Toward a History of Management Thought

Charles Howell SyracuseUniversity

The historyof managementthought suffers from a constricteddefinition of its subject.Constituent fields (marketing) and cognate fields ( and law) areoften neglected in studiesof thesubject. The term"thought" tends to be equated to knowledge,and thus given a positivistcast, or describedin instrumentalterms andthereby reduced to a generalizedform of practice.The historyof management thought,in short,invites more expansive treatment than it hashitherto received. Thispaper explores the potential benefits of an enlargeddefinition. The paperfocuses on two economists,Edwin Gay of Harvardand Richard Ely of the University of Wisconsin,who influencedthe developmentof managementthought, and whosecareers illuminate aspects of it that havebeen neglectedin previoushistories. Both are associated with institutionsthat promoted scholarship,education, and public discourse about business and its socialfunction-- institutionswhose role in shapingmanagement thought has received little attention. Both showeda keeninterest in the role of the statein economiclife. Their advocacy of regulatoryand fiscal policies suggests that ideas about techniques of managing grewup alongsideideas about political and social life, andthat in any satisfactory accountof managementthought these two strandsmust be interwoven.Both played a role in the professionalizationof economicsin the early twentiethcentury: their contributionto managementthought highlights interconnections between the two fieldsthat have yet to be explored. Gay and Ely are not the most prominentfigures of their era, either in managementeducation or in anyof theother fields with whichthey are associated. Their intellectualcommitments, however, are representativeof thoseof manyof theircolleagues, and the themesof their work pointtoward an enlargedhistory of managementthought and a more nuancedaccount of how ideas about the administrationof businesshave influenced politics and social life.

Gay, Ely, and the Influence of the German Historical School

The backgroundsof both Gay and Ely point to an influenceon the developmentof managementthought that has not been studied in depth.Economists by profession,both Gay andEly did graduatework in Germanyand were attracted to HistoricalEconomics, which offered a methodand philosophyvery different from theneoclassical approach then gaining ground in the .Members of theHistorical School--Schmoller, Sombart, and Weber amongothers--criticized the classicalsystem for overdependenceon deductivereasoning and urged an inductiveapproach in the studyof economicforces. Historical economists also

BUSINESSAND ECONOMIC HISTORY, Volumetwenty-four, no. 1, Fall 1995. Copyright¸1995 by theBusiness History Conference. ISSN 0849-6825.

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promotedstate interventionin economicaffairs and regardedthe principle of laissez-faireas a veiled expressionof the self-interestof business.The German economists'interest in the social effectsof businessand in inductiveinquiry mergedin thefamous series of statisticalcompilations published by the Verein for Sozialpolitik--anassociation of scholarscommitted to social reform and to the provisionof a factualfoundation for publicpolicy. As Jonesand Monieson point out in their studyof early marketingthought, studentsof the German historicaleconomists included many future leadersof Americaneconomics: besides Gay andEly, theseinclude Frank Taussig at Harvard, HenryC. Adamsof Michigan, andE.R.A. Seligmanof Columbia, andEmory Johnson, Joseph Johnson, Roland Faulkner, , and Edward Jonesat the WhartonSchool [10, p. 14; 14, p. 104]. Many of the German-trained economistsalso played importantroles in the evolutionof managementas an academicdiscipline. In the caseof Ely andGay, the mostimportant influence of the Historical School appearsto have been its stimulusto inductive work. Ely strongly emphasizedempirical study of economicphenomena both at JohnsHopkins, where he taughtafter returning from Germany,and at theUniversity of Wisconsin,where he spentmost of the rest of his career.Ely encouragedstudents to look to local economicconditions for thesisand paper topics; studentwork on marketing institutionsand the economics of publicutilities foreshadowed the developmentof severalareas of appliedeconomics [19, p. 25; 14, p. 104].Jones and Monieson note thatEly believedthe empirical and practical emphasis of hisGerman training were essentialnot just for the studyof economicsbut alsofor businesseducation. They point out that SamuelSparling, an early studentof Ely's who went on to teach publicadministration and to writean earlytextbook on business,"viewed marketing as part of the scienceof businessthat wouldbe developedby usingan inductive, comparative,historical approach" [14, pp. 104-105]. Gay, too, lookedto the localeconomy for raw datafrom which to construct a theoryof business.Industrialists were invited to addressclasses, and field tripsto localfirms were organized. Gay helpedto foundthe Bureauof BusinessResearch, whichcollected statistics on businessoperations. The accountingpractices instituted by theBureau to ensureconsistent data proved so helpful that proprietors frequently adoptedthem as regular operating procedure. The Bureau'sresearch influenced not onlymanagement practice, but alsomanagement education through publication of its famousseries of casestudies, which form an importantpart of the pedagogyof managementdown to the presentday [6, pp. 216-220]. Thoughin principleempirical methods need not entail commitment to social action, both men were drawn inexorablytoward issuesof public policy and ultimatelyto advocacyof a larger role for governmentin economiclife. The HistoricalSchool had laid the intellectualgroundwork for thistransition, teaching that the idea of a custodialstate was a specificallyEnglish creation, a theoretical constructand representationof classinterest rather than a consequenceof the naturalorder discoverable through objective study. Once the conceptof limited governmenthad been called into question, governmentitself proved willing to supplyan alternativevision. While still in Germany. Ely was recruitedby United StatesAmbassador Andrew D. White, on leave from the presidencyof CornellUmversity, to conductstudies of the Berlin city administrationand the nationalizationof Prussianrailroads; Ely idealizedhis 43

