DOCSLIB.ORG

Cambodia: the Lessons and Legacy of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Cambodia: the Lessons and Legacy of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report Cambodia The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden's 150 years of unbroken peace. The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. Governing Board Professor Daniel Tarschys, MP, Chairman (Sweden) Sir Brian Urquhart, Vice-chairman (United Kingdom) Dr Oscar Arias Sinchez (Costa Rica) Dr Gyula Horn (Hungary) Dr Ryukichi Imai (Japan) Professor Catherine Kelleher (United States) Dr Marjatta Rautio (Finland) Dr Lothar Riihl (Germany) The Director Director Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Pipers vag 28, S-170 73 Solna, Sweden Cable: SIPRI Telephone: 46 81655 97 00 Telefax: 46 81655 97 33 SIPRI Research Report No. 9 Trevor Findlay 1XFORD UNIVERSITY PRE Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP i Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calcutta Cape Town Dares Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York @ SIPRI 1995 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. Within the UK, exceptions are allowed in respect of any fair dealing for the purpose of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, or in the case of reprographic reproduction in accordance with the terms of the licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside these terms and in other countries should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above The paperback edition of this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without thepublisher'sprior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Findlay, Trevor. Cambodia: the legacy and lessons of UNTAC/ Trevor Findlay 4SIPRI research report; no. 9) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Cambodia-Politics and government-1975-. 2. United Nations. Transitional Authority in Cambodia. I. Title. 1. Series DS554.8.F57 1994 959.604-dc20 94-36156 ISBN 0-19-829186-8 ISBN 0-19-829185-X (pbk.) Typeset and originated by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddies Ltd., Guildford and King's Lynn Contents Preface vii ... Acknowledgements Vlll Acronyms X 1. The Cambodian peace process 1 Table 1.1. The four Cambodian factions and their military forces 2 2. The Paris Peace Accords 11 3. Implementation of the Paris Peace Accords 2 1 I. UNAMIC, the 'interim period' and Phase I of the 22 cease-fire 11. Planning for UNTAC 26 III. Deployment of UNTAC 33 TV. Phase 11 36 Table 3.1. States providing military personnel and civil police 28 to UNAMICrnTAC Table 3.2. Cantoned and disarmed forces of the Cambodian 38 factions as of 10 September 1992 Figure 3.1. UNTAC organizational chart 30 Figure 3.2. UNTAC military deployments in Cambodia 42 after October 1992 4. Other pre-election aspects of implementation 52 I. Repatriation 52 11. Electoral enrolment 54 111. The Supreme National Council 57 IV. Control of the civil administration 5 9 V. Human rights and law and order 63 VI. The economic situation 68 VII. Rehabilitation 69 VIU. Mine awareness and de-mining 72 Table 4.1. Membership of the Supreme National Council, 5 8 January 1993 5. The 1993 election 75 Table 5.1. The May 1993 election results 84 vi CAMBODIA: LEGACY AND LESSONS OF UNTAC 6. Formation of a new government and other post-election developments 7. An assessment of UNTAC's performance I. Introduction 11. Success or failure? HI. The factors behind UNTAC's success 8. The lessons of Cambodia I. The need for prompt deployment D. The indispensability of advance planning 111. The need for measured implementation IV. Organizational lessons V. Reaction to non-compliance of the parties VI. Supervision and control of the civil administration vn. The military VIII. The civil police IX. Other civilian personnel X. Human rights and law and order XI. Handling the economic impact XII. Press and information strategies xm. Lessons for negotiators 9. Conclusion Postscript Appendix. Documents on Cambodia, 1991-93 Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia-Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Con- flict-Agreement concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia-Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia-Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia Chronology, 1970-94 Bibliography Index The United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cambodia between 1991 and 1993 is, so far, the most successful of the many such operations established by the UN since the end of the cold war. Although commonly called a peacekeeping operation, the Cambodia enterprise was much more. While comprising elements of traditional UN peacekeeping, such as monitoring a cease-fire, it was in fact a comprehensive plan to bring peace, democracy, constitutionality, human rights and the beginnings of reconciliation and reconstruction to Cambodia. It was the most ambitious and expensive such exercise the UN has ever undertaken, pushing the limits of peacekeeping even beyond those envisaged in 'second-generation' models and