THE RISE OF AMONG IRANIAN : A STEP TOWARD ’S DISINTEGRATION? By Emil Souleimanov, Kamil Pikal, Josef Kraus*

This article deals with the Azerbaijani minority in Iran and its potential and real security threat for the country’s internal affairs and for the entire Caspian region. The article opens with an introduction on the ethnic and religious identities of and the community’s historical development in Iran--with a particular emphasis on the 1990s and onward. Next, it reviews the current situation in the region and the group’s primary motives and goals. The study also focuses on the international perspective, including the positions of key local and extra-regional powers that play an important role in the security of the Islamic Republic.

INTRODUCTION Azerbaijani origin and their first- or second- generation descendants.2 The Islamic Republic of Iran is a country of In view of their large numbers and multiple nationalities. Ethnic account corresponding representation among the for approximately half of the total population. members of the Iranian elite as well as their The remainder of the population consists of territorial concentration, the loyalty of Iran’s members of various ethnic groups of Turkic, Azerbaijanis is of key importance for Iranian, and Semitic origin, generally sustaining the regime and for maintaining the concentrated in a particular area.1 The exact Islamic Republic’s territorial integrity. The number of these individual minorities and growing nationalistic and, in extreme cases, even of the Persian majority is unknown, since even separatist tendencies within the population censuses in Iran do not determine Azerbaijani minority are therefore being nationalities, but rather religious affiliation evaluated by Iran’s government with growing alone. frequency as a security threat to which Nonetheless, Azerbaijanis are by far the attention must be devoted. This article then most populous ethnic minority in Iran. Various deals primarily with the growing national self- estimates place them between 12 and 22 consciousness among the members of the million within the territory of the Islamic Azerbaijani minority within Iran’s territory. Republic, accounting for as much as one The purpose of this study is to outline and quarter of Iran’s population. The large evaluate the security risks for Iran’s internal majority of the inhabits affairs and for the stability of the entire Iran’s northwestern provinces, which border Caspian region. As little has been written on with , , , and . the topic as of yet, this article focuses on the These include Western Azerbaijan (where a broader context, presenting readers with an considerable part of the population consists of introduction on the ethnic, religious, and ); Eastern Azerbaijan; and politico-historical factors influencing the Zanjan (together with Persians); to some current situation in the region. It then moves to extent also Gilan (together with Gilaki and the status of the ethnocultural emancipation Persians); and and Qazvin (in both movement of Iranian Azerbaijanis and its cases together with Persians). According to influence on Iran’s state security. Last, it deals some estimates, a quarter to a third of the with the international context of Azerbaijani population of consists of immigrants of nationalism in Iran, focusing primarily on the

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 71 Emil Souleimanov, Kamil Pikal, Josef Kraus security dimension. Also presented are the (or Parsi, Persian) for written communication, positions of the United States, Azerbaijan, as the Iranian variant of Azerbaijani Turkish Israel, Turkey, and and their relations had not been codified. Knowledge of the with the Azerbaijani minority and with Iran language among Azerbaijani immigrants in itself. Tehran, , and other cities outside of northwestern Iran is gradually declining, Ethnic and Religious Identity Among Iran’s which is also related to a reduction of Azerbaijanis Azerbaijani self-identification.6 The vast majority of Azerbaijanis, like the The Azerbaijani minority’s perceptions of majority of the rest of Iran’s inhabitants, the central government in Teheran and of belong to the Shi’i branch of .7 Shi’i Persians as the dominant in Iran Islam is predominant in only a few countries are directly related to their own historical other than Iran, including the Republic of experience of coexistence with the Persians. Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and Iraq. As a minority in Linguistic and religious affiliations and their the Islamic world, Shi’i solidarity is stronger evolution within the Iranian context play a than that found among the majority Sunnis. particularly important role here. The This bond was further reinforced in Iran Azerbaijanis of Iran speak a Turkic dialect that following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, in is part of the Oghuz language group. Apart which was from a rather large number of lexical overthrown and a Shi’i clerics led by Ayatollah borrowings from Persian and Arabic, it is took over with the identical to the language of the so-called velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) Northern (Soviet or Caucasian) Azerbaijanis.3 system of government. The multiethnic state It is also very close to the language spoken in that had relied on Persian nationalism and Turkey. The two languages (Azerbaijani and perceived power through the concept of the Anatolian Turkish) are mutually shared state of Iran during the era of the comprehensible. The language is commonly was replaced by the concept spoken among Azerbaijanis inhabiting of a religious Iran that unified its inhabitants northwestern Iran, though instruction in through the Shi’ism. Azerbaijani Turkish is de facto banned at all The fact that Persians and Azerbaijanis both levels in the country--in contradiction to Iran’s follow the Shi’i religion has historically constitution. The ban is in effect in all levels brought them together, while on the contrary, of school and applies not only to instruction in this has created animosity towards Anatolian the Turkish language, but also to teaching that Turks and Kurds, who mostly profess Sunni language as a subject. Thus, for example, at Islam. For many religiously oriented the University of , where seven other Azerbaijanis, to this day, a marriage between languages are taught, the native language of persons speaking the same (Turkic) language the majority of students may not be taught.4 but belonging to different branches of Islam Under the Persian nationalist regime of the (i.e., Shi’i or Sunni) is totally unthinkable. Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1979), the use of a frequent as a result of the mass migration of Turkic language in public was completely Azerbaijanis from the northwest to other places in banned. During the period that followed, the Iran. On the other hand, nothing would prevent policy was slightly more lenient, allowing for a marriage between two Shi’a of different the establishment of an Azerbaijani radio and ethnic origins (such as a Persian and an television station. These official media, Azerbaijani). Such “mixed” marriages have however, only broadcasted in Azerbaijani become frequent as a result of the mass Turkish for a few hours a day, and the migration of Azerbaijanis from the northwest language for broadcast was “Persianized” to to other places in Iran. Also affecting migrants the maximum possible extent.5 Until recently, to the Persian-speaking parts of the country is the majority of Iran’s Azerbaijanis used Farsi their separation from the Turkish-speaking

72 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) The Rise of Nationalism Among Iranian Azerbaijanis: A Step Toward Iran’s Disintegration? environment and ethno-linguistic certain extent even from their origins in the discrimination on the part of the Persians. Azerbaijani provinces. This is particularly true These factors have led to intensive of the members of the older generations. For of Azerbaijanis (as with example, Ayatollah Khamene’i very seldom migrants from other minorities) migrating to speaks Azerbaijani Turkish in public, and he Persian cities.8 refers to himself as an “Iranian from As Shi’a, Azerbaijanis are traditionally .”11 integrated into Iranian society. By no means negligible are the numbers of Azerbaijanis The Historical Experience of Iran’s serving as high state officials, clerics, army Azerbaijanis commanders, important figures in the economy, and representatives of the At the beginning of the twentieth century, intellectual elite. Among the most prominent Turkish dominance over Persia came to an end examples are the country’s supreme religious with the establishment of the first purely leader, Ali Khamene’i; the opposition leader Persian dynasty, the Pahlavis. Persian and reformist candidate in last year’s nationalism, already strongly developed at the presidential election, Mir-Hossein Mousavi time, became the state ideology.12 The (who is incidentally a distant relative of importance of religion as a collective identity Khamene’i, and who also comes from the that was not all-encompassing (in view of the same village as the ayatollah); and the former populous Sunni minority) was suppressed as Minister of Interior and Minister of Social much as possible by the shah’s regime. Security Sadeq Mahsouli. Instead, pan- dominated, Such cultural and religious figures include with the political assimilation of ethnic popular poet Mohammad-Hosein Shahriar, minorities. who was born in Tabriz and wrote in Persian The state’s assimilation policy was and Azerbaijani, and Grand Ayatollah especially harsh on the Azerbaijanis--who Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, one of the were viewed as a potential threat to the most influential clerics in Iraq and Iran in the country’s territorial integrity, above all twentieth century. As far as Azerbaijanis in the because of their numbers and their degree of Iranian armed forces are concerned, they face integration into Persian society. The regime no discrimination there and are full-fledged denied Azerbaijanis’ Turkic identities and members. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards,9 instead attempted to foist on them a theory however, are more ethnically pure, and according to which they were linguistically Persians account for the vast majority of the Turkicized members of the Iranian Azari general staff. ethnic group.13 It should be mentioned that the The majority of the Azerbaijani elite in regime’s concern about the insufficient loyalty high military, economic, and political of its Turkic population was not entirely positions at the central level are regarded by unfounded. With the support of Russia and ordinary Iranian Azerbaijanis as Persianized, later the Soviet Union, Azerbaijanis attempted and therefore as not being of their own kind. on several occasions to gain autonomy or For this reason, they do not even accept the complete separation from the country. This fact that the top man in the country is an ethnic mainly occurred from 1917-1920, when Azerbaijani. Rather, they regard him as having separatist movements in the region were long ago become a Persian.10 A condition for gaining strength. In July 1920, separatists attaining high standing in society, after all, is declared part of southern Azerbaijan an the renunciation of Turkic identity and independent territory called Azadistan (“Land declaration of one’s Iranian identity or of Freedom”). Within less than three months, devotion to the idea of Iranian statehood. however, the Persian army regained control of Many Azerbaijanis, therefore, distance the unrecognized territory. Another separation themselves from their Turkism, and to a attempt took place in November 1945, when

