Tiie Decade of Despair
By DAVID R.MARPLES
After the explosion, iie C'lieniobyl accident on April 26, of its ambitious nuclear power pi'ogram, and Soviet authorities U)
22 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists In the Soviet Union, "Chernobyl" became a em scientists have ad- battle cry for anti-Moscow protest, and for an hered to that number, A decade assault on an industry with a poor record. and it is a staple of after Unit 4 (Ironically, its record was no poorer than that Chernobyl stories in the of other Soviet energy industries; both the Westera press. The "of- exploded, coal and oil industries had suffered higher ca- ficial'' casualty report there is no sualty rates, and the coal industi-y had caused has developed into something of a tiiiism—if terrible air pollution for yeai-s.) something is repeated often enough, people consensus on Scientists have attempted definitive studies begin to accept it. of the effects of Chernobyl, but they have in- But the figure of 31 dii-ect fatalities at Cher- the number of variably fallen short of the mark, mainly be- nobyl is as mythic today as it was in 1986. Dur- victims, nor cause of the lack of adequate or reliable data. ing the early cleanup phase, it was clear there In August 1986, when the Soviet delegation would be many more victims, particularly are Soviet-style to the International Atomic Energy Agency among the crews decontaminating the plant, (IAEA) in Vienna reported its findings on the those flying helicopter sorties over the roof of reactors any accident, there was a widespread tendency to the gaping reactor in a flawed attempt to stop safer. praise the new openness of Mikhail Gorba- radiation from leaking into the atmosphere, chev's presidency. The Soviets emphasized and those working at the reactor scene at a that the disaster was caused by "human variety of other hazardous tasks. error," and a show trial was staged the follow- By 1990. at least 5,000 decontamination ing July in the contaminated town. The hap- workers had died, although not all their deaths less plant director, absent at the time of the can be attributed to Chernobyl,' experiment that caused the accident, received For the most part, these people were not a ten-year sentence. His colleagues got lesser volunteers. They were military reservists, penalties (two to five years). Repudiating this brought in from various parts of the Soviet staged nonsense, Valery Legasov, the leader Union. Most were in their 20s and 30s, but of the Soviet delegation to the IAEA, hanged some were older. One of theii* missions was to himself nine months later, on the second an- fill in the great hole in the reactor roof—work- niversary of the accident. By all accounts, ers on the roof flung shovelfuls of radioactive Legasov was plagued with guilt about the de- graphite into the hole and, wearing heavy sign faults and technical shortcomings of the shielding, made their way as quickly as possi- Soviet-made reactor. ble to safety. Radiation levels were so high Ten yeai'S later, there is no consensus on the that geiger counters, which were in inade- number of victims or the overall health impact quate supply, went off the scale. of Chernobyl, nor has the accident engendered Contrary to regulations, some of the work- a new safety consciousness at the nuclear ers remained in the "Exclusion Zone," an area plants in the newly independent states. In the around the damaged reactor with a 80-kilome- meantime, the Soviet Union has collapsed, re- ter radius, for six months or longer, accumu- placed by 15 new republics, most of which are lating potentially fatal doses of radiation. waging a battle for economic survival, with an Many were cavalier about safety. When I inadequate supply of energy as a critical ele- traveled by car to the Chernobyl plant in the ment in the struggle. Under these circum- summer of 1989, I saw reservists sitting in stances, the importance of nuclear power, ditches above which had been posted signs even in Ukraine, the site of the Chernobyl sta- declaring, "Danger! Radiation!" Wearing only tion, has increased. overalls, they were evidently taking a smoke Still, after a decade, it should be possible to break. A fi-iend at the German magazine Stem view the event without the emotions that have showed me one of his prize photographs: it shaped many earlier discussions. In reviewing was of cleanup crews taking a lunch break at various aspects of the disaster, I will try to the site of the damaged reactor. They wore no provide a reasoned discussion of the number protective headgear or clothing as they sat on of the accident's direct casualties, its long- the ground eating their sandwiches, with the term health effects, and its meaning to an in- roofless reactor looming behind them. dustry that relies on Soviet-made nuclear Any estimate of direct casualties involves power reactors. supposition and guesswork. I have encoun- tered totally undocumented estimates as high as 125,000.^ Even "official" sources are wildly Direct casualties inconsistent—how can one reconcile state- One of the most controversial arguments ments from Ukraine's health ministry and the about the accident concerns the number of di- Chernobyl Union that thousands of union rect casualties. The official Soviet toll rose members have died^with an official report from two to 31 during the summer of 1986, from Belarus that only 150 of the 60,000 de- where it remained thereafter. Several West- contamination workers from that republic
