Dangerous Prisoners: Confining the Convention Army In

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Dangerous prisoners: Confining the Convention Army in

American space during the American Revolution

Sean C. Halverson

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Mississippi State University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy in History in the Department of History

Mississippi State, Mississippi

May 2013

Sean C. Halverson

2013

Dangerous prisoners: Confining the Convention Army in

American space during the American Revolution

Sean C. Halverson

Approved:

William Anthony Hay Julia Osman Associate Professor of History Assistant Professor of History (Dissertation Director) (Committee Member)

Mark D. Hersey M. Kathryn Barbier Associate Professor of History Associate Professor of History (Committee Member) (Committee Member)

Peter C. Messer R. Gregory Dunaway Associate Professor of History Professor and Interim Dean (Graduate Coordinator) College of Arts & Sciences

Name: Sean C. Halverson

Date of Degree: May 11, 2013

Institution: Mississippi State University

Major Field: History

Major Professor: William Anthony Hay

Title of Study Dangerous prisoners: Confining the Convention Army in American space during the American Revolution

Pages in Study: 295

Candidate for Degree of Doctorate of Philosophy

This dissertation argues that American revolutionaries used America’s geographic space to defeat, secure, supply, and neutralize the Convention Army during the American

Revolution, which contributed to their victory over the British after the Continental

Congress repudiated the Convention of Saratoga in January of 1778. The study traces how the Americans used space as a means to first defeat and then control a dangerous army of prisoners. American forces first strategically used America’s space to capture

Lieutenant General John Burgoyne’s army by systematically retreating to avoid a decisive battle. Following the Convention Army’s capture, the Continental Army marched the captives from New York to Massachusetts where space temporarily became the central problem because the Americans lacked the capacity, housing, and provisions to secure their first captive army. Thus the prisoners became a threatening nuisance. The

Continental Congress turned to America’s space as a strategic means by placing the

Convention Army under congressional authority and ordered the captives moved from

Massachusetts to Virginia.

The Revolutionaries under General George Washington’s supervision took advantage of America’s geographic space by covertly moving the Convention Army to contain and supply it far from their adversary. Subsequently, they made use of America’s space as an asset to control the prisoners in the rural Virginian countryside at Camp

Albemarle, a great distance from the British and heavily populated areas. During the war’s later years, Congress and state governments relied on America’s space to secure large numbers of the prisoners to hold potential reinforcements from the British by dispersing them to makeshift encampments across the countryside. The Convention

Army’s defeat and detention suggests America’s space contributed to shaping the conflict and its outcome in the Revolutionaries’ favor by undermining a superior invader. The

American revolutionaries’ use of space allowed them to more securely hold large numbers of prisoners and decreased the British army’s capacity to wage war in America.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my mother, Laurie Jensen and grandparents Bill and Carol

Farmakes, for their constant support during this unexpected journey of twists and turns.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Completing a dissertation requires emotional support and assistance from many persons both personally and professionally. Many people in and outside of academy supported my efforts during this process. In professional terms, it is important to note that this dissertation would have never seen the light of day without the Mississippi State

University Department of History’s assistance and acceptance of my application. I am indebted to my dissertation committee for their time and assistance. Dr. William Hay agreed to chair my dissertation and oversaw the project from its conception. His comments and insights kept the project focused and allowed me to develop my own ideas. Additionally, I would have never completed this dissertation without Dr. Julia

Osman’s observations. She agreed to join the committee shortly after she arrived at MSU and our meetings contributed to shaping my ideas on the conception of space and how it relates to prisoners of war. In addition, Dr. Ridner pointed me in directions I had not considered and offered me valuable suggestions during our discussions. I also wish to thank Dr. Mark Hersey for his support during the tail end of the dissertation process.

And I wish to thank Dr. Mary Kathryn Barbier for agreeing to sit on the committee after I had taken up enough of her time in classes.

Others provided valuable suggestions as I developed and refocused the dissertation. Dr. Robert Olwell first brought the Convention Army to my attention and

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the need for historians to produce more secondary literature in the field of prisoners of war, and subsequent conversations informed this work. Dr. Gerald Chauldron graciously read the manuscript and offered helpful suggestions. I will always be grateful for his discussions concerning how historians should approach the treacherous and slippery slopes of academic writing.

This dissertation also required me to travel to unique places and work with archivists throughout the country. Their efforts proved helpful for me to compile resources and materials. I wish to specifically thank the staff’s at the Albemarle County

Historical Society, the University of Michigan’s William L. Clements Library, and New

York Historical Society in New York City in particular for their expertise to make available and move British and American resource materials. This made my research days more fruitful and less stressful. I will never forget my experiences in Central Park and other areas of New York City while researching at the society. Closer to home,

Patsy, Lonna, and Pam of the MSU History Department office all kindly assisted me with administrative matters. Moreover, the mircrofilm reference librarians and library liaisons at the Mitchell Memorial Library provided me with assistance. Christine Fletcher,

Pamela Beaty, Lee Dempsey, David Nolen, and Tessa Graham all assisted me in finding library materials and using resources. Furthermore, I wish to thank Stephanie Agnew for her assistance and Mattie Abraham for allowing me to work in the MSU Special

Collections during the tail end of my graduate career.

My fellow graduate students, Erinn, Whitney, Michael, Karen, Cari, Alyssa, Cliff,

Justin, Nathan Drake, Zach, and Nathan Horn, provided much needed support, assistance, and genuine friendship. My grandfather the late Dr. Raymond E. Halverson passed away

shortly before the project’s completion, but I know he would have approved of the end result. No words can describe the support I received from my mother, Laurie Jensen and grandparents, Bill and Carl Farmakes. Over the past two years, all I had to offer in return was endless troubles. I could not have completed graduate school at Mississippi State

University, nor this dissertation without their devoted support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

LIST OF FIGURES ...... vii

ABBREVIATIONS ...... viii

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

II. AMERICAN SPACE AND THE CONVENTION ARMY’S CAMPAIGN TO END A REVOLUTION ...... 26

III. SPACE SHORTAGES: HOUSING, PROVISIONS, VIOLENCE, AND SECURITY IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1777-1778 ...... 75

IV. AMERICA’S SPACE: CONGRESS AND CONVENTION ARMY PRISONERS ...... 130

V. SPACE AND MOVING THE CONVENTION ARMY FROM MASSACHUSETTS TO VIRGINIA ...... 162

VI. SECURING CONVENTION ARMY PRISONERS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT: SPACE AND CAMP ALBEMARLE, 1779-1781 ...... 199

VII. SPACE & DISPERSING PRISONERS: CONCLUSION, 1781-1783 ...... 241

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 274

APPENDIX

A. CONVENTION OF SARATOGA ...... 293

LIST OF FIGURES

1. Camp Albemarle 534...... 239

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ABBREVIATIONS

Carleton Papers British Headquarters: Sir Guy Carleton Papers, 1777-1783

Clinton Papers Sir Henry Clinton Papers

CAR Correspondence of the American Revolution

DAR, 1770-1783 Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series)

Gates Papers The Papers of Horatio Gates

German Papers Lord George Sackville Germain Papers

“Heath Papers,” CMHS “The Heath Papers,” Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society Seventh Series

HMC Historical Manuscripts Commission: Report on American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution of Great Britain

JCC Journals of the Continental Congress

LDC Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789

LMCC Letters of Members of the Continental Congress

PHE The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803

PCC The Papers of the Continental Congress

PGNG The Papers of General Nathanael Greene

PGW The Papers of George Washington

TJP The Papers of Thomas Jefferson

viii

WGW The Writings of George Washington

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General George Washington wrote on October 19, 1777, that the defeat of British

Lieutenant General John Burgoyne’s force near Saratoga, New York, “is a most important event” and “with one more fortunate stroke I think we shall have no great cause for anxiety respecting the future designs of Britain.”1 The defeat and capture of

Burgoyne’s 6,300 soldiers affected the outcome of the American Revolution (1775-

1783). Burgoyne’s force became known as the Convention Army after Burgoyne and

Major General Horatio Gates agreed to the Convention of Saratoga. In the convention, the two generals pledged that the defeated British army would march to Boston and embark for Britain in exchange for never returning to America during the conflict.2 A few days after signing the convention, Burgoyne expressed his pleasure with the treaty because it saved his army to fight against American forces again by keeping “from Mr.

1 Please note throughout this dissertation that the spelling and capitalizations quoted from primary sources have been modernized to make words more readable for readers without changing their authors’ meanings and ideas. George Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, October 19, 1777, The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series 20 Volumes, George Washington, W.W. Abbot, et al. eds. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985-2010), XI: 558 (hereafter cited as PGW).

2 Articles of Convention between Lieutenant General Burgoyne and Major General Gates, in The Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, John Burgoyne, ed. E.B. O’Callaghan, M.D., (Albany, N.Y: J. Munsell, 1860), 145 & 153.

Washington a force that might have decided the fate of the war.”3 The Continental

Congress recognized the potential of Burgoyne’s army and a few months later blocked its embarkation from Boston until the British government recognized Congress’s powers as a sovereign government. Congress then held Burgoyne’s army to deprive the British of reinforcements that would have influenced the war’s outcome.

The detention of Burgoyne’s army reduced British capacity to wage war. In the summer of 1777, Piers Mackesy has found that the British army included approximately

24,000 effective British infantry and cavalry troops in North America. An additional

4,000 Provincial rank-in-file soldiers and an estimated 18,000 German troops served with the British army throughout North America.4 Thus the defeat of Burgoyne’s army of

6,300 was a large number of troops for the British army to lose.5 Following Saratoga,

Congress and the Continental Army would use America’s geographical space as a strategic means to contain and withhold the prisoners from the British until the war’s conclusion.

The defeated army presented a security problem Congress and local assemblies found difficult to manage. Congress, the Continental Army, and local assemblies responsible for the captives’ care had to contain the captive army. Burgoyne planned for

3Lieutenant General John Burgoyne to Sir Henry Clinton, October 25, 1777, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (hereafter cited as Clements Library, Clinton Papers); for Clinton’s satisfaction with the convention, see Clinton to Burgoyne, December 16, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

4 Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783 revised edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 524-525; for the German numbers, see Jeremy Black, War for America: The Fight for Independence, 1775-1783 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 28.

5 Burgoyne’s army included at least 1,100 Canadians and Provincial troops who surrendered with the British and German soldiers at Saratoga, see The Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, Burgoyne, ed. O’Callaghan, M.D., 153. 2

his invasion army to receive assistance from General Sir William Howe and Colonel

Barrimore St. Leger’s forces in New York and together capture several American strategic strongholds in the Hudson River Valley, including Albany, along the Hudson

River and thereby defeat American forces in New England to bring the war to a conclusion.6 Congress and senior officers leading the Continental Army recognized that the British would either redeploy Burgoyne’s army or use it to release other troops for service in America. Thus American forces’ victory at Saratoga would be diminished if the Continental Army and state militias could contain the majority of Burgoyne’s army.

The Convention Army captives for the Americans became an immediate security threat and dangerous prisoners of war. The army’s capture proved troublesome for

Congress and the Continental Army because they lacked the capacity and resources to confine an army of prisoners. American forces also had never captured an entire British army before Saratoga, and Congress and state governments had no arrangements in place to control large numbers of prisoners. Additionally, the Convention prisoners’ sheer numbers made them a threat since they had the potential to revolt as an army and replenish British ranks. Furthermore, British forces had the potential to rescue the captives.

For six years, Convention prisoners challenged American revolutionaries’ capacity to control and provide for them. For Congress and its Continental Army, defining a prisoner of war also proved troublesome because they never prepared to incarcerate enemy captives before the war began in 1775. By the winter of 1781, six

6 Burgoyne to Lord George Germain, February 28, 1777, “Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada,” Documents of the American Revolution 1770-1783 (Colonial Office Series) 21 Volumes ed. KG. Davies (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1972), XII: 41-46 (hereafter cited as DAR, 1770-1783). 3

years into the conflict, Washington defined enemy prisoners as “all the persons taken in arms” that could be exchanged for any Continental Army soldiers and militiamen confined by the British. 7 Nevertheless, the American revolutionaries would rely on

America’s space to decrease the British capacity to wage war in America by moving and dispersing the captives.

America’s geographical space provided American revolutionaries more possibilities to control and secure the dangerous Convention Army prisoners by moving them across America. America’s vast terrain proved advantageous for American forces because the British lacked the troops and resources necessary to hold territory and move a considerable distance from their strongholds to rescue Convention captives without endangering their security. Space evolved into conceptual a framework in terms of geographical size, territory, security, housing, provision resources, impeding and facilitating movement, distance, community, and the dispersion of captives, which enabled Congress and Continental Army to defeat and contain Convention Army prisoners as an army. Space allowed American forces chances to hold from the British thousands of potential soldiers. In addition, America’s geographic space provided

Congress and the Continental Army with multiple locations to secure Convention Army prisoners in rural environments and far from heavily populated communities. To compensate for their limitations, the Revolutionaries relied on the countryside as a barrier

7 Washington to Abraham Skinner, February 17, 1781, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799 39 Volumes, George Washington, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931-1944), XXI: 237 (hereafter cited as WGW); for Congress defining naval captives as “all persons taken in arms on board any prize, be deemed prisoners,” see United States, Continental Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1775-1789, 34 Volumes (Washington D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904-1937), IV: 370 (hereafter cited as JCC, 1774- 1789).

to withhold Convention Army prisoners from the British until the war’s conclusion because of its convenience and advantageous size.

The following analytical narrative traces the Convention Army’s defeat and confinement after Saratoga. It examines how American revolutionaries used space to capture and contain Convention Army prisoners. This study argues that American revolutionaries conceived and used space in multiple ways as a strategic means to capture, supply, control, secure, and neutralize the Convention Army, which deprived the

British army of troops to wage war. How American forces used space by systematically withdrawing to avoid engagements allowed them to first capture Burgoyne’s army and then more effectively control it by moving and dispersing the captives beyond British reach. At least half of the Convention prisoners escaped from the Americans before the war’s end. Nevertheless, the defeat and imprisonment of Burgoyne’s army contributed to the Revolutionaries’ victory.

This dissertation suggests American revolutionaries’ attempts to defeat and secure

Burgoyne’s army can be examined in a framework of space that was not always evident to them. It suggests that space influenced American revolutionaries’ efforts to defeat and confine the Convention Army. Congress and assemblies never developed official plans to use America’s geographic space as a strategic means against the British. Although

American forces experienced resource and troops’ shortages, they did use space to their advantage. Space for American revolutionaries became an indispensable asset since the foreign British army could not overcome it without obtaining more resources and soldiers to control territories. America’s geographic space sometimes became American forces’

central problem by impeding their efforts to secure, house, supply, and move the prisoners.

Furthermore, this dissertation examines how the American revolutionaries defeated and confined the Convention Army following Saratoga. Space here is affected by the availability of resources, communications, and the infrastructure provided by varying levels of population density. During the war, for congressional, state, and

Continental Army officials, space held several meanings because of the British army’s movements and the Convention Army’s changing needs for resources. How American forces defeated and secured Convention prisoners from the British reveals space can be defined as geographical territory, size, security, provisions, housing facilities, and the capacity to securely confine prisoners a considerable distance from British forces. Space also included the means of delaying or facilitating movement, in addition to establishing a community space to control and provide for the captives in a rural environment.

Furthermore, in the war’s later years, space included for the Revolutionaries the dispersing of captives and continuous relocation of Convention Army prisoners across the countryside to withhold them from British forces. The Convention Army’s capture and confinement reveal how American forces defeated an invading army and neutralized a threat to their independence movement.

Works in various academic disciplines define space in different ways depending upon their specific focus. The most general definitions of space emphasize landmass and territory. Recently, the New Oxford American Dictionary defined space as “a continuous area or expanse which is free, available, or unoccupied.”8 Michel Foucault, however,

8New Oxford American Dictionary, 3rd ed., s.v. “space.” 6

connected space to power, community, discipline, and controlling institutional structures.

Space involved the relationship between the environment and those individuals or groups affected by it.9 He acknowledged that “A whole history remains to be written about spaces-which would at the same time be a history of powers (both of these terms in the plural)-from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat, institutional architecture from the classroom to the design of hospitals, passing via economic and political installations.” For Foucault, space related to methods of power and the ideas of control, which authorities constructed around them.10 Building off these assumptions, in this study, space relates to how American revolutionaries struggled to maintain a balance between their environment and caring for the Convention Army, while attempting to please locals in the communities where they confined the captives.

Many cultural geographers have also extensively examined space in connection to place and landscape.11 It is important to briefly distinguish how geographers have

9 Michel Foucault, Foucault Live (Interviews, 1961-1984), ed. Sylvere Lotringer. trans. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnson (New York: Semiotext (e), 1996), 345; for a brief discussion on Foucault ideas about space, see Nigel Thrift “Overcome by Space: Reworking Foucault,” in Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography, eds. Jeremy W. Crampton, and Stuart Elden, (Farnham Surrey and Burlington VA: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007), 55.

10 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1997, ed. and trans. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 149.

11 Cultural geographers have produced a large literature that discusses space in many areas and ways which cross over to conceptions of place, landscape, spatial theory, politics, globalization, economics, the body, medicine, identity, art, and race. For a good overview discussing the different approaches cultural geographers have taken to examine place, see Paul C. Adams, Steven Hoelscher, and Karen E. Till, eds. Textures of Place: Exploring Humanist Geographies (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), xiii-xxviii; for a classic study that examines how space and place converge together in various conceptual frames, see Yi-Fu Tuan, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1977); for a collection of essays that discusses how various communities created their own landscapes in multiple ways through their traditions and local needs, see John Brinckerhoff. Jackson, Discovering the Vernacular Landscape (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), for work that examines how people have collectively influenced their urban and rural spaces within a conceptual framework of nature, see William Cronon, Natures Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West first ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991). 7

generally differentiated between space and place. They have long accepted that space can be in various forms undefined, abstract, and potentially unlimited. Geographers have also long acknowledged that place is a distinct location or area with established boundaries that persons can recognize and build upon and change. As the geographer

Tim Cresswell wrote “the most straightforward and common definition of place” is “a meaningful location.”12 It is important to recognize that space can become place as societies change and a location is redeveloped and organized for specific purposes. In

1977, Geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, for instance, wrote that ‘Space is more abstract than place,’ but “What begins as undifferentiated space becomes place as we get to know it better and endow it with value.”13 Space and place shared a connection in British colonial and revolutionary America because settlers expanded into new territorial space, and in the process extended their power across the continent by controlling places and establishing communities. Both Congress and American forces contributed to this pattern by repeatedly moving Convention Army captives and allowing them to carve out their own place, such as the captives’ construction of Camp Albemarle, in Charlottesville,

Virginia.

12 Tim Cresswell, Place: A Short Introduction (Malden MA and Oxford UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 7; in the eighteenth century British world geography was in general defined as way to obtain knowledge of the world. The historian Robert Mayhew wrote that geography “was defined as a scale of enquiry” and “the discussion of the whole globe” and “all the nations of the world,” see Robert J. Mayhew, “Geography Books and the Character of Georgian Politics,” in Miles Ogborn and Charles W.J. Withers, eds. Georgian Geographies: Essays on Space, Place, and Landscape in the Eighteenth Century (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2004), 196; for an overview on how historians of British colonial America have recently connected space with place in their histories, see Karen Halttunen, “Grounded Histories: Land and Landscape in Early America,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 68, no. 4 (2011): 513-532.

13 Tuan, Space and Place, 6; for an extensive discussion about social space and its construction and meanings, see Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford UK and Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1991).

Space is an ambiguous term historians of the American Revolution and British colonies have used to explain power and European territorial expansion across North

America’s surface. John Parameter has written that studies focusing on the North

American colonies have broadly defined space in an imperial context “as a surface: mere territory to be traversed, mapped, conquered, and integrated by Europeans into various systems of imperial governance.”14 Paul Mapp has written about European empires’ attempts to have power over North America’s western territorial space during the eighteenth century. He concluded that Europeans sought to control territory in spite of their uncertainly about what western territories held. However, European governments’ interest in the region remained in large part because “it might hold something capable of contributing to imperial wealth and state power.”15 In comparison, for the American revolutionaries moving the captives across America’s geographic space provided them opportunities to gain new resources and control the prisoners. Stephen J. Hornsby also analyzed space in the context of power and argued that British America was divided into a British Atlantic, American Frontier, and an “intermediate space” of “continental staples and port towns along the eastern seaboard” that connected “the continental interior and the world of Atlantic trade.” Hornsby concluded that “geographical configurations of power” shaped these three spaces and their expansion “led to friction and conflict, and,

14 John Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods: Iroquoia, 1534-1701 (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2010), 276.

15 Paul W. Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest For Empire, 1713-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 432; many books discuss space in a context of empire. For a book that examines how English and Spanish conceptions of imperial space in North America influenced conflicting notions of power, expansion, exploitation, and social hierarchy, see John Elliot, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

eventually, the sundering of British America.”16 American forces also sought to control

Convention captives by moving them over America’s surface and deep into the interior far away from British forces along the eastern coast.

Other historians have written about space in connection to power and expansion in other ways. John Parmenter has examined space in relation to movement from the perspective of Amerindians and demonstrated how the Iroquoia nation expanded their political power and territory to protect their cultural ideals and identity in defense of colonial expansion during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.17 Moreover, this study suggests a connection between space and movement by discussing how American forces defeated Burgoyne’s army by withdrawing to gather reinforcements and secured many of the captives from the British following Saratoga by moving them across the countryside.

Gregory Nobles has discussed space from the perspective of English and colonial cartographers and demonstrated how their often incomplete maps of the North American frontier revealed a desire to control territorial space and determine borders. Thus mapmakers from afar shaped the political boundaries of North America because their drawn lines on maps claimed space and charted expected gains before settlers controlled it.18 The American revolutionaries would also map routes to plan strategies for moving

16 Stephen J. Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power in Early Modern British America (Lebanon NH: University Press of New England, 2005), 5-6; for a study that shows that the four largest port towns of Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Baltimore had little living space for residents, but grew nevertheless in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see Carole Shammas, “The Space Problem in Early United States Cities,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 57, no.3 (2000): 505- 542; for a work that argues city residents of Boston moved the colonies closer to independence by gaining control of the town’s urban waterfront space to increase their ranks and rally locals, see Benjamin L. Carp, Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 23-61.

17 Parmenter, The Edge of the Woods, xxvii-xlix.

18 Gregory Nobles, “Straight Lines: Mapping the Political Order of the Anglo-American Frontier,” The Journal of American History 80, no. 1 (1993): 9-35; for much more on how cartography maps in 10

the captives through America’s geographic space. These works revealed that European empires and colonists more effectively demonstrated their power by controlling space as in land.

Historians have produced many studies discussing how imperial-minded settlers defined physical and cultural space in connection to Europeans and Americans’ push into the North American interior. Richard White has examined how Amerindians and whites settlers associated space and place together by establishing a “middle ground” of cultural

“meanings” and “misunderstandings” in the Great Lakes region during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Warren Hofstra has discussed space in relation to America’s landscape and shown that colonists transformed the Shenandoah Valley countryside in

Virginia from a rural backcountry into a series of communities to settle and control a fertile region. William Cronon has studied how New England colonists permanently reshaped the region’s environmental space in their attempts to create a functional capitalist economy.19 Creating new communities and controlling space became essential for settlers’ expansion of British North America. Virginia’s government and the captives’ guards would also continue this trend by allowing the captives to establish a community at Camp Albemarle. various ways became important texts that influenced Europeans and colonial American settlers’ understanding of their space and environment, see Martin Brückner, ed. Early American Cartographies (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

19 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), x & 50-93; Warren Hofstra, The Planting of New Virginia: Settlement and Landscape in the Shenandoah Valley (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2004); William Cronon, Changes In The Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), 159-170; for another good discussion on how Puritan colonists reshaped New England’s environmental space and how the immense landmass contributed to changing expansionist minded settlers’ ideals and values in Massachusetts during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Gloria L. Main, People of a Spacious Land: Families and Cultures in Colonial New England (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).

This study also adds to the Convention Army’s historiography because no previous secondary study examines how the American revolutionaries with an inadequate administrative infrastructure managed the prisoners in a relationship to space. Most previous historians who have written about the Convention Army have told its general story and discussed the prisoners’ conditions and treatment rather than focusing on how

American forces first captured and managed the captive army. Their general narratives attempted to reveal the Convention Army prisoners’ story and confinement experiences.

However, the following studies only provided partial explanations on Convention prisoners’ defeat and confinement. Richard Sampson’s Escape in America: The British

Convention Prisoners 1777-1783 (1995) is the only book on the Convention Army and centered on British escapees. He concluded that British Convention troops eluded their captors in huge numbers to fight again and most sought their lines rather than desert and start new lives.20 In contrast, this study focuses on how American authorities managed the prisoners and examines the role space played for them to defeat and control the

Convention Army.

Previous articles on the Convention Army have also overlooked how its capture and detention benefited the Revolutionaries. Thomas Fleming, Alexander Wall, and

Charles R. Lingley summarized the Convention Army’s story in brief articles.21 Other

20 Richard Sampson, Escape in America: The British Convention Prisoners 1777-1783 (Chippenham, Witshire: Picton Publishing, 1995), 186; Sampson’s study detailed the first compiled roll of over 300 Convention Army escapees who attempted to or eluded their captors, see 194-200.

21 Alexander Wall, “The Story of the Convention Army, 1777-1783,” The New York Historical Society Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1927): 67-97; Charles Lingley, “The Treatment of Burgoyne’s Troops Under the Saratoga Convention,” Political Science Quarterly 22, no. 3 (1907): 440-459; Thomas Fleming, “Gentlemen’s Johnny’s Wondering Army,” American Heritage 24 (1972): 10-15 & 89-93; for another short article that discusses the army’s capture, see Jane Clark “The Convention Troops and the Perfidy of Sir William Howe,” American Historical Review 37, no. 4 (1932): 721-730. 12

historians have written narratives discussing only portions of the army’s confinement experiences at specific locations. Samuel F. Batchelder wrote a detailed account on the captive army’s incarceration in Massachusetts and American efforts to confine it there.

Philander D. Chase instead discussed the Convention Army’s confinement experience at

Camp Albemarle, near Charlottesville, Virginia.22 Janet Beroth also briefly recapped the army’s story to show how both sides undermined their convention treaty commitments after Saratoga. She concluded that the convention never proved advantageous for either the Americans or British because Convention Army soldiers endured a long confinement, and the American side had to address challenges managing and securing the captives with their limited resources.23 These studies have collectively revealed that Burgoyne and

Gates had not carefully conceived all of the implications their treaty would have for their respective governments.

William Dabney and George Knepper produced the only two dissertations on the

Convention Army, both published in 1954. Dabney supported no specific argument and attempted to explain the captive army’s story “more fully” than previous efforts.24

Knepper provided a more extensive narrative than previous studies. He attempted to tell

22 Samuel F. Batchelder, “Burgoyne and His Offices in Cambridge 1777-1778,” Cambridge Historical Society (Cambridge: Published by the Society, 1925) XIII: 17-80 (hereafter cited as The Cambridge Historical Society); for Chase, see Philander D. Chase, “Years of Hardships and Revelations: The Convention Army at the Albemarle Barracks, 1779-1781,” The Magazine of Albemarle County History 41 (1983): 9-53; for another article that specifically discusses the army’s incarceration and examines its general story in Virginia at Camp Albemarle, see Joan Ellet Graves, “The Virginia Sojourn of the Convention Troops,” The Magazine of Albemarle County 41 (1983): 137-148; for a very brief narrative on the Convention Army’s march through and presence in Connecticut, see Mary K. Stevens, “The Convention Troops in Connecticut,” Connecticut Quarterly, 3 (1897): 144-149.

23 Janet Beroth, “The Convention of Saratoga,” The New York Historical Society Quarterly Bulletin 8, no.3 (1927): 273 -275.

24 William Dabney, After Saratoga: The Story of the Convention Army (Albuquerque NM: The University of New Mexico Press, 1954), 3.

the army’s story and countered previous historians’ assertions that Congress was not “the sole culprit in breaking the terms of the Convention of Saratoga” since the British and other American authorities all ignored the treaty for their advantages. Ultimately, he concluded after examining the politics of exchange and story of the army that both sides undercut the convention agreements, the Americans more so, but the captives generally received better treatment than most American prisoners.25 Knepper and Dabney’s dissertations provided historians with broad overviews of the Convention Army’s experience in America.

Historians have focused their attention on British management and treatment of

American prisoners. As a result, how the Convention Army’s confinement shaped the

American Revolution has not been studied extensively by historians. Few historians have addressed British and German prisoners. This dissertation looks beyond the treatment and conditions of prisoners to analyze how the Revolutionaries managed their first army of prisoners. Previous studies in regard to prisoners captured by the British and

Americans during the American Revolution have instead focused on the following topics: treatment and conditions, policy, public memory, national identity, patriotism, confinement locations, Congress’s role managing prisoners, and naval captives’ experiences in Britain.

Previous studies that have focused on British and German prisoners have not examined American forces using space to control and secure prisoners of war. Historians of the American Revolution have instead explored British and German captives’

25 George Knepper, “The Convention Army, 1777-1783” (PhD. Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1954), ii-iii & 1-2 & 267-270.

confinement conditions and influence on shaping American identity and increasing patriotism in local communities. Daniel Krebs has examined the daily experiences of captured German soldiers and how the Americans developed their own means of captivity. Krebs only touched on the story of German Convention Army troops and their confinement experiences.26 Kenneth Miller focused on British and German prisoners’ experiences in a local context at the town of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, the American revolutionaries’ primary detention center for enemy land combatants, but only briefly discussed Convention captives. He studied how enemy prisoners in Lancaster in spite of their ethnic and political divisions contributed to strengthening locals’ national identity with their attempts to unit in arms against the British.27 John Wesley Moody and

Rembert Patrick summarized British prisoners’ management and confinement conditions.

Each author provided a single chapter overview on the Convention Army’s experience in

America. In the more recent study, Moody argued that Congress and the Continental

Army attempted to follow the eighteenth century’s assumed European rules of war and

26 Daniel Krebs,“Approaching the enemy: German captives in the American War of Independence, 1776—1783,”(PhD diss., Emory University, 2007), 3-6..For chapters that discuss captivity and prisoners’ treatment, 183-321; For his discussion on German captives of the Convention Army from Brunswick- Wolfenbüttel and Hesse-Hanau, see 331-333 & 336-352; for a study that discusses the treatment of German prisoners, see Lucy Leigh Bowie, “German Prisoners During the American Revolution,” Maryland Historical Magazine 40 (1945): 185-200.

27 Kenneth Miller,“Dangerous guests: Enemy captives and American national identity in Revolutionary, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1760-1783” (PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2006), 6- 9; for Miller’s brief discussions concerning Convention Army prisoners in Pennsylvania, see 125-126 & 137-138 & 143-145 & 154 & 160-162; Miller published another POW study that argues enemy prisoners’ presence at Lancaster influenced Americans’ patriotism and identity at the local level, see Ken Miller, “A Dangerous Set of People” British Captives and the Making of Revolutionary Identity in the Mid-Atlantic- Interior,” Journal of the Early Republic 32, no.4 (2012): 565-601; for another local study on German captives shaping locals’ war experiences in Reading, Pennsylvania, see Laura Becker,“Prisoners of War in the American Revolution: A Community Perspective,” Military Affairs 46, no. 4 (1982): 169-173.

largely avoided deliberately mistreating their British captives.28 These studies collectively revealed the various difficulties of managing large numbers of prisoners during the conflict. In addition, these studies have shown that Convention Army captives in general experienced more comfortable treatment than most of their counterparts under the British.

Historians have mostly focused on American prisoners’ treatment rather than the

Convention Army because more of them died in British prisons than Continental soldiers and militiamen combined during combat. Edwin Burrows examined American prisoners’ experiences at British headquarters in New York City. His analysis challenged the previous conclusions about prisoners’ death rates, and he concluded that the British imprisoned up to “32,000 Americans in and around Manhattan during the war” anywhere possible. Thus the British could not adequately manage them. As a result, he suggested perhaps up to “18,000” prisoners died in and nearby British controlled New York City.29

The high death rates in New York City provide an example of the difficulties in managing prisoners of war for the British army.

28 John Wesley Moody, “British Prisoner of War During the American Revolution,” Masters thesis, University of West Georgia, 2002), 88-92. for Moody’s summary on the Convention Army, see 67- 87; for Patrick’s older study, see Rembert Patrick, “British Prisoners of War in the American Revolution,” Masters thesis University of North Carolina, 1934). For Patrick’s brief narrative on the Convention Army and its experiences, see 42-60.

29 Burrows, Forgotten Patriots: xi & 200. For the quote, see 200; most historians had previously accepted Howard Peckham’s estimates of prisoner deaths at around 8,500, see Howard H. Peckham, ed. The Toll of Independence: Engagements and Battle Casualties of the American (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 132; for an American view and critique of British mistreatment of prisoners in New York City, see David Sterling, “American Prisoners of War in New York: A Report by Elias Boudinot,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 13, no.3 (1956): 376-393 ; for an overview on the harsh conditions American captives experienced on prison ships in New York City and American policy-makers’ responses, see Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 281-292.

American prisoners have also received more attention than the Convention Army from historians since many former captives during the nineteenth century published descriptions of their confinement experiences. As the nation collectively celebrated the dying revolutionary generation’s achievements and independence movement, many former American land and naval prisoners published works that became popular with the general public. Most of their works broadly discussed their struggles onboard British prison hulks, particularly the Jersey, located within Wallabout Bay in Brooklyn, New

York, on the East River. They in general discussed prisoners’ patriotism and resilience, and unsurprisingly condemned the British for their repeated abuse.30 John Robert Denn examined prisoners’ written works. He found that many accounts are often exaggerated because many former captives published their works decades after the war in the nineteenth century. In general, many former captives published their memoirs for political or religious purposes, or to prove that they were veterans to obtain fiscal assistance from the American government. Other prisoners attempted to emphasize their virtue in celebration of the Revolution’s ideals of liberty and patriotism.31

30 For examples of American captives’ discussing their hardships and experiences, see Ethan Allen, A Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen’s Captivity (Burlington, VT: H. Johnson, 1779. Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1779. Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no. 16180); Christopher Hawkins, The Adventures of Christopher Hawkins (New York: New York Times, 1968); John Blatchford, The Narrative of John Blatchford (New York: New York Times, 1971); for descriptions of American naval captives’ experiences, see Charles Herbert, A Relic of the Revolution (Boston: Charles H. Peirce, 1847); for specific descriptions of American prisoners’ confinement experiences on the Jersey, see Thomas Andros, The Old Jersey Captive or a Narrative of the Capacity of Thomas Andros (Boston: Published by William Pierce, 1833); Thomas Dring and Albert G. Green, ed. Recollections of the Jersey Prison-ship: Taken, and Prepared for Publication From the Original Manuscripts of the Late Captain Thomas Dring of Providence R.I (New York NY: P.M Davis, 1831).

31 Robert John Denn, “Prison Narratives of the American Revolution,” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 1980).

Many historians have also specifically concentrated on American prisoners rather than how Revolutionaries managed and secured Convention Army captives because the

British government adopted a policy of not recognizing the status of captured Americans as lawful combatants under the Law of Nations, but labeled them rebels until the spring of 1782. The Secretary of State of the American Department, Lord George Germain, presented the British House of Commons following the start of the war with a “bill to empower his majesty to secure and detain persons charged with or suspected of the crime of high treason committed in America, or on the high seas, or the crime of piracy.”32

Under the North Act, named after Prime Minister Lord Frederick North, the British government formally in March of 1777 blocked habeas corpus and approved their policy to hold captured Americans without trial.33 As a consequence, American prisoners for much of the war did not posses legal rights during their captivity. Thus the British government from a policy standpoint took a hard line, but in practice allowed their senior commanders to swap captives largely at their discretion to free prisoners.

32 Lord George German to the House of Commons, February 7, 1777, in The Parliamentary History of England from the Earliest Period to the Year 1803, 36 Volumes, eds. William Cobbet, and Thomas Hansard, (London: printed by T.C. Hansard, 1806-1820), XIX: 4 (hereafter cited as PHE).

33Ibid., 51-52; for more on British policy, see Report of a Committee Appointed by the Massachusetts Historical Society: Report of Exchange of Prisoners During The American Revolutionary War (Boston: Printed for the Society, 1861), 8-10; Olive Anderson, “The Treatment of Prisoners of War in Britain during the American War of Independence,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 28 (1955): 63-67; for British experience dealing with enemies identified as rebels prior to the American Revolution, see Johnathan Pope, “Law, tradition, and treason: Captured Americans during the American Revolution, 1775-1783,”( MA thesis, University of New Brunswick, 2003), 45-57;for how the British brutally punished Jacobite rebels as a backward people during and following the 1715 and 1745 rebellions, see Geoffrey Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); also see, Margaret Sankey, Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion: Preventing and Punishing Insurrection in Early Hanoverian Britain (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005).

American struggles to hold the Convention Army during the war show that the

American and British authorities did not have the facilities to hold and feed large numbers of prisoners. In addition, the Americans and British did not have clearly defined policies for managing captives. The two most extensive studies that examine these troubles are Larry Bowman’s Captive Americans: Prisoners during the American

Revolution (1976), and Charles Metzger’s, The Prisoner in the American Revolution

(1971). Bowman argued against former American prisoners’ claims that the British held malicious intentions because “The available evidence clearly indicates that the British army and navy were not guilty of a conscious policy of concerted cruelty in their conduct while caring for Americans languishing in their prisons.” He concluded that the British never developed an effective system to hold captives since they lacked the resources and sought to avoid recognizing American prisoners’ legal status. The British did not formally recognize captured Americans as prisoners for the reason to avoid negotiating with Congress as an independent power .34 Metzger supported no specific argument in his analysis, but concluded that the Convention Army proved “unique in the American

Revolution, perhaps history” since its confinement and the convention treaty “led to endless misunderstandings and acrimony which could not but affect the prisoners held by

34 Larry Bowman, Captive Americans: Prisoners during the American Revolution (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1976), 124-131; for a study that argued overall British authorities treated American captives relatively well in accordance to the eighteenth century rules of war, despite being rebels, see Pope, “Law, tradition, and treason: Captured Americans during the American Revolution, 1775-1783,”(MA thesis, University of New Brunswick, 2003); for an extensive overview of American prisoners’ management and treatment during the war, see Caroline Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington’s Continental Army (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 199- 235; for good works that argue American prisoners endured difficult circumstances and conditions under the British, see, William R. Lindsey, “Treatment of American Prisoners of War During the Revolution,” The Emporia State Research Studies 22, no.1 (1973): 5-32; Robert F. Grady, “The Evolution Of Legal And Classical Concern For The Prisoner Of War,” (PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1970), 54-65.

each of the combatants.” These misunderstandings centered on the convention’s legality and captives’ conflicting status because Burgoyne never agreed in the treaty to submit his troops as prisoners. As a result, the convention placed dilemmas on their governments, and the Convention Army became a pawn between Congress and the British. However,

Metzger only focused on the Convention Army in a single chapter.35 Both studies reveal that neither side was prepared to confine thousands of prisoners, such as Burgoyne’s troops, and many captives perished as a result.

Recent prisoners’ studies have continued to overlook the importance of incarcerating the Convention Army to deprive the British of troops. Carl P. Borick has studied American soldiers and civilians’ confinement during the American Revolution in the South and examined how they experienced similar conditions as in New York City.

Like in New York City, the British army held thousands of prisoners in bad conditions in jails and prison barges. The British captured and confined many American captives within their lines at Charleston, South Carolina, and Savannah, Georgia. He uncovered, for instance, that large numbers of Continental Army prisoners in Savannah and

Charleston died from disease and neglect and the more fortunate escaped.36 Robert E.

Cray Jr. examined the public memory of dead American prisoners and concluded “the story of the New Jersey dead illustrates how class, politics, and death rituals intertwined

35 Charles H. Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1971), 298 & 261-263. For the chapter on the Convention Army, see 241-280.

36 Carl P. Borick, Relieve Us of This Burthen: American Prisoners of War in the Revolutionary South, 1780-1782 (Columbia SC: The University of South Carolina Press, 2012), ix-xii. For his findings on Continental Army prisoners and British difficulties managing them in the South, see 1-26; for another work that argues American captives captured in the south experienced dreadful conditions, see Phillip Ranlet, “In the Hands of the British: The Treatment of American POWS During the War of Independence,” The Historian 62, no.4 (2000): 731-757.

to chart the course of public memory in the early Republic.”37 These studies have collectively portrayed the harsh circumstances prisoners endured and their importance in shaping Americans’ perceptions of it.

Historians of the American Revolution have also extensively explored Congress’s prisoner policies. They have long acknowledged that Congress never developed a comprehensive prisoner policy and depended on state councils and assemblies to manage prisoners. This proved troublesome throughout the war. Martha W. Dixon specifically discussed how Congress and state governments struggled during the war to develop an effective policy and concluded that their system may have not worked well, but functioned nevertheless. Dixon also included a single chapter on the story of the

Convention Army and Congress’s role confining the prisoners.38 Paul Springer has more recently argued “American POW policy and practice have always been improvisational” largely because “At no time in U.S. history has the nation entered a war fully prepared for the number of POWs captured in that war” since policymakers had not “adequately prepared for initial combat.” He noted that, in general, prisoners of war have not been considered to be “a major priority for the U.S. armed forces” in wartime. Springer concluded that the Revolutionaries proved no different since Congress improvised its prisoner of war policies and allowed Washington and state governments to influence

37 Robert E. Cray Jr., “Commemorating the Prison Ship Dead: Revolutionary Memory and the Politics of Sepulture in the Early Republic, 1776-1808,” The William and Mary Quarterly 56, no. 3 (1999): for the internment ceremony, see 583-587 & quote 589.

38 Martha W. Dixon, “Divided Authority: The American Management Of Prisoners In The Revolutionary War, 1775-1783,” (PhD diss., University of Utah, 1977), 313 & 321; for Dixon’s single chapter on the Convention Army, see 201-244; for a more on the events that led to large numbers of prisoners’ capture during the war, see Robert C. Doyle, The Enemy in Our Hands: American Treatment of Prisoners of War from the Revolution to the War on Terror (Lexington KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 11-31.

them.39 For Congress and the Continental Army, however, the Convention Army prisoners would be too important to the control of state governments.

Many historians have also written extensively about American naval prisoners confined in Britain. In the 1950s, Olive Anderson examined British policy and how the

Board of Sick and Hurt Commissioners worked under the supervision of the Admiralty to officially manage prisoners of war during prior conflicts and the American Revolution.

She demonstrated, like the Americans, how the British largely developed makeshift procedures for holding captives and a policy that never intended to directly mistreat

American prisoners.40 More recently in 1995, Sheldon Cohen told the story of

Continental mariner prisoners and privateers imprisoned at the two largest sites for holding prisoners of war in Great Britain, Mill prison near Plymouth and Forton close to

39 Paul Springer, America’s Captives: Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror (Lawrence Kansas: University Press, of Kansas, 2010), 203-204 & 15; for his discussion on the Convention Army, see 21-22; for his analysis on American prisoner policy during the Revolution, see 13- 41; for the various roles American prisoners played shaping national dialogues and political events during the revolutionary and early republic period, see David Dzurec, “An entertaining narrative of…cruel and barbarous treatment”: Captivity, narrative, and debate in the early American Republic, 1775-1816,” (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2008); for the politics and difficulties of exchange negotiations during the war, see Besty Knight, “Prisoner Exchange and Parole in the American Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1991): 201-222.

40 Anderson, “The Treatment of Prisoners of War in Britain during the American War of Independence,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 28 (1955): 63-67 & 80-83; for an extensive discussion on the origins and activities of the Sick and Hurt Board in Britain with prisoners prior to the American Revolution, see Sheldon Cohen in Yankee Sailors in British Gaols: Prisoners of War at Forton and Mill, 1777-1783 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1995), 19-22; Erica Charters, “The State and Administration of War: Prisoners of War in Britain during the mid Eighteenth Century,” in Charters, Eve Rosenhaft, and Hannah Smith, eds. Civilians and War in Europe, 1615-1815: Reconsidering Total War (Liverpool: University of Liverpool Press, 2012), 90-99; for how Ben Franklin while in Paris as America’s leading diplomat at the French court assisted American naval prisoners confined in Britain during the war, see Catherine Prelinger, “Benjamin Franklin and American Prisoners of War in England During the American Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly 32, no. 2 (1975): 261-294; for an unreferenced study that details the harsh treatment enemy captives received in Britain and British administration during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, see Francis Abell, Prisoners of War in Britain, 1750-1815 (London: Oxford University Press,1914).

Portsmouth. He studied how the British managed Continental Naval seamen and privateers at the two prisons.41 These studies in general revealed that the British established makeshift procedures to manage captives and nava l prisoners that experienced hardships in confinement. Like the British, American authorities would undertake improvised measures to confine the Convention Army.

The chapters of this dissertation are organized chronologically to explain how

American revolutionaries starting from the Saratoga campaign in 1777 until the war’s conclusion advantageously turned to America’s geographical space to defeat, supply, control, and secure Burgoyne’s army. Following this introduction, the second chapter examines why and how American forces used the geographical space to overpower and capture Burgoyne’s army. It analyzes how British plans for invasion never factored

America’s size as a potential problem. In addition, it discusses how American forces’ withdrawals and use of the terrain allowed them to avoid decisive battles and attack in overwhelming force under more advantageous circumstances. The third chapter examines how housing, provision, and security became the Revolutionaries’ most

41 Cohen in Yankee Sailors in British Gaols; another excellent study that discusses confinement life for American sailors at Forton and Mill prison through the eyes of a captured American named William Russell, see Francis Cogliano, American Maritime Prisoners in the Revolutionary War: The Captivity of William Russell (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); for a brief article on the struggles of American seamen escaping from Forton and Mill prisons, see Anderson, “American Escapes from British Naval Prisons During the War of Independence,” The Mariner’s Mirror 41 (1955): 238-240; for a work focusing on American seamen’s confinement experiences and patriotism while imprisoned and its consequences, see Jesse Lemisch, “Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchants Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America,” The William and Mary Quarterly 25, no.3 (1968): 402-404; Lemisch, “Listening to the ‘Inarticulate’: William Widger’s Dreams and the Loyalties of American Revolutionary Seamen in British Prisons,” Journal of Social History 3, no. 1 (1969): 1-29; for a study on American seamen forging their national character and loyalty to the cause in captivity, see Cogliano, “We All Hoisted the American Flag:” National Identity among American Prisoners in Britain during the American Revolution,” Journal of American Studies 32, no.1 (1998): 19-37).

troublesome concern in Massachusetts. The American revolutionaries’ needs for housing and provision resources created nearly impossible conditions to secure the captives in

Massachusetts. It addresses why the Continental Army’s Eastern Department and

Massachusetts government lacked the resources to secure prisoners for a year following

Saratoga and how they attempted to handle the crisis near the towns of Cambridge and

Rutland. Their unsuccessful efforts resulted in violent quarrels between the Americans and prisoners and made it impossible for Massachusetts authorities and Congress to control the Convention Army near Boston.

The next four chapters focus on how American revolutionaries used America’s geographical space and size as a strategic means to control, supply, and secure

Convention Army prisoners following their confinement in Massachusetts. Chapter four investigates how Congress gained control over the Convention Army after not overseeing an adequate prisoner administrative infrastructure and system to directly manage captured enemy combatants and began the process of using America’s size as an asset to secure and distance the captives from the British. Chapter five examines how American revolutionaries advantageously used America’s geographical space to control and hold the Convention Army from their adversary by covertly mobilizing and moving it under

Washington’s command 700 miles from Cambridge and Rutland, Massachusetts, to

Charlottesville, Virginia. It describes how Washington and Heath’s secret marching preparations and Washington’s security measures in Connecticut, New York, and

Pennsylvania allowed guard escorts to facilitate movement and avert the largest British rescue attempt of the war. Their efforts deprived the British of thousands of potential soldiers and kept large numbers of Convention Army prisoners from battlefields.

Chapter six discusses how American revolutionaries advantageously used

America’s size as a means to secure and control many Convention prisoners by creating an isolated community space beyond British strongholds for two years at Camp

Albemarle in central Virginia. The chapter addresses how America’s geographical size also undermined American operational attempts to secure and supply prisoners in the rural environment. It also examines how American authorities allowed prisoners to undertake the unprecedented step of establishing their own community to survive and take advantage of Virginia’s rural environment by producing food and building accommodations. Following the Convention Army’s confinement at Camp Albemarle, the final chapter reveals how American revolutionaries turned to America’s geographical space and size as a means until the war’s conclusion to hold and secure the remaining prisoners from the British. It discusses how Congress and American forces strategically dispersed the Convention Army by moving and dividing the captives away from British strongholds throughout Pennsylvania, Maryland, Connecticut, northern Virginia, and

Massachusetts, until the British government formally agreed to peace terms in 1783.

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN SPACE AND THE CONVENTION ARMY’S

CAMPAIGN TO END A REVOLUTION

“If this campaign does not finish the war, I prophesy 42 there is an end of British domination in America.”

Sir Henry Clinton

Burgoyne’s army’s troubles with America’s vast geographical space first appeared as his fighting force marched through the New York wilderness during the summer of 1777. The capture of Burgoyne’s army near Saratoga was a huge loss for the

British because they depended on its success to control the Hudson River Valley. Senior

British army commanders approved of plans to invade New York from Canada in a multi pronged attack to capture key American posts in the Hudson River Valley. Particularly, the stronghold of Albany, a critical supply depot and American forces key post, had the potential to reshape the war’s momentum in their favor. In July of 1777, the British army’s second in command in America, Sir Henry Clinton, explained his concerns in a letter to a friend. He wrote that he had few troops under his command at British headquarters in New York City to oppose an American attack. Clinton worried more that

American numbers would become a significant challenge to Burgoyne as his army advanced. He feared that after the British army’s loss at Trenton the previous fall, they

42 Clinton to Lord Percy, July 23, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

would be unable to secure a victory, if Burgoyne’s campaign proved unsuccessful because the British army lacked troops and resources for further campaigns.43 Indeed, in mid-October of 1777, American numbers devastated Burgoyne’s force, after approximately 20,000 Continental Army troops and militiamen isolated and overpowered his exhausted army near Saratoga. However, American numbers were not the only factor that led to the capture of more than 6,300 of Burgoyne’s soldiers. This chapter examines

Burgoyne’s invasion plans and critical points of the campaign and argues that the immense geographic space of America contributed decisively to the defeat and surrender of Burgoyne’s army. Burgoyne’s capture revealed space could play a crucial role in neutralizing a dangerous threat and undermining a foreign invader.

American forces first took advantage of America’s space to defeat Burgoyne’s army during the 1777 northern campaign. American and British officers conceived

“space” as geographical size and territory during the campaign and American forces made use of the large terrain by systematically withdrawing from their posts and stripping the countryside to wear down the invading army. Thus Burgoyne’s troops, despite conquering several posts, never controlled enough territory to secure regular supplies and a line of retreat. This chapter examines why Burgoyne’s invasion plans did not adequately factor America’s distance as a potential problem since he held little respect for his enemy. Moreover, he constructed a fighting force more suitable for positional warfare rather than one capable of moving quickly to strike a decisive blow and open communications with British headquarters at New York City. Continental

Army soldiers and militiamen then took advantage of America’s space by retreating and

43 Ibid. 27

using resources from the countryside. American forces strategy prevented a decisive

British victory and allowed them to assemble in greater force under more advantageous circumstances elsewhere. British troops proved unable to quickly move over the immense terrain and provide diversionary support as American forces increased their strength around Saratoga. Furthermore, the chapter discusses American forces isolating and defeating Burgoyne’s exhausted army near Saratoga in mid-October of 1777.