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 73 Emil Souleimanov, Kamil Pikal, Josef Kraus the Azerbaijan People’s Government was the public discourse and into the private created with the support of the Soviets. It was sphere. Together with the change of the social likewise crushed by Iranian forces after about climate in recent years, Turkic identity has a year, and its leadership headed by President been resurfacing with rather surprising Sayyed Ja’far Pishevari fled into Soviet intensity by Iranian standards. exile.14 Given the mistrust of the majority GROWING AZERBAIJANI population toward the Azerbaijani minority, NATIONALISM especially in the periods immediately following the liquidation of the two separatist Although has regions, many Azerbaijanis began hiding or always existed in northwestern Iran, since the even denying their Turkic origins, generally by 1990s, it has greatly increased. This is due to a claiming Iranian identity. This negation was combination of several different factors expressed as either of concealment of their affecting the Azerbaijani minority. As follows, regional origins and the acceptance of pan- the most important factors influencing Iran’s Iranianism or acceptance of the theory that Azerbaijanis within the Islamic Republic and Azerbaijanis were of Iranian origin. This was with respect to external forces are discussed. common both among representatives of the Azerbaijani social elite as well as of among Secularization and Admiration of Turkey the masses of rural Azerbaijanis, who left to Tehran and other Iranian cities outside of Since around the mid-1990s, there a historical Azerbaijan during the gradual strengthening of Turkic identity has industrialization of the 1960s /1970s and emerged among Iran’s Azerbaijanis. More and later.15 more Azerbaijanis are claiming their Turkic To a certain extent, the Islamic Revolution origins. Unlike in the past, this is no longer a of 1979 reduced the force of Iranian crime, nor is it socially unacceptable to speak nationalism, in that it solidified the role of the Azerbaijani Turkish in public, although doing Shi’i religion as the leading component of so can elicit an occasional negative reaction Iranian collective identity. Yet from the 1990s, from the Persian-speaking majority. One of the shortly after the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), most important reasons for this new rise of Iranian (Persian) nationalism again grew Azerbaijani nationalism is the reduced self- stronger. With this came an increase in anti- identification with the Iranian theocratic state Turkic sentiments directed in particular against and with religion, and the strengthening of the country’s Azerbaijani minority. Especially . About two-thirds of Iran’s in the cities where Persians are the majority, population is under the age of 30. Many young many Azerbaijanis have attempted to hide Iranians are dissatisfied with the restrictive their true identities in order to avoid becoming regime of the clerics, and this dissatisfaction objects of ridicule and discrimination. was multiplied in particular during the bloody In ethnically mixed Azerbaijani-Persian unrest surrounding the reelection of Mahmoud families, common in in Iran’s large cities, the Ahmadinejad in 2009. They no longer identify children generally claim Persian nationality. with the theocracy, or they identify with it to a Many parents in fully Azerbaijani families much lesser extent than the previous living outside the Azerbaijani provinces teach generation.17 their children only Persian from birth and Throughout society, and especially in the avoid communicating in their Turkic language urban environment, there is widespread to spare their offspring ridicule because of disillusion with the theocratic form of their Azerbaijani accents and origins.16 government and resistance to its Nonetheless, the Turkic identity of Iran’s fundamentalist aspects. There are increasing Azerbaijanis has not been eliminated expressions of the desire for societal reforms. completely. Rather, it has been pushed out of Out of protest against the regime, many

74 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) The Rise of Nationalism Among Iranian Azerbaijanis: A Step Toward Iran’s Disintegration? educated Iranians are also less fervent about although the use of satellite receivers is their religious identities. On the contrary, they formally forbidden in the country. Many admire the West. This also applies to Azerbaijani households also watch Turkish Azerbaijanis. Naturally, the weakening of self- television stations that provide a wide identification with the regime and with selection of programs of incomparably greater religion is leading to a search for an alternative interest than the strictly censored Iranian ideology--the revival of (ethnic) nationalism, television. which means Turkic nationalism to many Regularly watching Turkish broadcasts not Azerbaijanis. In the case of the Persians, what only strengthens their awareness of Turkic is involved is a constantly expanding role for solidarity, but also helps viewers improve their Persian nationalism, which turns to the pre- language skills. Interestingly, since the early Islamic tradition of the Persian empires of the 2000s, there has been a considerable increase past.18 This development is also reflected in in the number of Anatolian Turkish-isms in the growing number of films and literature language of Iran’s Azerbaijanis.21 glorifying the pre-Islamic past of the Persians. It seems that this phenomenon is being Independent Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani tolerated by the clerics, and that they are even Minority in Iran supportive of it to some degree. Fertile ground is thus emerging for conflict between Turkic In addition to admiration of Turkey, there (Azerbaijani) and Iranian (Persian) has been a growing identification with .19 Caucasian Azerbaijanis, who gained To these young Iranians described above, independence in 1991, in the northwestern Turkey represents a free, pro-Western, and . While many secularly and relatively developed country, which is also nationalistically minded Azerbaijanis view the politically and militarily powerful. Last but attributes of statehood of the Republic of not least, Turkey is perceived as a country that Azerbaijan with romantic enthusiasm-- is more “European” than Iran both culturally encouraged by nationalistic literature and as well as in the physical appearance of its films from the north, among other things22-- inhabitants. In recent years, Iranians have also the relationship of a large portion of Iran’s taken a liking to Turkish seaside resorts. Few Azerbaijanis with the so-called shuravis middle-class, urban Iranian families have (“Soviets”), as the northern Azerbaijanis are never visited Antalya, Antakya, or Bodrum.20 often called to this day, also has a number of Turkic identity in connection with a liberal, negative aspects. modern Turkey is no longer without prestige Azerbaijan’s partition between Russia and for many Iranians. This is also having Persia in 1828 led to a noticeable cultural something of an impact on the perception of Russification of the population of northern Iran’s Azerbaijani “Turks.” Azerbaijan, which also underwent strong Many Iranians, especially of Azerbaijani secularization under the Soviet regime. At the origin, travel to Turkey for work. There, they same time, however, Iran’s Azerbaijanis encounter very strong and preserved many elements of traditional consciousness of Turkic solidarity. This patriarchal life, and especially Islam.23 Among strengthens their ethno-lingual consciousness the two related populations, the division of and reduces something of their psychological that nation into northern and southern parts handicap dating back to the era of the Shah. thus led to the formation of differing cultures Also playing a significant role in the context and identities, which were antagonistic in of the ongoing ethnocultural revival of Iran’s many respects. Azerbaijanis is the reception of Turkish (and The division is also visible, however, Azerbaijani) satellite broadcasts. Watching within the community of Iran’s Azerbaijanis Turkish television stations in northwestern along the religion-nationalism dividing line. Iran became commonplace in the 1990s, Religiously oriented conservatives belonging