estab- lishing new precedents in international law and practice. Despite its flaws, it provides new benchmarks for future UN operations. This study is one of the first comprehensive assessments of the UN oper- ation in Cambodia to be published. Based on research conducted over two years in Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Sweden and the USA, including interviews with key participants in the UN operation, it examines the peace process that led to the Paris Peace Accords, dissects the Accords them- selves, discusses the establishment and operation of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and other elements of the peace process, and assesses the factors that contributed to the qualified success of the operation. Perhaps most important, it seeks to draw lessons from the Cambodia experience for future operations of similar size and nature. Finally it examines the troubling events that have occurred in Cambodia since the departure of UNTAC in late 1993 and the inferences that may be drawn about the durability of negotiated peace settlements once the UN blue helmets depart. The study is the first published product of SIPR17s Project on Peace- keeping and Regional Security, established in mid-1993. It is also one of a series of studies of UN peacekeeping operations conducted by the Canadian Centre for Global Security in Ottawa as part of its International Peace- keeping Programme funded by the Ford Foundation. The Foundation's funding of the study is gratefully acknowledged. SIPRI and the Canadian Centre for Global Security are delighted to be able to present Trevor Findlay's study jointly as a contribution to the present international debate on the future of multilateral peacekeeping. Dr Adam Daniel Rotfeld Dr David Cox Director Acting Director SIPRI Canadian Centre for Global Security Acknowledgements This study is based on research conducted in Australia and Sweden, a field trip to Cambodia from 21 to 27 May 1993, a workshop in Ottawa held on 19 November 1993 organized by the Canadian Centre for Global Security (CCGS), and subsequent interviews at UN headquarters in New York. In Australia I spoke with Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, Military Commander of UNTAC; Susan Aitkin, Unesco; Terry-Anne O'Neil, Australian Defence Intelligence Organisation; and Simon Baker, Overseas Services Bureau. In Cambodia, as well as visiting polling booths in Phnom Penh and Takhmau, UNTAC headquarters for press briefings and Cheung Ek (the 'killing fields' monument), I spoke with General and Mrs Sanderson; Nick Warner, Australian Mission; Stephen Marks, Basil Fernando and Jamie Medzel, UNTAC Human Rights Component; Mara Moustaphine, Telstra Overseas Telecommunications Corporation, Australia; Jennifer Ashton, UN High Commission for Refugees; Kwok Kwan Hung, Managing Director, Rasrnei Kampuchea newspaper; Khoun Sodary, Deputy Editor, Prachea- chuii newspaper; Susan Aitkin, Unesco; Kim Wiesener, Politilcen, a Danish newspaper; David Sporl, Canadian Mission; Sorasak Pan, Chief, EDP Section, UNTAC; Lieutenant-Colonel Damien Healy, UN Mixed Military Working Group Secretariat; Major John Flanagan, New Zealand Defence Force, Cambodian Mine Action Centre; Lieutenant-Colonel Marty Studdert, UNTAC Force Communications Unit; and Sek
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Seeking Justice in Cambodia Realism
    Seeking Justice in Cambodia By Gregory H. Stanton When the Khmer Rouge regime took power in Cambodia in 1975, its leaders hoped to establish a utopian rural communist society without cities, private property or money. They declared a new beginning of history, Year Zero, and a new nation, Democratic Kampuchea. Although they modeled their revolution on the Soviet Union under Stalin and China under Mao Tse-Tung, they believed those regimes had not gone far enough, fast enough in killing class enemies. The Khmer Rouge also eschewed the cults of personality established by Stalin and Mao. Instead the secretive Khmer Rouge power elite named themselves the Angkar, the organization, and claimed absolute obedience from every Kampuchean. Religion and worship were abolished. Buddhist monks were disrobed and often killed. Muslim Chams and the few Christians were murdered at a rate much higher than ordinary Kampucheans. Vietnamese Cambodians were forced to flee to Vietnam until 1977, when the border was closed and the remaining Vietnamese were murdered. Minority ethnic groups were forced to live in Khmer-speaking communes, and forbidden to speak their languages and practice their customs. The Khmer Rouge systematically stripped rural communes of the rice they produced in order to trade it to China for weapons and machines. They substituted traditional herbal treatments for scientific “foreign” medicine and neither manufactured nor imported modern antibiotics. “New people” originally from the cities were declared to be class enemies and were literally worked to death. By 1977, the failures of the Kampuchean economy were blamed on enemies within the Communist party, and purges began all over the country.