May/June 1996 23 Of the radionuclides released, the most harmful were iodine 131, cesium 137, and strontium 90. Because the latter two have much longer half-lives than iodine, they re- ceived most of the initial attention. The iodine, however, appears to have traveled the farthest and to have had the most severe repercussions in terms of health. Scientists disagi*ee about the effects of low- level radiation on humans. In Ukraine, claims made by scientists affiliated with the newly established Center for Radiation Medicine (administered at first by the Academy of Med- ical Sciences in Moscow) varied widely from statements made by environmentalists, politi- cal figures, doctors, local scientists, and jour- nalists. While visiting Chernobyl and Kiev in 1989, 1 was told by specialists at the center that none of the thyroid problems of Ukraini- an children were a result of the release of ra- SOIIBCE WQHD HEALTH dioactive iodine. They attributed all sickness- es to "radiophobia" or to sensational journal- The expiosion spread varying degrees of radioactive contamination over ism. On the other hand, the film Mi-kro-fon'., much of Europe; the most heavily contaminated areas {in gray) are in Ukraine, co-produced by journalist V. Kolinko, claimed Belarus, and eastern Russia. that birth defects found in livestock l-iOO miles have died? In Belaiiis, the names of the work- away were caused by fallout.' Both sides seem ers are known and their records have been to have indulged in gross distortion. preserved. A similar debate ai"ose over the amount of ra- Is it possible to make a reasonable estimate diation the human body could tolerate. On one of the number of direct casualties of Cher- occasion, a prominent Ukrainian politician re- nobyl? The National Committee for Radiation mai"ked that one week after the accident ra(iia- Protection of the Ukrainian Po]julation re- tion levels in the city of Kiev were 100 times cently issued what apj)ear to be far more reli- above the maximum permissible. What he able figures, indicating tbat 5,722 cleanup probably meant to say was that levels were 100 workers, or "liquidators" have died.' To this times above natui-al, or background, radiation. total must be added approximately 100 plant After the accident—and with the approval personnel, Pripyat residents, local farmers, of international authorities—the Soviet medi- coal miners, and officials who died in the im- cal authorities declared that the |>opulation mediate aftermath of the disaster. This num- could tolerate a level of 85 rem above back- ber may be low, because it is very difficult to ground over a natural life span of 70 years. obtain accurate information about those who This decision was immediately attacked by were evacuated. Still, total deaths directly re- Ukraine's Green World envii'onmentalist.s be- lated to the Chernobyl accident must be in the cause it ignored the amount of radiation that region of (),()00. To say more is to enter the evacuees and cleanup crews had already re- realm of the unknown. Nevertheless, I believe ceived. In 1991, the level was lowered from 35 that 6,000 represents the minimum, possible to 7 rem, or 0.1 rem (1 millisievert) per year. number. (The background level in Ukraine is consider- ably lower than in Finland, which is generally about 6 millisieverts per year.) Fallout The ai'ea hit hardest is a zone that embraces The Chernobyl reactor spewed highly radioac- about 20 percent of Belarusian territory, from tive fallout over a vast area, but only in the the Brest region in the southwest, to the spring of 1989 was detailed information about Mogilev and Gomel regions in the east and fallout made available to the public. The acci- southeast; a large portion of north-central dent contaminated an area of more than Ukraine, including the Kiev, Zhitomir, and 100,000 s(iuare kilometers (about the size of Chernigov regions: and in southern Russia, the state of Kentucky), and lower levels of the Bryansk and adjoining areas. Cesium con- contamination affected many parts of Europe, tamination is widespread. An estimated four particularly eastern Poland, southern Ger- million people live in areas where the soil is many, and Scandinavia. The worst hit regions contaminated with more than 1 curie per were in the then-Soviet republics of Belarus, square kilometer, which could result in addi- Ukraine, and Russia. tional radiation to the human body of 1 mil-