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 75 Emil Souleimanov, Kamil Pikal, Josef Kraus mainly to older generations identify further augmented by the fact that Turkey themselves primarily with their fellow represents an important rival of Iran in believers. They identify Shi’i Islam with the international politics, while Azerbaijan idea of Iranian statehood, and they are represents a potentially dangerous ally of the skeptical--even antagonistic--toward West and of the state of Israel (see below). manifestations of Azerbaijani nationalism. They generally have a negative opinion of Demonstrations and Displays of Anatolian Turks as being non-believers Dissatisfaction (Sunnis) and of Caucasian Azerbaijanis as “pro-.” As a result of the aforementioned factors, In this environment, it is not uncommon to there has been a growing sense of (Turkic) hear statements that the Republic of ethnocultural commonality of the Azerbaijani Azerbaijan should be annexed to Iran or to population in northwestern Iran since the mid- Iranian Azerbaijan, since “we are all Shiites,” 1990s. Since 1996, there have been several and that historically, Caucasian Azerbaijan has larger demonstrations in Tabriz, , and always belonged to Persia.24 On the other other mainly Azerbaijani cities. The protestors’ hand, among secular-minded Azerbaijanis, and main demands have been to permit instruction especially among young people, the in the Turkish language and the recognition of importance of Shi’ism as the pillar of their the ethnic and linguistic peculiarity of the identity is on the decline. They rather tend to “Azerbaijani Turks,” as they refer to claim their Turkish origins, or they profess themselves. There have also been occasional Turkish Azerbaijani nationalism. This calls for the establishment of cultural and nationalism distances them from the idea of administrative autonomy in the Azerbaijani Iranian statehood, while bringing them provinces.27 psychologically closer to the members of The culmination and turning point of the Turkic society in Iran as well as in the demonstrations for ethnocultural and Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey, with ethnolinguistic emancipation occurred when which they desire unification.25 riots broke out in May and June of 2006. On Among the nationalistic Azerbaijani May 12, 2006, the state newspaper Iran community in Iran, there has thus been a printed a grossly insulting caricature of an greater orientation toward Turkey than Azerbaijani as a stupid, dirty cockroach and Azerbaijan. While this might at first seem ran an article directed against the Azerbaijani paradoxical, this is the case because, among minority. Shortly after the publication of the other aforementioned factors, the present defamatory material, thousands of Republic of Azerbaijan is perceived in Iran as demonstrators turned up in the mostly a small, economically, militarily, and Azerbaijani-populated cities of northwestern politically weak state with rampant corruption, Iran as well as in Tehran. The demonstrations, under the authoritarian rule of one family, and initiated by students, paralyzed these cities for which also suffered disgrace in the form of several days, in some cases even weeks.28 The military defeat (Nagorno-).26 protestors even seized a television transmitter Therefore, somewhat paradoxically, Iranian for a short period in the western city of Urmia Azerbaijanis identify more with Turkey than as well as a municipal building in the eastern with the Republic of Azerbaijan. city of Sulduz. Meanwhile, the vast majority In such a case, when a significant ethnic of local police and militia (Basij29 and group in a state with multiple nationalities is Pasdaran), composed of ethnic Azerbaijanis, becoming more and more inclined toward refused to take action against their nationalities and states beyond the borders of compatriots, a case which was unprecedented its own country, this naturally puts pressure on in Iran. the identity of the home country. Here, the The demonstrators called for the creators of security threat arising from such tendencies is the caricature and the article to be punished,

76 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) The Rise of Nationalism Among Iranian Azerbaijanis: A Step Toward Iran’s Disintegration? about a demand that was finally met. The won a place in Iran’s top soccer league and has authors of the article and the editor-in-chief of broken several Iranian records at the national the newspaper were dismissed, and publication level. of the newspaper was temporarily suspended. Formerly, only Iran’s two biggest soccer Yet the demonstrations still continued. teams, both from Tehran (Esteghlal and Protestors shouted political slogans such as, “I Persepolis), were capable of turning out more am proud to be a Turk!” “Down with Persian fans at away games than the home team. chauvinism!” “Keep your hands off of Recently, however, Tractor fans have almost Azerbaijan!” and “We want instruction in outnumbered the home team fans at their Turkish in our schools!” Militia and army games against the two Teheran soccer teams, units were called in from other areas of Iran to thanks to the attendance of fans of Azerbaijani end the demonstrations, resulting in dozens of origin living in Tehran and the surrounding deaths. According to some reports, provided communities. Tractor Sazi games generally mainly by Azerbaijani nationalists, there were draw over 60,000 fans, an Iranian record. more than a hundred victims. The exact This high level of support for Tractor is number of victims cannot, however, be conditioned by the politicization of the team’s calculated, due to Teheran’s strict information fans, who articulate their demands for the embargo concerning the events in institution of instruction and television northwestern Iran.30 broadcasting in their native Azerbaijani The events of 2006 and the harsh language at almost every game. repressions that followed further strengthened Unprecedented in Iran, the crowds of tens of the Azerbaijanis’ Turkic nationalism and thousands of fans also shout pan-Turkic intensified their resentment toward the slogans and use pan-Turkic symbolism, such radically theocratic regime. These sentiments as, “Tabriz, , Ankara, our path leads in a reemerged, for example, during the 2009 different direction from the path of the presidential elections. Northwestern Iran Persians,” “Azerbaijan is ours, is supported the local native and reformist yours,” “All people have the right to study in Mousavi. A number of Azerbaijanis lost their their own language,” “Down with Persian lives during demonstrations. While resistance fascism,” “Long live free Azerbaijan,” “To to the ruling regime may serve to unite Iran’s hell with those who don’t like us,” “We’re Azerbaijanis with other opposition currents, proud to be Turks,” etc. there are nonetheless certain barriers--a At Tractor games against soccer teams from significant portion of the Persian opposition to Persia, hateful, defamatory slogans, with an the regime is critical of the theocratic ethno-nationalistic subtext, can be heard from government but is just as antagonistic toward both sides. The Persians generally chant “tork- Turkic nationalism as the current regime. e khar” or “Turkish donkey,” to which the Azerbaijanis have respond “fars-e maimoon” Soccer Nationalism or “Persian monkey.” This has led to bloody clashes, in which the police have generally In view of the de facto ban on all sided with the Persians.31 This polarization of Azerbaijani ethno-emancipatory activity, society along ethnic and linguistic lines and applying to other ethno-lingual communities nationalistic tensions between Persians and as well, sports have come to play an important Azerbaijanis is thus on the rise. This has also part of the flagship of the Azerbaijani led to an awakening among other, less emancipation movement in Iran. The success populous Turkic communities in Iran, which of the Tractor (also Teraktur, Tiraxtur) Sazi are claiming their Turkic identities more soccer team of Tabriz, the historical center of strongly than in the past. so-called southern Azerbaijan, has led to a sort of “soccer nationalism.” Founded in 1970 at a and Nationalization of the tractor factory in Tabriz, the team has since Environmental Movement

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of Azerbaijan’s natural wonders. Conspiracy Another important group of anti- theories have even emerged claiming this to be government protests that have assumed a carefully planned geoengineering project by strongly nationalistic overtones have been the regime which wishes to turn the fertile demonstrations calling attention to the poor territory of southern Azerbaijan into a salty condition of Lake Urmia. The lake itself, desert (because the salt from the dried-up lake located on the border between the Iranian would be spread by the wind to the provinces of Western and Eastern Azerbaijan, surrounding areas, where it would contaminate is a unique natural feature and is listed as a the soil). The fact that some Azerbaijani UNESCO biosphere reservation.32 nationalists believe such theories about the This salt lake has no outflow, and it is regime’s plans for the total destruction of the under threat from the intensification of region indicates their high degree of alienation agriculture in surrounding areas. Due to from a regime whose representatives tend to increasing use of water from rivers that feed be perceived as foreign usurpers.35 into the lake and the construction of over 30 dams in those streams, the surface area of the The Regime’s Reaction to Azerbaijani lake is progressively shrinking. According to Protests some experts, could the lake could dry up completely in a matter of a few years. Yet With any anti-regime protest, the Islamic officials of the Islamic Republic have not regime generally responds in the same taken serious measures to prevent the lake--not manner--harsh repression of demonstrations. only a valuable biotope, but also one of the State intervention against protests has become symbols of Southern Azerbaijan—from increasing severe, especially since the 2009 disappearing.33 presidential election riots. The Basij militia is From March 2010, a series of protests took usually deployed and uses batons, water place in hopes of drawing attention to this cannons, and rubber projectiles to disperse the serious ecological problem. Although Tractor protesters. Typically, there are arrests and Sazi fans, known for their inclination towards quasi-legal or even illegal abductions of Azerbaijani nationalism, have been involved selected demonstrators, followed by harsh in the protests from the start, the demands interrogations and imprisonment. were initially purely apolitical, aimed at Demonstrations also tend to be put down by solving an environmental problem. Even some the pro-regime vigilante group Ansar-e of the region’s elected deputies were among Hezbollah (Supporters of the Party of God), the voices of protestors, and their open letter which concentrates on enforcing Islamic was published by the official press agency morality among the citizens and on Fars. In spite of this, the regime took a very suppressing anti-regime opposition and signs hard line against the demonstrators. In turn, of protest.36 the demonstrators reacted by raising political The deployment of Ansar-e Hezbollah in and nationalistic issues in the protests.34 Azerbaijani territories is not, however, as At demonstrations in mid-2011, banners frequent or massive as is the case in Iran’s with such slogans as: “Lake Urmia is drying central and eastern provinces. There, the group up; Iran has ordered its execution,” and does not have a very large membership base, “Urmia is thirsty, Azerbaijan must take a stand and it only exhibits itself prominently in or lose the lake” were common. In response to Tabriz, where it assisted the Basij in the regime’s unwillingness to act on the issue, suppressing demonstrations. The group’s most what started as an ecological protest has visible personality, and at the same time, an become a nationalistic in nature. The problem example of the group’s weakness in Iranian has come to be interpreted as one of the Azerbaijan is Ruhollah Bejani, head of Ansar- inaction (some would say deliberate) of the e Hezbollah in Tabriz. Bejani gained attention Persians is leading to the disappearance of one in late 2011, when he launched a rhetorical