    [Show full text]
  • Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in Southeast Asia
    Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in Southeast Asia Geographically, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam are situated in the fastest growing region in the world, positioned alongside the dynamic economies of neighboring China and Thailand. Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in Southeast Asia compares the postwar political economies of these three countries in the context of their individual and collective impact on recent efforts at regional integration. Based on research carried out over three decades, Ronald Bruce St John highlights the different paths to reform taken by these countries and the effect this has had on regional plans for economic development. Through its comparative analysis of the reforms implemented by Cam- bodia, Laos and Vietnam over the last 30 years, the book draws attention to parallel themes of continuity and change. St John discusses how these countries have demonstrated related characteristics whilst at the same time making different modifications in order to exploit the strengths of their individual cultures. The book contributes to the contemporary debate over the role of democratic reform in promoting economic devel- opment and provides academics with a unique insight into the political economies of three countries at the heart of Southeast Asia. Ronald Bruce St John earned a Ph.D. in International Relations at the University of Denver before serving as a military intelligence officer in Vietnam. He is now an independent scholar and has published more than 300 books, articles and reviews with a focus on Southeast Asia,
    [Show full text]
  • U.S.-Japan Approaches to Democracy Promotion
    U.S. JAPAN APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION U.S. JAPAN Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA 1819 L St NW #300 Washington, DC 20036 [email protected] U.S.-JAPAN APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY SASAKAWA USA SASAKAWA PROMOTION Edited by Michael R. Auslin and Daniel E. Bob ISBN 9780996656764 51000 > 9 780996 656764 U.S.-JAPAN APPROACHES TO DEMOCRACY PROMOTION Edited by Michael R. Auslin Daniel E. Bob Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA is an independent, American non-profit and non- partisan institution devoted to research, analysis and better understanding of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Sasakawa USA accomplishes its mission through programs that benefit both nations and the broader Asia Pacific region. Our research programs focus on security, diplomacy, economics, trade and technology, and our education programs facilitate people-to-people exchange and discussion among American and Japanese policymakers, influential citizens and the broader public in both countries. ISBN: 978-0-9966567-6-4 Printed in the United States of America. © 2017 by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA LCCN Number applied for Sasakawa USA does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views expressed herein are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Sasakawa USA, its staff or its board. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by and means without permission in writing from Sasakawa USA. Please direct inquiries to: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA Research Department 1819 L Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20036 P: +1 202-296-6694 This publication can be downloaded at no cost at http://spfusa.org/ Cover photo: © EPA/Barbara Walton Contents Preface .............................................................................................................................v Dennis Blair and Yasushi Akashi INTRODUCTION U.S.-Japan Approaches to Democracy Promotion ............................................
    [Show full text]
  • Letters from a Fish to His Admiral (Pdf)
    LETTERS FROM A FISH TO HIS ADMIRAL BEING BRITANNIA NEWSLETTERS 1-20 17th November 1953 – 9th April 1954 from Acting Captain J S Dalglish, Royal Navy to Rear Admiral Connoly Abel Smith, Royal Navy (temporarily absent with Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II on board the S.S. GOTHIC for the Commonwealth tour of 1953/4) COMMISSIONING BRITANNIA The following notes and letters were written by Acting Captain J S Dalglish, the Officer in charge of Commissioning BRITANNIA, and getting her ready for Royal service, between November 1953 and April 1954. They were written to Rear Admiral Conolly Abel Smith who was on SS Gothic, in temporary use as a Royal Yacht, for The Queen’s Commonwealth Tour 53/54. Upon his return to the UK, Admiral Abel Smith would then become in charge of BRITANNIA, as the first Flag Officer Royal Yachts (FORY). Throughout his career Captain Dalglish was known as FISH. We have a copy of his autobiography – Life Story of a Fish. Prologue SOME RANDOM THOUGHTS ON “BRITANNIA” AT THE BEGINNING. Selection Officers were nominated by Flag Officer Royal Yachts after personal interviews, after which approval was formally given from the Palace. Royal Yachtsmen (who were ranked as ‘Riggers’ in V&A, but with us they became just ‘Yachtsmen’), were all volunteers in response to an AFO in 1953. About 1,000 names came up and we began, of course, with examination of Service Certificates from which any who were not VG Superior were eliminated (although I seem to remember some of our Stokers were VG Satisfactory because of numbers).