24 The Rulletin of the Atomic Scientists lisievert per year. Approximately fiO percent curies—especially families with children—are of this territory is in Belarus. 30 percent in considered eligible for evacuation if it should Ukraine, and 10 percent in Russia. Because become impossible to obtain uncontaminated the region is predominantly agricultural, most supplies of food and water. A much wider area families continue to rely on the food they pro- than the original 30-kilometer zone was evac- duce on their private plots. Most of the local uated in 1989. There was a great clamor for population has been consuming contaminated evacuation between 1986 and 1990. but this food for nearly a decade. sentiment has been less in evidence since then. I visited the Chausy district in Belarus in The declining interest in evacuation may be spring 1995. This region, which is 250 miles a reflection of the plight of evacuees in their north of Chernobyl, has not received much new surroundings. Tho Belarusian press is public attention. Radiation levels range from 1 filled with evacuee complaints—they are often to 15 curies per square kilometer. Contami- unable to find emi)loyment and their new nated wells have been boarded up and local housing is shoddy, often lacking hot water (or factories have closed down. The local economy just water). Sewerage is often inade(iuate. is depressed and the local stores stock little Many would-be evacuees prefer to wait in the food. Families must provide for themselves. In zone, hoping to be moved to Kiev or Minsk. In one house, an elderly man was even raising some cases, though, the authorities have sim- pigs in his kitchen. ply failed to act: A recent Ukrainian report Is the health ofthe local population at risk? noted that 2,000 families had been waiting to The opinion of the villagers was mixed, but be evacuated from the Poliske district, just most were fatalistic. Children from local vil- west of Chernobyl, for more than five years.'' lages were being sent by a Minsk charitable One family moved from the contaminated organization to Europe and North America for zone in Belarus to a "clean" area in Ukraine. summer vacations, in the hope that it might At their new destination they were shunned improve their generally poor health. by their neighbors, who feared the newcomers Evacuation is a controversial and much de- would contaminate them. Their children were bated affair. About ll(i,O()O i)eople were evac- ostracized at school for the same reason. The uated immediately after the accident, all from situation became so intolerable that the family the Exclusion Zone. In addition, both the So- decided to return to Belarus. viet and post-Soviet authorities have had a In Minsk, a group of newly constructed policy of immediately evacuating residents in apartment blocks at the far north ofthe city is other areas with cesium contamination of lo or occupietl almost exclusively by evacuees, who more curies per square kilometer. sit outside the apartments in rural style, con- Less urgent evacuation is based on 5-15 versing, smoking, and drinking. It has been curies, and those living in areas with 1-5 difficult for the evacuees to adjust suddenly to
The sarcophagus—shown here as it neared completion—was finished by late 1986. Today it is not expected to last more than another decade.
May/June lWMi 25 ContaiXh.div^ij i.c;,,
their new environment. As one reporter said, these organizations are generously supported. "There is a lot of drinking there," and people Most ai'e sti-uggling for .survival. As time pass- are nostalgic for their native villages. es, it becomes more difficult to raise funds. Many elderly people chose to remain in the zone. A 1991 study commissioned by the IAEA notes the strains caused by evacuation, Long-term health consequences but my visits to the zone suggest that staying Few questions have been debated more heat- behind is also a strain—few of those who re- edly than the effect of Chernobyl on the long- mained receive an adequate or nutritious food term health of the population. At one end of supply. the spectrum is Anatoli Romanenko, the Both Uki'aine and Belanis have bad to make Ukrainian bealth minister, who announced in deep cuts in spending for post-Chernobyl June 1986: "Medical services are keeping a problems. Before 1994, Chernobyl-related ex- close eye on health protection of everyone in- penditures—mainly for evacuating and pro- volved in I'elief work at Chernobyl. . . . The viding housing and amenities for the reset- main thing is to preserve people's health. tled—swallowed 13 percent of the Ukrainian There is no cause for alarm whatsoever in tbe government's budget. Severe cost-cutting rest of Uki'aine's territory [outside the 30-kilo- began in 1994 and 1995, and funding was cut to meter zonel.... Doctors have checked tens of 3.4 percent. The chairman of the parliamen- thousands of peo])le, and thousands of tests tary committee that deals with Chernobyl- have been carried out in the laboi-atoi-ies. related problems states that this amount is to- Their results give us grounds to say that there tally inadequate. In Belarus, funding has been is no danger to people's health."" cut from a high of more than 20 percent of the At the other end of the spectrum is the cur- budget to about 10 percent. Neither republic rent Ukrainian health ministry, which issues can afford to provide adequate funding on a statements that reqtiire careful analysis. One long-term basis. communique noted that the health of those in Both