subjectsto suchan extentthat White warnedagainst the "generalsurrender of individualism"that he fearedsuch an extensivebureaucracy might entail [19, p. 15]. Ely, however,was not deterredby the dangerof stateintervention. For him, the facts of economiclife were to be considered"in the contextof a plastichuman natureand an ethicalideal" [19, p. 25]. On returnto theUnited States, he advocated public ownership of natural monopolies,including railroads, purchaseby municipalitiesof unusedland to socializethe profitsof urbandevelopment, and public worksbureaus to ensurefull employment.Service on tax commissionsfor theState of Marylandand the City of Baltimoreallowed him to suggeststrategies for publicfinance that could ultimately be usedto fundsuch projects. He proposed that propertytaxes shouldbe allocatedexclusively to local governmentalunits, whichcould be expectedto assessproperty values more stringently; at statelevel, a graduatedincome tax wouldprovide a moreample and reliable stream of revenue. Suchproposals are significantnot becausethey were unusualat the time-- politiciansand economistsalike debatedsimilar measures--but rather because of Ely'sposition in thehistory of managementthought. Looking back to the originof managementas an academicdiscipline, historians will discoverin at leastone of the field's early strandsan overarchingethical commitmentand a zest for state interventionin economicaffairs quite different from the ethos implied by present-daydefinitions of managementor representedin recenthistorical accounts of its development.For Ely, the studyof businesswas first the studyof economic facts, construedto include businessstrategy, and second,the studyof the state actionthat those facts required. Modern organizational theory notwithstanding, the idea of managementthought as a setof decisiontools, applied in a dispassionate searchfor efficiency,represents a break from oneof the field'sfounding traditions. Gay, too,was sympathetic to thepopular social reforms of his day:as Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of BusinessAdministration, he collaborated with Henry Dennison,Chairman of the BostonChamber of Commerce,to form the Massachusettsbranch of theAmerican Association of LaborLaws, which promoted legislationagainst child labor and for a minimumwage and workers' compensation [9, pp. 89-90]. Gay's primary contributionto an American-stylesozialpolitik, however,lay in the introductionof statisticalmethods to governmentagencies. In World War I, he servedon variouseconomic planning and trade groups, adding his expertiseto that of GeorgeGoethals, Bernard Baruch, and HerbertHoover, and coordinatinghis effortswith thoseof otherbusiness faculty members, including A.E. Swansonof Northwestern,C.K. Leith of Wisconsin,Henry Hatfield of Berkeley,and Arch Shaw,Henry Dennison,and Melvin Copelandof Harvard[9, pp. 98, 110].Eventually Gay wasnamed by PresidentWilson to directthe Central Bureauof Planningand Statistics,which was to ensureinteragency coordination. After the war, Herbert Hoover, now Secretaryof Commerce,appointed Gay, WesleyMitchell, anda numberof othereconomists to his AdvisoryCommittee on Statistics,which urged "timely publication of dataon key sectorsof theeconomy"-- informationwhich Hoover believedcould help rationalize businessplanning, moderatecyclical fluctuations, and providea statisticalbasis for government stimulationof theeconomy [3, p. 8]. This advisorycommittee was a forerunnerof the National Bureauof EconomicResearch, which Gay and Mitchell helpedto foundand which Hoover,as president,commissioned to conductstudies closely resemblingthose that the AdvisoryCommittee had recommended [3, p. 20]. 44