78 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) The Rise of Nationalism Among Iranian Azerbaijanis: A Step Toward Iran’s Disintegration? attack on the Azerbaijani consulate in the city events at the universities in Tehran, there was in response to the anti-Islamic policy being a double standard was evident. . While the pursued in Azerbaijan.37 In April of 2012, he raids at the University of Tehran were repeated his demands to close the consulate, investigated by a specially appointed even calling upon President Ahmadinejad to committee of the Iranian National Security do so due to the consulate’s plans to hold a Council, the incidents in Tabriz were ignored. “gay parade” in Tabriz.38 These demands were Demonstrations and student unrest originally not met, however, making Ansar-e Hezbollah directed against the result of the election thus even more marginal in the eyes of the locals. quickly assumed an ethnic dimension. The The regime has also responded to local press immediately began questioning Azerbaijani separatist tendencies by placing why events in the Azerbaijani territory were greater control over the university dealt with differently.41 In addition to the environment. This is also being carried out by suppression of riots, the Iranian regime also the Basij group. In the mid-2000s, they employs sophisticated methods in order to installed their own loyal teachers, leading to infiltrate separatist groups, monitor them, and the formation of the Basij Teachers eliminate them. According to information Organization. The goal of its establishment confirmed by Iranian government officials and was to strengthen the influence of its members academics, separatist cells are emerging over other academics and influence the among Traktor Sazi soccer fans (see manner of instruction. The organization claims aforementioned), which is leading to the to have over 15,000 members, accounting for politicization of their demands. Generally, about a quarter of all university teachers. these cells meet in Nakhchivan, the (northern) There is also a Basij Student Organization, Azerbaijani exclave, where Iranian citizens an association of students who are also have no visa requirements. Traktor fans views members of Basij units. For many young the team as a defender of the rights and people, membership in Basij may be the only freedom of the Azerbaijanis. Yet support for way to receive a university education. The the team among Iran’s Azerbaijani community organization has 650,000 members in 700 is longstanding and thus difficult to abolish. Iranian universities. Among the organization’s The Iranian government has thus allegedly main tasks are the coordination of attempted to infiltrate the network through confrontations with reform activists and the agents in order to identify and prosecute those exertion of pressure on university fans who are the most politically engaged.42 administrations concerning the schools’ social, In Iranian Azerbaijan in general, in the case moral, and political shortcomings.39 of any hint of anti-state activity, through its This regime structure no only limits and developed network of agencies, the regime controls academic freedom, but also serves for responds with oppression. When arrested, the rapid suppression of student riots or ethno-lingual rights activists of the Azerbaijani protests of any kind. Its effectiveness was community are routinely tortured by the clearly visible during the post-election police. Reports of rape have emerged as well. demonstrations in Iranian Azerbaijan (and Due to the lack of official data on the elsewhere) in 2009, when student unrest was nationalities of prisoners and the fact that harshly suppressed by paramilitary units. many activists are convicted of non-political There was even a Basij raid of universities and crimes (such as disorderly conduct), the exact of student dormitories in which tear gas and numbers of such prisoners cannot be batons were used and mass arrests were determined. Most of them tend to receive made.40 lighter sentences of a few months. The raids were especially harsh at the Nonetheless, some activists have received University of Tabriz and included beatings, harsher sentences. One such example is arrests, violent interrogations of students, and journalist Said Mantipour, who was sentenced destruction of property. When compared to in 2008 to eight years in prison.43

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An additional tactic of the regime has been The state has created an absolute to incite tensions between the Kurds and the information embargo on such activities. The Azerbaijanis. This is an integral part of majority Persian population, thus, has only a Tehran’s policy, especially in Western limited awareness of the situation in the Azerbaijan, where there is a populous Kurdish region. Even the state’s top representatives at community. During the 1990s especially, the times exhibit such ignorance. One such Islamic regime settled Kurds in villages south example took place in the spring of 2006 of the River, along which the national during an official visit by President Mahmoud border with Azerbaijan and Armenia runs, in Ahmadinejad in Tabriz at the local university. order to create a sort of buffer zone. In doing Azerbaijani students provocatively welcomed so, the government created considerable the statesman with the traditional greeting of tension between the local Azerbaijani residents pan-Turkic radicals known as the “wolf’s and the newly arrived Kurds. head” (kurtbaşı). Ahmadinejad interpreted the Tehran’s efforts to turn the Kurdish and gesture as a local greeting, and he returned it Azerbaijani communities of this province without knowing its political connotations. against each other were partially successful Pictures of the president inadvertently using and caused a certain worsening of relations the greeting of an organization that his regime between the two groups. This has not, has harshly repressed still circulate the however, developed into a more serious internet.46 conflict thus far. In addition, according to In September 2010, field research reports from the region, there is mutual conducted by Emil Souleimanov revealed a agreement between the leaders of the two surprising development among Iran’s communities, which strive for similar reforms Azerbaijani community. For example, there is (instruction in Kurdish and in Azerbaijani almost open talk in Tabriz about the need for Turkish as well as the establishment of ethno- federalization in Iran and for the establishment administrative autonomy, etc.).44 of Azerbaijani autonomy. One even hears occasional assertions about the need for The Situation in Iranian Azerbaijan from the Azerbaijan to split away from Iran. In stark Early 2000s contrast to the situation in the early 1990s-- when it was hardly possible to hear a Turkic From the early 2000s, in spite of the language in Tabriz--or even in the early 2000s- restrictions imposed by the Iranian authorities, -when scarcely half of the population spoke a Azerbaijanis have almost regularly held mass Turkic language in public--Azerbaijani is now marches to their national symbols of Mount commonly spoken in public and many listen Savalan and the Bazz fortress. On these exclusively to Azerbaijani and Turkish music. marches are Separatist slogans, pan-Turkic According to some unverified reports from symbolism, and the illegal flag of so-called independent sources, in the spring of 2009, South Azerbaijan (which has a structure there were explosions at police stations in similar to the flag of the Republic of several places in Western Azerbaijan, said to Azerbaijan) are not unusual.45 In addition to have been the work of Azerbaijani separatists. these marches and the increasingly frequent Some reports claim that this was the joint clashes between soccer fans of Azerbaijani and activity of Azerbaijani separatists with Persian origin, anonymous posters calling for Kurdish separatists, who have a longstanding instruction in Turkish, along with the flags of tradition of armed resistance in the region. Azerbaijan and of Turkey, have also begun to Similarly, though isolated, incidents occurred appear in Tabriz, Urmia, Maraz, Sulduz, in 1996 in the same part of Iranian Azerbaijan. Ardabil, and several other towns of Iranian The government in Tehran successfully nipped Azerbaijan. The posters are put up overnight those incidents in the bud, however, in part in prominent places and are then immediately due to the limited support Azerbaijani torn down by the police and militia units. separatists had at the time from their

80 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) The Rise of Nationalism Among Iranian Azerbaijanis: A Step Toward Iran’s Disintegration? compatriots.47 section will deal with security and Iran’s These developments are an indication that relations with those countries. an emancipation phase for Azerbaijani nationalism is underway, in parallel with the The United States emergence and development of elements of armed resistance. Despite the obstacles, it is Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the U.S. apparent that the nationalistic groups of Iran’s relationship with Iran has been a complicated Azerbaijanis have broad support. In view of one. Tehran went from being a key ally of the repressive nature of the Iranian regime, Washington to its archenemy practically one could scarcely imagine that such overnight. The long-term American position movements could function without support with respect to the Islamic Republic has thus from abroad, whether provided by foreign been antagonistic, and since the overthrow the governments or the diaspora. Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, Iran has A careful analysis of these nationalistic become the main adversary of the United movements must therefore address the foreign States in the region. American interests and influences affecting the development of these activities have, however, been more groups. Due to the scarcity of sources, this concentrated in the than the aspect is the most difficult to research. In Iran Caspian Sea region (primarily due to its close itself, sources on this topic are entirely ties with Saudi Arabia and the so-called Carter lacking, as the regime attempts to quash any Doctrine).48 information of this character for security Since 1995, the United States has enforced reasons. Likewise, the members of Azerbaijani harsh economic sanctions against Iran and its nationalistic groups in Iran avoid discussing energy industry sector, and it has attempted to foreign support for fear of possible accusations limit Iranian participation in energy projects in of espionage, etc. The outline that follows is the Caspian Sea and elsewhere. For example, therefore based mainly on fragmentary in November 1994, an agreement was signed information available in countries that support between Azerbaijan and Iran to provide a one- southern Azerbaijani nationalistic groups or quarter share in the energy and drilling have supported them in the past. consortium Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) to Iran, so that the National THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was to enter the AZERBAIJANI NATIONALISM IN IRAN consortium. By April 1995, however, the agreement had been cancelled, and the NIOC In addition to internal security problems in was excluded from the consortium, primarily Iran posed by its Azerbaijani minority, the due to firm American opposition. Richard Azerbaijani element is also important in terms Kauzlarich, the U.S. ambassador in Baku at of foreign relations. As a regional power with the time, openly threatened that unless the interests beyond its own borders, Iranian Iranian company were removed from the list policy on this matter has been pragmatic. for the consortium, the American firms would Though the issue of the Azerbaijani minority completely pull out their 40 percent share. In has been of secondary importance both with response, Iran immediately accused President regards to Iran’s own foreign policy and that Aliyev of Azerbaijan of being a puppet of the of external powers, the issue could play a “.”49 significant role in the political, military, and The U.S. (as well as European) position economic security of the entire Middle East. with respect to Iran has also blocked any Among the most important foreign powers Iranian participation in the Nabucco project. influencing the position of the Azerbaijani This is, of course, a purely political decision, nationalists in the Islamic Republic are the since from an economic, technical, and energy United States, the Republic of Azerbaijan, viewpoint, Iran has the largest deposits of Turkey, Russia, and also Israel. The following natural gas (the second-largest supply of