Ukraine and Belarus have depended the contaminated zones was deterioi'ating. By on international aid, and on charitable assis- 1991, only 28-32 percent of adults and 27-31 tance in particular. In Minsk Hospital No. 3,1 percent of children were said to be in good saw testing equipment for diabetes and other health." Such astonishing figures reflect main- items that had been sent from Gennany to the ly heightened rates of respiratory diseases Belarusian Chaiitable Fund's "For the Chil- and diseases of the blood and nervous system. dren of Chernobyl." At one time, 38 charitable Tbese conflicting statements show how vari- organizations were devoted to assisting chil- able a single institution has been throughout dren in Belarus who were affected by Cher- the course of the disaster. The later claim— nobyl. But it would be a mistake to think that surely exaggerated—is the antithesis of the
26 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists attempt to cover up in the first months after chief of Minsk's Children's Hospital No. 3 told the accident. me that there has been a dramatic increase in Not all Health information was classified during the congenital diabetes. "Before Chernobyl," he liquidators Soviet period, and apart from a single and added, "we had no such problems." By 1995, nearly unreadable volume issued by the Soviet according to the Belarusian State Information have been Academy of Medical Sciences in 1989, little was Agency, the lung cancer rate among the 82,0(H) monitored on forthcoming other than the proceedings of sci- evacuees was four times the average of the entific conferences. Before C'hemobyl, little re- rest of the capital's population.'" a regular search was conducted on the kinds of problems These reports present the observer with a a Chernobyl-type accident would produce. predicament; Which current health problems basis, and In 1992. the Institute of Psychology of the are related specifically to fallout? There is no information Russian Academy of Sciences produced a known or previously suggested link between major psychological study, noting that the congenital diabetes and radiation or the con- from official field was new and little researched."* Dr. A. sumption of irradiated products. Yet the Guskova of the Russian Institute of Bio- largest number of cases of childhood diabetes Ukrainian physics observed: "The psychological damage emanate from Gomel province, the most heav- sources is is clearly the most important [11 feel that ily contaminated region. it is very important to realize that this factor As a group, the cleanup crews, or liquida- unreliable. is due not so much to a conviction that danger tors, have clearly been affected the most. They exists or does not exist, but rather to an un- suffer from a variety of diseases, particularly certainty, a lack of constructive plans for the skin ailments. But not all liquidators have been future."^ monitored on a regular basis, and information During a tour of hospitals and clinics in from official Ukrainian sources is unreliable. Minsk in December 1992, I was told that, be- Even the number of those who took part in fore Chemobyl, diseases of the blood received cleanup is uncertain, with repoits vaiying from little attention in the medical community in 600,000 to 660,000. But the number seeking aid Belarus. A study of the incidence of leukemia from the government has declined. was undertaken after Chernobyl, but a dis- One reads indifferent and even callous pute was evident between the director of the statements denying that the accident has Institute of Hematology and several of his caused major health problems, even as more leading researchers over the validity of re- deaths are reported." But exaggerated state- ports of pre-Chernobyl rates. Today's num- ments fi'om ostensibly responsible bodies like bers might be reliable, but statistics from the the Ukrainian Health Ministi-y mean that real- 1970s were probably the result of guesswork. ity is often overlooked, especially in the skep- Some researchers are now using tbe average tical international community. European incidence as a baseline. We do know that in general health and bealth care is problematic in both Belarus and Ukraine, and that in re- cent years, health statistics have taken an alarming turn. (In part, that may re- flect a notable improvement in disease detection.) The infant mortality rate is -i more than double that for Europe as ;i whole, and cases of infectious diseases have risen markedly over the past four years. Both Ukraine and Belarus have experienced negative population growth in recent years. Diseases like tuberculo- sis and diptheria, once thought to be under control, are back; vaccination rates have dropped. In southera Ukraine, 400 cases of cholera occun'ed last summer as a result of polluted water. U.S. bone marrow specialist Robert Gale, speaking at the Eurochernobyl-2 conference in Kiev in 1991, remarked that although Kiev's hospital beds were full, he doubted that the occupan- cy rate was specifically related to Chernobyl. More recently, the deputy A "tent city" where cleanup workers were housed in late 1986.
