The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 25, No. 1, March 2013, 87Ð107

An Analysis of Political Instability in the DPRK: Identity, Interest, and Leader-Elite Relations

Kim Jina*

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Seoul, Republic of Korea

This study explores answers to such questions as “Why has North Korea been so immune to regime change?” and “What are the leading causes of North Korea’s regime fragility?” It acknowledges that indicators of macroeconomic performance, although they are primary indicators of a successful state, are neither available nor reliable for the study of North Korea’s regime stability. Therefore, this study tries to specify factors affecting the leadership rather than looking at a broad matrix of indicators. This study assumes that it becomes increasingly important for the North Korean leadership to provide privileged benefits to rent-seeking elites for the regime maintenance and hence tries to analyze variables related to change of identity and interests of the North Korean power elites. First, it identifies key variables of North Korea’s stability by reclassifying indicators from the indicator clusters examined in the previous studies. Next, it analyzes factors directly related to the leader-follower relationship in North Korea such as ruling ideology, elite composition, rent-seeking behaviors and opportunity cost of choosing alternative options. Findings of this study reveal many paradoxes in North Korea and suggest that North Korean elites’ support for the Kim Jong Un regime depends on the young new leader’s ability to retain the mechanism of providing benefits to the elites and increasing the opportunity cost of elites’ defection.

Keywords: North Korea, political stability, contingency, constructivism, leader-elite relations

Introduction The perceived pressure to anticipate state failure has increased in the past several years, and the pressure to anticipate North Korea’s fragility has also increased. However, the track record of previous studies in this regard has not been very good. The North Korean regime has spent decades figuring out ways to survive, which it is still managing to do, despite repeated predictions of imminent collapse, showing potential resilience to the internal and external challenges. Efforts to rank states to identify state weakness have increased but have little policy relevance for the DPRK. This inadequacy exists

*E-mail: [email protected] **This paper was presented at a closed session of the KIDA-Brookings Seminar on September 5, 2012.

ISSN 1016-3271 print, ISSN 1941-4641 online © 2013 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses http://www.kida.re.kr/kjda 88 Kim Jina for several reasons. First, there was a tendency to make hasty generalizations. Studies point out different causes of state failure without giving much attention to state-specific causes. Second, studies relied on monitoring background factors. Therefore, latent variables are examined without giving different weight to such factors related to regime fragility. Accordingly, studies do not provide accurate information on the probability of regime collapse in North Korea. Given North Korea’s resilience and adaptability, sorting out key variables is necessary. The death of Kim Jong Il could change the matrix of North Korea’s regime stability, and hence it becomes even more important than before to provide guidelines for identifying priority sectors. Notably, after the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea underwent successful consolidation processes in the mid-1990s. As O’Donnell and Schmitter argue, political transition can increase the likelihood of regime collapse,1 but predicting whether or not North Korea will succeed again in power transition and regime stabilization should be based on thorough examination. Goldstone contends that a number of factors have to come together for a revolu- tionary change to succeed, and these factors include mobilization of a broad-based section of the population, the elites’ alienation from the state, and nonintervention of external powers.2 In the case of North Korea, mass mobilization is a less-likely scenario, and neighboring states, at least at this point, have interests in maintaining the status quo. However, the leader-follower relationship is a growing concern. In democracy, leaders need the support of citizens, but dictators maintain their command by having some of their authority delegated and forming an elite stratum below them.3 Therefore, in a dictatorship, politics centers on the interplay between leaders and elites. This study will focus on the relationship between the North Korean leadership and the power elites. It should be noted that defection among elites led to the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,4 the very factor that Kim Il Sung warned not to repeat in North Korea. North Korea has recruited elites who have demonstrated their ideological integrity and loyalty to the leadership while it ensured checks-and-balances among the elites. Because elites benefit from their membership, they are engaged in internal bargaining that maintains the existing structure. However, their ideational bond weakens and rational calculation dominates, and this is more likely to happen when there are changes of leadership, elite composition, and, consequently, bureaucratic culture. The North Korean leadership remains in control of the elites, and it is unlikely that that elite disintegration can occur in the coming months. However, it is important to study the significance of the North Korean elites, whose support the leader requires to stay in power, and how their relationship with the leadership has changed. This study is designed to find answers to such questions as “Why has North Korea been so immune to regime change?” “What are the leading causes of North Korea’s regime fragility?” “What are new variables to be examined?” and “What framework can be best applied to North Korea?” This paper is composed of two parts. It will first identify key indicators from the indicator clusters examined in the previous studies and reclassify variables to distinguish latent as well as key variables of North Korea’s stability. Then, it will examine how these variables are related to the mechanism of sustaining elite support for the North Korean regime. Political Instability in the DPRK 89