    [Show full text]
  • The Constitutive Discourse of the Khmer Rouge
    Henri Locard. Pol Pot's Little Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar. Chang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005. xvi +336 pp. $18.95, paper, ISBN 978-974-9575-56-7. Reviewed by Jason Edwards Published on H-Genocide (August, 2005) The Khmer Rouge governed Cambodia from life. Constitutive rhetoric, therefore, is the discur‐ April 1975 to January 1979 and can be truly called sive background of social life for a particular peo‐ one of the most brutal regimes of the twentieth ple. The slogans used by the Khmer Rouge provide century. However, understanding Khmer Rouge a form of constitutive discourse. These slogans ideology and its impact on Cambodian society is were rooted in Maoist ideology and Cambodian often difficult to discern because the regime's cultural mythology. However, until now they were leaders did not create any major manifestos.[1] never compiled into a specific text for the people That is why Henri Locard's book, Pol Pot's Little to study en masse. Rather, since Cambodia is an Red Book: The Sayings of Angkar, is such an im‐ oral culture, the Khmer leadership and their sur‐ portant text for understanding the political rogates spoke them on a daily basis. The Khmer thought of the Khmer Rouge. Rouge interpellated ordinary Cambodians Locard provides the reader with a group of through continuous rote instruction. sayings and slogans that he collected over four Locard's book is composed of an introduction, years, 1991-1995, from survivors of the Khmer six chapters, and an epilogue. The introduction Rouge's regime, as well as snippets from speeches provides an understanding and a justification for by Khmer leadership.
    [Show full text]
  • Cambodia: Human Rights Before and After the Elections
    May 1993 Vol.5 No.10 CAMBODIA: HUMAN RIGHTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS I. INTRODUCTION Cambodians will go to the polls on May 23 in an atmosphere of political and ethnic violence and renewed civil war. The elections are the culmination of a 17-month United Nations presence, the largest, most ambitious and most expensive peace-keeping effort ever, which was supposed to bring about an end to the conflict. Instead, Cambodia is faced with as much fighting as when the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) entered the country in March 1992, and a spiralling level of serious human rights abuses. The "neutral political environment" that was supposed to be the precondition for elections is entirely absent. The five permanent members of the Security Council and other drafters of the 1991 Paris peace accords, formally known as the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, are determined to go ahead with the elections regardless. But what happens on May 23 is almost less important than what happens in the days after the results are announced. Asia Watch believes that an analysis of the missteps that led to the current human rights situation is critically important to determining how, or perhaps whether, human rights of Cambodians can be protected under whatever government comes to power then. The reasons for the deterioration in the human rights situation in late 1992 and early 1993 are complex. None of the parties to the conflict has a history of respect for human rights and one, Democratic Kampuchea, better known as the Khmer Rouge, has one of the worst human rights records in modern history.
    [Show full text]
  • First Quarterly Report: January-March, 2012
    mCÄmNÐlÉkßrkm<úCa Documentation Center of Cambodia Quarterly Report: January‐March, 2012 DC‐Cam Team Leaders and the Management Team Prepared and Compiled by Farina So Office Manager Edited by Norman (Sambath) Pentelovitch April, 2012 Sirik Savina, Outreach Coordinator, discusses with the villagers about the hearing process at Khmer Rouge Tribunal. Abbreviations CHRAC Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee CP Civil Party CTM Cambodia Tribunal Monitor DC‐Cam Documentation Center of Cambodia DK Democratic Kampuchea ECCC Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ICC International Criminal Court ITP Sida Advanced International Training Programme KID Khmer Institute for Democracy KR Khmer Rouge MMMF Margaret McNamara Memorial Fund MRDC Mondul Kiri Resource and Documentation Centre OCP Office of Co‐Prosecutors OCIJ Office of Co‐Investigating Judges PTSD Post‐Traumatic Stress Disorder Sida Swedish International Development Agency TSL Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum UN United Nations UNDP United Nation for Development Program USAID United States Agency for International Development VOT Victims of Torture VPA Victims Participation Project VSS Victim Support Section YFP Youth for Peace YRDP Youth Resource Development Program 2 Table of Contents Executive Summary.............................................................................................................. 1 Results/Outcome................................................................................................................. 7 Raised Public Awareness on the Value of Documents.............................................