Finally, the chapter closes with Gates agreeing to favorable convention terms to secure his victory and completely disarm Burgoyne’s army without more bloodshed prior to their confinement in America.

Previous studies of the Convention Army’s story in America have not extensively considered how America’s size became a key factor in its capture, nor have they discussed Burgoyne’s defeat in the context of space. A few of these studies only briefly touched on Burgoyne’s campaign and defeat. They generally focused instead on the

Convention of Saratoga treaty negotiations and how each side pledged conditions they would not honor following the battle, rather than how American forces defeated

Burgoyne’s army.44 Moreover, many military historians examining American forces during the war have written that Continental Army soldiers and militiamen in desperation relied on irregular tactics to defeat the British army.45 It is true, American forces had to

44 Sampson, Escape in America, 30 -44; Sampson did start his study with a broad narrative of Burgoyne’s campaign and defeat following the battles of Saratoga from a British viewpoint, see Ibid., 1-29; Dabney, After Saratoga, 7-15; Wall, “The Story of the Convention Army, 1777-1783,” The New York Historical Society Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1927): 67-70; Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 201-202; Knepper also included a short narrative of the campaign before extensively discuss the convention negotiations, see Knepper, “The Convention Army, 1777-1783,” 7-16; Patrick, “British Prisoners of War in the American Revolution,” 42-43; Moody, “British Prisoners of War in the American Revolution,” 67-69.

45 For good secondary histories on American forces’ irregular tactics and the large roles state militias played engaging the British for Washington’s Continental Army, see Don Higginbotham, The War 28

improvise with irregular tactics because of their limited manpower and resources for holding posts and engaging the British. Yet studies focused on these tactics only explain part of their victory. American forces never outlined a grand strategy during Burgoyne’s campaign to use territory and initially retreated to survive and regroup. However, as the campaign wore on geographical space became an asset for Continental Army soldiers and militiamen because they could repeatedly rely on it.46

of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policy, and Practice, 1763-1789 (Bloomington and London; Indian University Press, 1971), 1-28 & 57-80 & 352-376; Higginbotham, “Daniel Morgan: Guerrilla Fighter,” in ed. George Athan Billias, George Washington’s Generals (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1964), 291-316; for a study that argues that Washington advantageously used local militias in the middle colonies to conduct irregular warfare for his army and in the process they contributed to the American victory, see Mark V. Kwasny, Washington’s Partisan War, 1775-1783 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996); for more on militia mobilization from different regions in America prior to the Revolution, see John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflection on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 23-33; for studies that discuss partisan warfare and tactics in the south, see Jonathan S. Pancake, This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolina’s 1780-1782 (Tuscaloosa AL: University of Alabama Press, 1985); Walter Edgar, Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution (New York: Perennial, 2001).

46 For the story of the Saratoga campaign and each sides maneuvers and plans, see John Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution (New York and El Dorado California: Savas Beatie, 2008); Richard M. Ketchum, Saratoga: Turning Point of the American Revolution (New York: Henry Holt, 1997); Hoffman Nickerson, Turning Point of the Revolution, or Burgoyne in America (Cambridge MA: Kessinger Publishing, 2006); Harrison Bird, March to Saratoga: General Burgoyne and American Campaign of 1777 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); for more concise discussions on the Saratoga campaign, see Max Mintz, The Generals of Saratoga : John Burgoyne & Horatio Gates (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 131-227; John S. Pancake, 1777, The Year of the Hangman (Tuscaloosa AL: University of Alabama Press, 1977), 114-191; Richard Phifer, “Campaign to Saratoga,” Military Heritage 2, no.1 (2000): 40-51; Black, War for America, 125 -135; John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 211-241; Millard M. Wallace, Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1951), 147-168; John R. Alden, A History of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1969), 309-327; Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 revised and expanded edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 373-391; for good in depth studies on the Saratoga campaign from British perspectives and British plans, see Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783, 112-116 & 121-124 & 130-144; Christopher Hibbert, Redcoats & Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes (New York: Norton, 1990), 167-200.

*****

The British did not sufficiently factor in America’s geographic space as a potential problem for Burgoyne’s force, which contributed to his army’s defeat. First,

British plans did not adequately address the large terrain as possibly troublesome for

Burgoyne’s army moving through New York and capturing Albany. Instead, Burgoyne focused most of his energy and time in constructing a British force dependent on a siege train and slow moving infantry rather than one capable of quickly pressuring his enemy within the wilderness. In addition, he gave little thought to the dangers of his enemy using America’s size as a means against his army since he was confident a British fighting force would overpower undisciplined American forces. Moreover, the army he put together in Quebec after arriving from Britain in the spring of 1777 did not fulfill the troop and provision quotas he had previously planned to have before invading eastern

New York. Nevertheless, British officials largely approved of his plans to invade New

York because their previous strategies had not checked the rebellion.

Burgoyne gained the opportunity to lead the British Northern Army and plan the invasion after Quebec’s Governor and commander of British forces in Canada, Major

General Sir Guy Carleton, proved unsuccessful during the fall of 1776 in controlling

Lake Champlain and capturing Fort Ticonderoga in eastern New York. In February of

1776, Carleton had orders from Germain to invade New York and pursue American forces that had attacked Quebec and Montreal during the previous fall.47 Germain had

47 Germain to Carleton, February 17, 1776, ed. Davies, DAR, XII: 56-57; for more of Carleton’s orders from Germain to clear Canada of American rebels and take Lakes Champlain and George for the 1776 campaign, see Germain to Carleton, August 22, 1776, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, As Laid Before the House of Commons, John Burgoyne (New York; The New York Times and Arno Press, 30

approved an invasion plan that had been sketched and supported by senior British commanders in America.48 The plan required a large force of around 10,000 troops to move south from Quebec to invade New York’s Hudson River Valley. Carleton would lead the Northern Army from Canada into New York and join forces with the overall commander of British forces in America, Sir William Howe and his army, in the Hudson

River Valley. Together the two forces would capture American strongholds and gain control of the Hudson River. Unfortunately, for the British, Carleton’s attempts to build several ships to counter American vessels on Lake Champlain stalled the British advance through New York. By the fall of 1776 with the campaign season coming to a close,

Carleton withdrew his troops back to Canada before the British attacked the Americans’ stronghold at Fort Ticonderoga.49 Burgoyne would essentially adopt the same plan the following year.

After returning to London following Carleton’s unfinished northern campaign,

Burgoyne specifically sought “active employment…for the next campaign” in America from his superiors.50 Following his return, he developed a daring plan, titled “Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada.” Wanting command of Britain’s

Northern Army based in Canada, Burgoyne in February of 1777 gave these plans to

1969), Appendix, ii-iii; for Burgoyne discussing his perspective of Carleton’s 1776 campaign and its success and difficulties, see Burgoyne to Clinton, November 7, 1776, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.. 48 Mackesy, The War for America 1775-1783, 58-60.

49 Conway, The War of American Independence 1775-1783 (London and New York: E. Arnold distributed exclusively in the United States by St. Martin’s Press Inc., 1995), 79-80; Mackesy, The War for America 1775-1783, 60 & 93-96; for a narrative on Carleton’s 1776 invasion of New York and American and British engagements on Lake Champlain, see William M. Fowler, Jr., Rebels Under Sail: The American Navy during the Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976), 192-211.

50 Burgoyne to Germain, January 1, 1777, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, i-ii.

Germain. Burgoyne’s plan essentially required several thousand British and allied troops to capture posts in the Hudson River Valley and proceed south from Canada through eastern New York down the Hudson River. A combined British, Hessian, Canadian, and

Amerindian force would leave Canada and start its operations “from Crown Point” and move south into Lake Champlain to Fort Ticonderoga, a crucial outpost located on the southern point of the lake. The large army led by Burgoyne would then move southeast through the New York wilderness a few hundred miles to capture Fort Ticonderoga and cross the Hudson River to conquer Albany, the most important American supply depot in the region. The plan essentially would crush American forces operating in eastern New

York and cut off their forces’ communications and capacity to ship resources along Lakes

Champlain and George and the Hudson River. If the plan succeeded, British forces would control the important Hudson River to move troops and sever New England from the other colonies.51 For this plan to work, Burgoyne’s army needed to capture several

American strongholds and control more than 350 miles in eastern New York and required diversionary support from the main British army.

Nonetheless, Burgoyne made only a small effort to address potential problems moving over the large terrain. Burgoyne did not plan to act alone. Instead, he planned a multi-pronged attack against American forces throughout the Hudson River Valley.

Burgoyne sought diversionary support for his advance and suggested conducting a joint operation with two other expeditions prior to converging near Albany. A smaller British expedition force from Canada would ideally serve “as a diversion to facilitate every

51 Burgoyne to Germain, February 28, 1777, “Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada,” ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 41-46; Carleton had first advocated plans for splitting the colonies in the 1760s, see Ketchum, Saratoga, 19.

proposed operation” and move “by the Lake Ontario and Oswego to the Mohawk” River, located in central New York. His force would attack Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler to the

Americans). General Burgoyne desired Colonel Barrimore St. Leger, an Irish-born veteran of the Seven Years’ War, to take charge of the second force and defeat American garrisons at their strongholds in the Mohawk Valley. Moreover, Burgoyne expected his force to coordinate with the main British army under General Howe in New York.

Howe’s army would be the most critical component for Burgoyne’s advance since he planned “to effect a junction with General Howe” for the invasion to succeed. After cooperating with Howe, Burgoyne hoped to capture “Albany and open the communication to New York.”52 Despite the risks, Burgoyne’s plan had support because the British army needed to control the Hudson River. Unless the British controlled the northern portion of the river, they could not securely send communications, troops, and provisions from Montreal and St. Johns supply depots to their headquarters in New York

City.

Burgoyne’s invasion plans largely dismissed America’s geographical vastness as a potential problem because British reference points on warfare did not focus on conducting a campaign in New York’s large wilderness. Senior British officers had certainly dealt with geographic constraints when handling communications and logistic concerns in North America and Europe. However, most British officers’ operational experience occurred near heavily populated areas and waterways where supplies and

52 Ibid, 44-46; for secondary works that specifically discuss British plans for the 1777 campaign, see Ferling, Almost A Miracle, 211-213; also see, Jane Clark, “Responsibility for the Failure of the Burgoyne Campaign,” American Historical Review, 35, no.3 (1930): 542-559; Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783, 112 -120; Bird, March to Saratoga, 14-17; for a discussion on St. Leger’s unsuccessful campaign that summer, see Gavin K. Watt, Rebellion in the Mohawk Campaign: The St. Leger Expedition of 1777 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2002).

communications were less problematic for invading armies. British officers’ experiences in warfare were largely determined in the Low Countries of Europe, which did not prepare them for marching long distances through upstate New York. Ira Gruber has shown that British officers during the eighteenth-century became voracious readers of classical and early modern warfare books that extensively discussed linear tactics, constructing ramparts, and various battlefield formations. These points were important for army officers since they primarily conducted military operations by means of siege tactics and flanking maneuvers to avoid defeat and decrease casualties on the battlefields.

Using large numbers of artillery and holding strategic fortifications in Europe became critical for officers because they sought to win tactical victories decisively and quickly after conquering defensive strongholds, or an enemy capital.53 Consequently, British officers during the American Revolution generally did not embrace irregular tactics to defeat American forces.

British officers instead largely chose to fight a war by controlling and maintaining strategic positions to conserve their small numbers for conducting offensive and defensive maneuvers in America. Jeremy Black has noted British officers conducted

“positional warfare” tactics to defeat American forces because their troops generally

53 Ira D. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: The Society of the Cincinnati by The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 3-45; for specifics on how senior British commanders conducted warfare in America during the American Revolution, see 45-53; for books read by American officers during the war and their contents, see Sandra L. Powers, “Studying the Art of War: Military Books Known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century,” The Journal of Military History 70, no.3 (2006): 781-814; for more on the organization of a typical eighteenth century British army and specific infantry procedures, see Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline (London: Sam Buckley, 1727). Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number. CW3307292567; Great Britain, Adjutant General’s Office, The Manuel Exercise, As Ordered by His Majesty in 1764 (Philadelphia: William and Thomas Bradford, 1775) Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no. 14105.

could outflank the enemy and as a result gained control of important places like,

Charleston and Long Island. Thus for the British army positional warfare included holding important strategic points to outflank and dislodge American forces from their defenses before attacking in force to scatter and defeat them.54

A good example of British positional warfare occurred during Burgoyne’s advance on Albany at Bemis Heights, near Saratoga. Burgoyne attempted to probe his enemy to find American force’s weakest point at Bemis Heights before attacking his enemy in force. A portion of Burgoyne’s army attacked the Americans’ right flank to drive them back and attain a more advantageous position during its advance. The British general tried to entice American forces to leave their entrenched defenses to weaken their more exposed flank. However, the Americans replenished their numbers quickly and attacked Burgoyne’s center commanded by Brigadier General Johann Friedrich Specht in full force. The Americans exposed Specht’s flanks and forced him to retreat since his small force of 300 troops could not hold the center position of the battlefield and turn their enemy to the British advantage. Thus Burgoyne’s positional tactic proved unsuccessful in driving back and outflanking the more numerous Americans during the

Battle of Bemis Heights. American forces only continued to add reinforcements against an enemy unable to replenish its ranks and supplies.55

54 Jeremy Black, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999), 124; for more examples of British army success moving around and surrounding American defensive posts and positions, see Matthew Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 7-8.

55 Max Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. William L. Stone, 2 vols (New York: New York Times Press and Arno Press, 1969), I: 162-164; for more on Burgoyne’s discussions of his maneuver at Bemis Heights, see Burgoyne to Lord Germain, October 20, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 230-232.

Scarce British knowledge of the countryside decreased Burgoyne’s chances of planning a successful military operation to move more than 350 miles from Quebec and

St. John’s, Canada to Albany through open country. This was not entirely Burgoyne’s fault since most British policy-makers and officers lacked knowledge of the New York countryside. Carleton noted that the British Ministry in London knew little about

America and the general populace much to the annoyance of their commanders. After the Saratoga campaign, Carleton expressed frustration over this point. He naively hoped that the British loss at Saratoga “will in future prevent ministers from pretending to direct operations of war, in a country at three thousand miles distance, of which they have little knowledge.”56 For the British army, controlling territory remained problematic during the war because they lacked the troops to hold areas.

British generals repeatedly struggled to make plans for conducting operations over America’s geographical space because of their resource and troop limitations for offensive and defensive maneuvers. Clinton ran into this problem when trying to aid

Burgoyne’s advance during the summer and fall months of 1777. That summer, Clinton informed a fellow general, Edward Harvey, that Burgoyne’s army could not campaign beyond Albany because his 6,000 troop-garrison in New York City would be unable to simultaneously defend 200 miles of coastline and also, reinforce the advancing army in

New York. Undertaking both measures could have dangerously extended the British

56 Sir Guy Carleton’s Letter, November 12, 1777, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, l; for more specific details on the British army’s difficult operation tasks and constraints in America, see Spring, With Zeal and with Bayonets Only, 3-49; for more on Europeans’ limited knowledge of North American geography and waterways during the eighteenth century, see Jeremy Black, Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), 1-26 ; also see, Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest For Empire, 1713-1763.

garrison in New York City.57 Therefore, Clinton only risked that fall sending half of his garrison for diversion support up the Hudson River to Forts Clinton and Montgomery, located in the New York Highlands. However, these locations were nearly 150 miles from the Saratoga battlefield, where Burgoyne’s army had become isolated and exhausted by thousands of Continentals and militiamen. Furthermore, space hindered the British army’s logistics and communications for operations. The British sometimes found it more convenient to destroy captured outposts and deny them to the enemy. For instance, following the 1777 campaign, the British army campaign dismantled Forts Clinton and

Montgomery after their capture because “a proper communication with New York could not be maintained in the winter” between British forces.58

It is unknown how many soldiers served within the British army in North

America from 1777-1783. Stephen Conway has focused on the British army’s mobilization attempts to increase their troop and sailor numbers during the war. He uncovered that the British successfully expanded their army’s size and strength for national defense and to engage enemies abroad. Conway wrote that the British army when the war began totaled over 48,000 officers and troops, not including foreigners and militiamen in the army. The British government could deploy about 36,000 of these soldiers. By the end of the conflict in 1783, the British had increased their army’s ranks to around 100,000 troops. An unknown number of Amerindians warriors joined British

57 Clinton to General Edward Harvey, August 18, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for two good studies discussing the British army’s logistic and supply difficulties during the war, see Spring, With Zeal and Bayonets Only, 24-49; Arthur R. Bowler, Logistics and the failure of the British Army in America, 1775-1783 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

58 Sir William Howe to Germain, October 21, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 238; also see, Clinton to James Robertson, October 18, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

forces, and perhaps as many as 19,000 Loyalists enlisted to fight in Provincial units against the American revolutionaries.59 In addition, the British government hired from

German principalities at least 30,000 soldiers to serve in North America with its fighting force.60 In spite of raising large number of troops, Jeremy Black has noted that North

American British commanders had to disperse their troops over a considerable distance between Canada to Florida to defend and garrison their strongholds. Furthermore, after

France formally joined forces with the American revolutionaries in 1778, the British army had to move regiments from North America to Britain, Ireland, Gibraltar, the West

Indies, Africa, and other areas to repel enemy attacks.61

As in all military conflicts, casualties, disease, and desertions reduced British army troop numbers in North America during the 1777 campaign. The exact number of

British and German soldiers fighting in the British army is unknown. During that summer in August of 1777, Mackesy has noted that the British army had at least 23,694 effective British cavalry and infantry soldiers serving in North America. These troops did not include the nearly 3,738 Provincial troops and 18,000 German mercenaries with the British army in America prior to Saratoga.62 In 1779, Lord Sir William Howe provided a different estimate after he informed Parliament that he had under his

59 Stephen Conway, The British Isles and the War of American Independence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13 & 20 & 29; Conway, The War of American Independence 1775-1783, 37-38 & for the Ameridians and Loyalist numbers see 46.

60 Krebs, “Approaching the enemy,” 2.

61 Black, War For America, 27-29; Ferling, Almost A Miracle, 563; Conway, The War of American Independence 1775-1783, 46.

62 Mackesy, The War for America 1775-1783, 525-526;for the German mercenary total by the end of 1776 of 18,000 Germans, see Black, The War For America, 28.

command in the American colonies a total of 18,000 British and German troops, not including the 3,000 Provincial soldiers with his army in New York City.63 Prior to

Burgoyne’s departure from Canada in the spring of 1777, Carleton had under his command around 10,500 German and British troops in Canada. After Burgoyne departed for New York, Carleton would have between 3,000-3,700 British and German troops remaining under his command in Canada. Thus the 7,000 British and German troops

Germain ordered attached to General Burgoyne’s army represented a sizable portion of

British troops engaged in the conflict.64

Burgoyne gave little thought to the dangers of his army marching over America’s geographical space. He was confident a disciplined British army could overpower what he regarded as disorganized and undisciplined Continentals and militiamen. The British general confidently told friends prior to the campaign that “he hoped to bring America to a proper sense of duty before he returned.”65 He expected his army to encounter light resistance and reach Albany in only a few months. Max Mintz noted that Burgoyne had gained military experience as a cavalry officer fighting leading small raids in Portugal during the Seven Years’ War (1754-1763). In addition, he had demonstrated his talents as a “regimental organizer” after playing a large role in developing a light horse

63 Sir William Howe, The Narrative of Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, In a Committee of the House of Commons, on the 29th of April 1779, Relative of His Conduct During his Late Campaign of the Kings Troops in North America third edition (London: H. Baldwin, 1779), 13.

64 For Carleton and Burgoyne’s troop numbers in accordance to Germain’s orders prior to the invasion of New York, see Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, xiv-xvii.

65 John Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books: A Journal Kept in Canada Upon Burgoyne Campaign in 1776 and 1777 (Freeport NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 397; for another reference to Burgoyne’s confidence and expectation of receiving little resistance, see Burgoyne to Captain Philemon Pownoll, March 2, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

regiment, “the Sixteenth Light Dragoons.”66 More importantly, however, his confidence of a British victory remained firm following the bloody battle of Breeds and Bunker Hill in 1775, near Boston. In a report to Lord George Germain, the Secretary of State for the

American Department of the British government, who approved military operations in

North America, Burgoyne wrote from Boston that despite large British loses his belief that in “most states of the world…trained troops are invincible against any number or any position of undisciplined rabble.”67 In turn, Burgoyne came to believe because of his confidence that even a smaller British fighting force could defeat the Americans and move them through New York’s terrain into Albany.

Burgoyne increased his problems after constructing a largely immobile fighting force dependant on artillery for striking blows over a large area. Defending himself before Parliament in the spring of 1778 following Saratoga, Burgoyne explained why he chose to haul large numbers of mortar artillery pieces and howitzer guns to support his fighting force. His army had brought 146 for reducing American strongholds in the

66 Mintz, The Generals of Saratoga, 9-10; for a brief overview of Burgoyne’s life before the American Revolution, see Ferling, Almost A Miracle, 192-193; also, see Pancake, 1777, the Year of the Hangman, 90-91; for a brief discussion on Burgoyne’s light horse regiment, see David Hackett Fisher, Washington’s Crossing (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 36-37; for two good biographies of the general, see Richard Hargrove, General John Burgoyne (Newark Delaware: University of Delaware Press, 1983); Gerald Howson, Burgoyne of Saratoga (New York: New York Times, 1979); for a study that compliments Burgoyne’s abilities as a general and strategist more so than most historians, see Billias, “John Burgoyne: Ambitious General,” in George Washington’s Opponents: British Generals and Admirals in the American Revolution, George Athan Billias ed. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc), 142-192.

67 Burgoyne to Germain, August 20, 1775, in Political and Military Episodes in the Latter Half of the Eighteenth Century Derived from the Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. John Burgoyne, General, Statesmen, Dramatist, Edward Barrington de Fonblanque (London: Macmillan and Co. 1876), 192-193; for Burgoyne describing Boston and the bloody British attack against American forces at the battle of Bunker Hill, see Burgoyne to Lord Edward Stanley, June 25, 1775, in Burgoyne and the Saratoga Campaign His Papers, John Burgoyne, ed. Douglas R. Cubbison (Norman OK: Arthur H. Clark Company, University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 147-150.

Hudson Valley. Howe and Carleton had both planned to employ heavy guns for their campaigns to combat the Americans’ reliance on field fortifications and other defense measures. Subsequently, he and his second in command, Brigadier General William

Phillips, concluded that artillery would dislodge American soldiers from their defensive positions at various posts. Moreover, heavy guns could be deployed for offensive and defensive purposes onboard gunboats patrolling the Hudson River. Finally, expecting success, Burgoyne anticipated the need to fortify Albany after its capture with his heavy guns.68 Ultimately, the artillery train slowed down his army’s advance providing

American forces time to withdraw and mobilize more reinforcements near Saratoga.

During the spring of 1777, Burgoyne constructed a weaker force in Canada than he planned to march through America and defeat the Revolutionaries. Specifically, he could not find enough troops in Quebec and Montreal to campaign and garrison outposts in the Hudson River Valley and Albany. Burgoyne’s troubles started after he landed at

Quebec in the spring of 1777, to take command of the British Northern Army.69 Much of

Burgoyne’s army was already based in Montreal and Quebec garrisons. Germain’s orders granted Burgoyne overall command of the Northern Army invasion force, and only about 3,770 British and German troops remained under Carleton’s charge to

68 Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada, 12-16; for more on Burgoyne’s artillery, see Pancake, 1777, the Year of the Hangman, 115; for Burgoyne’s first list of regulations and general orders for his invasion army, see anonymous journal, “A Journal of Carleton’s and Burgoyne’s Campaigns,” The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 11 (1964): 263-267.

69 Burgoyne to Germain, May 15, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 78; Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 93 & 96; Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada, As Laid Before the House of Commons, 9; for Germain’s instructions for Carleton to remain in command of the British army in Canada, and assist Burgoyne, see Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, xii-xvii; for Carleton acknowledging that he received Germain’s instructions, see Carleton to Germain, May 9, 1777, in Burgoyne and the Saratoga Campaign His Papers, Burgoyne, ed. Cubbison, 194.

undertake garrison duties for Canada’s defense.70 Burgoyne, however, in a letter to

Germain dated May 14 from Quebec, wrote that a lack of supply essentials and

Canadians, Loyalists, and Amerindian allies joining the army had become a problem because numbers fell “short of the strength computed in England.” Despite shortages,

Burgoyne assured Germain that “I have nevertheless determined to put the troops, destined for my command, immediately in motion; and assisted by the spirit of health in which they abound, I am confident in the prospect of overcoming difficulties and disappointments.”71 A few days later, Burgoyne admitted to Germain from Montreal that heavy rains in Canada had caused delays and made roads for moving troops and supplies temporarily impassible.72 Burgoyne’s gamble to move an army without a full complement of troops, scouts, and laborers through a large geographical space would cost his army dearly.

In spite of troop shortages, Burgoyne’s army was one of the largest forces that the

British government had sent to North America to assist in putting down the rebellion.

70 Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne, Burgoyne, Appendix, xii-xvii; Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 97-98; a fleet of additional British and German troops arrived from Europe shortly before the army’s departure, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 103-104.

71 Burgoyne to Germain, May 14, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 78-79; for specific descriptions of Burgoyne’s troop and resource shortages, see Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada, 10; Burgoyne to Lord Germain, June 22, 1777, ed. Davies DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 120-121; for Burgoyne’s attempts to recruit Loyalists to make up shortages, see Burgoyne to Germain, June 22, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 120; about 700 Loyalists joined the army in Canada and New York, see Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, lx; Carleton also informed Burgoyne of the high number of deserters in Canada, see Carleton to Burgoyne, May 29, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 100; only about 400 Amerindian warriors joined the army’s ranks in Canada, see Carleton to Germain, June 26, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 121.

72 Burgoyne to Germain, May 19, 1777, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, xx; Burgoyne admitted weather delays, bad roads, and “a thousand other difficulties and accidents” undermined the British army’s preparations in Canada for the invasion of New York, see Extract of a Letter to Harvey, June 22, 1777, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, lviii.

Germain’s instructions that May show that Burgoyne’s force initially consisted of at least

7,173 British and German troops, and Burgoyne had authority to take whatever

Canadians and Amerindian allies he required from Carleton’s force. St. Leger would initially have 675 British, German, and Loyalist troops.73 A troop return dated July 7,

1777, from Burgoyne’s orderly book listed a total of 3,724 British and 3,016 German troops.74 Robert Webler noted that the army which plunged into New York in June totaled around 8,000 plus and included another “1,000 combined women, children, wagon and baggage handlers, and other non-combatants” that would accompany

Burgoyne’s army through the New York wilderness.75 In addition, an experienced group of senior officers served under Burgoyne as tools for leading his regiments and advance.

Burgoyne’s orderly book for the New York campaign revealed that the British officers included Brigadier Generals William Phillips, Henry Powell, and James Hamilton leading the British regiments and Simon Frasier the advance. German troops served under Major

General Friedrich Adolf Baron Riedesel and Brigadier Generals, Johann Friedrich Specht

73 Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, xv-xvii.

74 Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, lix-lx & 44-46; not all primary sources discussing Burgoyne’s army’s numbers list all the participating British and German regiments. For other regiment number listings, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 97-98; Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada, xv-xvi; anonymous journal, “A Journal of Carton’s and Burgoyne’s Campaigns,” The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 11(1964): 259-260; Johann Friedrich Specht, The Specht Journal: A Military Journal of the Burgoyne Campaign, ed. Mary C. Lynn. trans. Helga Doblin (Greenwood CT: Westport, 1995), 42-43; for detailed list of the 667 German troops that stayed behind in Canada under Carleton’s command, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 101.

75 Robert Webler, “Braunschweig and Hessen-Hanau Captives from Burgoyne’s Army Marching Through New England to Prisons-August-November 1777,” Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association, Inc 7 no. 3 (2003): 1.

and Wilhelm von Gall led the Hessian and Brunswick regiments.76 These officers became important for Burgoyne since he relied on their advice and previous experience in warfare during the Seven Years War (1754-1763) to force his way through America’s space. Despite the size of the invasion army, Burgoyne would not have enough troops to both occupy posts and engage American forces for more than 350 miles of wilderness.

In spite of the dangers of moving an army hundreds of miles from supply lines,

British officials in London accepted Burgoyne’s plan for the reason that previous campaign strategies had failed to check the rebellion and break its momentum. Germain wrote in February of 1778 with the appointment of Clinton as commander in chief that

British policy goals focused on “suppressing the rebellion and restoring legal government in the revolted provinces.”77 Those objectives dictated three strategies prior to Saratoga under the commands of the respective British commander and chief during those periods.

Lieutenant General Thomas Gage implemented the first strategy and played dual military

76 Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, 44-45; for more on the regiments and commanders, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 105-107; anonymous journal, “A Journal of Carton’s and Burgoyne’s Campaigns,” The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum 11(1964): 259-260; for Phillips appointment as second in command of Burgoyne’s army by Carleton, see Carleton to Phillips, April 8, 1777, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, Appendix No. 1 345-346; most German officers and troops fighting for Burgoyne’s army came from Hesse Hanau and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel; for detailed descriptions of Burgoyne’s senior officers and a listing, see Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, xlvi-lviii & Appendix no. 1-22, 343-562; Powell and Fraser only temporarily became brigadier generals for the northern campaign that year until they rejoined Howe’s command, see Germain to Howe, April 19, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 70-71.

77 Germain to Clinton, February 4, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for Germain and King George III accepting Howe’s resignation, see Germain to Howe, February 4, 1778, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770- 1783, XV: 37-38; for secondary studies that focus on British strategy during the war, see Gruber, “British Strategy: The Theory and Practice of Eighteenth Century Warfare,” in ed. Higginbotham, Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War, 14-31; William B. Willcox, Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in the War of Independence. New York: Knopf, 1964); Mackesy, The War for America, 1775-1783; Gruber, The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972; Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964); for how the British government managed the American conflict from London, see Stephen Conway, “British Governments and the Conduct of the American War,” in ed. H.T. Dickinson, Britain and the American Revolution (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998), 155-179.

and political roles in Boston. After receiving secret orders in January of 1775, Gage had broad discretion to maintain royal authority and to arrest patriot leaders and exercise martial law. His orders consisted of weakening the growing insurgency in Massachusetts through coercion and restrained military action to force angry colonists back into allegiance.78 His joint responsibilities kept him from securing an acceptable settlement for the British army before the rebellion gained momentum in Massachusetts and spread to the surrounding colonies.

The British army’s subsequent strategy focused on conducting military campaigns to crush the Continental Army throughout New England’s countryside. Led by Howe, this strategy proved ineffective as the American insurgency strengthened. Through the fall of 1776, Howe believed that the British would not end the conflict without forcing “a general action” that could destroy Washington’s army.79 The British systematically stalked Washington’s army throughout 1776 and 1777, and simultaneously obtained bases for their operations by capturing cities, like New York City and Boston. By the fall of 1776, however, Clinton wrote that “We seem always marching & etc in hopes of putting an end to this campaign and the war,” but the British army had proved unsuccessful and could not “draw these people to a decisive action.”80 Therefore, the success of Burgoyne’s army in New York would prove important for the British.

British commanders recognized the importance of Burgoyne’s campaign for winning the war in America. Howe’s second in command, Clinton, thought that

78 For Gage’s secret orders, see Earl of Dartmouth (William Legge) to Lieutenant-General Thomas Gage (Secret), January 27, 1775, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, IX: 37-41; Gruber, The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution, 116-120.

79 Howe to Germain, January 20, 1777 (private), ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 33.

80 Clinton to Martha and Elizabeth Carter, October 31, 1776, Clinton Papers, Clements Library. 45

Burgoyne’s ambitious plan to move through eastern New York and conquer essential strongholds in the Hudson River Valley would prove critical for British success. Clinton, for instance, informed Harvie that he had repeatedly warned Howe in the summer of

1777 that the main British army should not invade Pennsylvania, but support Burgoyne’s push for Albany in force. Moving against American forces in eastern New York would increase the chances of the British army controlling the valuable Hudson River and launching “more operations against the northern provinces.”81 Thus Burgoyne’s plans to capture Albany and control critical posts along the Hudson River from Fort Ticonderoga to New York City had the potential to shift the war in the British army’s favor.

Burgoyne’s ambitious plan faced an immediate problem after the campaign commenced into New York. Poor communication and misunderstandings about

Germain’s orders undermined his force. Letters from London took a few months to reach commanders’ hands and slowed communications. This affected how senior British officers prepared for the invasion. Howe informed Germain in the winter of 1777 that he had already made other plans to invade Pennsylvania and capture Philadelphia.82 Months later, before Burgoyne invaded New York, Germain did not modify Howe’s

Pennsylvania plans since it appeared that believed Howe could assist the northern

81 Clinton to General Edward Harvey, July 7, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for more of his thoughts on the importance of Burgoyne’s campaign, see Clinton to Duke of Newscastle, July 27, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; Clinton, ed. Willcox, The American Rebellion, 60-61.

82 Howe to Germain, January 20, 1777 (private), ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 33; for more on Howe’s plans to invade Pennsylvania and capture Philadelphia, see Howe to Germain, April 2, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 64; Howe to Germain, July 16, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 145; for Burgoyne’s uncertainly of Howe’s location since all his messengers had failed to return, see Burgoyne to Germain, July 30, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV:154; Clinton later reminded Phillips that Carleton informed Burgoyne in Canada that no cooperation was likely forthcoming from other British forces, see Clinton to Phillips, December 11, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

invasion force after taking Philadelphia. After approving Howe’s plan for attacking

Philadelphia, Germain wrote to Howe on May 18 “to co operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada, and put itself under your command.”83 Howe’s lack of support eventually made Burgoyne’s army more vulnerable as the invaders moved deeper into the wilderness low on supplies and unable to establish communications with British headquarters in New York City. The invasion force would experience great difficulties because American forces retreated from their posts to deprive the invaders of a significant victory and used the countryside in various ways to gradually defeat their enemy.

*****

Continental Army troops and militiamen began relying on America’s large space, geographical size and terrain, as a means to defeat the invading army after Burgoyne’s force entered New York by systematically withdrawing and using the terrain to delay and defeat the invaders. Retreating from the advancing invaders allowed the Americans to avoid a decisive loss and reorganize in force at Gates’s base camps near Saratoga. After the invading army’s arrival in New York, American forces lost every significant post between Crown Point and Fort Edward along its path until the battles near Saratoga.

Continental Army soldiers of the Northern Department and various militia units had no official plan for using the terrain to their advantage against the invading army. However, retreating from the posts that summer became an important part of their strategy and

83 Germain to Howe, May 18, 1777, in British Headquarters: Sir Guy Carleton Papers, 1777-1783 Guy Carleton Baron of Dorchester, (microfilm, reel, no. 530, vol. 5) (Wooster OH: Microphoto Division Bell & Howell, 1975, 1-5 (hereafter cited as microfilm, Carleton Papers); Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition from Canada, 189-190.

allowed them to turn a series of tactical defeats into a strategic opportunity by gathering in strength on the roads to Bemis Heights and Stillwater, near Saratoga. In addition,

Continental Army soldiers and militiamen took advantage of the terrain to delay and wear down the superior enemy army by stripping the countryside of provisions and destroying roads and bridges. As a result, Burgoyne’s army won hollow victories as American forces gradually retreated and slowed down his army throughout the late summer and early fall of 1777.

America’s geographical territory affected Burgoyne’s army’s advance after the invaders arrived in New York. Riedesel’s memoirs note that in June, Burgoyne’s army started from Montreal and Quebec towards New York after crossing the St. Lawrence

River and sailed down the Sorrel River (today known as Richelieu River) for St. John’s.

It had to meet and reorganize down the river for supplies in Cumberland, New York, located near the northern tip of Lake Champlain.84 Lake Champlain provided a water highway for the invaders south from Canada to Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga, New

York. Britain’s 8,000 plus Northern Army seemed on their way to success because the

Americans offered no resistance. With Burgoyne’s troops moving down the lake, however, American forces in northeastern New York had begun withdrawing deeper into the countryside after abandoning Crown Point. Specht noted in his journal that

Burgoyne’s soldiers discovered American forces had retreated from the small post.85 In

84 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 99- 104; for the fleet of ships and gun boats that sailed Burgoyne’s army south, see Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, 52-54.

85 Specht, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 49-50; Riedesel’s memoirs note one staff officer and 200 troops stayed behind to garrison Crown Point, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 110.

spite of Burgoyne’s victory, their withdrawals benefited the retreating forces by allowing them to avoid defeat and survive for fighting another day.

Continental Army and militia units further took advantage of American space via retreating across the terrain from Fort Ticonderoga, which was located at a critical point on Lake Champlain. By retreating, the Revolutionaries used the terrain to save their forces from defeat and regroup in force. A small American force had captured the fortress in May of 1775 under the joint command of Benedict Arnold and Colonel Ethan

Allen.86 John Luzader wrote that Fort Ticonderoga was “the Gibraltar of the North’ because it was located on a mountain overlooking Lake Champlain’s western end where

Lake George empties into Champlain. Defenders occupied a series of nearby mountaintops and fortifications surrounding the lake.87 Controlling Ticonderoga provided a critical water passage for supply and communication purposes and also, allowed a fighting force to move soldiers along the upper Hudson River and conduct military operations throughout New York.

American forces had not planned on making use of America’s geographical space as a means to avoid defeat at Fort Ticonderoga because senior Continental Army officers wanted the fortress defended and held. British advances, however, came at a terrible time for Continental Army officers of the Northern Department under Major General John

Phillip Schuyler’s command. The commander at Ticonderoga, Major General Arthur St.

Clair, a former British army officer who saw action during the Seven Years’ War,

86 For a rather brief American primary account of the capture and reactions to taking Fort Ticonderoga from Benedict Arnold, see Frederic Jesup Stimpson, My Story: Being the Memoirs of Benedict Arnold (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1917), 34-40.

87 Luzader, Saratoga, 47-49; for more on Ticonderoga’s location and redoubts, see Ferling, Almost A Miracle, 215.

reported on June 13 that he had only 1,576 able-bodied Continental Army soldiers and 5 regiments of unreliable and often deserting New Hampshire and Massachusetts militia for a defense. St. Clair warned Schuyler from Fort Ticonderoga that he had scarce supplies and a high number of unhealthy troops unable to fight, thus, if attacked, “we are very ill prepared to receive them.” The neglected fortifications had crumbled and calling for militia reinforcements made almost no difference without more supplies.88 St. Clair concluded shortly before the British army lay siege to the fortress, that without substantial militia reinforcements, defenders could not hold Ticonderoga and the surrounding defenses.89

Washington initially provided the senior Continental Army officers of the

Northern Department with limited reinforcements. Schuyler reported in June to

Washington that his department had very few troops to oppose Burgoyne’s advance

“should a disaster befall us at Ticonderoga” and few prospects of increasing his force with militiamen. Thus he would have to request reinforcements from the Continental

Army garrison at Peekskill if necessary, located along the lower Hudson River near New

York City.90 Washington nearly a week later informed Schuyler that Ticonderoga’s garrison could hold the fortress from an attack because Burgoyne had not enough soldiers to move more than 5,000 troops, lay siege, and severe communications between nearby

Forts Edward and George. Moreover, Washington did not believe it prudent to send

88 St. Clair to Schuyler, June 13, 1777, in William Henry Smith, The St. Clair Papers. The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair, Soldier of the Revolutionary War; President of the Continental Congress; and Governor of the North-Western Territory. 2 Volumes (Freeport NY: Books For Library Press, 1970), I: 399-400 (hereafter cited as The St. Clair Papers); for more, see Ketchum, Saratoga, 118- 119. 89 St. Clair to Schuyler, June 25, 1777, in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, I: 409.

90 Schuyler to Washington, June 14, 1777, ed. Grizzard Jr., PGW, X: 39.

reinforcements at this time because additional troops would consume the garrison’s limited provisions.91

Nevertheless, on June 25 after visiting Ticonderoga, Schuyler again reported his desperate circumstances and applied to Washington for immediate Continental Army reinforcements.92 Consequently, St. Clair and Schuyler had a task they could not fulfill with the resources available at Fort Ticonderoga. Hence, St. Clair and his war council ordered on July 5 Ticonderoga’s defenders to evacuate their positions and retreat after

Burgoyne’s troops prepared to open fire and attack defenses.93 Their withdrawal allowed them to continue reorganizing their forces in more advantageous areas in the New York backcountry.

American withdrawals began wearing down Burgoyne’s army because the British chased retreating American forces over inadequate roads deeper into the countryside.

This long and bloody process started near the tiny village of Hubbardton, about 25 miles from the Ticonderoga fortress. Riedesel’s memoirs describe how two small detachments

91 Washington to Schuyler, June 20, 1777, ed. Grizzard Jr., PGW, X: 90; Washington did order Major General Israel Putnam hold in readiness four Massachusetts regiments “to march at the shortest notice” for Ticonderoga if he so ordered, see Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, June 20, 1777, ed. Grizzard Jr., PGW, X: 89.

92 Schuyler to Washington, June 25, 1777, ed. Grizzard Jr., PGW, X:127; for another request for immediate reinforcements to oppose Burgoyne’s advance south on Lake Champlain if the invaders advanced and Ticonderoga fell, see Schuyler to Washington, June 28, 1777, ed. Grizzard Jr., PGW, X: 140-141; Schuyler also applied for more militiamen from New York and other neighboring states, see Schuyler to St. Clair, June 28, 1777, in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, I:412.

93 The Evacuation of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, July 5, 1777, in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, I: 420-421; for full descriptions of the retreat, see St. Clair to Governor Bowdoin, July 9, 1777, in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, I: 425-426; St. Clair to Hancock, July 14, 1777, in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, I: 426-429; St. Clair to Washington, July 17, 1777, ed. Grizzard Jr., PGW, X: 308 -310; Burgoyne left behind one German and one British regiment to garrison the fortress and Mount Independence, see Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, 93-94; for a British perspective of Burgoyne’s army’s movements and the events at Fort Ticonderoga, see Burgoyne to Germain, July 11, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 133-136.

of Burgoyne’s army moved to catch the retreating defenders before they rejoined other

American forces. The small expeditions under Fraser and Riedesel’s command pursued

St. Clair’s soldiers near, Skenesboro, New York.94 Fraser had engaged a much larger

American force without waiting for Riedesel’s troops. Riedesel’s Brunswick troops joined Fraser to avert a defeat after the fighting commenced at Hubbardton. After the battle, the Americans retreated deeper into New York for Fort Edward.95 Hubbardton proved important for the retreating Americans because the battle had produced another hollow victory for the British and revealed Burgoyne’s new troubles of chasing his retreating enemy deeper into the New York countryside.

The Revolutionaries further used America’s geographical space to their advantage by withdrawing from Skenesboro and Fort Anne to avoid defeat and reorganize more reinforcements as the invading army advanced on those strongholds. Riedesel’s memoirs describe after taking and garrisoning Fort Ticonderoga, Burgoyne’s army sailed down

Lake Champlain to capture Skenesboro. The British army succeeded in capturing

Skenesboro after American forces burned some of their ships and retreated to nearby Fort

Anne. Burgoyne on July 6 landed three regiments to assault the post and simultaneously severe the American defenders’ retreat. He ordered Lieutenant Colonel John Hill lead a

94 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I:114- 115; for more on the battle from a British perspective, see Burgoyne to Germain, July 11, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 137-138; for more on the battle from the Americans’ view, see St. Clair to Schuyler, July 8, 1777, in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, I: 425-426; St. Clair to Hancock, July 14, 1777, in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, I: 423-424.

95 Ibid., 114-116; for primary discussions on the battle and casualties, see Order For Headquarters, July 10, 1777, in Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 118; Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, 91-92; St. Clair to Schuyler, July 8, 1777, in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, II: 423-424; Burgoyne to Germain, July 11, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 137-138; St. Clair reported that the Americans suffered 50 wounded and killed, see St. Clair to Washington, July 17, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, X: 310.

force to capture the American stronghold.96 This would not be an easy task. A few days later, Burgoyne informed his officers in a general order that after a fierce “contest of three hours,” the Americans evacuated Fort Anne and burned their former stronghold.

The general briefly described that his soldiers had overcome great odds to defeat the

American revolutionaries at Fort Anne because Burgoyne’s troops now occupied the fort in spite of being heavily outnumbered during the engagement.97 The withdrawals allowed American forces to continue using space as a means to deprive Burgoyne of a significant victory at Skenesboro and Fort Anne.

Following the fall of Ticonderoga, the retreating Americans used the terrain as a strategic asset to delay the invaders by systematically stripping the countryside of forage and destroying bridges and roads. After the loss of Fort Anne on July 8, Schuyler assured

Washington that despite his limited number of troops, “I will however throw as many obstructions in the enemy’s route as possible” and “fall trees across the road between this and Fort Anne; to take up all the bridges; drive off all the cattle, and bring away the carriages” to stop them from falling into enemy hands.98 An American soldier serving at

Saratoga, Leonard Spaulding, recorded in his diary that Gates ordered him and a party of men, a few days before the second battle of Saratoga at Bemis Heights, to capture what cattle and sheep they could find. Spaulding estimated his foraging group confiscated and

96 Ibid., 117.

97 Order From Headquarters, July 10, 1777, in Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 118; Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, 92-93; for more general details about the battle for Fort Anne, see Ferling, Almost a Miracle, 222-223; Luzader, Saratoga, 69-71.

98 Schuyler to Washington, July 9, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, X: 234-235; for more on Schuyler placing every obstacle he could on the roads to delay the invaders, see Schuyler to Washington, July 10, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, X: 245.

moved 70 sheep and 25 livestock alone to keep them from the British army.99 American forces had too few soldiers for engaging British forces, but they had enough tools and manpower for confiscating food resources to undermine the invasion army’s momentum following its victories.

American withdrawals and removing resources from the countryside began to wear down the British army throughout the summer of 1777. Burgoyne’s officers struggled to move their troops and supplies through American space. In a letter addressed to Germain from Skenesboro dated July 11, Burgoyne explained that he still planned to fulfill his orders “to force a junction” with Howe and had determined to combat Continental Army soldiers and militiamen by employing Indian warriors and make use of “their terror” to deter them from removing “their magazines from Forts

George and Edward, and everywhere destroying the roads, and preparing to drive and burn the country towards Albany.”100 Yet Burgoyne admitted to Germain in a letter written from near Fort Edward on July 30 that “The toil of the march was great but supported with the utmost alacrity.” He briefly described a few of the ways American revolutionaries successfully took advantage of the countryside to impede his army’s progress by using natural resources to obstruct their advance:

The country being a wilderness, in almost every part of the passage the enemy took the means of cutting large timber trees on both sides the road so as to fall across and lengthways with the branches interwoven. The troops not only had

99 Leonard Spaulding, Diary and Account, 1755-1783, New York Historical Society, New York, New York.

100 Burgoyne to Germain, July 11, 1777, in A State of the Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, xxxviii-xxxix; Burgoyne had predicted in undated notes to Germain that retreating American forces would attempt to confiscate food and other essentials from the countryside since Schuyler had done that the previous campaign, see Memorandum & Observations Related To The Service in Canada, Submitted To Germain By (Burgoyne) undated, in Burgoyne and the Saratoga Campaign His Papers, Burgoyne, ed. Cubbison, 172. 54

layers of these to remove in places where it was impossible to take any other direction, but also they had above forty bridges to construct and others to repair, one of which was a logwork over a morass two miles in extent.101

Placing obstructions on roads proved effective for the Revolutionaries and their use of the terrain only extended delays for Burgoyne’s army in New York. Schuyler informed

Washington in mid-July that his forces confiscated what forage they could and broke up the roads between Forts Edward and Anne and made them “impassable, unless much labor is bestowed on them.”102 These measures worked very well in delaying Burgoyne’s army’s advance between Skenesboro and Fort Anne. Jonathan Pancake wrote that

Burgoyne’s engineering and work crews labored a week removing the Americans’ obstacles on the roads that weaved through the New York wilderness. The invaders quickly occupied nearby Fort Edward by July’s end, but spent a month accumulating thirty days supplies from Fort George and the surrounding countryside.103 American forces’ use of the resources on the terrain had contributed to these lengthy delays and denied Burgoyne’s foragers easy access to food supplies as they marched.

Continental Army soldiers’ and militiamen’s efforts of using resources had further consequences for the British army because its foraging parties had to seek provisions beyond their controlled posts and the roads. This led to the British army’s disastrous defeat at Bennington, New York. With supplies dwindling, the British army sought food deep into enemy territory. Burgoyne wrote following Bennington that he sent an expedition in force to increase his food stores as his army moved from Fort Edward

101 Burgoyne to Germain, July 30, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 153.

102 Schuyler to Washington, July 17, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, X: 312.

103 Pancake, 1777, the Year of the Hangman, 127.

towards Albany. He knew that Bennington had a large number of Loyalists and available stores he could obtain of cattle, corn, and flour, and only militiamen guarded these resources.104 Burgoyne ordered around 500 mostly German and Canadian troops under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum, a veteran of the Seven Years’ War, to Bennington.105 However, New Hampshire’s Brigadier General John Stark explained to the New Hampshire Council that he ordered a detachment of Continental Army soldiers and militia under Lieutenant Colonel William Gregg to stop Baum’s columns. After a brief skirmish, Gregg’s 200 troops advantageously used the large countryside via retreating to delay a fight and gather more reinforcements. The withdrawing American forces joined 2,000 recently raised militiamen outside Bennington. They combined under these more advantageous circumstances surrounded and defeated Baum’s force and

German reinforcements near the town. Burgoyne’s army lost around 900 seasoned officers and soldiers in which at least 200 died and the remainder were missing or captured. American losses consisted of only 20 to 30 killed and about 50 wounded.106

Baum’s catastrophic defeat near Bennington only decreased rather than increased

Burgoyne’s chances of controlling territory and supplies in the New York wilderness.

104 Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition From Canada, 19.

105 Burgoyne to Germain, August 20, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 163; for Burgoyne’s orders to Baum, see Burgoyne Instructions for Lieutenant Colonel Friedrich Baum, August, 9, 1777, in A State of the Expedition From Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, lxiii-lxviii; Burgoyne to Baum, August 14, 1777, in A State of the Expedition From Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, lxxi; Burgoyne Instructions to Colonel Skeene, upon the Expedition to Bennington, in A State of the Expedition From Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, lxxi-lxxii.

106 Brigadier General John Starks to the Council of the State of New Hampshire, August 18, 1777, in Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, 121-130; for another listing of 900 casualties, see Copy of an Account of the Loses of the Enemy near Bennington VT, August 16, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; the Americans also captured 900 swords and 1,000 arms, see Brigadier General Horatio Gates to Washington, August 22, 1777, eds. Lengel and Chase, PGW, XI: 39.