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 81 Emil Souleimanov, Kamil Pikal, Josef Kraus natural gas in the world) and would have been neighbor to the north. During the conflict over the main supplier from the region to . Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and The transport of this gas would have to cross Azerbaijan, Iran was not inclined to take sides through Azerbaijan or directly through Turkey, with its fellow Shi’a. Instead, Iran supported and any infrastructure or pipeline would its Christian adversary by providing weapons ultimately run through the territory of Iranian from Russia and the Armenian diaspora. Azerbaijan. As such, neither the West nor Nonetheless, the independent state of Azerbaijan and Turkey would wish for unrest Azerbaijan has had a limited role in the in the region, which could jeopardize the emancipation efforts of its southern ethnic energy infrastructure. relatives. A much more important player is As far as the U.S. relationship with the Turkey (see below), where thousands of Azerbaijani minority is concerned, according Iranians go to work and witness its modernity, to available information, in 2003-2004, progressiveness, and prosperity. Washington was still working to instigate Nonetheless, since Azerbaijan’s existence Azerbaijani separatism in Iran. However, as a as an independent state, Iran has result of the relatively weak ethnic self- systematically attempted to weaken that state. awareness of the Azerbaijanis and their One way has been by creating problems with apolitical nature at the time, the plan was not and blocking solutions to the status of the successfully realized.50 At that time, SANAM Caspian Sea. Iran has long backed Russia’s (South Azerbaijan National Awakening position regarding the division of the body of Movement) leader,51 Dr. Mahmudali water, thereby deliberately weakening Chohraganli (Chohragani in Persian), was Azerbaijan’s ability to do surveying and received at the highest level in Washington in drilling in the disputed Caspian waters. 2003 and again in 2004. Azerbaijan’s economy and its relationship Following the failed U.S. efforts to activate with the West mainly revolve around the separatism in northwestern Iran, the 2006 extraction, processing, and export of energy unrest came as a surprise both to Washington resources, and Iran has long been engaged in and to Tehran. Although the government in efforts to complicate this for Azerbaijan. Tehran has traditionally accused the instigators Tensions peaked in July 2001, when an Iranian of unrest of having ties to the United States warship forced an Azerbaijani survey ship and Israel, the fact that the Western media with experts from British Petroleum to leave barely covered the events in northwestern Iran the territorial waters around the Araz-Alov- indicated that the Americans had no Sharg field. The field is located a full 100 connection with them.52 Developments in kilometers to the north of the Soviet-Iranian recent years, however, indicate the situation in border and is claimed by Tehran. The incident Iranian Azerbaijan has changed. In the effectively ruined the chance of work foreseeable future, it may be possible to beginning in that field in the foreseeable foment Azerbaijani separatism and thereby to future.53 Teheran also opposed construction of weaken the central government in Tehran. the Baku--Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, but its efforts to stop this failed and the Azerbaijan pipeline was completed and began operating 2006. This was one of Tehran’s biggest The relationship between Iran and political defeats in the region. Azerbaijan has been quite problematic from Another factor in mutual security relations the very beginning, when the former Soviet has been Iranian attempts to export its radical Republic of Azerbaijan gained its Shi’i dogma to its northern, secular neighbor. independence. Iran’s concerns over the Iran’s religious leaders have attempted to gain irredentist and separatist tendencies of its influence in Azerbaijan’s mosques, to spread Azerbaijani minority have influenced to a their ideology, and to support Islamist-oriented considerable extent its relations with its political groups, such as the Islamic Party of

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Azerbaijan. Despite that party’s growing as possible from the events in Iranian popularity, Teheran’s efforts to Islamize Azerbaijan, and it has not made any official Azerbaijan are not likely to succeed in the near declarations of support for the separatist future.54 movements. Nonetheless, the government in As for the military security dimension, Baku has not closed the SANAM headquarters Azerbaijan’s orientation toward the West has on its territory in spite of Tehran’s protests.58 elicited Iranian fears of the possible use of its Interestingly, since the early 1990s, neighbor’s territory to attack the Islamic Azerbaijani nationalists have referred to Republic. Iranian representatives regularly northwestern Iran exclusively as “Southern warn Azerbaijan about its orientation toward Azerbaijan,” a term which is forbidden in Iran. the United States and Israel and the harsh Their goal is the unification of the two consequences for Azerbaijan if a threat of any and thus the formation of a kind were to come from Azerbaijani powerful country in the region.59 It is territory.55 questionable whether the government in Baku In particular, Iran suspects Azerbaijan of is determined to support separatism of the allowing the United States to use Azerbaijani Azerbaijanis in northwestern Iran (with the territory for reconnaissance activities against support of the United States, Israel, or other the Islamic Republic. In this regard, Ali Western countries, but without security Larijani, speaker of parliament and former guarantees from them).60 secretary of the Iranian Security Council, Baku may, however, find the southern stated that if Azerbaijani territory were to be Azerbaijani card a useful means to exert used for an attack on Iran, Tehran would carry diplomatic pressure--if limited--on Iran for at out reprisals against the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan least two reasons. The first might be a demand crude oil pipeline and other strategic facilities that the Islamic Republic take a more in Azerbaijan.56 favorable position toward Baku concerning the As a result of increasing Iranian pressure question of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh on Azerbaijan, the two countries signed a non- conflict. The presence of an increasingly aggression pact in 2005, according to which nationalistic Azerbaijani community in Iran the signatories would not permit a third might, if the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh country to build military bases on their were to erupt again, cause Iran to behave in territories to be used for an attack on the other accordance with the desires of its Azerbaijani party.57 Nonetheless, the mutual distrust population. A second reason might be the between the two countries continues and is possible escalation of disputes over the still growing, as Azerbaijan establishes closer ties undefined mutual boundaries on the Caspian with Iran’s archenemy, Israel (see below). Sea.61 In spite of the problematic relations between the two countries, official Azerbaijani Israel policy distances itself from the affairs of its southern neighbors. President Ilham Aliyev Since the 2000s, Israel has developed ties has regarded the question of southern (Iranian) with Azerbaijan in order to promote its Azerbaijan as being exclusively Iran’s internal interests in the region. In wake of the dispute political affairs, despite increasing demands of with Turkey, Israel is increasingly inclined southern (Iranian) Azerbaijanis for the toward the secular and cooperative Azerbaijan. expansion of their ethno-lingual rights. Still, Historically, Azerbaijani-Israeli/Azerbaijani- the Azerbaijani government seems to have had Jewish relations have been good. Of a certain degree of unofficial influence. importance to Israel is the fact that there have According to some reports, the Tractor Sazi never been strong manifestations of soccer team receives financial support from antisemitism in Azerbaijan (considerable Baku. This aside, however, post-Soviet numbers of so-called Mountain Jews live Azerbaijan has tried to distance itself as much within Azerbaijani territory, as well as