Economiccontrols during wartime and collectionof statisticsin time of peace,it might be argued,do not in themselvesconstitute an extensionof state authorityin economiclife. The Bureauwas not a governmentagency, and its reportsserved only an advisoryfunction. Hoover had proposedintervention no moredrastic than postponement of public works projects in timesof boom,so that the backlogof work could providea stimulativeeffect duringdownturns. Gay, however,had reason to knowthat the N.B.E.R. laid foundationsfor a muchlarger politicalshift. His closeassociate Wesley Mitchell, Directorof Researchfor the Bureau,explicitly envisioned a mixedeconomy, with governmentplanners playing a role in directingprivate economic activity [15, p. 396]. Althoughprogress toward thisgoal during the twentieswas modest,the directionwas clearlydiscernible. As William Barberhas shown, proponents of moreexpansive policies in theNew Deal citedHoover's activism as precedent [3]. That Gay, through his work at the N.B.E.R., helped to promote macroeconomicmanagement does not establish a tie betweenmanagement thought and macroeconomicpolicy, any morethan management thought can be logically linked to Ely's policy of publicownership of railroads.As in the caseof Ely, however,a moregeneralized connection between early managementthought and thepolitical ideas of itspromoters may be hypothesized.In theera of Gay andEly, businessprosperity was generally associated with publicwelfare. By promoting enterprise,business schools contributed to the general good. Professional managementcould not, however, solve the problem of businesscycles. The belief arose that government could ameliorate the problem through well-timed 'expenditures.In effect,some managers and management scholars came to believe that public spendingwas neededto maintainbusiness prosperity, which in turn servedthe publicwelfare. To whatextent Gay acceptedthis view is notclear from Heaton'sbiography or Barber'saccount of the N.B.E.R. If he did acceptit, and if othermanagement educatorsshared his view, then early managementthought may havedeveloped in conjunctionwith a political programthat has not previouslybeen articulatedin historiesof the field. Granted,that program may neverhave been announced as a tenet of managementtheory. If it can be shown,however, that managersor managementteachers or scholarspromoted stimulative spending policies or other policiesassociated with macroeconomic planning, then management thought cannot be dissociatedsuch a program.The exampleof Gay suggeststhat the possibility deservesexploration.

The Institutional Context of Management Thought

A studyof Gay'sand Ely's institutional associations provides a differentkind of insightinto their contributions to managementthought. They left theirimprint on universitiesand professional organizations that profoundly influenced the education of businessleaders, the directionof researchon managementtechniques, and the characterof publicdiscourse about the role of businessin nationallife. This aspect of theirwork, too, suggests new lines of developmentfor thehistory of management thought.Histories of individualinstitutions abound, but with rareexceptions [7], their influenceon the developmentof thoughthas not been examined. Of the two men, it was Gay whoseinstitutional influence was more direct andtherefore more easily described: it washe. notEly, who actuallyfounded and 45