Literature on DPRK Contingency Previous studies conducted mostly by Korean scholars focused on presenting various scenarios of North Korea’s regime instability. However, these studies were rather focused on the consequences,5 not the causes, of North Korea’s regime fragility. They present requirements for managing problems associated with collapse,6 anticipate the attitudes of the neighboring states in mitigating consequences,7 and suggest advance planning for contingency situations.8 Other studies presented quantitative analysis for identifying leading indicators or conditions that are associated with states’ regime fragility, but these efforts largely were aimed at developing global risk assessment. They have been successful in conveying the impression that North Korea shows signs of slow collapse, but they were not adequately designed to make case-specific considerations of policy implications or predictions. In the previous studies, North Korea has a mixed profile, succeeding in some of the dimensions such as state control while failing in other dimensions such as economic efficiency.9 To many observers North Korea seems to be an anomaly. For example, CIFP (Country Indicator for Foreign Policy) fragile states reports measured relative strengths and weaknesses across a broad range of indicators of state fragility, and North Korea ranked 52nd in 2007 and 56th in 2011.10 However, North Korea’s ranking changes depending on the indicators:11 it becomes the 25th with a fragility index of 5.88 if selected indicators are considered, and North Korea’s average index decreases from 7.38 to 3.11 if political stability indicators are considered.12 Goldstone’s Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability13 selected control cases at random for a global model that identifies factors associated with the risk of all types of state failure, and North Korea is one of the states scoring high in strength but low in legitimacy. This means that North Korea is likely to be efficient at causing problems for its people, but it scores high in overall strength. Because indices do not converge, it is questionable whether or not the indicators used in the global models are adequately capturing the mechanisms that are making the DPRK fragile. Studies of quantitative analyses of comparable measures and comprehensive analyses of all the relevant indicators are meaningful. However, it is important to identify the key elements of the DPRK’s fragility at a given point. A simple numerical calculation, despite its strength of methodologically sound analysis, is not sufficient for a full understanding of North Korea’s unique environment. First, there are some indices that are neither available nor significant in the case of North Korea. Among unavailable and insignificant variables are elite ethnicity, income inequality, inflation, territory affected by conflict, unemployment rate, and crime rate. For example, indicators related to North Korea’s macroeconomic perfor- mance, although they are primary indicators of a successful state, are neither available nor reliable. In addition, experts use different measurements of GDP for the study of North Korea’s economy. Besides, studies assess state stability by examining bordering states embroiled in armed conflict, which is nonexistent in the case of North Korea. Indicators such as religion, ethnicity, migration, and language are critical for the assessment of regime stability in African or Arab states but not necessarily significant for North Korea where the ethnically homogenous, ideologically indoctrinated masses are under the influence of centralized education. Second, results of the analysis can be interpreted otherwise. For example, poverty 90 Kim Jina bility, State legitimacy Herfindahl index conflict 14 ruling elite ethnic character of elite efficiency trade openness, inequalityimports of weapons, income inequality, inflation, armed forces export trade in coup, human rights, regulatory qualitypopulation density, access to sanitation, economic decline territorial conflict infant mortality, life state repression nourishment, access to expectancy, education, water/sanitation, life manufactured goods expectancy burden index, human capital care refugee, group grievance, (infant mortality rate) mortality rate, discrimination, public services, human number of regional upheaval, separatist activity rights organizations, ethnic civil/political rights, rule of law, accountability, coup event, factionalism, state, factionalized elites score, voice/accounta corruption, press freedom corruption, freedom discrimination, elite ethnicity, ideology of religious diversity political violence, rule of law, graft, ruling ideology, Economic GDP, FDI, inflation, Security GNI/per capita, GDP, Social Military expenditure, GDP/per capita, share of Conflict intensity, violence, Uneven development, Residual war, Trade openness, regulatory Ethnic diversity, Child mortality, education, Security apparatus Human development Ethnic war, history of Demographic pressure, Population density, infant Table 1. Comparative Chart Major IndicatorsPolitical CIFP Democracy, Government effectiveness, Brookings Leadership duration, Delegitimization of the Democracy score-autocracy George Mason Fund for Peace State Failure TF Report DPRK score 52nd (2007)Ð56th (2011) 15th (2008) 8(2007), 10(2001), 11(1995) 13th (2007)Ð22nd (2011) Environmental stress/Int’l Deforestation, arable Linkage Lowest index land, water resource Economic/political Security legitimacy External intervention Border states with civil Political Instability in the DPRK 91 increases the probability of rebellion and civil unrest, but it does not reveal the fact that resources are unequally distributed to a targeted group of people with different levels of significance for the regime’s stability. Studies show that unequal development and low urbanization are destabilizing factors, indicating that the rate of urbanization is low during periods of instability.15 With low urbanization rates, it becomes difficult for the government to control the dispersed population, but the low level of urbaniza- tion also means that it is hard to imagine a dissident movement spreading throughout the country. Dispersed people in North Korea, although much of the country is cut off from the food-distribution system, survive through subsistence farming in rural areas.16 International sanctions, even though imposed by the UN, do not seem to have a significant impact on the North Korean regime. Tension caused by the hostile security environment is rather exploited by the North Korean regime for increasing internal unity. The lack of economic growth can be a source of instability.17 Long- term economic crises, on the contrary, deprive citizens of resources to mobilize. Third, ideational factors are hard to quantify. For example, indicators to assess whether citizens accept their system of governance as legitimate are hard to measure. North Korea’s poor record in citizens’ political freedom and civil liberties based on Transparency International’s “Corruption Perception Index,” or Freedom House’s “Freedom of the World Report,” does not seem to match with Pyongyang citizens’ support to the leadership that is deemed to be illegitimate. Indeed, North Korea is the most fragile state in terms of legitimacy, but this is not a major conflict-inducing factor. It is more appropriate to specify factors affecting the leadership rather than to look at a broad matrix of indicators. A comprehensive matrix can provide a sweeping overview in all aspects and offer an effective way of measuring North Korea’s stability. However, these cannot be used to forecast outcomes or specific policy prescriptions. Previous studies use methodology focused on macro or long- term processes associated with structural transformation. However, given the slow change of structural variables, this approach does not adequately capture the internal dynamics of the North Korean regime. It should be noted that North Korea has long been in a state of “collapse of infrastructure/collapse of governance.” Variables such as democracy, civil/political rights, inequality, human rights abuses, and government effectiveness have been long-lasting problems that did not significantly affect the risk of instability onset. North Korea’s poor performance of delivering public goods to the North Korean people, despite its significance of indicating North Korea’s weak legitimacy and efficiency, does not seem to facilitate transition from collapse of institution to state collapse. This paper intentionally selects certain indicators based on what historically have been shown to represent measures of stability and potential sources of conflict. Given that the DPRK is a patrimonial totalitarian state,18 loss of the leadership can easily lead to system collapse and furthermore state collapse, and hence examining the power relationship between the leadership and the elites is important. This is an effort to address such concerns as 1) who exactly are the constituents of the North Korean leadership? 2) How satisfied do the ruling elites have to be?, and 3) What factors besides regime performance affect the elites’ acquiescence? 92 Kim Jina

Hypotheses This study assumes that civil society is not mature enough to mobilize and challenge the regime and stresses the role of the power elites in sustaining the North Korean regime. These are elites who have private access to Kim Jong Un’s decision-making process. Included are Members of the Politburo, Party Secretariat, Directors of Department under the Secretariat, Chief of Local Party Committees, Premier of the Cabinet, Director of each Department, Members of Central Military Committee, Members of National Defense Committee, and heads of security apparatus. The moribund economy dissociated the masses from the elite and continuously deprived them of power to resist. Potential dissidents are given a certain level of flexibility in seeking alternative ways of escaping North Korea. According to Wright Mills, power elites, on the other hand, are composed of people whose positions enable them to transcend the common environments of ordinary men and women.19 Therefore, some of the indicators that affect the masses may not be significant for the elites, and attention should thus be paid to indicators associated with psychological and social unity of the elites. This study hypothesizes that the more elites are identity-oriented, the more they show loyalty to the regime. It also hypothesizes that the more elites become interest- driven, the more the North Korean regime is fragile because it becomes important for the North Korean leadership to provide privileged benefits to rent-seeking elites. If elites are taking interest-driven approaches to the regime support, they are opportunistic and susceptible to the change of awarded benefits by the leadership. This study will examine ruling ideology, elite composition, rent-seeking behaviors and opportunity cost of choosing alternative options—factors that can affect identity and interest of the North Korean power elites.