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Ashkenazi Jews),62 and that Azerbaijan is a United States, Israel, and other Western Muslim but decidedly secular country. For countries.66 Azerbaijan, on the other hand, the alliance is These activities and the rivalry between beneficial for economic reasons (Israel Iranian and Israeli secret services on imports up to one-sixth of its crude oil from Azerbaijani territory could also spill over into Azerbaijan) as well as from a military/security Iranian Azerbaijan. If this were to occur, it standpoint. would mean a far greater risk for the security The most striking example of cooperation of the Islamic Republic. One of Israel’s long- on this front was the February 2012 arms deal term goals is to destabilize the regime in for the import of 1.6 billion dollars’ worth of Tehran. The approach is thus identical to that Israeli weapons to Azerbaijan, in particular of the United States. Another possibility antiaircraft and antimissile defense systems.63 involving the Azerbaijani minority in Iran is The deal has caused speculation that Israel direct support of Israeli military operations might request to use Azerbaijani territory to against the Islamic Republic. As Israeli attack Iran. It has thus purchased defensive Brigadier General Oded Tira reportedly military technology in the case of a retaliatory commented on rumors of the use of attack. There is also speculation that Israel has Azerbaijani military airbases by Israel, “With been granted access to an Azerbaijani military the help of Azerbaijan, Israel could count on airbase in the south of the country, which the support of Iran’s Azerbaijanis.” could be used for an aerial attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.64 The proximity of this Turkey infrastructure and its possible use by Israel to destabilize the Iranian regime through the Iran’s relations with the moderate Islamist Azerbaijani minority is truly suggestive. government in Ankara are relatively warm. While Israeli activity in Iranian Azerbaijan This is in part due to Tehran’s efforts to cannot thus far be documented completely or maintain normal relations with Turkey, an definitively, it is possible such activities will important economic partner and a significant increase in the near future. This is already regional player. Though Ankara has made apparent from the Israeli-Iranian rivalry within official statements in favor of Iran with the territory of independent Azerbaijan. In regards to the imposition of sanctions on the early 2012, plans for a terrorist attack on the Islamic Republic, if Tehran were to obtain Israeli ambassador in Baku and on several nuclear weapons this would pose a security representatives of the local Jewish community risk to the Republic of Turkey. were uncovered. Yet Turkish-Iranian relations have not The Azerbaijani authorities immediately always been good. In fact, there have been accused the Iranian secret services, which more periods of hostility than normalcy were said to have masterminded, financed, and between the two. In the past, for example, the directed the entire operation. At the same time, Iranians have supported the Turkish Hizballah there were speculations that Israel’s secret offshoot, leading to a cooling of relations in service, the Mossad, had foiled the attack, the 1990s. The Turks also fear Tehran may which would confirm its presence and activity support Iraqi (and Turkish) Kurdish on Azerbaijani soil.65 Just two months later, separatism, as in the past (for example, during the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security the Iran-Iraq War).67 announced the arrest of 22 people accused of treason and espionage for Iran’s Revolutionary From a historical and ethnic perspective, Guard. According to the ministry, the group Turkey also has very close ties with was said to have already been operating on Azerbaijan and is its closest and most Azerbaijani territory since the 1990s in order important ally. In spite of this, however, and in to carry out sabotage operations and terrorist view of its limited economic and political attacks on embassies and organizations of the potential, Turkey has not been able to help

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Baku reach a more effective resolution of its resources to Europe through Turkey have been dispute with Armenia or to provide Azerbaijan blocked for political reasons. This, of course, with security guarantees in the potentially has not prevented Ankara from having its own explosive region. It is true in this regard that policy with respect to its eastern neighbor. Iran Turkey’s efforts to play a leading role in the is the second largest supplier of natural gas to region have run up against a number of Turkey, which is vitally dependent on gas obstacles. While both sides appeared to have imports. The gas is imported through the great expectations in the mid-1990s, such Tabriz-Ankara gas pipeline, with plans for hopes have faded and have been replaced with expansion through the construction of the so- a much more moderate, pragmatic approach-- called Persian Gas Pipeline at the cost of 1.3 with the main emphasis on relations based on billion dollars.70 mutual economic advantage.68 In addition, Nonetheless, in April 2012, Turkey after Baku established a direct connection with announced plans to cut its consumption of the U.S. administration, Ankara’s role as an Iranian gas by 20 percent. The first and most intermediary between Baku and the West was likely explanation for this is pressure from noticeably weakened. Nonetheless, in Ankara to lower the price of Iranian gas, agreement on a number of key foreign policy which is more expensive than gas supplied issues, relations between Turkey and from Russia. Second, there is speculation Azerbaijan have strengthened. With the more about U.S. pressure on Turkey to abandon active military-political engagement of the Iranian energy resources as part of economic United States in the region since 2001, this has sanctions.71 further become apparent. All energy exports crossing overland from A key link between Turkey and Iran and Iran to Western markets, whether from the between Turkey and Azerbaijan, as well as Persian Gulf or of the Caspian Sea, would Ankara’s main political tool in the region, is necessarily have to pass directly through the energy. In Turkey, the diversification of EU region of Iranian Azerbaijan. This is the case efforts to rid themselves of dependence on with the new transport infrastructure as well. energy imports from Russia in line with Any threat to the crude oil and gas pipelines, Turkey’s own economic and political interests. whether targeted attacks by armed groups or Turkey has an eminent interest in becoming a even the loss of Tehran’s control over that key Eurasian power corridor. territory, would necessarily mean a threat to The effort become a strategic energy Turkey’s business interests and its energy crossroads at the frontier of Russian Siberia, security. However positively Ankara may view the Caspian region, the Persian Gulf, and the the emancipation efforts of the ethnically close Middle East is manifest in particular in the Azerbaijani minority in Iran, if the situation foreign policy of the governing party, which were to get out of control and/or if the secure has an interest in building up Turkey’s supply of energy resources from Turkey’s international political standing as an important eastern neighbor were to be disrupted, this trans-regional country seeking admission to would have serious consequences for Turkey. the EU.69 A key project for Turkey is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, for Russia which the main oil supplier is Azerbaijan. Potentially, of course, the crude oil pipeline Russia is itself a country with considerable also offers connections to other countries of energy wealth. In the 1990s, it became an the region. The increased supply of Caspian important supplier of weapon systems to the oil and gas to Europe, however, is hindered by Iran, a key trade partner, making the launch of the still unresolved status of the Caspian Sea. its nuclear program possible. Russia and In addition, since July 2012, there has been a Iranian interests in the Caspian Sea region are ban on the import of Iranian oil to Europe. similar. As for the Persian Gulf, Russian Larger transports of Iranian energy energy companies have attempted to secure

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) 85 Emil Souleimanov, Kamil Pikal, Josef Kraus lucrative contracts for the development of export route to Turkey and the European Iranian oil and gas fields. In spite of Union. The ethno-separatist aspirations of international sanctions, Russian companies Iran’s Azerbaijanis could also influence Iran’s have successfully penetrated the Iranian other (smaller) Turkic nationalities, e.g., the energy market. The most important Russian East Mazandarni and Khorasani Turkmen, companies involved in expansion there are concentrated near the border with Gazprom and Transneft.72 and with a population of nearly Russia’s policy towards Azerbaijan has 1.5 million. been shaped by its long-term ties with that Although Azerbaijani emancipation efforts territory and by Russian energy and business and anti-regime protests have been interests. Both Tehran and Moscow favor a overshadowed by the general mass unrest weak Azerbaijan that is not oriented toward following the 2009 presidential elections, this the West. Russian relations with Turkey, as a issue is still a threat to Iran’s domestic security suitable transport node for energy going to and integrity as a state. Suppression of the Europe, are also much like those of Iran. post-election protests of course did not bypass Russia has long acted as a key ally of the territory of Iran’s Azerbaijanis, which was Teheran, regularly rejecting and vetoing harsh ravaged by members of the Basij and of the sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council. Ansar-e Hezbollah. Aware that universities It has strong commercial and other interests in have become one of the centers for possible the Islamic Republic as well, and has a similar resistance, the Iranian regime has strengthened position regarding the Caspian region. It has its presence there through Basij organizations. no interest in the strengthening of the Above all, soccer has played an important Azerbaijani element within the state of Iran. At part in Azerbaijani-Persian tensions and has present, a strong, pragmatic, and stable Iran is served as an outlet for expressions of more useful to Russia than an Iran weakened Azerbaijani nationalism as well as anti-Persian by domestic squabbles, which would threaten intolerance. Beyond soccer, Azerbaijani regional security and strengthen the positions nationalists have adopted the campaign to of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and its Western allies. prevent the ecological catastrophe of Lake Urmia, sometimes described as the pearl of CONCLUSION (southern) Azerbaijan. Conspiracy theories revolving around the issue are abundant and While it appears an emancipation phase is these “environmental” protests are thus underway for Azerbaijani nationalism coupled becoming more and more politicized. with the emergence and development of In the international arena, the Azerbaijani elements of armed resistance, the powerful, card could be used to weaken Iran. This might restrictive Iranian regime has made this very be an option for Israel and the United States in difficult to carry out. As Azerbaijanis represent particular, which have long had a troubled Iran’s largest ethnic minority, their relationship with Iran. While U.S. attempts in Strengthening separatism would pose a far this regard in the early 2000s failed Israel has greater threat to Iran’s territorial integrity than taken this somewhat further. Israel’s primary that of the already active Kurds, Baloch, and interest is in building close political and Khuzestani . Unlike the marginal (Sunni) security ties with that country in the event of a Kurds, Baloch, and Arabs, many Azerbaijanis possible confrontation with the Iran. Using the are in important positions in Iranian society, in Azerbaijani minority for logistical support in large part due to their strong influence in case of an attack against Iran could be useful, militia, army, and police units as well as in the though is not a building block of Israeli state apparatus. Moreover, the Iranian strategy. A more effective tool would be to Azerbaijanis territory is of great strategic mobilize this minority in order to weaken and importance to the country, both for agricultural preoccupy the central government. Thus far, production its strategic location as a major however, neither the United States nor Israel