American forces’ withdrawals provide them more opportunities to gather

Continental Army reinforcements by recruitment, near the small towns of Stillwater and

Saratoga. Burgoyne’s conquests and progress only inflamed much of the upper New

York populace. Stark informed Gates in late August that “the country is in an uproar” against Burgoyne’s march for Albany.107 Burgoyne wrote to Germain in August that

Washington dispatched 2,500 Continentals to Albany and 4,000 others resided at the

Highlands ready to engage the invaders. Another two Continental Army highland brigades reinforced the main American army assembling at Stillwater, near Saratoga. At least another 3,000 to 4,000 armed militiamen consistently gathered everywhere

Burgoyne’s army went within 24 hours to delay its advancements by confiscating essentials.108 Unable to send more Continental reinforcements, Washington in early

August warned the Governor of Connecticut Jonathan Trumbull about the importance of raising militiamen for immediate service to challenge Burgoyne’s advance. He wrote “If the quota of men exacted from the states were complete, we could, with great ease, check the progress of General Burgoyne” and he desired “every man to turn out and act with vigor at this juncture.”109 Washington would not be disappointed because Northern

Department fighting forces only increased as thousands of militiamen arrived at the

Americans’ headquarters near Saratoga.

In early August of 1777, Congress ordered Schuyler replaced by Gates to lead the

Americans’ northern army. A former British army officer during the Seven Years’ War,

107 Stark to Gates, August 24, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS . 108 Burgoyne to Germain, August 20, 1777, in A State of the Expedition From Canada, Burgoyne, Appendix, xlvi.

109 Washington to Governor Jonathan Trumbull, August 4, 1777, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, IX: 16.

Gates would have “command of the Northern Department.”110 After arriving in camp to take command of the army, Gates found it reinforced with Continental Army soldiers and in good spirits camped about nine miles north of Albany at Van Schaack’s Islands.111

Following his arrival, Gates assured Congress he would “turn the tables” against the invaders by focusing on mobilizing more militia support “from all quarters” and striking aggressively when favorable circumstances arose.112 The new commander of the

Northern Department would have an easier task than Schuyler because his army’s numbers had grown in numbered fighting capacity. Unlike the Americans, Burgoyne would not be receiving any reinforcements and his enemy continued using the terrain to their advantage.

These withdrawals and defensive tactics using the countryside to delay

Burgoyne’s army fit with the Americans’ unofficial Fabian strategy. The Fabian strategy is defined here as tactical and strategic defensive measures that represent offensive attempts to weaken an enemy adversary through attrition. Continental Army officers and leaders of the Revolution, like Samuel Adams, a member of the Board of War from

Massachusetts, learned of the value and origins of the strategy from the Roman General

Quintus Fabius Maximus, who during the days of the Roman Empire fought a defensive war by skirmishing, severing supply lines, and avoided large battles against the

110 Resolves of Congress: Northern Department Command and Militia, August 4, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for Washington informing Gates of Congress’s decision to appoint him commander, see Washington to Gates, August 4, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for much more on Gates and his previous background prior to taking command of the Northern Department, see David Paul Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), 1-21.

111 Gates to Washington, August 22, 1777, eds. Lengel and Chase, PGW, XI: 38-39.

112 Gates to Hancock, August 20, 1777, in note # 2, eds. Lengel and Chase, PGW, XI: 56.

Carthaginian invader Hannibal’s forces.113 Charles Royster described that the Fabian strategy required attacking superior opponents only in advantageous circumstances and avoid general engagements. Thus preserving an organized army mattered more than holding terrain the British could not control over the long term. American fighters adopted Fabian methods on many campaigns including Burgoyne and Howe’s army’s movements in 1777 and British incursions through the south in 1780 and 1781.114

European fighting forces also favored defensive tactics, but they used them in a more confined space in Europe.

Despite the Fabian strategy, Washington desired to construct his fighting force like the British army. However, Washington supported a more defensive strategy after the 1776 New York campaign to keep America’s fledging Revolution from collapsing.

Most Continental Army officers ultimately believed that maintaining their army showed

113 Samuel Adams to Nathanael Greene, May 12, 1777, The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, 8 Volumes, Nathanael Greene, Richard K. Showman, et al. eds. (Chapel Hill: Published for the Rhode Island Historical Society by the University of North Carolina Press, 1983), II: 77-78 (hereafter cited as PGNG); for Continental Army officers’ support for the Fabius strategy, see St. Clair to Washington, January 5, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XIII: 156-157; Major General John Sullivans Opinion, October 29, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 55-56.

114 Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People At War: The Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, VA., by the University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 116-118; for a small sliver of secondary studies that discuss Americans and Europeans’ conceptions of irregular warfare and strategy in America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1973); Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare in America, 1675-1815 (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Guy Chet, Conquering The American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Northeast (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Ferling, A Wilderness of Miseries: War and Warriors in Early America (Wesport CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); for how historians have in various ways analyzed warfare and strategy in North America during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Wayne E. Lee, “Early American Ways of War: A New Reconnaissance, 1600-1815,” The Historical Journal 44, no.1 (2001): 269-289.

they were effective and could sustain a more functional army against British forces. 115

General Washington described to Congress in September of 1776 the Fabian strategy as a defensive war of posts to “avoid a general action” until “compelled by a necessity, into which we ought never to be drawn.” He explained his strategy of fighting the war from strong defensive positions would keep the army together and his inexperienced troops from suffering dreadful defeats on open ground against the British army’s superior numbers and discipline.116 Both Schuyler and Gates emulated Washington’s strategy by avoiding a large engagement against the superior British army until numbers and circumstances favored their forces. America’s terrain had provided them an ideal environment to practice their Fabian strategy.

*****

America’s geographical space contributed to Burgoyne’s surrender because

Clinton’s diversion force could not move fast enough over the few hundred miles of terrain to provide support. Clinton’s simultaneous attacks and tactical victories at Forts

Clinton and Montgomery proved ultimately disadvantageous since American troops concentrated in overwhelming numbers at Stillwater and Saratoga. In September, Gates’ large force gained strength after Burgoyne advanced his army beyond its communication and supply lines to fight in a dangerously isolated position around Saratoga. Burgoyne’s army became vulnerable following the battles of Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights

115Ibid; for more on Washington and his understanding of Fabian strategy, see Joseph Ellis, His Excellency: George Washington (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 99-109; David A. Clary, Adopted Son: Washington, Lafayette, and the Friendship that Saved the Revolution (New York: Bantam Books, 2007), 118-119.

116 Washington to President of Congress, September 8, 1776, eds. Chase and Grizzard Jr., PGW, VI: 248-249; for more on Washington’s war of posts, see Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 333-362. 60

because his exhausted force no longer had the manpower and resources to control its line of retreat and remained far from reinforcements and supplies. Ultimately, Gates’ generous terms in the Convention of Saratoga quickly secured his victory and avoided unnecessary casualties for his army. As a result, for the first time, American forces defeated and captured an entire British army.

After his army crossed the Hudson River and without additional support,

America’s geographical space made his force susceptible to defeat. Burgoyne admitted in a private letter to Germain dated August 20 that trying to reach Albany could potentially leave his army in dangerous circumstances because they lacked supplies and needed reinforcements. He wrote that he had not received communications from Howe for some time and no other British force had moved from the Highlands or anywhere else to support him. Burgoyne knew after crossing the Hudson and moving “towards Albany all safety of communications ceases” and American troops would surely place themselves in his rear. Despite these risks, he refused to turn back because circumstances would worsen and he would lose the opportunity “of fighting my way back to Ticonderoga” if necessary. Therefore, he planned to fulfill his orders, despite the fact that he had not planned on moving “my way through such a tract of country and hosts and foes without any cooperation from New York” and garrisoning Ticonderoga with only his troops.117

Burgoyne’s gamble of pushing towards Albany would sever his communication lines and made his army dependent on British reinforcements from Clinton in New York City.

Space proved more problematic for the British in supporting Burgoyne because of senior commanders’ troop and resource limitations. After Howe invaded Pennsylvania,

117 Burgoyne to Germain, August 20, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 166-167. 61

Burgoyne depended on Clinton’s troops for support from New York City. Howe in a letter dated July 7 informed Germain he had appointed Clinton commander of 22 British battalions prior to his army’s departure for Pennsylvania. Clinton had orders to defend

British headquarters and only take offensive measures “according to concurrent circumstances without losing sight of the principal object in the security of this place,”

New York City.118 However, Clinton explained in a letter to Harvey that he had obtained a primarily defensive force of 6,000 troops for resisting American advances on New York

City and half were provincials. Moreover, he fully understood that the enormous countryside made the prospect of simultaneously conducting an offensive military operation to reinforce Burgoyne and defend British headquarters dangerous. He hoped that Burgoyne’s army would not move deeper into New York’s interior than Albany because there it could maintain “communications with Canada by the Mohawk River,

Wood Creek, & Oneida Lake and that of Ontario.” He concluded that unless Burgoyne’s army used these communication highways, it risked an attack from the surrounding

“provinces.”119 Clinton understood that moving over the countryside could prove problematic for the British army to rescue Burgoyne’s force. .

Despite this, Clinton mobilized a force to support Burgoyne’s advance. He later described in his memoirs that he had become apprehensive about Burgoyne’s fate after not hearing of his progress following Ticonderoga’s capture. He had received a letter from Burgoyne written at Fort Edward dated August 6. Burgoyne remained confident he

118 Howe to Germain, July 7, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 130.

119 Clinton to Harvey, August 18, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; Clinton, ed. Willcox, The American Rebellion, 70.

could arrive at Albany in a few weeks. However, Clinton learned through other communications of American forces’ movements and the previous misfortune of Colonel

Baum. Thus Clinton wrote to Burgoyne on September 11 to inquire if a 2,000 man diversionary force could assist his advance by attacking “the forts in the highlands”

(Forts Montgomery and Clinton). If so, he could send it “in about ten days.” By

September’s end another messenger from Burgoyne told Clinton his army had a month’s provisions and could not protect his communications much longer. Burgoyne replied that

‘an attack or even the menace of one upon Fort Montgomery would be of great use to him’ in moving towards Albany.120

Clinton’s diversion force had to make its way through the countryside and simultaneously engage an overwhelming number of American forces. From British headquarters, Clinton sailed northward on the Hudson River on October 3 with 3,000 troops and captured Forts Montgomery and Clinton in the Highlands and drove the

Americans from nearby Peekskill.121 After capturing the two forts and removing obstacles placed in the river, Clinton detached Major-General John Vaughan in early

October with 2,000 troops further up the Hudson River “to feel for G. Burgoyne and assist his operations.”122 However, American forces responded by sending a large number of Continentals and militiamen to watch the river and oppose Vaughn’s force.

After burning the town of Esophus, known as Kingston to the Americans, Vaughn moved up the river to divert American forces and facilitate Burgoyne’s operation. However, he

120 Clinton, ed. Willcox, The American Rebellion, 70 & 72.

121 Ibid., 72-78.

122 Clinton to James Robertson, October 18, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; Clinton, ed. Willcox, The American Rebellion, 79-80.

retreated soon afterward finding “it impracticable to give him any further assistance” after uncovering at least 6,500 American forces taking posts around his flanks.123 In addition, Clinton soon withdrew after receiving instructions from Howe requesting 5,000 reinforcements for supporting his army’s advances in Pennsylvania without delay.124

Unfortunately, for the British, the distance between the forts and Saratoga, about 150 miles, limited the impact Clinton’s victories had on supporting Burgoyne’s army’s advance for Albany.

American forces’ withdrawals and use of America’s space to delay Burgoyne’s army allowed them the chance to decisively engage the invaders at Freeman’s Farm and

Bemis Heights. Thomas Ferling noted that Burgoyne’s army attacked American forces first on September 19 at Freeman’s Farm, less than thirty miles from Albany. American fighters fortified positions in the woods, and Burgoyne’s force attempted to advance to gain control of a critical “ridgeline above the rebel lines.” Gates moved much of his army against Burgoyne’s columns. After a hard fight, Burgoyne’s army held the field, but his casualties more than doubled the Americans at about 600 dead and wounded, not including the captured and missing. This fight near Saratoga cost Burgoyne troops and resources he could not replace and prevented the invaders from moving through Gates army and continuing to march on Albany.125 Burgoyne later admitted that his army

123 Vaughn to Clinton, October 26, 1777, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783, XIV: 246-247.

124 Clinton to Vaughn, October 18, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; Clinton, ed. Willcox, The American Rebellion, 80-81; for Clinton describing British operations and success in the capture of Forts Clinton and Montgomery, see Clinton to Howe, October 9, 1777, in Naval Documents of the American Revolution 11 Volumes, Michael J. Crawford, et al., eds. (Washington D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1964-1996): X: 98-100.

125 Ferling, Almost A Miracle, 233-235; for specific maneuvers at Freeman’s Farm, see Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, 162-166; for Riedesel’s recollections of Freeman’s Farm, see Von 64

fought honorably, but the victory provided no “immediate advantages” and American positions proved hard to uncover in the dense woods.126 Despite their retreat, Gates’s army had moved a step closer to forcing the enemy invaders to lay down their arms.

Burgoyne’s army could not simultaneously move across America’s geographical space and engage American forces after suffering a defeat at Bemis Heights on October

7. The loss forced Burgoyne to retreat for the first time as American forces continued to surround his army. Riedesel’s memoirs reveal that Burgoyne led 1,500 troops towards the American camp to probe his enemy’s weaker flank for an attack. Burgoyne’s forces engaged American positions after their forces increased. However, Burgoyne’s force was nearly surrounded after the Americans attacked his center and encircled its positions.

The Americans exposed the British army’s flanks and it suffered heavy casualties before retreating. Burgoyne ordered a hasty retreat on October 8 before daybreak under the

Americans’ fire and abandoned more than 800 soldiers at his army hospital.127

Ultimately, Pancake noted that the fighting at Bemis Heights had cost Burgoyne the services of at least 600 troops and officers. Even two key senior officers, Simon Fraser and Heinrich Von Breymann, died from wounds they had received during the battle.128

For the next several days, Burgoyne’s army failed to reach the Hudson River as the

Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 145-151; Captain Greog Pausch, Journal of Captain Pausch: Chief of the Hanau Artillery during the Burgoyne Campaign, trans. William Stone (New York: The New York Times and Arno Press, 1971), 159-175.

126 Burgoyne, A State of the Expedition From Canada, 23.

127 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 162- 167; Lamb recounted 480 wounded men left behind by Burgoyne after he ordered his army to retreat, see Lamb, Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War, 165 & 177.

128 Pancake, 1777, the Year of the Hangman, 187; for more accounts on Burgoyne’s advance and its results at Bemis Heights, see Specht, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 89 -91; Minz, The Generals of Saratoga, 204-213; Nelson, General Horatio Gates, 135-137.

Americans stalked the smaller force. British Sergeant Roger Lamb remembered

Americans during the retreat “swarmed around the little adverse army like birds of prey.”129 This reveals that the invasion force could not control their retreat line as

American forces relentlessly fired upon the withdrawing and exhausted army.

American revolutionaries’ use of space contributed to creating the circumstances that led to the Convention of Saratoga and Burgoyne’s troops laying down their arms.

On the advice of his war council, Burgoyne on October 13 sought to open treaty negotiations with Gates by sending “a field officer with a message to M. Gen. Gates upon a matter of a high moment for both armies.” Gates agreed to meet the officer the next morning.130 Riedesel recalled that Gates initially demanded the defeated army lay down its arms and colors as unconditional prisoners of war, but Burgoyne and his officers rejected those terms.131 Instead, Burgoyne submitted his own treaty proposal, which included “a free passage” for his army “to Great Britain upon condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest.”132

129 Lamb, Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War, 165-166.

130 Burgoyne to Gates, October 13, 1777, in The Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, Burgoyne, ed. O'Callaghan M.D., 132; for Gates agreement to a meeting the very next morning, see Gates to Burgoyne, October 13, 1777, in The Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, Burgoyne, ed. O'Callaghan M.D., 132; Burgoyne’s council estimated they were surrounded by 14,000 Continentals and militiamen, see Gt. British Army under Burgoyne, “Minutes of the Council of War, Held Upon the Heights of Saratoga,” October 12, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

131 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 181- 182. 132 Gt. Brit Army under Burgoyne, October 15, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for more descriptions of Burgoyne’s proposals in his orderly book, see Burgoyne to Gates, October 15, 1777, in The Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, Burgoyne, ed. O'Callaghan M.D., 136-139.

Gates avoided another battle and any potential setbacks by agreeing to

Burgoyne’s free embarkation proposal. He agreed that the defeated force would embark from Boston to Britain in return for never again fighting against the Americans during the war.133 The American general a few weeks later officially informed Congress that he had approved generous terms to save his army for another campaign and prepare a defense of

Albany. He wrote that Burgoyne’s force remained formidably entrenched and another assault would have needlessly decreased his army.134 The treaty for Gates solved his problem of how to neutralize and disarm Burgoyne’s army without further bloodshed.

Burgoyne never surrendered his army as prisoners of war since he signed a convention that did not include the term surrender. Gates had allowed Burgoyne’s commissary negotiators during the negotiations to change the word “capitulation…to a treaty of convention.”135 Therefore, Burgoyne and his troops would not consider themselves prisoners of war following Saratoga. Nevertheless, American authorities identified Burgoyne’s officers and troops as prisoners of the United States. While confined, senior Convention Army officers, like Phillips, angrily protested that Congress

133 Burgoyne to Gates, October 15, 1777, in The Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, Burgoyne, ed. O'Callaghan M.D., 136; Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 182.

134 Gates to Congress: Message-signed by James Wilkinson, November 4, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS. 135 Captain James Henry Craig to Colonel Wilkinson, October 15, 1777, in The Following Messages &c. Passed Between Major General Gates and Lieutenant General Burgoyne, Previous to the Convention of Saratoga (York-Town PA: David Hall, William Hall, and William Sellers, 1777), 3. Evans Digital Collection, Early American Imprints Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no. 43247; for Gates approving the word change, see Wilkinson to Craig, October 15, 1777, in The Following Messages &c. Passed Between Major General Gates and Lieutenant General Burgoyne, Previous to the Convention of Saratoga, 3. Evans Digital Collection, Early American Imprints Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. No. 43247; for Gates presenting the Convention of Saratoga to Congress, see Gates to Hancock, October 18, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS.

and American officers always used the term “prisoners” when managing and supervising the Convention captives.136 After his parole to Britain in the spring of 1778, Burgoyne vigorously opposed the American revolutionaries using the term “a prisoner of war” in reference to him and demanding his return.137 The Revolutionaries, however, following

Saratoga would treat and refer to Convention Army captives as prisoners of war until the war’s conclusion because they had captured them as a defeated enemy. After Congress in the spring of 1781 ordered the remaining troops confined in Maryland, Pennsylvania, northern Virginia, and Connecticut, Congress officially changed the Convention Army’s status to unconditional prisoners of war.138

Nevertheless, America’s large space had contributed to forcing Burgoyne to negotiate and the convention made his officers and soldiers the Convention Army following the two generals’ signatures on the treaty during the night of October 16,

1777.139 At least 6,350 of Burgoyne’s officers and troops laid down their arms on the morning of October 17 near Saratoga.140 The treaty consisted of thirteen agreements.

136 Major General William Phillips to Clinton, June 14, 1778, in, HMC, I: 267.

137 Burgoyne to Clinton, July 4, 1781, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

138 JCC,1774-1789, March 23, 1781, XIX: 300-302.

139 For the evening exchange and signing, see Wilkinson, October 17, 1777?, The Following Messages &c. Passed Between Major General Gates and Lieutenant General Burgoyne, Previous to the Convention of Saratoga, 3. Evans Digital Collection, Early American Imprints Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no. 43247.

140 Burgoyne’s orderly book indicates that they were 6,350 total Convention Army prisoners included in the convention, 2,442 British and 2,198 foreigners, six members of Parliament, 12 staff officers, and 1,100 Canadians and Loyalists left for Canada as agreed within the convention, see in The Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, Burgoyne, ed. O’Callaghan, M.D., 153; William Heath, Heath’s Memoirs of the American War (Freeport New York: Books for Library Press, 1970), 144; for another record that recorded 5,652 total British and German troops captured at Saratoga, see Cortland to William Shireff, October 30 and 31, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; Great Britain, Army in America to no recipient October 1777 (no specific date), Clinton Papers, Clements Library; Burgoyne later listed to 68

The second pledge of “A free passage to be granted to the army under Lieutenant-

General Burgoyne to Great Britain” from Boston “on condition of not serving again in

North America during the present contest” would be the most contentious. Other important articles in the treaty included allowing the defeated army to move without delay by the most “convenient route; and to be quartered in, near, or as convenient as possible to Boston.” In addition, the troops would eat the same food quantity as

Continental Army soldiers. Burgoyne’s officers would receive parole in Massachusetts and accommodation “according to rank” and “not, as far as circumstances will admit, to be separated from their men.”141 Unknown to Burgoyne’s soldiers, however, the

Continentals and Congress would further take advantage of America’s vast space to hold them from the British for the next six years.

It is important to note that the convention provided a practical solution for the two generals to end hostilities following the assumed rules of war. In general, convention treaties specified terms and expectations for the victors and defeated force after discussions on the battlefield. For instance, immediately following Saratoga, General

Burgoyne wrote to Clinton that he had agreed to a “treaty” with Gates that specified

Parliament that he had 3,724 British and 3,016 German rank-in-file submitted under the convention for a total 6,740 armed men, see Burgoyne, May 20, 1778, Extract from Genl. Burgoyne’s Speech to the House of Commons, Lord George Sackville Germain Papers, Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan (hereafter cited as Germain Papers); for more on the various Convention Army soldier returns, see Sampson , Escape in America, 191-192.

141 For the treaty, see Burgoyne, Articles of Convention between Lieutenant General Burgoyne and Major General Gates, October 17, 1777, in The Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, Burgoyne, ed. O'Callaghan M.D., 144-148; Articles of the Convention between Lieutenant General Burgoyne and Major General Gates, in The Following Messages &c. Passed Between Major General Gates and Lieutenant General Burgoyne, Previous to the Convention of Saratoga, 3-4. Evans Digital Collection, Early American Imprints Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no. 43247; for King George III receiving the convention, see Germain to Howe, February 11, 1778, Germain Papers, Clements Library.

terms and conditions between him and the Americans.142 European and American officers accepted convention treaties in the late eighteenth century as an unwritten rule of war following the emerging Law of Nations. During the eighteenth century, Stephen

Conway wrote that European officers accepted “A common military mentality was a product not simply shared social, cultural, and professional experience, but the laws of war, a subset of today’s international law, which in the eighteenth century was known as the law of nations.” Officers identified the law’s source from “treaties, recorded practice, and pronouncements of leading public lawyers…who believed that the principles of restraint and proportionality, so characteristic of the Enlightenment, where essential guides to military conduct.”143

The laws of war concerning capitulation and prisoners of war differed during the eighteenth century than today. Quarter, conventions, food for prisoners, parole for officers, and cartel exchanges for instance were unwritten and un-codified rules of war

142 Burgoyne to Clinton, October 20, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for previous convention treaties prior to the Revolution, see Ian K. Steele, “Surrounding Rites: Prisoners on Colonial North American Frontiers,” Stephen Taylor, Richard Conners, and Clyve Jones, eds. Hanoverian Britain and Empire: Essays in Memory of Phillip Lawson (Woodbridge England and Rochester NY: Boydell Press, 1998), 151-156; convention did not always go well. For the disastrous Fort William and Henry 1757 convention and the following massacre of colonials and British troops after their surrender to French forces, see Steele, Betrayals: Fort William Henry Massacre (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 109-128; Fred Anderson, The Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in North America, 1754-1766 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 185-201.

143 Conway, “The British Army, ‘Military Europe,’ and The American War of Independence,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 67, no.1 (2010): 93; there is an immense secondary literature on the development of Western European laws of war during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Michael Howard, “Constraints on Warfare,” & Geoffrey Parker, “Early Modern Europe,” in eds. Howard, Shulman, and Andreopoulos, The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, 1-11 & 40- 58; Peter Karsten, Law, Soldiers, and Combat (Westport CT: Greenwood, Press, 1978); Stephen Neff, Warfare and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Armstrong Starkey, War in the Age of the Enlightenment, 1700-1789 (Wesport CT and London England: Praeger, 2003); Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London: Rutledge and Kagan Paul LtD, 1987); Krebs, “Approaching the enemy,” 183-201.

that Western European governments and senior officers attempted to comply with during the eighteenth century. In the spring of 1776, Congress, for example, ordered that enemy captives receive food and officers would have parole and monetary funds for their

“lodgings.”144 Edwin Burrows has noted that “The rise of nation-states in early modern

Europe had brought a degree of predictability to the conduct of war and valorized certain precepts and customs bearing the treatment of prisoners of war.” These “customs” included captors provide their captives with “food, clothing, and shelter.”145 During the

American Revolution, the governments and armies of captured prisoners had the task of paying for their confined naval seamen and soldiers’ expenses.146 In addition, officers typically accepted paroles as agreements pledging to honor their captors’ confinement conditions and boundary restrictions for living arrangements and travel. In general, officers would receive parole after taking an oath to return when recalled and avoid participating in military activities. Most officers paid for their own necessities. Another

144 JCC, 1774-1783, IV: 370-371.

145Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 26-27; for more specifics on the management and treatment of prisoners of war during the American Revolution, see Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 31-63 & 151-162; Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, 199-235; Gregory Knouff, The Soldiers Revolution: Pennsylvanians in Arms and the Forging of Early American Identity (University Park PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 131-135; for the developing ideas of two influential philosophical theorists discussing the rules of war in relation to prisoners, see Hugo Grotius, On The Law of War and Peace (Whitefish MT: Kessinger Publishing Company, 2004); Vemmerich de. Vattel, The Laws of Nations, or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (Philadelphia: T & J. W. Johnson, Co., Law Booksellers, 1883); for a brief description of the different types of cartel exchanges during the period , see Knight, “Prisoner Exchange and Parole in the American Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1991): 201-202; for details on prisoner exchanges and those troubles during the war, see Report of a Committee Appointed by The Massachusetts Historical Society, 12-25.

146 For the American revolutionaries’ attempts to pay for their prisoners needs, see Bowman, Captive Americans, 75-80.

important rule governments and negotiators determined for warfare was cartel exchanges, or agreements to exchange prisoners.147

How officers conducted themselves became essential to maintain their status and honor under the war.148 Thus a massacre at Saratoga would have violated the assumed

Law of Nations and greatly damaged Gates and Burgoyne’s reputations. As in all conflicts, participants of the American Revolution fighting for both sides sometimes ignored the assumed rules, particularly, a defeated adversary’s pleas for quarter. British

Major John André described, for instance, in his journal during the 1777 campaign that

British soldiers surprised and stabbed submitting American troops at Paoli,

Pennsylvania.149 Senior officers, however, on both sides generally wanted to avoid unnecessary casualties and prisoner deaths to avert initiating a cycle of reprisals and to maintain their honor as gentlemen. For instance, in the spring of 1782, Washington wrote to British Lieutenant General James Robertson that he did not desire the execution of a British officer chosen for reprisal purposes and would “be extremely happy in agreeing with you to prevent or punish every breach of the rules of war within the spheres of our respective commands.”150

147 Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 191 -232 (esp.192-198) ; Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 28-29; for a discussion on the troubles of agreeing to a general cartel exchange and swapping and paroling captives, see Knight, “Prisoner Exchange and Parole in the American Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly 48, no. 2 (1991): 201-222.

148 Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 27-29.

149 John André, Major André’s Journal: Operations of the British Army under Lieutenant Generals Sir William Howe and Sir Henry Clinton, June 1777, to November, 1778 (Tarrytown NY: W.W. Abbatt, 1930), 49-51.

150 Washington to Lieutenant General James Robertson, May 4, 1782, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XXIV: 220; for a secondary work describing how both sides discarded the unwritten quarter rules by killing submitting enemies on the battlefields, see Armstrong Starkey, “Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry During the American Revolution,” Journal of Military History 58, no.1 (1994): 7-27. 72

Honor was an important factor for officers to uphold concerning the un-codified rules of war and establishing convention treaties. Caroline Cox wrote that “officers were by legal definition, gentlemen” and genteel status “was the cornerstone of military discipline and backed up in military law” for Continental Army officers. An officer could lose his honor for ungentlemanly behavior and it held several “social meanings…glory and fame, compassion, and integrity” and they desired to “have the rank you claimed respected by those around you and for you to offer appropriate respect to everyone else above and below you on the social scale.” Maintaining a respectable status “was absolutely essential to acceptance into polite society.”151 Officers generally accepted that honor made their reputations, but more importantly for the Revolutionaries, they had unexpectedly defeated a British army at Saratoga.

American revolutionaries’ victory changed the war since for the first time they captured an entire British army deployed to end the conflict and reduced its military capacity. As Stephen Hornsby wrote, Saratoga convinced the French government to ally with the Americans and French intervention altered “the strategic situation completely” since the British had “to defend the country against French invasion and to protect the

West Indies” and India from attacks.152 Burgoyne contributed to his defeat by not respecting his opponent, or properly planning for problems of moving a considerable distance and holding territory. He lacked the number of troops necessary for controlling

151 Cox, A Proper Sense of Honor, xv-xvi & 38-39; for more on honor and American officers’ conceptions of it, see Wayne E. Lee, Barbarians and Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 202-207; Royster, A Revolutionary People At War, 88-91 & 207- 212; for European officers conceptions of honor influenced by their aristocratic culture of warfare and polite society, see David A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, Company, 2007), 24-51.

152 Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier, 233-234. 73

a large geographical space and constructed an insufficient fighting force better prepared for positional warfare rather than striking and moving quickly in a vast wilderness.

Continental Army soldiers and militiamen took advantage of the large terrain to weaken

Burgoyne’s army by retreating to avoid casualties, reorganize, and maneuver to gather reinforcements under more beneficial situations around Bennington and Saratoga. They also used the terrain and its natural resources as a means by destroying roads, bridges, and stripped the countryside to delay the invaders. America’s vast space contributed to

Burgoyne’s defeat because Clinton could not move his force fast enough over the countryside to divert enough American forces from concentrating on the invasion army near Saratoga. For the Americans, the capture of Burgoyne’s army created its own set of problems in which space played a major role. The American revolutionaries for the first time faced the difficulties of producing enough secure housing and provision resources to confine the Convention Army. American authorities’ limited capacity to provide barracks and enough food for a captive army would create conditions for an unprecedented crisis in Massachusetts.

CHAPTER III

SPACE SHORTAGES: HOUSING, PROVISIONS, VIOLENCE, AND

SECURITY IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1777-1778

“The taking of Burgoyne and his army was certainly a glorious event for America, but I can’t help considering it a misfortune to us that this state was pitched upon the place of their captivity.”153

James Warren, Boston native and former President of Massachusetts Provisional Congress

Following the battles of Saratoga, American authorities encountered a series of unprecedented problems of what to do with the Convention Army. In June of 1778,

James Warren warned his friend, Samuel Adams, a member of the Board of War and an influential leader for the Revolutionaries, that the prisoners would only threaten the populace by working to decrease their confidence in the revolutionary movement and persuade them to change sides. As a result, he concluded prisoners had proven an enormous burden to residents.154 A more urgent problem for local authorities was that they had few resources for the Convention Army prisoners in Massachusetts. Following

Saratoga, the Continental Army and Massachusetts government could not confine over

6,000 prisoners of war adequately in Boston, a city of only about 16,000 residents. The

153 James Warren to Samuel Adams, June 28, 1778, Samuel Adams, Samuel Adams Papers, (microfilm, reel, no. 2) (New York: New York Public Library Manuscripts Division (Wilmington DE Scholarly Resources Distributer, 1964-1971).

154 Ibid.

commander of the Eastern Department, Brigadier General William Heath, had the responsibility of managing the Convention Army in Cambridge, and he anticipated a housing and provision resource crisis and asked Congress “to facilitate their removal as soon as possible for many obvious reasons.”155 Saratoga forced Massachusetts officials to improvise, and Heath faced overwhelming difficulties supplying, housing, and controlling the captive army because neither Continental Army, nor state authorities had developed a system to handle large numbers of prisoners. This chapter examines Gates’s inadequate relocation preparations and the Convention Army’s march to Boston and its confinement in Massachusetts. The chapter argues that American authorities lacked the housing and provision space to confine a captive army in New England. Consequently, the Americans’ limited space in Massachusetts led to violent quarrels and made incarcerating the captive army nearly impossible. Those challenges and the

Massachusetts authorities’ inability to overcome them forced Congress to move the prisoners from New England and begin the process of using the large terrain as a means to secure and care for the captives elsewhere.

Where geographical space had aided the Americans during the 1777 northern campaign, the challenges of confining the Convention Army made space the central problem in Massachusetts. The Convention Army prisoners’ first march as captives and their experiences in Massachusetts from October 1777 through November 1778 shows how the Continental Army and local officials had almost no capacity to manage the large number of prisoners. Convention Army captives and their jailors came to understand

155 William Heath to The President of Congress, October 25, 1777,“The Heath Papers,” Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society Seventh Series (Boston: Published by the Society, 1904) IV: 167-168(hereafter cited as “The Heath Papers,” CMHS); also see, Heath to Washington, October 25, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 166. 76

space as more than geographical size and territory, but in terms of housing facilities, provision resources, and security. Since the Americans had no established prisoner of war camps, prisoners were commonly confined in towns prior to the Convention Army’s capture. Ken Miller has discussed that American revolutionaries before Burgoyne’s defeat confined large numbers of prisoners in barracks at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and how it increased the already heated ethnic tensions in the community. He uncovered that many prisoners and residents distrusted and despised the other, and local authorities struggled to manage their captives. Therefore, the first large number of captives became

“so unmanageable” by February of 1776 “that Pennsylvania’s Council of Safety” requested that Congress move them from the community.156 Like Lancaster, the

Massachusetts Assembly and Eastern Department also discovered that they could not securely manage Convention Army officers or troops anywhere near Boston. Ultimately,

American jailors and their prisoners in Massachusetts identified space as secure housing and essential provisions.

Previous studies about the Convention Army’s Massachusetts experience present a story of repeated convention violations and prisoners’ miserable conditions and attempted escapes. These prisoner-centered works have mostly discussed Convention

Army prisoners’ treatment and American attempts to hold them. They have repeatedly suggested that the captives lived in Massachusetts for a year as political hostages waiting to leave for Britain as both sides argued over the issues of exchange and recognizing

156 Miller, “A Dangerous Set of People” British Captives and the Making of Revolutionary Identity in the Mid-Atlantic-Interior,” Journal of the Early Republic 32, no.4 (2012): 577-582.

Congress’s sovereignty.157 There is another perspective, however, which highlights the

Continental Army’s and New England’s administrative limitations for containing

Convention Army prisoners. This chapter focuses on the Continental Army and

Massachusetts officials’ incapacity to accommodate and secure an army of prisoners.

Their inability to handle these quandaries contributed to Convention Army prisoners becoming violent and dangerous. These problems forced Congress to rely on America’s landmass as a means to withhold Convention prisoners from the British after placing them under its control and ordering their relocation from Massachusetts to Virginia.

*****

General Gates contributed to the American revolutionaries’ space shortages in

Massachusetts because he made few preparations following the convention for the defeated army’s confinement. In addition, he lacked the capacity to fulfill the provision and housing pledges in the convention. As a result, Gates and his subordinates improvised arrangements after ordering Burgoyne’s defeated army to march immediately, so he could prepare a defense of Albany. This consumed his attentions following the convention negotiations. Thus the General did not lead the march, nor inform

Washington and Massachusetts authorities of the relocation until after he sent the army on its way to Boston. He assigned most marching and supply particulars to Brigadier

157 For descriptions of the Convention Army’s conditions and treatment in Massachusetts following Saratoga, see Sampson, Escape in America, 55-81; Dabney, After Saratoga, 35-49; Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 203-213; Knepper, “The Convention Army, 1777 -1783,” 29-46 & 74-97 & 113-145; Fleming, “Gentlemen Johnny’s Wandering Army,” 24 no. 1 (1972): 13-15 & 89-91; Wall, “The Story of the Convention Army, 1777-1783,” XI, no. 2 (1927): 70-81 & 83-87; Beroth, “The Convention of Saratoga,” The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association, 8, no.3 (1927): 258-266; Patrick, “British Prisoners of War in the American Revolution,” 45-55; the most in depth secondary work on the Americans’ efforts to manage the Convention Army in Massachusetts is Samuel F. Batchelder’s “Burgoyne and His Offices in Cambridge 1777-1778,”in The Cambridge Historical Society: Publications XIII Proceedings For The Year 1918 (Cambridge MA: Published by the Society, 1925), 17-80. 78

General John Glover, his subordinate. Consequently, Gates could not guarantee adequate space for the Convention Army and improvised arrangements following Saratoga.

Of course, Gates had no guidelines for providing space for an army of prisoners.

This occurred in large part because the Continental Army had not established an adequate supply system prior to Saratoga. E. Wayne Carp has argued that shortages largely transpired because of Congress’s attempts to maintain its political republican principles.

Congress allowed state governments influence on political and military affairs to avoid centralizing authority. In addition, Congress feared army officers abused their positions, which interfered with the administration and supply of the Continental Army.

Furthermore, local authorities often refused to share their few resources, and Congress undermined army officers’ attempts to make improvements.158 Unsurprisingly, Gates could not guarantee supplies and resources. Previously, Congress had no need for making preparations to transfer a captured enemy army with its Continental Army commanders. Congress had no rules for marching enemy captives in its first war articles, which passed in the summer of 1775.159 Moreover, Congress allowed state assemblies and community defense councils to mostly move and exchange enemy naval prisoners on their own terms after it ordered these matters “be taken care of by the supreme executive power in each colony,” and local :counties, districts, or towns, assigned for the residence

158 E. Wayne Carp, To Starve The Army At Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 219-221 &for the army resorting to impress resources and local authorities withholding supplies, see 77-98; for Congress’s specific fears of staff officers and corruption investigations, see 99-152; for broad discussion that summaries why the Continental Army experienced supply problems during the war, see Erna Risch, Supplying Washington’s Army (Washington D.C., Center of Military History United States Army, 1981), 416-438.

159 JCC, 1774-1789, June 30, 1775, II: 111-123.

of prisoners, be empowered to superintend their conduct.” 160 Hence, before Saratoga, unsurprisingly, Congress had granted state assemblies and field commanders a great deal of authority to manage prisoners. Thus there were no specific guidelines in place for the

Continental Army to manage a captured army and finding housing and provision space resources for it.

An important factor in Gates’s lack of housing and supply preparations was his focus on British reinforcements striking his army and Albany’s defenses following the convention discussions. A British attack on Albany seemed plausible after Clinton captured Fort Montgomery along the Hudson River and dispatched Vaughn’s diversion force to support Burgoyne’s army and “cooperate with him” if “he can penetrate to

Albany.”161 After the British dismantled Fort Montgomery, Vaughn’s force sailed up the

Hudson River until it reached American defenses at Esophus and destroyed the town.

But he retreated after hearing accounts of Burgoyne’s situation and the overwhelming number of American soldiers at Saratoga.162 In response to fears of British reinforcements, Gates prepared to march the prisoners immediately following Saratoga.

Specht recorded in his journal only a day after the convention agreement on October 18 that the Americans started Burgoyne’s soldiers from Stillwater for Boston and “2 regiments of Americans formed our escort” to move the German division.163 A British

160 JCC, 1774-1783, May 21, 1776, IV: 370 & 372.

161 Clinton to Lord Rawdon, October 14, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

162 Vaughn to Clinton, October 17, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for Vaughn’s retreat, see Vaughn to Clinton, October 26, 1777, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for Gates learning that the British attacked Kingston, see John Williams to Gates, October 18, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS.

163 Specht, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 102.

private named George Fox recalled in his memoirs another “strong guard of 500” held the captives at Freemans Farm the night before their march commenced.164 Thus Gates contributed to the space problems because he continued to focus on British army advancements and not housing and provision concerns near Boston.

Another reason General Gates did not focus on potential housing and resource concerns was because local authorities pressured him on defense. New York’s Governor,

George Clinton, advised Gates a few days after Burgoyne’s defeat not to retreat from the region with his forces because he feared that “this whole country will be ravaged and destroyed” and many families placed under great distress.165 A few weeks after signing the convention, Gates admitted to Congress that British troop movements and the threat to attack Albany’s supply depot gave him little time to deal with Burgoyne’s army at

Saratoga.166 These fears of further British attacks led Gates to focus on defense matters rather than housing and provision space concerns at Boston.

Gates directly contributed to the impending space difficulties in Massachusetts by agreeing to convention stipulations that the Americans did not have the means to honor following Saratoga. In the convention treaty, Gates had specifically pledged Convention

Army officers and troops living quarters close to and in Boston to maintain order in the town. Moreover, he agreed officers had a right to reside near their troops and to housing

164 Houlding and Yates, “Corporal Fox’s Memoir of Service, 1766-1783,” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, LXVIII: (1990): 162.

165 George Clinton to Gates, October 21, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for more American fears of Gates’s army leaving the region, see Schuyler to Gates, October 23, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for local officials seeking militiamen for Albany’s defense following Saratoga, see Peter Livingston, Dick Janson & P Wynkoop to the Committee of Albany, October 18, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS.

166 Gates to Congress: Message-signed by James Wilkinson, November 3, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS. 81

privileges. The treaty also stipulated that the captives would receive the same quantity of food and access to their personal effects as Continental Army soldiers, which included horses and cattle. In addition, Gates even conceded future goods and pledged passports for clothes and other belongings from Canada.167 Local authorities would not have the housing and food resources to follow through on these pledges listed in the convention.

Gates further contributed to the space shortages around Boston by sending the

Convention Army immediately to Boston before securing the Massachusetts’s governing

Council’s approval. A day after signing the convention, Gates, in a short letter, informed

Massachusetts’s Council of the prisoners’ destination. Gates reported he had agreed to a convention treaty and sent the prisoners eastward to Boston and blamed Vaughn’s movements up the Hudson River for the rush.168 Indeed, the Convention Army left

Saratoga so quickly that the Massachusetts’s Council and General Heath’s Eastern

Department had just three weeks to prepare for their unexpected guests.

Congress and Washington had no opportunity to address the housing space concerns since Gates started the march before informing them of the circumstances.

Thus neither Congress, nor Washington could contribute anything to obtaining the necessary resources to hold and secure Convention Army captives in Massachusetts. By late October, Washington wrote, he had “not received a single line from Genl. Gates, I do

167 Articles of Convention between Lieutenant General Burgoyne and Major General Gates, October 16, 1777, in The Orderly Book of Lt. General John Burgoyne from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, Burgoyne, ed. E.B. O'Callaghan M.D, 144-148; the Americans did have more than sufficient food supplies for feeding the captives at Freeman’s Farm following the hostilities, see Sampson, Escape in America, 48.

168 Gates to the President of the Council of Massachusetts, October 18, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for more on the captives’ starting their march on October 18, see Specht, Lynn, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 102.

not know what steps he is taking with the army under his command.” Washington a few days later wrote Gates explaining that he would have liked from him a personally signed letter verifying the events of Saratoga rather than obtaining only a report and correspondence from others.169 As for Congress, Gates wrote to it a day after signing the convention that he was sending Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkinson with the treaty and his official correspondence to reveal that “Burgoyne has surrendered himself & his whole army into my hands; & they are now upon their march to Boston.”170 In early November,

Congress finally obtained the general’s official dispatches. Thus Congress only learned of the Convention Army’s march a few days before it reached Boston.171 Gates’s lack of coordination did not give Washington and Congress any role in finding housing space for the army’s march, 200 miles eastward, towards Boston.

General Gates’ subordinates had to improvise housing and provision arrangements following the convention. Their improvisations became nearly a fruitless process since they had no administrative system in place for overseeing an army of over

6,000 prisoners. Officially, Gates had assigned marching and management

169Washington to Major General Israel Putnam, October 26, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 21; for Washington explaining he wanted more confirmation about his activities at Saratoga to Gates, see Washington to Gates, October, 30, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 59-60; Putnam had learned about Burgoyne’s defeat from New York’s Governor George Clinton and passed it on the Washington, see Gov. George Clinton to Putnam, October 15, 1777, in note # 3, eds. Chase and Lengel, PGW, XI: 532; for Putnam’s report to Washington of Burgoyne’s defeat, see Putnam to Washington, October 16, 1777, eds. Chase and Lengel, PGW, XI: 532; for Washington obtaining the sketchy message about Burgoyne’s surrender, see Washington to Hancock, October 24, 1777, eds. Chase and Lengel, PGW, XI: 596.

170 Gates to Hancock, October 18, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS.

171 Wilkinson to Gates, November 4, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for Congress officially receiving news of the British defeat at Saratoga and convention, see JCC, 1774-1789, October 31, 1777, IX: 851; Congress celebrated the Saratoga victory and rewarded Gates with a gold medal, see Resolves of Congress: Victory of Gates, November 4, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for Gates messenger Wilkinson explaining to Washington the circumstances at Saratoga and Burgoyne’s surrender, see Wilkinson to Washington, October 24, 1777, eds. Lengel and Chase, PGW, XI: 604-605.

responsibilities to Saratoga veteran John Glover. Gates on October 17 ordered Glover to acquire supplies and wagons he needed and obtain whatever necessary for the captives.

In these brief orders, Gates provided Glover with a route to follow through a series of small towns from Saratoga to Boston.172 America’s geographic space, which had previously contributed to defeating Burgoyne’s army, would become an enormous burden to American escorts.

Glover faced a daunting task of moving Convention Army captives over the large countryside. A combination of Continental Army troops and militiamen would escort the

Convention Army captives through the woods of eastern New York and Massachusetts.

Glover’s most effective improvised measure was to separately march British and German soldiers of Burgoyne’s army separately. After the march, Glover wrote to Washington that he had sent the British and German Convention prisoners along different roads “for the better supplying of which, & the conveniency of the inhabitants of the country through which they marched.”173 He admitted to Heath, however, that American ineffectiveness to “collect and settle the accounts of supplies” and prevent “damages

172 Gates to Brigadier General John Glover, October 17, 1777, Gates Papers, NHYS; for Gates informing the Massachusetts Council of the Convention Army captives’ march, see Gates to the President of the Council of Massachusetts, October 18, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for a review of Glover’s career in the Continental Army, see George Billias, General John Glover and his Marblehead Mariners (New York: Holt, 1960); Continental Army Brigadier General William Whipple also had orders for the march “to attend Mr. Burgoyne to Boston,” see Brigadier General William Whipple to Meshech Weare President of New Hampshire, October 21, 1777, in The Magazine of History With Notes and Queries, Volume 7 (New York: William Abbatt, 1908), 112-113.

173 Glover to Washington, January 27, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XIII: 362-363; for the route and towns that the two divisions passed through during the march, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 214-216; Specht, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 102-109; also Robert Webler published a few German diary accounts of the march within his short manuscript article. They reveal marching distances and towns German Convention Army troops and officers passed through to their confinement barracks near Boston, see Robert Webler, “Braunschweig and Hessen-Hanau Captives from ‘Burgoyne’s Army Marching Through New England to Prisons-August- November 1777.” Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association 7, no.3 (2003): 4-5 & 8. For a detailed map, see page 13.Ibid. 84

committed on the road” by the captives “embarrassed” him.174 As such, the American revolutionaries searched for the best route where resources could be gathered to care for the captives. Glover told Washington after the march about the troubles of recording the

Convention Army’s accounts and supply expenses. He placed their unpaid bills directly on a general account the Americans established for Burgoyne to settle. Drivers for wagons and quarter-masters joined commissaries to record the mounting costs, collect bills for supplies, and “give orders on me for payment.”175 Consequently, this started the messy business of how to bill and collect expenses charged to the prisoners and guards’ accounts. These bill troubles only worsened for the American revolutionaries during the march and in Boston.

*****

The Continental Army’s limited space for Convention Army prisoners inhibited their journey through New York and Massachusetts. Stories told by the prisoners of the march show that New England lacked the space, housing and provision resources, necessary to confine captives, and their captors’ improvised measures proved unsuccessful on the roads through New York and Massachusetts. Their stories revealed local officials and escorts’ disorganization and limited facilities, capacity, and lack of resources to hold and supply the Convention Army in New England. This was unsurprisingly since American military authorities had inadequate resources to supply even the Continental Army. From the start of the conflict, Erna Risch has noted that

Continental Army officers from the war’s commencement seized from the civilian

174 Heath to Washington, January 25, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XIII: 341.

175 Glover to Washington, January 27, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XIII: 362-363. 85

population whatever goods they needed for their soldiers.176 Carp has found that

Continental Army authorities in general did not enjoy confiscating locals’ resources, but repeatedly tried to cease their provision problems by obtaining necessities by force.177 As for the Convention Army, a few Continental Army commissary agents attended to the captives to distribute provisions and satisfy accommodation arrangements, but they had few funds and scant leverage with locals. Commissaries and their deputies were commonly employed by governments and armies in the eighteenth century to purchase and distribute food provisions and supplies for soldiers and prisoners.178 However, the prisoners sought everyday essentials wherever they could during the march as the

Americans improvised arrangements proved inadequate. All of these troubles showed for the first time American revolutionaries’ housing space shortages and limitations to supply a captive army in New England.

The Continental Army had never relocated an army of prisoners across eastern

New York and Massachusetts before Saratoga. American revolutionaries had relocated prisoners of war from battlefields to inland towns following the victories at Trenton,

Princeton, and engagements in Canada. However, those experiences had involved much smaller numbers of prisoners. The Americans’ limited preparations showed on the march. After the march, British Lieutenant Thomas Anburey discussed in his diary the confusing circumstances that reigned everywhere on the road. He wrote that even crossing the Hudson River proved treacherous after an “unruly” horse nearly leaped out

176 Risch, Supplying Washington’s Army, 20-23.

177 Carp, To Starve The Army At Pleasure, 82-88.

178 Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 77-101. 86

of the captives’ transport “and very near overset it.”179 Furthermore, Anburey noted that after the baggage train stalled frustrations boiled over. He wrote that “after a heavy fall of snow…it is impossible to describe the confusion that ensued” as captives and their families moved forward on the road. Everything went wrong and Anburey described the confusion of “carts breaking down, others sticking fast, some oversetting, horses tumbling with their loads of baggage, men cursing, women shrieking, and children squalling!” One scene remained most vivid in his memory and involved one soldier’s wife delivering a child on a cart during a snowstorm “with nothing to shelter her from the inclemency of the weather but a bit of an old-oil cloth.”180 These circumstances reveal the difficulties of moving an army of prisoners over a rugged terrain.

Both the two Continental Army divisions and the militiamen escorting the captives directly inhibited the Convention Army’s journey since they struggled to organize prisoners, which slowed down the march in bad weather conditions. Riedesel’s memoirs reveal that Continental Army soldiers and militia units were so disorganized that captives and escorts fell behind and got lost near Westfield, Massachusetts. Unable to secure proper quarters, two German captives died from the cold.181 Specht told of prisoners near Westfield struggling to move a single inch forward since conditions became so bad officers could not keep their men together. Captives ran into any houses

179 Thomas Anburey, Travels through the Interior Parts of America: In a Series of Letters 2 Volumes (Carlisle MA: Applewood Books, 2007); II: 22.

180 Ibid., 24-25.

181 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 215.

they found to get out of the cold and “one grenadier froze to death.”182 Although

American escorts moved the captives, they would struggle for the remainder of the march to obtain sufficient housing space for a captive army.

The escorts had no adequate facilities to securely accommodate Convention Army captives and improvised arrangements with locals during the march. Small villages scattered across the New England countryside had few available accommodations for an army of prisoners. Specht wrote that tiny villages, like Nobletown, New York, became problematic because “corps received 2 or 3 houses per regt. here, but these, even with the barns, were so small that that they could only shelter 1/5th of the” Convention Army troops.183 Prisoners repeatedly sought temporary accommodation space from locals along the two routes until they reached Boston.