led a business school. As first Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration,Gay helpedto establisha numberof intellectualtraditions that still figureprominently in managementresearch and education. His interestin empirical study,his foundation of theBureau of BusinessResearch, and his emphasis on the casemethod (originally the problem method) as a basisfor businessinstruction have alreadybeen alluded to, and havein any casebeen amply documented in the literatureof management.Two otheraspects of the early businesscurriculum at Harvard,however, suggest directions for furtherinquiry. The first of theseis law. Gay'sGerman experience notwithstanding, the HarvardLaw School was the primary model for thenew Business School. Widely recognizedin the late 19th centuryas the preeminentAmerican institution of its kind,the Law Schoolwas already educating many young men destined for business careers.Melvin Copeland,in hisofficial history of the BusinessSchool, observes thatthe Socraticapproach used in the Law Schoolserved as the inspirationfor Gay'sproblem method. Commercial Law wasone of the first coursesthe Business School offered; it conferred benefits both of relevance to a career in businessand theconvenience of publishedcourt cases which were easily adaptable to classroom use[6, p. 28], presumablybecause their emphasis on competing arguments spurred classdiscussion and because their deductive logical structure was congenial to the problemapproach Gay was developing. The echoesof legaltraining in management thoughtand education, both in research,teaching methods, and institutional forms, deservefurther exploration. The role of law as constitutiveof marketsand state economicpolicy suggests another layer of significancefor suchan inquiry. A secondsuggestive aspect of theHarvard curriculum is theparticipation of FrederickTaylor and his associates. Gay wentto considerablelengths to employ Taylor as a lecturerin IndustrialOrganization, successfully overcoming Taylor's skepticismabout the valueof academicstudy in a field dominatedby practical problems. Jones and Monieson cite Taylor as a critical influence on the developmentof a scientificapproach to marketing. The significanceof the scientific approachto problemsof human organizationhas been widely acknowledged [8]. Historianshave not neglected the contributionsof engineersto the developmentof administrativesystems and financialand costaccounting [5, pp. 95, 132, 465]. The contributionsof the nationalgovernment have also been noted, though the political implications of its role have not been examined.The governmentpromoted both disciplines, sometimesin conjunctionwith one another.West Point was the site of the first engineeringschool. The SpringfieldArmory, a military supplier,pioneered techniquesof large-scaleproduction [5, pp. 72-75], whilethe Watertown Arsenal provideda famoustest case for the applicationof Taylorism[1], whichhad been popularizedearlier through expert testimony in theEastern Rate Case [22, p. 143], an earlytest of governmentauthority to regulateprivate economic activity and an unusuallyexplicit instance of governmentpromotion of managementtheory. Less explicit but more widely influentialin the long run wasthe Morrill Act, which allocatedfederal lands to supportmechanical and commercial education. While this acthas been identified as a milestonein thedevelopment of highereducation in the UnitedStates, its link to thecentralization of politicalpower has received little attention.The act hadbeen blocked by Southernstates as an unwarrantedintrusion of federalpower, and wasn't finally passed until 1862after secession. Government encouragementof managementand engineering thus depended on a specificand 46

debatable construction of the role of the state, which has not been considered in previouswork in the historyof managementthought. Anotherneglected aspect of governmentinfluence in the developmentof managementand engineering is its effect on the economyand on the structureof markets. Governmentencouragement of management,and especially of science-basedmanagement, usually centered on verylarge-scale enterprises, and is thusoften associated with conditions of monopoly,oligopoly, or monopsony.What aresometimes characterized as attempts to improvethe efficiency of management seemto haveproliferated where incentives to efficiencywere impaired and to have contributed to their further impairment.A study of how science influenced managementthought therefore requires an assessmentof its effectson the size of organizations,the effectsof the size of organizationson the numberof market participants,and the effect of marketstructure on thepolitical dispositions of firms andmanagers. While politicalinfluence and the reorganization of marketsmay not be announcedgoals of managementthought, they could still turn out to be preconditionsfor or unanticipatedconsequences of its development,and if so, importantelements of any accountof how it cameto be what it is now. Engineering,in short,has had a complexinfluence on the evolutionof managementthought, on its connectionto the state,and even on the structureof markets.Although the fact of engineering'scontribution is well documented,its political implicationshave not beenexplored in depth.There is, to be sure, no evidencethat Gay pondered the political implications of engineeringwhen he hired Taylorto teachat the HarvardBusiness School. For the historianof management thought,however, the fact thatGay recognizedTaylor's significance and thathe pursuedand hired him justifies inquiry into the political implicationsof this connection.That Taylor stronglyinfluenced both studentsand other faculty membersstrengthens motivation for suchan inquiry.That Gay subsequentlywent to work for Hoover, and that he appliedthe scientificattitude in serviceto a politicalproject, would appear to renderthe projectindispensable. Ely, by contrast,never directed a businessschool. As first director of the Universityof WisconsinSchool of Economics,he had expectedto be given authorityover the newly-established School of Commerce,but waspassed over in favor of the moreconservative William A. Scott [19, p. 162]. Ely's institutional influenceon managementthought was therefore less direct than Gay's; his approach to teaching,cast in theGerman mold and emphasizing social problems and ethical ideals,may be regardedas the road not takenfor managementeducation. Simon Patten,Scott Nearing, and others briefly experimented with a similarapproach at the WhartonSchool, but soonfell afoul of local businessleaders and trustees[20, pp.91-126]. Elsewhere, the technocratic approach embodied by Gay andHarvard generallyprevailed. Ely, however,must still be consideredan importantforce both in the developmentof businesseducation and in theevolution of managementthought. As notedabove, his research interest helped lay the foundations for businessdisciplines in the areasof marketing,public utilities, and publicadministration and finance. Perhapsmore important are his effects on individualstudents, many of whomwent on to exerciseinfluence in theirown right on theeconomic and political thought of the nation: Frederick JacksonTurner, Thomas Nixon Carver, Thorsten Veblen, Wesley Mitchell, Albion Small, JohnR. Commons,and Woodrow Wilson. Three of his students--Albert Shaw, Newton D. Baker, and Frederick Howe--went on to 47