Testing Hypothesis I: Identity Identity-oriented support to the leadership can occur when elites have shared belief, composed by people with identical memory and sense of membership. This is possible when North Korea conducts policies of ideological control and idolization of the leadership, minimizing the size of the privileged class of cohorts with personal ties.

Leadership and Ideological Bond Elites that have identical ideologies and feel sympathetic toward the national goals are more likely to unite to pursue the same ends.20 Indoctrination of ruling ideology is a mechanism through which the legitimacy of the leadership is confirmed and reconfirmed, and the process of reaffirming idolization shapes North Korean elites’ affinity for the leader. Therefore, this study will examine whether or not these key components of collective identity are protected or under threat.

Ruling Ideology The ruling ideology is a medium of class consciousness. Juche (self-reliance) ideology played a major role in uniting all sectors of the North Korean society as an organic Political Instability in the DPRK 93 whole through intense socialization. During the process of establishing a totalitarian regime, ties of personal and familial loyalty are banned, while instead “revolutionary comradeship” and “big family membership” are emphasized. By emphasizing “theory of socio-political life,”21 Kim Jong Il stressed the unity among the leader, party and the people with Suryong (supreme leader) on top of a party-state system. People are given identity as a socio-political organism, and they find their raison d’etre within the sociopolitical community that aims to give unconditional loyalty to the leadership.22 Because the core claim of Juche ideology is that it has the potential of generating a substantive system without the risk of undermining its own foundation, any change has been justified under Juche ideology.23 With the introduction of Songun (military- first) politics, the military was placed upfront.24 Although North Korea explained that Songun politics originated from Juche, weakening of the status of the working class, ambiguous role division among the party, military and the state, contention among the elites were caused after this ideological shift. North Korea introduced Shili (pragmatic) socialism.25 North Korea has a segmen- tation economy autonomously run by small-sized economic units, which created the economic system of the black market, household industry, and primitive self-suffi- ciency.26 The self-reliance-based economy is called a pragmatic economic policy, another application of Juche principles. However, this new phenomenon signifies that material incentives, not collectivist values, become significant motivation for people’s activities in North Korea where an individual’s commercial profits are highly valued. With the transition of North Korea’s ruling ideology through reinterpretation and adaptation, the ideological control that have helped unifying the mass is increasingly becoming weaker. However, this does not mean that regime maintenance is threatened because the military is the major beneficiary of Songun politics, and pragmatic economic policy allowed the military, party, and specialized organizations to engage in economic activities, which generated new rents to be sought by power elites. Nevertheless, the authority of the North Korean leadership to create and modify ruling ideology is intact, and one-man dictatorship under the pretext of Songun and Shili socialism still prevails.

Table 2. Ruling Ideology and Change of Social Values Ideology Juche Songun Pragmatic Socialism values collective identityas military might pursuit of profit an organic whole background theoretical basis to introduction of a new collapse of centralized ensure one-man rule doctrine of prioritizing economy, partial military affairs adoption of pragmatism implication creative application of reinterpretation of adaptation to a new Marxism-Leninism Juche ideology environment subject entire masses military individual center of gravity leadership leadership leadership 94 Kim Jina

Idolization The cult-like system of North Korea is another medium to ensure people’s support for the leadership. In order for the Suryong-working class relationship to continue, there are two ingredients—factors justifying its operation and a power group willing to trigger its operation.27 Therefore, North Korea has built powerful personality cults around Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il through myth-making; and it is now doing the same with Kim Jong Un, who is busy developing a personality cult of his own, imitating his grandfather Kim Il Sung by creating an image of a loveable fatherly leader, more human-like and approachable than Kim Jong Il. It should be noted that the image politics of an untested young leader relies on the myth of another persona—North Korea’s Eternal President. This means that the power succession depends on the credibility that Kim Il Sung provides, and Kim Jong Un’s capability to keep this going on matters. The problem is that personality-based leadership takes time and needs demonstration of personal achievements that match such a projected image. Kim Jong Il’s actual ruling of North Korea began when he was designated as the successor, and Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung jointly ran the system since 1974.28 Similarly, Kim Jong Un is believed to have jointly run the regime with Kim Jong Il since 2008.29 The Organization and Leadership Department convened senior members to deliver a message of Kim Jong Un’s appointment as a successor in January 2009.30 In January and February 2009, meetings to swear loyalty to Kim Jong Un were held in the Party’s Central Committee, the KPA, the Ministry of State Security, and the Ministry of Armed Forces. Kim Jong Un has been allegedly involved in personnel management since early 2009, controlling the authority over the appointment of mid-career officials and recommending high-ranking officials to Kim Jong Il.31 A direct reporting system to Kim Jong Un was established to ensure his control over the military and the security apparatus, and the role of the KWP Secretariat was strengthened to support Kim Jong Un’s participation in the state affairs. Those who were first vice directors of the Organization and Guidance Department helped Kim Jong Un control the elderly elites.32 The General Political Bureau of the KPA began propagandizing Kim Jong Un’s achievement within the army in May 200933 and began a lecture-tour to advertise Kim Jong Un’s greatness in June 200934 which targeted larger audiences in factories and companies. North Korea distributed an educational material35 and a newly com- posed song of praise “Footsteps” has been played at major events.36 Referring to him as a “party center,” North Korea indicates that Kim Jong Un himself is cementing his grip on power by relying on the party as the central tool of control just like what Kim Jong Il did.37 As Kim Jong Il was announced to be one of the “brains of the Party,” the same expression appeared when Kim Jong Un was introduced.38 Several nationwide rallies were held between January 6 and 7, which was right before Kim Jong Un’s birthday on January 8. A rally at the Chollima Steel Complex spread the words of “average age of 25” being the center of the revolution.39 It should be noted that when his rally began to take place Kim Jong Un, born in 1983, was more than coincidentally 25 years old. Since March 2009, a unique rhetoric—“sun (supreme leader) and star (new star/kwangmyungsong), luminous brains of Revolution”— began to spread out, hinting that not only Kim Jong Il but also Kim Jong Un are the “brains of revolution.” It should be noted that at the center of the idolization are power elites in the key organizations. Political Instability in the DPRK 95

Table 3. Major Events of Idolization Date Event Implication

Nov.16, 2008 Repetitive emphasis of “Fire of Steel Alluded emergence of a new era Wire” and “Average Age of 25”

Mar. 2009 Rhetoric of “Sun and Moon,”40 Introduced an heir apparent “Party Center,” “Brains of the Revolution”

Sep.16, 2009 Mass-mobilization (150-day campaign,41 Secured nationwide support for 100-day campaign)42 the power succession

Sep. 2010 3rd party representatives meeting Institutionalized succession

Up to present Official appearance Education of Kim Jong Un as a successor

Elite Composition The composition of the power elites and the magnitude of the coalition between the leadership and the elites are important factors that affect the North Korean regime’s stability. As the economy deteriorates, it becomes more important to ensure loyalty from the core elites who have potential to challenge the incumbent regime. The smaller the inner circle gets, the greater the well-being of the elites becomes, and the tighter the coalition between the leadership and the elites, the less likely it becomes that the elites will choose to seek alternative options. It is because the elites compete to show their loyalty to the leadership to secure their position within the coalition group.