86 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2013) The Rise of Nationalism Among Iranian Azerbaijanis: A Step Toward Iran’s Disintegration? has provided substantial support to the among nationalities is inherent to all Azerbaijani emancipation movement. multiethnic states, which fear threats to their The role of the northern Azerbaijanis in the territorial integrity, domestic security, and region of Iran inhabited mainly by their ethnic international standing. If the Azerbaijani relatives is not yet entirely clear. While Baku’s loyalty to the idea of Iranian statehood were to official policy has distanced itself from this end, this would have severe repercussions for issue, considering it an Iranian domestic affair, Iran’s regional security and future as a state. there has been some influence. In any case, the independent state of their compatriots has *Dr. Emil Souleimanov and Kamil Pikal work certainly served as a strong motivational at the Department of Russian and East element for Iran’s Azerbaijanis. Still, many European Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Iranian Azerbaijanis tend to view Turkey as a Charles University in Prague. Josef Kraus model. Beyond ethnic and linguistic ties, works in the field of Security and Strategic Turkey’s modernity, advanced economy, and Studies at the Masaryk University Faculty of culture are also appealing. In comparison, Social Studies in Brno. This study was written Northern Azerbaijan tends to be perceived as a under the auspices of the Centre for Collective weak, economically unproductive country Memory Research (UNCE 204007) at the controlled by a single clan. Turkey itself, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. however, has complicated ties with Iran, as it is, on the one hand, largely dependent on the NOTES Iranian energy supply, but, on the other hand, is a natural regional rival. The contradiction 1 The Turkophone ethnic groups include the between its economic and energy interests on Azerbaijanis, Turkmen, Qashqai, Avshars, and the one hand and its ethnic and power politics . Ethnic Iranians living within the on the other hand has kept Turkey from any territory of the Islamic Republic include (in serious involvement in the issue of the addition to the predominant Persians) Kurds, Azerbaijani minority in Iran. Still, Turkey has , Talysh, Gilaki, Mazandarani, Baloch, considerable potential to influence this Pashtuns, and Hazaras. Constituting a minority situation, and in many regards it has more nationality of Semitic origin is the large impact than Azerbaijan itself. Ankara’s population of Arabs living mainly in the increasingly Islamist orientation does not southwest of the country near the shores of the leave much room for the United States or Persian Gulf. Israel to promote their interests through 2 James Minahan, Encyclopedia of the Turkey, and independent Azerbaijan may be a Stateless Nations (Westport: Greenwood more likely partner. Publishing Group, 2002), pp. 1765–66. In comparison, Russian policy wants a 3 The language spoken by the Azerbaijanis is stable Iran, a weak Azerbaijan, and a Turkey commonly referred to as Azerbaijani in the that is not too strong--Turkey being a U.S. ally Republic of Azerbaijan. In Iran, this is more and NATO member. The ethnocultural and commonly called “Azerbaijani Turkish,” the ethnolinguistic emancipation efforts of Iran’s term used in this study. Azerbaijanis are thus somewhat contrary to 4 “Southern Azerbaijan,” Unrepresented these Russian political goals. With regards to Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) Iran’s Azerbaijanis and in the case of unrest Report, The Hague (2010), p. 4, and ensuing Iranian suppression of this http://www.unpo.org/downloads/319.pdf. minority, Russia would most likely follow a 5 This includes broadcasts by the Iranian state policy of strict noninterference with Iranian television station Sahar 1. The station in domestic affairs. It could also undermine any question is intended primarily for viewers in U.S. efforts to address such a potential northern Azerbaijan, and it strives to situation at the UN Security Council. disseminate Iranian state propaganda and The risk of growing internal tensions

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Iranian culture. The Sahar network also 14 Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran operates similar stations in other languages of and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity worldwide and regional importance. See: (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 75–76. Sahar, “Azeri TV of Sahar Universal 15 Hamid Mohtadi, “Rural Stratification, Rural Network,” to Urban Migration, and Urban Inequality: http://www.sahartv.ir/en/index.php?option=co Evidence from Iran,” World Development, Vol. m_content&view=article&id=574&Itemid=53 14, No. 6 (June 1986), pp. 717–18. (accessed March 3, 2011). 16 “Racism in Contemporary Iran: an Interview 6 Minahan, Encyclopedia of the Stateless with Alireza Asgharzadeh,” ADDAP, Nations, pp. 1765–66. http://adapp.info/en/index.php?option=com_c 7 There is also a Sunni minority in the country, ontent&view=article&id=192:profile-dr- consisting mainly of ethnic Kurds, Baloch, alireza-asgharzadeh&catid=32:adapp- Turkmen, Pashtuns, and some of the Arabs. exposes&Itemid=47. Together, the Sunnis account for 17 Nastaran Moosavi, “Secularism in Iran,” in approximately nine percent of Iran’s Barry A. Kosmin and Ariela Keysar (eds.), population. Hussein Hassan, Iran: Ethnic and Secularism and Secularity: Contemporary Religious Minorities (Washington, D.C.: International Perspectives (Hartford: ISSSC, Congressional Research Service, 2008), p. 3. 2007), pp. 143–45. 8 Minahan, Encyclopedia of the Stateless 18 Kamyar Abdi, “Nationalism, Politics, and Nations, pp. 1765–66. the Development of Archeology in Iran,” 9 Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, American Journal of Archeology, Vol. 105, literally the Army of Guardians of the Islamic No. 1 (January 2001), p. 52. Revolution. They are also known by the names 19 “Racism in Contemporary Iran: an Interview Sepah or Pasdaran or by the abbreviation with Alireza Asgharzadeh,” ADDAP, IRGC (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard http://adapp.info/en/index.php?option=com_c Corps). The Revolutionary Guards were ontent&view=article&id=192:profile-dr- founded by Ayatollah Khomeini immediately alireza-asgharzadeh&catid=32:adapp- after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 to protect exposes&Itemid=47. the newly imposed Islamic order. 20 “İranlı turistler Türkiye'ye geliyor” [“Iranian 10 Personal consultation of Josef Kraus with Tourists Visit Turkey“], Hurriyet, February 22, Nima Rashedan, commentator for Radio 2011, Farda, November 2011. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/17087969 11 “Racism in Contemporary Iran: An .asp (accessed July 31, 2011). Interview with Alireza Asgharzadeh,” 21 Fardin Alikhan, “The Politics of Satellite Association for Defense of Azerbaijani ,” in Mehdi Semati (ed.), Political Prisoners in Iran (ADDAP), October Media, Culture and Society in Iran (New 9, 2009, York: Routledge, 2008), p. 98. http://adapp.info/en/index.php?option=com_c 22 Cameron Brown, “Observations from ontent&view=article&id=192:profile-dr- Azerbaijan,” Middle East Review of alireza-asgharzadeh&catid=32:adapp- International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2002), exposes&Itemid=47 (accessed March 31, p. 68, http://www.gloria- 2011). center.org/meria/2002/12/brown.pdf. 12 “Southern Azerbaijan,” pp. 4–5. 23 Personal consultation of Emil Souleimanov 13 Mohammed Akhbari, “A Geopolitical with inhabitants of Tabriz, September 2010. Analysis of Ethnicity in Iran, with an 24 Svante E. Cornell, “Iranian Azerbaijan: A Emphasis on Challenges and Opportunities,” Brewing Hotspot,” Azeri.dk, November 22, Geopolitics Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Winter 2004, 2009), pp. 56–57. http://www.azeri.dk/en/articles/Iranian_azerbai