Many local inhabitants in general impeded the prisoners’ journey and efforts to obtain housing space. Their fascination with the Convention Army occurred because most New Englanders had never met a British or German soldier in their lives. Most inhabitants lived on farms outside of urban areas far from the coast where the British army was based. Riedesel’s wife, Baroness Frederika, remembered “the people insisted upon seeing the wife of the German general and her children” and feared if she did not halt her wagon while traveling through the New England countryside that locals would

182 Specht, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 107; Sampson wrote at least 12 captives died during the march and 160 went missing by the end of October. Many of these missing captives escaped their captors during the march, see Sampson, Escape in America, 49-50.

183 Ibid., 106.

likely “tear off the linen covering from the wagon in their eagerness to see me.”184 Most often locals were bent on thievery and harassing prisoners and their families. General

Riedesel’s memoirs reveal, for instance, that thieves stole his family’s belongings in

Albany despite under guard.185 Many inhabitants saw the captives as a form of amusement. Anburey told of how villagers on one occasion as the prisoners marched through their town simply put “up their hands and praying to Heaven, some admiring the soldiers, others looking with astonishment.”186 He also recounted the locals’ fascination with aristocratic officers after some inhabitants of the town imagined Lord Francis Napier as “something more than man.” A small group of women located his lodgings and a

British officer introduced him by his various titles. The women looked on assiduously as he and his companions laughed about the circumstances. Napier’s rough appearance disappointed the women and one proclaimed she wished never to see another lord again besides “Jehovah.”187

Securing housing space in locals’ homes did not always guarantee prisoners a comfortable evening during the march. An unnamed German officer, for instance, recorded in West Springfield, Massachusetts, that inhabitants took prisoners into their houses, but provided little else as “whole families with wives and daughters” across the countryside simply visited to look at them. The German officer recalled in amusement

184 Baroness Frederika Charlotte Riedesel Letters and Journals, trans. William Stone (New York: Arno Press, 1968), 137; for the problem of inhabitants stealing Convention Army officers’ horses, see Specht, Doblin trans. and ed. Lynn, The Specht Journal, 105.

185 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 222.

186 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 31.

187 Ibid., 32-33.

how he got some revenge for his lack of privacy through offering prettier girls chairs and after they took their seats, he stared at them until the prisoners could no longer tolerate

“the jest, for one party after another walked boldly into the room without even knocking.”

To view them, the German officer suspected that the owner of his quarters must have

“charged admission.”188 However, American revolutionaries’ housing shortages did not prove troublesome for all Convention Army prisoners.

A few senior officers experienced captivity without suffering the Continental

Army’s housing shortages and wider rules for captives. Their status allowed them to not experience the pitfalls of foraging for supplies and housing. The wife of General

Riedesel, Baroness Frederika, wrote in her memoirs that senior officers and their families dinned with Gates following the battles of Saratoga, and he had allowed them to travel separately towards Boston.189 However, these happy times for the senior officers would not last. Riedesel joined his German troops in the small village of Kinderhook,

Massachusetts, on October 23. While there, Riedesel’s troops “encamped in the woods” and their circumstances depressed him. He spent much of the march trying to find accommodations for his exhausted troops. Sometimes he succeeded with his attempts, but not always. Riedesel, for instance, in West Springfield convinced locals to accommodate some of his fatigued Brunswick and Hessian soldiers. However, General

Riedesel did not have the same success with the inhabitants of nearby East Springfield.

188 Pettengill, Letters from America, 1776-1779, 123.

189 Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 135-137; Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 214; Lamb, Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War, 181-182; for a brief few sentence secondary reference to the generals’ time in Albany, see Sampson, Escape in America, 48.

They instead refused to accommodate his soldiers in their homes.190 The scarcity of money only increased American escorts’ difficulties during the march.

Locals and escorts also lacked money to increase their capacity of purchasing accommodation for the Convention Army. This contributed to shortages for the reason that high costs decreased both commissaries and captives’ purchasing power. Specht recalled that the Americans’ nearly worthless dollars was supposed to be equivalent of gold and silver coins in circulation in New England. Inhabitants exchanged their paper dollars at inflated rates for prisoners’ gold and silver coins and fixed prices for supplies at advantageous rates. Thus Specht wrote that “whenever we were in very great need of something, we had to pay three times as much for it” after inhabitants demanded they pay with their silver and gold coins and only exchanged paper bills in return. Consequently, the captives repeatedly lost money and some residents made profits from the captives.191

Inflation and the Americans’ high rates for provisions only diminished prisoners’ purchasing power during the march.

Many prisoners tried compensating for the Americans’ limitations by taking advantage of every means of exchange possible in New England to rent rooms and purchase their provisions. As a result, the prisoners obtained necessities any way possible to survive in the New England countryside. Anburey, for instance, wrote that a

Convention Army officer obtained boots from an American general for a single gold guinea. In addition, the local people demanded gold guineas from the prisoners’ pockets

190 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 214- 215. 191 Specht, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 105; for more discussions on money, see Pettengill, trans. Letters from America, 1776-1779, 126-127; for more discussions on money, see Sampson, Escape in America, 51.

instead of dollars because as Anburey observed, locals constantly sought “our guineas” whenever possible to boost their economy and prices for goods.192 The soaring expenses and shortages concerned Continental Army authorities responsible for escorting the prisoners to Boston. Glover discussed with Gates following the march that he had worried about running out of food for the senior Convention Army officers because of the expenses from Albany to Cambridge.193 Revolutionaries’ struggles to secure more funds from the prisoners for them to purchase housing space and provisions only worsened after the march near Boston.

American revolutionaries needed stronger institutions to find more accommodation space in New England. Glover’s struggles to track the Convention

Army’s accounts and debts accumulated from commissaries and inhabitants after purchases and demonstrated the need for more effective administrative institutions to solve these concerns. He informed Washington in January of 1778 that locals sent their bills to him and charged ridiculously inflated prices for anything damaged and used by the captives, such as damages done to homes and private property, and the inhabitants demanded reimbursements. Glover predicted, however, that Burgoyne would complain about paying for these items under the circumstances. Exhausted, Glover concluded that the Convention Army’s endless “difficulties” and bills would hold him in Massachusetts

192.Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 33-34; Riedesel’s wife made a shorter reference to the same boot story in her memoirs, see Riedesel, Letters and Journals, trans. Stone, 138. 193 Glover to Gates, November 16, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; Glover also later complained German Convention Army troops stole and robbed from Boston residents, see Glover to Gates, December 4, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS.

until Burgoyne embarked for Britain.194 Glover’s frustration shows the immediate consequences of the Americans’ limitations during the march.

American revolutionaries’ improvised measures led to security problems because of the Convention Army’s numbers. Gates admitted following the march that large numbers of the German and British prisoners had deserted and many more would follow.195 For escorts, simultaneously moving and controlling columns became troublesome because of the large prisoner numbers. Consequently, guards struggled to stop Convention Army troops from deserting their regiments and seeking resources.

Prisoners wrote stories about escapees freely roaming the countryside to search for more housing and provisions. Anburey noted in his diary how one unnamed junior British officer had escaped undetected and convinced residents of a small unnamed village that he was John Burgoyne. After reaching this community, the escapee impersonated the general “with such an air of confidence” that the locals “assigned him the best quarters.”196 Specht also recalled that some Convention Army captives when moving through “the woods and without any guards” would quickly “disappear.”197 The incidents showed the Americans’ limited control of the prisoners during the march.

194 Glover to Washington, January 27, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XIII: 362; Glover’s task managing the army only encouraged him to step down from the Continental Army. Washington had a high opinion of him as a valuable officer and encouraged him to remain on, see Washington to Glover, February 18, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XIII: 579-580; Glover ultimately stayed in the Continental Army until his retirement in the summer of 1782, see in note # 2, ed. Lengel, PGW, XIII: 363.

195 Gates to Laurens, November 10, 1777, in note # 1, eds. Grizzard, Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 360.

196 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 23-24.

197 Specht, Lynn, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 105.

American revolutionaries’ space limitations did not stop them from bringing the prisoners to Boston. Housing and provision shortages had contributed to impeding

American escorts’ progress to securely move and provide for the thousands of

Convention Army prisoners marching on roads through eastern New York and

Massachusetts. Gates and his subordinates lacked the resources to move the prisoners without more support. Although American revolutionaries had struggled to move the captives, Riedesel recorded that the Convention Army’s difficult three week journey finally concluded on November 7, 1777. The Americans then placed the captives in the neighborhood of Cambridge, Massachusetts, near Boston.198 Unfortunately, for both senior Convention officers and their soldiers, the space troubles only worsened after the army arrived at its destination.

*****

Despite America’s size, space for the Americans became a serious obstacle in confining the Convention Army in Massachusetts because they lacked the housing and facilities. The facilities for accommodating prisoners were no better around Boston than on the journey and the Americans scrambled to make arrangements with what resources they had available. The housing crisis occurred primarily because of New England’s limited resources, and the Eastern Department did not have the capacity to effectively improve these matters. Thus Continental and Massachusetts officials could not produce the necessary housing facilities, and resources to control the army around Boston. Heath

198 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 216; Pettengill, Letters from America, 1776-1779, 129; Specht, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 109; Sampson, Escape in America, 54.

held primary authority over the Convention Army prisoners, but he relied on the

Massachusetts Council to secure resources and address locals’ complaints. The two, however, did not always work in tandem because of the Council’s limited powers and fears of upsetting locals. Nevertheless, Heath and the Massachusetts government focused on finding rooms and barracks for their continental garrison and the Convention Army.

However, most residents became an insurmountable problem for the Council and Heath since they refused orders to provide British and German junior officers rooms in their homes. As a result, Heath placed the majority of junior officers and soldiers in inadequate barracks on Prospect and Winter Hills, near Cambridge, a neighborhood of

Boston. Heath attempted to increase housing space for the captives after he expanded officers’ parole boundaries, moved British captives to Rutland, and tried persuading

Harvard College to provide rooms. Nonetheless, his efforts never secured sufficient housing space to accommodate the unwelcomed captive army in Massachusetts.

Heath’s struggle with the local population to accommodate prisoners was not unusual during the American Revolution. During the war, locals often struggled adapting to the dangers of living among enemy soldiers and competing armies. During the campaign of 1777-1778, Wayne Bodle has examined how civilians who lived in the

Delaware Valley struggled adjusting to the circumstances of war. As a result, he found that with the approach of the American and British army many residents fled and others prepared to fight. He noted that the close proximity of the competing armies “altered people’s demeanor along the lines of their prior dispositions toward the war” since locals

chose to either flee or stay in their homes.199 Unsurprisingly, many Bostonians would struggle living among the Convention Army. Residents of Boston had long had problems living near British troops. As Ferling noted, most Bostonians despised the British army occupation. Prior to the conflict in the 1760s, British soldiers occupied the town to bring order to the community after Boston radicals began violently protesting the British government’s attempts to directly tax them. Clashes between Boston radicals and British troops repeatedly led to violence and eventually military conflict at Lexington and

Concord and Bunker Hill, in 1775.200

Heath managed the captive army’s detention from his headquarters in Boston.

Unlike Gates, Heath could not just march the Convention Army officers and troops somewhere else. As commander of the Continental Army’s Eastern Department, Heath received orders from the Massachusetts Council to manage and supervise the Convention

Army prisoners and their families.201 Heath told Washington a few days before that he immediately recognized the captive army required a number of guards and other precautions if British transports arrived. He requested Washington’s instructions and inquired whether it would be agreeable for Washington to dispatch for arranging supplies near Boston one or more “continental deputy commissaries general of prisoners to repair this way immediately.”202 Nevertheless, with the prisoners coming into Boston in a

199 Wayne Bodle, The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 77-80 (quote on 79).

200 Ferling, Almost A Miracle, 6-7 & 23-24 & 29-33 & 49-60. . 201 Heath to Washington, October 25, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 166.

202 Heath to Washington, October 22, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 164; for Glover later letting Heath know of the Convention Army’s impending arrival, see Glover to Heath, November 2, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 172-173. 96

matter of days, Heath and the Council had to make do with the existing space accommodations that they had available throughout the Boston area.

Like most Continental Army officers, Heath had no experience trying to find barracks for an army of prisoners. He did not have a distinguished battlefield record, but he had received many promotions after he first joined the cause as a militia officer in

1765 for a Boston-based militiamen artillery attachment. He also published military related articles on discipline and use of arms in the Boston Gazette and earned promotions within the Massachusetts’s militia until in June of 1775 he became a major- general. A little more than a year later, he obtained the rank of major general within the

Continental Army.203 In the spring of 1777, he became the overall commander of the department after Washington recommended him to Congress for the job following the resignation of Major General Artemas Ward. Heath officially accepted Ward’s command on March 20, 1777.204 None of these prior promotions prepared Heath for managing a captive army and its housing facility needs.

Housing space became troublesome because few facilities existed for accommodating a captive army anywhere in the Boston region. The geography of Boston provided little housing space for a captive army anywhere. Benjamin Carp has noted that

203 William Heath, Heath’s Memoirs of the American War (Freeport New York: Books for Library Press, 1970), 15-18; nearly the same background sketch is printed within his papers inside the Preface of “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: xviii-xix.

204 Washington to Heath, March 3, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, VIII: 498; for Heath taking command in Boston after learning of Washington’s appointment, see Heath, Heath’s Memoirs of the American War, 126-127; for Washington informing Ward of his replacement, see Washington to Major General Artemas Ward, March 3, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, VIII: 507; Congress through the Board of War in late February 1777 requested Washington specifically appoint a successor for Ward as Eastern Department commander, see Richard Peters to Washington, February 21, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, VIII: 400-401; for Ward’s resignation, see Ward to Washington, March 20, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, VIII: 608-609.

Boston during the American Revolution was “larger than most communities in British

America,” but only a town of 16,000 residents located on a small and “hilly peninsula” surrounded by water, where its residents “lived elbow to elbow…about two miles from tip to neck.” Only “a narrow isthmus” provided travelers and the local population a single road leaving the peninsula when not swept away by the ocean’s “high tide.” The town was a dynamic and crowded port community filled with merchants, shopkeepers, and seamen.205 With few places to put the prisoners, in late October, Heath ordered barracks on Winter Hill and Prospect Hill, outside Cambridge, inspected and made ready for occupation before the captives’ arrival. He specifically appointed Duty Quartermaster

Thomas Chase for the job and ordered militia guards to occupy barracks in Cambridge and on nearby Bunker Hill.206 Late that month, Heath, however, informed Washington he knew of nowhere else to house and provide for up to 6,000 men other than Prospect

Hill and Winter Hill barracks if they remained near Boston. The Massachusetts

Assembly had also recommended that he relocate the captives there outside Boston.207

But authorities did not have the time, money, and building materials to build a proper prisoner facility in Boston.

205 Benjamin L. Carp, Defiance of the Patriots: The Boston Tea Party & the Making of America (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2010), 26-31; for a similar description of Boston, see David Hackett Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 10-12.

206 Heath to Thomas Chase, October 27, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV:169; Specht, Doblin trans. and ed. Lynn, The Specht Journal, 110; Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 221.

207 Heath to Washington, October 25, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 166; Heath to The President of Congress, October 25, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 167-168; Heath to Washington, November 23, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW XII: 362.

During the war, because of their status, captured senior and junior officers, often obtained housing in locals’ homes. Ensign Thomas Hughes had a typical experience for confined British and German officers in America. After his capture at Fort Ticonderoga,

Hughes described spending the next four years moving from one private residence to another. Hughes’s experience reveals that the Americans often made arrangements haphazardly according to accommodations readily at hand, and officers often lived with locals after they signed paroles pledging to remain in designated areas.208 Convention

Army officers, however, would struggle securing accommodations in the homes of locals because of the Americans’ housing space limitations in Massachusetts and other places.

With no secure space to hold the Convention Army in Boston, the Americans placed British Convention Army junior officers and troops on Prospect Hill and the

Germans at Winter Hill. Specht recalled in his diary that the two hills lay next to each other about a mile and a half from Cambridge. Continental Army soldiers had constructed the barracks on Prospect Hill and Winter Hill, and the British had built them on Bunker Hill during the 1775 siege. The Americans used Cambridge as a supply depot for the Continental Army, and a garrison occupied the town to protect its war materials.

Before the army’s arrival, Specht noted that wealthier Boston residents had built large homes and stone buildings there as a summer retreat. Some of the buildings had Italian- styled roofs and prisoners had impressive views of Boston and its harbor. Moreover, militiamen and their officers initially stopped confined prisoners on the two hills from

208 Thomas Hughes, A Journal By Thomas Hughes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1947), viii-xi; for a little bibliographic summary on Hughes, see Springer, American’s Captives, 13-14; for Convention Army officers’ confinement experiences, see Anburey, Travels through the Interior Parts of America; August Wilhelm Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder: Lieutenant and Adjunct to the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778, trans. Charlotte Epping (New York: D. Appleton Co, Agents, 1911); Pettengill, Letters From America, 1776-1779.

entering Boston to likely avoid riots and disorder. Thus Convention Army officers and troops as an army never made it into Boston city limits as agreed in the convention.209

Placing Convention Army captives in such shabby huts only increased tensions and would create circumstances for violent quarrels between the prisoners and their guards.

Prospect Hill and Winter Hill never solved the Americans’ housing needs since the barracks there were small wooden huts. These wooden huts were not proper barracks for accommodating prisoners because the Continental soldiers serving with the

Cambridge garrison had clearly neglected these structures after the British army evacuated Boston in 1776. Such poor arrangements appalled Convention Army officers and soldiers. Anburey noted, for instance, that British junior officers’ accommodations after their arrival on Prospect Hill were “in the worst condition imaginable for the reception of troops, being so much out of repair.”210 Such circumstances and flimsy huts made it difficult for the Americans to safely accommodate the prisoners.

The residents’ unwillingness to open their homes in Cambridge to Convention

Army officers became another factor in creating a housing space shortage. Most inhabitants disregarded the Council orders and avoided assisting captive officers. Samuel

Batchelder found that many Cambridge residents gathered for a town meeting on

November 3 at Harvard College and most attendees voted not to allow the officers into

209 Specht, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 109-110; for more on Boston and the captives being deprived of entering it, see Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 36- 37 & 41 & 43; Pettengill, Letters From America, 1776-1779, 130-131; for more on Boston, see Lamb, Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War, 198-200.

210 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 36-37.

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Cambridge.211 Heath, in response, tried improving circumstances by pressuring the

Massachusetts Council in writing to provide rooms for officers since their previous orders had little affect with the public. He warned the Council that “The honor of the state is in danger” due to these troubles and urged it to make more rooms available for officers.212

Heath, without a doubt, understood that contented senior officers would likely be more willing to help maintain order at their barracks. However, Eastern Department officers’ and the Massachusetts Council’s inability to force residents made solving the housing problem impossible.

Heath’s most ambitious attempt to find housing space for Convention Army officers in Cambridge took place on Harvard College’s grounds. However, in early

November, Heath recognized in a letter to the Massachusetts Council that he lacked authority to appropriate the space and asked the Council to use its powers written in

Massachusetts’s constitution to secure at least one of Harvard’s buildings to house the officers.213 The Council that month granted him authority to use rooms in Massachusetts

Hall on the grounds unless he located other suitable quarters within the officers’ parole boundaries, and they compensated the school for any damages and paid for board.214 The

211 Batchelder, “Burgoyne and His Offices in Cambridge 1777-1778,” Cambridge Historical Society, XIII: 22-23. He also labeled residents’ refusals to provide quarters for Convention Army officers as the “The Great Cambridge Conspiracy,” see 41. 212 Heath to The Council of Massachusetts, November 11, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 176-177; for more of Heath’s warnings about officers’ limited quarters to the Massachusetts Council, see Heath to The Council of Massachusetts, November 18, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 179; for Heath’s orders to obtain particular houses for senior Convention Army officers in and around Cambridge, see Heath to Chase, November 7, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 175.

213 Heath to The Council of Massachusetts, November 11, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 177. 214 Faculty of Harvard College To The Council of Massachusetts, November 20, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 182; for more on the Council’s orders and specific correspondence concerning the hall, see Batchelder, “Burgoyne and His Offices in Cambridge 1777-1778,”in Cambridge Historical Society, XIII: 47-48; for Heath asking the Harvard governing board to have “students in Massachusetts Hall 101

Harvard governing board convened a meeting on November 14 and discussed the unusual matter, but delayed a firm commitment. It concluded that the college should “be sensible to the many great difficulties and hazards to the interest of the college that must be incur’d” from housing Convention Army officers at the college. It clung to the naive hope that the officers could yet find other private arrangements somewhere else in

Cambridge. However, if necessary it agreed to provide only twelve rooms in a recently obtained residence for officers’ use “upon reasonable terms.”215 By November 18, Heath had learned that Harvard had 90 rooms for officers’ use at the college.216 Housing

Convention officers at Harvard would not have fully solved American authorities’ housing shortages, but reduced it.

Harvard’s authorities’ refusals to follow Heath’s plans worsened the housing space concerns in Cambridge. Heath proved unsuccessful in gaining housing at Harvard because of the faculty concerns. Despite the Council’s previous orders, the faculty on

November 18 detailed a series of excuses for not following the Council’s orders because they feared that Convention Army officers would damage rooms, require rent measures, and students would have to leave their rooms.217 Batchelder found that having no luck convincing the Council and Heath about changing their orders, the faculty took their

remove their effects as soon as possible,” see Heath to The Corporation of Harvard College, November 19, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 181-182; for Heath ordering Chase to work with Harvard to determine a rent fee for Convention Army officers using rooms in Massachusetts Hall, see Heath to Chase, November 22, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 186.

215 Action of Harvard College, November 14, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 177-178.

216 Heath to The Council of Massachusetts, November 18, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 179. 217 Faculty of Harvard College to The Council of Massachusetts, November 18, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 182-183.

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objections to the Massachusetts House of Representatives. The House appointed another committee to investigate, but Heath eventually gave up on his quest to house officers at

Harvard.218

To resolve the problem, Heath also tried enlarging Convention Army officers’ housing space after expanding parole boundaries and having the captive officers sign honor pledge restrictions. Heath’s plan for boundaries provided the only systematic means of addressing housing needs for Convention Army officers. As previously discussed officers in the eighteenth century expected their captors to grant them parole as a courtesy under the laws of war. Parole boundaries were areas officers could reside and travel through without direct supervision from their captors. Officers, typically on their honor, agreed in their paroles not to travel beyond the boundaries. On the army’s arrival,

Heath required Convention Army officers had to stay within their parole boundaries and junior officers return to their rooms by the late evening. Officers who traveled beyond their parole boundaries would face close confinement in Cambridge.219 These expected rules would only decrease the housing space available for Convention Army officers.

Heath’s ambitious plan required using vacant homes and expanding parole boundaries around Boston into the neighborhoods of Medford and Menontomy. After placing some officers, Heath extended parole limits to include the road to Watertown. As in Cambridge, Watertown residents resisted housing British officers, but Heath found

218 Batchelder, “Burgoyne and His Offices in Cambridge 1777-1778,” in Cambridge Historical Society, XIII: 50-51.

219 State of Massachusetts Bay, November 8, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778, ii-iii. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273; Von Eelking, trans. Stone, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, I: 223-224.

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lodgings for a large number. Some officers, however, had to reside in the barracks after no lodging could be found that winter.220 Ultimately, playing the role of broker placed

Heath in an impossible situation because of his limited resources.

Housing space problems worsened on Prospect Hill and Winter Hills because many junior officers lived there with the enlisted men. Officers’ presence at the barracks filled the huts beyond their capacity. Riedesel told Burgoyne as many as 24 men shared a barrack with nearly no basic necessities for comfort and light.221 Burgoyne complained to Heath that he had seen more comfortable jails since these quarters did not suite gentlemen “in any part of the world” after militiamen crowded six to eight officers together in rooms only eight feet square with nowhere to cook, eat, or sleep comfortably.222 Even Burgoyne could not receive proper accommodations fitting his status during the army’s first days in Cambridge. He rejected Heath’s first two suggestions for him and his staff “since either would make my condition worse than it is.”223 Heath had ordered Chase, on the day of the Convention Army’s arrival, to “obtain

220 Batchelder, “Burgoyne and His Offices in Cambridge 1777-1778,” in Cambridge Historical Society, XIII: 54-56.

221Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 219.

222 Burgoyne to Heath, November 10, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. iv-v; each day a staff officer visited the two hills for inspection and to address any problems, see Von Eelking, trans. Stone, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, I: 225; for more on officers’ troubles on the barrack hills, see Pettengill, trans. Letters From America, 1776-1779, 129; Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 36-37.

223 Burgoyne to Heath, November 12, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. vii-viii; Heath to Burgoyne, November 11, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. Vi; for Heath searching

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proper houses upon the best terms you can for the accommodation of” senior officers around Cambridge.224 Heath eventually found senior officers housing in unoccupied homes in Cambridge and Burgoyne settled at the former home of Continental Army

Brigadier General Israel Putnam.225 For the remainder of the army’s confinement in

Cambridge, most junior officers were not so lucky. Housing officers with their men undoubtedly improved discipline, but concurrently forced a large number of the captives to share huts and contributed to the space problem.

Burgoyne recognized that the Americans had no housing space to adequately confine the army. The housing troubles convinced Convention Army officers that their captors had deliberately violated their convention pledges. After all, Gates in the convention had pledged Convention Army officers and soldiers housing privileges in and around Boston.226 In November of 1777, Burgoyne wanted Heath to issue a passport and send a British officer to Congress and Washington explaining that the Americans had undermined the convention because of the accommodation troubles.227 Burgoyne’s complaints eventually made matters worse for the officers after Congress that fall investigated convention violations committed by the British general. Frustrated that the

Massachusetts Council repeatedly failed to enforce its orders for locals to provide

224 Heath to Chase, November 7, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 175.

225 Heath to Washington, November 23, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 362; for Riedesel and his families accommodations, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 217-218.

226 Articles of Convention between Lieutenant General Burgoyne and Major General Gates, October 16, 1777, in The Orderly Book of Lt. General John Burgoyne from His Entry into the State of New York until His Surrender at Saratoga, 16 October, 1777, Burgoyne, ed. E.B. O'Callaghan M.D, 146.

227 Heath to The Council of Massachusetts, November 18, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 178-179.

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housing for officers and improve the barracks, Burgoyne wrote that “the public faith is broke, & we are the immediate sufferers.”228 Heath, however, vigorously denied

Burgoyne’s charges about officers’ accommodations within Cambridge and the barracks.

He refused to concede “that the convention is infringed” because he had to “quarter a large number of” officers. Heath assured him these circumstances would improve, and most Continental Army officers garrisoned in the town had suffered and lived in the same barracks the previous winters.229 Captive officers’ anger over housing only made them less cooperative with Continental Army and Massachusetts officials.

Transferring some prisoners to Rutland, a town about 60 miles west of Boston, provided a different solution to solving housing space shortages in April of 1778. Heath attempted to solve housing difficulties by allowing the British prisoners’ to start marching for Rutland.230 Congress initially approved 500 British troops’ relocation to barracks in Rutland and ordered more “temporary barracks at that place for the remainder of the British” and Massachusetts authorities “to take effectual measures to render an escape impracticable.” The congressional government approved the Hessian prisoners of the Convention Army remain incarcerated in Cambridge “if no other places more safe and convenient at a greater distance from Boston can be had.”231 Congress had a few months earlier in February considered removing the Convention Army somewhere else

228 Burgoyne to Gates, November 14, 1778, Gates Papers, NYHS.

229 Heath to Burgoyne, November 11, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. v-vi.

230 Heath to Washington, April 13, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 228.

231 JCC, 1774-1789, May 30, 1778, XI: 556.

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since delegates had reports of the prisoners “distressing” Cambridge inhabitants. After the Board of War recommended that the Convention Army leave Boston, Congress ordered the Massachusetts Council authority to divide the prisoners and place them anywhere else in the state “convenient for their subsistence and security.” It also recommended completing work on barracks in Cambridge for housing and resolving the increasing housing and provision problem232 However, nothing ever came of these congressional orders. Nevertheless, Congress’s approval to transfer British prisoners granted Heath more authority to initiate his relocation plan and find more accommodations for the captives.

Unfortunately, Rutland proved inadequate for increasing housing space for

Convention Army captives. The move proved unsuccessful in improving the situation because Rutland had no better accommodations than Boston. For instance, Riedesel’s memoirs noted that senior officers stayed behind in Cambridge because Rutland had no extra rooms available for their use.233 The first several hundred captives arrived in April to discover conditions primitive at best after their jailors forced them into barracks.

Sergeant Lamb wrote that the Rutland encampment consisted of a small 2-3 acre area surrounded by a fence and sharpened wooden pickets stuck into the ground. Located in the woods, sentries patrolled outside the fence and two guards watched the gate at all times. The captives made their huts inside the enclosed area and their guards resided in a nearby guardhouse.234

232 JCC, 1774-1789, February 19, 1778, X: 184-185.

233 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 43.

234 Lamb, Journal of Occurrences During the Late American War, 208. 107

The American revolutionaries’ accommodations in Rutland did not solve their problems because residents were as uncooperative as those in Boston. John Gooch,

Heath’s Deputy Quarter Master General, charged with managing the British prisoners at

Rutland, reported most residents refused to open their homes to prisoners. After attending a town meeting in nearby Hardwick, he personally witnessed most attendees vote not to offer rooms to officers, despite orders from his superiors. Some residents told

Gooch privately they would have provided rooms, but feared their neighbors’ setting ablaze their homes. Despite fears, he somehow convinced a few members of this group to house officers.235 A few days later, he reported that some inhabitants became so unhappy that they threatened to leave and demanded to see his orders for placing British officers near their town.236 These troubles in Rutland showed that even relocating a few thousand British captives would not end the housing space problem in Massachusetts; provisions proved to be another problem.

*****

Heath and Massachusetts authorities’ limited provisions further revealed that the

Americans had insufficient space to contain an army of prisoners in Massachusetts.

Specifically, American authorities could not effectively increase the provisions needed for Convention Army captives because of the Continental Army’s limited capacity and the environment could not furnish adequate supplies. These essential supplies and provisions included fuel, wood, blankets, clothes, and food, which impacted the captives’

235 John Gooch to Heath, June 12, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 238-239.

236 Gooch to Heath, June 15, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 240. 108

environment. Obtaining money and food provisions from Connecticut, the British, and

Burgoyne’s ransom only temporarily relieved the supply shortages. Thus Heath and the

Massachusetts Council could not meet the needs of captives. Ultimately, the

Massachusetts government never produced nor found enough resources to sufficiently provision and supply Convention Army needs in Massachusetts.

First, Boston had inadequate supplies for holding the Convention Army in the town. Heath urged Congress a few weeks after the army’s capture to move Convention

Army officers and troops immediately anywhere possible since Boston had few provisions for the prisoners, particularly wood and fuel. Heath summed up the bleak circumstances to Congress:

The obtaining of fuel will be attended with much trouble; wood is now at the price of twelve and fourteen dollars per cord and the inhabitants cannot obtain a supply. Congress will be sensible that this extra demand will be great, and the inhabitants will suffer, unless some mode can be devised for the obtaining a supply from the eastward.

The surrounding terrain lacked resources and Heath needed British ships to bring supplies from the east because many of the Americans ships had been captured by the British. He concluded without “obtaining a protection from Lord Howe for such coasters,” or “some step of this kind I fear we shall be much embarrassed.”237 Thus Heath had recognized immediately that the Americans faced a troublesome problem in Boston following the

Convention Army’s arrival.

The Continental Army’s Commissary Department could not compensate for

Boston’s limitations because they had an inadequate supply system for producing and

237 Heath to The President of Congress, October 25, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 167- 168; for Heath’s same concerns about supplies and removing the army to Washington, see Heath to Washington, October 25, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 166-167. 109

distributing resources. Carp has noted Congress attempted in 1777 to reorganize the

Commissary Department after learning that extensive “corruption” had occurred among commissary officials after they had wasted “public money” and unfairly raised the prices for goods. However, Congress feared centralizing its power and providing commissary generals with too much control over administrative matters.238 Ultimately, American authorities could not effectively end the provision problems because of the Continental

Army’s administrative troubles. The Continental Army’s system depended on commissary agents to locate and purchase supplies from inhabitants. This made circumstances difficult because during the fall and winter of 1777, the Continental Army commissaries found insufficient footwear and clothing and the Board of War approved obtaining supplies through force.239 In November, Heath noted to Congress that including Convention Army troops, guards, and other prisoners of war, he had somewhere between 6,000 to 7,000 men to provision around Boston. He again asked

Congress to undertake whatever measures necessary, and send more commissaries to improve the situation.240

The Continental Army’s disorganized Quartermaster and Commissary

Departments turned into one of Heath’s largest problems. An angry Heath admitted in late November that “I have been much embarrassed in the commissary’s department” by its recent internal disputes and he clashed with newly arriving Continental Army

238 Carp, To Starve The Army At Pleasure, 37-41.

239 Richard Peters to Washington, November 7, 1777, eds. Grizzard, Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 158; Washington to Peters, November 11, 1777, eds. Grizzard, Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 212; for more on the Continental Army’s supply troubles, see Washington to George Clinton, February 16, 1778, PGW, XIII: 552-553.

240 Heath to Laurens, November 19, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 180-181.

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commissaries for supplies after learning of congressional orders to move elsewhere “all the provisions and stores” he had available for his troops in Boston. Consequently, he ignored these orders and confiscated Boston’ supply stores and appointed new temporary commissaries.241 The Continental Army’s Quartermaster and Commissary divisions simply had too many mouths to feed in Massachusetts.

All of the Continental Army’s provision shortages made it impossible for

Washington to solve Heath’s supply problems. Washington advised Heath that Congress likely “will give proper directions in this matter,” but Washington was focused more on keeping Convention Army troops from the British. He held no faith the British government planned to honor the convention pledges and withhold the prisoners from rejoining the war. From his headquarters at Whitemarsh in Pennsylvania, he warned

Heath that “I do not think it our interest, to expedite the passage of the prisoners to

England” because the British would “immediately throw them into different garrisons, and bring out an equal number.” He concluded in November that the Americans should supply necessary rations for the captives, but not provisions for a voyage to delay any embarkation.242 Consequently, Washington focused more on the captive army’s security and military potential rather than its daily needs and later influenced Congress’s decision to hold Convention Army prisoners in America.

241 Heath to Washington, November 21, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 185.

242 Washington to Heath, November 5, 1777, eds. Grizzard, Jr., and David R. Hoth, PGW, XII: 132; Washington to Jeremiah Dummer Powell, November 5, 1777, eds. Grizzard, Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 137-138; Washington to Heath, November 13, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 238 -239; Heath promised to “pay strict attention to” Washington’s opinion on the Convention Army’s embarkation, see Heath to Washington, November 23, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 362; Heath to Washington, November 26, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 411-412; Washington to Laurens, November 26-27, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 421.

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Heath and the Council took several measures to end the provision problems and they first extended their requests for food beyond Massachusetts to nearby states. Heath charged Deputy Quartermaster General Charles Miller, and his commissary department to undertake whatever actions required for supplying the captives.243 Moreover, Heath sought supplies in Connecticut. Heath in November sent a message to Connecticut

Governor Jonathan Trumbull informing him that the captive army and their guards needed “a large supply of provisions for their subsistence” and requesting he allow an officer “to purchase and drive from your state a number of fat cattle for that purpose.”244

Trumbull only granted “a permit for seventy cattle at this time” from Connecticut for the troubled authorities in Massachusetts.245

The Massachusetts Council and Heath also attempted to expand the Americans’ capacity to provision Convention Army prisoners by turning to the British for aid and money. Most European governments in the eighteenth century compensated opposing governments for the costs of their prisoners’ supplies.246 Although the British government and army refused to recognize Continental Army and naval prisoners as legal combatants, the respective commissary departments of Britain and the United States sent agents to distribute money and provisions to confined captives. During the war, officers allowed captured enemy officers to seek supplies from their respective armies and government. Heath would do the same and continuously encouraged senior Convention

243 Heath to Charles Miller, October 27, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 169-170.

244 Heath to Jonathan Trumbull, November 2, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 172.

245 Trumbull to Heath, November 7, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 175.

246 Doyle, The Enemy In Our Hands, 12.

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Army officers to seek British aid from New York and Rhode Island. Heath wrote in late

April of 1778 that British provisions and money had the potential to reduce provision costs and grant the Americans the chance to totally focus on their soldiers supply needs.247 Burgoyne first requested British passports from Major General Robert Pigot in

November, commander of the British army in Rhode Island, to transport supplies into

Boston. Heath had no objection since “Blanketing or other articles necessary for the comfort of your troops cannot be obtained in Boston” and pledged to send a trusted man to receive passports and grant a quartermaster access to necessities.248

However, British sources largely proved unsuccessful in increasing Convention

Army stores because they had few extra provisions and funds available for supplying their own army. Burgoyne, however, would persistently request British money, provisions, and transports from Rhode Island and New York. The requests sometimes produced results, but never fully met the army’s needs. A typical case occurred in

January of 1778 after Burgoyne requested passports from British Paymaster David

Geddes to fetch money from Newport, so his troops could purchase supplies in Boston.249

Sympathizing with Burgoyne, Pigot could only grant Geddes £20,000 for the Convention

Army, but recommended Clinton dispatch more monetary assistance from New York

247 Heath to Washington, April 26, 1778, ed. Hoth. PGW, XIV: 649; for Heath’s plans for consistent British supplies entering Boston for Convention Army prisoners, see Heath to Pigot, April 24, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 231-233.

248 For Burgoyne’s request for passports, see Burgoyne to Heath, November 18, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. x; for Heath and the quote, see Heath to Burgoyne, November 21, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xiii.

249 Burgoyne to Major General Robert Pigot, January 4, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

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City.250 The British had little money for purchasing and delivering goods, and Howe warned Clinton in March of 1778 that “the military chest at New York is totally exhausted by the large remittance sent to Rhode Island for the use of the troops under

General Burgoyne.” In response, Howe informed Clinton that he had ordered Pigot to prepare four months of supplies for future Convention Army supply shipments.251 The

British reluctance to dispatch money and provisions made Convention Army shortages worse.

For the Eastern Department and Massachusetts Council, ransom was another means of meeting the Convention Army’s provision needs after Congress paroled

Burgoyne instead of exchanging him for Continental Army officers and troops. Congress agreed to parole Burgoyne in the spring of 1778 for reasons of ill-health.252 Exactly how much money the Eastern Department and Massachusetts spent to supply Convention

Army captives will likely never be known. The British estimated by the fall of 1778 that the Americans’ requests for monetary compensation to settle Convention Army debts could cost the British government £200,000 a year.253 However, settling Burgoyne’s accounts turned into a chance to gain a return for previous expenses and care. After negotiations, Heath recognized a golden opportunity and noted on March 21, 1778, that

250 Pigot to Clinton, January 11, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

251 Howe to Clinton, March 16, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for Howe’s same orders to Pigot concerning supplies and four months, see Howe to Pigot, March 16, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; the British recognized Americans’ adjusted monetary costs ridiculously high for the army’s provisions, see Phillips to Richard Prescott, October or November, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; Jonathan Clark to Clinton, October 25, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

252 JCC, 1774-1789, March 3, 1778, X: 218.

253 William Eden to Clinton, November 7, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

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Burgoyne “is to replace a considerable quantity of the provisions, which I think is a happy circumstance in our favor at this time.”254

Specifically, Burgoyne and Heath agreed on April 2, 1778, that the British would provide food and money for the Convention Army’s detention expenses after Burgoyne’s release. Burgoyne would pay Heath nearly £29,000, 000 for his army’s fuel expenses.

Fuel costs included debts recorded by Glover during the march. The Americans would receive a “quantity of barreled provision equal to the” amount charged on Burgoyne’s accounts by Heath’s commissary, Miller. The agreements specified that at least half of the provision supplies needed to arrive in Boston Harbor within twenty days of Burgoyne reaching Newport. The British could send the remainder from New York City forty days after Burgoyne’s departure.255 Burgoyne’s ransom only temporarily strengthened the

Revolutionaries’ capacity to provide provisions for the captive army’s needs, but could not reduce the rising disorder and violence in Cambridge.

254 Heath to Washington, March 21, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 221.

255 Agreement As To The Payment For Provisions, ETC, April 2, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 225-226; for the inventory of goods shipped by the British to the Americans, see Return of Provisions, April 2, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. lxxxvi; for the Americans and British agreements at Newport, see ARTICLES of Agreement, April 10, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. lxxxi-lxxxiv;Burgoyne had to wait for an American officer to escort him to Rhode Island and passports from Heath, see Burgoyne to Heath, March 31, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. lxxv- lxxiv; for British instructions on supplying the troops in accords to the agreement, see Pigot to Deputy Commissary Major Morrison, April 11, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. lxxxiv-lxxxv.

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*****

Housing limitations in the barracks led to violent quarrels and desertions that made Convention Army prisoners a dangerous nuisance to the community. For the

Americans, the violence and desertions created unfeasible conditions for confining

Convention Army prisoners in Massachusetts. Both local and Eastern Department officials lacked the guards, infrastructure, and a reliable security system to control and supervise the prisoners. The prisoners’ sheer numbers made it nearly impossible for the

Americans to control them at the barracks. As a result, angry captives routinely and violently challenged their militia guards. At least two prisoners died in quarrels, and many more deserted searching for essentials. American troubles in the prisoners’ barracks showed that security was a problem. Ultimately, the Massachusetts Council and

Eastern Department could not secure the captives and calm local fears of a potential riot.

Consequently, Congress would order the captive army moved to Virginia.

Guards lacked the experience to control prisoners at the barracks in

Massachusetts. Violent quarrels started on both Prospect Hill and Winter Hill because the Americans’ housing space limitations. In addition, guards struggled to control the captives because Heath relied on inexperienced Massachusetts militiamen to manage them at the barracks. Before the captives’ arrival, Heath had “applied for 1,000 or 1,200 men for guards” from the Massachusetts government.256 However, Anburey recorded that largely old men and teenagers served as guards. He observed these undisciplined guards created troubles for the prisoners for the reasons that most could not read signed

256 Heath to Washington, October 25, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 166; Heath to The President of Congress, October 25, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 167-168.

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passes and often disobeyed “their orders” and did whatever they pleased.257 However, the prisoners mostly had contact with no other authority, while living at the barracks.

Specht recorded that a series of guardhouses encircled the two barracks and no troops and junior officers “could leave that area without a pass.”258 Despite this, Convention Army captives began challenging their inexperienced guards as conditions deteriorated on the hills.

Heath and the Council struggled to contain the violence because they had few resources on Prospect Hill and Winter Hill. They allowed junior captive officers to discipline their troops and conduct regiment roll calls and purchases with commissaries.

Prisoners were generally free to move about their barracks as they pleased during the day until their curfews. Riedesel wrote that “Every day a staff officer was sent upon each of the hills” to address problems. On Thursdays and Sundays, the Convention Army regiments grouped together at the two barracks for parades and their generals looked over the troops’ lines and clothes to maintain cleanliness and discipline.259 However, officers’ control over their troops was limited since the Americans confined them as prisoners of war. Heath had granted Massachusetts native, William R. Lee, authority to confine

Convention Army troops within their limits and officers to their lodgings until they agreed to their paroles. Lee further received authorization to assign additional guards if

257 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 47-48.

258 Specht, The Specht Journal, ed. Lynn, trans. Doblin, 110; for another brief reference on the chain of outposts, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 221.

259 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 225.

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necessary to keep the captives orderly and Cambridge secure.260 However, because the

Americans lacked the capacity to build housing and provide provisions conflicts between the guards and captives only increased.

Prisoners’ lack of housing space and food provisions created conditions for violence at the barracks. One incident in particular reveals how the violent circumstances made it impossible for the Americans to secure the captives within the limited space of the barracks and Boston. Colonel David Henley, commander of the guards, described to

Heath that on the morning of January 8, 1778, he investigated a report that prisoners killed two militiamen on Prospect Hill. He ordered the garrison to arms and took 100 men to investigate the matter and learned a British soldier had nearly killed a sentry after hitting him with a rock. Captives took up arms with clubs during a search for the prisoner and sentry’s weapon. Henley ordered a group of prisoners to disperse, but “they did it with so much reluctance and insolence that I run a British soldier through the body and push with such force that it may prove fatal to him.” Two other prisoners and an

American soldier suffered wounds.261

Many prisoners testified at Henley’s court martial about the violent encounter at the overcrowded barracks. A British Corporal of the Convention Army identified as

Buchannan testified that a heated verbal confrontation ensued after Henley questioned captives confined at the guardhouse and called a British soldier named Corporal Reeves a name he took issue with. Already confined to the guardhouse, Reeves declared that he

260 Heath to William R. Lee, November 7, 1777, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 176; Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 225.

261 David Henley to Heath, January 8, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 201-202.

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planned to fight the Americans again “for my king and country.” Henley informed

Reeves to be quiet and attacked the corporal after a “guard” refused to carry out his orders “to run the prisoner thro” with a bayonet. After wounding Reeves with a bayonet,

Henley threatened while pressing the blade to Reeves chest if the prisoner “said another word, he would have it thro’ his body.”262 Reeves survived his wound, but violent quarrels between the captives and their guards only increased at the barracks. The near death of Reeves revealed that the lack of space in the barracks led to security breakdowns and created conditions for violence in the barracks.

The Henley incident revealed that the Continental Army and Massachusetts government desperately needed more space for security purposes beyond the small neighborhoods of Boston. Convention Army officers’ reaction to the Henley Affair affected Heath and Burgoyne because the two squabbled on blame and proper punishment for Henley. In a letter to Heath only a day after the incident, Burgoyne interpreted Reeves’s wound and beating as inexcusable. In addition, he complained about the Americans’ treatment and officially accused Henley of unlawful behavior and

“intentional murder.”263 Heath countered that same day that the British prisoners at the

262 Henley, The Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Held at Cambridge, on Tuesday the Twentieth of January; and Continued by Several Adjournments to Wednesday the 25th of February: Upon the Trail of Colonel David Henley. Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. No.16139. Boston: J. Gill, 1778, 9-10 & 13 & 78.

263 Burgoyne to Heath, January 9, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxx-xxxi; for more criticisms of Henley’s conduct and Burgoyne pushing for a court martial to allow witnesses to be placed under oath , see Burgoyne to Heath, January 12, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxiv- xxxv; for more , see Burgoyne to Heath, January 13, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 119

barracks had proved troublesome after they continuously offended and mistreated their guards and forged passes to leave against his orders whenever they pleased.264 Moreover,

Heath defended the arrests and warned prisoners who discarded orders would face consequences, but ordered “Henley under arrest, and appointed a court of inquiry” to investigate Burgoyne’s charges under the direction of Glover.265 Heath and Burgoyne’s arguments about security ultimately could not end without more space for the prisoners.

Henley’s trial did not address the Americans’ space concerns in the barracks.

Glover’s investigation committee ruled eight days after its appointment on January 18 that Burgoyne’s evidence warranted “a special general court martial.”266 By the end of

1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxvi- xxxvii. 264 Heath to Burgoyne, January 9, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxi-xxxii.

265 Heath to Burgoyne, January 10, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxiii-xxxiv; Heath to Burgoyne, January 13, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxvi; Heath defended the Court of Inquiry as standard procedure for investigating similar matters in the Continental Army, see Heath to Burgoyne, January 13, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxvi; Heath, Heath’s Memoirs of the American War, 165; for a list of court members and their inquiry duties, see PAROLE, January 18, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xliii.

266 Heath, Heath’s Memoirs of the American War, 165-166; for a list of the Court of Inquiry members, see page 165; Burgoyne also submitted five questions through Heath for the Court of Inquiry relating to oaths, witnesses, and the court’s authority. For the specific questions and the Court of Inquiry’s responses, see (no same to send to ands unsigned), January 14, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxix; for Glover and the Court’s responses, see Glover, (likely sent to Heath), (undated) Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxix.

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February, the Court ruled Burgoyne’s charges of intentional murder dismissed because

Henley had followed orders to secure the barracks and not planned on attacking

Reeves.267 The trial would have no affect on the Americans’ overcrowding concerns at the barracks.

American revolutionaries’ limited space only created conditions for more violence in Massachusetts. A German prisoner in January of 1778, likely an officer, faced confinement on a gun-ship after raising his sword to a guard in the Cambridge barracks.268 Inhabitants’ grievance reports for an Eastern Department Court of Inquiry shows the escalation of violence. One court in February investigated five separate confrontations alone. This included the stabbing of a British captive trying to escape the barracks and a complaint by one Mr. Ephraim Muller against a British officer “for following him with a drawn bayonet” and “swearing to burn his father’s house.”269

William Warren filed a grievance against British Captain Atherton “for threatening his person, scandalizing the country, and going beyond the limits assigned the officers.”270

Heath also suspected escapees committed a number of robberies of travelers and residents.. Burgoyne retorted the various accusations against his army “are false, others exaggerated, and none” sanctioned through him. He concluded that the Americans’

267 Henley, The Proceedings of a General Court-Martial, Held at Cambridge, on Tuesday the Twentieth of January. Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no.16139. 78-88.

268 Henley to Heath, January 9, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxii.

269 Extract From General Orders, February 14, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. lii.

270 Ibid.

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treatment and imprisonment of his army proved far worse than anything his troops had done to their jailors.271 These issues further showed American authorities could not securely hold the Convention Army in Massachusetts without an adequate security system and more space for the prisoners.

In the summer of 1778, two prisoners’ deaths dramatically showed American authorities need for greater control. Riedesel’s memoirs reveal in mid-June of 1778 an unnamed Brunswick soldier was killed after defending his wife near the sentry outposts from a group of militiamen’s unwanted advances. After beating back the militiamen with a cane, a nearby sentry bayoneted the captive and the Brunswick soldier “soon expired.”

What happened to the sentry after the attack is unclear.272 Furthermore, Heath explained to Congress that a guard shot and killed British Lieutenant Richard Brown on June 17,

1778, on Prospect Hill, as he attempted to move past the sentry line “after not stopping when repeatedly challenged.”273 Heath informed Washington later that month that a court of inquiry found nothing against the guard. Brown had ignored orders to halt at the guard’s request before crossing the sentry line and he had no pass. Thus the guard had

271 Heath to Burgoyne, January 10, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxiii-xxxiv; for Burgoyne’s response, see Burgoyne to Heath, January 13, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xxxviii.

272 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans Stone, II: 28-29.

273 Heath to Henry Laurens, June 19, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 240-241; for Heath informing Philips of the incident, see Heath to Phillips, June 17, 1778, in Heath’s Memoirs of the American War, 177; for Heath describing Brown’s death to Washington, see Heath to Washington, June 22, 1778, PGW, XV: 499; for the coroner’s short and rather vague report, see Joel Smith Coroner, June 18, 1778, Heath’s Memoirs of the American War, 186-187; for Congress listening the investigation report, see JCC, 1774-1789, July 7, 1778, XI: 672. 122

correctly followed procedure at the barracks.274 The incident had immediate consequences because after Brown’s death, a group of British prisoners disarmed and attacked the teenage guard who had shot Brown. The guard somehow survived the attack.275 The officers’ deaths near Prospect Hill demonstrated the need for greater authority outside Massachusetts.

