DEFENCE, FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY

RUSSIA‘S INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN

MARIITA MATTIISEN - PRZEMYSŁAW ŻURAWSKI VEL GRAJEWSKI - AGATA SUPINSKA

www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform A Brussels-based free market, euro-realist think-tank and publisher, established in 2010 under the patronage of Baroness Thatcher. We have satellite offices in London, Rome and Warsaw.

New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform is registered in as a non-for-profit organisation (ASBL) and is partly funded by the . REGISTERED OFFICE: Rue du Trône, 4, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgium. DIRECTOR: Naweed Khan. www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform The European Parliament and New Direction assume no responsibility for the opinions expressed in this publication. Sole liability rests with the author. ‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska AUTHORS TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITORIAL 7

INTRODUCTION 9

1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RUSSIAN-ESTONIAN RELATIONS 10

2 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 13

3 ECONOMIC RELATIONS 14

4 ATTITUDES TOWARDS RUSSIA IN ESTONIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 17 Mariita Mattiisen 5 RUSSIAN INFLUENCE: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS NARRATIVES 18 6 INFLUENCE IN THE ECONOMY 20

7 LINKS WITH INTERNAL POLITICS AND BUSINESS 22

8 RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY 24 Prof Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski 9 RUSSIAN COMPATRIOTS’ POLICY 25

10 HYBRID TACTICS 26

11 INFLUENCE IN THE MEDIA 27 Agata Supinska 12 INFLUENCE IN THE CYBER SPACE 29 CONCLUSIONS 30

ANNEX 1 KOMENTARZ PROF. PRZEMYSŁAWA ŻURAWSKIEGO VEL GRAJEWSKIEGO 32

ANNEX 2 POMNIK NIEZGODY by Agata Supinska 36

ANNEX 3 RUSSIA AS A THREAT TO THE STATES BEING IN THE ZONE OF INFLUENCE 39

ANNEX 4 POPULATION AND LANGUAGES IN THE ESTONIA, 40 INCLUDING RUSSIAN MINORITY AND

ANNEX 5 PARLIAMENTARY 42

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its former ‘soviet republics’ and its attempts to undermine European unity through energy interests, political funding, and media (dis)information.

Similar to its efforts in , the Russian regime is using gas exports as a political weapon in the Baltic Tomasz Poręba States in order to undermine European solidarity by creating political and economic rifts. As the Tomasz Poręba is a Member of the European Baltic States form an energy island, traditionally Parliament and President of New Direction – The Foundation for European Reform. heavily reliant on Russian imports, they have little manoeuvring space to lead an autonomous and independent energy policy.

With regard to (dis)information, Russia exerts a firm hese three reports by New Direction on influence by ‘generously’ funding Baltic media outlets the Russian regime’s influence in the Baltic at both the local and national levels. Ethnic minorities T States come in a very important time period, still use Russian media (mainly TV channels) as their especially in light of the current debates on lifting main source of information. There is a strong correlation sanctions against Russia, the increase in polls of between time spent watching Russian TV channels and political parties being neutral towards Russia, and the perception of Putin’s policies in a more positive light. The never-ending hybrid war in led by President recent propaganda multimedia project called Sputnik Putin. Using its old divide et impera tactics, Russia poses a threat to the Baltic States’ information security is challenging the unity of the EU Member States by and challenges their sovereignty. taking full advantage of different factors, including economic links and support from political parties with Moreover, due to historical ties, it is much more difficult especially strong ties to the Kremlin. to grasp the Russian regime’s influence in Baltic States than it is to grasp its influence in other EU Member It is time we look closer at Putin’s game, a big part States. The Kremlin can play the Soviet nostalgia card of which is a conflict in the East of Ukraine, and react as a way to influence public opinion. The same logic is before it is too late. As stated in these New Direction behind the funding of political parties which are mostly studies, ‘at the heat of the fighting in Donbass in early supported by Russian-speaking populations. 2014, 87 per cent of admitted fear that Russia might again occupy their country’. Last but not least, the Baltic States’ vulnerabilities in the case of military aggression should not be treated If Ukrainian conflict teaches us something, it is that as purely hypothetical. The last NATO summit held in the Russian regime has recently diverted much of Warsaw drew special attention to the Suwalki gap, a its resources and focus from mobilising hard power key weakness in the area’s military defence. in protecting its interests to soft power, including funding media outlets and political parties. After the study on Russia’s influence in Bulgaria, this new research by New Direction should be used by policy The Baltic cases precisely identify this new aspect of advisers and politicians to better understand the Russian Putin’s influence across the EU. These studies describe regime’s behaviour and reshape their policy towards in detail the ongoing game played by the Russian Russia. Before we are able to compete externally, we regime and neatly sums up its current policy towards must first establish internal sovereignty. •

Tomasz Poręba

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INTRODUCTION RUSSIA’S PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN ESTONIA

stonia has always considered itself as a Nordic by the USSR. Over the five decades of the Cold War and Baltic country. Over the centuries Estonian period maintained their language, history, E culture and religion has always been leaning literature, folk music and other traditions. more towards the West than linked to Russia. A small country both in terms of area (45,000 km2) Thus, in 1991, after the collapse of the USSR Estonia and population (1,3 million inhabitants) Estonia did was not founded as a new state but it was re- not always had a chance to make its own way. During established with the knowledge and experience of the the history, the present Estonia’s territories had been previous independence period. In its foreign policy, at taken over by the , Germans, Swedes and only first, Estonia focused on joining various international in the 18th Century under the reign of tsar Peter the institutions (UN, Council of , CBSS, OSCE etc.) Great, Estonia became a part of the . and also set a goal to become a member of the EU In the early 20th century, after the breakup of the and NATO. Despite different contradictory opinions empire, Estonia existed as an independent nation and debates over the membership, the overall policy state in 1920s and 1930s until it was seized by the was consistent and Estonia was admitted to both in 1940s. Most of the Western states had organizations in 2004 and continued its Western- never recognized de jure the annexation of Estonia oriented policy. •

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of the Soviet order in the country. With some described as restructuring of the Communist Party. It 1 exceptions, the Western world never recognized offered a bit more freedom for local ruling elites. The Estonia as a lawful part of the USSR, claiming it idea was never meant to end the communist rule and to be under the occupation until Estonia regained command economy but rather to make it work better. independence in the early 1990s. Eventually it ended up with the collapse of the Soviet Union. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF During the WWII and Soviet times Estonia lost around 20 percent of its population mainly due At that time, public protests started in Estonia. At RUSSIAN-ESTONIAN RELATIONS to deportations to and other parts of the first they were related to the non-political issues Soviet empire. After Stalin’s death in 1953, there like the natural environment but gradually grew into came a degree of softening in the political climate political demonstrations with massive participation

in Estonia, which ended with the new Soviet period of 300,000 people at a time. In 1988 the “Singing ussian-Estonian relations can be traced back to When the WWII began, Estonia declared neutrality of regime tightening under the leadership of Revolution” began, which was a massive peaceful the beginning of the 11th century, when prince but it continuously faced Soviet military. In August, Brezhnev. This period (1978-1985) is known as the protest against the Soviet occupation. In August, Yaroslav the Smart occupied Estonian city . 1939 Soviet Union and signed the R th Russification aimed at the assimilation of the non- 1989 the “Baltic Way” was organised on the 50 In the year 1710, Estonian authorities surrendered to the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with its secret Russian communities under the Soviet rule. It meant anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It was Russian tsar, but under his auspices a self-governing dividing the countries located between the Soviet not only continuing influx of the Russian-speaking a hand-in-hand human chain from to Vilnius Baltic Landestaat was formed within the empire remain Union and Germany to their respective spheres of population from other parts of the Soviet Union but in which all together around two million people with its own legal system and preference to Lutheran interests. As a result, the mutual assistance pact also preference for the Russian language in public life participated. On 20 August 1991 Estonia restored its church. It lasted till the end of the Russian Empire in between Estonia and the Soviet Union was signed and schools. Whereas in 1934 constituted 8,2 independence as the continuation of the pre-war the WWI. The collapse of the Russian Empire resulted in September 1939 which allowed the Soviets to percent of the Estonia’s population in 1989 it was 30,3 Republic of Estonia. The first country to recognize for Estonia with independence, which was declared establish its military bases in Estonia. In 1940 the percent with the share of ethnic Estonians falling to Estonia’s re-independence was Iceland. Russia, at on 24 February 1918. It was followed by the Estonian Soviet Union occupied Estonia and began to destroy 61,3 percent. that time Russian Federation within the defunct USSR Independence War ended by the Tartu Peace Treaty its independent institutions. The Soviets When Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the headed by president Boris Yeltsin recognized Estonia’s signed in February 1920. By this act Russia became the forced rigged elections (under military presence) in USSR a period started which can be re-independence four days later. first state to recognize Estonia’s independencede jure. occupied Estonia that resulted with the establishment

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Even though Estonia was an independent country, the However, the most problematic issue between Russian armed forces withdrew from the country not the two countries in the first period of their 2 until 1994. Relations between two countries have been relation was the Russian-speaking minority complex since. Estonian accession to the EU was not in Estonia. When in 1991 Estonia laid down its seen as a positive step by Russia, while the accession citizenship policy, most of the country’s ethnic to NATO in 2004 was clearly perceived as a negative Russian and Russian-speaking minority were development. declared non-citizens. They could be naturalized DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS as Estonian citizens and indeed majority of them did (150,000 individuals) but the process was lengthy especially in the early 1990s. It included and constitution tests and the pledge of allegiance. On the other hand, the non- citizens had the same civil and social (although not political) rights. All these factors made the group of the people without Estonian citizenship relatively high in the 1990s. Today 84,2 percent of Estonia’s inhabitants are Estonian citizens, 9,7 percent holds other citizenship (mostly Russian) and 6,1 percent is stateless (98,000 individuals).