May/June 1996 27 has been plagued by a shortage of funds. After the atomic bomb was di'opped on Hi- roshima in 1945, the rate of leukemia increased within 18 months, and the number of cases peaked within four to five years. (Jiven the Japanese experience, it was anticipated that an increase in the rate of leukemia would be a major consequence ofthe Chernobyl accident. Although it may take as lung as 15 years after exposure to develop tho disorder, there has not been a significant increase in leukemia in the Chernobyl-affected areas so far. Levels have risen somewhat in Uki'aine and Belarus tienerally, and the leukemia rate is at the upper end ofthe European average. But the rate of leukemia seems to be lower than it wa.s in the 1970s. In Minsk, which has the highest incidence of leukemia, there were 48 cases per million children from 1986 to 1991, compared to the reported 72.5 cases per million in 1979.'^ Evgeni Ivanov. the chief hematologist in Be- larus, asserts that the main cause of leukemia in that republic is industrial pollution, not ra- diation from the Chernobyl accident. His posi- A deserted village In 1991, some reliable data were provided tion is disputed by some of his ow^n colleagues, lane in the Exclusion by V. G. Baryakhtar. the vice president ofthe who argue that it is not backed by scientific Zone. Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He re])(trted data; they add that Novopolotsk and Svet- that about 129,000 cleanup workers were liv- lagorsk. for example, ai*e more heavily polluted ing in Ukraine, but precise data were available than Minsk but have a lower incidence of for only 5G,000 who had received radiation leukemia.'"' It may be premature tn say that doses of 100-200 millisieverts. This number the Chernobyl accident has not resulted in in- excluded 1S7 local residents who suffered from creased cases of leukemia, but one can say that acute radiation sickness, and another 1,000 original predictions have not materialized. who had radiation burns as a result ofthe acci- In contrast, the rate of thyroid cancers in dent. About 80 percent of those examined had children has increased dramatically, and the an impaired immune response. The rate of increases appear to correlate closely with the thrombosis was increased in cleanup crews, areas that received the most radioactive fall- and about one-third of this gi-oup had experi- out. These cancers may be attributed to the enced a loss of libido. About 40 percent of radioactive iodine in the atmosphere in the those studied had marked hearing impair- first days after the accident, or to the con- ments. Medical authorities in Minsk also re- sumption of contaminated milk, which affects port that people in areas where the radiation infants far more than adults. dose is estimated at 10-30 rem have an im- One 1993 Ukrainian study predicted that, of paired immune response. Significant chi-omo- the 89.000 people exposed to radioactive iodine somal aberrations are found in the population in Pripyat and other heavily contaminated re- in all affected areas.'^ gions, there would be a maximum of 530 cases Has Chernobyl had adverse genetic conse- of thyroid cancer in children, of which 50 quences for the human population? Of the would be incurable; and 290 cases in adults, of three republics most affected, only Belarus which 30 would be incurable.'" has a program that monitors the incidence of In a letter to the author, John Jagger, a re- congenital deformities. Using the pei'iod 1982 tired U.S. radiation expert, predicted that to 1985 as a baseline, the overall rate of con- from 1989 to 2000 the number of cases of child- genital defects rose 24 percent from 1987 to hood thyroid cancers would be double the 1992; in areas where the cesium contamination number recorded between 1989 and 1994, and of the soil was 1-5 cuiies per square kilometer, would decline thereafter, with the rate of inci- the increase was 30 percent; and in areas with dence following a bell-shai)ed curve. Accord- more than 15 curies per square kilometer, the ing to Jagger, a total of 932 cases could be ex- increase was 83 percent. On February 1, 1991. pected.'' There is no evidence, however, that the Belarusian parliament established the the disease has reached its peak, or that its ai>- "National Preventive Program of Genetic pearance in the population follows Jagger's Consequences of the Chernobyl Accident."" model or the mathematical model adopted by Unfortunately, this study, like many others. the Ukrainian scientific team.