Increased desertions were another consequence of the Americans’ poor control, which would contribute to Congress seeking an alternative confinement location outside

Massachusetts. Shortly after reaching Cambridge, Burgoyne blamed the Americans for not providing adequate barracks and essentials, which led to desertions. He noted to

Heath that he had received letters from Convention Army escapees claiming they deserted to survive. He also argued locals and guards pressured deserters to join the

American army after their escape by distributing alcohol and money as inducements. He concluded that deserters “hourly” joined American units and tried to persuade others to join them.276 All his officers could do was to discourage troops from deserting by making examples of recaptured deserters. Riedesel’s memories reveal that Brunswick

274 Heath reported to Washington shortly after Brown’s death about the Court of Inquiry findings, see Heath to Washington, June 29, 1778, ed. Lengel. The Papers of George Washington, XV: 586-587; Congress ultimately commended Heath’s report and conduct managing the Brown incident, see JCC, 1774- 1789, July 7, 1778, XI: 672; Washington also approved of Heath’s actions, see Washington to Heath, July 3, 1778, ed. Hoth, PGW, XVI: 18; Heath accepted Washington’s praise, see Heath to Washington, August 12, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 249.

275 the sentry who shot Brown was a 14 year old teenager and militiamen. After shooting Brown, British prisoners beat him up, see note # 1, ed. Lengel, PGW, XV: 499-500; for more for British outrage over Brown’s death, see Phillips to Heath, June 17, 1778, in Heath, Heath’s Memoirs of the American War, 177-178.

276 Burgoyne to Heath, November 18, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xi-xii; Riedesel wrote the Americans allowed non-Convention Army prisoners disguised in civilian clothing to enter the barracks and entice the troops to desert, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, I: 224. 123

officers on one occasion recaptured a deserter and “in the presence of all the troops” had him “tied to a post” before giving him “thirty lashes” and cutting off his hair. The

Americans allowed the officers to inflict their punishment on the soldier without interfering. Convention Army captives continued to desert to their barracks, however.277

Nevertheless, senior Convention Army officers proved powerless to enlarge the barracks to increase the housing space for their soldiers to live in.

Richard Sampson found that junior officers became a big part of the desertion problem because they provided fake passports for their troops to escape. Senior officers generally did not encourage their soldiers to desert posts since it demonstrated dishonorable behavior and often cost them and their government bounty money to rebuild regiments. Most often British troops’ reasons for leaving their units behind did not matter to their officers and they received the label of deserter anyway. Therefore, many

British army officers and troops regarded desertion and escape as equivalent.278

Revolutionaries could not stop the high number of desertions without finding more housing space for strengthening their capacity to secure the barracks. Heath, in a letter to Burgoyne in November of 1777, never denied the shortages, but requested more assistance from Convention Army officers to make examples of troublemakers and recaptured deserters without resorting to capital punishments. He concluded that desertions occurred in all armies and were not surprising for a captured army in such

277 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 24; for Burgoyne criticizing deserters and discouraging the practice among the Convention troops, see Burgoyne, December 4, 1777, in Hadden, Hadden’s Journal and Orderly Books, 330-331.

278 Sampson, Escape in America, xiii & 63-65. Sampson also noted that the British army had no word for escape, just desertion, in their ranks.

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circumstances.279 However, desertions remained high since militiamen could not adequately supervise the prisoners and enticed escapees to desert with promises they could secure money and provisions outside their confinement areas. Desertions continued because Eastern Department and local authorities never adequately increased their capacity to produce more provisions and housing space at the barracks.

Ultimately, the high number of Convention Army desertions reveals that the

Eastern Department and Massachusetts authorities had insufficient staff and housing space to maintain adequate security at the barracks. George Knepper wrote that at least

1,368 combined British and German troops escaped during their year-long detention in

Massachusetts. More desertions took place in Massachusetts than in Virginia and elsewhere during the Convention Army’s imprisonment in America.280 Ultimately, most escapees were British captives searching for their lines. An unknown number of escapees reached British lines in New York City and Newport. Desertions, for instance, became so high that Riedesel even requested Howe provide Brunswick escapes with necessities and money in New York City.281 It is likely that about several hundred rejoined British

279 Heath to Burgoyne, November 21, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xiii-xiv; Congress issued contradictory policies about enlisting prisoners. Heath recognized this and wanted instructions since Convention troops would likely enlist in the American army, see Heath to Washington, May 25, 1778, ed. Lengel. PGW, XV: 215; for a sketchy map of 29 locations where Americans held Convention Army escapes during the war, see Sampson, Escape in America, 67.

280 Knepper provides a diagram of desertion rates from a Convention Army troop return he found in the Clinton Papers, see Knepper, “The Convention Army, 1777-1783,” 197; Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 207-208.

281 Riedesel to Howe, May 12, 1778, HMC, I: 250; for more on escapees while the army remained in Massachusetts, see Sampson, Escape in America, 63-81.

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lines, mostly in New York City, and afterwards their senior officers placed most of them in other regiments.

In response, Massachusetts authorities focused more on capturing Convention

Army escapees rather than end the violence. Since Heath and the Council lacked the means and facility to adequately address the root of the problem, they simply hoped to round up as many deserters as possible. A frustrated Massachusetts Council, for instance, ordered its committees of correspondence and selectmen to assist the Continental

Commissary General of Prisoners in locating and arresting Convention Army deserters.

One Deputy Commissary of Prisoners in Boston, Joshua Mersereau, publically condemned escapees and persons assisting their enlistments into American regiments.

He sought public assistance and urged all patriots capture and return deserters. The commissary estimated at least 700 Convention Army escapees enlisted, swore oaths, and deserted to bear arms against the United States after rejoining British lines.282 By the fall of 1778, American authorities’ efforts to capture deserters did nothing to reduce the number of captives leaving their barracks. Ultimately, Heath and local authorities did not have enough adequate security or housing space to prevent desertions in Massachusetts.

All American attempts to reduce security risks proved inadequate without a greater capacity to produce more housing space in the barracks. Heath also attempted to ensure order by collecting hidden firearms from the prisoners. He ordered Burgoyne in

January that Convention Army officers had to hand over any guns in their possession and instructed officers place their arms in “a chest” after identifying on their guns their

282 United States. Continental Army. Commissary General’s Department, “Advertisement Urging Apprehension of Prisoners of War. Evans Digital Collection, Early American Imprints Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no. 16347. Boston: s.n., 1779, 1.

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“name, rank, and regiment.”283 The Massachusetts government decreed that spring its suspicions that a “considerable part of the troops of the Convention have by some means supplied themselves with fire-arms” and “the matter should be immediately examined into…for the safety of the state.” Afterward, Heath had Adjutant General Colonel Keith inspect the barracks with orders to “search such places as are most likely to have arms concealed” and allow officers’ to keep their guns, but take “into custody” Convention

Army soldiers’ guns.284 However, a search of the two barracks found few firearms after the Americans uncovered “about ten” guns “belonging to the officers in the barracks occupied by the German troops” and none among “the English troops.”285 This gun scare demonstrated the Americans’ fears of the captive army and its potential for violence.

The American revolutionaries also needed more space for security purposes because the British army planned to rescue and redeploy the Convention Army. In the fall of 1777, Burgoyne desired his soldiers to embark from British controlled Newport, so he could complete his secret plans with Howe and prepare for another campaign against the American insurgents. This would be made possible with a plan he hatched with

283 Heath to Burgoyne, January 22, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xlvi-xlvii; Heath to Burgoyne, January 30, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xlviii.

284 Heath to Lt. Colonel Keith, March 17, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. lvi; for Heath informing Burgoyne of the impending search of the Convention Army barracks, see Heath to Burgoyne, March 18, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. lvii-lviii;

285 Keith, March 18, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. lvi-lvii.

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Howe. The two generals began planning their secretive operation a little more than a week after the Convention Army arrived in Cambridge. After the army’s arrival, Howe submitted a letter to Burgoyne that fall sketching a potential covert operation to redeploy

Convention Army soldiers in America. Howe’s plan required British naval transports to board Burgoyne’s army in Newport and without the Revolutionaries’ knowledge sail the

British infantry and artillery troops to New York City. The naval captain had instructions to follow Burgoyne’s destination orders upon meeting him before the departure to assure secrecy.286 Howe’s secret plan revealed the prisoners’ importance for the British army’s plans in America. Howe no doubt saw them as an opportunity to replenish British army ranks and expand his operation capacity. Yet the American revolutionaries could not adequately secure the Convention Army and stop Howe’s plans without first gaining control of the prisoners.

Carl Borick has noted that prisoners’ treatment “has been a concern for armies and their governing authorities since the dawn of warfare” because victors had to find housing and provisions for them following their capture.287 American forces during the

Revolution were no exception to these problems. They did not have the provisions and space in the barracks to hold a captive army in Massachusetts. Space became the

Americans’ most pressing problem. Gates contributed to the space problem because he agreed to generous convention terms he could not uphold and rushed his prisoners’ relocation without making adequate preparations since he was focused on the potential

286Howe to Burgoyne, November 16, 1777, secret correspondence, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

287 Borick, Relieve US of This Burthen, ix. 128

British attack on Albany. As a result, he and his officers improvised arrangements for the march during the prisoners’ 200 mile journey from Freemans Farm to Boston.

All of Heath and the Massachusetts government’s efforts did not end the housing space problem. Heath attempted to find accommodations at Harvard, move British captives to Rutland, expand parole borders for officers, ransom Burgoyne, and obtain money and supplies from Connecticut and the Continental Army. For the

Revolutionaries, housing space shortages and inexperienced militia guards created conditions for violence and made constructing a proper security system and administrative infrastructure at Rutland and Cambridge impossible. Heath and

Massachusetts’s authorities made efforts to strengthen security by arresting unruly captives, collecting weapons, and capturing escapees. Two prisoners died, and escapees combined with the recurring violence made them a troublesome nuisance for the locals and authorities. This forced Congress to use America’s geographical landmass as a strategic means by ordering the captive army to move to a more secure location from

British forces in Virginia.

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CHAPTER IV

AMERICA’S SPACE: CONGRESS AND

CONVENTION ARMY PRISONERS

“That General Washington be directed…to take the necessary steps for removing, with all convenient speed, all the prisoners of the Convention of Saratoga to the town of Charlottesville, in the county of Albemarle, in the state of Virginia.”288

Continental Congress resolution, October 16, 1778

Securing more than 6,000 Convention Army prisoners presented Congress with a problem it had to address after the prisoners exhausted Massachusetts. A resolution passed on October 16 directed Washington to relocate the captive army from

Massachusetts to Charlottesville, Virginia. Congress took the unusual step of ordering the Convention Army’s relocation after Clinton refused to supply the prisoners in

Massachusetts.289 Convention Army prisoners’ confinement placed Congress in a quandary over how to control them. Like the Eastern Department, Congress did not have the means and capacity to secure a large body of prisoners in Boston. British troops, however, could raid Boston from Rhode Island and New York to return prisoners into their ranks. As a result, Congress needed to safeguard Convention Army prisoners elsewhere before the British rescued them. The following chapter argues Congress

288 JCC, 1774-1778, October 16, 1778, XII: 1016.

289 Ibid., 1016-1018; Congress first repudiated the convention embarkation pledge to withhold Convention Army troops in America in January of 1778, see JCC, 1774-1789, January 8, 1778, X: 35; by the fall of 1778, Congress ordered Convention Army captives’ relocation to Virginia under its Board of Wars’ control and discretion, see JCC, 1774-1789, October 8, 1778, XII: 992. 130

turned to America’s size to control and supply Convention Army prisoners by putting them under congressional authority and ordering them moved from Massachusetts since it had no other means to secure large numbers of prisoners. Ultimately, Congress’s actions later contributed to neutralizing the Convention Army and depriving the British of soldiers by placing them at a rural location where the Revolutionaries could hold them more securely in an environment far from their enemy.

Congress’s order to relocate Convention Army prisoners hundreds of miles from

Massachusetts to Virginia made use of geographical space as a strategic means because it began the process of moving the prisoners to an isolated location, away from British strongholds. After Congress ordered the prisoners’ moved in October of 1778, space for the Americans not only came to mean territory, size, essential provisions, facilities, and security, but managing captives from a relative distance from British lines and at a location where accommodations and provisions could be found. Congress’s order to relocate the Convention Army reveals that the congressional government recognized distance and location as essential factors for controlling and providing for the prisoners.

Hence, Congress granted the Board of War broad authority in October of 1778 “to pursue the most speedy and effectual measures for removing the troops under the convention of

Saratoga” to a secure area in Virginia.290 In January of 1779, after a 700 mile march, the

American revolutionaries placed Convention Army officers and troops near

Charlottesville under the congressional governments’ authority, not the state assemblies.

The chapter will first discuss Congress’s unsuccessful efforts to construct an administrative infrastructure and holding system to care for prisoners before Saratoga and

290 JCC, 1774-1789, October 8, 1778, XII: 992. 131

then show how the fledging government gained control over the Convention Army.

Finally, this chapter will close with Congress’s orders for the Convention Army’s march to Virginia and the British Army’s inability to stop Congress from taking advantage of the large terrain. The few historians who have extensively discussed Congress’s involvement with Convention Army prisoners during their first year in confinement have not focused on space as a central theme. They have largely told the story of Congress’s measures to foil the convention treaty to suspend the embarkation and use the captives as hostages for political leverage. For the most part, they have provided readers with a story and not an analytical narrative.291 Rather than retelling the entire story and focusing on these discussions and convention violations, this analysis instead shows how Congress placed Convention Army captives under congressional authority and took advantage of

America’s large size to keep the captives from the British.

*****

Congress had to make the most of America’s space as a means to manage and control Convention Army prisoners because the struggling government never constructed an effective administrative infrastructure and incarceration system for holding captives.

The Eastern Department’s limitations in Massachusetts revealed that such arrangements as existed could not work on a large scale following the capture of the Convention Army.

Such circumstances would force congressional action to order the Convention Army

291 Sampson, Escape in America, 82-88; Sampson was critical of Congress’s actions undermining the convention; Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 210-214; Dabney, After Saratoga, 47-49; for a more broad narrative discussing Congress’s role with Convention Army prisoners and suspending the convention embarkation , see Knepper, “The Convention Army, 1777-1783,” 58-73 & 137-138; Springer, America’s Captives, 21-22; Wall did not focus on these congressional discussions to move the captives, see “The Story of the Convention Army, 1777-1783,” The New York Historical Society Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1927): 67-97. 132

moved from Massachusetts and turn to America’s terrain as a means to hold the

Convention Army prisoners. Congress, however, had no plan in place for using the large territory and managing Convention Army prisoners at another location more capable of providing accommodations and supplies. However, fears of a British rescue and pressure from Continental and Massachusetts authorities to move the Convention Army to another location more suitable for meeting its needs, forced congressional action.

In accordance to the assumed Law of Nations, Congress’s official policy for holding prisoners of war was treating them humanely. In May of 1776, Congress ordered state assemblies to ensure that enemy combatants receive humane treatment, parole officers, and provide captives with the same amount of food provisions as Continental

Army soldiers. Congress, however, stipulated to state assemblies that captured enemy officers avoid coastal towns and not reside with their troops in barracks. No prisoner could join the Continental Army, but state authorities could relocate captives anywhere within their regions. In addition, officers would receive from Congress a few dollars “a week for board and lodgings,” which would be repaid by the officers before their release.292 Congress, however, struggled to enforce their policy because it did not have a proper incarceration system and the means in place to secure captives.

Before Saratoga, Congress was not prepared for the challenges of confining the

Convention Army. Congressional and Continental Army officials had made few

292 JCC, 1774-1789, May 21, 1776, IV: 370-373; one of Congress’s first instructions relating to prisoners decreed captured enemy officers barred from coastal areas where the British army might free them in raids, see JCC, 1774-1783, November 8, 1775; III: 341; for much more on prisoner policy during the war, see Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution; Dixon, “Divided Authority.”; Congress also requested state authorities pay captives’ allowances for their necessary needs. If no money was available from the assemblies, authorities had to seek it from Congress’s president, see JCC, 1774-1789, April 9, 1776, IV; 264-265; Congress also requested account records for all funds forwarded for enemy prisoners’ care and their expenses from state assemblies, see JCC, 1774-1789, August 15, 1777, VIII: 643.

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preparations to detain prisoners largely because they faced endless organizational and supply problems by conducting a war against a superior and more experienced British army. John Adams best summed up its troubles to Greene. He warned Greene in the summer of 1776 that Congress because of its limited experience as a government needed counsel and suggestions on how to manage a war.293 Congress also never established a strong incarceration system because American forces mostly suffered defeats and held few captives. For the purposes of this chapter, Congress’s incarceration system is defined as the process of confining and managing prisoners of war under congressional authority. The late Martha Dixon noted that American forces first took a handful of

British prisoners near Boston in April of 1775 during the skirmishes of Lexington and

Concord.294 The Continental Army would not hold large numbers of prisoners until

Christmas of 1776 after around 900 Hessians laid down their arms at Trenton and 300

British troops were captured near Princeton a few days later.295 Therefore, prior to

Burgoyne’s defeat, Congress, with few prisoners in state governments’ hands did not have a strong need to create permanent holding facilities and a sustainable system for processing prisoners. Nevertheless, the Convention Army’s capture presented a substantial challenge because Congress was unprepared to handle an army of its size.

293 John Adams to Greene, June 22, 1776, ed. Showman, PGNG, I: 240; for much more on Congress’s committee style government to address problems and make recommendations for the whole body to pass, see Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941). 294 Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 10.

295 Washington to Colonel John Calwalader, December 27, 1776, ed. Chase, PGW, VII: 450-451; Washington to John Hancock, December 27, 1776, ed. Chase, PGW, VII: 454; for British prisoners captured at Princeton, see Washington to Hancock, January 5, 1777, ed. Chase, PGW, VII: 521.

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Congress primarily relied on senior Continental Army commanders and local governments far from the coast to manage enemy prisoners of war. In July of 1776,

Congress approved Continental Army department heads to swap prisoners at their discretion for an equal exchange and state assembly’s the “right to make any exchange they think proper for prisoners taken from them or by them.”296 In addition, most British and German land prisoners of war resided under local authorities control in Pennsylvania.

Charles Metzger wrote that American forces specifically placed most British and German prisoners in towns more able to feed and quarter prisoners and reduce chances of a rescue. The Americans moved a large number of their prisoners to Pennsylvania, particularly the town of Lancaster.297 Kenneth Miller has focused on Lancaster and prisoner activities there within his work, “Dangerous guests: Enemy captives and

American national identity in Revolutionary Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1760-1783.” He examined how the town of Lancaster became American revolutionaries’ primary holding area for British and German prisoners since it had housing facilities for prisoners and was located in a patriot stronghold and abundant farming region for feeding captives. These factors and locals’ loyalty and assistance minimized security, housing, and supply problems.298 Miller has noted that prisoners’ presence only increased tensions between the town residents. Many locals remained uncommitted to the Revolution and divided over competing ethnic and spiritual lines. In addition, for supporters of the Revolution,

296 JCC, 1774-1789, July 22, 1776, V: 599; for more, see Bowman, Captive Americans, 3-5.

297 Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 49; for an example of Congress resolving the removal of enemy prisoners captured in Canada to inland locations in Pennsylvania and far from coastal British bases, see JCC, 1774-1783, November 17, 1775, III: 358

298 Miller, “Dangerous guests,” 58; also see, Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 49. 135

the arrival of British captives at the start of the conflict in 1775 brought back memories of frontier violence during the Seven Years War.299 Yet no single town had enough manpower or resources to incarcerate an army of prisoners before Saratoga.

Several other specific factors contributed to Congress not developing an organized incarceration system to manage the Convention Army. Paul Springer has written that, for Congress, the value of prisoners “lay in their role as a diplomatic tool, a means to secure defacto recognition of the American government through diplomatic negotiations to create an exchange cartel,” but for much of the conflict the British government refused to concede officially the crucial point of independence.300 However,

Springer noted that Congress never specifically created an efficient department to manage state assemblies, councils, and committees’ control of prisoners. Congress’s policy, he wrote, “consisted of a series of improvised measures created by Congress, influenced by” Washington and state governments to improve the treatment and exchange of American prisoners of war. State authorities did not always recognize

Congress “as the supreme authority, but it served as a unifying body attempting to create a coherent POW policy that coincided with the war aims of the individual states.”301 As a government, congressional committees largely handled prisoners’ issues case by case, but state authorities and Continental Army commanders discarded orders in favor of their immediate local or departmental interests during the war. Consequently, Congress

299 Miller, “A Dangerous Set of People” British Captives and the Making of Revolutionary Atlantic Identity in the Mid-Atlantic Interior,” Journal of the Early Republic 32, no.4 (2012): 568-569.

300 Springer, America’s Captives, 16.

301 Ibid., 15-16; Bowman, Captive Americans, 68-87; Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 1-21 ;; for three overviews of Congress’s flimsy prisoner policies, see Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 10-30; Springer, America Captives, 15-41; Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 40-63. 136

oversaw an unworkable system that made no serious effort “to utilize the labor and intelligence value of prisoners” during the Revolution.302 Congress’s attempts to improve its system would not prove successful.

Later in the war, Congress unsuccessfully attempted to enable prisoners to pay for their expenses. For instance in the summer of 1782, Congress passed an unsuccessful labor plan. The plan specified prisoners who worked would gain their liberty if citizens who employed them paid a fee in “French guineas” to “the Bank of North America” and signed an agreement “ for any deputy commissary of prisoners” pledging payment and

“the safe return of such a prisoner.”303 However, Congress’s plans for this labor system largely came to nothing after many commissaries and locals followed their own practices of managing prisoners’ employment. On July 19, a congressional investigating committee warned Congress that many working captives had “ already been lost to the

United States” because of escapes and recommended “no permission be granted to British prisoners on any conditions whatsoever to go out to work for the inhabitants.”304 Such ineffective attempts for a workable system further revealed Congress’s limited capacity to manage and control prisoners.

Another factor that undermined Congress’s efforts to construct a manageable prisoner incarceration system was by passing conflicting resolutions. Congress passed resolutions encouraging enemy captives’ desertion to avoid replenishing British ranks. In

302 Ibid., 15.

303 JCC, 1774-1789, June 21, 1782, XXII: 343-344.

304 JCC, 1774-1789, July 19, 1782, XXII: 403; for a congressional committee a year earlier reporting large number of British Convention Army desertions and drafted by the Continental Army, see JCC, 1774-1789, March 23, 1781, XIX: 300.

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May of 1778, Congress recommended state legislatures pass laws to exempt British army and navy deserters from militia service and exclude prisoners and escapees from serving as substitutes in American militia units to encourage their desertion. This broad resolution included state authorities voiding the contracts of prisoner deserters in militia service.305 Congress’s orders did not go unnoticed by Convention Army officers since

Riedesel noted that Congress in the spring of 1778 offered enemy soldiers land to desert the British army and the chance to avoid serving the militia.306 Yet Congress had little means to fulfill promises and few enemy troops and prisoners agreed to its terms.

Nevertheless, such improvised orders and empty promises only hindered the chances of working with state assemblies to create an advantageous system to confine and manage

Convention Army prisoners in Massachusetts.

Congressional commissaries contributed to Congress’s troubles of managing prisoners of war with state governments because they promoted desertion to reduce their costs and responsibilities. Commissaries worked under the commissary general assigned by Congress to purchase essentials for prisoners and obtain housing and other resources.

They typically provided essentials and money to captives for their maintenance.307 In

Massachusetts, however, senior Convention Army officers routinely uncovered American commissaries deliberately encouraged and aided desertion attempts. In December of

1778, Phillips demanded punishment for one such congressional commissary, Joshua

305 JCC, 1774-1789, May 22, 1778, XI: 522-523; for Congress approving the recruitment of German prisoners into the Continental Army with promises of a bounty late in the war, see JCC, 1774- 1789, June 5, 1782, XXII: 317-318.

306Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 19-21.

307 Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 72-101.

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Mersereau, after he had, according to the general, assisted Convention Army deserters to disperse across “the Eastern Provinces,” which decreased the exchange value of the army and chances of a cartel.308 Riedesel to reduce desertions that spring offered pardons to

German prisoners, who returned to their Cambridge barracks. Although several deserters returned, pardons did not stop locals from sneaking into barracks and encouraging more prisoners to escape after promising them money and liquor. Furthermore, desertions only increased that spring after American commissaries pledged Congress would supply farm animals and opportunities to secure a livelihood for British army and prisoner deserters, who became American citizens.309 Convention officers’ complaints about commissaries did nothing to slow down desertion rates.

State assemblies and defense councils’ unequal prisoner exchanges only decreased Congress’s chances of producing holding facilities for their incarceration system, which undermined congressional sovereignty. Furthermore, assembly exchanges undermined the chances of the British agreeing to a cartel agreement. Springer wrote that assemblies and councils exchanged enemy prisoners on their terms and enlisted them to meet Continental Army quotas. Despite pleas from Congress and Washington, state

308 Phillips to Gates, December 12, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; recruiting prisoners to join their enemy became common practice during the war. For British efforts enticing American prisoners join their ranks for gaining manpower and save fiscal costs, see Germain to Lord Charles Cornwallis, November 9, 1780, ed. Charles Ross, Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis 3 Volumes (London: John Murray, 1859), I: 79-80; Diary of William Slade, Appendix, in Danske Dandridge, American Prisoners of the Revolution, (Charlottesville VA: The Michie Company printers, 1911), 498; American prisoners also often agreed to join British ranks to obtain better provisions and food, see John Jay to Ben Franklin, July 9, 1781, in The Life of John Jay with Selections From His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers 2 Volumes, ed. William Jay (New York: J & J Harper, 1833), II: 84; Congress recognized that the British would improve conditions to encourage captives to join their naval forces, see JCC, 1774-1789, August 3, 1781, XXI: 830.

309 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 18-

21.

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militias, defense councils, and assemblies all paroled enemy officers and agreed to exchange agreements with the British army on their terms without congressional knowledge.310 Accordingly, Congress largely throughout the war relied on Washington to manage prisoner affairs with the assemblies. As a result, Washington tried resolving these troubles by coaxing Continental Army commanders and assemblies to send him lists of prisoners’ names, ranks, and monetary accounts. But they rarely provided him with the information he needed for conducting exchanges effectively.311 In response, in the spring of 1777, Wa shington, desired to place all exchange negotiations “under the direction of one head” to learn of state authorities’ actions and control the circumstances of exchanges so “the management of prisoners will be better understood” and more

“accurate accounts will be kept on our part.”312 His pleas did not elicit Congress to produce a workable system to manage large numbers of prisoners of war.

Following Convention Army prisoners’ capture, Congress had to rely on

America’s large geographical space because congressional departments constructed a weak administrative infrastructure to oversee an incarceration and supply system.

Congress’s infrastructure is defined for this chapter as an administrative entity that could not effectively produce the personnel and monetary resources to manage prisoners of

310 Springer, America’s Captives, 19-21; for a congressional request for assemblies and councils to stop exchanging prisoners, see JCC, 1774-1789, November 19, 1779, XV: 1288.

311 General Orders, June 27, 1777, ed. Grizzard Jr., PGW, X: 131.

312 Washington to Governor Nicholas Cooke, March 3, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, VIII: 496- 497; sometimes Washington had no list of captured prisoners’ ranks and names to suggest an exchange and had to ask for one from the British, see Washington to Howe, December 29, 1776, ed. Chase, PGW, VII: 478; Congress also wanted lists of names and ranks of captured prisoners, see JCC, 1774-1789, May 21, 1776, IV: 372; for Washington describing the benefits of cartel exchanges with Howe for prisoners and authorities, see Washington to Howe, April 9, 1777, ed. Chase, PGW, IX: 102-105.

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war. Congress could not construct proper prisoner facilities with its departments because the fledging government struggled to maintain the Continental Army and assert its political powers, while trying to survive moving from place to place. Congress, for instance, before the Convention Army prisoners’ capture, had tried to exert more control on the treatment and management of captured enemy combatants. It had appointed an agent, David Franks, as a commissary of British prisoners to work with contractors and supply captives basic necessities. He became in May of 1776 Congress’s first commissary of British prisoners and it “permitted him to supply the prisoners with provisions and other necessities, and to sell his bills for such sums of money as are necessary for that purpose.”313 However, complicating matters, Franks was arrested in

October of 1778 on suspicions of collaborating with the enemy in Philadelphia after the

British occupation.314 His appointment had done little to improve the management of prisoners of war and revealed the limitations of congressional power and influence in prisoner affairs.

Led by the Board of War and commissary general of prisoners, Congress slowly formed administrative departments to manage prisoners. On June 12, 1776, it appointed a Board of War committee to manage war measures and provide congressional

313 JCC, 1774-1789, May 21, 1776, IV: 371; for more specifics on David Franks supply powers and duties, see JCC, 1774-1789, December 2, 1775, III: 398-399; for Washington advocating the appointment of a commissary to provide essentials for prisoners and suggestion Franks send a deputy to fulfill Congress’s orders concerning captives, see and Washington to Hancock, February 9, 1776, ed. Chase, PGW, III: 277-27 8; for a specific study on Franks, see Mark Abott Stern, David Franks: Colonial Merchant (University Park PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 116-121; for more on Franks appointment, see Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 72-73.

314 Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 72-73; for Congress resolving Franks arrest and relieving him of his duties, see JCC, 1774-1789, October 21, 1778, XII: 1032-1033; Franks fled to British controlled New York City and England where he died, see note # 6, in ed. Chase, PGW, III: 280-281.

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instructions and recommendations to Congress and state governments about “the care and direction of all prisoners of war, agreeable to the orders and regulations of Congress.”

This included attending to the needs and conditions of both enemy prisoners and

Americans in British hands.315 Congress took another important step to simultaneously limit assemblies and defense councils’ authority and increase its control on prisoners.

Washington had urged the appointment of a commissary of prisoners to save on prisoners’ care costs and improve conditions and chances for a general cartel.316

Congress acted on his suggestions and ordered a commissary general of prisoner’s position by the summer of 1777 to manage and supervise American and enemy captives’ debts and essential supply needs. The commissary general had the Board of War’s authority to work through his appointed agents to handle provision issues and negotiate with the British.317 The commissary general obtained a commissary department and broad powers to settle prisoner matters.

In spring of 1777, Congress’s attempt to build up an administrative infrastructure to manage prisoners proved largely unsuccessful after choosing New Jersey native Elias

315 JCC, 1774-1783, June 12, 1776, V: 435; for a list of Board of War members during its first months, see JCC, 1774-1783, Standing Committees 1775-1776, VI: 1068; Congress choose John Adams the first chair of the Board of War, see David McCullough, John Adams (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 140-142; for more specific details on the Board and a description of its activities, see Sanders, Evolution of Executive Departments of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, 8-17.

316 Washington to Hancock, December 20, 1776, ed. Chase, PGW, VII: 383; for more examples of Washington urging Congress to choose a commissary of prisoners or agents to manage captives, see Washington to John Hancock, November 8, 1775, ed. Chase, PGW, II: 331; Washington to Hancock, February 9, 1776, ed. Chase, PGW, III: 277-278; Washington to Hancock, September 25, 1776, eds. Chase and Grizzard Jr., PGW, VI: 402; Washington to Hancock, May 11, 1776, ed. Chase, PGW, IV: 278.

317 JCC, 1774-1789, June 24, 1777, VIII: 494-495 ; Congress first detailed three specific commissaries for supervising and managing captives for its three departments in May of 1776, see JCC, 1774-1789, May 16, 1776, IV: 361; for more on the commissary department, see Bowman, Captive Americans, 68-79; Metzger, The Prisoner in the American Revolution, 71-101.

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Boudinet as its first commissary general of prisoners. He had full authority over all

British army prisoners in America and could for his department “appoint two deputy commissaries of prisoners.”318 However, Dixon observed Congress never effectively specified the commissary department’s administrative powers and many disputes ensued over authority.319 Congress attempted to end the Commissary Department’s problems.

Carp wrote that Congress in 1780 attempted to fix the Commissary Department’s abuses and cost overruns by restructuring the commissary general and his chief agents’ incomes for their services.320 This would not effectively reduce the department’s problems providing food for the American army. Ultimately, Congress abolished the commissary of prisoners in the summer of 1782, and placed prisoners under the control of Secretary of War General Benjamin Lincoln for the duration of the conflict with Britain.321 None of these departmental changes considerably improved Congress’s capacity and administrative infrastructure to incarcerate and provide for large numbers of prisoners.

Thus Congress’s organizational challenges only further decreased the congressional

318 JCC, 1774-1789, June 6, 1777, VIII: 422; a few months later Boudinet received congressional approval to appoint a deputy commissary for every state, see JCC, 1774-1777, October 6, 1777, IX: 777; Congress empowered Washington to select a Continental Army commissary general and after two Continental Army officers turned him down and as a result he asked Boudinet, see Washington to Elias Boudinet, April 1, 1777, ed. Chase, PGW, IX: 33-34; for much more on Boudinet’s struggles, see Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 89-100; for Boudinet’s own descriptions of his orders, see Boudinet To the Governors and Executive Bodies of the Thirteen States, April 17, 1777, in Their Distress Is Almost Intolerable: The Elias Boudinet Letterbook, 1777-1778, Elias Boudinet, ed. Joseph Lee Boyle (Bowie: Heritage Books, 2002); 1; Boudinet To the Secretary of the Board of War, April 17, 1777, Boyle, Their Distress Is Almost Intolerable, 1; three other men held the position of commissary general after Boudinet resigned in 1778. John Beatty, 1778-1780, Abraham Skinner, 1780-1781, and William Stevens Smith, 1781-1782. For discussions on their tenures as commissary general, see Bowman, Captive Americans, 68- 79. 319 Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 90-95; Boudinet often paid out of his own pocket for American prisoners of wars’ supplies, see Burrows, Forgotten Patriots, 130-132.

320 Carp, To Starve the Army At Pleasure, 176-177.

321 Bowman, Captive Americans, 74.

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government’s chances to manage prisoners before it sought to gain more space for the

Convention prisoners’ by ordering their relocation to create a relative distance from

British bases.

The Eastern Department’s struggles in Massachusetts revealed that Congress’s arrangements would not work for enforcing orders and managing a captive army. In

November of 1778, Congress ordered Heath to obtain a comprehensive prisoner directory of the Convention Army officers and troops and anyone else under the treaty. It specifically requested names, occupations, ages, ranks, size, and psychical descriptions of the captives from Burgoyne for its records. Congress threatened Convention Army deserters “found in arms against these states in North America” could expect conviction and “suffer the punishment.”322 Heath and the British general argued in late November over the role and powers of Congress. Heath, in a letter to Burgoyne dated November 21, defended congressional power as a governing body to protect its citizens and their welfare from their enemies. From Burgoyne’s perspective, Congress had no right to a directory since Convention captives were not Congress’s subjects and it had no “right to impose new conditions on a treaty of public faith.”323 However, this attempt showed

322 JCC, 1774-1789, November 8, 1777, IX: 880-881; for Heath’s orders to create the directory, see General Orders, November 20, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xii-xiii.

323 Heath to Burgoyne, November 21, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xv; from Burgoyne’s perspective and the quote, see Burgoyne to Heath, November 23, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xvi-xvii; Burgoyne to Heath, November 20, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xiii. 144

Congress’s state system’s limitations because it never received the directory. Congress had lost an opportunity to gain greater influence over the captive army in Massachusetts.

Despite the insufficient system, Congress wanted Convention Army captives confined to not only decrease British ranks, but for exchange and retaliation purposes.

Congress hoped that holding the Convention Army prisoners would increase the chances of the British government recognizing it as an independent power. Congress, for example, blocked the Convention Army’s departure for Britain on January 8, 1778, until the British government ratified the convention treaty.324 Also, Congress used Burgoyne as a bargaining chip to exchange American prisoners following his parole to Britain.

Burgoyne, for instance, desperately sought parole to defend his “honor” in Parliament.325

After several requests from the British general, Congress officially paroled Burgoyne and his staff members to Britain from Rhode Island on March 3, 1778, for reasons of ill- health. Burgoyne received parole under the condition that unless exchanged he and his staff had to “return to America” when called upon by Congress.326 In February of 1782, his formal exchange freed 1,047 American officers and enlisted troops from British

324 JCC, 1774-1789, January 8, 1778, X: 35.

325 Burgoyne to Clinton, April 9, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

326 JCC, 1774-1789, March 3, 1778, X: 218; Burgoyne first officially described his ill health to Congress on February 11, see Burgoyne to Henry Laurens, February 11, 1778, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770- 1783, XV: 38; Congress read his February 11 letter and chose a committee to review Burgoyne’s claims and offer recommendations, see JCC, 1774-1789, February 26, 1778, X: 196; for the president of Congress’s belief that it would eventually parole Burgoyne for humane purposes, see Henry Laurens to John Laurens, March 3, 1778, in Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, 8 Volumes, ed. Edmund C. Burnett (Washington D.C: Carnegie Institution, 1921), III: 105-106 (hereafter cited as LMCC); for a second letter that Congress accepted from Burgoyne requesting parole for only him and his family of staff officers, see JCC, 1774-1783, March 2, 1778, X: 209-210.

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prisons.327 Thus the Convention Army proved important to Congress in exchange negotiations for American prisoners.

Following Saratoga, Congress repeatedly used Convention Army captives to make reprisal threats. Congress made threats to protect American prisoners and convince the British to change their confinement status from rebels to legal combatants held under the Law of Nations. It formally provided in July of 1776 Continental Army commanders authority to retaliate against British captives for the mistreatment and deaths of American prisoners.328 Threats became more commonplace than reprisals because both sides sought to comply with the rules of war and avoid starting a chain reaction of executions.

Nevertheless, reprisals occurred and commanders threatened retaliation to protect their officers and soldiers in enemy hands and encourage exchanges. Washington, for example, warned the British that violence demonstrated against American officers would

“be severely retaliated upon the lives or liberties of the British officers or those of their foreign allies at present in our hands.”329 The Convention Army’s confinement allowed

Congress to retaliate. In January of 1778 after reviewing a Board of War report that the

British had placed American captives in substandard confinement conditions and mistreated them, Congress empowered American commissary agents to reduce at their

327 Prisoners, February 9, 1782, HMC, II: 397; for Congress approving Burgoyne’s exchange and resolving Washington powers to do so, see JCC, 1774-1789, August 21, 1781, XXI: 889.

328 JCC, 1774-1789, July 10, 1776, V: 539; for Congress ordering Washington to dispatch its orders threatening reprisals to Burgoyne and Howe for the mistreatment of American captives held in Canada, see Hancock to Washington, July 13, 1776, ed. Chase, PGW, V: 295-296.

329 Washington to Howe, January 13, 1777, ed. Grizzard, Jr., PGW, VIII: 60; American authorities wanted the British to grant captured Americans the status of prisoners of war, see Washington to Gage, August 19, 1775, in Thomas Gage, The Letters of the Two Commanders in Chief: Generals Gage, Washington, and Major Generals Burgoyne and Lee; with the Manifesto of General Washington to the Inhabitants of Canada. Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no. 14559. New York: James Rivington, 1775, 5.

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discretion funds for Convention Army prisoners’ rations and imprison them under the same conditions.330

In March of 1781 after officially changing Convention Army prisoners’ status to prisoners of war, Congress used the army as leverage to improve American captives’ treatment. Until the British reimbursed American commissaries for their confinement expenses, Congress ordered the remaining captives’ rations reduced to those of unconditional prisoners.331 Threats did not always prove successful, but holding the

Convention Army granted Congress more chances to use enemy prisoners for reprisals and exchanges. Nevertheless, Congress had to officially order the Convention Army under congressional authority to move the captives from Massachusetts to Virginia.

*****

By the winter of 1778, Congress needed to place Convention Army prisoners under its authority to take advantage of America’s countryside as a means to control and secure the army a distance from the British. Congress and the Continental Army, however, had never relocated an entire army of prisoners. Congress had no way to effectively control the Convention Army captives beyond the British army’s grasp without first placing them under congressional control. It undertook a series of steps in reaction to fears of a British rescue and pressure from Continental Army officers to deprive their superior adversary of soldiers. Washington and Gates contributed to increasing congressional control after they recommended holding the prisoners from the

British and denied Burgoyne’s requests to change the convention embarkation port. In

330 JCC, 1774-1789, January 21, 1778, X: 74-81.

331 JCC, 1774-1789, March 23, 1781, XIX: 300. 147

addition, Congress found evidence to withhold the army after investigating Burgoyne and determined he had violated the treaty. As a result, Congress ordered in January of 1778 that the Convention Army was under its control after suspending the treaty’s embarkation pledge. Congress’s orders to move the captives took take advantage of America’s large geographical space to control and house them far from the British in central Virginia.

Congress specifically placed the Convention Army under its authority because many delegates feared that the British would only redeploy the prisoners in America.

The President of Congress, Henry Laurens, noted around the spring of 1782, a few years after Congress’s decision to hold the captive army, that “Had the Convention troops reached New York or Philadelphia they would have instantly been employed against us, either in garrison or in the field, probably both.”332 In spite of Congress’s fears, placing the army under its control and blocking their embarkation forced Congress to choose between maintaining security or risk its reputation. A congressional delegate from

Connecticut, Eliphaet Dyer, wrote that to allow Burgoyne to depart with his soldiers “at once puts it in his power to join the enemy and to be more dangerous to us that if we never had accepted of his surrender.” He noted, however, Congress wanted “to keep our faith, & maintain our honor” by fulfilling “all treaties, contracts and conventions made even with our enemies” and “not offend Heaven by our perfidy, nor forfeit our honor & reputation in the eyes of this, or the European world, who are & will be most attentively

332 Henry Laurens’ Notes, January 8, 1778, in Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789, 26 Volumes , ed. Paul H. Smith (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976-2000), VIII: 543 (hereafter cited as LDC).

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watchful, over every part of our public conduct.”333 Ultimately, Congress feared the consequences of a free Convention Army more than maintaining national honor.

Senior Continental Army officers pressured Congress to increase congressional power over the Convention Army to keep them from the British. Potential British plans troubled Continental Army officers. Washington recognized a month after the army’s capture that the Revolutionaries gained no advantages if they embarked Convention

Army troops for either Boston or Rhode Island. In a letter to Gates, he wrote that the enemy would only replenish their garrisons in Britain and free up more troops for Howe’s army, or would be ordered to serve some other purpose “against the states.”334 He advised Congress against returning the Convention Army captives to Britain because “the moment they get” to Britain the British government would be “placing them in garrison and sending others out to reinforce Genl. Howe, or upon any other expedition they may think proper to undertake against us.”335 Gates also pressured Congress to assert more authority and prevent the prisoners from replenishing enemy ranks. Only a few weeks after Saratoga, Gates recommended to Congress that because Howe had refused a cartel exchange to delay fulfilling the treaty. Also, he agreed with Washington that the British government would recall most of the prisoners to duty in Britain and supported not

333 Eliphalet Dyer to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr. January 5, 1778, ed. Smith, LDC, VIII: 527; for more on Congress’s debate about undermining the convention and risking national honor, see John Witherspoon’s Speech in Congress, January 2, 1778, ed. Paul H. Smith, LDC, VIII: 551-557.

334 Washington to Gates, November 14, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; Washington to Heath, November 13, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 238-239.

335Washington to Laurens, November 26-27, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 421.

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changing ports to stop “any sinister design.”336 This combined pressure from the generals moved Congress closer to controlling the captive army.

During the Convention Army’s detention in Massachusetts, Washington had become concerned about its security. Through the spring of 1778, an unknown number of Convention Army deserters had replenished British ranks or ran off with valuable arms and bounty money after joining Continental Army regiments to move closer to enemy lines. Consequently, in frustration, Washington informed Boston’s James Bowdoin, the former President of the Massachusetts Provisional Congress, that “Mr Burgoyne could hardly if he were consulted, suggest a more effectual plan for plundering us of so much money, reinforcing Mr Howe with so many men & arms, and preventing us from recruiting a certain number of regiments.”337 The general concluded a few months later in May that “No practice has been more impolitic nor more injuries in proportion to its extent” than Convention Army enlistments in the Continental Army. Washington recorded a Continental Army detachment of 60 of mostly former Convention Army

336 Gates to Henry Laurens, November 10, 1777, in note # 1 eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 360; For Gates agreeing with Washington that the British would recall the prisoners to duty and avoid “any sinister design,” see Gates to Washington, November 23, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS.

337 Washington to James Bowdoin, March 17, 1778, ed. Hoth, PGW, XIV: 205-206; Washington knew of Massachusetts defense committees enlisting and paying Convention Army deserters as substitutes in Massachusetts, see Thomas Cogswell to Washington, February 14, 1778, ed. Lengel. PGW, XIII: 530- 531; Washington observed that most deserters did not fear capture and returning, see Washington to Jeremiah Dummer Powell, May 19, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XV: 166-167; a few primary newspaper records noted Convention Army deserters enlisted with naval privateers and contributed to starting a riot in Boston looking for bread from French bakers supplying the French navy fleet. No deaths, but a few persons had wounds, see Independent Ledger, and the American Advertiser (Boston) September 14, 1778, in note # 3, ed. Hoth, PGW, XVI: 556-557.

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prisoners was reduced to 12 or 13 after they deserted to British lines.338 The general’s concern revealed his anxiety about the prisoners’ security in Massachusetts.

By delaying and rejecting Burgoyne’s request to depart from Newport,

Washington strengthened Congress’s control over the Convention Army and thwarted

British plans for a rescue. After learning of the arrival of British transports for the

Convention troops, Burgoyne in a letter on November 25, requested Washington directly pressure Massachusetts authorities to allow his army to sail from Newport. He attempted to convince Washington in the letter that a Newport embarkation worked in the

Americans’ favor because it fulfilled the convention and move the troublesome

Convention soldiers faster from Massachusetts due to the wind difficulties of sailing into and out of Boston.339 Washington, however, only increased congressional control over the captives after informing Burgoyne he would not answer his “requests without first consulting Congress.”340 Washington’s delays would contribute to Congress gaining control of the prisoners and giving it the chance to take advantage of America’s space to secure them from the British.

338 Washington to Powell, May 19, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XV: 166-167; for descriptions of other examples of Convention Army deserters joining the American army, see Washington to Bowdoin, March 17, 1778, ed. David R. Hoth, PGW, XV: 205-206; Major Cogswell to Washington, February 14, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XIII: 530-531.

339 Burgoyne to Washington, November 25, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 384- 385; also see, Burgoyne to Heath, December 9, 1777, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xix-xx; for more on Boston’s difficult weather conditions, see Frederick Mackenzie, The Diary of Frederick Mackenzie, 2 Volumes (New York: New York Times, 1968), I: 220 & 223-224.

340 Washington to Burgoyne, December 17, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 621; Washington to Heath, December 17, 1777, eds. Grizzard Jr., and Hoth, PGW, XII: 623.

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Congress took the first step to amplify congressional power over the Convention

Army by prohibiting Burgoyne from changing embarkation ports from Boston to

Newport. Congress did so on December 1, 1777, by resolving that it “rejected”

Burgoyne’s requests for a port change. The Convention Army prisoners could only depart for Britain from Boston.341 A few weeks later, Congress ordered Washington to instruct Burgoyne it would no longer “receive nor consider any proposition for indulgence or altering the terms of the convention of Saratoga, unless immediately directed to their own body.”342 Congress operated like a single entity in rejecting

Burgoyne’s port change and, by refusing to consider more requests moved closer to ordering the prisoners under its hold before blocking the army’s embarkation.

Congress moved a step closer to taking advantage of America’s geographical space as a means to distance the captives from the British by ordering the captives relocation after officially searching for reasons to void the convention embarkation terms.

A series of congressional committees sought evidence Burgoyne and his officers violated their treaty commitments during and following the Saratoga negotiations. Congress, for example, established an investigating committee in late November of 1777 to examine

Burgoyne’s conduct after the Board of War reported that Convention Army officers had not submitted their regimental colors and weapons to Gates as agreed. The committee found Burgoyne’s officers and soldiers only surrendered a negligible number of military supplies and 4, 647 old and largely unusable flintlock guns for an army of 6,000 plus.

341 JCC, 1774-1789, December 1, 1777, IX: 982; Laurens to Gates, December 1, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS.

342 JCC, 1774-1789, December 17, 1777, IX: 1032; despite the setback, Burgoyne continued to seek transports for his army from Rhode Island, see Burgoyne to Major General Robert Pigot, January 4, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

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These numbers proved unacceptable to the committee and increased suspicions that

Burgoyne purposely violated his pledges following Saratoga.343 Congress established another committee to examine Burgoyne’s actions and it concluded he voided the treaty by writing “the public faith” broken in his correspondence with Gates and not submitting much of the army’s military supplies and regimental colors were missing. Moreover, he had not provided a directory of names, ranks, ages, and physical descriptions. Thus the committee recommended Congress delay the prisoners’ departure until the British government ratified the convention treaty.344 Ultimately, this evidence provided enough grounds for Congress to overwhelmingly support holding the prisoners in Virginia at its discretion.

After three months of reacting to fears of a British rescue and following

Washington and Gates’s advice, Congress formally and overwhelmingly placed the prisoners under congressional authority on January 8, 1778, after the government repudiated the Convention of Saratoga’s embarkation pledge. Congress’s order held them in America under congressional supervision until Parliament sanctioned the treaty and acknowledged its independence by reporting it to Congress. As justification, most delegates voted Burgoyne had intentionally violated the convention, while most

343 JCC, 1774-1789, November 22, 1777, IX: 949; for more on Burgoyne’s bad faith potentially proving advantageous for the Americans, see James Hughes to Gates, November 19, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for Congress seeking evidence from Gates about the location of “all the arms ammunitions, and military tools” Convention Army soldiers submitted at Saratoga, see Richard Peters (The Board of War) to Gates, November 7, 1777, Gates Papers, NYHS; for Gates’s response to Congress that his Continental Army soldiers and militiamen, not Burgoyne, made the defeated army’s equipment disappear since they confiscated guns, bayonets, and cartridge boxes during the convention ceremonies, see Gates to Laurens, December 3, 1777, Gates Papers; for the interesting story of General Riedesel’s wife violating the convention by hiding the Germans’ colors in a specially made mattress in Cambridge and shipping them to Halifax, Canada, see Riedesel, trans. Stone, Letters and Journals, 144.

344 JCC, 1774-1789, December 27, 1777, IX: 1059-1063.

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American authorities had not. In a secret 14 to 4 vote, Congress officially bypassed state assemblies’ powers to confine and manage Convention Army prisoners. Congress largely repeated the committee’s reasons for suspending their departure and agreed the potential “operations of General Burgoyne’s army in America would not only defeat the main object of the convention, but prove highly prejudicial to the interests of these states.”345 This important resolution officially granted Congress control over the captive army and the chance to place later the prisoners anywhere and hundreds of miles from the

British forces in New York and Rhode Island.

Congress chose Albemarle County, Virginia, because the region provided considerable housing space for accommodations and provisions for the Convention Army captives a large distance from the British threat. In early October, Congress directed the

Board of War to find a location in Virginia for securing the Convention Army and gave orders to build barracks and employ guards.346 Philander Chase wrote that the Board of

War recommended Albemarle County for the reasons that the county resided in primarily rich agricultural area for growing crops for the captives and was located a considerable distance from established Continental Army foraging areas in 1778. In addition, British army bases were hundreds of miles away because the fighting was centered in

Pennsylvania and New England, and rescue attempts would likely fail. Another reason that the Board of War recommended Albemarle County for the new incarceration site was the influence of Colonel John Harvie. A member of the Board of War, Congress,

345 JCC, 1774-1789, January 8, 1778, X: 34-35; for Congress ordering its Convention Army orders kept secret from the British, see United States Continental Congress, January 8, 1777, in Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress, From the First Meeting Thereof to the Dissolution of the Confederation 4 Volumes (Boston: printed and published by Thomas B. Wait, 1820-1821), I: 49.