becomeprominent municipal reformers. Shaw edited the influentialReview of Reviews and became an advisor to Theodore Roosevelt. Baker served as Wilson's Secretaryof War. Howe,who went on to servein theNew Deal, wrotetellingly to Ely of the inspirationhe hadprovided:

You disclosed to us the whole forest rather than a few trees which constitutedthe science of politicaleconomy in thepast, and that man is somethingmore than a merecovetous machine and that the science which dealswith him in societyhas largeraims than the studyof rent, interest,wages, and value [19, p. 22].

Raderclaims that "[n]o professorof politicaleconomy in the countrydirected or helpedto directso many future leaders in the socialsciences" [p. 26]. Within the professionof economics,Ely was a forcefulif not a dominant presence.As a reformer, he contestedthe views of neoclassicistssuch as Simon Newcomband William GrahamSumner, who arguedfor an analyticaleconomics whichavoided moral questions about the distribution of wealthor theresponsibility of governmentto protectthe poor and vulnerable.He contributedenergetically to popular discussionof economicissues, speaking out vigorouslyin supportof workersand unions. Taking his cue from hisfriend and fellow-student in Germany CharlesBaxter Adams, founder of the AmericanHistorical Association, he helped to found the AmericanEconomic Association, intending it to counterbalancethe influence of Sumner and the other conservatives, who had founded the Club to promote neoclassicalprinciples. In due course, however, moderationprevailed, and the Associationdropped Ely's restrictive statement of principles,which had beenintended to excludethe conservatives.Ely tried and failed to createother organizations for progressiveeconomists, especially in the Western part of the country; his efforts, however, must be counted as encouragementto sozialpolitikand the survivalof the ethicalideal in the face of a sometimes hostile academic climate. Perhapsthe greatest influence Ely exercised,however, was his work at the Universityof Wisconsin.Following up on his interestin charitiesand corrections, he inaugurateda course in ,which was "not intended to trainspecialists but to preparestudents for citizenship."Lecturers from penal institutionswere broughtto campus.Ely raisedmoney to supportstudent fieldwork in settlement housesand other charities. He gavepublic lectures on socialism,public ownership of utilities, and other controversialissues. He stimulatedoriginal researchby studentswith his seminars,debate teams, and roundtable researchmeetings. He developedrelationships with stateagencies, which later formed the basisfor close cooperationbetween state government and the university.In short,as Rader points out, he laid the foundationsfor the work of the next generationof institutional economists:John R. Commons,Charles McCarthy, Albion Small, and Wesley Mitchell. In doing so, he did not exercise the kind of direct influence on managementthought that can be attributedto Gay, but he did muchto encourage cross-fertilizinginfluences and to shapethe intellectualcontext within whichideas aboutmanagement developed.