Composition of the Inner Circle Elite recruitment was based on people’s ideological integrity—nationalism and loyalty— and the power elites were survivors of political purges during the process of Kim Il Sung’s power consolidation and power transition to Kim Jong Il. The regime has been buttressed by his military comrades-in-arms from Kim Il Sung’s years as guerrilla fighters. Those of the second generation are the peers of Kim Jong Il and the sons of loyal supporters of Kim Il Sung and major beneficiaries of North Korea’s socialist system. Members of the “small-unit-movement for three revolutions,” Kim Il Sung University, Party Secretariat, and Organization and Guidance Department became Kim Jong Il’s people who had shared backgrounds in education and experience. Therefore, they have vested interests in maintaining the status quo that their privilege has long depended upon. However, those of the third-generation in the 1930s and 1940s were affected by the “arduous march” which changed people’s views on the North Korean government’s legitimacy and efficiency. The natural deaths of the first-generation of the revolution, however, caused an inevitable generational change of the power elites. Currently, permanent members of the Politburo are in their 80s, except for Choi Ryong Hae, Kim Khyung Hee, and Kang Sok Ju, but candidate members of the Politburo and Secretariats, mostly working- 96 Kim Jina level elites, are in their 50s and 60s.43 Whether or not the third generation that Kim Jong Un’s succession may usher in has risen to key positions in the party and the military is still unknown, but it should be noted that the replacement of power elites by the second and third generations, less loyal to the party and less intimate is changing the leadership and the nature of the leader-elite relationship in North Korea.

Rise of the Military Elites Kim Jong Il’s choice of setting military values up front was a strategic decision for the survival of the system as it allowed convergence of interests between Kim Jong Il and the military elites who had interests in maintaining such a symbiotic relationship.44 Songun politics reduced the size of the core elites by emphasizing the role of the military and limited the number of candidates who would be the major beneficiaries. It also increased predictability of policy direction and future rewards in exchange for political loyalty to the regime. However, the downside of this power structure is that, as indicated in the recent military reshuffle, readjusting the power imbalance can create a chasm among the elites. Table 4 shows the rate of military elites who accompanied Kim Jong Il during his field instructions.

Table 4. Military Elites Who Accompanied Kim Jong Il’s Field Instructions

Year ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 ’11 ’12

(%) 50 60 50 53 53 47 40 47 40 33 33 25 33 40 53 42

Diagram 1 shows that the rate of military elites in the inner circle increases at the critical moment of power transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il and from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un, respectively.45 This was inevitable because military support was a critical component of the power consolidation of Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un. The number of military elites elected to the Supreme People’s Assembly

Diagram 1. Military Elites in the Inner Circle Political Instability in the DPRK 97 increased from 57 (9 percent) in 1990 to 101 (15 percent) in 1998, but decreased to 68 (10 percent) in 2003 when the third generation elites were not re-elected.46 This means that the political power of the young military elites was adjusted. Overall, the military elites enjoyed relatively more special benefits during the Kim Jong Il era, and hence have a high affinity for the system. Therefore, any attempt to deprive the military elites of previously enjoyed privilege can damage them too much. How the military will react when their special benefits are transferred through reshuffle is in question. However, it should also be noted that most of the military elites with signifi- cant political influence are those who got promotion in September 2010 when Kim Jong Un was named “general,” and these people are believed to be loyal to Kim Jong Un at present.47 Another unique phenomenon is increasing the centrality of networked power elites. Kim Jong Il maintained balance among elites who gradually formed closer relationships during the power transition phase. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il have retained the functional division of labor between elites in the military and the party under their leadership. However, a study based on social network theory shows that the centrality of the elites within the party and the military changed between 2007 and 2009.48 It shows that intense international pressure and increasing concerns over Kim Jong Il’s health condition increased the centrality of North Korea’s power elites. This means high level of cohesion between the power elites and the leadership, but increasing centrality also means higher competition among the elites. The recent military reshuffle may indicate that Kim Jong Un’s power consolidation is almost complete. During the power consolidation of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in the 1960s and 1980s, there were signs of promotion of the military elites who had supported the two Kims’ respective rise to the throne. However, after the power transition was almost complete, measures were taken to lessen the influence of the military. Likewise, Lee Yong Ho’s deposition may indicate that Kim Jong Un has demonstrated his confidence in exercising his power of controlling the military. However, whether or not Kim Jong Un has established a foundation based on his direct lineage is in question. It should be noted that Kim Jong Il eliminated relatives who could be his potential rivals by defining his stepmothers and their children as “side branches” since 1975. Kim Jong Un still relies primarily on patronage to secure his hold on power. The recent reorganization of power elites shows that those close to Jang Sung Taek are currently occupying key posts in the Central Party Secretary, the General Political Department, the National Security Agency, the Central Military Committee and the People’s Armed Forces.49 Whether or not JST will continue to keep a low profile should be carefully watched.50

Testing Hypothesis II: Interest Interest-driven behavior occurs in a situation where horizontal and hierarchical friction is rampant. This is possible when power elites pursue rent-seeking behaviors and bureaucratic culture is dominated by opportunism and pragmatism.

Rent-seeking Behavior Autocrats are fundamentally interested in their own survival in power, and this is done 98 Kim Jina by appeasing elite members, not just by resorting to intimidation.51 North Korea has bestowed resources upon the core elites52 who, in turn, have given loyalty to the leadership. Prospect theory can also be a useful tool to analyze North Korean elites’ consistent support to the regime: in the domain of gain, elites tend to be conservative and prefer the status quo rather than a sudden change.53 The shadow of the future, in other words expectation of regime stability, shapes the elites’ interests in supporting the regime. All these factors lead to suturing ills such as the spread of individualism, corruption, and change of bureaucratic culture and widening horizontal friction. Therefore, this study will examine elites’ rent-seeking opportunities, asset specificity, and opportunity cost of defection.