28 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists According to an October 1994 article in Na- IAEA visits the most potentially problematic ture, 527 cases of thyroid cancer had appeared plants. International attention has focused on in children in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia; other Chernobyl-type reactors, graphite-mod- more than (if) pei'cent were in Belarus. At a erated RBMKs. RBMK plants include the re- November 1995 meeting of radiation scientists actors at Sosnovi Bor (St. Petersburg), Kursk, sponsored by the World Health Organization, and Smolensk, in Russia; and the Ignalina these cases were directly attributed to fallout plant in Lithuania.''' from Chernobyl. One ex])ert who has written The Chernobyl reactor that was destroyed widely on the subject, Dillwyn Williams of was a second-generation RBMK-IOOO. Al- Cambiidge University's Addenbrooke's Hospi- though little could be done to improve the tal, stated that in heavily contaminated regions other reactors on the site—-to eliminate their one in every 10 children could conceivably de- instability if opei-ated at low power or to foi-ti- velop th>Toid cancer. S(5me cases have occuired fy their inadequate containment—some im- as far as oOO miles away from Chernobyl."" provements were implemented: Shutdown Evgeni Demidchik, head of the Minsk Thy- time was reduced; uranium enrichment was roid Tumoi' Clinic, has monitored the inci- increased; and strict rules were introduced re- dence of the disease in Belarusian childi-en garding the disabling of safety mechanisms since 196(i. Before the Chernobyl disaster, he and the conduct of experiments. saw an average of one case per year. "Excess" Nonetheless, the state of the nuclear power cases began to appear in 1990, and from 199H industry in the newly independent states is a to 1995, the ntimber of new cases rose from 79 cause for concern, if not alarm. Several first- to 91 per year. By 1994, Belarus alone had re- generation units are considei*ed obsolete and ported that 424 childi-en had thyroid cancer. unsafe. An Armenian reactor, now re-started, Contrary to expectations, the number of cases is located in an earthquake-prone area. In ad- has continued to rise each year. dition, there are concerns about technical as- Somewhat more than half of all cases came pects of later generations of »-eactors. And de- fi-om the heavily contaminated Gomel pi-ovince, spite its problems, Russia has announced an and another 23 percent were reported in east- ambitious reactor-building program that ern areas of Brest province, near Pinsk; 11 would expand its nuclear power industry percent occurred in Minsk. According to gi'eatly. Demidehik, only seven cases have been re- Cost overruns and financial shortages have poited in northern Vitebsk province, the only also contributed to jjroblems in the nuclear in- region of Belarus not affected by fallout. Almost all of the afflicted children wei-e born or conceived before the Chernobyl acci- dent.'" Because of the close correlation of cases with the pattern of fallout and the ingestion of radioactive iodine, it seems probable that, of the 91 cases of thyroid cancer in Belarusian children in 1994, some 90 percent were radia- tion-induced. Belarus also reports an increase in the rate of non-cancerous tumors in children. Before the Chernobyl accident, the average rate was one a year; now the annual rate exceeds GO.^' The increased incidence of both benign and cancerous tumors is a discernible and disturb- ing consequence of the Chernobyl accident. It is reasonable to conclude that Ukraine and Belarus had serious pre-existing health prob- lems and that those problems have been exac- erbated by the Chernobyl accident.
Nuclear power The disaster at Chernobyl caused many coun- tries, and most particularly the Soviet Union, to review the status of their nuclear power plants. On the smiace, the newly independent republics have made notable improvements. and information about the operation of the nu- Many local residents packed up and moved in with relatives liv- clear power industry is more available. The ing in "clean" areas. About 2,000 families still await evacuation.