During the 1990s the Russian State Duma adopted several resolutions condemning Estonian legislation on citizenship, language, naturalization and aliens and accepted various support programs for the compatriots abroad. These programs, however, have never been realized. The Russian government officials have regularly raised “the Russian minority question”, equated with the alleged human rights violations and it has been a solid item on Russia’s agenda towards Estonia.

There was relatively quiet time in Estonian- Russian relations between mid 1990s and 2007 when the Estonian government decided to move the so called “Bronze Soldier”, a Soviet-time WW II memorial, from the Tallinn city centre to a military cemetery. The removal caused a real iplomatic relations between Estonia and Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920. Russia does not want to rebellion on the streets of Tallinn, mainly by the Russian Federation nowadays are mainly accept this statement as it does not accept Estonia’s Russian-speaking minority, with accusations D focused on practical issues. There has not independence on the basis of continuity but as a that the Estonian government supports fascism. been a high-level official meeting between the two new state created in 1991. In 2005 the treaty was It stirred an attack on the Estonian embassy in countries for a while now, mainly due to Russia’s on- signed but it mentioned in the preamble the Tartu Moscow and Estonian government and private going actions in Ukraine. Peace Treaty and Russia took back its signature. sector websites experienced cyber-attacks The corrected treaty was finally signed in 2014 for many months, causing significant service One of the main topics in Estonian-Russian and Estonia agreed in it to give up a small part of disruptions to websites, servers, banking, media diplomatic relations is the border treaty, signed but its territory to have the border secure in terms of etc. These attacks captured international media not ratified. The treaty negotiations started shortly the international law. The treaty is still not in force attention. Mainly due to these events, Estonia has after Estonia regained its independent and lasted however because it has not been ratified. Estonia taken a leading role on cyber security, both in the until 2014 when the latest version of the document expects the Russian Federation to ratify it first. In EU and in NATO. Next year after the attacks, in was signed by both parties. The main issue with October 2016 Russia informed that the treaty might 2008, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre the border treaty is that Estonia stresses in its get ratification by the end of the year but otherwise of Excellence was established in Estonia. • constitution that the border is delineated by the the situation did not change. •

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Somewhat different question is the electricity. 3 Estonia is connected to the Russian North-West electricity system together with other Baltic States and the Kaliningrad enclave. Producing all electricity for the local consumption by itself ECONOMIC RELATIONS Estonia profits from the connection with the Russian grid. The whole system is based on the frequency of balance of the gird, which makes the dependence on Russia actually reciprocal. While Russia is experiencing waves in its electricity ussia has always been an important trade one of the first steps in the re-independent Estonia, system, Estonia can help to balance it and vice partner for Estonia but its importance while dependence on the Russian natural gas and its versa. However, Russian grids are usually much is decreasing. In 2014, sanctions were supplier, Gazprom company, was an issue for a long R older and different unexpected blackouts or introduced against Russia by the EU due to Russian time. Thanks to the opening of the Klaipėda liquefied accidents are more frequent than in the Baltic actions in Ukraine. Under these circumstances natural gas floating storage and regasification unit States, so it is Estonia who supplies the electricity. economic relations between Estonia and Russia were terminal in 2014, also an on-going development of restricted. Russia introduced counter-sanctions, their a pipelines from Poland and , the situation Nevertheless, Estonia continuously looks for impact however was of minor importance for the changes substantially. alternatives to decrease the dependence on Estonian economy. Unlike in previous decades Russia Russian gas and electric grid. Estonian ties with is not even a top five trade partner for Estonia. It is Today, Estonia still depends on Russia’s natural gas the Baltic Sea neighbours and generally with the not only a result of the sanctions but also Estonia’s supplied to Estonia via pipelines but it hardly can EU are more important and stronger than with continuous search for alternative markets. The be considered a major issue. Even though Estonia Russia enabling importing energy resources from exports to Russia have decreased almost by half imports natural gas basically only from Russia it other countries via terminals on the Baltic Sea. during last eight years while import has been more makes only about 8 percent of its overall energy Recently, Estonia and Finland signed a contract stable (see table below). sources and is being reduced every year (see chart to establish a new gas pipeline between the below). Estonia imports around one third of its energy countries, the Balticconnector which would make Many former Soviet republics and other Central in total. Approximately 65-70 percent of the energy the overall Baltic gas market much bigger and and Eastern European countries are more or less Estonia uses is produced in Estonia. No Estonian would give Estonia the possibility to deliver the dependent on Russia’s energy sources supplies. energy company is legally connected to Gazprom gas from Finland. Cutting-off the dependence on the Russian oil was even if buying the gas from Russians.

ESTONIAN-RUSSIAN TRADE DYNAMICS 2008-2016 IMPORTS AND EXPORTS FROM THE EU AND RUSSIA

EXPORT PERCENTAGE OF IMPORT PERCENTAGE OF 14 BILLION USD (IN EUR) OVERALL EXPORT (IN EUR) OVERALL IMPORT 12 2008 880 385 827 10,39 832 431 896 7,64 10 2009 601 131 009 9,27 597 427 223 8,22 8 2010 844 425 107 9,66 762 820 667 8,23

2011 1 312 322 095 10,93 1 264 577 660 9,94 6

2012 1 511 546 429 12,07 1 003 710 767 7,12 4

2013 1 411 469 426 11,49 787 188 526 5,66 2

2014 1 186 517 524 9,88 852 273 070 6,18 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2015 771 604 513 6,67 785 467 775 5,99

2016 476 607 072 6,18 473 926 880 5,35 IMPORTS FROM THE EU IMPORTS FROM RUSSIA EXPORTS TO THE EU EXPORTS TO RUSSIA

Source: Statistics Estonia, www.stat.ee Source: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russian-influence-fades-baltics

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NATURAL GAS IMPORTS FROM RUSSIA TO ESTONIA 4

1200 MILLION CUBIC METERS ATTITUDES TOWARDS RUSSIA IN

1000 ESTONIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

800

600

400

200

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Source: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russian-influence-fades-baltics

Estonia had been an important transit country for Russia via the railway network. Russia developed its own infrastructure and capabilities however and alternative ways for transit were established therefore Estonia’s importance was reduced. The ‘Bronze soldier’ case also played a role here: when Russia wanted to punish Estonia it eventually limited some eing a member of the EU and NATO, Russia was described as the main security threat to important cargo flows.1 Estonia together with its allies has Estonian existence in the recent report by Estonian B constantly expressed its willingness to Information Board, an intelligence service2. Eesti Pank, the Estonian central bank, data showed cooperate with Russia. The development of that in mid-2016 EUR 0,74 billion of direct investments and the rule of law in Russia are in Estonian society however does not always see it that were of the Russian origin, which constituted 4,2 Estonia’s interest and is also a basis for better way. It is not visible in everyday life and more than half percent of the overall foreign investments and placed cooperation in all sectors of economy and of the society does not recognize Russia as a threat. Russia on the 4th place of the foreign investors list. At society. After 2014, when Russia occupied and A recent survey carried out in spring 2016 shows 63,6 the same time Russia is number 6 target for Estonian annexed the Crimea and started war in the percent of respondents considering refugees as the foreign investments with EUR 0,23 billion sum, 4 eastern Ukraine these possibilities to cooperate main security threat to Estonia instead, even though percent of the total. were drastically reduced. Estonia strongly there were none in Estonia at that time.3 In this respect supports sanctions against Russia. Being there is a difference in attitudes towards Russia between Estonia has been quite popular among Russian experienced by a Russian occupation, Estonians Estonians and Russian speaking population (around one tourists, mainly during the Christmas and New Year do not see Russia as a trustworthy partner fourth of the population). Almost 90 percent of Russian- season. Even though the number of Russian tourists and latest actions and rhetoric of the Russian speakers does not see Russia as a threat to Estonia while travelling to Estonia was reduced in recent years, leadership have deepened this position. only less than 30% of Estonians thinks that way.4 • Russia is still among top five countries of origin of incoming tourists. • 2 Estonian Information Board, International Security and Estonia 2016, pp. 11-29.