Bureaucratic Culture During the Kim Il Sung era, the monolithic system that supports the supreme leader was formed. Bureaucracy was defined as “abuse of authority to pursue personal wealth, honor, easy life, and success”54 and “an act of wielding power to repress and exploit the mass.” However, the bureaucratic culture has changed as North Korea’s core social value, with the change of the socioeconomic environment, switches from collectivism to pragmatism and individualism.55 Consequently, practices of oppor- tunism and self-protection within the regime are not an act of opprobrium but an act of rational choice.56 Failure of planned economy and the mechanism of personal connection and bribe increasingly make it prominent that leader-elite relationship is dominantly interest-driven. Hence, the rent-seeking of elites becomes the zeitgeist.

Social Deviation Social deviation increases when dissidents seek exit routes, by defecting from North Korea. Because these people are otherwise potential challengers, however, their having a chance of exodus decreases the likelihood of forming social resistance in North Korea. Social deviation of the masses is less significant than elites’ social deviation that occurs in the form of corruption and pursuit of group interests. As the economy remained stagnant, the distributive economy collapsed, and official corruption became endemic in many parts of the country.57 Private goods are provided to the power elites in the form of state-granted monopolies and access to hard currency and bribes, legitimizing their pursuit of rent-seeking behaviors.58 North Korea was given the lowest score of all rated countries in corruption in 2011.59 Transparency Interna- tional ranked North Korea 182nd out of 183 countries based on data from 17 surveys that look at factors such as bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, and embezzlement of public funds. A refugee survey shows that a large number of refugees responded that corruption and criminality is the most lucrative career path.60 Power elites are the managers of the nationalized means of production,61 monop- olizing rare resources of wealth, power and social prestige. Loyalty competition is pursued by the elites at the top of the system’s pyramid. Privileges also exist for the staffs that are middle-class elites in the distribution system. Since a growing number of economic criminals are arrested, officials choose to extort money for avoiding high cost of arresting, sentencing and incarcerating those involved in market-oriented economic activities. Therefore, underpaid officials extract bribes from the unprivileged Political Instability in the DPRK 99 placed at the bottom of this pyramid of exploitation. However, corruption acts as a safety valve for the maintenance of support as it provides elites access to economic rents. The problem is competition among the elites over the distribution of resources.

Horizontal Friction Haber argues that there is a risk associated with the distribution of economic transfers and rents to the elites because access to economic resources can be used to overthrow an authoritarian regime.62 However, it is also possible that elites are neither alienated from the state nor unwilling to defend the government as long as they can have rent- seeking opportunities. Koh pointed out that tension between the military and the state organs was caused by pursuing both Songun politics and inter-Korean economic cooperation.63 However, ironically, the KPA became the beneficiary of a decentralized/ market-oriented economic reform. It is deeply involved in business and trade based on its control over manpower, especially young laborers, possession of delivery means, and exclusive jurisdiction over “military affairs.” Parceling out state-run trading companies to key supporters in the party and the military, Kim Jong Il created stakeholders who make money in sagging economic times. In this situation, the ability of elites to hold the leader accountable for poor policy choices weakens. Kim Jong Il maintained loyalty completion among elites through managing “revolutionary fund,” in other words “loyal currency.” This is a voluntary bribe offered by the elites in the form of foreign currency fund apart from the planned quota. Kim Jong Il’s supervision and control of granting “Wak” (international export/import license and quota) was another mechanism to exercise his authority: “proposals”64 are reviewed by Kim Jong Il who gave the “policy line” handed down to the lower level, and this system sustained loyalty competition among the elites.65 The process of lobbying activity generates “rent” sought by the elites. Almost 200 companies are reportedly operated by various organs,66 and the heads of these state trading companies have their own patronage groups.67 Since the proposal for getting special licenses goes through many key organizations including the Ministry of Foreign Trade and State Security Department, politics among those with key influence on the process of economic management matters.

Table 5. Organizations Involved in International Trade68

Military& Security Background Cabinet Party Apparatus69

Collapse of the State External Room 38/39*, State Security Department; public distribution Economic Affairs Daesung General General Staff, system, introduction of Commission, Heavy Bureau, League of Reconnaissance Bureau, “new trade system,”70 Industry Commission, Socialist Working General Guard Bureau, “trade-first policy,” Light Industry Youth, 2nd Economic General Political Bureau, establishment of Commission, Physical Commission Pyongyang Defense sector-specific banks Culture and Sports State Development Command, Ministry of Guidance Committee Bank, Joint Venture People’s Armed Forces, and Investment Taepung International Commission Investment Group*

* Disappeared or merged 100 Kim Jina

The problem is that not all elites have the same weight in the ruling elite coalition and hence they compete to have access to the leadership. North Korea has such problems as fragmentation of economic management among competing rent-seeking elites. There were reports on measures to shut down local companies run by the military located especially in border areas in February 2008,71 which was intended to control the influence of the military.72 However, after Kim Jong Il’s stroke, a coalition between the military and the security services was formed. The military has reportedly controlled approximately 70 to 80 percent of foreign currency business in North Korea.73 The Kim Jong Un regime is at the juncture of external pressure that limits resources available for the elites and internal competition over the privilege of manag- ing foreign currencies. A report says that competition over rights between the Party and the Military led to high-level disagreement over the management of orchards near the Taedong River and the construction of Rajin Port.74 Orders to supervise trading companies were issued by the NDU where representatives from both the party and the military are present, but JST reportedly keeps a tight rein on the military- run trading companies.75 The party reportedly moved a department of the military that was in charge of earning foreign currency in to the cabinet.76 Recently, North Korea has made a decision to merge the Joint Venture and Investment Commission with the military-owned Taepung Group which acted as the manager of foreign investors and joint-venture companies and shut down Room 39 which managed businesses earning foreign currency through 17 overseas offices and 100 trade firms.77 These are believed to be the signs of empowering the Cabinet as Kim Jong Un attempted to loosen the grip of the military over money. If this decision was prompted by an intention to steer the privilege to individuals with greater personal connection, the elite’s rent-seeking competition will intensify.