May/June 1996 29 dustry. In 1994, it was reported at an interna- grants and $1.8 billion in loans—just over half tional conference in Monterey, California, that of what the government estimates is needed. safety regulators in TJkraine were not being Left hanging is the funding needed to place paid on a regular basis, and that nuclear indus- a new shell, sometimes called the Sarkofag-2, try personnel were generally dissatisfied.^ over the sarcophagus in which Unit 4 was en- Overri(Ung this disturbing picture is the pro- cased in December 1986. The first sarcopha- tracted debate between the (17 industrial na- gus was visibly deteriorating by the late tions and Ukraine over setting a date for the 19S0s, and it is not expected to last more than closure of the Chernobyl station and the con- another decade. It cannot be repaired from in- struction of a new iron and concrete shell to side because of dangerously high radiation lev- cover the now-decaying sarcophagus in which els—10,000 roentgens per hour, according to Chernobyl's Unit 4 is encased. one source."' After the new cover is in place— a yet-unfunded project that would cost up- wards of a billion dollars—technicians could The Chernobyl station's future conceivably begin to disassemble the frag- The Ukrainian government maintains that menting first cover. Because Chernobyl tJnit international concern about safety at Cher- 3 will have to be shut down during construc- nobyl is unwarranted; that the complex is tion of the new sarcophagus, Ukrainian au- safer than other RBMKs, and safer than thorities would like to delay the process as plants with the other major Soviet reactor long as possible.'''' type, the VVER (water-water-pressurized G7 loans will be used to help Slavutich, a reactor). Ukraine's VVERs have a poor safe- new town of about 28,000 that was built about ty record; incidents occur regularly at the 45 miles east of the Cheniobyl station to house giant station near Zaporozhe.^' plant employees and their families, and to pur- Ukraine and the G7 countries finally agreed chase a new source of energy to compensate in December 1995 to set the target date for for the loss of Chernobyl. Within Ukraine, the shutdown of Chernobyl as the year 2000.^^ there is a debate about whether it would be Ukraine was basically forced to accept this better to build a gas- or a coal-fired plant, or to agreement by the G7's threat to withhold fu- commission two new reactoi' units at Rovno ture credits. Ukraine was also formally ac- and Khmelnitsky.-' cepted into the Council of Europe in Novem- The Slavutich region is constantly moni- ber 1995 and it did not wash to endanger this tored because the soil was contaminated by hard-won status. In exchange for the shut- Chernobyl's fallout. The choice of coal would down, Ukraine will receive $500 million in simply compound the area's environmental problems. On the other hand, neither Rovno nor Khmelnitsky has a particularly good safe- ty record. Greenpeace has proposed an alternative so- lution that would involve a stringent program of conservation. Primarily by reducing the ac- tivities of its machine-building and metallurgi- cal industries, Ukraine might be able to re- duce its energy use by as much as (15 percent.^ This plan would be unpopulai- because it would increase unemployment. However, the Green- peace suggestion was highlighted in the par- liamentary newspaper, suggesting that it is being taken seriously. Statements from the Ukrainian nuclear in- dustry and the Chernobyl plant suggest that the lessons of Chernobyl have been forgotten in some quarters. Sergei Parashin, the plant director, has frequently said that Chernobyl is much safer than other RBMK stations. His re- marks were echoed in late November by Chernobyl press officer Valeri Idelson, who declared that the station was "the safest nu- After the accident, this statue of clear plant in Ukraine and one of the best Prometheus—the among the Iformer Soviet] countries."'^' The giver of fire—was Chemobyl plant sponsored the i)ublication of a moved to the book claiming that the station could operate Chernobyl plant. effectively and safely far into the future."'
30 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Facing the future at Enerhodar. near the industrial city of Za- All the Daunting |)roblems await. The roof over the de- porozhe, where there were two incidents in stroyed reactor is cracked and its longevity is the first week of December 1995. Ironically, problems doubted. The situation has been aptly described every accident there or at another VVER sta- by a Ukrainian expert who stated that virtual- tion bolsters the case for keeping Chernobyl engendered ly all the problems engendered by Chernobyl open, on the theoi*y that since 1986 it has been by Chemobyl still remain, including the destroyed reactor relatively accident-free. and over 100 radioactive burial sites nearby." Meanwhile, the Ukrainian nuclear industry remain. In .spite of their financial and safety problems, has lost a number of speciahsts to Russia, both Ukraine and Russia have decided to con- where wages are higher and economic condi- tinue to commission new nuclear power plants. tions are somewhat better. Over 8,000 nucle- Ukraine cannot iifford to finance a new sarcoph- ar workers left Uki-aine between 1998 and agus, and the aid the G7 group has proposed 1995 alone, and the economic crisis has meant will cover only a small part of the expense. that many employees in the industry have In retrospect, the one major international worked for extensive periods without receiv- study ofthe health consequences ofthe acci- ing wages.'