346 JCC, 1774-1789, October 8, 1778, XII: 992.

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and also, a lawyer, from Albemarle County, Harvie offered to confine Convention Army soldiers on a few hundred of his acres located on Ivy Creek, a few miles from

Charlottesville, for a small cost. It seems likely Harvie desired to house the army to obtain skilled workers for the county residents.347 Whatever his intentions, Congress approved the Board of War’s recommendation to provide $23,000 for the construction of barracks on his land.348 Therefore, Albemarle County appeared to possess the attributes to be agriculturally abundant and in a secure region for prisoners located far from British controlled New York and Rhode Island.

In mid-October of 1778, Congress officially turned to America’s large territorial space by ordering the Convention Army’s relocation from Massachusetts to Virginia.

The government voted 27 to 3 on October 16 to march the prisoners and their families

700- miles to Charlottesville. On October 16, Congress granted Washington authority “to take the necessary steps for removing, with all convenient speed, all the prisoners of the

Convention of Saratoga to the town of Charlottesville,” and the Board of War to appoint an official to manage the army and another person to contract its fuel, build huts by

December 15, and apply to Virginia’s governor and council for guards.349 Hence,

Congress’s relocation order for Washington gave him the authority to relocate the army

347 Philander D. Chase, “Years of Hardships and Revelations:” The Convention Army at the Albemarle Barracks, 1779 -1781,” The Magazine Of Albemarle County, 41 (1983): 15-18; Dabney, After Saratoga, 48.

348 For the Board of War’s permission for Captain George Rice to construct the barracks for $23,000, see The Board of War to Laurens, January 20, 1778, Reports of the Board of War, PCC, m247, r157, i147, v2, 343. Accessed March 28, 2012 http://www.fold3.com/image/#383648; JCC, 1774-1789, January 9, 1779, XIII: 39.

349 JCC, 1774-1789, October 16, 1778, XII: 1016-1018; for Congress informing Washington of its decision to move Convention Army captives to Virginia if the British did not supply the captives, see Laurens to Washington, October 16, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 405.

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and take advantage of America’s countryside to distance the several thousand remaining

Convention captives from the British army.

*****

Congress relied on America’s geographic space and size as a means to provide for the Convention Army after gaining control of the captives. Operating like a single entity,

Congress sought to neutralize the dangerous captive army beyond British reach by ordering its relocation from Massachusetts to Virginia. Congress turned to America’s countryside after the British refused to provide more provisions and money in retaliation for the Convention Army’s confinement. Prior to the Convention Army’s departure,

British plans to rescue the captives would again prove unsuccessful. Nonetheless,

Congress ordered the Convention Army’s removal more than 700-miles under

Washington’s command and supervision from Massachusetts to Charlottesville.

Congress’s removal orders ultimately allowed the Continental Army more housing space to accommodate the prisoners in an environment and location more suitable for their needs hundreds of miles from British forces.

Congress had to take advantage of America’s geographic space by moving the captives because the congressional government had proven unsuccessful producing sufficient money and supplies for the captives. On January 13 a few days after repudiating the convention embarkation pledge, Congress requested that Howe provide passports to allow American vessels to bring the prisoners fuel, flour, and meat.350 After no reply from the British, Congress made the same requests again on September 3 and

350 JCC, 1774-1789, January 13, 1778, X: 44-45.

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11. After failing to receive passports from the British, Congress overwhelmingly ordered on September 11 the deadline of October 5 for Clinton to grant passports. If Clinton failed to provide passports, Congress would order the army’s relocation.351

British anger over Congress’s actions to block the Convention Army’s return to

Britain did not change the congressional government’s plans to move the captives a considerable distance. Congress had ordered its resolution kept secret until necessary as a matter of good policy and decreed at least 1,500 more guards around Convention Army soldiers in Massachusetts.352 The British would learn of Congress’s action after Heath submitted a copy of Congress’s resolution to Burgoyne nearly a month later.353 The

British army retaliated against Congress for repudiating the convention terms by refusing to address American demands for funds and resources. In September of 1778, instead, an angry Clinton in a letter through Washington to Congress demanded that the body fulfill

351 For the September 3 request, see JCC, 177 4-1789, September 3, 1778, XII: 876-877; for the resolution and October 5 deadline, see JCC, 1774 -1789, September 11, 1778, XII: 901-902.

352 For the guards, see JCC, 1774-1789, January 12, 1778, X: 42; for congressional orders keeping its embarkation resolution secret until necessary, see Laurens to Washington, January 5, 1778, ed. Lengel, GWP, XIII: 148; for Washington informing Congress he would keep its resolution secret at the Continental Army’s headquarters at Valley Forge, see Washington to Laurens, January 9, 1778, ed. Fitzpatrick, GWP, X: 286; for Congress instructing Heath to keep its embarkation resolution a secret in Boston, see Laurens to Heath, January 14, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS IV: 203.

353 Heath to Burgoyne, February 4, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xlviii-xlxix; for Burgoyne receiving the resolution, see Burgoyne to Heath, February 4, 1778, Appendix to the Canada Papers, Relating Principally to the Convention Army after its Arrival in the Neighborhood of Boston, in the Years 1777 and 1778. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale. Gale Document Number: CB3326 991273. xlxix;

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the convention terms and wrote its actions “unprecedented among parties at war.”354

Uncooperative British actions forced Congress to order the captive army’s removal.

The British planned to free the Convention Army by every means short of acknowledging American sovereignty. Before Congress blocked the Convention troops’ departure, Clinton saw the convention, “as most favorable” for British interests.355 This changed after Congress placed the Convention Army under its control. Clinton planned on releasing the Convention Army through force rather than concession after Congress repudiated the convention embarkation terms. For instance in January of 1778, he sketched a rather complicated plan he never implemented to rescue the Convention

Army. Clinton’s plans required Howe to march 6,000 British troops from Philadelphia to the Chesapeake Bay as a means of deception to distract the American army. With Howe on the move, Clinton from New York would lead another British force to Hartford,

Connecticut. If the Americans did not free the captives, the British would lay Hartford in ruins. Clinton, for reasons unknown, did not detail in his plans where, or how the British would meet the prisoners.356 Clinton’s proposal revealed how desperately the British desired the prisoners returned to their army.

The British army could not prevent Congress from taking advantage of America’s space unless Clinton raided Massachusetts to rescue the captives before American forces moved them. The British army had no official policy for rescuing the Convention Army.

354 Clinton to Washington, September 19, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for Congress not answering Clinton’s demand, see Charles Thompson to Clinton, September 28, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library

355 Clinton to Burgoyne, December 16, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

356 Clinton Plan, January 18, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

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In June of 1778, Germain wrote that he suspected that the Americans had no intention of freeing the Convention Army, but the king felt “most sensibly for the distress and hardship they are exposed to, every proper endeavor must be used on our part for obtaining their release.” Hence, he desired Clinton undertake “every necessary step” for strictly observing the convention stipulations, but also, if possible, secure the captive army’s release.357 By December, Germain noted in a letter his frustrations with the

Americans’ desire for funds and refusal to release the prisoners. He believed Congress

“had a fixed purpose” to evade the convention “by every means, however, sinister, than ingenuity can devise” and the British would only “waste the public treasure, and gratify that body in one of their chief views in withholding the troops” by sending more money to the Americans for the army’s care. Therefore, he approved Clinton to exercise his own judgment in freeing the captives at the general’s discretion.358 The British, however, would not attempt a rescue operation before Washington’s force marched the prisoners from Massachusetts to Virginia.

Congress also prevented the Convention Army from rejoining British ranks by refusing to consider a secret ransom plan from Phillips. In December of 1778, Phillips proposed to Gates that the British could pay a ransom for the Convention Army’s release after the Americans freed the prisoners. He offered to settle a private cartel treaty with

Gates since British and American cartel negotiators proved unsuccessful determining an exchange. Phillips argued his proposal benefited both sides for the reasons that an agreement could avert future expenses and establish a cartel exchange for prisoners.

357 Germain to Clinton, June 12, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

358 Germain to Clinton, December 2, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

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British would compensate the Americans through him after paying in specie and securing a means of payment.359 Gates forwarded the proposal to Congress, but it took no action pursuing Phillip’s ransom plans.360 Thus Phillips’ proposal had no affect on Congress’s decision to advantageously use America’s space to secure Convention Army captives from British.

Congress contributed to confining and neutralizing the Convention Army threat by ordering the captives moved from Massachusetts. For the Americans space was confining and supplying the prisoners a great distance at another location beyond

Massachusetts and British reach where provisions and housing were more available.

Congress reacted to the circumstances in Massachusetts and started using America’s geographic space as a strategic means for settling security and supply arrangements for the Convention Army. Congress feared releasing the captive army would substantially strengthen British war capacity and decrease the chances of American independence.

Therefore, Congress used the captives for diplomacy and exchange purposes and retaliations against the British for American prisoners’ treatment. Congress had to rely on America’s large terrain to control and secure Convention Army captives because it never developed a strong administrative infrastructure and incarceration system for holding prisoners. Congressional departments had insufficient resources to enforce their orders to local authorities and state governments.

359 Phillips to Gates, December 1, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; Phillips to Gates, December 3, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for Phillips pitching his secret plan to determine a private treaty to Clinton, see Phillips to Clinton, December 6, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library.

360 For Gates sending Phillip’s proposal to Congress, see Gates to Phillips, December 3, 1778, Clinton Papers, Clements Library; for Congress not bothering to respond to Phillip’s ransom proposal, see JCC, 1774-1789, December 31, 1778, XII: 1264-1265. 160

As a new government, Congress could not take advantage of America’s size until placing the army under its authority. Following Washington and Gates’ advice, Congress strengthened their authority over the captive army by rejecting Burgoyne’s port change and embarkation request. It then found he committed convention violations and suspended the prisoners’ embarkation for Britain. Congress then ordered the Convention

Army’s relocation under Washington’s supervision from Massachusetts to

Charlottesville. Furthermore, Congress strengthened its hold over the captives by rejecting Phillips ransom request to exchange the Convention Army. Congress’s orders, however, only commenced the Revolutionaries’ first step in keeping the captive army from the British. Washington and his officers had to deal with the challenges of moving the army through America and near British lines in New York City. Moving more than

4,000 prisoners through America only tested the Americans’ capacity for managing prisoners because Washington and Heath had to move the captives hundreds of miles between Massachusetts and Virginia.

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CHAPTER V

SPACE AND MOVING THE CONVENTION ARMY:

FROM MASSACHUSETTS TO VIRGINIA

‘Exile is no very agreeable point of view, everyday’s journey brings it nearer to me, and when I arrive in Virginia, which from distance and situation will naturally exclude me from all communication with my friends, I shall sit down a melancholy but patient example of the ill fortune of war.’361

Phillips, December 1778

Following Congress’s resolution to move Convention Army prisoners from

Massachusetts to Virginia, Phillips worried about how the prisoners would face the miserable task of marching deep into a rural region and a great distance from

Massachusetts. Continentals and militiamen marched the Convention Army more than

700-miles through Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,

Maryland, and finally central Virginia. Washington commanded a force of Continentals and militiamen from each region to escort the captives from Cambridge and Rutland,

Massachusetts to Camp Albemarle, a few miles northeast of Charlottesville, Virginia. He relied on his Continental Army officers to follow his orders and direct Continentals and militiamen to guard the prisoners. This chapter will examine Washington’s preparations and supervision of the Convention Army prisoners from Massachusetts to Virginia and argues that preparing and moving the captives allowed American forces to more

361 Phillips to Clinton, December 8, 1778, HMC, I: 356; for Phillips describing his relocation to Virginia “as a state of exile” to Washington, see Phillips to Washington, October 29, 1778, HMC, I: 327.

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effectively secure the Convention Army. Thus in the late fall of 1778, America’s large geographic space became an important asset for Washington because the British army could not follow the prisoners hundreds of miles beyond their bases and supply lines near

New York City without risking their own security.

This chapter builds on the previous chapter in asserting that Washington and his escorts fulfilled Congress’s relocation orders to take advantage of America’s geographical space to control and neutralize Convention Army prisoners as an army by moving them from Massachusetts to Virginia. The chapter will first discuss

Washington’s relocation preparations. It then shows how his security measures in

Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania prevented a rescue attempt and potentially troublesome marching delays by moving the captives at a fast pace. The following chapter will close with the nearly 4,000 prisoners’ arrival in Virginia shortly before the construction of Camp Albemarle. Ultimately, the captive army’s relocation helped shape the conflict in the Revolutionaries’ favor since marching the prisoners from

Massachusetts to Virginia deprived the British army of troops that they sought for their forces. Jeremy Black has found that Clinton in late November of 1778 had under his command around 22,683 effective troops and officers at British bases in New York and

Rhode Island.362 The rescue of the remaining 4,000 Convention Army captives would have increased his army’s numbers. In November of 1778, Clinton made plans to rescue the prisoners and sent a large force to intercept the captives as they crossed the Hudson

River at nearby Fishkill, New York.363 A successful rescue attempt would have

362 Black, War For America, 28.

363 Clinton, ed. Willcox, The American Rebellion, 114-115. 163

eventually forced Continental Army troops and militiamen to reengage much of the captive army on another battlefield.

Washington oversaw the Convention Army prisoners’ relocation through

America. Moving, for the first time, a large group of prisoners of war over hundreds of miles was an unprecedented task for the Americans. The march commenced over a three day period from November 9-11, 1778, and took Convention Army officers and troops through more of America than most Americans had themselves traveled in during the period. However, space during the operation became recognized as more than geographical size, territory, secure housing, provision resources, location, security, and distance from Massachusetts. It also came to involve how terrain and resources either facilitated or impeded movement, which informed the way authorities would address these other necessities. The Americans included movement and putting the prisoners in motion as components of their evolving recognition of space because they had to relocate the captives, so they could secure them from a more powerful enemy and find more daily supply essentials for the prisoners for the remainder of the war. As a result, by January

17, 1779, after a little more than a two month march, nearly 4,000 Convention Army officers and troops reached their new home at Camp Albemarle.364

Washington had a large role in overseeing the march because Congress had specifically ordered him to move the Convention Army speedily from Massachusetts to

Charlottesville. Prior to the Convention Army’s march, Congress had depended on

364 For brief references to when Washington and Heath started the Convention Army’s march in early November of 1778, see Heath to Washington, November 12, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 291; Washington to Colonel Theodorick Bland, November 8, 1778, eds. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 77; for the prisoners’ arrival to Charlottesville in January, see Bland to Washington, January 17, 1779, eds. Chase and William M. Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 10-11; Chase, “Years of Hardships and Revelations: The Convention Army at the Albemarle Barracks, 1779-1781,” The Magazine of Albemarle County History, 41 (1983): 18- 19. 164

Washington to lead its army against the British. Congress on June 15, 1775,

“unanimously elected” Washington commander-in-chief of the Continental Army, and he would remain so for the war’s duration.365 Despite having great flexibility to conduct military operations, Washington was beholden to Congress’s orders and served at its pleasure. As the most senior officer of the Continental Army, Washington led the undermanned and underequipped force against one of the most powerful Western

European army’s in the eighteenth century. Washington, however, faced different challenges while managing the Convention Army because he never planned or oversaw an entire army of prisoners’ relocation before. He would, for the Convention Army’s march from Massachusetts to Virginia, rely on Heath and other officers to implement his orders and make decisions determining local arrangements. How Washington used

America’s large space to his advantage had limitations because bad roads and wilderness restricted where he could move the prisoners and find supplies. Nevertheless,

Washington’s covert march proved to be one of the most successful military operations of the Revolution.

Previous studies on the Convention Army’s incarceration have only briefly addressed the operational specifics of Washington’s march. Most works on the topic were written as narrative histories rather than analytical scholarship. They mostly described the prisoners’ march as another unpleasant experience of their confinement.

Historians’ attention mostly focused on the Americans’ treatment of the captives and offered descriptions of the various communities the captives traveled through during the

365 JCC, 1774-1789, June 15, 1775, II: 91; for Washington’s initial six orders from Congress as its commander-in-chief of the Continental Army, see JCC, 1774-1789, June 20, 1775, II: 100-101.

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march.366 None of these placed the Americans’ preparations and relocation in the context of space. Thus these narratives have not extensively discussed how securing and moving the Convention Army contributed to American forces advantageously using America’s space to contain a threat and reduce the British army’s capacity to wage war.

*****

American forces would not have been able to take advantage of the large terrain without Washington and Heath organizing security and supply preparations in

Massachusetts. The two generals made American forces’ security, logistical, and provision preparations to relocate the prisoners, which included ill captives by sea. Their arrangements allowed American forces to move and supply the prisoners over a large terrain. For three weeks, Washington and Heath successfully collaborated together through their correspondence to manage security, logistic, and supply particulars. Their combined efforts in Massachusetts successfully facilitated the prisoners’ movement from

Massachusetts to Virginia.

366 Sampson only vaguely discussed some of the Americans’ operational plans and concerns in a fifteen page chapter. His primary focus was on escape attempts, see Sampson, Escape in America, 101- 116; also, Dabney told the march as a story and only touched on a small number of operation plans, see Dabney, After Saratoga: The Story of the Convention Army, 51-58; for very brief discussions and references to the march from Massachusetts to Virginia, see Fleming, “Gentlemen’s Johnny’s Wondering Army,” American Heritage, 24 (1972): 91; Lingley, “The Treatment of Burgoyne’s Troops Under the Saratoga Convention,” Political Science Quarterly, 22, no. 3 (1907): 456; Moody, “British Prisoners of War in the American Revolution,” 78-79; Beroth, “The Convention of Saratoga,” The New York Historical Society Quarterly Bulletin 8, no.3 (1927): 267; Chase, “Years of Hardships and Revelations: The Convention Army at the Albemarle Barracks, 1779-1781,” The Magazine of Albemarle County History, 41 (1983): 18-19; Patrick, “British Prisoners of War in the American Revolution,” 55-56; Dixon told the Convention Army’s general confinement story in a single chapter of her dissertation. She only summarized the march from Massachusetts to Virginia, see Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 214 -223; for more detailed studies on the march and preparations, see Knepper, “The Convention Army, 1777-1783,” 138-153; Wall, “The Story of the Convention Army, 1777-1783,” The New York Historical Society Quarterly, XI, no.2 (1927): 87-92.

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Preparing to move prisoners for a lengthy march would be a difficult task for

Washington and Heath because Massachusetts authorities had not improved their capacity for providing supplies, and prisoners lacked money for provision purchases. As previously discussed in the eighteenth century, it was customary for “belligerents” to

“supply and pay their own prisoners in enemy hands,” so they could purchase essentials while in confinement.367 Thus the American revolutionaries continued to allow senior

Convention Army officers to seek money and supplies from the British to care for the prisoners. By the fall of 1778, the public’s demand for scarce goods inflated prices for purchasing food provisions and other essentials in Boston and the surrounding area.368

This affected captives’ ability to purchase supplies because “The want of money was one of critical importance in our position at that time.”369 In early October, Phillips responded to this problem by requesting Clinton send British commissaries to bring cash and various food provisions and clothing so ships could deliver these essentials before a catastrophe occurred in Massachusetts.370 Phillips’s estimated a few days before the

367 Boyle, The Enemy in Our Hands, 12.

368 Greene to Jeremiah Powell, President of the Massachusetts Executive Council, September 17, 1778, ed. Showman, PGNG, II: 521-522; shortly before the march Heath admitted that Massachusetts’s dangerous shortage of flour scared both the Americans and prisoners alike and could lead to a disaster. He foresaw no remedy to the problem unless he could borrow provisions from the fleet and requested through the Board of War and Naval Board any additional flour they could spare him, see Heath to Washington, October 25, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 570; Heath, Heath’s Memoirs of the American War, 214; for Washington’s duel concerns about flour, see Washington to Heath, October 29, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 630; Washington to Laurens, October 29, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 631.

369 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 48.

370 Phillips to Clinton, October 2, 1778, HMC, I: 308-309; Phillips that fall repeatedly pleaded with Clinton and Heath for more clothing and money to purchase provisions and settle debts, see Phillips to Clinton, October 20, 1778, HMC, I: 314; Phillips to Heath, August 30, 1778, HMC, I: 283; Phillips to Heath, September 7, 1778, HMC, I: 285; Heath to Phillips, September 10, 1778, HMC, I: 287; Phillips assured Clinton that the Convention officers and men demonstrated great “zeal” preparing for the march, see Phillips to Clinton, October 25, 1778, HMC, I: 325.

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march that his troops and officers combined had less than £50 among them for purchasing provisions and settling debts.371 The Convention Army’s lead Commissary,

Jonathan Clarke, informed Clinton that the prisoners’ debts had risen to over £103, 000 in six months alone according to American commissaries.372 Without money for rent and provisions local magistrates in Cambridge threatened to place Convention Army officers under arrest for their debts.373 However, Clinton would not respond.

Despite money and supply challenges, Washington and Heath’s cooperation became the first key factor in their successful preparations and facilitating the Convention

Army’s movement in Massachusetts because Congress provided no instructions for moving the prisoners into Virginia. For instance, the fledging American government only ordered that Convention troops and their families leave Massachusetts; Washington had to implement the order. Empowered by Congress on October 16, 1778 “to take the necessary steps for removing, with all convenient speed, all the prisoners of the

Convention of Saratoga to the town of Charlottesville,” Washington gained extraordinary discretion as to how to conduct the operation.374 Unfortunately, Washington and his officers assumed the operation’s burdens without much congressional assistance.

371 Phillips to Prescott, November 1, 1778, HMC, I: 331; for more descriptions of money, supply, and clothing concerns shortly before the march, see Hamilton to Heath, November 2, 1778, HMC, I: 332; Phillips to Clinton, October 2, 1778, HMC, I: 308; Phillips to Prescott, October 20, 1778, HMC, I: 315-316.

372 Report of Jonathan Clarke, Deputy Commissary of Accounts, October 25, 1778, in Clinton, ed. Willcox, Appendix, The American Rebellion, 394-395.

373 Hamilton to Heath, November 4, 1778, HMC, I: 336.

374 JCC, 1774-1789, October 16, 1778, XII: 1016; Laurens to Washington, October 16, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 405-406; Phillips also acknowledged Washington’s powers “to govern this long and tedious march,” but hoped his counterpart would allow him to stay in Massachusetts, see Phillips to Washington, October 29, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 633-634.

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From his headquarters in Fredericksburg, New York, Washington oversaw the preparations but was not in a position to implement them himself. Thus he first ordered

Heath a few days after Congress’s relocation resolution on October 21 “that the

Convention troops should without loss of time, be put in motion for Charlottesville in

Virginia agreeable to the order of Congress…signify this to General Phillips immediately upon the receipt.”375 Heath five days later assured Washington he would do so and make necessary preparations.376 In late October, he informed Phillips, still under house arrest in Cambridge, of the march from Massachusetts to Virginia.377 This cooperation would be vital for enabling the Americans to facilitate the prisoners’ march from Massachusetts and across the terrain.

American forces could not have moved the captive army beyond British reach without Heath and Washington addressing security concerns and food shortages.

Ultimately, feeding the prisoners proved difficult because as previously noted, Congress had little money and essentials available, and the British army refused to send supply ships into Boston for the prisoners’ use. Congress in September of 1778 hoped British

375 Washington to Heath, October 21, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 503-504; Washington to Heath, October 22, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 519-520; for Heath receiving and distributing Washington’s removal orders to the Massachusetts government, see Heath to The Council of Massachusetts, October 28, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 279.

376 Heath to Washington, October 26, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 582.

377 Heath to Washington, October 25, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 570; for Heath informing the commander of the Massachusetts militia of Washington’s removal orders, see Heath to Jacob Gerrish, November 1, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 283; for Heath informing the acting Convention Army commander of Washington’s removal orders, see Heath to Brigadier General James Hamilton, October 25, 1778, HMC, I: 319-320; immediately upon learning of the march, Phillips requested General Prescott in Rhode Island to inform Clinton about the marching orders and sent word himself a few days later, see Phillips to Prescott, October 26, 1778, HMC, I: 322; for Phillips informing Clinton of the march, see Phillips to Clinton, October 29, 1778, HMC, I: 325; Phillips issued directions for the Convention Army commanders to follow Heath’s relocation order on November 2, 1778, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 46. 169

supply ships could ease provision shortages in Massachusetts. Consequently, Congress on September 11 directly threatened to move the captives elsewhere unless Clinton by

October 5, 1778, supplied the prisoners with fuel and provisions, or granted passports and guaranteed American vessels a safe passage to bring these essentials to Boston.378

Congress had first threatened that January to move or split Convention prisoners anywhere in Massachusetts if Howe did not provide passports for American ships to move fuel and food provisions through British controlled waters to Boston for the captives’ use.379 The British never complied. A few days after Congress’s September 11 resolution, Washington specifically sought Clinton’s answer about the “passports by the earliest opportunity.”380 Clinton, unsurprisingly, disappointed Congress and the Eastern

Department by not providing them with a single shipment of provision resources and funds that fall. After Clinton rejected Congress’s application for passport requests that

October, Congress ordered Washington to move the prisoners to Charlottesville.381

Congress’s threats had not achieved its purpose. As a result, Washington would have to supply the prisoners as best he could.

378 JCC, 1774-1789, September 11, 1778, XII: 901-902; for previous congressional resolutions directing Washington to seek passports from the British for the Convention Army’s needs, see JCC, 1774- 1789, September 2, 1778, XII: 861; JCC, 1774-1789, September 3, 1778, XII: 876-877; for more on Congress classifying the Convention Army as a problem for Cambridge, see JCC, 1774-1789, February 19, 1778, X: 184-185.

379 JCC, 1774-1789, January 13, 1778, X: 45.

380 Washington to Clinton, September 16, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 22; for Clinton’s refusal since the Americans failed to honor the convention stipulations, see Clinton to Washington, September 19, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 45-46.

381 JCC, 1774-1789, October 16, 1778, XII: 1016-1018; for Washington’s orders to move the Convention Army from Massachusetts to Charlottesville since Clinton never provided the prisoners with provisions and flour, see Washington to Heath, October 21, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 503-504; Washington to Heath, October 22, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 519-520; Washington to Henry Laurens, October 22-23, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 521; Washington to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., October 23, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 549.

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In preparation for the beginning of the march on November 9, 1778, Washington and Heath empowered large numbers of commissaries to purchase and forage for supplies. Nearly two weeks before the march, Heath had anticipated Convention Army officers’ complaints about not being able to “support themselves on the road” since “they have not a shilling to pay” for quarters and other essentials.382 Therefore, he ordered a

Massachusetts commissary and assistant quartermaster to attend the prisoners until they reached the borders of Connecticut. Also, he requested that Connecticut Governor

Jonathan Trumbull send his commissaries to furnish supplies in that state, unless he had a better method for providing essentials. However, he warned the governor for moving the prisoners and their guards’ baggage “Upwards of 120 teams will be necessary.”383

Commissaries never fully solved the problems of Convention Army provision shortages because they always lacked the necessary means and resources to meet the army’s needs.

Washington contributed to increasing commissary numbers. A day before the

Convention Army started from Massachusetts, he ordered Colonel Theodorick Bland, the

Virginian cavalry officer and former physician he selected to lead the march, to respect

Continental Army commissaries and quartermasters attending the prisoners and grant them the authority to find necessary accommodations and distribute food provisions to the captives when necessary during the march. He specifically expected Bland to assure that housing quartermasters to “see that their halting places are convenient for cover and accommodation” and show “regard to the commissaries, so that good provisions be

382 Heath to Washington, October 25, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 570.

383 Heath to Trumbull Sr., November 2, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 285-286; shortly before the march, Heath assured Washington he had made every arrangement possible to supply the prisoners in Massachusetts, but worried how the Americans would obtain essentials after the captives departed its borders, see Heath to Washington, November 3, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 288- 289. 171

distributed and at the proper times.”384 As well, he ordered his army’s most senior supply officer, Quartermaster General Nathanael Greene, to choose another quartermaster to specifically set out and join Bland on the march.385 Despite shortages, these initial provision preparations greatly increased the ability of the two generals to move and supply the prisoners as an army from Massachusetts to Virginia.

Another important factor Washington and Heath had to resolve was security arrangements in Massachusetts. Heath had to make decisions on the immediate security arrangements to fulfill Washington’s relocation orders. He noted in a letter dated

October 28 to the Massachusetts Council that his initial security preparations consisted of ordering the Convention Army prisoners divided into six divisions under the command of

Under Colonel Jacob Gerrish: three British and three German and each division to leave their barracks a day following the other to Enfield, Connecticut. An escort of 100

Massachusetts militiamen would march with each division. Furthermore, Heath requested that the Massachusetts Council “would detach from the militia in the vicinity of

Rutland two captains, four subalterns, and 140 militiamen, including non-commissioned officers as reinforcement to the guards at Rutland under the command of Col. Gerrish.”

After arriving in Enfield the Massachusetts militia guards would not be dismissed from

384 Washington to Bland, November 8, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 76-77; for Washington formally appointing Bland to led the Convention Army march from Massachusetts, see November 5, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 46-47; also see, Washington to Bland, November 8, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 76-77; Bland would meet the six divisions for the first time at Enfield, Connecticut on November 13, see Bland to Washington, November 13, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 131; Washington assured Phillips he had “appointed an officer of rank to attend the march,” see Washington to Phillips, November 6, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 59; Phillips supported the decision and praised Bland’s character and qualities as an officer, see Phillips to Washington, November 24, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 283.

385 James McHenry to Quartermaster General Nathanael Greene, November 8, 1778, in note # 2, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 77; Washington also assured Phillips he had appointed Continental Army “commissaries and quartermasters to meet the troops,” see Washington to Phillips, November 6, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 59.

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Gerrish’s service until the Connecticut militia could effectively secure the captives. 386 In total, a guard of 430 Massachusetts militiamen had been chosen to escort prisoners into

Connecticut.387

On November 1, Heath ordered Gerrish to assemble the British and German divisions at their barracks before the march. He also assigned him other responsibilities as well. Gerrish had to “pursue the route” chosen by Heath and appoint officers to manage each Convention Army division. His instructions included to “preserve order and prevent abuses to the persons or properties of the good people of the several towns through which you march; and you will not allow either your own troops or those of the

Convention to commit any with impunity.”388 Militia units chosen to march with the captives would prove essential for Washington and Heath to control the captives and ultimately take advantage of America’s size by moving the captives across the terrain to keep them from the British.

Another key factor of Washington and Heath’s marching preparations became finding a secret route for moving the captive army. The two generals had limitations moving thousands of Convention prisoners because they needed to march them where roads and adequate supplies existed. Thus any route would have to pass through a series

386 Heath to The Council of Massachusetts, October 28, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 279; Heath to Gerrish, November 1, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 283-285; the six divisions consisted of about 700 prisoners each, see Bland to Washington, November 13, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 131.

387 Heath to Trumbull, Sr., November 2, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 286.

388 Heath to Gerrish, November 1, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 283-284; for more on division specifics and their Convention Army officers, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 46-47; Convention Army officers had to sign parole agreements to help manage their men on the march, see Riedesel and Hamilton to Heath, November 7, 1778, HMC, I: 338-339.

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of small towns for cover and supplies and not through the wilderness. Washington relied on Heath initially to fix “the time of march and route, and inform Governor Trumbull he may be ready to receive them upon the borders of Connecticut.”389 As a result, Heath in a few days at his headquarters in Boston, mapped the first portion of the route into

Connecticut and purposely withheld specifics from Convention Army officers “to keep them in ignorance what route they are to take further then Enfield” out of fear Clinton would attempt a rescue at nor near the Hudson River, or in the Jersies.”390 Thus the

American revolutionaries planned a route to march the captives that used America’s terrain to their advantage by planning to keep the captives moving through areas uncontrolled by the British.

After selecting Bland to lead the march, shortly before the prisoners’ departure,

Washington on November 8 provided Bland the route directions from Cambridge to

Fishkill, New York, the crucial crossing point of the Hudson River about 75 miles from

British headquarters. Only after the divisions and escorts safely crossed the river and marched past the town would Bland “be furnished with a new route for your direction thro’ the states of New-York-New Jersey-Pennsylvania-Maryland, and to their place of destination in Virginia.”391 The march first went through Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York through the towns of “Springfield, Enfield, Simsbury, New Hartford,

Norfolk, Canaan, Sharon, Beckman Patent” (modern Beekman) until crossing the Hudson

389 Washington to Heath October 21, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 503.

390 Heath to Washington, October 30, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 281-282.

391 Washington to Bland, November 8, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 76-77.

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River at Fishkill into New Jersey.392 These plans required Bland and his escorts to move

Convention Army prisoners hundreds of miles over an enormous countryside.

Additionally, Washington and Heath had to determine a route for moving the prisoners from Pennsylvania into Virginia. Washington would not provide Bland with more route directions until after the army began marching for Virginia. The general informed Bland in a letter dated November 23 that this route weaved through “New

Windsor to Sussex Court-House-to Hackests Town-to Sherrards ferry by Pitts-Town-to

White Horse on the Lancaster road-to Lancaster...through York in Pennsylvania,

Frederickstown in Maryland and Leesburg in Virginia.” After moving beyond Leesburg, about thirty miles south of present day Washington D.C., Washington did not provide directions and Bland could proceed how he pleased in accordance “to your own judgment, and the information you receive and the arrangements of the Commissary with respect to provisions.”393 Thus the marching columns had to cross the Potomac River from Maryland into Virginia and then march through the central Virginian interior on some travels roads into Albemarle County. This route was significant because it was available and remained largely uncontrolled by the British. Determining the route moved the Revolutionaries a step closer to moving the captives far from the British.

392 For these towns listed as the route between Cambridge to Fishkill, see Royal Flint to Richard K. Meade, November 5, 1778, with Convention Route, in George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799: Series 4. General Correspondence. 1697-1799 image 1144 of 1203.. http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=mgw4&fileName=gwpage053.db&recNum=1143accessed March 21, 2012.

393 Washington to Bland, November 23, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 262-263; Bland dispatched a messenger to obtain directions for the new route beyond Fishkill a day after Washington sent his instructions, see Bland to Washington, November 24, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 277.

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Washington determined the overall route, but Heath undertook logistical precautions for the crucial first portion of the route into Connecticut. Heath avoided marching the prisoners on roads through Loyalist areas in Connecticut. Shortly before the march, Connecticut’s governor warned Heath about the dreadful roads in his state.

To enable the Convention troops to move faster through his state, Trumbull desired escorts march them on another route through Waterbury and Danbury in Berkshire

County, Connecticut. The proposal appealed to the governor because the captives would be better supplied and “The other roads leading through this state to Fishkill” had become noticeably “worn out” and “almost impassible.”394 However, Heath did not want the prisoners to undertake the route he suggested because he had been informed that

Berkshire County had many Loyalists. He had already completed arrangements to take the captives through Enfield, and several officers had gone to Rutland to take charge and move the captives. Heath concluded that he could not change routes “without much embarrassment and delay.”395 To avoid unexpected problems, Washington granted Bland the authority to dictate pace in accordance “to the state of the weather, the condition of the troops, and the nature of the country through which they travel,” and ordered him “to attend to the complaints which may arise and obviate them as far as possible.”396

Washington and Heath’s logistical plans reveal that they carefully determined the safest routes through the countryside to facilitate movement and use the terrain as a strategic asset to keep the captives from the British.

394 Trumbull, Sr., to Heath, October 28, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 277-278.

395 Heath to Trumbull Sr., November 3, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 287-288; also see, Heath to Washington, November 3, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 288-289.

396 Washington to Bland, November 8, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 76-77. 176

Washington and Heath completed their initial preparations for putting the

Convention Army prisoners into motion by ordering heavy baggage and sickly prisoners to be secretly relocated by boat to Virginia to avoid delays during the march. This became a long process since loading ships and handling ill prisoners took time. Brigadier

General James Hamilton, Phillips’s second in command, had in late October pushed

Heath to allow about five or six ill and married officers to travel by sea in a vessel under a flag of truce and subject to “any condition of parole it may be judged proper to require of them.” In addition, Hamilton requested an unknown number of ill and injured troops remain at the Cambridge hospital “under charge of an officer and surgeons mate until directions are given for their going to sea or otherwise as will be thought most proper by you or the American Congress.”397 Placing ill captives on ships allowed Washington and

Heath to use the sea as an asset to move feeble prisoners and avoid having them slow down the march.

Less than a week before the Americans started the march, Washington ordered the bulk of the captives’ belongings placed on a supply ship sailing for Virginia specifically for the reason that “It will be certainly best for their baggage to go by water into James

River” and following, then be moved inland to the prisoners’ encampment in central

Virginia. The general observed that “If they have flag vessels of their own at Boston, or choose to provide them, the baggage had better go in them.” If not, Washington directed

Heath to otherwise direct appropriate ships “to be provided for the occasion” of moving

397 General James Hamilton to Heath, October 31, 1778, in note # 2, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 18- 19; for Heath’s response that ill captives could remain behind until he received further instructions from Washington, see Heath to Hamilton, November 1, 1778, HMC, I: 331; Riedesel recorded two unhealthy German officers remained in Cambridge at the hospital, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 49.

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the captives’ baggage by sea to its destination.398 Ultimately, Washington granted the new Eastern Department commander, Gates, authority to approve passports for vessels boarding sickly captives to proceed for the James River in Virginia. Gates also had to keep a record of officers and troops sailing for Charlottesville.399 Thus the American revolutionaries began the process of using waterways to move the captives from

Massachusetts to Virginia.

Washington moved to finalize the operation by requesting Congress approve relocating ill prisoners by sea. Though given considerable autonomy by Congress,

Washington was careful to seek congressional approval for his operations. For this operation, Washington informed Congress that he supported moving the few prisoners by sea because he thought “it may be safely done,” and “save the trouble and expense of another escort at a future day.”400 Congress granted Washington discretion for moving married officers by sea in late November. Ultimately, a few hundred Convention Army troops and a small handful of officers required transport by sea.401 These sea preparations only increased the American revolutionaries’ capacity for facilitating the prisoners’ movement for Virginia.

398 Washington to Heath, November 3, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 29.

399 Washington to Gates, December 17, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 431.

400 Washington to Laurens, November 12, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 122; for on Washington’s orders to move sickly Convention troops and officers by sea, see Washington to Laurens, December 4, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 365; Washington to Heath, November 12, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 120.

401 For Congress’s approval to move married and sickly Convention officers by sea , see JCC, 1774-1789, November 23, 1778, XII: 1152; for the few hundred Convention Army troops and married officers requiring transport by sea, see Phillips to Gates, December 2, 1778, HMC, I: 353; a small number of ill and wounded British officers and troops were granted parole and permission to leave for New York, see Phillips to Clinton, December 2, 1778, HMC, I: 353; Phillips to Clinton, December 8, 1778, HMC, I: 356. 178

On November 9, following the operational particulars, the first two Convention

Army divisions started their march without a hitch from Rutland and Cambridge. Over the course of the next three days, all divisions left their barracks.402 According to the numbers provided by Heath to the Massachusetts Council, the Convention Army prisoners totaled 4,145 prisoners, 2,263 British and 1,182 Hessian and Brunswick soldiers.403 Bland arrived in Enfield on November 13, and found all six divisions with about 700 prisoners each under Gerrish’s command in good order. He planned on marching around 15 to 20 miles per day until reaching Camp Albemarle in Virginia.404

These numbers did not include the unknown number of families and servants traveling with the captive army.

Washington’s and Heath’s preparations included the challenge of moving and feeding the wives and children of Convention Army officers and soldiers. In the eighteenth century, women and children often traveled with armies as camp followers.

Holly Mayer has examined how the Continental Army managed and depended on its

402 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 49; for Heath informing Washington of the march, see Heath to Washington, November 12, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 291; for Phillips informing Clinton of the start of the march, see Phillips to Clinton, November 15, 1778, HMC, I: 346.

403 Heath to The Council of Massachusetts, October 28, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 279; Heath delayed the march a few days “Finding it impractical” that everything would be in readiness by November 4, see Heath to Washington, November 2, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 18-19; Heath to Trumbull, Sr., November 2, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 285-286; for Heath’s rejection of senior Convention Army officers’ requests for an indefinite delay, see Heath to Riedesel and Hamilton, October 26, 1778, HMC, I: 321-322; Phillips and Riedesel could not travel with the army south until they settled the captive army’s debts, Phillips the British, and Riedesel the German. For this and Phillips requesting £10,000 from Rhode Island to settle bills, see Phillips to Clinton, November 15, 1778, HMC, I: 346; Phillips to Prescott, November 15, 1778, HMC, I: 347; Hamilton to Heath, October 31, 1778, HMC, I: 329; after obtaining the money from Rhode Island in late November both generals set out for Virginia, see Phillips to Clinton, December 2, 1778, HMC, I: 353; Riedesel finally left Cambridge for Virginia on November 28, see Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 56.

404 Bland to Washington, November 13, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 131.

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camp followers to sustain its army. In the process, the Continental Army and its large number of camp followers together forged its “own military community.” Camp followers can be broadly described as “those people who live and work with the military, and accept, willingly or not, its governance of their affairs.”405 Convention Army prisoners were no exception to having civilians traveling and living with them, mostly, their wives and children. Little is known of Convention Army families’ preparations because they did not appear to be a priority for the Continental Army officers directing the march and few families left written records of their experiences with the Convention

Army. Indeed, an unknown number of wives and children marched with the captive army to Virginia.

Riedesel’s wife, Frederika, wrote a brief memoir describing her husband’s service with the Convention Army and the families’ troubles with the Americans. She described her family’s journey from Cambridge to Charlottesville as difficult since wagons broke down, and her family had few means for subsistence.406 She revealed that even families of senior officers traveling by wagon during the march suffered because supplies always fell behind and local inhabitants made life difficult for her family. Sometimes, American locals living in the towns the captive army passed through refused to feed her family. On one occasion, she pleaded with a local woman during the march for meat to feed her and her family, but the woman refused. The American women accused Riedesel of trying to kill Americans and destroy their property. Thus she would not provide the Riedesel’s

405 Holly A. Mayer, Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and Community During the American Revolution (Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 1-2 & 7.

406 Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 145-154.

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with any food. Riedesel noted that the women enjoyed the chance to “torment” the hungry family. Not until Riedesel’s young child approached the woman for food did she grudgingly consent to provide some food for the Riedesel family.407 Nevertheless,

Washington’s largest challenge would be to keep the captives moving and secure from the British during the march in Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania.

*****

Washington’s security precautions in Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania allowed American forces to move Convention prisoners as an army and take advantage of

America’s large geographic space by securing the captives far beyond British reach in

Virginia. Washington’s troops and their militia allies could not take advantage of

America’s large countryside unless they kept Convention prisoners marching on roads and moving through small towns to obtain supplies. Nevertheless, Washington’s security measures allowed his forces to advantageously utilize America’s space as an asset by moving the captives a distance from British controlled areas since Clinton’s rescue force could not follow the prisoners beyond New York without risking their own security.

Washington undertook several security measures that contributed to moving the prisoners over the terrain through Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania. He obtained militiamen from each region as escorts and dispatched Continentals to watch vulnerable areas. In addition, Washington reinforced militia escorts in Connecticut with

Continental regiments to move the prisoners through New York and dispatched additional troops to serve as intelligence gatherers and hold roads near British controlled areas and passages along the Hudson River. Subsequently, he secretly placed supplies at

407 Ibid., 146-147. 181

the crucial Hudson River crossing point of Fishkill, New York, less than 70 miles from

British headquarters, and relocated nearly his entire army there to keep the prisoners moving from the British. These measures contributed to foiling the British army’s largest rescue attempt of the war. Clinton’s unsuccessful rescue proved important in depriving the British of troops in New York for military operations. After the prisoners’ arrival in

Pennsylvania, Washington ordered Bland to push the pace, so to avoid long delays and move prisoners more quickly beyond Clinton’s reach.

Washington recognized in late October that he did not have enough Continentals to move the Convention Army prisoners safely and wrote “It will not be possible for me to send proper guards from the army to escort the troops on their march.”408 Washington had no illusions that without militiamen’s services, prisoners and their baggage would not move forward since he had no other “way of conveying the troops to the place of their destination but by calling upon the several states thro' which they are to pass for a proper guard of militia and carriages sufficient to transport their baggage.”409 Washington requested militia from authorities in each state in which the prisoners marched because escorts required militiamen to move captives in their borders until they reached the next state and could hand them over.410 Without militia regiments, Washington and his

Continentals would not have been able to securely move the prisoners.

408 Washington to Laurens, October 22-23, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 521; for Washington empowering Heath to obtain militia escorts in Connecticut, seeWashington to Trumbull, Sr. October 23, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 549.

409 Washington to Heath, October 21, 1778, ed. Chase, PGW, XVII: 503-504.

410 For Washington’s requests for militiamen or orders empowering Bland to do so to securely move Convention troops during the march, see Washington to Richard Peters (The Board of War), November 18, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 199; Washington to Peters, November 23, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 272; Peters to Washington, November 23, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 272; Washington 182

Washington undertook his second security precaution in Connecticut by ordering

Continental troops to join the marching columns. In mid-November of 1778, Washington ordered Continental Army Brigadier General Enoch Poor and his brigade of Continental soldiers to take charge of the Convention prisoners at Enfield, and escort them to Fishkill under Bland’s overall command. Moreover, he ordered a Continental Army officer placed within the Convention Army divisions to more effectively move and supervise the prisoners. He instructed Poor that Bland would have to leave the divisions under his care for a time to settle housing arrangements for the prisoners in New Jersey and

Pennsylvania. Also, Poor received Washington’s consent to join the first division, “or wait to make any arrangements, you may judge necessary.”411 Reinforcing columns with

Continental Army soldiers allowed Washington the chance to move large numbers of

Convention Army prisoners over the terrain through New York and Connecticut.

Before Continental Army troops made their way to Enfield, to move the

Convention Army captives, Washington faced problems when disgruntled militiamen challenged his authority and stalled progress. As the captive army marched through northern Connecticut towards eastern New York, Bland informed Washington on

November 21 that a “stop is put to the march of the Convention troops owing to some to Bland, November 23, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 263; Washington to the Commanding Officers of Militia in the Counties of Loudoun, Fauquier, Culpeper, and Orange County, VA, November 23, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 264; Washington to Bland, December 9, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 387.

411 Washington to Brigadier General Enoch Poor, November 17, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 184; for Washington informing Bland of Poor to assist in escorting the captives to the Hudson River, see Washington to Bland, November 17, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 179; Bland approved Continental troops at his service rather than militia, see Bland to Washington November 21, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 248; Washington also sent two additional Continental Army Massachusetts Brigades under the command of Putnam with their artillery to nearby Danbury, see Washington to Putnam, November 17, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 184 -185; Washington had to wait a few days for these troops to march for Danbury because wagons required repairs and officers were absent, see Putnam to Washington, November 19, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 213.

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misconception between” Washington and Connecticut’s government.412 Connecticut militiamen would not follow Washington’s orders through Bland to march the prisoners to Sharon, in the northwestern corner of Connecticut and beyond to the Hudson River.

They proved troublesome because their assembly had issued orders ending their service after the Convention Army reached the town and handed the captives over to the New

York militia or any other guards New York’s governor appointed. Bland worried their disobedience would halt divisions in areas unprepared for food arrangements. In response, he requested Washington send more Continentals to continue the march. Until he received reinforcements from Washington, Bland ordered his troops to halt all the

Convention Army divisions in Sharon.413 Thus Washington faced his first set back while moving the Convention Army in Connecticut.

Washington dispatched more Continental troops from the surrounding region for escorting Convention prisoners into New York. The day after Bland halted the march,

Washington ordered Continental Army soldiers to meet the Convention Army and an advance team of 100 set out ahead of his larger force to reach Bland faster. The general hoped some militiamen may be persuaded to continue, but he ordered Bland to “put the first division in motion as soon as possible after this reaches you.”414 Subsequently,

Washington ordered a nearby German battalion of Continentals to serve as additional security escorts to Sherrards Ferry on the Delaware River. Specifically, 500 Continentals

412 Bland to Washington, November 21, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 249.

413 Ibid.

414 Washington to Bland, November 22, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 253; Washington sent a portion of the Pennsylvania brigades, see Washington to Huntington, November 22, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 257.

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from Pennsylvania would escort the six divisions from Sharon to the Hudson River at

Fishkill.415 Although these deployments reduced Washington’s available defensive forces, he ordered a Connecticut brigade of the Continental Army to secure his encampment in Fredericksburg “against every possible accident” until the Convention

Army moved beyond the Hudson River in New Jersey.416 Subsequently, Continental

Army reinforcements joined marching columns in Sharon and proceeded to move the first two divisions to the Hudson River on November 24, 1778. The remaining divisions soon followed and Bland assured Washington after Continental troops’ arrival that “the whole line of march will be once more regularly in motion” for the march to continue onward into New York and beyond.417 Dispatching Continental Army soldiers from Maryland,

Pennsylvania, and New York became one of Washington’s primary means to secure the captives and move them at a faster pace when the captives neared British controlled areas.

As in Connecticut, Washington ordered Continental troops to reinforce

Convention Army divisions marching through New York to decrease the chances of a

British rescue. American forces had to march the Convention Army prisoners near

British controlled areas near New York City. Washington worried most about deserters

415 Washington to Laurens, November 23-24, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 269-270; for the 500 Pennsylvania Continental Army troops, see General Orders, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 247.

416 Washington to Huntington, November 22, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 257; for Bland receiving 16 Dragoons (cavalry troops) for escort purposes from Washington, see Washington to Bland, November 29, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 331-332; Washington to Major General Stirling, November 29, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 337.

417 Bland to Washington, November 24, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 277.

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finding “their way into New York.”418 He addressed desertion and rescue concerns from his headquarters by ordering Continental officers based in New York to detach troops and guard critical passes along the Hudson River and direct parties to capture and hold escapees before they reached British headquarters. Washington, for instance, instructed

Colonel William Malcolm to use boats on the Hudson River to catch deserters before they warned the British.419 In addition, he ordered Thomas Clark to apprehend escapees and place them under guard until they could be secured somewhere else.420 He also dispatched Brigadier General Jedediah Huntington to send a detachment of Continentals to watch the critical roads near the Hudson River for escapees and secure them.421 Thus the American revolutionaries again would use waterways to their advantage to move the captives. These precautions reveal that Washington recognized Continentals had to secure roads near British lines before Clinton learned of the prisoners’ location.

Another Washington precaution that contributed to not delaying the Convention

Army’s movement through New York was having provision supplies available for the captives along the route. Washington obtained for his escorts a large shipment of provisions during the march from the British after deceiving them to deliver previously agreed supplies to the captives. Washington began this process after the march began by

418 Washington to Huntington, November 18, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 196; Washington to Kalb, November 18, 1778 ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 197; for Washington’s fears of a rescue, see Washington to Colonel William Malcom, November 20, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 234.

419 Washington to Malcom, November 20, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 234; for more on securing deserters by sending Continentals to guard critical passes before they warned the British, see Washington to Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, November 25, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 296-297.

