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Aristotelian Causal Pluralism and Mental Causation

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Aristotelian Causal Pluralism and Mental Causation Running Head: ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL PLURALISM & MENTAL CAUSATION Aristotelian Causal Pluralism and Mental Causation Marc William Cole Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The University of Leeds School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science March 2019 ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL PLURALISM & MENTAL CAUSATION ii The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others. This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. The right of Marc William Cole to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by Marc William Cole in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL PLURALISM & MENTAL CAUSATION iii Acknowledgements There are so many people to thank! I would like to start by thanking my wife Oksana and my children--Calvin, Svyatoslav, and Tadeusz. You all were critical in supporting me through this time. Indeed, I couldn't have done it without you. To my supervisors, Heather Logue and Jamie Dow. Thank you for all you did to help me bring my idea to fruition, for all the meetings, for all the discussions. I would also like to thank Helen Steward and Anna Marmodoro for examining my thesis. Thank you for all your helpful and thoughtful comments about my project! It was an honor to work with you. To all my philosophy friends at the University of Leeds and beyond. Your friendship and support helped sustain me through dark times. Thank you, as well, for the countless philosophical discussions! I would also like to thank the St Barnabas Society for stepping in and helping us at a critical juncture. Thank you to my employer for all the support and understanding as I worked full time and finished my dissertation. To Morgan with love. J. M. J. ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL PLURALISM & MENTAL CAUSATION iv Abstract In my thesis, I argue that Aristotle's causal pluralism in conjunction with his hylomorphic account of mental states solves the exclusion problems for mental causation. The exclusion problems are the result of a causal tension between the principle of Causal Closure (the thesis that caused physical events have sufficient physical causes) and the principle of Anti-reductionism (the thesis that mental properties and physical properties are distinct). The first exclusion problem is that Causal Closure excludes any non-physical causal influences on physical effects. The second exclusion problem shows that if one also holds any version of supervenience theory between mental and physical properties, mental states cannot cause other mental states. Denying either Causal Closure or Anti-reductionism would help to solve the problem. Many consider Causal Closure in a stronger position than Anti-reductionism. However, I argue that there is good reason to deny Causal Closure and retain Anti- reductionism. This is only the first step. This just means that other, non-physical causes can influence the physical domain. But it says nothing about what these causes are or how they are related to their effects and perhaps other causes. I suggest that a way forward is through causal pluralism, but, after putting forward a version of causal pluralism, I show it is still unclear how causes are related to other causes; in particular, how a mental cause is related to its underlying neural state. I argue that Aristotle's hylomorphism helps with understanding how a mental cause is related to its underlying base, and his causal pluralism helps with how to understand a plurality of causes in mental causation. Aristotle's metaphysics of causation show how each of the causes are related to one another and how they are related to their effects. These insights are applied to mental causation and the exclusion problems. ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL PLURALISM & MENTAL CAUSATION v Table of Contents Introduction: Thesis, Context, and Project Outline ____________________________ 1 Chapter 1: The Exclusion Problems for Mental Causation _______________________ 4 1.1 The Problem of Mental-to-Physical Causation _________________________________ 4 1.2 The Problem of Mental-to-Mental Causation __________________________________ 7 1.3 Probing the Principles ___________________________________________________ 10 1.3.1 Anti-reductionism and Causal Exclusion _________________________________________ 10 1.3.2 Causal Closure _____________________________________________________________ 12 Chapter 2: A Solution to the Exclusion Problem: Deny Causal Closure, Embrace Causal Pluralism _____________________________________________________________ 18 2.1 Causal Closure is Under-Motivated _________________________________________ 18 2.1.1 Causal Closure at the level of Physics ___________________________________________ 18 2.1.2 Causal Closure in the Special Sciences __________________________________________ 27 2.2 A Causal Pluralist Alternative _____________________________________________ 30 2.2.1 Causal Pluralism in Broad Outline ______________________________________________ 30 2.2.2 Causal Pluralism and Causal Closure ____________________________________________ 34 2.2.3 Causal pluralism and Causal Exclusion __________________________________________ 36 2.2.4 Rationalising vs. Triggering Causes _____________________________________________ 38 2.3 Lingering Worries _______________________________________________________ 39 2.3.1 How Are the Rationalizing and Triggering Causes Related to Each Other? ______________ 40 2.3.2 Why Don't These Two Kinds of Causes Compete for Sufficiency? _____________________ 44 2.3.3 Jaworski's Neutrality on Causal Closure _________________________________________ 47 2.4 Summing Up and Some Questions for Jaworski _______________________________ 49 Chapter 3: Aristotle’s causal pluralism _____________________________________ 51 3.1 The Relation between Explanation and Causation on Aristotle’s View ____________ 51 3.2 Aristotle’s Four Causes ___________________________________________________ 57 3.2.1 The Material Cause _________________________________________________________ 58 3.2.2 The Formal Cause __________________________________________________________ 60 3.2.3 The Efficient Cause _________________________________________________________ 66 3.2.4 The Final Cause--The "End" of the "Matter" _____________________________________ 69 3.2.5 The four causes at work in explaining change ____________________________________ 70 3.2.5.1 Material Cause in Change ________________________________________________ 71 ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL PLURALISM & MENTAL CAUSATION vi 3.2.5.2 Formal Cause in Change __________________________________________________ 72 3.2.5.3 The Efficient Cause in Change _____________________________________________ 74 3.2.5.4 The Final Cause in Change ________________________________________________ 76 3.2.6 Taking Stock, and Some Loose Ends ____________________________________________ 77 3.3 Why the Four Causes do not Compete _____________________________________ 79 3.4 How Matter and Form are Related ________________________________________ 83 Chapter 4: How Aristotle’s Causal Pluralism Solves the Exclusion Problems for Mental Causation ____________________________________________________________ 89 4.1 Aristotle's Four Causes and Mental Causation _______________________________ 90 4.1.1 Aristotle’s Account of Psychological States _______________________________________ 90 4.1.2 The Four Causes at Work in a Case of Mental Causation ____________________________ 99 4.1.2.1. Mental causation without deliberation ____________________________________ 100 4.1.2.2 Mental causation with deliberation _______________________________________ 103 4.1.2.3 Some Further Thoughts on Aristotle and Desire in Action ______________________ 112 4.1.2.4 Mental-to-Mental Causation _____________________________________________ 113 4.1.3 Why the Causes Do Not Compete in Cases of Mental Causation _____________________ 114 4.1.3.1 Why the Causes are not in Competition for Mental-to-Mental Causation __________ 124 4.1.4 How Form and Matter are Related in the Case of Mental States _____________________ 124 4.2 Mapping Jaworski's Rationalizing and Triggering Causes into the Aristotelian Framework _____________________________________________________________ 136 4.2.1 Placement of the Rationalizing Cause in Aristotle's Metaphysics _____________________ 137 4.2.2 Placement of the Triggering Cause in Aristotle's Framework ________________________ 143 4.2.3 How the Rationalizing and Triggering Causes are Related, and Why They Are Not in Competition __________________________________________________________________ 144 Chapter 5: Conclusion _________________________________________________ 148 References __________________________________________________________ 153 ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL PLURALISM & MENTAL CAUSATION 1 Introduction: Thesis, Context, and Project Outline The thesis of this project is that Aristotle's causal pluralism, including his hylomorphic account of mental states, solves the exclusion problems for mental causation and offers an account of how mental properties are related to their neural bases and their subsequent effects. The context of this project takes its cue from the exclusion problems for mental causation, especially as formulated by Jaegwon Kim. The exclusion problems demonstrate the problems for "finding a place" for mental properties to be causally efficacious in the
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