    [Show full text]
  • Yale-UN Oral History Project Yasushi Akashi James Sutterlin, Interviewer November 28, 1997 New York, New York Session 2
    Yale-UN Oral History Project Yasushi Akashi James Sutterlin, Interviewer November 28, 1997 New York, New York Session 2 James Sutterlin : So, Mr. Akashi at our last session we ended by talking about intelligence and the extent to which you had an intelligence capacity in Cambodia. You said a good bit about it but you might have something you want to add at this point. Yasushi Akashi : There was a very good amount of military intelligence and General Sanderson and I were only the receiving end of intelligence reports, particularly from the United States. Sanderson was somewhat skeptical of some of the quality of intelligence, but we took such intelligence seriously and we evaluated each one of them. I must also add that, in a broad sense, I had a constant exchange of political intelligence with ambassadors. The Japanese ambassador was very adept about dealing with Sihanouk’s psychology. The French Ambassador Phillipe Coste was very good at the goings-on in Prince Sihanouk’s royal family. He was pretty close to his wife, Princess Monique, sometimes to the extent to annoy Sihanouk himself. The American ambassador, Twining, was very methodical, very thorough, and I had a good overall judgment [of him]. Since we lived in the same hotel during the first part of my eighteenth month, we either got together or we had an exchange of “love” notes about the Cambodian situation almost every day. And, the Australian ambassador was interested in developmental issues; he visited projects in the field and reported to me about his impressions. The Chinese 1 ambassador was particularly strong, obviously, about Khmer Rouge psychology and motivations, which he was not very free to share with us, but nevertheless as a conduit to the Khmer Rouge he was very handy.
    [Show full text]
  • SPIONS a Lehallgatandók Nem Tudták Tovább Folytatni a Konverzációt, Nem Volt Mit Lehallgatni
    Najmányi László megalapítása bejelentésének, és az aktualitását vesztett punkról az elektronikus tánczenére való áttérésnek. A frontember Knut Hamsun Éhségét olvassa, tudtam meg, aztán megszakadt a vonal. Gyakran előfordult, amikor a lehallgatók beleuntak a lehallgatásba. Ha szétkapcsolták a vonalat, SPIONS a lehallgatandók nem tudták tovább folytatni a konverzációt, nem volt mit lehallgatni. A lehall- gatók egymással dumálhattak, család, főnö- kök, csajok, bármi. Szilveszter napján biztosan Ötvenharmadik rész már délután elkezdtek piálni. Ki akar szilvesz- terkor lehallgatni? Senki. Biszku elvtárs talán. Ha éppen nem vadászik. Vagy a tévében Ernyey Béla. Amikor nyomozót játszik. � Jean-François Bizot6 (1944–2007) francia arisz- Végzetes szerelem, Khmer Rouge, Run by R.U.N. tokrata, antropológus, író és újságíró, az Actuel magazin alapító főszerkesztője7 volt az egyet- „Másképpen írok, mint ahogy beszélek. Másképpen beszélek, mint ahogy gon- len nyugati, aki túlélte a Kambodzsát 1975–79 dolkodom. Másképpen gondolkodom, mint ahogy kellene, és így mind a legmé- között terrorizáló vörös khmerek börtönét. lyebb sötétségbe hull.” A SPIONS 1978 nyarán, Robert Filliou (1926–1987) Franz Kafka francia fluxusművész közvetítésével, Párizsban ismerkedett meg vele. Többször meghívott bennünket vacsorára, és a vidéki kastélyában Az 1979-es évem végzetes szerelemmel indult. Meg ugyan nem vakított, de meg- rendezett, napokig tartó bulikra, ahol megismer- bolondított, az biztos. Művészileg pedig – bár addigra már annyira eltávolodtam kedhettünk a francia punk és new wave szcéna a művészettől, amennyire ez lehetséges – feltétlenül inspirált. Tragikus szerelem prominens művészeivel, producerekkel, mene- volt, a műfaj minden mélységével, szépségével, banalitásával és morbiditásával. dzserekkel, koncertszervezőkkel, független Kívülről nézve persze roppant mulatságos, különösen azért, mert én, a gép, a kém, lemezkiadókkal és a vezető rock-újságírókkal.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in Trying Khmer Rouge Human Rights Offender in Cambodia
    The Role of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in trying Khmer Rouge Human Rights Offender in Cambodia Ahza Arzanul Haq, Dea Putri Krisanti, Zein Ibnu Wiguna Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Sebelas Maret Surakarta, Indonesia [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Article Abstract Information Submitted : February 3, 2020 Conflict often occurs when two or more interests are in contradiction and no Revised : May 18, 2020 Accepted : June 30, 2020 one wants to concede. We know a variety of conflicts today, from the conflict preexisting since a long time ago such as intertribal conflict to more modern conflict Keywords : such as a state’s tapping over another. The way of resolving conflict is also varying Khmer Rouge; Cambodia; according to the types of conflict, big conflict such as interstate conflict or the one ECCC; Humanity Crime; attracting