a study at all. I am satisfied with the answer that ethics teaches us how to be moral and anyone who understands what morality is will thereby want to live by it, just as anyone who understands the meaning of an analytic proposition will thereby see its truth. But wanting to be moral, I believe, is not sufficient to justify either the study of ethics or the attempt to practice morality. The question, "Should I try to be moral?" is not the same as the classic question, "Why be moral?" The latter question is sufficiently answered by the response that morality is its own justification. Morality aims at the good and anyone who understands what good means will see that its pursuit is justified. -
Is Religiousness a Biocultural Adaptation?
Is Religiousness a Biocultural Adaptation? Erica Harris and Patrick McNamara In this paper, we argue that religiousness satisfies minimal criteria to be con- sidered a biocultural adaptation. Why should anyone care whether religious- ness is an adaptation? To establish religiousness as an adaptation will help to rule out some old and tiresome misconstruals of religiousness. If, for ex- ample, religiousness is an adaptation, then it is not likely to be a mere cogni- tive delusion as has been argued for centuries by anti-religious ideologues (and more recently by Dawkins 200). Adaptations evolve to solve pressing fitness-related problems. Religiousness may have evolved to solve problems that our ancestors faced, but it still may be ‘solving’ similar problems in mod- ern environments. For example, if religiousness promoted healing in some individuals in ancestral populations, it may still be doing so now. Similarly, if religiousness promoted outgroup antagonisms in ancestral populations, it may still be doing so now. Thus, evaluating potential adaptive properties of religiousness may help us to discover potential functions of religiosity. To conclude that a trait is an adaptation, we must establish specific cri- teria that any trait must satisfy in order to be considered an adaptation and then test the evidence for each of these criteria. In this paper, we lay out what we believe to be the minimal criteria any trait must satisfy to be considered a biocultural adaptation. We use ‘bio-cultural’ instead of ‘biological’ because we are discussing human beings, who are shaped by both biologic and cul- tural forces. We define religiousness as composed of two fundamental abilities: (1) the positing of belief in supernatural agents and (2) the tendency to perform rituals to relate to those agents.