3 See full report: http://www.inst.ee/uuringud/eesti-inimeste-hoiakud-pagulaskriisi-suhtes

1 Baltic Rim Economies Review, University of Turku, May 2015 4 See full report: http://www.inst.ee/uuringud/vaartushinnangute-uuring-2016

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traditions and everything connected with this ethnic 5 group. In the early years of Estonian re-independence there were stories frequently spread by the Russian media about Estonia as culturally still a part of Russia since its culture and history had been tied to Russia.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE: The situation with the Russian influence in schools is somewhat different. 19 percent of Estonia’s school HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND children attends institutions where Russian is the language of instruction. In such schools, Estonian RELIGIOUS NARRATIVES language is mandatory to teach from the first standards, discrimination and even ethnic cleansing, grade. In high school, at least 60% of classes have apartheid, genocide. In a conflicting picture Estonia to be in Estonian. Schools can apply for permissions follows the logic of being occupied, colonized and to teach in some other language, however, there accordingly attempted to be russified. The Russian haven’t given any so far (except for one school politicians in turn offer an explanation of Estonia to teach in German). Allegedly, it is a sign of joining the USSR as a result of its free will in 1940 discriminating of Russian-speaking minority and an after which the republic became a victim not so much attempt to eliminate Russian culture from Estonia. of the Russification but as all the Soviet nations and The integration of the Russian-speaking minority to republics of the Sovietization.5 As a consequence the Estonian-speakers is seen as a negative process ethnic groups gradually developed towards the by Russia. Many Russian schoolteachers are also formation of a new national and ideological entity. The rather oriented to Russian information sources, Estonization, a term used by some Russian politicians, which most probably influences also their pupils. is an analogous characteristic of the suppression of Lately, the NGO Russian School in Estonia, that the rights of Russians and is probably taken from the unites many Russian teachers, more actively started Estonian lexicon of the Soviet period.6 Estonization to speak about the discrimination and destruction means supremacy of the Estonian language, culture, of Russian culture. •

ven if Estonia is today seen by Russia as a part One of the historical arguments used by Russia of the West and does not play an important role concerns the issue of Estonian re-independence. E for Russia on its own, Russia does not recognize Russian politicians have been constantly expressing the Soviet rule over the Baltic States as occupation. the idea that the Tartu Peace Treaty ceased to be For many members of the current Russian leadership binding by the fact of Estonia becoming a member (and substantial part of the population) the Soviet of the USSR in 1940. According to that logic, Estonia Union was a great empire and communist repressions did not restore its independence in 1991 after the were frequently justified and all other interpretations unsuccessful coup in Moscow but became a newly of history are labelled as “Nazi” or are simply wrong. independent state. History and historical narrative plays a major role in Russia’s foreign but also domestic policies. The goal is The mixed historical and cultural aspect can be also mainly to justify current Russia’s actions, for example found in the Russian-speaking minority narrative.

supporting claims to another country’s territory Russia continuously accusing Estonia of practicing 5 V.N. Yelagin, “The Non-Trivial Advice of a Russian from Tallinn”, Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, no 13-14, 1994, p. 66.

claiming it was historically Russian. the policy of creation a mono-ethnic state of double 6 Ibid., p. 66.

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ability to speak Russian. It is hard to say, how many There is no remarkable direct footprint of Russia in 6 of all registered businesses are actually involved the finance sector either. Most of the banks operating to Russia as many Russians are operating via local in Estonia are of Finnish, Danish or Swedish origin. businessmen. Companies with strategic importance The only bank with a majority of Russian shareholder or in IT sector are under stronger control by the is Krediidipank, owned by Russian government- state because of their possible influence on national controlled BM-Bank PJSC. Because of the sanctions INFLUENCE IN THE ECONOMY security. imposed on Russia, Krediidibank is also being sanctioned to some extent. Tallinna äripank (Tallinn The Estonian real estate market has not been very Business Bank) is also a bank with Russian roots, attractive to Russians as yet. In 2016, officially only 10 being also a bank for the Russian Embassy in Estonia. Russians owned real estate in Estonia. Whereas a few Both of them are small banks and do not have a years ago Russians still were buying real estate mainly remarkable impact on the market, however, they could in the eastern part of Estonia, in 2016 this trend is be good places for money laundering or other activity almost vanished. in Russia’s interests. •

n recent years Estonia has reduced its dependence Estonia but due to the development of alternative on Russia in the field of economy remarkably. means of transportation, which Russia managed to I Estonia, as other Baltic States, depends to some establish, it diminished. Estonia is forced to keep its extent on Russian gas but it is hardly possible that prices low for Russian customers to get any transit. Russia would manipulate the gas sector. Due to an old Russia can use it as a tool for pressure if needed, as Soviet-time transmission system, Russia itself depends Estonia today is rather a back-up transit route for on Inčukalns gas storage located in . During Russia. cold winters, there is not enough gas for the North- West Russia, so Russia has to ‘take it back’ from the When it comes to the sanctions introduced in storage and, in this sense, depends on it. There is no 2014 and Russian counter-sanctions, they have not real possibility that it can cut the Baltic States out of had a remarkable impact on Estonia’s economy in gas, as this would be fatal to Russia’s own North-West general. Mostly they hurt milk production sector but region. Possible manipulation with the gas prices for example pork exports increased because other would not play a great role either thanks to Estonia’s markets were quickly discovered. alternative supplies. Concerning Russian involvement in local businesses, The transit sector used to be the most vulnerable based on the 2016 data, there were nearly 3000 to the Russian pressure but in recent years the businesses in Estonia where Russians were partners transit via Estonia was reduced remarkably. Railway or owners. Russian businesses are mostly attracted by transit was an important source of income for Estonian tax system, cheap labour force and people’s

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LINKS WITH INTERNAL POLITICS AND BUSINESS

he influence of Russia-oriented politicians, officials and businessmen is not high in Estonia. T The most conspicuous case was in 2009 about Herman Simm, a former Ministry of Defence high- level official, who was sentenced to prison for illegally collecting classified information and passing it to Russia. He was the first caught Russian spy in the re- independent Estonia. Fortunately, there haven’t been a lot of these kind of incidents. Russian-style governing method is seen as a good However, the corruption can always be a factor Regarding politics, the Centre Party, since November way to protect conservative values. These movements conducive to Russian influence in business and 2016 the senior partner in the governing coalition usually do not spend much time on pondering over politics. and second biggest party in the parliament, has its Russia’s goals in Western societies and therefore may electoral base among Russian-speaking population. be easily used to expand Russian The Tallinn Harbour corruption case some years ago, Majority of them have the Estonian citizenship and in Europe.7 where high-level employees of the harbour operator Russian-speakers make around 15 percent of the and members of the coalition parties were involved, electorate. The party signed an official co-operation now, by choosing a new leader and taking much more A corruption-welcoming environment proved to be a is a good example. Even though the company was agreement with the governing Putin’s party United pro-western course. good ground for an illicit Russian influence in many Estonian and in the corruption case no Russian Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya) in 2004. The idea behind places of the world. In this respect, Estonia is not a money connection was detected, a corrupted person the agreement is to develop long-term partnership: Savisaar himself has been charged with accepting typical example. Ranked on the anti-corruption index might be a possible security threat. Especially that to meet on regular basis, share experiences, have bribes, money laundry, embezzlement and forbidden (Transparency International CPI) on the 23th-26th the harbour operator owns also the Estonian Gas, joint committees, organize cooperation of experts, party donations. The Centre Party as a legal person is place out of 168 countries and improving every year, a company not directly connected to Gazprom but communicate with the youth. also suspected for taking illegal donations. Apart from Estonia combats corruption quite effectively. buying the commodity from Gazprom. • Savisaar, a few other businessmen and politicians This agreement stirred a debate in Estonia with voices close to the party were accused of helping to get that the contract should be repealed. The Centre Party forbidden donations and falsification. itself plays the agreement down as dead but is not unified internally as far as the issue of co-operation It is also worth mentioning Yana Toom, a MEP for with Russia is concerned. A long-time leader of the the Centre Party. Although she is not directly linked party, former prime minister and mayor of Tallinn to Russia she runs a blog frequently speaking a Edgar Savisaar, is an iconic Estonian politician taking language different from the official Estonian policy care of Russians for the Russian-speaking voters and when it comes to Russia. She also met recently Bashar he is skilled to build this image up. For instance, he al-Assad for the second time in one year term, the organized and financed the construction of a new Russia-supported leader of Syria. in a Russian-speaking neighbourhood of Tallinn. On the other hand, the The populist movements are rising all across the money came from sources linked to a close Putin Europe and Estonia is no exception. These movements associate Vladimir Yakunin. In order to get into power, are usually not against the Western values but in the Centre Party distanced itself from Savisaar, who some cases, criticize also the EU. Especially when it has been distanced from political life for quite a while comes to the refugee crisis or same-sex marriage, 7 Estonian Internal Security Service Yearbook 2015.