- .Small wonder that nuclear work- dent, the International Chernobyl Project, ers are described as "demoralized." was inaccurate. Its conclusions have been con- Ukraine's situation is not unique. The col- tradicted as better information became avail- lapse ofthe Soviet Union created an energy- able about thyroid cancer, casualties among rich Russia and Turkmenistan, and energy- liquidators, the incidence of congenital defects, hungry countries everywhere else. With an and the general rise in morbidity that is some- urgent need for energy, the basic niles of safe- times termed "Chernobyl AIDS." Few long- ty have been pushed into the background. On term safety lessons appear to have been one occasion I heard a Ukrainian nuclear offi- learned. If anything, the chance ofa major nu- cial being lectured by a U.S. specialist about clear accident in the region is greater today this sorry state of affairs. The response was than in 198(J. angry, and can be paraphrased as follows: "It's Several recent nuclear incidents could, po- all very well for you energ^^'-rich capitalists to tentially, have been serious, and one resulted sit in your armchairs and lecture our people, in the loss of life. Of most immediate concern is who shiver in frozen apartments. But if you the giant nuclear edifice on the Dnieper River were in our position, what would you do?" •
1. Daviil R. Marples, "Revelations ofa Chernobyl In- Press. 1996), ch. 4. sider: An Interview with Yun Risovanny," Bulletin of 15. Ibid. the Atomic Scientiat-i. Dec. 1990, pp. l^2\. 111.1. A. Likhtarev et aL, "Ukrainian Thyroid Doses 2. Ub-aiiiiiui Ministi-y of Health, dted in The Ukmini- After the Chernobyl Accident," Health Physics, vol. an Weekly, April 81). 1995. 64. no. 6 (June 1998): p. 59H. ;•}. Holos (Jtcrahit/, June 7. 1S)95. p. 4. 17. John Jagger, letters to author, Jan. 4 and 11,1996. 4. Molod Ukrainy. Feb. 2(1, 1989. 18. "Health Consequences of the (Chernobyl and 5. Holos Ukrainy, Oct. 4,1995. Other Radiological Accidents," sponsored by the World (i. Radio Kiev, Broadcast to Europe, June 2,1986. Health (Organization, Geneva, 1995, Cited in Michael 7. Raboclinija gazeta. May 12. 199:^. Baiter, "Chernobyl's Thyroid Cancer Toll," Science, H. M. I. Bobneva, ed. Chernobyl'skii] sled: mediko- vol. 270. Dec. 15,1995. kie poslmistviya radiatsionnogo voz- 19. E. P. Demid('hik. "Osobennosti klinicheskogo tech- . 'I VOIH. (MOSCOW: Votum, 1992.) eniya i khimrgicheskogo leecheniya raka shchitovidnoy 9. The International Chemobyl Project, Proceedivgs zhelezy u detey." Unpublished paper. Minsk. 1993. of an bilenialUiiiai Conference: Assessment ofRadio- 20. E. P. Demidchik. letter to author, Feb. 2.1996, logicat Con.HfiqiiencffS and Evaluation of Proiertire 21. The U.S. Energy Department lists Ignalina as Mea^snreti ("The ICP"] (Vienna; International Atomic one of the ten most dangerous nuclear power plants in Energy Agency. 1991), p. 4(1. the world. 10. Interview with V. V. Glod. editor-in-chief. Be- 22. Nikolay Steinl>erg, fonner chief engineer at Cher- larusian State Information Agency. Minsk. April 1995. noby! and chief of safety operations for Ukrainian nu- 11. For example, see the account of a visit to the clear power stations. Chernobyl zone by Sir Bernard Inghani (Margaret 2:1 Reutei-s. Dec. 7, 1995. Thatcher's press secretary) in Naclcur Fonitx, Au- 24. Holos Vkmniy. Dec. 21.1995. p. 4. tLimn 1994, pp. 7-9. 25. Mikhail Umanets (former Chernobyl plant dii-ec- 12. The ICP, pp. 41-44: interview with Bvgeni Kono- tor and until recently chairman ofthe State Committee plya. Director. Institute uf Radiobiniogy, Belarusian of Ukj'aine for the Use of Nuclear Energy), cited in Academy of Sdencps, Minsk. April 14,1998. liotos UkraiHy, April 1,1995, p. 5. 18. (^i. I. Lazyuk et al., "Genetiehefikie posledstviya 2(x Holos Ukrainy, March 21, 1995, p. 4. katastrofy na Chemobyl'skoy AES i puti fkh mini- 27. Ibid., Sept. 5,1995, p. G. mizatsii." // Mizhnamdny Kanhre.^ 'Svet pa-Hlya 28. Ibid., Dec. 2., 1995, p. 4. Chaniohyli/a' (Minsk: Belarusian Charitable Fund 29. Intelnews, Dec. 4,1995. "For the Children of Cht-iiKtbyl," 1994, pp, 19-20,) 30. Ibid. 14. Cited in David R. Marples, Belarus: From Soviet 31. The ICP, p. 62. Rule to Nuclear Catastrophe (New York: St. Martin's 32. Holos Ukrainy, Feb. 15,1995, p. 4.
May/June 1996 31