Marketing, Management, and Economics 48

Gay and Ely have been claimedas pioneersin marketing,an area often excludedfrom the historyof managementthought, despite the two fields'functional interdependence.Gay's and Ely's diverseaccomplishments suggest that sucha distinctionis unrealistic.Their careers,moreover, are not the only enticementthat marketingholds out to historiansof managementthought. It alsooffers a largebody of its own historicaland philosophicalscholarship. Marketers have exploredthe socialimplications of theirdiscipline [ 18], the historicalbackground of marketing theory[4, 14], andmarketing's epistemic foundations as seenfrom the perspective of the philosophyof science[2, 12, 13, 16, 17]. Particularlyhelpful has been marketers'recognition of their debt to economics[11]--an awarenesswhich the intellectualhistorian of managementwould do well to heed. Attentionto economicsis criticalto the historyof managementthought not only becausemany management scholars have been trained as economists, but also becauseeconomic ideas have been importedinto managementthought without examinationof the assumptionson which they are based or considerationof subsequentcriticism of them in their field of origin. One obviousexample is the institutionof markets,often characterizedin managementthought in termsof the classicalnorm of pure competition,ready access,and wide disseminationof knowledge.As marketershave pointed out, however,this characterizationis problematic.In a studyof how marketersconceptualize exchange, Houston and Gassenheimerargue that the actual strategies of marketersare the antithesis of pure competition:

[S]uccessto a marketeris escapingperfect competition .... Success is the gainingof the differentialadvantage, becoming a monopolistic competitor or, with enough finesse or prowess,maybe even a monopolist[11, p. 15].

Economists,on theother hand, are saidto considerpure competition the ideal case, because"resources are allocated efficiently and customers are getting their products at their least cost." The contrastis telling.Pure competition can be construedas the failureof management:under these conditions,markets tightly constrainevery business decisionand leave no scopefor strategy.It followsthat management's task is to earn monopolyprofits; thus, its affinity for large enterprise,which tendsto restrict competitionand makemonopoly profits more easily attainable, and its questfor political influenceand statesponsorship, which permit escape from the restraints of markets.Such an understandingof businessbehavior, in fact,corresponds closely with a traditionof economicanalysis, not mentionedby Houstonand Gassenheimer, whichbegins with the Frencheconomist Cournot and is elaboratedin the work of Sraffa and Robinsonin Englandand EdwardChamberlin in the United States.As Schumpetercharacterizes this tradition,it treatsmonopolistic competition as the normrather than a deviation;pure monopolyand pure competitionare viewedas degeneratecases in whichone of the two essentialcharacteristics of marketsdrives out the other and incentivesto competitionand enterpriseare destroyed[21, pp. 1151-52]. If managementthought can be shownto imply sucha view, then the field'sethical foundations as well as historians'account of the motivesof its leading figuresmay be duefor revision.Such time-honored concepts as consumerchoice, 49

thelevel playing field, and free flow of informationmay be convenient rhetorically, but canscarcely be saidto be an importantpart of theagenda of management.

Conclusion

Study of the careersof Edwin Gay and RichardEly suggestsseveral directionsfor explorationin the history of managementthought. First, it demonstramsthe importance of interdisciplinaryconnections, especially in thearea of economicsand law. Second,it illuminatesthe role of institutionsin shaping managementthought, both directly, through promotion of educationand research, and indirectly,through environmental influence. Third, it showsthat the political dimension of managementthought may be more significantthan has been recognizedin previousaccounts. Whetheror notthese aspects of thesubject receive the attention they appear to meritdepends in parton how the management thought is definedby historians. If it is equatedeither to knowledgeor to practice,then the interdisciplinary, institutional,and politicalaspects of the subjectwill tend to drop out of the historicalnarrative. Even a cursoryreview of Gay'sand Ely'scareers, however, showsthe undesirability of sucha result.Any accountthat segregated their activities intodisciplinary categories would explain so little about what they thought and did andcontributed to thehistory of managementthought that it couldscarcely be said to constitute a historical narrative.

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