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RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITY RUSSIAN COMPATRIOTS’ POLICY

ut of 25 million Russians living abroad as information used by Russia in suitable contexts but a result of the disintegration of the Soviet also spread the news about Russian-speaking “bad O Union, 1,3% live in Estonia. The aim of Russian situation” on international forums, mainly in the OSCE compatriot policy is to connect the or ODIHR.8 with ‘Mother Russia’, but it is also part of wider Russia’s foreign policy. This wider goal is to keep A Moscow-based institution’s report from 2011 compatriots away from integrating to local societies indicated that Russia is worried about the situation and keep them in the Russian information space, when the diaspora decreases in terms of numbers so they could be useful for influencing Estonia and and people do not consume information from other Baltic States without noticeable Russian state Russia anymore. Russia feels obliged to influence interference. the younger generation because they are already integrated with Estonia and do not know much In 2012, a foundation to support the rights of of Russia’s history, culture or religion. The report compatriots abroad was established. It mainly recommended offering culture trips to Russia, operates in the ‘near abroad’ i.e. in the former Soviet organizing Russian cultural events in Russian language Union republics through local NGOs. Being finance in Estonia and carrying out other activities to ‘protect by Russia they co-organize, participate and report compatriots from European propaganda’. These on events taking place in Estonia. They gather projects should be financed by Russia.9 •

mong Estonia’s 1,3 million population, there Large numbers of do not speak are around 27 percent of Russian-speaking Estonian and live in the Russian information space A inhabitants, including 7 percent holding listening to the Russian radio, watching official Russian citizenship. Remarkable numbers of them Russian TV channels and reading Russian news. They live in Lasnamäe (eastern part of the capital city of might actually have never been to Russia but in a Tallinn) and in , a city in eastern Estonia, close broad sense are anti-Western. They might be called to the Russian border. Since the re-establishment grey-zone people who do not want to go to live in of independence, Estonia has faced fundamental Russia but do not cherish Estonia either. They do political, judicial, economic and psychological enjoy travelling in the EU without visas and value problems with the integration of the non-titular their living standards in Estonia, knowing that Russia nations into the country’s society. The situation of would not be a better place for them as for example has been monitored by salaries are almost twice as high as in Russia. The international organizations such as the Helsinki young generation receives the Estonian citizenship Watch, the and the Lawyers automatic upon request and is usually bilingual, Committee for Human Rights, from the very which makes entering to the labour market easier. beginning of the establishment of re-independence. Estonia’s inhabitants without citizenship (today Nevertheless, the political and economic condition of roughly 6 percent) and resident Russian citizens Estonia’s Russian-speaking population has repeatedly enjoy most of the rights and privileges the citizens been over-dramatized and politicized by the of Estonia do. They have the social rights, the right Russian government officials and parliamentarians. to privatize their apartments in Estonia, buy land etc. Their rhetoric mostly consists of the accusations Ethnic Russians can also participate in the elections of discrimination, supporting Nazi movements and of local governments and can carry on their national 8 Ibid. pointing to Estonian failures in every aspect of life. traditions. • 9 Русская диаспора Эстонии: состояние и перспективы, Moscow 2011.

24 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 25 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska

10 11

HYBRID TACTICS INFLUENCE IN THE MEDIA

ree media is a sign of working democracy but they can also be vulnerability when it comes to F the propaganda or disinformation by outside actor. Estonia is on the 16th place out of 180 countries regarding media freedom according to the report 2016 on press freedom, which means among other, that it is extremely easy to publish different opinions in the newspapers, blogs and internet portals in Estonia.

Sputnik and Baltnews, the well-known Russian propaganda outlets opened their branches in Estonia. The latter is not worth mentioning because of its almost non-activity in Estonia. Sputnik has been more active but it was not easy for them to open a branch in Estonia. It took a lot of effort and time to find someone who could speak Estonian and would be willing to work for that outspoken foreign interests representative.10 Still many Sputnik’s articles are just translation from Russian. channels are also available via main cable TV and telecommunication operators in Estonia (Telia, In eastern Estonia, it is possible to listen to Russian Starman, Viasat) and therefore it is possible to watch radio station and watch Russian TV channels without them all over Estonia. any additional equipment. Selected Russians In 2015, a new channel in Russian was started by the Estonian national broadcaster ETV. When the ETV+ ybrid and information warfare, disinformation become stronger and more aggressive towards was created, the Russian media welcomed it as a and propaganda are not a novelty in Russian the West and especially NATO and the US. People government propaganda channel aimed at minorities H activities, however, due to the growing use living in this kind of information space are therefore manipulation. The idea behind the channel however of the internet and social media, they have gained a becoming even more anti-NATO, which makes it is to integrate Russian-speaking population to the new dimension. Since the occupation of Crimea and even harder to explain them the real situation. The Estonian society by giving them the same information war in eastern Ukraine, Russia uses messages through information given by Russia about NATO is usually as to Estonian-speakers but in the minority’s different channels to influence citizens of other criticizing NATO being provocative and surrounding own language. There are also Russian-language countries. The idea behind these tactics seems to be Russia with its troops. In September 2016, the peace programmes on other Estonian TV channels. destabilization of Western societies. march was held in Tallinn, where only around 40 people took part of it. However, it was organized According to a recent survey, Russian TV channels are In Estonia, the message consists of the rhetoric of on the same day as an annual autumn-run was still more popular among Russian speakers in Estonia, the violation of human rights of Russian speaking organized in Tallinn, where thousands of people though the main Estonian news programs such as minority, anti-NATO rhetoric, peace marches but also take part every year. Most probably Russia may “AK” in Russian are also frequently watched. There is instigating the fear of immigrants and refugees. have wanted to include these masses to the picture a major difference between Estonians and Russians in case to show how many of Estonian people are in the trust in the information received. Whereas In on-going intense security situation between against NATO and against the troops coming to Russia and the West, the narrative by Russia has Estonia in spring 2017. • 10 Estonian Internal Security Service Yearbook 2015.

26 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 27 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska

Estonians mainly trusts their Estonian information channels, Russians’ trust rate is 50/50. Moreover, 12 Russians do not trust neither Estonian nor Russian channels. The difference is also between younger and older generation of the Russian-speaking population: the older mainly watch and listen Russian channels and the younger prefer in many cases Estonian INFLUENCE IN THE CYBER SPACE channels. Even though many Russians live in the Kremlin information space, about half of them do not trust their sources of information and compare them with the news provided by Estonian or even western channels like BBC or CNN.11 On the Facebook, there also exist Russian-friendly communities communicating mainly in Estonian, but In a highly digitalized society, which Estonia indeed also in Russian. The main discussion developed there is, social media have become a powerful tool to are the likes of “Putin’s greatness” substantiated by his spread a (dis)information what Russia uses actively capability to deal with homosexuals and immigrants. for its purposes. Latvian-based NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence researched Even though the Facebook is popular both among a troll-farm in Russia and their activities in Latvian Estonians and Russian-speaking population in Estonia, Media.12 Although there is no comparable study about Russian-speakers also use Russian social media sites Estonia, one can easily notice trolls in online media such as Odnoklassniki or Vkontakte where they have outlets and Facebook commentaries. slightly different information.13 •

country like Estonia where almost all services, but it is seen as part of a wider picture together including vital ones, are connected to the with information warfare. The annual report of A internet, is vulnerable to all kinds of cyber the main Estonian agency in charge of security threats. Since the 2007 Estonia has experienced concludes, that in the cyber space, Russia is the different cyber-attacks and the numbers are growing greatest threat to Estonia but also to the EU and every year. According to the annual report of the NATO: by means of a direct cyber-attack, cyber Estonian Information System Authority Cyber Security espionage or cyber-crime. Branch, the country experienced 5809 different kinds of cyber cases in 2016, out of which 402 were Estonian Information System Authority Cyber reported by the governmental agencies and 27 Security Branch is already accustomed to the fact percent of them were highly critical. that Estonia’s networks and information systems are regularly mapped and measured to obtain information In the case of cyber-attacks, it is hard to detect useful for planning any kind of large-scale activities their real origins. For Russia, however, the cyber against Estonia.14 Whether it is Russia, a private actor space is not a purely technical aspect of influence or some other state, it is hard to say. • 11 Estonian Integration Monitoring 2015, http://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/7peatykk.pdf