420 Washington to Colonel Thomas Clark, November 18, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 188; Washington to Huntington, November 18, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 196.

421 Washington to Huntington, November 18, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 196-197; Huntington to Washington, November 20, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 226.

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granting Jonathan Clarke, the British Assistant Commissary General to the Convention

Army, a passport to “proceed by the most convenient route to Cambridge or the troops of the convention.”422 Clarke hoped he could return to Cambridge after obtaining an urgent letter from Phillips to settle the prisoners’ debts and subsistence matters prior to their departure. The commissary carried a letter from Clinton for Washington. Clarke desired

Washington approve another passport for a British supply vessel to sail up the Hudson

River carrying “money & necessaries for their march.”423 Washington, however, deceived Clarke to obtain necessary supplies for the prisoners and continue marching through northern New York without losing time foraging and giving away the route. He accomplished this by allowing Clarke to write Clinton telling him to send previously owed money and necessities to King’s Ferry, New York, located about 200 miles from

New York City. After receiving the supplies and money in hand, Washington assured

Clarke he would “have them conveyed to the troops,” but he never mentioned their location.424 The British already knew Washington had ordered the prisoners to march for

Virginia, but they did not know when it would occur, or the route. Clinton and Clarke

422 Washington to Jonathan Clarke, November 14, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 144; Washington to Clinton, November 14, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 144; Clarke had gone to Rhode Island and New York to settle the Convention troops’ public accounts and secure more money from the British, see Heath to Washington, October 31, 1778, “The Heath Papers,” CMHS, IV: 283; for British knowledge that orders were given to march the prisoners at some point, see Clarke to Washington, November 13, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 132; Clinton to Washington, November 10, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 85. Washington informed Congress Heath had allowed Clarke “to go from Boston to New York to settle the accounts and procure money for the discharge of the debts of the troops at Cambridge,” see Washington to Laurens, November 14, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 152.

423 Clarke to Washington, November 13, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 132; for Clinton’s letter, see Clinton to Washington, November 10, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 85; Clarke waited in Bedford New York for permission to proceed to Boston on November 13, 1778, see Brigadier General Charles Scott to Washington, November 13, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 140. Unknown to the British, Heath had already commenced the Convention Army’s march.

424 Washington to Clarke, November 14, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 144.

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certainly had no idea of Washington’s plans to use the British provisions to supply

Convention Army captives during its march.

Washington’s deception successfully placed the British supply ship carrying money and provisions to the captives. In mid-November, Washington granted permission for the single British ship to sail along the Hudson River from New York City to King’s Ferry. Unknown to the British, he wrote detailed instructions for Brigadier

General James Clinton, an officer who fought at Saratoga, to seize the boat at King’s

Ferry and “procure a proper vessel and take the goods out of her and send them under the care of an officer who is to deliver them to the Deputy Quarter Master General at Fishkill landing, to be carefully stored until called for.”425 Riedesel’s memoirs reveal that these fresh supplies lifted the sagging spirits of the cold and weary captives. They appreciated receiving money and clothes, and “officers received sufficient forage money for one hundred and sixty-five days, and the soldier’s stockings and shoes. This caused universal joy.”426 More importantly for the Americans, Washington had found supplies for the captives without slowing down the march.

Washington’s security attempts allowed the Americans to foil the British army’s rescue efforts. Washington’s final preventative measure in New York required relocating nearly his entire army around Fishkill to guard the prisoners during their Hudson River crossing. This would assure that the captives would keep moving before Clinton could attack Washington’s force and rescue the captives. In late November, Bland expressed

425 Washington to Brigadier General James Clinton, November 14, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 144-145. 426 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 57; for the other German officers’ response, see Von Eelking, The German Allied Troops in the War of American Independence, 1776-1783, 149. 188

concerns to Washington about a rescue and strengthened the guard around the British columns after prisoners dropped “hints” and openly expressed that they “expected to be rescued, & intended to make some effort themselves.” Bland had expected to arrive with the Convention prisoners at Fishkill on the evening of the 24th and cross the river the next night.427 Although Bland had followed his orders during the march, Washington took the precaution in late November of marching much of the Continental Army from

Fredericksburg to Fishkill. His army with the exception of one single “light corps” and a

“brigade” would “give time for the Convention troops to make some progress in crossing the North River-to prevent a possibility of accident.” Once the prisoners completed their passage by November’s end, the Continental Army would stop its campaign activities for the winter.428 As the Convention prisoners approached Fishkill, Washington noted to

Henry Laurens that he would place “over a part of the army, in order to form a line of posts parallel to their march, for the greater security of the several passes leading to the

River.”429 The general established his headquarters at Fishkill and saw the Convention

Army divisions cross the Hudson River from the New York to New Jersey’s shore.430

Washington’ security precaution at Fishkill allowed American forces to effectively move the six Convention divisions across the Hudson River. The prisoners crossed the river without a hitch over a period of a few days. Continental Army escorts

427 Bland to Washington, November 24, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 277.

428 Washington to Laurens, November 27, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 309-310.

429 Washington to Laurens, November 21, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 251.

430 For Washington arriving at Fishkill, see Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the Services of the Duke of Brunswick, trans. Epping, 137-138; Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 57; Von Eelking, The German Allied Troops in the War of American Independence, 1776-1783, 148-149.

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began ferrying British divisions first on November 29 “in the midst of a severe storm.”431

Lieutenant Du Roi noted that the Brunswick and Hessians followed and by December 1, two of their divisions after crossing the Hudson River temporally resided in Newburgh shortly before the final division made its way over the water.432 As a result of placing nearly the entire Continental Army around Fishkill, American escorts succeeded in moving the captives quickly over the river.

America’s geographical space continued to remain a valuable asset for

Washington in New York since Clinton could not safely lead a rescue force beyond

British controlled areas of the Hudson River into New Jersey without risking his army’s security. Washington’s security precautions and America’s geographical space both undermined Clinton’s rescue attempt because moving across the large terrain into areas uncontrolled by the British army would prove too risky for his force. The operation was

Clinton’s second plan to rescue the prisoners and return them to British lines. His previous plan in early 1778 to coordinate with Howe and force Congress to release the prisoners after threatening to destroy Hartford came to nothing for reasons that logistics proved unrealistic, and he could not secure the necessary troops as second in command.

The Convention Army’s march less than 70 miles from British headquarters, however, provided Clinton his best opportunity to free the prisoners in the accessible town of

Fishkill, but he had to attack before the Continentals moved the captives over the river because his forces lacked resources and troops to securely follow them south into New

431 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 57; for another account of the crossing during the difficult weather, see Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 149.

432 Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the Services of the Duke of Brunswick, trans. Epping, 138.

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Jersey and Pennsylvania. Thus Clinton’s force could only rescue the captives while they marched in close proximity to British strongholds.

The British army’s large numbers in New York City granted Clinton a chance to strike in force against the Americans. Clinton developed an ambitious operation that required knowledge of the terrain. He learned about the march after Congress in mid-

October passed the relocation resolutions. However, Clinton only knew of the relocation resolutions, not the timing, or route. To obtain revenge against Congress in early

November, he had his commissaries bring back captured American officers on parole to close confinement in New York City.433 Washington countered Clinton’s measure a month later on December 16 by empowering his Commissary General, John Betty, “to call for the immediate return of the Convention and other officers” with the exception of

Burgoyne to American authorities, “who have been permitted to go to the enemy on parole.”434 Nevertheless, Clinton wrote in his memoirs that the circumstances presented him the chance to rescue the captives after intelligence informed him “that the

Convention troops were soon to cross the North River on their march to Virginia, covered by the greatest part of Mr. Washington’s army” which presented an opportunity “of recovering at least part of those troops.” Thus Clinton immediately planned a surprise attack against “Mr. Washington’s rear in his passage of the river.”435 His plan required a

433 Clinton to Washington, November 10, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 85.

434 Washington to John Beatty, December 16, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 421; Washington to Jay, December 16, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 422-423.

435 Clinton, ed. Willcox, The American Rebellion, 114; Washington aide Robert Hanson Harrison informed Nathanael Greene of Clinton’s maneuver and possible intention of rescuing the Convention troops. He wrote the British were too late, see Robert Hanson Harrison to Greene, December 4, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 363; Washington also believed it probably unable to rescue the Convention troops 191

force to sail up the Hudson River from New York City towards Washington’s army and additional battalions and cavalry would move overland from British headquarters in support. Clinton’s force in the first week of December boarded at least 52 transports and sailed north on the Hudson River to engage Washington and rescue the captives.436 In spite of his ships’ numbers, Clinton’s force proved unable to safely chase the captives into New Jersey.

America’s geographical space immediately became an obstacle for Clinton’s rescue force because his force had to reach the Convention Army captives before

American forces moved them beyond the Hudson River crossing at Fishkill. A successful raid, however, seemed feasible since Clinton had done well in his offensive up the Hudson River at the close of the Saratoga campaign and he might be able to surprise the Americans at Fishkill. Clinton recorded in his memoirs that obstacles in the Hudson

River delayed the advance by four days. He landed his flank companies and most of the force’s battalion guards at nearby Stony Point to pursue the Americans, but they had already retreated. Clinton was forced to redeploy his troops to their prior bases near New

York City without rescuing a single Convention Army prisoner after he found nothing of value to hold.437 Clinton’s retreat shows that America’s large geographical space and the

since they had already crossed the Hudson River by the end of November and remained under a heavy guard, see Harrison to Laurens, December 5, 1778, in note # 1, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 370.

436 Ibid., 114-115; for Washington passing on his intelligence of 52 British transports sailing up the Hudson River towards the Convention Army at Fishkill, see Washington to Brigadier General Anthony Wayne, December 4, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 368; Washington to Colonel Daniel Morgan, December 4, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 366; Washington to Brigadier General Peter Muhlenberg, December 4, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 367; Major General Alexander McDougall, December 5, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 371.

437 Ibid; for another account of the British rescue coming up empty handed, see Stephen Kemble, Journals of Lieut. Colonel Stephen Kemble, 1773-1789: and British Army Orders, ed. George Billias, (Boston: Gregg Press, 1972), 167-168. 192

British army’s limited control of areas constrained his strike capacity because he could not follow the Convention Army hundreds of miles and leave New York City weakly defended. This operation proved to be Clinton’s final attempt to rescue Convention

Army captives for the remainder of his command in America. The British army’s failure proved important in shaping British war capacity because rescuing most of the prisoners would have forced the Continental Army to reengage thousands of additional enemy troops after British commanders reequipped and redeployed the Convention soldiers.

Washington’s precautions by no means secured each Convention Army prisoner or totally prevented desertion. Phillips received a report in early December that at least

80 prisoners, “50 British and 30 Germans deserted” their columns before the divisions reached the Connecticut River.438 In most cases, recaptured escapees never returned to their regiments and remained confined with local magistrates, which enabled them to make more escapes. Magistrates and militiamen often held escapees multiple times housing them wherever they found convenient. The Governor of New Jersey, William

Livingston, noted to Washington in January that 30 Convention Army troops had deserted in Andover, with 20 recaptured and jailed in nearby Morristown. Five of those recaptured deserters escaped and subsequently jailed in Newark. He asked Washington to place these troublemakers in a safer area far from British lines because militia guards could not hold them for long.439 The British knew of Convention Army escapees’ efforts during and following the march. Clinton reported to Germain that by January of 1779

Loyalists had smuggled and delivered at least 30 deserters to British headquarters in New

438 Phillips to Clinton, December 2, 1778, HMC, I: 353.

439 William Livingston to Washington, January 9, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 605-606.

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York City.440 Ultimately, an unknown number of Convention Army deserters reached

British lines over the next few months, but these numbers were small compared to the army the Americans were able to contain.

The British army’s inability to chase the 4,000 Convention Army captives far from their strongholds over America’s large geographic space proved to be a blessing for

Washington since he had less control over the prisoners in Pennsylvania. The general recognized that Continental Army troops, who escorted the prisoners beyond New Jersey, faced the distressing circumstances of building shelters in winter conditions upon their return to his Middlebrook, New Jersey headquarters.441 In spite of fewer Continental

Army regulars at Washington’s disposal, the Revolutionaries continuing to move the captives across the countryside further from British headquarters. After learning of

British advances up the Hudson River, Washington admitted his uncertainty about enemy intentions. Nevertheless, he ordered Major General Johann Kalb on December 4 to tell

Bland to move the Convention divisions more quickly. Specifically, Kalb was to “urge him in my name to hasten on the Convention troops as fast as possible to the Delaware and to redouble his vigilance to suppress any effort on their part.” He had Washington’s approval to undertake further precautions if the British attempted a rescue.442 The general at this time, nevertheless, assured the Board of War that Convention Army captives would speedily and securely move beyond New York because “a considerable part of the Pennsylvanians and the Marylanders are employed in escorting the

440 Clinton to Germain, January 11, 1779, ed. Davies, DAR, 1770-1783,” XVII: 28.

441 Washington to Peters, December 20, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 475.

442 Washington to Kalb, December 4, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 364-365.

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Convention Troops from the North River to Delaware and securing the communication between them and the disaffected parts of the states of New York and New Jersey.”443

Bland continued moving the Convention Army divisions south into New Jersey.

Washington’s security measures assured American forces success moving the captives through the countryside beyond the British army’s grasp.

America’s immense geographic space also sometimes impeded American forces’ attempt to secure Convention Army captives during the march because they had to search a large countryside to round up deserters. Although American escorts moved Convention

Army captives at a good pace after New York, Washington’s control weakened in

Pennsylvania without the services of Continental Army soldiers to reinforce columns. At least a few hundred of Hessian and Brunswick junior officers and troops escaped into the surrounding German communities. For instance, Du Roi recorded that as many as 400

Convention Army prisoners deserted during the march, mostly Germans in

Pennsylvania.444 On another occasion, Du Roi noted that for at least 7 miles within

Pennsylvania his division marched under the supervision of no escort until a lone

American colonel and his few soldiers joined them. The officer, however, had no idea what to do with the captives and admitted to Du Roi that “he was willing to do anything I would tell him, so that no complaint would be made” against him for slowing down the march.445

443 Washington to the Board of War, December 4, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 367.

444 Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the Services of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778, trans. Epping, 151; he also noted many German inhabitants often refused rooms to prisoners and blatantly stole their few possessions after they arrived within their towns; Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 174 & 179.

445 Ibid., 141. 195

Washington had to rely more on geographical space as a barrier after New York since many militiamen drafted by the Pennsylvania Assembly never joined their regiments for escorting the Convention Army through their borders. Washington ordered

Bland to supervise the divisions’ movements south to take the “number of Continentals troops as are absolutely necessary until you obtain a sufficient militia guard.” Even if

Bland failed to recruit sufficient militiamen, Washington granted Bland authority to march German Convention troops under a reduced guard rather than increase the numbers of Continentals to escort the columns southward. In addition, he ordered Bland to have the Board of War obtain from the governor and council additional guards and note the specific numbers the colonel required to assure “no further misunderstanding.”446

Bland specifically in mid-December sought from the Board of War more militia, but after arriving in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, learned that Lancaster and York Counties had not drafted a single militiaman. Thus Bland had to temporarily stop the march again and after a day of heavy rain lost another day. He could not securely push the divisions further south without more militiamen.447 Despite the security breaches in Pennsylvania,

Bland implemented Washington’s orders and quickly moved the captives through

Maryland, and after crossing the Potomac River, into Virginia. The militiamen shortages in Pennsylvania proved to be the last major security problem for Washington until the six

Convention Army divisions arrived in Camp Albemarle in mid January of 1779.

After marching for two months and crossing the Potomac River, Washington’s

Continental and Virginian escorts had fulfilled Congress’s relocation orders. The

446 Washington to Bland, December 9, 1778, Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 387.

447 Bland to Washington, December 19, 1778, Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 464.

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Convention Army trudged through the rural Virginian countryside that January, and reached Albemarle County. Many of the prisoners’ troubles increased over the next two years as the state of Virginia confined and isolated most of the remaining Convention

Army junior officers and troops at Camp Albemarle. Washington and Heath’s plans to put the Convention Army in motion and move them from Massachusetts to Virginia contributed to American revolutionaries using America’s geographical space as a means to secure it from their enemy. Their joint security, supply, and logistical preparations prior to the march to obtain commissaries, guards, map a secret route, and move sickly captives by sea to avoid delays facilitated the army’s movement in Massachusetts. This allowed the American revolutionaries to secure the captives beyond British reach.

American forces, however, had to march prisoners on roads and move them through towns for provisions. Nevertheless, the Americans’ relocation of the Convention Army deprived the British of soldiers Clinton sought for his army.

Furthermore, Washington’s security precautions in Connecticut, New York, and

Pennsylvania allowed American forces to thwart Clinton’s rescue raid because the British could not move beyond New York City without leaving their headquarters and force vulnerable. Furthermore, Clinton could not rescue the captives since he lacked the resources to control more than 700 miles of terrain. Washington maintained a fast pace after reinforcing unreliable militia escorts with Continental Army troops and ordered his commanders to control vulnerable areas along the route. He duped the British into depositing essential supplies near Fishkill and assured the captive army’s movement by surrounding the crossing there with his army. In addition, Washington ordered Bland to march through Pennsylvania without proper escorts to continue moving quickly. In spite

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of securing the majority of the captives, the Revolutionaries did not totally solve their problems since they had to construct Camp Albemarle from scratch to accommodate prisoners in rural Albemarle County. As in Massachusetts, Virginia’s government proved to be unprepared for managing and supervising the prisoners. Consequently, the arrival of the Convention Army was only the first of the tremendous challenges Virginian and Continental Army officials faced from January of 1779 until American forces moved the prisoners elsewhere.

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CHAPTER VI

SECURING CONVENTION ARMY PRISONERS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT:

SPACE AND CAMP ALBEMARLE, 1779-1781

“The situation of the troops is not what I expected nor does it correspond with those rules I had been led to imagine would govern the conduct of the persons into whose care the troops were to be put.”448 Phillips, February 1779

Following the American revolutionaries’ march from Massachusetts to Virginia,

Continental and Virginian authorities faced the challenge of managing and controlling

Convention Army prisoners within a rural countryside. Shortly after visiting Camp

Albemarle, named after the county where it stood a few miles northwest of

Charlottesville, Phillips informed Clinton that their jailors had selected a dreadful location for the prisoners because the barracks were “not convenient and erected a distance from water.”449 For American forces, however, holding nearly 4,000

Convention Army prisoners at the camp marked a turning point for confining the captive army that allowed them for the first time to contain and supply it far from British raids and more densely populated, coastal areas. The following chapter discusses the

Convention Army’s confinement at Camp Albemarle, and shows how Continental and

Virginian authorities managed a large number of prisoners within the camp. This chapter argues Virginia’s rural countryside allowed the Americans to take advantage of

448 Phillips to Clinton, February 28, 1779, HMC, I: 387.

449 Ibid. 199

America’s size to contain a large number of Convention Army prisoners by creating a community space, but not without significant problems. Insufficient planning, desertions, and the lack of facilities and provisions impacted American efforts to confine the prisoners. Thus the large countryside became both an asset and a liability for the

Americans in confining Convention Army captives at Camp Albemarle. Nevertheless, holding a majority of the prisoners at Camp Albemarle from January 1779 into the winter of 1781 contributed to the Americans’ victory over the British. Camp Albemarle allowed

American forces for the time being to contain a dangerous threat to their cause by depriving the British of a potential army at a crucial point in the war.

The Convention Army’s confinement at Camp Albemarle was unique for the

American revolutionaries in confining prisoners of war. Never before had the

Continental Army and a state government held and supplied prisoners so far from heavily populated communities and other captives. The American revolutionaries had placed

Camp Albemarle in a largely rural environment in central Virginia. Space, for the

American revolutionaries, included more than territory, resources, security, distance, and movement. Space included establishing a community space and affected providing resources for the prisoners in a large rural environment and isolated community a considerable distance from the British. This chapter will first discuss how Virginia’s largely rural environment proved advantageous to the Revolutionaries for holding the captives. It then examines how Bland’s security measures contributed to using

America’s size as a means by preventing large numbers of escapees from leaving the camp. Subsequently, in contrast, the chapter discusses the Convention Army at the camp and how the large rural environment often undermined Americans’ attempts to round up

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deserters and bring supplies to the encampment. Finally, since the Americans lacked plans and adequate resources, the chapter closes with how prisoners had to cope with the housing and food shortage problems by building a community and carving out a space to survive. The Americans allowed the prisoners to build the their own encampment, and the prisoners were forced to use Virginia’s natural resources for constructing log huts and growing food to establish a small community. Nevertheless, holding the captives at the camp further diminished the Convention Army as a potential treat until the British army invaded central Virginia in 1781.

Historians, who have written about the Convention Army’s incarceration in

Virginia, have largely described prisoners at Camp Albemarle suffering from a series of hardships rather than focusing on the larger picture of the camp’s isolation and rough terrain as an essential means to secure the Convention Army in Virginia. They mostly described Convention Army soldiers becoming victims neglected by both the British and

American governments as negotiators fought over recognizing Congress and compensation for the captives’ care. Prisoners indeed suffered from lodging and food shortages and continued to escape into the countryside.450 But rather than simply add to the current historiography about prison life at Camp Albemarle, this chapter reveals that

450 Sampson focused on escapees, see Sampson, Escape in America; 117-146; for narratives discussing the Convention Army’s story and prisoners’ troublesome confinement conditions at Camp Albemarle, see Chase, “Years of Hardships and Revelations:” The Convention Army at the Albemarle Barracks, 1779-1781,” The Magazine Of Albemarle County, 41 (1983): 9-53; Dixon, “Divided Authority,” 223-234 ; Knepper, “The Convention Army, 1777-1783,” 154-163 & 182-190; Dabney, After Saratoga, 59- 68; Graves, “The Virginia Sojourn of the Convention Troops,” The Magazine of Albemarle County, 41 (1983): 137-148; Wall, “The Story of the Convention, 1777-1783,” The New York Historical Society Quarterly, 11, no. 2 (1927): 91-96; Beroth, “The Convention of Saratoga,” The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association, 8, no.3 (1927): 267-270; for brief discussions on the prisoners at the camp, see Moody, “British Prisoners of War in the American Revolution,” 79-80; Patrick, “British Prisoners of War in the American Revolution,” 55-58.

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building and securing Camp Albemarle allowed the Continental Army and Virginian government to advantageously use America’s geographic space to control a still dangerous threat at a much safer distance from enemy lines.

*****

America’s size and Albemarle County’s location immediately provided American revolutionaries with potential community space in Virginia; it was a rural environment for isolating prisoners far from the British army and heavily populated areas, where they had to compete for provisions and housing materials. Rhys Isaac described Virginia’s

Piedmont countryside as a large and diverse wooded landscape of valleys, hills, and streams.451 Marching through the rural countryside took a physical toll on the prisoners as fatigue wore them down upon their arrival in Albemarle County located in the

Piedmont region near Charlottesville. Anburey wrote within his journal that the prisoners’ “distresses” on Albemarle County’s roads became extreme after these hungry and tired men sank “up to our knees” in hard crusted snow and privates slept within “the woods.” In addition, they found that “The country is so covered with woods, that you travel a long time without seeing an habitation.”452 German divisions’ experiences were similar to the British captives. For instance, Lieutenant Du Roi observed that “The roads in this part of the country are very bad” and turned “very muddy” for moving hungry and

451 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia by the University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 11.

452 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 183 & for the second quote, see 196; one German noted that German POW’s celebrated the New Year in Virginia “in a wild wood, with snow a foot deep, with no shelter and little protection,” see Von Eelking, The German Allied Troops in the War of North American Independence, 149.

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tired prisoners.453 Living within such countryside would immediately prove challenging for the prisoners, but advantageous for the Revolutionaries.

Additionally, Albemarle County’s appearance and environment shocked most of the prisoners. Many prisoners had been told that Albemarle County had abundant agricultural resources and accommodations for the captives’ needs. Previous to the march, Phillips assumed that American authorities had diverted resources to manage his army’s basic needs in the rural county. During the captives’ march, Phillips asked

Washington about Albemarle County and the conditions there. He learned Albemarle

County had few standing houses for his troops’ accommodations. But he still assumed that Congress and its employed contractors had ordered barracks “to be built” in Virginia before the army’s arrival.454 Phillips could only pledge to end these issues by attempting to improve their circumstances anyway possible and after the arrival of supply ships with more necessities.455 Like many of the prisoners, he had been naïve about what the countryside could immediately provide after arriving in Albemarle County.

Congress had indeed chosen a region that encompassed a great deal of uninhabited territorial space for isolating the prisoners far from British forces in New

York and Rhode Island. Bland and his escorts had placed the prisoners in a very different and much larger environment than what the captives had experienced at their barracks in

453 Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the Services of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778, trans. Epping, 148 &149 ; Anburey also noted that the prisoners experienced great difficulty finding the roads, see Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 196.

454 Phillips to Washington, November 24, 1778, ed. Lengel, PGW, XVIII: 283; Riedesel too had believed the Americans’ earlier descriptions of the countryside being more plentiful, see Riedesel to Washington, February 16, 1778, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 216.

455 Order of General Phillips, No. 1 February 12, 1778, in Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 67-68. 203

Rutland and on Prospect and Winter Hills. The region appeared to be a wilderness to many of the European prisoners because the houses remained a considerable distance apart. Du Roi in his journal described the Virginian countryside and its wooded landscape following his arrival at Charlottesville. He wrote:

The province of Virginia is the largest of all and the most thickly populated, however, not enough for its dimensions. Each plantation has so many acres that that it is impossible to cultivate all the grounds. A man considers himself poor unless she has 4000-5000 acres in his plantation. There are even some plantations of 15,000 acres. Only a small part of the land is tilled, the rest wooded. All of the houses, therefore, are quite a distance apart, which gives the county an appearance of wilderness.

Du Roi also noted that prisoners observed a much different world in Albemarle County than they had experienced around Boston. Most white Virginians, for instance, grew tobacco as their main crop. In addition, most of the white population raised cattle, horses, and pigs for food and profit. Unlike Boston, wild animals roamed the countryside and peaches and other fruits grew in abundance.456 Holding the Convention Army captives in Albemarle County would prove challenging, but serve American forces’ overall interests by containing the prisoners as an army in a larger and more rural environment than Boston, Massachusetts.

The town of Charlottesville was a community deep within the woods. The town had nearly as many residents living there as Boston had during the Revolution, but it had a much different appearance because the community was neither a seaport town, nor community occupied by armies competing with locals for food provisions and other supply essentials. Chase notes that a decade after the war in 1790, Charlottesville as a

456 Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the Services of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778, trans. Epping, 155-158.

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community would grow considerably to maintain a population of nearly 6,000 slaves and

12,585 total residents. The prisoners drastically increased the county’s population during their two years there between January 1779 and February of 1781, but lived there as

“aliens in almost every sense of the word, being foreigners, professional soldiers, and prisoners of war.”457 As a result, for most of the prisoners, Charlottesville as a community resembled more a no man’s land than a town capable of managing prisoners of war. Unsurprisingly, the prisoners described Charlottesville in a negative light because of their circumstances and because the town had few residents and buildings during the war. For example, Anburey, observed in his diary that “no pen can describe the scene of misery and confusion” among the officers after they located the small town for the reason that it “consisted of only a courthouse, one tavern, and about a dozen houses” and all “crowded with officers” searching for quarters.458 However, the countryside immediately aided their jailors by providing a natural barrier between the camp and British bases. The rural environment made a potential rebellion extremely difficult because of the great distance between prisoners and British bases and heavily populated areas, where British commanders could reorganize the army.

Albemarle County’s rural environment proved advantageous for the Americans in providing a potential community space for isolating prisoners in Virginia, but the region had few available resources because the war had drained the state of supplies. In January of 1779, Riedesel’s wife described German officers’ extreme hunger after their arrival to

457 Chase, “Years of Hardships and Revelations:” The Convention Army at the Albemarle Barracks, 1779-1781,” The Magazine of Albemarle County, 41 (1983): 10.

458 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 183-184.

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Virginia. They looked to her husband for support, while they remained in the rural county. She recalled one particular incident when a group of eight officers, likely

Hessian and Brunswick, joined her family for dinner. She had few provisions available for her family’s consumption and almost nothing to offer these troubled officers. Feeling sorry for them, she decided to share the food they had available after their circumstances reduced her to tears.459 Both British and German officers had little money or other means to purchase food for their troops. Many junior officers suffered as much as their subordinates.

As a result, Albemarle County’s difficulties broke down officers’ discipline and morale as shortages increased. Anburey recorded in his journal that many officers, likely junior officers, placed red-pepper in the spring water they used to make drinking it tolerable. In addition, he described that these exhausted officers turned to peach brandy to drown their sorrows. Some drank themselves silly and “were guilty of deeds that would admit of no apology” that he did not bother to record. Discipline broke down after

Albemarle County militiamen guarding the prisoners allowed a small number of discouraged officers to participate in duels to settle their disputes, but Anburey recorded no deaths.460 This too proved advantageous for the Revolutionaries because disorganized officers would be less likely to lead a revolt against their captors and the local populace.

The only prisoners less affected by the conditions in Albemarle County were senior officers. As in Massachusetts, senior Convention Army officers relied on British

459 Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 154-155.

460 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 185-186; despite alcohol troubles British commissary suppliers shipped additional rum to the prisoners in Charlottesville. It arrived in March of 1779 to the encampment, see Clarke to General Daniel Weir, March 26, 1779, HMC, I: 403-404.

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and American commissaries to deliver them money to purchase their food and shelter.

After arriving in Albemarle County, Riedesel, for instance, lived as a farmer with his family at the Colle plantation, the home of physician and American diplomatic agent

Phillip Mazzei, near Charlottesville.461 Riedesel’s wife recorded that their family lived more comfortably than most of the prisoners because slaves fetched chickens and vegetables and everything else they required for their needs.462 The Riedesel’s stayed at

Colle for six months between February and the end of the summer of 1779 until the general’s parole. After his delayed arrival from Cambridge, Phillips, too, had quarters and use of a plantation named Blenheim, owned by Virginian and Continental Army officer Colonel Edward Carter.463 Nevertheless, in general terms, Albemarle County’s isolation had successfully provided Continental and Virginian authorities with a potential community space for holding the prisoners far from the British army’s reach through

1779 and 1780.

*****

The Americans attempted to take advantage of the spacious countryside to secure the Convention Army in Albemarle County. Bland began this process by securing the prisoners at the camp to keep the captives as an army a considerable distance from British

461 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 65; Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 154-157; Mazzei exited his home and traveled to Europe to assist the American revolutionaries and find money for Virginia. For him seeking Washington’s instructions before leaving for Europe, see Mazzei to Washington, January 27, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 90- 91; Mazzei became an intelligence informant for Jefferson in Europe, see Phillip Mazzei to Thomas Jefferson, December 12, 1779, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 38 Volumes, Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd, et. al. eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950-2011), III: 217-221 (hereafter cited as PTJ); Mazzei to Jefferson, December 18, 1779, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III:231-235; Mazzei to Jefferson, March 5, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 305-306.

462 Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 155.

463 Anburey, Travels Through The Interior Parts of America, II: 213-214. 207

forces. The Americans feared escapees because they could replenish enemy ranks, or enlist in Continental Army regiments to obtain bounty money and move closer to British lines. Escapes became rampant because of poor security and undisciplined Albemarle

County militiamen, who were drafted for guard duty. Bland’s security measures at Camp

Albemarle revealed how American forces attempted to carve out a secure community space at Camp Albemarle by developing a security system to slow down desertion attempts and secure the camp. In the spring of 1779, with Convention Army escapees daily leaving the camp, Bland, added Continental Army troops and militiamen to guard the captives and had cavalry dragoons, troops on horseback, capture deserters. In addition, he had his troops establish several security checkpoints and build guard houses and picket lines that encircled the encampment. Yet, these specific attempts to secure the prisoners could not hold all the captives at Camp Albemarle; Bland never totally stopped

Convention Army escapees from leaving the camp. However, Bland’s measures were a mixed success because they kept a large number of prisoners away from the British by building barracks and establishing sentry posts.

Continental and Virginian authorities were mostly concerned with the consequences of Convention Army escapees reaching British strongholds and prisoners living among the local population. Virginian authorities were wise to fear for the captives’ security because Virginia was a contentious place of class and racial conflicts.

Michael McDonnell showed that class tensions only increased social divisions throughout the Virginian countryside and erupted into violence between the state’s wealthier residents and their middle and lower class counterparts. Many poor Virginians specifically resisted their leaders’ attempts to recruit them into militia and Continental

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Army service because they had a greater desire to protect their local interests rather than contribute to preserving the old social hierarchy and fulfill their leaders’ national ambitions.464 Unsurprisingly, Virginia’s government even worried about paroled

Convention Army officers living in the capital city of Richmond. Paroled officers agreed not to receive and distribute messages unapproved by the governor or proper authorities.

They signed parole pledges not to gather and acquire intelligence, nor participate in commerce with American citizens. The officers also agreed to only purchase accommodations and essentials from locals and commissaries and not to say or do anything against the United States.465 In February of 1779, Governor Patrick Henry became fearful that Convention Army officers would seek housing and supplies in larger communities. As a result, Henry opposed Convention officers living with the general population in Richmond because he worried that they would obtain potential access to the state’s public papers and an arms depository.466 Thus Henry feared that the captive officers would become a security threat to the Virginian government. Yet an unknown number of British officers would locate rooms in Richmond after signing their paroles.

464 Michael A. McDonnell, The Politics of War: Race, Class,& Conflict in Revolutionary Virginia (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 5-6; for more on lower and middle class Virginians’ agendas and resistance, see McDonnell, “Class War? Class Struggles During the American Revolution in Virginia,” The William and Mary Quarterly 63, no.2 (2006): 305-344; for more on class struggles in Virginia, see Wood Holton, Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, and Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 2007). 465 Form of Parole for Captives Officers, (no date) 1779, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 253-254; for more on officers’ specific county limits, see Theodorick Bland to Colonel Francis Taylor, November (no date number) 1779, The Bland Papers: Being A Selection From The Manuscripts of Colonel Theodorick Bland Jr., of Prince George County Virginia, 2 Volumes, Theodorick Bland, Charles Campbell, ed. (Petersburg: Printed by Edmund & Julian C. Ruffin, 1840) II: 27 (hereafter cited as Bland Papers).

466 Henry to John Jay, February 5, 1779, ed. McILwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia, I: 355.

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American authorities feared the consequences of Convention Army escapees leaving the rural countryside of Albemarle County and impairing their ability to defeat the British army. Washington still feared escapees reaching New York City. In May of

1779, he complained to fellow Virginian, Benjamin Harrison, that “we are everyday apprehending these people in their attempts to get into New York.”467 Consequently, on

February 20, 1779, Washington had specifically instructed, Continental Army Brigadier

General William Maxwell to securely hold and relocate recaptured escapees caught on the well traveled roads leading through New Jersey into New York to the American controlled towns of Elizabethtown and Morristown, New Jersey, under Continental soldiers’ supervision. He had already increased the guard there with Continentals to hold recaptured deserters held by magistrates (likely a few hundred) within barracks in those towns.468 Washington also gave further instructions to Governor William Livingston of

New Jersey from his headquarters in Philadelphia to supervise escapees there and “that measures may be taken for securing them, ’till orders can be given for their removal.”469

Washington’s instructions reveal that he hoped to keep Convention Army escapees far from the British army.

The rural countryside did not guarantee security because Convention Army escapees also undermined the Americans by joining enemy partisan raiding parties. New

York’s Governor George Clinton recorded Convention Army escapees joined the enemy

467 Washington to Benjamin Harrison, May 5-7, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 334-335.

468 Washington to Brigadier General William Maxwell, February 20, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 233-234.

469 Washington to William Livingston, January 31, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 113- 114; Livingston doubted that deserters would remain confined for long in which made him uncomfortable, see Livingston to Washington, February 8, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 149-150.

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and attacked Revolutionaries and frontier settlements. On one occasion, he reported to

Washington that a party of “27 Tories…mostly Hessian deserters of the Convention troops,” formed the nucleus of a potentially destructive raiding party, which joined forces with a larger force of Indians and Tories. This combined force moved to attack the town of Shendeacon in early May of 1779, in Ulster County, about 50 miles south of Albany,

New York. Fortunately, for the Americans, militiamen this time turned back these raiders from destroying the town and advancing further into the county.470 More escapees would only undermine the American revolutionaries’ efforts to secure

Convention captives in Albemarle County.

Escapees leaving Camp Albemarle’s rural environment troubled the American revolutionaries. Virginian officials did not shy away from reporting desertions to

Washington and Congress in the hopes of gaining their assistance. In June of 1779,

Governor Thomas Jefferson warned Washington six months after the army’s arrival that

400 prisoners escaped from the camp during one evening alone. Many of the captives carried with them phony papers claiming they had pledged their loyalty to the state of

Virginia in exchange for citizenship. He concluded these escapees likely had support from sympathetic law officials and their junior officers after recapturing most with their forged identification on the road heading for New York City. Jefferson notified

Washington, so he could send Continentals to intercept escapees’ progress as they passed

470 George Clinton to Washington, May 18, 1779, ed. Lengel. PGW, XX: 523.

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“through Pennsylvania and Jersey.”471 In this particular instance Virginia’s rural environment did not prove to be an asset for the Americans at the camp.

America’s large geographical space did not always prove advantageous for

American revolutionaries because America’s landmass helped conceal escapees.

Hundreds of prisoners disappeared into the countryside either to start new lives in

America, or reach British lines. Convention Army roll records indicate that it continued to shrink at Camp Albemarle. Wall has written that a general return of prisoners taken in

August of 1779 by senior officers recorded 2,790 total Convention Army prisoners confined in Virginia, 1,365 less than Heath relocated for the march nine months earlier.472

Another roll return taken by the Americans and reported to Jefferson in November of

1780 recorded 2,307 prisoners, 804 British soldiers and 1,503 Germans, which included the officers remaining incarcerated under the Americans’ control.473 Other estimates provide different numbers, however. A report dated August 16, 1780, in Riedesel’s journal by Specht recorded that the number of Germans remaining included “77 officers,

142 noncommissioned officers, 25 drummers, 809 privates and 94 servants; total,

471 Thomas Jefferson to Washington, July 17, 1779, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 41; Jefferson had assumed Virginia’s governorship in June of 1779, see Bland to Jefferson, June 14, 1779, ed. Boyd, PTJ, II: 291-292; Phillips to Jefferson, June 18, 1779, ed. Boyd. PTJ, III: 3.

472 Wall, “The Story of the Convention, 1777-1783,” The New York Historical Society Quarterly, 11, no. 2 (1927): 92; for a chart of declining Convention Army numbers between October 1777 through October of 1781, see Knepper, “The Convention Army, 1777-1783,” 274.

473 Jefferson to Huntington, November 3, 1780, ed. McILwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia II: 229; for another breakdown of the number of troops remaining at the camp that fall without totals, see Unknown. Charlottesville. “Return of British and German troops under the Convention of Saratoga,” September 26, 1780, Papers of the Continental Congress, Record Group Number 360, pp. 125-127. http://www.fold3.com/image/#346498. accessed November 20, 2011 (hereafter cited as PCC and all are located in record group number 360).

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1,147.”474 By 1781, more than half of the 6,300 plus men captured at Saratoga no longer remained with the army after captive deaths, desertions, and officers’ exchanges.

In spite of their diminished numbers, Convention Army prisoners remained a threat to the Americans as the war shifted to the south in 1780, and Congress still needed enemy captives under their grasp for diplomatic and retaliation leverage against the

British during peace negotiations. Thus the Revolutionaries still wanted to hold

Convention escapees from the British to avoid replenishing enemy ranks. Jefferson, for instance, in late October of 1780 warned Maryland’s Governor Thomas Sim Lee that

Virginia’s government could no longer safely confine Convention Army prisoners as the

British army roamed through their state because escapees would replenish enemy ranks and a rescue seemed likely. Moreover, Virginia militia forces had insufficient manpower to simultaneously supervise prisoners and engage the invaders.475 In addition, like in

Massachusetts, escapes roaming the countryside unnerved locals and authorities alike.

American efforts to recapture and hold escapees in various jails shows that their goals to keep Convention Army captives from the British and neutralize a dangerous threat had not changed, despite the army’s reduced numbers.

America’s rural environment also aided escapees because they could spread out over the large terrain. Washington recognized Convention Army escapees hid in mountains and other remote areas in New York. In early May of 1779, Washington wrote that deserters during the march to Virginia received aid from Tories, supporters of the British crown during the Revolution, “who kept them concealed in the mountains &

474 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 88.

475 Jefferson to Thomas Sim Lee, October 26, 1780 ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 70-71.

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obscure places effected a junction with the enemy.” He specifically blamed Convention

Army officers for encouraging devious desertion practices and trying to “poison the minds of those around them,” while on parole “by magnifying the power of G. Britain, her favorable disposition to others,” in addition to, “apprehending a good deal from the hospitality & unsuspicious temper of my countrymen.” As a result, Washington looked

“upon them as dangerous guests in the bowels of our country.” He desired to keep “a watchful eye” on Convention Army officers, particularly Phillips, after he breached

“military propriety” during the march by taking another route to Virginia rather than the one chosen for him.476 Washington understood that Convention Army deserters could easily disappear because they could hide in the rough terrain.

American authorities looked to senior Convention Army officers to discourage escapees from deserting before they dispersed across America’s rural geographical space and proved impossible to relocate. In the summer of 1779, Phillips admitted to Bland that many Convention Army soldiers deserted following the convention agreement, but disputed suspicions that he and his junior officers supported their activities. As numbers of escapees rose in the summer of 1779, he defended himself by writing that preserving the army maintained his “character and honor.” He had worked instead to keep

Convention troops together as an army in accordance to the treaty. In addition, he specifically blamed poor conditions and opposing officers’ previous enticements for the army’s desertions.477 Phillips, however, in a letter to Bland in August of 1779, explained

476 Washington to Harrison, May 5-7, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 334-335.

477 Phillips to Bland, July 3, 1779, ed. Campbell, The Bland Papers, I: 141-142; for another response by Phillips defending Convention Army officers concerning desertion, see Phillips to Bland, August 11, 1779, ed. Campbell, The Bland Papers, II: 19-20. 214

that he had no responsibility to stop deserters since it had become more important “to correct any abuses and misbehavior” his troops committed towards the local inhabitants.478 Phillips’s unwillingness to curb desertion made holding Convention Army captives at Camp Albemarle more difficult for the American revolutionaries.

The size of the country and Virginia’s rural environment never discouraged

Convention Army captives from attempting to escape. An unknown number of deserters and escapees easily slipped through the Americans’ fingers during the winter and spring of 1779. Anburey’s journal in the winter of 1779 described British prisoners’ desperation to leave the camp and Albemarle County’s bleak countryside. Many soldiers ignored

Convention Army officers’ instructions to remain and explained their escape plans.

Convention Army officers could not generally stop their troops from leaving and learned from their counterparts’ correspondence in New York City that at least 100 had successfully made their way into British headquarters that winter alone.479 Escapees continued to leave the camp to either reach British lines, or start a new life in America as tradesmen and farmers.

Anburey revealed in his diary that British prisoners made up most of the escapees at Camp Albemarle. He noted that German captives often behave better than their British counterparts. Many of the German captives gave the American revolutionaries less trouble because as mercenaries they generally had little attachment to the British army and while in America received about four times more money for their expenses than they

478 Phillips to Bland, August 11, 1779, ed. Campbell, The Bland Papers, II: 20.

479 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 254.

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would have received from their German princes in Europe. German prisoners at the camp typically got along with their guards, who generally in return granted them work passes because as non-British they had less incentive to escape and rejoin the British army.480 Hessian and Brunswick captives took advantage of this, and many assimilated into American society and lived as farmers, learned trades, and married local women to join communities during the Revolution. For instance, British Lieutenant-Colonel

Banastre Tarleton recorded in his memoirs that in 1781, he found at least 20 former

German Convention Army prisoners working as farmers in Charlottesville.481 Tarleton had led the raid after Continentals and militia regiments evacuated the army from the region. In February of 1781, Jefferson had even granted German prisoners Virginian citizenship if they deserted the British army and remained there as landowners and farmers since they could potentially strengthen the regional economy and settle occupied lands. Jefferson pledged each deserter cattle, money, and exempted them from paying taxes and military service.482 How many former prisoners accepted Jefferson’s offer and received his promises is unknown, but at least a few hundred German deserters stayed in

Virginia after the Convention Army left Albemarle County.

Although the large geographical space made searching for escapees problematic for the Americans, the American revolutionaries recaptured Convention Army prisoners

480 Ibid., 255.

481 Banastre Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781in the Southern Provinces of North America (New York: New York Times, 1968); for more on Hessian and Brunswick Convention Army soldiers working as tradesmen in Virginia, see Colonel James Wood to Jefferson, February 20, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ , IV: 672; Richard Claiborne to Jefferson, February 2, 1781, ed. Boyd. PTJ, IV: 500.

482 Proclamation: Inviting Mercenary Troops in the British Service to Desert, February 2, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 505-506.

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to hold them from the British. Local magistrates, militiamen, and the guards returned an unknown number of Convention Army escapees to Camp Albemarle. Escapees in general escaped numerous times from American jails after their recapture. After escaping from the guards at Camp Albemarle, Alexander Skirvin, described to a British investigating Board of Enquiry the difficulties he faced in trying to reach British lines. In

July of 1779, he successfully escaped from the camp. However, American authorities recaptured him on several occasions trying to reach British lines. However, he often escaped local magistrates. Skirven was confined to Fort Pitt in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, before escaping. In addition, he escaped from the prison barracks at Winchester twice.

More than two years after he escaped from Camp Albemarle in 1781, he reached British lines in New York City.483 After they escaped Camp Albemarle an unknown number of

Convention Army escapees made their way for British controlled areas. The exact number of escaped soldiers who returned to British lines is unknown.

Continental Army and Virginian authorities could not fully take advantage of

Camp Albemarle to control Convention captives until they obtained more effective guards to secure it. The large number of escapes was caused by insufficient guards and lax security at the encampment. Virginia’s first effort to effectively control captives at

Camp Albemarle’s rural space did not work primarily because they had relied on undisciplined Albemarle County militia guards and had few resources. Following the army’s arrival, Bland had passed supervision duties to Colonel Charles Lewis, the first commander of the guard after his appointment by the Virginian government, and

483 Alexander Skirvin to Carleton, September 1783?, HMC, IV: 386; for more escapees’ stories after escaping from Camp Albemarle, see Sampson, Escape in America, 131-133.

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Albemarle County militiamen served as guards until the Virginia Council and governor could secure a permanent commander and a 600 man militia regiment for supervision duties.484 In late December, the Council and Governor Patrick Henry had officially placed this incoming garrison under the command of Lewis.485 Enhancing security measures at the camp would prove taxing for the Americans.

Although Virginia’s rural environment and Camp Albemarle provided space for

American revolutionaries to confine Convention Army captives, militia guards’ lack of success in the encampment initially undermined authorities’ security attempts. By order of Congress, the Virginia Council, like Massachusetts, had drafted militiamen in

December of 1778 to safeguard the camp. That winter, Henry stressed their assignment

“as a matter of high concern to the safety & repose of this state.” Virginia’s Council had empowered Colonel Francis Taylor to command a battalion of militiamen drafted by the surrounding counties. Each county would provide 100 men, and Henry encouraged

Taylor to have another “battalion of militia” ready for guard duty immediately “’til the other corps is raised” since the guard marching the captives into Albemarle County would likely return home after their arrival.486 Bland, however, explained to Washington in a letter dated April 23, 1779, that only about 200 Albemarle County militiamen made

484 Bland to Washington, January 17, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 10-11.

485 Patrick Henry to Colonel Charles Lewis, December 23, 1778, ed. McILwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia, I: 348-349; the General Assembly’s Board advised the governor receive 100 men each from six surrounding counties when Lewis requested them, see (From Journal of the Council) December 23, 1778, ed. McILwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia, I: 348. 486 Ibid;the Virginian government aid a bounty of $30.00 for to induce potential recruits to serve as guards within the battalion, see Henry to The President of Congress, John Jay, January 28, 1778, ed. McILwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia, I: 355; for a list and roll of officers working with the guard regiment and supervising prisoners in camp, see Roll of Officers of the Regiment of Guards for the Convention Prisoners, November 5, 1779, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 155 -156.

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up the guard garrison at the camp when he had returned at Washington’s request to take control and supervise the army. The guards’ lack of discipline, arms, and clothing shocked the colonel after his return.487 Solely relying on militiamen would not be sufficient for controlling and securing thousands of prisoners in Albemarle County.

With the appointment of Bland as camp commander, the Americans gained the chance of controlling the Convention Army captives in Virginia’s rural space.

Washington selected Bland to return as commander of the encampment and prisoners. In the summer of 1779, Congress requested Washington stop escapees. In addition,

Congress empowered the Board of War “to take effectual measures to prevent the desertion” of the Convention Army captives whenever possible.488 The Board of War’s only measure was to seek Washington’s assistance in choosing a capable officer to control the Convention Army by securing the encampment. The Board of War chair,

Richard Peters, detailed their specific concerns about “great disorder & confusion” at the camp for Washington to resolve:

The Board have received disagreeable accounts of the situation of affairs at the convention barracks in Albemarle County Virginia where great disorder & confusion prevail in almost every department. One great source of the evils is that there is no person there of sufficient authority to harmonize & conduct the whole machine…But it is the opinion of the Board that nothing will so effectively tend to bring the affairs there into a proper train as the presence of a sensible discreet officer with authority to direct all matters with respect to our officers & with sufficient weight & knowledge to regulate business to regulate the uneasy & discordant spirits among the prisoners. I am therefore to request your Excellency to direct an officer of the above description to repair to the barracks & reside there until further orders.489

487 Bland to Washington, April 23, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 170-171.

488 JCC, 1774-1789, July 21, 1779, XIV: 862-863.

489 Richard Peters to Washington, February 22, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 241- 242. 219

Washington directly contributed to managing the Convention Army at the camp by appointing Bland to remedy “the sources of discontent.” Washington chose Bland because he would be “no stranger to the characters with which you will have principally to deal” among the prisoners. Bland’s specific orders included restoring discipline and recapturing deserters to firmly secure the prisoners inside the camp parameters.490 A few months later, Washington requested Bland “use every possible means to have them recovered, and prevent any farther desertions.” In addition, he recommended recaptured deserters face closed confinement “as an example to others” following their return and warned Bland unless security improved the army would escape and “seize the first opportunity to escape to the enemy.”491 Washington found an individual to discipline the prisoners and secure the camp before the entire Convention Army escaped and struck a decisive blow against the Revolutionaries by attacking their forces somewhere else.

After taking command, Bland provided the American revolutionaries the chance to take advantage of America’s large territorial space by securing the camp. Bland arrived on April 15, 1779, at Charlottesville under Washington’s authority to reorganize the encampment and reported that he had promoted new personnel to manage the quartermasters and hospital department. Bland found the barracks in relatively good order and prisoners well supplied and satisfied, but only about “two hundred men badly

490 Washington to Bland, February 28, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 286-287; for Bland informing Phillips of his appointment, see Bland to Phillips, April 18, 1779, ed. Campbell, The Bland Papers, I: 116; on the same day he informed Bland of his orders, Washington told Congress his selection, see Washington to The Board of War, February 28, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 287; Bland received Washington’s letter nearly a month later. He began his duties at Camp Albemarle a few weeks later on April 15, 1779, see Bland to Washington, April 23, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 169- 171. 491 Washington to Bland, July 27, 1779, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XV: 493-494.