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jan.html (accessed August 1, 2011). UNESCO, 25 There thus exists friction and antagonism http://www.unesco.org/mabdb/br/brdir/director between the religious solidarity of y/biores.asp?code=IRA+07&mode=all Azerbaijanis and Persians, on the one hand-- (accessed June 13, 2012). which does not extend, for example, to Kurds, 33 Michael Hogan, “Lake Urmia,” in Cutler J. Baloch, and other Sunnis--and their ethnic Cleveland (ed.), Encyclopedia of Earth incompatibility, on the other hand, with the (Washington D.C.: Environmental Information Azerbaijani minority being much closer to the Coalition, National Council for Science and Turks and Azerbaijanis beyond Iran’s actual the Environment, 2011) borders. Naturally, this has affects national and http://www.eoearth.org/article/Lake_Urmia?to regional security. pic=49560 (accessed June 13, 2012). 26 Brenda Shaffer, “The Formation of 34 Saeed K. Denghan, “Iranian Greens Fear Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran,” Disaster as Lake Orumieh Shrinks: Football Nationalities Papers, Vol. 28 No. 3 (2000), Chants and Street Protests Raise Profile of p. 470. Fight to Save UNESCO-listed Site,” The 27 Rasmus C. Elling, “State of Mind, State of Guardian, September 5, 2011, Order. Reaction to the Ethnic Unrest in the http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/05/ Islamic Republic of Iran,” Studies in Ethnicity iran-greens-lake-orumieh-shrinks (accessed and Nationalism, Vol. 8 No. 3 (2008), p. 486. June 13, 2012). 28 Bijan Baharan, The Hidden Side of Iran: 35 Emil Souleimanov, “Concerns about Urmia Discrimination against Ethnic and Religious Lake Boost Nationalism among Azerbaijanis Minorities (Paris: International Federation for in Iran,” CACIAnalyst.org, October 5, 2011, Human Rights, 2010), p. 15. http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5637. 29 Basij-e Mostazafan, literally the 36 Frederic Wehrey, The Rise of Pasdaran: Mobilization of the Oppressed. This is a Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic paramilitary volunteer group under the Revolutionary Guards Corps (Santa Monica: Revolutionary Guard. During the Iran-Iraq RAND Corporation, 2009), pp. 10–11. War, it took part in combat operations, but 37 “Hezbollah Threatens to Stop Activity of now focuses mainly on internal security--the Azerbaijani Consulate General in Tabriz,” suppression of demonstrations and unrest; News., November 1, 2011, compelling compliance with Islamic laws and http://www.news.az/articles/48006 (accessed morals; and in the event of an attack on the August 1, 2012). state, it represents reserves for military 38 “Iranian Clergyman Vows to Close deployment and home defense. Azerbaijan’s Consulate in Tabriz,” 30 Yashar Bugun, “Tractor Sazi Football Club Panorama.am, April 16, 2012, and Racism in Iran,” Havadaran Tirakhtur http://www.panorama.am/en/society/2012/04/1 Azarbaijan, December 13, 2010, 6/gays-azerbayjan/ (accessed August 1, 2012). http://tractorfans.blogsky.com/1389/09/22/post 39 Wehrey, The Rise of Pasdaran, pp. 39–41. -4/ (accessed August 31, 2011). 40 Robert Tait and Julian Borger, “Iran 31 Neyereh Tohidi, “Iran: Regionalism, Election: Mass Arrests and Campus Raids as Ethnicity and Democracy,” Regime Hits Back,” The Guardian, June 17, OpenDemocracy.net, June 28, 2006, 2009, http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy- http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/17/ irandemocracy/regionalism_3695.jsp iran-election-protests-arrests1 (August 1, (accessed April 1, 2011). 2012). 32 United Nations Educational, Scientific and 41 “Students Protest in Tabriz Crushed with Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), “Biosphere Utter Violence,” Iran Press Service, August Reserve Information: Lake Oromeeh,” 12, 2009, http://www.iran-press-

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service.com/articles/students_killed_12899.ht Azerbaijani abbreviation GAMOH (Guney ml (accessed August 1, 2012). Azerbaycan Milli Oyanis Hereketi – the 42 Emil Souleimanov, “Iranian Azerbaijan: The Movement for the National Revival of South Brewing Hotspot of Future Separatism?” Azerbaijan), was founded in 1995 by Dr. CACIAnalyst.org, October 27, 2010, Mahmudali Chehregani and its headquarters http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5432/prin are located in Baku. It is strictly banned in t (accessed August 1, 2011). Iran. The members are made up of 43 “Said Matinpour,” Association for Defense Azerbaijanis in the diaspora, including in the of Azerbaijani Political Prisoners in Iran, Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Western February 2, 2011, Europe, and North America. Their goals are http://adapp.info/en/index.php?option=com_c equality of cultural and lingual rights for ontent&view=article&id=464:saeed- Azerbaijanis in Iran; the establishment of matinpour&catid=32:adapp- autonomy in a federalized Iran; and according exposes&Itemid=47 (accessed July 31, 2011). to some sources, some radical elements even 44 Majid Khorshidi, Yok F. Lee, and advocate from Iran. See GAMOH, Fakhreddin Soltani, “Ethnic Secessionism in March 31, 2011, Iran. Accusation or Fact?” Journal of Politics http://www.gamoh.biz/default.asp. and Law, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2010), p. 273. 52 Personal consultation of Emil Souleimanov 45 For a depiction of the South Azerbaijan flag, with State Department officials in Washington, see Guney Azerbaycan Milli Oyanis Hereketi D.C., April 2007. [the Movement for the National Revival of 53 Svante Cornell, Mamuka Tsereteli, and South Azerbaijan], March 31, 2011, Vladimir Socor, “Geostrategic Implications of http://www.gamoh.biz/default.asp. the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline,” in S. 46 “AlefNoon, Photo 21,” Picasa Web Albums, Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell (eds.), last modified February 5, 2007, The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil http://picasaweb.google.com/alefnoonphoto/Al Window to the West (Washington, efNoon#5028156005409439138 (accessed D.C./Uppsala, Sweden: Central Asia- July 31, 2011). Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 47 Personal consultation of Emil Souleimanov 2005), p. 20. with researchers at the University of Tehran 54 Souleimanov and Ditrych, “Iran and with ties to the government, September 2010. Azerbaijan/” 48 In January 1980, Jimmy Carter, then 55 “Senior MP Warns Azerbaijan Not to president of the United States, declared in his Shelter Mossad Terrorists,” Fars News State of the Union address, “Let our position Agency, February 29, 2012, be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn= force to gain control of the Persian Gulf will 9010176604 (accessed August 1, 2012). be regarded as an assault on the vital interests 56 Taleh Ziyadov, “Azerbaijan Fears Standoff of the United States and such an assault will between Washington and Tehran,” Eurasia be repelled by all means necessary including Daily Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 82 (April 2006). military force.” 57 “Azerbaijan Says Tehran, Baku Military 49 Emil Souleimanov and Ondrej Ditrych, Cooperation Important,” Turkish Weekly, June “Iran and Azerbaijan: A Contested 17, 2005, accessed August 1, 2012, Neighborhood,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/12868/aze No. 2 (2007). rbaijan-says-tehran-baku-military-cooperation- 50 Personal consultation of Emil Souleimanov important.html. with undisclosed CIA official in Washington, 58 Cameron Brown, “Wanting to Have Their D.C., April 2007. Cake and Their Neighbor's Too: Azerbaijani 51 This organization, also known by the Attitudes towards Karabakh and Iranian

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Azerbaijan,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. other Grave Crimes Were Detained,” March 58, No. 4 (Autumn 2004), pp. 592–95. 14, 2012, 59 On the other hand, some Iranian clerics have http://www.mns.gov.az/en/news/327.html. on the contrary been calling for the annexation 67 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik. of Northern Azerbaijan to the Islamic Republic Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu [Strategic on the basis of their shared Shi’i identity. For Depth: Turkey's International Standing] example, Ayatollah Mohsin Shabestani in (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2008), pp. 426–36. Tabriz has made such statements on several 68 Ziya Onis, “Turkey and Post-Soviet States: occasions. Elahé Hicks, “Iran's Religious and Potential and Limits of Regional Power Ethnic Minorities: Discrimination in Law and Influence,” Middle East Review of Practice,” Amnesty International, Vol. 9, No. 7 International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June (September 1997), 2001). http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1997/iran/ 69 For more information, see Tuncay Babali, (accessed April 1, 2011). “Turkey at the Energy Crossroads,” The 60 Touraj Atabaki, “Ethnic Diversity and Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring Territorial Integrity of Iran: Domestic 2009), pp. 25–33. Harmony and Regional Challenges,” Iranian 70 Joe Parkinson, “Iran Sets Turkish Pipeline Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2005), p. 43. Project,” The Wall Street Journal, July 24, 61 Irina Morozova, “Contemporary Azerbaijani 2010, Historiography on the Problem of ‘Southern http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527 Azerbaijan’ after World War II,” Iran and the 48704249004575385330536199748.html#arti Caucasus, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2005), p. 119. cleTabs%3Darticle (accessed August 1, 2012). 62 For more information, see Gabriel Lerner, 71 Justin Vela, “Turkey: Ankara Engaged in “Azeri Jews: Centuries of Coexistence in Energy Balancing Act,” EUROASIA.org, April Azerbaijan,” JewishJournal.com, January 10, 4, 2012, 2008, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65224 http://www.jewishjournal.com/world/article/az (accessed August 1, 2012). eri_jews_centuries_of_coexistence_in_azerbai 72 For more information, see Roger Howard, jan_20080111/ (accessed August 1, 2012). Iran Oil: The New Middle East Challenge to 63 “Israel Signs $1.6 Billion Arms Deal with America (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). Azerbaijan,” Haaretz.com, February 26, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy- defense/israel-signs-1-6-billion-arms-deal- with-azerbaijan-1.414916 (accessed August 1, 2012). 64 Mark Perry, “Israel's Secret Staging Ground,” Foreign Policy, March 28, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03 /28/israel_s_secret_staging_ground (accessed August 1, 2012). 65 Emil Souleimanov, “Is Azerbaijan Becoming Area of Confrontation Between Iran and Israel?” CACIAnalyst.org, February 8, 2012, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5711 (accessed August 1, 2012). 66 Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan Republic, “22 People Accused of Treason and

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