the world’s attention, using more complex resolution and usually using the Human Right Violation third party. Therefore, a special organization will be founded to solve a conflict. One of organizations created to solve a conflict is the Extraordinary Chambers in The Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) aiming to try the war criminals during Khmer Rouge humanity crime incidence in 1975-1979. Humanity crime occurring in Cambodia is one of largest humanity tragedies in modern era post 2nd World War. This ECCC was founded because at that time Cambodia’s National Justice Institution could not try the perpetrator of humanity crime. Cambodian government along with UN then agreed to found a justice institution specifically aiming to deal with and to resolve Khmer Rouge case.
    [Show full text]
  • International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Srebrenica 1993-1995
    International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Srebrenica 1993-1995 Rapporteur Report The Hague June 29-July 1, 2015 International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Srebrenica 1993-1995 Conference in The Hague, June 29 – July 1, 2015 Executive Summary Leading decision-makers from more than a dozen countries gathered in The Hague from June 29 to July 1, 2015, to consider the failure of the international community to protect the United Nations “safe area” of Srebrenica, resulting in the largest massacre in Europe since World War II. Participants included three former members of the UN Security Council, senior government and UN officials, peacekeepers, and eyewitnesses to the Srebrenica tragedy. Over the course of four working sessions, a public event, and numerous informal meetings, conference participants focused on a disastrous two-year chain of events that culminated in the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995. They examined the origins of the “safe area” policy, beginning with the March 1993 visit to Srebrenica by French General Philippe Morillon, and disagreements on how to implement frequently impractical Security Council resolutions. The discussion revealed sharp disconnects between the policy-makers in New York, the peacekeepers on the ground, and the people the “safe areas” were ostensibly designed to keep safe. “I saw this conference as a kind of truth commission,” said Srebrenica survivor Muhamed Duraković. “Twenty years on, we cannot bring back the dead, but we can learn from what went wrong in Srebrenica. If we are not able to go through the process of fact-finding, truth, and reconciliation, we may be creating problems for future generations.” At the heart of the international failure in Srebrenica in July 1995 was the inability of the major powers to devise and implement an agreed strategy for ending the defining conflict of the immediate post-Cold War era.
    [Show full text]
  • Summary of AG-011 United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) (1946-Present)
    Summary of AG-011 United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) (1946-present) Title United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) (1946-present) Active Dates 1919-2014 Administrative History The Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) was established initially in 1946 to assist the Secretary-General with relations with members and organs of the United Nations, and with specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations, as well as to assist with policy and coordination of the Secretariat. It was established shortly after the first Secretary-General of the United Nations took office following appointment by the General Assembly on 1 February 1946. The Executive Office of the Secretary-General "assists the Secretary-General in the performance of those functions which he does not delegate to the departments and for which he retains personal responsibility. These functions include consultation with governments and the heads of the specialized agencies and the supervision of special projects" (YUN, 1947-1948) It also aids in policy creation and implementation, coordinates the activities of the departments, publications and correspondence, and advises on UN protocol. The following Secretariat bodies reported to the Secretary-General from the beginning: the Department of Security Council Affairs, the Department of Economic Affairs, the Department of Social Affairs, the Department of Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, the Department of Public Information, the Department of Legal Affairs, the Department of Conference and General Services, and the Department of Administrative and Financial Services. From 1946 through the 1950s the EOSG was responsible for protocol and liaison with diplomatic representatives, as well as for relationships with non-governmental organizations, communications with member state representatives and related, and for the coordination and support of General Assembly activities.
    [Show full text]