12 See full report, http://www.stratcomcoe.org/internet-trolling-hybrid-warfare-tool-case-latvia-0 14 2015 Annual Report of the Estonian Information System Authority’s Cyber Security Branch: https://www.ria.ee/public/Kuberturvalisus/2015-RIA-Annual- 13 Estonian Integration Monitoring 2015, http://www.kul.ee/sites/kulminn/files/7peatykk.pdf cyber-report.pdf

28 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 29 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska

CONCLUSIONS

ven though one fourth of Estonia’s populations also a sensitive topic as Russia is very advanced and are Russian speakers and Estonia depends to active in that sector. E some extent on Russian gas and electricity Therefore, the integration between Russian-speaking grid, it can be said that Estonia is not dangerously and Estonian population is an important factor for influenced by Russia. Estonia has been independent reducing the gap between two different information for 25 years and the social memory of the Soviet spaces people live in. Civil society organizations past is still there. The understanding of Russia and play an important role here and should be involved its capabilities by the elites and by the public is systematically to supplement official policies on these widespread and Russia is not seen as a trustworthy questions. The adequate information, both in Estonian partner. Since re-independence, Estonia has oriented and in Russian, should be widely available to the its policy strongly to the West joining the NATO and society to combat propaganda messages and reduce EU in 2004 and developing multi-level cooperation. their influence.

Due to the historical experience and clear Stronger effort should be made to decrease understanding of the Russian threat today, the corruption and increase transparency in all sectors, influence by Russia decreases every year. In the including financing political parties and critical areas economy and finance sector, Estonia has always been such as strategically important positions and IT sector looking for alternatives to Russian gas, electricity companies. and money. From the society side, Estonia has developed better policies to integrate Russian- The search for alternatives in the energy sector and speaking population to the Estonian society more new customers for the railway transit should be effectively. Still, the integration process takes time, continued. Stronger cooperation in these questions especially when Russia actively opposes it. Therefore, mainly with other Baltic States and Poland would the Russia-speaking population has remained one possibly be beneficial as well as stressing these of the key factors for Russian influence. On political questions together on the EU level. level, the understanding of Russian threat is more or less consensual among all parties but there are also A cooperation within and between NATO and the politicians linked to Russia on different bases. Russia EU has to be promoted, recognizing, that Russia may try to influence them and/or help them to get to influences with its soft power not only the Baltic the power. Businesspeople in the few sectors linked States or Eastern Europe but also Western European to Russia are also prone to a potential influence or countries and even the United States. A strong united manipulation. Since Estonia and Russia do not have position and actions together with the EU and NATO strong connections any more, it is the human factor countries should be considered, especially against that can be the main factor of influence. Cyber field is hybrid tactics. •

30 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 31 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska

ANNEX 1 KOMENTARZ PROF. PRZEMYSŁAWA ŻURAWSKIEGO VEL GRAJEWSKIEGO

Jaką rolę obecnie spełnia Unia Europejska i NATO w brytyjskiego i francuskiego) nie był wyzwaniem poprawie pozycji krajów bałtyckich względem Rosji? wojskowym dla północnej grupy armii sowieckiej, tylko Co nie jest, a powinno być robione w kontekście właśnie wyzwaniem politycznym. Czym innym byłaby polityki prowadzonej przez Federację Rosyjską? operacja złamania oporu policji zachodnioberlińskiej, a czym innym otwarcie ognia do żołnierzy owych Kluczowe dla bezpieczeństwa państw bałtyckich głównych mocarstw nuklearnych NATO. jest NATO jako sojusz obronny. Unia Europejska, nie będąc strukturą wojskową, ma znaczenie ograniczone. Tu jest powtórzenie tej sytuacji. Niedostatek, na Obecnie rozmieszczane są siły wsparcia wschodniej który można wskazać to fakt, że o ile w okresie flanki NATO w państwach bałtyckich i w Polsce, zimnej wojny całą konstrukcję wysuniętej obecności ponieważ państwa bałtyckie, z uwagi na swoją strukturę odstraszania przez ukaranie (deterrence by narodowościową oraz liczną mniejszość rosyjską, punishment), a zatem wytworzenie sytuacji, w której szczególnie na Łotwie i w Estonii, są słusznie typowane potencjalny agresor nie tyle ma uniemożliwione jako obszar możliwej, potencjalnej prowokacji rosyjskiej zajęcie danego terytorium – to wojskowo jest możliwe z wykorzystaniem faktu istnienia tej mniejszości, a – tyle, że jest postawiony wobec perspektywy srogiej zatem, możliwy obszar zainicjowania konfliktu, który kary za podjęcie takiej próby poprzez wejście w ostatecznie może doprowadzić do starcia zbrojnego. konflikt zbrojny z wiodącymi mocarstwami. Cała ta Owo rozmieszczanie wojsk wiodących mocarstw NATO konstrukcja nosiła w okresie zimnej wojny nazwę jest krokiem zmniejszającym prawdopodobieństwo wiretrap, czyli rodzaj potykacza, drutu, który jest wystąpienia konfliktu, albowiem przerzuca na barki rozciągnięty od zapalnika miny. Jeśli biegnący zawadzi potencjalnego agresora decyzję o de facto otwarciu o ten drut, spowoduje wybuch. Państwa bałtyckie są ognia do żołnierzy największych mocarstw będących obecnie takim drutem. Problem polega na tym, że państwami członkowskimi NATO, co jest politycznie wtedy istniała mina, czyli potężne zgrupowanie wojsk odmiennej jakości decyzją niż decyzja o otwarciu ognia NATO na terenie RFN. Obecność amerykańska, bo do żołnierzy estońskich, litewskich czy łotewskich. to głównie o nią chodzi, jest w Europie ograniczona. Jest to decyzja o wojnie z Wielką Brytanią, Kanadą i Zainicjowana przez pociągnięcie zawleczki eksplozja Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Jest zatem zarazem mniej będzie znacznie mniejsza niż poprzednio. Ale też i prawdopodobną decyzją. Pomimo, że rozmieszczane siły Rosja nie jest Związkiem Sowieckim, jej potencjał jest w sensie liczebnym, wojskowym, nie zmieniają w sposób wielokrotnie mniejszy, możliwości również. zasadniczy sytuacji wojskowej w regionie, to sytuację polityczną zmieniają jednak w sposób absolutnie Problemem w razie zaistnienia takiej sytuacji jest zasadniczy. czas potrzebny na przerzucenie do naszego regionu wojsk amerykańskich czy sił innych wiodących Wielokrotnie to robiłem, więc i teraz użyję tego państw NATO. Ten czas trzeba kupić obroną własną, porównania: jest to powtórzenie sytuacji z okresu zimnej czyli wojska państw bałtyckich i Polski będą musiały wojny, w jakiej funkcjonował Berlin Zachodni, gdzie fakt wytrzymać w obronie około dwóch tygodni do stacjonowania garnizonów alianckich (amerykańskiego, momentu pojawienia się przerzucanych sił.