Asset Specificity and Opportunity Cost The question is whether or not political competition among elite groups for influence in resource management will lead to factionalism and weaken the North Korean regime. Goldstone contends that factionalism occurs in autocracies that do not repress political competition either by design or incapacity.78 According to this logic, failure to coordinate complex interests among the power elites can affect North Korea’s regime stability. An awkward combination of closing the window of opportunity to make profits that cannot be evenly distributed to the stakeholders and widening gap between the beneficiaries and the rest can unleash discontent among the elites. However, North Korea has a huge bureaucracy and scarce resources, which makes elites reliance on the existing system and tendency to avoid high opportunity cost associated with seeking alternative options. Hence, discrimination between the power elites who crowd around the leadership and the rest whose relative gains are sacrificed can also be a positive factor for regime stability. North Korea’s power elites have not diversified their income-generating activities. Their rent-seeking is focused on specific activities insulated from normal market such as running an investment screening entity to build an economy outside of the state-planned economy or regulation of fishing permits and mining operations.79 This makes asset specificity prominent and protecting group interests fierce.80 Another phenomenon is increasing the opportunity cost of defection. Elites’ depen- dence on the regime has increased as they are stakeholders of the regime stability. Political Instability in the DPRK 101

Since their resource comes from guaranteeing the current system that generates their privilege and benefits they resist changing the status-quo.81 Lack of reform and openness increases predictability of the system continuity, which generates higher opportunity cost for the core elites to challenge the current regime. Extreme economic hardship, in particular, consolidates the relationship between the leadership and the elites whose interest is avoiding cost to be borne by regime change. Uncertainty about future benefits that alternative allocation of resources can bring about reduces the likelihood of replacing the leadership. The power elites may have interests in allowing this smooth leadership transition, rather than in a fundamental alteration of the current structure which can undermine their positions. Bueno de Mesquita contends that the leaders rely predominately on rewarding their relatively small number of supporters whose welfare in the coalition is much higher than that of those outside the coalition.82 He examined the relationship between the size of the winning coalition and the welfare of the incumbent’s coalition and argued that, when the winning coalition is small, the ruler and the members share a common goal of restricting the size because expansion dilutes each member’s rewards.83 With the same logic, this study examined different variables—the benefits of the elites and the amount of resource available for distribution. Figure 1 shows paradox of regime fragility in North Korea. As resources grow scarcer, the size of the privileged elites gets smaller. However, sufficiently small-sized power elites have greater privileges, higher affinity with the leadership, and therefore higher rewards. Because they have higher opportunity cost of defection, their loyalty competition gets intense and the likelihood of regime fragility decreases. However, the threshold of support and defection can change depending on the elites’ identity and interest: when elites are interest-driven, their expected return is high and can seek alternatives more easily than identity-oriented elites.

Figure1. North Korea’s Paradox84

Conclusion This paper explored answers to “Why has the North Korean regime not been crippled despite low indicators of regime legitimacy and efficiency?” and analyzed change of identity and interests of the North Korean power elites. This study ruled out the possi- 102 Kim Jina bility of a sudden change of the North Korean regime by civil movement,85 and instead focused on the variables associated with the power elites in North Korea. It presented many paradoxes in North Korea. Decrease in the amount of public goods distributed to the masses weakens legitimacy of the leadership, but larger share of private goods awarded to the elite groups increases their loyalty to the leadership, leading to regime stability in the short-term. Horizontal inequality is normally a significant predictor of civil war, leading to social unrest, instability and fragility,86 but unequal treatment increases opportunity cost of the elites and intensifies loyalty competition to secure their privileged share. Because North Korea’s bureaucratic culture is increasingly dominated by pragmatism and opportunism, power elites’ rent- seeking behavior will have path-dependency. The replacement of identity-oriented elites with interests-driven elites may not be a destabilizing factor in the short-term but can increase potential risk of regime fragility in the long-term. This paper addressed the significance of variables related to identity and interest of the power elites. Since the power elites are becoming interest-driven, the elites’ support to the Kim Jong Un regime depends on the Kim Jong Un’s ability to handle horizontal friction among the elites while retaining the mechanism of providing private goods for the benefit of the elites and increasing the opportunity cost of elites’ defection. Elites are concerned about the cost caused by his/her exclusion from the ruling elite coalition, and hence high level of predictability of the regime continuity increases the fear of paying such a cost. North Korea is sending signals that it is moving in the direction of change, another risk factor for the regime stability. Alexis de Tocqueville contended that the most dangerous time for autocracies arose when they first set out on the path to reform. How this will affect the power elites’ balance sheet will be another issue to be examined for the study of regime fragility in North Korea.

Notes

1. G. O’Donnell and P.C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 6. 2. Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2011). 3. Erica Frantz and Natasha Ezrow, The Politics of Dictatorship: Institutions and Outcomes in Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 2. 4. Gordon Tullock, Autocracy (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). 5. Lee Gi-dong, “Probability of North Korean Contingency and Scenarios,” NDU Academic Seminar Sourcebook (Seoul: National Defense University, 2009), 5. 6. Han Yong-seop, “Possibility of Regime Collapse in North Korea and Our Preparation,” NDU Kyosunonchong 11 (Seoul: NDU, 1997): 285–314; Gu Jong Seo et al., “Scenarios of Korean Unification,” Policy Study Report (Seoul: SERI, 1996). 7. Jeong Kyung-young, “North Korean Contingency and the U.S. Position,” NDU Academic Seminar Sourcebook (Seoul: National Defense University, 2009), 11Ð15. 8. Ryu Seung-kyung, “Future of North Korean Regime: Scenarios,” Policy Study Report (Seoul: LGERI, 1997); Bruce W. Bennett and Jennifer Lind, “The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements,” International Security 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 84Ð119. 9. Brzezinski’s analysis is focused on the impact of economic decentralization and political pluralism. Anthony’s Political Stability Index explored the relationship between the Political Instability in the DPRK 103

degree of fractionalization of a country’s population and political instability. The Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World examined 20 indicators and North Korea was the 15th in this study, with 3.87 in overall score. Indicators are standardized and aggregated to create individual indicator and basket scores ranging from 0 (worst) to 10 (best). Fund for Peace suggests socioeconomic indicators of instability and North Korea ranked 13th in 2005 and 22nd in 2011. Marshall and Cole’s “State Fragility Index” presents an array of measures of individual state fragilities of 162 countries, and North Korea’s fragility score was 8 in 2007, 10 in 2001, and 11 in 1995, respectively. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1989), 234; and Anthony Annett, “Social Fractionalization, Political Instability, and the Size of Government,” IMF Staff Papers 48, no. 3 (2001), http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2001/03/pdf/annett .pdf (accessed July 2, 2012); Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy, Issue 149 (July/August 2005): 56–65; and Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, “Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2008,” http://wdc.org.ua/en/node/39601. 10. CIFP reports are based on three analytical elements—authority, legitimacy and capacity— and analyze indicators of governance, economics, security, human development, demography, and environment. Carleton University, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, http://www4 .carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1402.pdf (accessed July 2, 2012). 11. In 2007 CIFP report DPRK is the 8th after Myanmar, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, Congo, Somalia and Liberia. 12. North Korea’s average index is 7.38 (out of 10) if democratic participation, economic efficiency, accountability, human rights, political stability and rule of law are considered, but North Korea scores 3.11 in Political Stability indicator. If authority, legitimacy, capacity, governance, economics, security/crime, human development, demography, environment, and gender are considered, DPRK becomes the 25th with a fragility index of 5.88 (one for the best performance to nine for the worst performance). Carleton University, “Country Ranking Table,” in Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/ app/gdp_ranking.php (accessed July 22, 2012). 13. Jack A. Goldstone et al., “Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability,” http://globalpolicy .gmu.edu/pitf/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20Final.pdf (accessed June 22, 2012). 14. State legitimacy is a measurement of state repression. 15. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004): 563Ð95. 16. “Deprive and Rule: Why does North Korea’s Dictatorship Remain so Entrenched Despite Causing such Hunger and Misery?” The Economist, September 17, 2011, http://www .economist.com/node/21529063 (accessed August 3, 2012). 17. Marcus Noland, “North Korea in Transition,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 17, no. 1 (2005): 7Ð32. 18. Han Byung-jin, “Theoretical Analysis of Regime Stability in North Korea,” Kukga Jongryak [National Strategy] 15, no. 1 (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 2009), 123; and Faleh A. Jabbar, “Totalitarianism Revisited: with a Note on Iraq,” Orient-Institute Studies 1 (2012), 2. 19. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1956), 3. 20. Barbara Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument,” a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta (September 1999), 5. 21. Kim Jong Il stressed that people have two distinct lives—corporal life and sociopolitical life. The former is given by the parents and the latter is given by Kim Il Sung. For the Completion of Kim Jong Il’s Juche Revolutionary Achievement 3 (Pyongyang: KWP Press, 1987), 91-124. 22. Kim Jong Il, Lecture, “Talk to the Senior Officials of the Central Committee of the 104 Kim Jina

Worker’s Party of Korea,” July 15, 1986, 19-24, http://www.korea-dpr.com/lib/Kim%20 Jong%20Il%20-%204/ON%20SOME%20PROBLEMS%20OF%20EDUCATION%20IN %20THE%20JUCHE%20IDEA.pdf (accessed July 2, 2011). 23. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1997), 20. 24. “In the Pursuit of Great Songun Ideology, We Will Win One Hundred Battles,” Rodong Sinmun, April 25, 2001; “Our Revolutionary Achievement Defies Defeat on the Rout of Realizing Great Songun Ideology,” Rodong Sinmun, October 5, 2002. 25. North Korea defines “shili” as an activity to produce the greatest profit out of the smallest investment. Lim Chun-il, “Principles in Establishing Business Strategy,” Kyongje Yongu no. 1 (Pyongyang: Science Encyclopedia Press, 2008): 23. 26. Seo Jae-Jean, “Economic Hardship and Regime Sustainability in North Korea,” KINU Studies Series 08-06 (2008): 28(1Ð49). 27. Lee Myung Soo, “North Korea and International Law: Theory and Practice,” The North Korean System in the Post-Cold War Era (New York, NY: Palgrave (St. Martin’s Press), 2001), 214. 28. Hwang Jang Yop, I Saw the Truth of History (Seoul: Hanwool, 1999), 224. 29. Jeong Sung Jang, “Real Power of KJU, Characteristics of the Leadership and Core Power Elites,” paper presented at JPI Policy Forum, January 27, 2012. 30. Open Radio for Korea, August 5, 2010; and Yonhap News, January 9, 2009. 31. Park Myungyu et al., KJU Regime in North Korea: Power Consolidation Process, Elite, Policy and Stability (Seoul: IPA, 2011). 32. Lee Jong-chul, “Study of Military Elite Power under Songun Politics,” Dong-A Yongu 60 (2011), 53Ð54. 33. Lee Joon-un, “Kim Jong Un Controls Military Elites,” Open Radio for Korea, June, 8, 2009. 34. Ha Tae-kyung, “Process of Succession, Analysis by Open Radio for Korea,” Jugan Chosun 2063, July 13, 2009. 35. “Notice to All Party Members, Servicepersons and People,” KCNA, December 19, 2011; and “We Are Under Respected Kim Jong Un,” KCNA, December 19, 2011. 36. Jeong Sung-jang, “The 3rd KWP Representatives Conference and Completion of Power Succession to KJU,” Sejong Nonpyong 196 (2010), 2. 37. Choe Sang-hun, “Kim Jong Il Son Cleared as Top Military Commander,” New York Times, December 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/world/asia/kim-jong-un-hailed -as-supreme-commander-of-north-koreas-military.html?pagewanted=all (accessed January 2, 2012). 38. Similar rhetoric can be found in “Chulima (swift horse)! Dominate the century” (December 26, 2008), “Moving forward undauntedly with the fire of steel wire” (December 30, 2008), “Horn for advance echoes to the hearts of ten million people” (1.12, 2009). 39. “Fire of Steel Wire,” Rodong Shinmun, November 6, 2008. 40. “We Knocked on the Door of Kangsungdaekuk,” Rodong Shinmun, April 7, 2009. 41. “Our Proud Achievement of Making a Turing Point for Kangsungdaekuk (Strong and Prosperous Nation),” KCNA, September 25, 2009. 42. “Chosun Marches in 100-Day Battle,” KCNA October 2, 2009. 43. Park Hyung-joong, “Beginning of KJU Ruling Coalition,” KINU Online Series, 12Ð18 (2012), 4. 44. Amos Perlmutter and William LeoGrande, “The Party in Uniform: Toward a Theory of Civil-Military Relations in Communist Political Systems,” The American Political Science Review 76, no. 4 (December, 1982): 778-89. 45. The rate of military elites in the inner circle has changed: 19.8 percent on average in the 1960s, 27.7 percent in 1970, 21.4 percent in 1980, 9 percent in 1986, 13 percent in 1994, 30 percent in 1998, 28 percent in 2001, 19 percent in 2005, 29.4 percent in 2008 and 30 Political Instability in the DPRK 105