32 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 33 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska

Czy w obliczu zapowiadanej zmiany linii polityki mowę kurczaczą, w języku polskim nazywaną zajęczą, na jakiś sposób wsparcia bezpieczeństwa państw Nie wydaje mi się, aby Unia miała jeszcze jakieś amerykańskiej względem Rosji, kraje bałtyckie, w sensie zajęczego serca namawiającego Ukraińców bałtyckich, który otrzymałyby od Unii Europejskiej, istotne instrumenty poza sankcjami ekonomicznymi. a zwłaszcza Estonia czy Łotwa mogą czuć się do pozostania w Związku Sowieckim. Pomysły były nie otrzymując go od NATO. To wszystko, w wymiarze Należy pamiętać, że bez względu na to, jakie zagrożone? absolutnie szalone w przeszłości i nic z tego nie wyszło. bezpieczeństwa szczególnie, są konstrukcje oparte są realia, decydenci na Kremlu nie szanują Unii Z umiarkowanymi obawami bym podchodził do tego ostatecznie na decyzjach rządów narodowych. To Europejskiej, nie ma czegoś takiego jak prestiż Unii Każdy z prezydentów amerykańskich obejmujący typu czarnych scenariuszy. Nie będą cofnięte decyzje państwa członkowskie będą wydzielały swoje zasoby w oczach rosyjskich, a w związku z tym, wola brania urząd zapowiada podjęcie próby poprawy, warszawskiego szczytu NATO, realia wojskowe będą do reakcji w sytuacji kryzysu. pod uwagę jej zdania politycznego. Unia w relacjach wyrównania relacji z Rosją. To wszystko zależy de zmieniane – nowy prezydent Stanów Zjednoczonych z Rosją, nie tylko teraz, ale i w okresie swojej facto od Rosji, jak ona się będzie zachowywała. obiecuje podniesienie wydatków zbrojeniowych, Oczywiście są elementy uzupełniające dodatkowo, świetności, miała dosyć ograniczone instrumenty Natura interesów amerykańskich i rosyjskich, tak jak liczebności armii i to są twarde fakty. Lepiej mówić jak sankcje ekonomiczne Unii Europejskiej. W tym działania i trzeba rozumieć, na jakich polach Unia są postrzegane przez elity przywódcze, jest absolutnie miękko, a budować wojskowo, niż odwrotnie, mówić zakresie Bałtowie korzystają ze swojej niewielkiej może działać skutecznie, a na jakich nie może. Unia sprzeczna i nawet jeśli takie próby ocieplenia relacji twardo, a redukować armię. wagi głosów na rzecz podtrzymania sankcji, które mogła skutecznie wprowadzić strefę Schengen, są podejmowane, to szybko się kończą w świetle stanowią element politycznego odstraszania przez opartą na swoich granicach zewnętrznych, które w realiów i faktów. Jakkolwiek, przy braku przychylności Obawy są przesadne, co nie znaczy, że żadnych uświadamianie Rosji kosztów kolejnych agresji. Stąd, wymiarze granic państw bałtyckich czy polskich, mediów, także amerykańskich w stosunku do nowego zawirowań nie należy się spodziewać, ale bardziej znaczenie tych sankcji, pomijając wymiar gospodarczy, są granicami z Rosją. Unia może wprowadzać prezydenta, trzeba pamiętać, że Stany Zjednoczone obawiał bym się rozwoju sytuacji w Europie w mają znaczenie jako instrument przesłania politycznego regulacje antydumpingowe np. na eksport nie są Rosją, nie są państwem samodzierżcy, który perspektywie wyborów francuskich czy niemieckich. wobec decydentów na Kremlu, które musi być rosyjskich wyrobów metalowych, dotowanych jednoosobowo podejmuje decyzje, gdy wszyscy wystosowane, żebyśmy uniknęli kolejnej agresji, musi przez niskie ceny energii w Rosji. Unia może inni stoją na baczność i wykonują, tylko są strukturą Jak państwa bałtyckie wykorzystywały i nadal łamać przeświadczenie, które istnieje w Moskwie i zakazywać używania starych, rosyjskich samolotów opartą na zasadzie check and balance poważnych wykorzystują członkostwo w Unii Europejskiej w któremu Rosjanie dali wyraz 1 marca 2014 roku, kiedy do komunikacji na lotniskach na terytorium Unii instytucji, zakorzenionych w wieloletniej tradycji, swoich relacjach z Rosją czy względem Rosji i jaki to w czasie dyskusji w Radzie Federacji, izbie wyższej Europejskiej, z uwagi na generowanie poziomu stabilnych instytucji państwowych osadzonych w wpływ ma na to kryzys Unii Europejskiej? parlamentu rosyjskiego, panowała opinia na temat hałasu wyższego niż zezwalają na to przepisy tradycji demokratycznej, z potężną doświadczoną oczekiwanej reakcji Zachodu na wprowadzenie wojsk unijne. Ale to nie jest polityka strategiczna. To jest klasą polityczną, w tym także wojskową, której głos Unia Europejska nie jest strukturą w oparciu, o którą rosyjskich na Ukrainę, sformułowana zdaniem „trochę tzw. niska polityka, a nie gra o bezpieczeństwo nie może być lekceważony, z bardzo doświadczonymi można prowadzić politykę strategiczną w wymiarze się poawanturują i przestaną”, reakcja będzie słowna państw bałtyckich. Tam gdzie dorobek prawny wojskowymi. bezpieczeństwa. Oczywiście przejawiała czasem takie i będzie krótka. Utrzymanie tych sankcji unijnych jak Wspólnot Europejskich rozstrzyga o jakiś normach ambicje. Teraz nastąpił powrót deklaratywny do tego najdłużej jest elementem łamania owego przekonania, działania na terytorium Unii, jest ona twardym Miałem okazję w ubiegłym roku rozmawiać wymiaru, prze czym wybór Donalda Trumpa jest jednym że reakcja Zachodu będzie symboliczna i krótkotrwała. graczem, bo zmiany tych reguł wymagałyby w Waszyngtonie z kilkunastoma ośrodkami z argumentów na rzecz tworzenia takiej struktury, która w A takie przekonanie zachęca oczywiście do kolejnych renegocjacji w gronie wszystkich państw analitycznymi i, poza jednym przypadkiem, wszyscy razie czego by ubezpieczała dodatkowo te państwa, ale agresji. W tym wymiarze Unia ma znaczenie, a państwa członkowskich. Żaden, nawet najbardziej prorosyjski mają bardzo trzeźwy stosunek do Rosji, wiedzą czym to nie ma odzwierciedlenia w rzeczywistej wydolności i bałtyckie w miarę swoich możliwości, dodając Polskę, polityk Unii nie jest w stanie samodzielnie podjąć ona jest i jakie zagrożenie stwarza. Amerykańska możliwości Unii Europejskiej w tym zakresie. Skandynawów, Niemcy – jak długo kanclerz Merkel stoi decyzji o ustępstwie. Tam, gdzie mamy do czynienia klasa polityczna wszelkich opcji jest jak najbardziej na czele tego państwa – ten blok jest zwolennikami z dyplomacją na wysokim poziomie strategicznym, świadoma zagrożenia płynącego z Rosji. Relacje z Rosją nie są prowadzone przez przewidziane sankcji przeciwko Rosji, w związku z wojną na Ukrainie. tam de facto grają mocarstwa unijne, Niemcy do tego struktury unijne. W formacie normandzkim Jak długo on będzie utrzymany, istotne tu są wybory, i Francja w formacie normandzkim, a nie Unia Jakkolwiek, zapewne nastąpi próba ocieplenia, to będzie nie jest znana publicznie, bo jej nie ma po prostu, które nas czekają we wrześniu tego roku, tak długo Europejska. W tym sensie, odpowiedź na pytanie ograniczana realiami polityki rosyjskiej. Nie przewiduję, rola szefowej dyplomacji UE, Federici Mogherini. obecna linia będzie utrzymana. o poczynania Unii Europejskiej, jest faktycznie żeby odniosła sukces. Obama i wcześniejsi prezydenci Wydolność wojskowa Unii Europejskiej jest odpowiedzią na pytanie o decyzje polityczne, w też zapowiadali ocieplanie relacji z Rosją. Bush nawet dosyć symboliczna. Lepiej z perspektywy państw Co jeszcze Unia Europejska mogłaby zrobić, aby tej chwili przede wszystkim Berlina. Reszta państw widział w oczach Putina szczerego demokratę, bałtyckich, jest być w tej strukturze, niż nie być, politycznie zapewnić bezpieczeństwo krajom podąży za tymi decyzjami. Perspektywa wyborów Obama rozpoczynał od resetu, Bush senior wygłaszał jednak podstawowym instrumentem bezpieczeństwa bałtyckim, które są najbardziej narażone na na razie pozwala jakieś przewidywania czynić tylko przemówienie w Kijowie, zwane chicken speech, czyli wojskowego w regionie jest NATO. Trudno wskazać agresywną politykę Rosji? do września. •

34 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 35 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska

ANNEX 2 POMNIK NIEZGODY

Agata Supinska

marcu 2007 roku w Estonii odbyły użyć gazu łzawiącego. Podczas zamieszek zginął się wybory parlamentarne, w których 20-letni Rosjanin. Według doniesień estońskich W zwyciężyły ugrupowania: liberalna Partia mediów, mężczyzna zmarł od dźgnięcia nożem przez Reform i centrolewicowa Partia Centrum. Przed innego mężczyznę, z którym wspólnie plądrowali koalicją rządzącą stanęło wyzwanie uregulowania estoński sklep. W oczach Rosjan ich rodak był ochładzających się relacji z Rosją, a przede wszystkim jednak ofiarą zamieszek, ginąc z rąk estońskiej ratyfikacja traktatu granicznego. Nowy parlament policji. Ponadto, około 44 osób zostało rannych, a uchwalił jednak ustawę zezwalającą na przenoszenie aresztowanych zostało ok. 300 uczestników zajścia. cmentarzy żołnierzy radzieckich z II wojny światowej Za inicjatorów zamieszek zostali uznani członkowie i usuwanie pomników „wyzwolicieli”. W kwietniu organizacji Nocna Straż, którzy jednocześnie byli ich podjęto decyzję o zdemontowaniu Pomnika najaktywniejszymi uczestnikami. Zamieszki miały Wyzwolicieli Tallina, upamiętniającego żołnierzy miejsce nie tylko w samym Tallinie, ale również w radzieckich poległych w Estonii podczas II wojny kilku miastach okręgu Idu-, w północno- światowej. Pomnik został odsłonięty 22 września wschodniej części kraju, zamieszkiwanej w większości 1947 roku, w trzecią rocznicę wyzwolenia Tallina od przez Rosjan. O rozruchy oskarżano lokalnych okupacji niemieckiej przez wojsko Armii Czerwonej. rosyjskich radykałów oraz rosyjskich dyplomatów, Zlokalizowany był na Wzgórzu św. Antoniego którym zarzucano liczne spotkania z liderami Partii Tõnismägi. Obok niego znajdowała się zbiorowa Konstytucyjnej i młodzieżowej organizacji Nocna mogiła, zawierająca szczątki sowieckich żołnierzy Straż. poległych w 1944 roku. Przewodniczący Komisji Spraw Zagranicznych Usunięciu pomnika z centrum Tallina sprzeciwiali się Dumy Konstantin Kosaczow ocenił postępowanie działacze mniejszości rosyjskiej, którzy przez kilka władz Estonii jako „barbarzyństwo” i „bluźnierstwo”. NATO, oraz w Radzie Europy i OBWE”. Do wystąpień cyberataków na infrastrukturę informatyczną Estonii. miesięcy stróżowali przy „Brązowym Żołnierzu”, aby Rosyjski wicepremier Siergiej Iwanow wzywał rosyjskich polityków odniosła się ambasador Estonii Unieruchomiono strony internetowe parlamentu, zapobiec jego zniszczeniu. Przyjęta przez parlament Rosjan do bojkotowania towarów z Estonii. Rosyjski w Moskwie, Marina Kaljurand: „Nie będziemy ministerstw obrony i sprawiedliwości, partii ustawa okazała się łagodniejszym rozwiązaniem, gdyż parlament apelował do Władimira Putina o nałożenie wysłuchiwać szantażu i gróźb innych krajów”. politycznych, policji, a nawet szkół publicznych. W prezydent Estonii zawetował projekt zakładający sankcji gospodarczych na Estonię, a nawet zerwanie końcu, przy rządzie estońskim utworzono jednostkę całkowitą likwidację Brązowego Żołnierza jako stosunków dyplomatycznych. Putin ostro skrytykował Wbrew zobowiązaniom wynikającym z konwencji Estonian Computer Emergency Response Team, „zakazanego obiektu” symbolizującego radziecką decyzję władz Estonii, potępiając „bezczeszczenie wiedeńskiej o stosunkach dyplomatycznych, rosyjskie kierowaną przez Hillara Aarelaida, która miała okupację Estonii. Szczątki żołnierzy miały być pomników” i „sianie waśni” między narodami. służby nie zapewniły odpowiedniego bezpieczeństwa prowadzić improwizowaną obronę systemów. ekshumowane i przeniesione na cmentarz wojskowy Rosyjskie media, relacjonując zamieszki w Tallinie, Ambasadzie Estonii w Moskwie, w związku z czym Apogeum nastąpiło 9 maja (rosyjski Dzień pod Tallinem. Dla Estończyków „Brązowy Żołnierz” zarzucały estońskiej policji brutalność, nazywając w nocy z 26 na 27 kwietnia 2007 roku, nazwanej Zwycięstwa), kiedy to atakami dotknięty został także to symbol początku radzieckiej okupacji Estonii, zaś mniejszość rosyjską biorącą udział w zamieszkach „Brązową Nocą” doszło do ataku prokremlowskich sektor prywatny, zaś 18 maja ataki nagle przerwano. dla mniejszości rosyjskiej to pamiątka po żołnierzach „obrońcami pomnika” i „antyfaszystami”. W rosyjskiej młodzieżówek. Protestujący wtargnęli bezprawnie Ich cel jednak został spełniony: w ciągu zaledwie poległych w walce z niemieckimi faszystami. prasie zaczęto pisać o „SS-toni” jako państwie na teren placówki, obrzucili ją kamieniami i fekaliami, trzech tygodni małe, europejskie państwo zostało faszystowskim. W swoim oświadczeniu, rosyjskie zerwali z masztu flagę Estonii i spalili ją, ostatecznie całkowicie sparaliżowane. Gadi Evron, izraelski ekspert Przeniesienie pomnika wyznaczono na dzień MSZ poinformowało: „Dziesiątki cywilów padły ofiarą atakując bezpośrednio ambasador Estonii Marinę ds. bezpieczeństwa, który był w tym czasie w Estonii, 26 kwietnia 2007 roku. Pomnik został otoczony nadmiernego użycia siły przez władze estońskie Kaljurand. stwierdził że „za pomocą cyberbomby Estonia została przez milicję, która miała za zadanie nie dopuścić przeciwko manifestantom. Mamy nadzieję, że niemal zepchnięta do epoki kamiennej”. demonstrantów rosyjskich do mogił znajdujących postępowanie władz estońskich zostanie odpowiednio 27 kwietnia o godzinie 22.30 zauważono tzw. ataki się przy monumencie. Kiedy grupa demonstrujących ocenione przez społeczność międzynarodową, a denial of services (DoS) na internetowe serwisy W toku śledztwa ustalono, że hakerzy atakowali z zdecydowała się na szturm, policja była zmuszona zwłaszcza sojuszników Estonii w Unii Europejskiej i rządu Estonii. W ciągu kolejnych dni nasilała się fala komputerów należących do administracji rządowej

36 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 37 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska

Rosji. 24 stycznia 2008 roku w Estonii zapadł pierwszy której pomnik określono jako „monument żołnierzy ANNEX 3 wyrok w sprawie cyberataków. Dmitrij Gałuszkiewicz, armii sowieckiej okupujących Tallin od 22 września który przyznał się do winy, został ukarany grzywną 1944 roku”. Pracownik Ministerstwa Obrony, pod ok. 1,1 tys. euroza zaatakowanie strony Partii Reform. którego zarządem znajduje się cmentarz wojskowy, RUSSIA AS A THREAT TO THE Atak na estońskie sieci informatyczne był o tyle powiedział, że tablica „odzwierciedla historyczny niebezpieczny, że państwo to jest zaawansowane fakt okupacji Estonii od 1940 po 1991 rok”. technologicznie i wszystkie rejestry państwowe są Zamieszczenie podpisu tej treści wywołało sprzeciw STATES BEING IN THE ZONE prowadzone w formie elektronicznej, całkowicie weteranów Armii Czerwonej. Przewodniczący zastępując papierowe archiwum. Wydarzenia wiosny Tallińskiego Stowarzyszenia Weteranów Drugiej OF INFLUENCE 2007 roku, zapoczątkowane konfliktem o pomnik Wojny Światowej, Władimir Metelica, wyraził swoje „Brązowego Żołnierza”, rozpoczęły zupełnie nowy oburzenie, podkreślając, że dla weteranów pomnik wyścig zbrojeń, prowadzony w cyberprzestrzeni. jest symbolem oswobodzenia Tallina od faszystów. Reakcja ówczesnego prezydenta Estonii, Toomasa Jeszcze radykalniej wypowiedział się przewodniczący Hendrika Ilves była bardzo emocjonalna. Nawoływał organizacji społecznej „Nocna Straż”, Dmitrij Linter, on, aby Rosja, sąsiad Estonii, starała się pozostać którego zdaniem takie działanie władz estońskich jest cywilizowanym państwem, w których nieporozumienia przepisywaniem historii, prześladowaniem żołnierzy rozwiązywane są przez dyplomatów i polityków, koalicji antyhitlerowskiej i antyfaszystowskiej. a nie poprzez spór ludności i ataki komputerowe. 70% Trivimi Velliste, były minister spraw zagranicznych Próba wznowienia dialogu między Moskwą a Tallinem Estonii, w rozmowie z Piotrem Falkowskim stanowczo została podjęta 28 czerwca 2008 roku, kiedy to powiedział: „Tallin jest w Estonii. A Estonia jest prezydent Estonii Toomas Hendrik Ilves przybył niepodległym państwem i my nie pytamy się Rosji na zaproszenie prezydenta Dmitrija Miedwiediewa 60% o jej punkt widzenia. Pomniki w Estonii podlegają na odbywajacy sie w Chanty-Mansyjsku Kongres całkowicie suwerennej decyzji władz estońskich Narodow Ugrofinskich. Dwa lata po zamieszkach wybranych przez naród”. Brązowej Nocy, Kristina Norman, artystka estońsko- rosyjskiego pochodzenia w miejscu lokalizacji 50% Pomnik Brązowego Żołnierza, dzięki prowadzonej starego pomnika Brązowego Żołnierza postawiła przez Rosję narracji, nazywany był w światowych jego złotą replikę. Wśród społeczeństwa zapanowało mediach pomnikiem „Żołnierza Wyzwoliciela”, symbol zdezorientowanie, a w mediach gorące polemiki. wyzwolenia Estonii przez Armię Czerwoną spod Estońscy intelektualiści uznali pomnik za obraźliwy, 40% okupacji niemieckiej. Według Estończyków historia zaś artystka została zatrzymana przez policję. wyzwolenia wyglądała nieco inaczej. 17 września 1944 Zarzucono jej prowokację, marnowanie publicznych roku Estończycy dowiedzieli się o planie ewakuacji pieniędzy i atak na instytucje państwowe. Złotą replikę wojsk niemieckich z ich terytorium. Dzień później, pomnika Brązowego Żołnierza odkupiło ostatecznie 30% 18 września, pełniący obowiązki prezydenta, prof. Muzeum Sztuki Współczesnej w Helsinkach, włączając Juri Uluots, ostatni premier niepodległej Estonii, go do wystawy prezentującej narrację post-radziecką. powołał rząd Republiki Estońskiej, który ogłosił neutralność Estonii w wojnie niemiecko-sowieckiej. W 2016 roku Centralny Bank Rosji wydał serię 20% „22 września, kiedy Rosjanie opanowali Tallinn, na pamiątkowych 5-rublowych monet z pomnikami wieży Pikk Hermann powiewała niebiesko-biało- „wyzwolicieli”, które znajdują się w stolicach krajów czarna (estońska) flaga, a estońska władza była już wyzwolonych przez wojska sowieckie spod okupacji przywrócona. Flaga Estonii została sponiewierana nazistowskiej. Wśród nich jest moneta z „Brązowym 10% kulami i zerwana. Zamiast wyzwolenia Armia Żołnierzem”, czyli „Pomnikiem Wyzwolicieli” z Czerwona okupowała Estonię przez kolejne 50 Tallina. Rzecznik prasowy Banku Centralnego Rosji lat” – mówi wiceprzewodniczący Estońskiej oświadczył, że puszczona w obieg seria monet Konserwatywnej Partii Ludowej. Nieliczny oddział upamiętnia zwycięstwo nad faszyzmem. Estońska 0% uzbrojonych Estończyków bronił swoich rodaków, Konserwatywna Partia Ludowa wystąpiła do rządu, umożliwiając im ucieczkę przed „wyzwoleńczą” Armią by ten zmusił Moskwę do przeprosin i wycofania Czerwoną. pieniędzy z obrotu. Jednak rząd, na czele z minister spraw zagranicznych Mariną Kaljurand, pomimo Na cmentarzu wojennym w Tallinnie, przy pomniku ożywionej reakcji Litwy, nie wydał w tej sprawie „Brązowego Żołnierza” zamieszczono tablicę, na żadnego oświadczenia. • Source: gallup.com (est. 2015)

38 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 39 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska

ANNEX 4 RUSSIANS IN ESTONIA 2012-2016

POPULATION AND LANGUAGES 334000 IN THE ESTONIA, INCLUDING 332500 331000 RUSSIAN MINORITY AND RUSSIAN 329500 328000 LANGUAGE 326500 325000 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

BIRTHS IN ESTONIA 1990-2015

POPULATION: 1,258,545 (JULY 2016 EST.) YEAR 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL 18 522 9 040 9 771 8 771 11 698 11 698 8 779 11 377 11 576

ESTONIAN 13 918 2 059 7 706 2 040 9 155 9 155 2 412 8 897 8 973 RUSSIAN 4 196 60 1 978 24 2 472 2 472 30 2 406 2 511 UKRAINIAN 217 11 38 4 21 21 6 22 37 POPULATION (%) 2011 EST. LANGUAGES (%) 2011 EST. BELORUSIAN 74 1 9 0 2 2 1 3 3 FIN 7 2 4 1 5 5 5 0 2 JEW 7 2 2 2 5 5 3 5 5 TATAR 19 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 GERMAN 9 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 2 LATVIAN 3 0 0 0 3 3 0 1 1 POLE 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 3 0 LITHUANIAN 2 8 0 7 1 1 7 0 1 ARMENIAN 15 22 1 13 4 4 27 7 0

BIRTHS OF RUSSIANS 1990-2015

4,000

3,500

3,000

ESTONIAN 68.7% ESTONIAN (OFFICIAL) 68.5% 2,500 RUSSIAN 24.8% RUSSIAN 29.6% 2,000

UKRAINIAN 1.7% UKRAINIAN 0.6% 1,500 BELARUSIAN 1% OTHER 1.2% 1,000 FINN 0.6% UNSPECIFIED 0.1% 500 OTHER 1.6% 0

UNSPECIFIED 1.6% https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ Agency, Intelligence Central Source: 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2012 2013 2014 2015 pub.staat.ee Source:

40 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 41 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska

ANNEX 5 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 2011 PARTY NUMBER OF VOTES RESULT (%) MANDATES

ESTONIAN REFORM PARTY 164 255 28,56 33

ESTONIAN CENTRE PARTY 134 124 23,32 26

UNION OF PRO PATRIA AND RES PUBLICA 118023 20,52 23

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 98 307 17,09 19

ESTONIAN GREENS 21 824 3,80 0

PEOPLE’S UNION OF ESTONIA 12 184 2,12 0

RUSSIAN PARTY IN ESTONIA 5 029 0,9 0

ESTONIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS 2 934 0,5 0

ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY 2 571 0,4 0

INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES 15 882 2,8 0

COALITION: , Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica

PRIME MINISTER: Andrus Ansip http://www.vvk.ee/varasemad/rk2011/mandate_distribution.html Source:

2007 2015

PARTY ELECTION RESULT (%) MANDATES PARTY NUMBER OF VOTES ELECTION RESULT (%) MANDATES

ESTONIAN REFORM PARTY 27,8 31 ESTONIAN REFORM PARTY 158 965 27,7 30

ESTONIAN CENTRE PARTY 26,1 29 ESTONIAN CENTRE PARTY 142 438 24,8 27

UNION OF PRO PATRIA AND RES PUBLICA 17,9 19 SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 87 186 15,2 15

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY 10,6 10 UNION OF PRO PATRIA AND RES PUBLICA 78 707 13,7 14

ESTONIAN GREENS 7,1 6 ESTONIAN FREE PARTY 49 885 8,7 8

PEOPLE’S UNION OF ESTONIA 7,1 6 CONSERVATIVE PEOPLE’S PARTY OF ESTONIA 46 772 8,1 7

ESTONIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS 1,7 0 ESTONIAN GREENS 5 193 0,9 0

CONSTITUTION PARTY 1 0 PARTY OF PEOPLE’S UNITY 2 289 0,4 0

ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY 0,2 0 ESTONIAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY 1 046 0,2 0

RUSSIAN PARTY IN ESTONIA 0,2 0 ESTONIAN UNITED LEFT PARTY 764 0,1 0

ESTONIAN LEFT PARTY 0,1 0 INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES 887 0,2 0

COALITION: Estonian Reform Party, Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica, Social Democratic Party (left the coalition in 2009) COALITION: Estonian Reform Party, Social Democratic Party, Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica

PRIME MINISTER: Andrus Ansip http://www.vvk.ee/past-elections/riigikogu-parliament-elections/-elections-2007/ Source: PRIME MINISTER: Taavie Rõivas (since 23rd November listopada Jüri Ratas government from Estonian Centre Party who joined coalition for Estonian Reform Party)

42 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 43 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska NOTES

44 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 45 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia Mariita Mattiisen - Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski - Agata Supinska NOTES

46 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform www.europeanreform.org @europeanreform 47 Russia‘s influence and presence in Estonia

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48 New Direction - The Foundation for European Reform