percent in 2009. 46. At the 12th SPA, about 46 percent of the members were replaced, but members with mili- tary background are believed to have held their positions. Jeon Hyun Joon, “Analysis of the 12th SPA Election Result,” Tongiljongsaebunseok (2009), 4. 47. Those with at least three positions in the CMC, NDC, and Politburo are Kim Yong Chun, Kim Won Hong, Kim Jong Gak, Lee Myung Soo, Jang Sung Taek, Choi Ryong Hae and Hyun Chul Hae. Meanwhile, Choi Ryong Hae, Hyun Young Chul, Choi Bu Il, Jang Sung Taek, Park Do Chun, Kim Young Chul and Kim Kyung Ok were named “General” with KJU. Most of them are active in public appearance, but the only exceptions are Kim Kyung Ok who is relatively low-key and Lee Yong Ho who was replaced by Hyun Young Chul in July 2012. 48. Lee Jong-hyun, “Analysis of North Korean Power Elites’ Social Network” KANKS Summer Academic Seminar Sourcebook (2009): 175Ð202. 49. These people include Choi Ryong Hae, Kim Won Hong, Ri Myong Su and Kim Jeong Gak. 50. Cho Han-bum, “Kim Jon Un Regime: Reorganization of Power and Diagnosis of Crisis Factors,” KINU Online Series 12–23 (2012): 4 (1–9). 51. Gordon Tullock, Social Dilemma: of Autocracy, Revolution, Coup d’Etat, and War 8 (Indianapolis, IND: Liberty Fund, 2005), 48Ð62. 52. Keith Faulks, Political Sociology: A Critical Introduction (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2000), 40. 53. Rose McDermott, Risk-taking in International Politics (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998). 54. Dictionary of Politics (Pyongyang: Social Science Press, 1973), 191Ð92 55. Park Sang-ik, “Bureaucratic Culture in Songun Era,” KANKS 13, no. 1 (Seoul: KANKS, 2008): 1Ð33. 56. North Korean Dictionary describes corruption as an act of anti-Proletariat, repressive, exploitation committed by bureaucrats in Capitalism. Chosun Language Dictionary 1 (Pyongyang: Social Science Press, 1992), 512. 57. Seo Jae-jean, Changes of North Korean Regime after 7.1 Economic Reform: Changes from the Bottom and Reform to Market-Socialism (Seoul: KINU, 2004), 106Ð07. 58. Han Byung-jin, “Types of Elites’ Rent-seeking Behavior and the future of Regime,” International Area Studies 15, no. 4 (2006): 3; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, “Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders,” British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 4 (2002): 559Ð90. 59. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2011,” Transparency International, http://www.transparency .hu/Corruption_Perceptions_Index_2011_-_Press_Release (accessed July 30, 2012). 60. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Economic Crime and Punishment in North Korea,” EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper, no. 5 (2011): 2. 61. Ralf Miliband, Class Power and State Power (New York: Verso, 1983), 161Ð62. 62. Stephen Haber, “Authoritarian Government” in Handbook of Political Economy, eds. B. R. Weingast and D. Wittman (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 693Ð707. 63. Koh Jae-hong, “Prospect of North Korean Crisis and Our Preparation,” Strategic Studies, no. 47 (2009): 7Ð36. 64. Choi Joo-hwal, “Military’s involvement in currency control ,and its impact on the war- fighting capacity,” North Korea Research & Study 2, no. 2 (Seoul: Institute of Unification Policy, 1999), 27Ð28. 65. Lim Kang-taeg et al., “Study of the Status of North Korea’s Official Economy for Estimation of Unification Costs/Benefits,” KINU Research Abstract 11Ð03 (2011), 2Ð3. 66. This number may not be correct because trading companies often change their names to avoid sanction-related regulations. “North Korean Trading Companies Totaling 200,” Asia Today, August 17, 2011. 106 Kim Jina

67. Choi Joo-hwal, “Military’s involvement in currency control, and its impact on the war- fighting capacity,” North Korea Research & Study 2, no. 2 (Seoul: Institute of Unification Policy, 1999): 27Ð28. 68. Kim Kwang-jin, “Change in North Korea’s Currency Exchange Control,” dissertation, Graduate School of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University, February 2008. 69. KPA-affiliated state trading companies include Kangsung General Co. (General Staff); Birobong Trading Co.(Reconnaissance Bureau); Chungunsan Trading Co.(General Guard Bureau); Baekro Trading Co.(General Political Bureau); Baekyang Trading Co (Pyongyang Defense Command); Maebong General Co.(Ministry of People’s Armed Forces). 70. Park Hyung-joong, “Commercial Activities by the Government in the 1990s and Expansion of Market Economy,” Tongiljongchaekyongu 20, no. 1 (Seoul: KINU, 2011): 220. 71. Lee Joon-un, “Park Nam Gi’s Deposition, Caused by Power Struggle with the Military,” Open Radio for Korea, February 8, 2010. 72. Due to increasing tension over the nuclear program coupled with the failed negotiation with the World Bank, North Korea slowed economic reform and instead initiated a campaign against “anti-socialist element” led by North Korea’s security service. Consequently, the military-run foreign currency trading companies, regardless of the size, were under inspection. 73. Shin Chang-ho, “KJU, Withdrawing Economic Privileges from the Military,” Kookmin Ilbo, July 19, 2012. 74. Ahn Ui-gun, “I Prefer Making Profits, Various Competition over Privileges among Elites,” Joongang Media Network, May 3, 2012. 75. Joongang Ilbo, July 5, 2010. 76. “Civil-Military Struggle over Money Called for LYH’s Deposition,” Joongang Ilbo, July 18, 2012. 77. Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard, “Good Governance or Competing for Rents? The closure of the Taepung Group,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 10, 2012, http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=7084 (accessed August 16, 2012). 78. Jack A. Goldstone et al., “A Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1Ð4, 2005, 17. 79. Park Hyung-joong, “Is the KJU Regime Ready for Reform?” KINU Online Series 12Ð21 (2012): 3. 80. Asset specificity refers an investment that is so specialized and unique. On the other hand, if an investment will be likely to have equal returns across a variety of different settings, it is a highly asset-unspecific investment. 81. Kim Seung-chul, Lifestyle and Last Hope of North Koreans (Seoul: Jaryowon, 2000), 314Ð15. 82. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith, “Leader Survival, Revolutions and the Nature of Government Finance,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 4 (October 2010): 938 (936Ð50). 83. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., “Political Institutions,” 576. 84. This figure is modified from Bueno de Mesquita’s Figure of “Welfare of the incumbent’s coalition as a function of winning coalition size.” Ibid., 576. 85. Mark N. Hagonpian, The Phenomenon of Revolution (New York, NY: Company, 1974), 1 and 76Ð78. 86. Ted Robert Gurr and Will Moore, “Ethnopolitical Rebellion: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the 1980s with Risk Assessment for the 1990s,” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 1079. Political Instability in the DPRK 107

Notes on Contributor

Kim Jina is an Associate Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, and holds a Ph.D in International Relations from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Her research area includes U.S.-North Korea relations and the North Korean nuclear crisis. She has taught seminars on nuclear proliferation and terrorism at Tufts University and worked for the Korean National Assembly, UNESCO, and BBC. Her recent publications include “The Strategic Environment of the Korean Unification,” “The Kim Jong Un Regime and Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations,” “ROK-U.S. Cooperation in Deterring North Korea’s Military Threat,” and “Prospects and Limitations of Establishing a Security Regime in the Asia-Pacific.”