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armed, worse clothed, & scarcely at all disciplined” as guards. He immediately began increasing security around the camp after requesting the Virginia Council to order the surrounding counties to mobilize and arm additional militiamen for assisting him should the British army invade the area, or an insurrection occurred in the camp. Moreover, he assured Washington he would find a way to use the James River whenever possible for shipping supplies and avoid foraging for provisions in areas used by the Continental

Army.492 Thus Bland sought to improve the Americans’ capacity to retain the prisoners.

By initiating a security system at the camp to hold the Convention Army prisoners, Bland made the encampment more secure by taking control of the prisoners and decreasing desertions. Bland began security measures in the camp to accomplish this. In March of 1779, Bland sought and received before taking charge from the

Virginia Council fifteen cavalry dragoons “from his own regiment to serve at the barracks” from the Winchester garrison. They joined Bland not only as guards at the barracks, but also were to “pursue deserters & be ready for emergencies” to sustain the camp.493 As a cavalry officer, Bland saw the dragoons as “absolutely necessary” since the 200 raw militia recruits desperately needed assistance in bringing order to the camp.494 Continental soldiers rather than militiamen provided Bland more reliable guards to control and secure the prisoners.

Additionally, Bland continued to develop a security system from his headquarters in Charlottesville after building a chain of sentry posts and “security pickets.” In May of

492 Bland to Washington, April 23, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 169-172.

493 Council Minutes, March 29, 1779, ed. McILwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia I: 363.

494 Bland to Washington, April 23, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 171.

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1779, he would also acquire more guards from the Council after British ships appeared off the Virginian coast. An additional 450 militiamen joined the guard garrison to repeal any British rescue attempt, or to evacuate the prisoners, if necessary. Furthermore, he had his dragoons patrol the countryside beyond the sentry stations to round-up deserters

“outside of the chain of sentries,” or search anyone they came across. The colonel informed Washington he hoped his security measures would slow down desertions and avert any attempts of “rescue, insurrection, or desertion” from transpiring.495 These additional measures only temporarily secured the camp from a potential British threat and slowed down the number of Convention Army captives escaping into the Virginian countryside.

Another important aspect of Bland’s security measures was conducting inspections and holding recaptured escapees in a small picketed prison, near the barracks.

Anburey recorded that the Americans on one occasion returned “60 or 70 men” and placed them inside. These men ultimately depended on their officers to pay for and provide them with food in this area.496 Local magistrates and dragoons also placed recaptured escapees within the prison. Moreover, in late April of 1779, Bland required anyone with business at the camp to receive his general orders before starting their

495 Bland to Washington, May 31, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 702-703; Washington approved of Bland’s security measures at the encampment, see Washington to Bland, June 28, 1779, ed. Campbell, The Bland Papers, I: 140; for more on the British raids and threat to move on Albemarle County, see Boudinot to Washington, May 16, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 506; Washington to Boudinot, May 17, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 511;Washington briefly noted the only “obvious policy” to combat a rescue involved removing and likely separating the Convention Army, see Washington to Jay, May 17, 1779, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 514-515.

496 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 254.

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duties.497 Bland’s measures contributed to enhancing security and more effectively confining the captives.

A letter of regulations written by Bland sometime in 1779 reveals how the

American revolutionaries inspected the barracks a few times a week and had a “barrack- master” accompanied by “a sergeant’s guard” to search them weekly to ensure cleanliness and good order. A Continental Army field officer each day checked guards and provision stores. This officer had to inform the senior commander if the barrack- master failed in his duties, and a quarter-master would clear debris on roads that impeded supply wagons from reaching the camp. The commissary reviewed provisions and determined available supplies and needs.498 The camp gates Bland wrote must remain closed, and a sergeant and four militiamen bring the keys “to the officer of the guard.” In addition, guards would be stationed in their respective “blockhouses” outside the wooden picket fences to avert unauthorized captives from leaving. Only Convention officers would have permission to leave the camp on parole, but men searching for materials intended for barrack repairs could still labor near huts.499 Bland’s efforts securing

Convention Army prisoners in Albemarle County’s rural environment decreased the number of Convention Army escapees. More importantly, the construction of the camp allowed Continental and Virginian authorities to withhold the captives from the British.

Nonetheless, Bland’s security measures produced mixed results.

497 General Orders, April 24, 1779, ed. Campbell, The Bland Papers, II: 156.

498 Sketch of Regulations for the Post at Charlottesville, (no date) 1779, ed. Campbell, The Bland Papers, I: 158-159.

499Bland to Francis Taylor “Instructions,” November 1779, ed. Campbell, The Bland Papers, II: 27-28. 223

*****

Virginia’s rough territorial space affected the establishment of Camp Albemarle for the American revolutionaries. Continental Army and Virginian officials’ largely unsuccessful operational preparations and facilitations would reveal that the large countryside contributed to impeding their capacity to hold and manage the Convention

Army. The Americans’ operational failures resulted from a lack of planning and scarce resources. As in Massachusetts, Virginian authorities experienced a housing and provision crisis at the camp. Unlike what had transpired in Massachusetts, however,

Convention Army captives would largely build their own accommodations and establish a community. Local authorities and Congress’s operational failures occurred because of their limited planning and resources. As had occurred in Massachusetts, the Virginia

Councils’ limited planning, housing, and provisions affected both guards and prisoners and became the captives’ largest challenges to overcome. Ultimately, the American revolutionaries’ housing and food provision shortages forced junior officers and soldiers to build their own community space after constructing log huts to survive in the rural countryside.

Congress contributed to hampering efforts to establish an encampment because it did not provide the funds necessary for constructing an adequate camp space in

Albemarle County. For instance, on January 9, 1779, Congress for reasons unclear awarded George Rice, a former Continental Army captain of the 11th Virginian regiment, a contract to construct huts for prisoners and guards. It paid Rice $23,000 in Continental currency to purchase building materials and cover expenses for barracks upon his arrival in Albemarle County. Rice had the responsibility once at the camp to pay contractors for

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their supplies and labor in Virginia.500 According to a watchful Thomas Jefferson, who lived only a few miles from the encampment, “the expense of building barracks was said to have been £25,000.”501 Therefore, Congress had only provided a small amount of funds for lodging prisoners and the few hundred wives and children following them.

The Americans’ disorganization complicated efforts to build Camp Albemarle in the largely rural countryside. Congressional contractors and Harvie had limited building resources and only completed a few log huts before the prisoners’ arrival on his private property, near a small stream called Ivy Creek. Harvie assumed command of the prisoners following the march after Bland departed Charlottesville in mid-January of

1779. Bland passed his authority to Harvie as Washington’s instructions required. Thus

Harvie became the primary commissary for the prisoners.502 Nevertheless, Harvie had insufficient housing and provisions resources available to securely manage a captive army in Albemarle County. As a result, Du Roi frustratingly wrote in his diary that “we reached the climax of all bad things, when we reached the barracks at Charlottesville.”503

The lack of barrack housing at the internment site largely occurred because Harvie had “a number of the inhabitants” and his slaves construct barracks. Thus the slaves and

500 JCC, 1774-1789, January 9, 1779, XIII: 39; for more, see Chase, “Years of Hardships and Revelations:” The Convention Army at the Albemarle Barracks, 1779-1781,” The Magazine of Albemarle County, 41 (1983): 17; for a little bibliographical information on Rice, see note 4, ed. Lengel, PGW, XX: 171. 501 Jefferson to Henry, March 27, 1779, ed. Boyd, PTJ, II: 238.

502 Bland to Washington, January 17, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 10-11; Phillips informed his superior in New York of Harvie’s authority over the captives, see Phillips to Clinton, February 28, 1778, HMC, I: 387.

503 Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the Services of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778, trans. Epping, 151.

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laborers had few huts ready for the Convention Army following its arrival.504 As a result, building a camp would prove to be a challenging chore for Virginia and Continental

Army authorities.

Additionally, developing a community space at Camp Albemarle tested the

American revolutionaries’ limited capacities to control and supply the prisoners because they did not have a workable plan. Chase suggested that Harvie’s overall plans were largely unclear since he likely “exaggerated the area’s advantages, and he probably benefited to some degree from the various improvements which the convention troops made to his property,” but he did not directly earn money from the army’s presence.505

Harvie left behind few records addressing his intentions and goals, but revealed to

Jefferson that the more hardy Convention troops may provide skilled laborers for

Virginia. Harvie concluded the likelihood of “some tradesmen of the professions you may want be found amongst them and procr’d” for labor use.506 It seems unlikely Harvie purposely delayed the construction of the camp for personal gain or otherwise. Harvie and Congress could not increase the pace of building the camp for the prisoners without more support from Congress and the state of Virginia.

504 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 212- 213.

505 Chase, “Years of Hardships and Revelations:” The Convention Army at the Albemarle Barracks, 1779-1781,” The Magazine of Albemarle County, 41 (1983): 17-18; Sampson’s analysis on Harvie and his intentions is much sketchier. He concluded that he simply proved unable to carry out his duties, see Sampson, Escape in America, 117-118; for other brief Harvie references, see Dabney, After Saratoga, 21; Graves, “The Virginia Sojourn of the Convention Troops,” The Magazine of Albemarle County, 43 (1983): 137; for Phillips complaints about Harvie and his preparations, see Phillips to Washington, March 4, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 362.

506 Harvie to Jefferson, September 15, 1778, ed. Boyd, PTJ, II: 212.

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The Americans’ combined limited resources and lack of planning prevented them from building the encampment they envisioned to place in the large countryside. A drawing in The Papers of the Continental Congress, for instance, reveals that either

Greene or someone else sketched a plan for constructing an orderly and secure encampment in Albemarle County sometime in 1779. The sketch shows a map of 32 large barracks within a square, which would measure 228 feet in length and 30 feet apart from each other, and a 912 feet picket line would stretch across the north end of the camp outside the square. On the other end would reside the main guard house and a series of other small block houses clustered together in two groups to shelter supply stores,

American officers, guards, and other personnel. A stockade would surround the camp and single entrance and exit would be placed at the southern end of it.507 Nonetheless, only part of this plan became a reality for the Americans because their insufficient planning and limited resources remained an ongoing obstacle for the duration of the army’s detention in Virginia.

The Virginia government and Harvie initially proved unsuccessful in administering to the prisoners directly in the rural environment. The Americans’ limited barracks and preparations had already caught up to them following the Convention

Army’s arrival at the camp in January of 1779. Riedesel wrote that the Convention captives found the huts as “nothing but some logs laid upon one another, without any

507 Unknown. Letters from Nathanial Greene, Plan of Barracks for the Convention Troops in Virginia, 1779. PCC, pp. 29 & 31. accessed November 12, 2011 http://www.fold3.com/image/#403143.

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covering, with snow three feet deep on the ground.”508 Anburey described in more detail these unexpected circumstances:

As to the men, the situation was truly horrible, after the hard shifts they had experienced in their march from the Potomac, they were instead of comfortable barracks, conducted into a wood, where a few log huts were just begun to be built, the most part not covered over, and all of them full of snow; these the men were obliged to clear out, and cover over to secure themselves from the inclemency of the weather as quick as they could, and in the course of two or three days rendered them habitable, but by no means a comfortable retirement.509

Much of the meat that the Revolutionaries had stored for the captives had rotted because the Americans had not dug holes deep enough.510 Anburey concluded that

“Never was a country so destitute of every comfort” for the prisoners. The lieutenant and his fellow captives received no new provisions for the first ten days at the camp.

Prisoners consumed small amounts of salted pork and Indian corn meal to survive.511

Holding little in cash, both officers and enlisted troops faced difficulty in purchasing provisions from the few locals they encountered due to high food prices. As a result, these immediate shortages demonstrated the difficulties the Americans faced in provisioning and housing a captive army in a rural environment.

Albemarle County initially provided too few resources for housing the prisoners because the Americans had insufficient facilities. Another operational deficiency for the

508 Riedesel to Washington, February 16, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 216.

509 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 184.

510 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 65.

511 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 184-185; for more on the hardships following the captives’ arrival, see Dabney, After Saratoga, 60-62; Sampson, Escape in America, 117-118; Riedesel’s wife describes in her journal that prisoners ate Indian meal, see Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 155; for how to make Indian meal corn, see Graves, “The Virginia Sojourn of the Convention Troops,” The Magazine of Albemarle County, 41 (1983): 138.

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Continental Army and Virginian government became accommodating the captive officers and soldiers in the early days of their confinement at Camp Albemarle. Junior officers and troops had to lodge themselves anywhere possible during the army’s initial weeks at the camp. Du Roi wrote German officers camped with their men near the unfinished barracks since English officers had taken most available rooms within Charlottesville a few miles away. A few Brunswick and Hessian officers found single rooms near the camp clearing thanks to the generosity of local households. A sympathetic Virginian, for instance, granted Du Roi a room for a monthly fee of two guineas: a much cheaper rate than most junior officers paid to other landlords.512 Du Roi’s experience proved typical for many junior officers since accommodation shortages at the camp site forced most to search for rooms anywhere their captors would parole them. Harvie had to grant parole to captive officers as far as “40 miles away from the barracks” in the small town of

Stanton.513 As a result, the Americans granted Convention officers access to more populated areas. Bland admitted to Washington following his arrival at Charlottesville that Harvie because of accommodation limitations granted Convention officers “parole down the country towards Richmond & Fredericksburg & up towards Stanton.”514 Thus the Americans were forced to address the housing challenges.

Senior Convention Army officers had no way to end the housing problem without their troops’ assistance. Phillips grew more concerned about his officers’ housing

512 Du Roi shared a room with a few other officers for only two guineas a month, see Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the Services of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778, trans. Epping, 152-154.

513 Ibid., 153.

514 Bland to Washington, January 17, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 10.

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shortages and the distances they traveled to find quarters. He revealed his concerns in late January of 1779 by directly requesting Washington persuade Continental contractors and Virginian authorities to build barracks and acquire resources for officers much closer to Camp Albemarle.515 Despite Phillips’ efforts, the small camp garrison eventually determined that the only way to achieve their goal of keeping the captive army far from the British was to have prisoners build their own camp for survival.

The prisoners coped with the Americans’ lack of preparations by building their own community space a few miles from Charlottesville. Thus they carved out their own place. Unlike in Massachusetts, the Albemarle County militia garrison allowed captives to take advantage of the terrain for building huts from materials found in the woods. This allowed the prisoners to construct log huts and to establish their developing community space. It is likely that the primitive conditions only encouraged and fueled their motivations to form work details. Du Roi’s journal described how prisoners constructed huts not uncommon at the time and cut down trees for their lodgings at the camp.

Prisoners chopped down trees and found nearby logs to construct simple huts covered over with clay and smaller brush. The captives made their roofs from larger logs to prevent high winds from blowing them off. Other prisoners linked logs together to keep them in place and dug holes on the floors of each hut to close wooden doors. 516

515 Phillips to Washington, January 29, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 106; Washington response made no mention of specifically building barracks for officers, but he reminded Phillips that his authority over the captives ended after the march from Cambridge to Charlottesville, however, he had no doubt circumstances would improve, see Washington to Phillips, January 30, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 110-111.

516 Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the Services of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778, trans. Epping, 151-152; Riedesel informed Washington that the Convention troops had set out to build their own barracks without the use of many “utensils,” see Riedesel to Washington, 230

Accordingly, Convention Army junior officers and troops constructed small makeshift and uncomfortable huts within the rural environment.

Using these simple materials for constructing barracks in Virginia had some limitations since the prisoners still needed money to purchase essentials not readily available in the rural countryside. The prisoners, for example, required nails for stronger huts, but that valuable commodity proved hard to locate within Albemarle County. Even senior officers struggled to find nails for expanding and maintaining housing arrangements. Riedesel in May of 1779 requested 6,000 nails for building an additional house at Colle for his accommodations near the barracks. He had already received 2,000 nails, but did not have enough for workmen to complete the additions.517 Nails and other building materials shortages remained a problem for the duration of their detention.

Camp Albemarle’s barracks unsurprisingly remained unfinished because prisoners could only carve out a living space with wood found around the encampment.

The prisoners did not have nails and large stones to build homes because of supply shortages. Thus the lack of resources and tough conditions made maintaining huts a constant struggle since high winds, heavy rain, and local wildlife threatened to destroy the primitive structures. Anburey described that an unknown insect “resembling a large grub-worm” ate through the timbers that held their log hut barracks together. Huts routinely fell down, and rats and cats ran wild to consume the captives’ outfits and

February 16, 1779, eds. Chase and Ferraro, PGW, XIX: 216; for brief secondary accounts discussing the captives’ rapid construction and improvements to barracks, see Sampson, Escape in America, 117-118.

517 Riedesel to Bland, May 1, 1779, ed. Campbell, The Bland Papers, I: 123-124.

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disturbed their already tattered bedding.518 Consequently, such circumstances made barrack life in the Virginian countryside often troublesome for prisoners in Camp

Albemarle, and maintenance remained a constant chore.

Although shortages existed, Albemarle County had more than enough wood for the captives to build wooden huts. Convention Army prisoners completed a few hundred primitive log huts, or what the prisoners termed as barracks, within a large square, near

Ivy Creek. Du Roi write in his diary that “336 barracks” existed on a hill “in four rows in a square, each row consisting of 12 barracks.” In addition, each barrack was “24 feet long, and 14 feet wide, and big enough to shelter 18 men.”519 John Elliot Graves had written that the encampment square was at least around 1,000 feet.520 Thus the captives constructed their dwellings as small log houses were space was tight. In spite of the camp’s primitive conditions, the captives had moved a step closer by building huts to having a community space.

As the war dragged onward, the Americans struggled to provide for the captives because of increasing supply shortages. Thus another of the Americans’ operational

518 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 262. 519 Du Roi, Journal of Du Roi, the Elder, Lieutenant and Adjutant in the Services of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778, trans. Epping, 151.

520 Graves concludes that 1,000 foot square can still be found near a small hill, see Graves, “The Virginia Sojourn of the Convention Troops,” The Magazine of Albemarle County, 41 (1983): 140; R.T. Huntington reveals that no standing structures remain of Camp Albemarle, which is located on private property known as Barracks Farm. Its exact location has not been definitively proven since the landscape has changed over the past few hundred years. During the late 1960s, he conducted both foot searches and an flyover with the help of John Gerow, the manager of the farm. They searched area with a medal- detector on a few occasions, but found no definitive evidence of an encampment. Despite this, he feels he found the correct spot because of a sharp right terrain feature, which indicates human manipulation. For his topographical map and other findings, see T.R. Huntington, “The Convention Army Site in Retrospect,” The Magazine of Albemarle County 41 (1983): 4-8; only a few journals and letters describe the camp and its parameters. Jefferson recorded its location “on the top and brow of a very high hill” with access to four nearby springs for water, see Jefferson to Henry, March 27, 1779, ed. Boyd, PTJ, II: 241; for another brief reference to the camps community structures, see Letter from Staunton Virginia, June 1, 1779, Letters of Brunswick and Hessian officers during the American Revolution, William L. Stone, ed. (Kessinger Publishing Company, 2006), 182-183. 232

failures at the camp was provision and clothing shortages because they lacked the capacity to construct an adequate supply system and move resources. Prisoners repeatedly complained to American authorities and their senior officers about shortages.

One prisoner named John Hay in July of 1779 asked Phillips to provide relief for the captives at the camp. He told Phillips many prisoners had accumulated large debts paying “monstrous prices” for basic necessities and large numbers lacked shoes. They also had little in necessary clothes or cloth and thread to make more. As a result, he predicted many of the Convention Army prisoners at the camp would soon not have clothing and funds to buy essentials.521 Ultimately, the Americans needed a better commissary infrastructure to supply all the prisoners.

Virginia’s rural environment presented logistical problems for American commissaries because the rough terrain made delivering and distributing resources difficult. The Americans’ supply system at Camp Albemarle depended on Continental

Army commissaries purchasing provisions from anywhere they could and then transporting them by wagon a great distance to the rural encampment. After spending time in Camp Albemarle, the Continental Convention Army Quartermaster, William

Finnie, reported to Congress his doubts in February of 1779 about the camp and holding the prisoners indefinitely in rural Virginia. He wrote that the camp’s remote location made wagon deliveries difficult. Moreover, commissaries had to haul provisions

“seventy miles” over clay roads from supply depots across the Virginian countryside. In

521 John Hay to General Phillips, July 3, 1779, ed. Campbell, Bland Papers, II: 12-13; for a later report written by a senior Convention Army officer describing the captives’ severe food shortages and limited nutritional intake at the camp, see Robert Hoakesly, Hoaskesly’s Report, July 12, 1780, HMC, II: 155-156.

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addition, a “fork” in the James River about 8 miles from Camp Albemarle delayed wagon drivers’ deliveries because they had to maneuver around it and then cross the river to reach the camp. Furthermore, rain made the James River, the primary water highway for moving supplies into the region, impassible with its clay banks, which only increased costs and delays. Finnie concluded that he, Governor Henry, and the Council all agreed

“that the troops, by any means, cannot be supported in that part of the country” and requested Congress order the Convention Army moved as soon as possible.522 Hence, the camp’s isolation and America’s rough terrain only increased shortages.

Clothing shortages also affected both guards and prisoners at the camp. This forced Bland to avert the militia guards from attempting a mutiny. In April of 1779, the

Albemarle militia garrison and its officers complained bitterly about clothes and several deserted. These matters troubled Governor Henry after learning from Bland of the guards’ circumstances. As a result, he informed Virginia’s congressional delegates in late April that the camp troops complained “most bitterly for the want of clothes” and feared the consequences “unless they are supplied in the most speedy manner” for the reason that “desertions have begun already to take place.”523 They, however, could do little to immediately assist Bland. Indeed, Washington in August learned Bland had prevented a mutiny among the garrison. Washington could only recommend Bland avert future troubles with the garrison by applying to the state authorities for further manpower assistance. Perhaps, he suggested they could call upon more effective state Continentals

522 William Finnie to Jay, February 5, 1778, “Miscellaneous Letters Addressed to Congress, 1774- 1789,” PCC, pp. 221-223. http://www.fold3.com/image/#179209. Accessed November 12, 2011.

523 Governor Henry to The Virginia Delegates in Congress, April 23, 1779, ed. McILwaine, Official Letters of the Governors of the State of Virginia I: 365.

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for garrison duty rather than militia.524 The camp’s location, however, only contributed to the captives and guards’ needs for clothes.

The Council’s money could not secure sufficient food resources because of shortages and rising costs. The Virginia treasury supplied money to Continental Army commissaries to purchase food for the prisoners. Governor Jefferson complained to

Washington that the Convention Army’s Continental Commissary, Major Robert Forsyth, purchased provisions from across Virginia and not from the neighboring counties, which only increased food and supply costs for the commissaries and state. In late 1780,

Jefferson told Washington that his state had provided over £361, 000 for the prisoners’ provisions by August of 1780. At least £130,000 had passed through Forsyth’s

Continental Army deputy based at the barracks. These expenses forced Jefferson to grant commissaries the authority from the surrounding counties to confiscate provisions for prisoners at Camp Albemarle. He, however, warned Washington that Virginia’s “means of supply are not at present what they have been” and prisoners may experience hardships as a result.525 This action would not cease the supply shortage problems during the army’s detention in Virginia. Hence, the inadequate supplies for the captives left them vulnerable.

524 Washington to Bland, August 20, 1779, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XVI: 139-140.

525 Jefferson to Washington, August (no specific date) 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 581-582; for Jefferson orders empowering commissaries to take provisions from nearby counties for the barracks, see Jefferson To the Commissioners of the Provision Law for Albemarle and Certain Other Counties, August 29, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 568; Jefferson To the Commissioners of the Provision Law for Bedford and Certain Other Counties, August 29, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 568.

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*****

The Americans’ insufficiencies forced Convention Army prisoners to establish their own community space and place to survive. At Camp Albemarle, Convention Army captives never followed an official American policy that encouraged them to build a community. Nevertheless, Convention Army captives contributed to their survival by constructing a farming community. The prisoners accomplished this feat after purchasing animals and planting food plots to sustain their community. They built a church, cemetery, taverns, and a theater. Although the prisoners remained in Virginia’s countryside, they proved resourceful in creating a community. Never before had prisoners of war during the American Revolution constructed a community for an army of captives.

Virginia’s fertile terrain granted prisoners chances to conduct farming activities.

Convention Army officers had encouraged their soldiers’ leisure activities in accordance to “the universal opinion throughout the army, that we shall remain prisoners the remainder of the war” and to improve spirits while they lived in isolation.526 For instance, prisoners grew food gardens and raised animals to exchange them for things they needed since commissaries’ supply wagon deliveries proved undependable. As a result, prisoners would turn Camp Albemarle into a small farming community. In the spring of 1779, Jefferson wrote that officers began finding comfortable quarters and purchasing animals and settling into a life of farming. In addition, the captives had cleared land for “growing hundreds of gardens” in which he had “little doubt that their

526 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 256.

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own gardens will furnish them a great abundance of vegetables through the year.”527 One

German officer wrote that their gardens attracted a stream of local visitors from “sixty or more miles away,” who stood around the camp simply to see them.528 The prisoners’ agricultural activities even impressed Riedesel’s wife, and she wrote in her journal that they had constructed an orderly town. She noted that “Behind each barrack, they laid out gardens and constructed pretty little enclosures for poultry.”529 Therefore, horticultural activities would provide the prisoners with a small food supply of vegetables and eggs at the camp.

The rough environment did not discourage some Convention Army prisoners from attempting to improve their circumstances in Albemarle County. Prisoners found some success after the garrison allowed them to acquire animals and earn money at the encampment and their residences. As in Massachusetts, Convention Army prisoners bartered items they obtained from inhabitants or made in return for food and cash.

Riedesel’s wife recorded Phillips and her family weekly “killed, by turns, an ox and two pigs” for food and soon afterward improved their circumstances.530 Hessian and

Brunswick prisoners raised chickens in enclosures near their barracks for locals to purchase. Male cocks at the camp fetched money from locals willing to purchase them

527 Jefferson to Henry, March 27, 1779, ed. Boyd, PTJ, II: 242.

528 Letter from Staunton Virginia, June 1, 1779, ed. Stone, Letters of Brunswick and Hessian officers during the American Revolution, 182.

529 Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 155.

530 Ibid.

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for their fighting abilities.531 Thus for some of the captives Virginia’s rural space provided an ideal environment to raise animals and improve their circumstances.

Prisoners constructed a place and community space to serve some of their needs.

American authorities allowed taverns at the camp for officers and social occasions. At least four tavern structures were constructed for officers’ “entertainment” near the barracks.532 An unidentified German officer noted that the 21st English regiment constructed a small church for worship, where chaplains and prisoners conducted services. Prisoners dug wells to increase the water supply and established a small cemetery for burying the dead near the church. British prisoners also constructed a theater with benches and boxes where prisoners performed comedies.533 These community structures had served some of the prisoners’ needs and boosted their morale.

American and Convention Army prisoners’ few surviving descriptions of Camp

Albemarle contain no drawings of the encampment. Anburey’s journal reveals an etching of Camp Albemarle. The journal was first published in 1789 and the drawing reveals an encampment of wooden structures surrounded by hills and mountains in the secluded Albemarle County woods. It shows that the Americans and prisoners have cleared land by cutting down numerous trees around the encampment and a wagon, and perhaps, two guards riding horses move on the road. No standing structures remain today of the makeshift encampment to validate the drawings accuracy. In the spite of the

531 Letter from Staunton Virginia, June 1, 1779, in Letters of Brunswick and Hessian officers during the American Revolution, ed. Stone, 182.

532 John Hawkins to Bland, June 3, 1779, ed. Campbell. The Bland Papers I: 132.

533 Letter from Staunton Virginia, June 1, 1779, in Letters of Brunswick and Hessian officers during the American Revolution, ed. Stone, 182-183. 238

numerous problems, the Americans had successfully contained a few thousand

Convention Army prisoners in Camp Albemarle.

534 Figure 1 Camp Albemarle.

Continental Army and Virginia officials made use of America’s rural environment at Camp Albemarle to confine and supply Convention Army prisoners a considerable distance from the British army. Ultimately, the captive army’s detention at the camp benefited Congress and the Continental Army’s plan of withholding the prisoners from the British and neutralizing an internal threat. Space for the Revolutionaries at the camp was trying to supply prisoners in the rural environment and establish a secure community

534 Library of Congress, Rare Book and Special Collections Division, Encampment of the Convention Army at Charlottes Ville in Virginia after they had surrendered to the Americans, (LC-USZ62- 31960), Courtesy of the Library of Congress, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2004670080/. 239

space far from British reach and heavily populated towns. Holding and controlling the prisoners in the rural county provided a more secure location than Boston to contain them at Camp Albemarle. Bland’s security measures allowed the American revolutionaries to secure the camp and slow down the number of escapees. Escapees attempting to reach

British lines remained a troubling concern for the Americans. Yet the rough Virginian countryside became an issue for the Americans since they struggled to move supplies to the camp. In addition, the surrounding countryside provided scarce resources and the camp’s location made obtaining supplies difficult. Thus the prisoners carved out a community and place to survive. After the British army under Lord Charles Cornwallis invaded Virginia in the spring of 1781, Congress had to further take advantage of

America’s large geographical space to undermine the British war machine by relocating and dividing the remaining 3,000 prisoners. Thus the Americans once again used space to their advantage by dispersing the captives until the war’s conclusion to diminish the

British threat. They would rely on America’s size as a barrier for keeping the captives from the British army.

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CHAPTER VII

SPACE & DISPERSING PRISONERS: CONCLUSION, 1781-1783

This dissertation has shown how the Revolutionaries used America’s space in multiple ways to capture, control, supply, secure, and neutralize 6,300 Convention Army prisoners, which contributed to defeating the British army during the American

Revolution. Congress, the Continental Army, and state assemblies who managed the prisoners used space as a means to combat a superior adversary. The ways in which they did so enabled them first to defeat and then to control Burgoyne’s army over the course of the war. Space first contributed to the defeat of Burgoyne’s army after American forces methodically withdrew from their posts to Saratoga and used the terrain’s resources to delay the invaders and strike in force. Their minimal space proved inadequate to house and provide for the Convention Army prisoners in Massachusetts.

The prisoners quickly became a dangerous menace around Boston. Congress took advantage of America’s geographic space to contain and secure the army by placing the prisoners under its control and ordering their relocation to Virginia beyond British reach.

Thus for the Americans space presented the problem of supply and accommodation along with the advantage of security. Subsequently, the Revolutionaries took advantage of the large terrain as a means to control and neutralize the prisoners far from the British by facilitating movement across the terrain and marching them from Massachusetts to

Virginia. The construction of Camp Albemarle provided a rural community space to 241

contain and provision the prisoners hundreds of miles from British bases and lines.

Although the large terrain undermined efforts to locate escapees and supply the camp, the

Continental Army and Virginian government kept the army of prisoners far away from the battlefield. During the wars final years, American forces depended on the large geographical space to distance the captives from the British by dispersing them across the countryside, which prevented many of them from returning to British lines.

The Convention Army’s story reveals how American revolutionaries took advantage of America’s geographical space as a means to defeat an enemy army and contain prisoners. Their use of space also shows how a weaker power can use an immense territory to undermine a foreign power by moving and withholding large numbers of prisoners of war. Following Saratoga, the Revolutionaries specifically relied on space to withhold Convention prisoners from British lines because their numbers presented a dangerous threat. Their prospective strength created circumstances for a potential revolt and the state governments holding them faced the possibility of a British invasion or raids to rescue them. In addition, the Americans’ administrative limitations created conditions for disorder and violence among the prisoners and their guards. How the Revolutionaries used space, however, allowed them to overcome and more efficiently control the prisoners over the course of the war. In spite of being a highly contested countryside, the Revolutionaries turned to their hinterland in reaction to a threat because it was vast and available. .

It is important to note that the Revolutionaries during the war were not organized enough to develop a formal strategy with state governments for using space.

Furthermore, space never influenced every decision that Congress and the Continental

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Army acted upon to defeat and contain Convention captives. However, the

Revolutionaries’ attempts to defeat and control the Convention Army can be understood in a framework of space. Their attempts to capture, secure, and supply thousands of

Convention Army prisoners shows that space as a concept can be understood during the

American Revolution as size and territory, housing, provisions, security, distance from

British army bases and where essentials could be found in a more secure location. Space included terrain and supplies facilitating movement and American forces establishing a community space in a rural environment far from British bases at Camp Albemarle. The isolated countryside for the Americans acted as an invisible wall in keeping many captives from the British army. Additionally, space included relocating and dispersing prisoners across America to keep them away from their enemy. Ultimately, the

American revolutionaries’ use of space contributed to their victory because it diminished

British capacity to wage war and the prisoners ceased to be a fighting force.

The countryside did not always prove strategically advantageous and provide satisfactory results for Congress, the Continental Army, and the state governments caring for the Convention captives. Their combined capacity and resource limitations created unfavorable conditions for withholding the prisoners and their families for six years. The

Revolutionaries never solved all of their security, facility, and supply problems with the captives. The large countryside sometimes impeded American attempts to secure the captives since escapees could disperse and hid in a large countryside. Provision and housing shortages and catching escapees continuously remained problematic. Although the countryside in general allowed American forces to confine and provision the captive

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army at multiple locations and in rural environments, it had some limitations. The

Americans restricted confinement locations to accessible regions.

American forces continued to make use of America’s territorial space to control and secure Convention Army prisoners from the British until the war’s conclusion. The relocations of the Convention Army reveal how the Revolutionaries continued to control and care for the prisoners after their confinement at Camp Albemarle. The Americans again relied on the countryside to withhold the prisoners far from British forces. The

Americans moved the captives from Virginia because the British army invaded the south in 1780 and 1781. Congress and state governments’ recurring relocations of the army deprived the British of troops and prevented the prisoners’ redeployment as an army against their forces. The British lacked the military capacity to launch rescue attempts far from their coastal strongholds. Between 1780 and 1783, Congress ordered Convention

Army captives relocated on four occasions to northern Virginia, Maryland, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania to reduce the probability of rescue attempts and escapees reaching enemy lines until the British defeat.

In 1780, Congressional and Virginia’s government began dispersing and moving

Convention Army prisoners throughout American territory to keep them from the British.

As British troops under the command of Lieutenant General Lord Charles Cornwallis invaded the south in the summer of 1780, the Virginia Council recommended that

Jefferson instruct Colonel James Wood, the commander of Camp Albemarle, order paroled Convention Army officers return to camp and mobilize Albemarle and other nearby counties militia to escort the prisoners through the Blue Ridge Mountains “at a warning” whenever Wood deemed such measures prudent. The Council further

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recommended Wood dispatch horsemen to shadow the British and report “their movements.”535 Virginian authorities’ could not move the captives until they found another secure location. The Virginian government never constructed another sizable prisoner encampment, like Camp Albemarle in another rural environment. Jefferson had no idea where to move the Convention Army. He specifically sought “instructions” from

Congress on October 5 concerning this issue because the Convention troops remained under its charge in Virginia.536 Had Cornwallis rescued the thousands of remaining prisoners and solved otheblems pr of equipping and supplying them, he would have substantially increased his army’s numbers. Therefore, moving the captive army became imperative for American forces.

Congress and Virginia’s Council had not specifically planned on using America’s large territorial space as a means to disperse the captives. The Virginia Council had to take advantage of America’s geographical space by moving the captives to a safer location before British troops arrived. Wood’s troubles reveal that congressional and state governments never adequately improved their administrative and resource limitations to manage large numbers of prisoners. In June of 1780, Wood noted to

Jefferson that he found it nearly impossible to move the Convention Army and avoid mass desertions because of the guard and food limitations at Camp Albemarle. He had no money to pay for necessities and authority from the Virginia government to seize supplies from the local inhabitants. Despite these troubles, Wood ordered an additional

535 Council Order for the Security of the Convention Prisoners, June 9, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 423-424.

536 Jefferson to Wood, October 5, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 14-15.

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200 militiamen each from Albemarle and Augusta Counties to remain ready for a march.537 Nevertheless, in late October, Jefferson assured that the Convention Army’s removal would be a priority for Virginian officials if the enemy invaded.538 Virginia authorities had to move Convention Army captives from Camp Albemarle before

American forces could disperse the captives.

Before Cornwallis’s army invaded central Virginia, Congress contributed to moving Convention Army captives from Camp Albemarle by ordering the prisoners’ relocation to Maryland. The congressional delegates first chose Maryland after hearing a report from a congressional committee investigating the concerns of Southern

Continental Army commander Nathanael Greene about a British plan to rescue the

Convention Army from New York City.539 On September 20, 1780, before Congress received Jefferson’s requests for instructions, the congressional government ordered

Jefferson and the Council to march the Convention Army northward about 150 miles from Camp Albemarle to Fort Frederick, an American post that had barracks to house prisoners in northwestern Maryland. The Board of War agreed to supply tents and arms

537 Wood to Jefferson, June 15, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 449-450; Jefferson assured Wood he would be furnished with necessary money and powers of impressments if he had to relocate the captives, see Jefferson to Wood, June 16, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 453; for Jefferson informing Wood of future meat provisions from local commissaries to the Camp Albemarle barracks, see Jefferson to Wood, July 14, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 486.

538 Jefferson to Samuel Huntington, October 22, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 58; Jefferson that same day informed Washington that Virginia’s government needed more information about British numbers and movements before moving the captive army, see Jefferson to Washington, October 22, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 60.

539 JCC, 1774-1789, September 20, 1780, XVIII: 842-843; for more on Greene’s intelligence, see Ben Stoddert, Secretary, War Office, to Governor Thomas Sims Lee, September 21, 1780, Archives of Maryland: Journal and Correspondence of the State Council of Maryland 1780-1781 72 Volumes, William Hand Browne, et al. eds. (Baltimore MD: Maryland Historical Society, 1927), XLV: 114 (hereafter cited as Archives of Maryland); for Congress informing Jefferson and Maryland Governor Thomas Lee about the relocation to Fort Frederick, see Huntington to Jefferson, September 20, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 650-651; Huntington to Lee, September 20, 1780, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 112; 246

for militiamen, but Virginias and Maryland’s governments had the responsibility of determining manpower and food arrangements.540 Hence, Maryland became the first location Congress placed the Convention Army following the captives’ confinement at

Camp Albemarle.

Virginian authorities oversaw the Convention Army’s removal. By the summer of 1780, Jefferson feared that the British army might attempt to rescue the prisoners. In

June, Jefferson granted Wood authority to evacuate Camp Albemarle when necessary. In addition, Jefferson to follow enemy advances ordered Heath to set up communication lines between the encampment and Cornwallis’s force.541 Months before the British army’s arrival in Albemarle County in late October of 1780, Jefferson ordered the

Convention Army “removed without delay” to Fort Frederick and a Maryland regiment moved south to support Wood’s Albemarle County militiamen and the Continental Army battalion at the camp. Jefferson supplied Wood with a route through the Virginian backcountry into northwestern Maryland, and he granted the colonel authority to acquire inhabitants’ wagons and food provisions when necessary.542

By the fall of 1780, Virginian authorities would seek to use America’s space by overseeing British Convention captives’ relocation from Camp Albemarle to Maryland

540 Ibid, 842-843; for a brief secondary reference describing Fort Frederick and holding prisoners there during the Revolution, see Frank B. Sarles Jr., and Charles E. Shedd, John Porter Bloom, and Robert M. Utley,eds. Colonials and Patriots: Historic Places Commemorating our Forbearers, 1700-1783 (Washington: U.S. Dept of the Interior, 1964), 202-203.

541 Jefferson to Wood, June 9, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 428-429; for more on Jefferson’s concerns about enemy movements, see Jefferson to Abner Nash, June 16, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, III: 453; Jefferson concluded that the Americans could not do anything to effectively stop British captives from deserting with a British army in Virginia, see Jefferson to Wood, November 7, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 101.

542 Jefferson to Wood, October 26, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 72-74; for Wood’s food provision and wagon confiscation powers, see Warrant for Impressing Supplies for the Convention Army on Its March to Maryland, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 75-76.

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and northern Virginia. Jefferson and the council advised Wood to move the British captives only to Fort Frederick because it lacked barracks and supplies for all. In addition, the British prisoners would likely attempt escapes for enemy lines. Thus

Virginia’s government thought it best to separate the British from the Germans of the army. Without delay, Colonel Joseph Crocket’s Continental Army troops would march the British Convention Army prisoners to Fort Frederick, and the Brunswick and Hessian captives would stay confined at Camp Albemarle until Maryland could provide proper barracks.543 By late November, Jefferson made sure to inform senior Continental Army officers that the Virginians had separated the captive army and British prisoners had vacated Camp Albemarle and marched for Fort Frederick.544 Dividing the remaining

British captives allowed American forces to more easily move Convention Army prisoners to Maryland and eventually into Pennsylvania and Connecticut.

A few months later Revolutionaries began dispersing the Brunswick and Hessian captives to Maryland and northern Virginia. In early January of 1781, after British forces invaded Virginia, Jefferson ordered Taylor to “take measures instantly for their removal to Fort Frederick…or Fredericktown” and confiscate anything required for a march.545 A

543 Jefferson to Huntington, November 3, 1780 ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 92-93; Jefferson could not wait for the British Convention Army captives to leave since “their presence gives uneasiness,” see Jefferson to Wood, November 16, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 120.

544 Jefferson to Washington, November 26, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 160; Jefferson also informed Gates of the British captives’ impending march to Fort Frederick and separation from the Brunswick and Hessians, see Jefferson to Gates, November 10, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 109; Jefferson to Benjamin Harrison, November 25, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 154-155.

545 Jefferson to Colonel Francis Taylor, January 2, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 299; a little more than a week after his first removal order, Jefferson ordered the prisoners returned to the camp because they had marched without food and clothing and the British withdrew from the region, see Jefferson to Wood, January 12, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 347; Jefferson advised Wood keep guards and prisoners “in readiness” for another march if necessary, see Jefferson to Wood, February 15, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 625. 248

month later, after Cornwallis’s British army began advancing through the central

Virginian countryside, Jefferson ordered Wood after he returned from Maryland “to remove them in the instant of receiving this” from Camp Albemarle.546 A detachment of

Cornwallis’s army raided Charlottesville in June of 1781, but Convention prisoners were safely moved from the region by then. Thus moving the captives across the terrain had allowed them to withhold most of the remaining prisoners as an army from Cornwallis.

Maryland’s limited capacity to hold and provide for a large body of prisoners led the Americans to continue moving them. After learning about the impending arrival of

1,200 British prisoners, Maryland’s Council estimated that the Fort Frederick’s barracks could only hold 500 prisoners since they were “unfinished” and no provisions were available. Wood no longer had enough provisions from the march to keep providing for the captives and Maryland authorities lacked the time to obtain sufficient essentials without more funds. The council noted that many prisoners would likely “escape” to the

British army.547 This proved to be the case despite the Maryland Council’s gradual attempts to employ militiamen for security and commissaries to distribute essentials. For instance, on December 15, Wood complained to Maryland’s Governor Thomas Sims that he and two other officials found it nearly impossible at Fort Frederick for “getting workmen or tools to do anything to the barracks, for want of money” and lack of

546 Jefferson to Wood, February 18, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 652; for Wood removing the captives and experiencing troubles, see Wood to Jefferson, February 20, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV:671-672; for Continental Army Inspector General Freidrich Wilhelm Von Steuben suggesting the Convention prisoners’ removal, see Von Steuben to Jefferson, February 18, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 652.

547 Council to General Assembly, December 6, 1780, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 236-237.

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cooperation from the sheriff.548 After the captives’ arrival in Maryland under the

Virginia militia’s guard, security only grew worse. In December, Fort Frederick’s commissary of prisoners, Moses Rawlings, reported to Lee that food and water shortages led to a revolt after the British Convention prisoners attempted “to force the” fort’s gate open to escape; nonetheless, the guards brought them back under control. He advised immediately relocating all the British captives to nearby Fredericktown, 150 miles east of

Fort Frederick in northeastern Maryland because the town had good barracks and enough rooms for officers to remain near their men.549 Thus the American revolutionaries would have to continue moving the Convention Army across America’s space to another location to control and provide for the remaining captives.

In spite of congressional orders, Wood attempted to persuade Maryland’s government to confine the remaining British Convention Army prisoners. After traveling to Annapolis, Wood convinced Maryland’s Council to hold British prisoners at nearby

Fredericktown because he suggested that they could not possibly return to Charlottesville without shoes for another march. Therefore, Wood marched the British prisoners to

Fredericktown until further arrangements could be made with Jefferson and the Maryland

548 Wood to Governor Thomas Sims Lee, December 15, 1780, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 203-204; for the Council’s response to relieve the problems by sending money via commissaries, see Council to James Wood, December 21, 1780, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 249; the Council appointed George Murdock as the prisoners’ purchasing commissary at Fort Frederick, see Council to George Murdock, December 8, 1780, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 238-239; ; Jefferson had only sent along a £10,000 warrant to help cover “the incidental charges in moving the” British captives northward into Maryland, see Jefferson to Wood, November 7, 1780, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 102.

549 Moses Rawlings to Governor Thomas Sims Lee, December 5, 1780, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 199; for more on the Council’s attempts to strengthen security by sending Maryland militiamen to guard the captives at Fredericktown replacing the Virginian militia, see Council to Colonel Crocket February 3, 1781, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 299-300; Council to Phillip Thomas, February 20, 1781, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 320-321.

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Council, despite the lack of supplies for guards and prisoners.550 Nevertheless, prisoners continued to escape. In late March of 1781, the commander of the guard at

Fredericktown reported to Lee that 815 British Convention Army captives remained there and since his last return revealed 32 exchanges, 39 desertions, and 2 deaths had taken place among the prisoners.551 Lodging and supply shortages around Fredericktown proved extremely difficult. The Maryland Council learned from their militia guard commander Colonel Baker Johnson in late February that British Convention Army prisoners had at Fredericktown no “fresh provision for 15 to 16 days.”552 These various security and provision concerns made the circumstances impossible for controlling

Convention troops in Maryland until the British government agreed to terms.

The Americans continued moving and dispersing the prisoners through two different states. Wood suggested to Jefferson on February 20th that his escorts not bother marching Brunswick and Hessian troops to Maryland after becoming convinced

Maryland officials would refuse to hold them because they had insufficient resources.

Hence, he recommended dispersing the Germans throughout northern Virginia specifically at “Winchester, Martinsburg, and the Warm Springs.” Wood concluded that these towns would prove sufficient for the German captives because they had “a number of vacant houses.” Thus Wood would be placing the captives at a location with no

550 Wood to Jefferson, December 31, 1780, ed. Boyd. PTJ, IV: 255.

551 M. Bayly to Lee, March 25, 1781, ed. J. Hall Pleasants, Archives of Maryland, XLVII: 147.

552 Council to Murdock, February 20, 1781, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 319; the Council ordered Johnson to command a company of militia from his county for guard duty, see Council to Colonel Baker Johnson, February 8, 1781, ed. Steiner, Archives of Maryland, XLV: 301; Jefferson learned that even Continental Army officers managing the prisoners struggled to find lodging and provisions in Fredericktown, see Joseph Crockett to Jefferson, January 4, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 303-304.

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established barracks for accommodating prisoners. Nevertheless, Jefferson and the

Council agreed without complaint to Wood’s improvised plan.553 In March of 1781,

Wood’s escort placed most of these prisoners in the northern Virginian towns of

Winchester and nearby Warm Springs. By early March of 1781, the Revolutionaries confined at least 1200 combined Hesse Hanu and Brunswick captives in northern

Virginia to relieve crowding concerns.554 In spite of the difficulties, American forces had successfully made use of America’s terrain by moving and dispersing the remaining

German captives.

Using America’s space to disperse the captive army allowed Congress to exchange Convention Army officers for American captives. In late 1780, Washington under Congress’s direction paroled and exchanged the remaining senior officers for

American prisoners of war, including Riedesel, Phillips, Specht, and de Gall.555 In late

November of 1780, Congress granted Washington broad authority to exchange all

Continental Army prisoners and other captives “for an equal number of the Convention

553 Wood to Jefferson, February 20, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 671-672; for Jefferson’s approval, see Jefferson to Wood, February 21, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 685.

554 For Wood’s escort placing the captives in Winchester and Warm Springs, see Wood to Jefferson, March 5, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, V: 71; for the remaining Brunswick and Hessian numbers, see Francis Taylor to Jefferson, March 8, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, V: 100-101 ; provisions and housing remained insufficient for the German captives in Winchester, see Wood to Jefferson, February 24, 1781, ed. Boyd, PTJ, IV: 702.

555 For Washington approving Riedesel and Phillips parole, see Washington to Bland, August 11, 1779, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XVI: 82-83; for the two generals’ journey from Charlottesville to New York City and exchange, see Riedesel, Memoirs Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 73-77 & 88-89; for Riedesel leaving the German captives under Specht’s command at Camp Albemarle, see Von Eelking, Memoirs Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 73; for Brigadier General James Hamilton assuming command of the British Convention troops at Camp Albemarle from Phillips, see Phillips to Bland, September 7, 1779, ed. Campbell, Bland Papers, II: 22-23; for Washington consenting to the exchange of Specht and de Gall, see Washington to Wood, October 31, 1780, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XX: 268; Washington to Skinner, October 31, 1780, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XX: 268-269. 252

troops and other prisoners in our hands, rank for rank.”556 Congress and Washington, however, exchanged Convention Army officers only on their terms to diminish British chances of gaining more potential rank-in-file soldiers. For instance, in the spring of

1780, Washington recommended Congress not exchange privates with the British because of the large number of soldiers they would receive and officer swaps would lead to more equal exchanges.557 This produced results after Washington exchanged a number of Convention Army officers that fall for 140 American officers and “all our privates in

New York” for a total of 476, including Major General Benjamin Lincoln. He had refused British requests to exchange a division of Convention Army soldiers, unless the deal included exchanging Burgoyne.558 Ultimately, Congress followed Washington’s advice and never agreed to a general exchange of Convention Army soldiers to avoid strengthening British army ranks.

Security fears and supply concerns, however, forced Congress to support removing and dividing the remaining Convention Army soldiers from Maryland and northern Virginia. In early June of 1781, Washington suggested that the Board of War imprison Convention prisoners in Pennsylvania since its stores held more food resources than New England and a shorter relocation would reduce escape numbers.559 Congress searched for a location to incarcerate the Convention Army. In desperation, Congress in

556 JCC, 1774-1789, November 7, 1780, XVIII: 1028-1029.

557 Washington to The President of Congress, July 10, 1780, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XIX: 148-149; Washington to The President of Congress, June 6, 1781, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XXII: 167-168.

558 Washington to The President of Congress, November 7, 1780, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XX: 314- 315; Washington to The Board of War, November 7, 1780, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XX: 316.

559 Washington to The Board of War, June 6, 1781, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XXII: 169-170.

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late February issued a vague order for the Board of War to move the Convention Army prisoners confined in Virginia “into some state more northerly… and continue their march by way of Knowland’s Ferry (Maryland), until the farther order of Congress.”560

Congress appointed a committee, and in May it recommended Massachusetts as the state to manage the captives. However, the vote did not carry. Thus Congress ordered that the

Board of War move the Convention Army to another location that they thought “most conducive to the good of the union in general.” As before, states the prisoners marched through had to supply the guards and provisions necessary within their borders for the relocation.561 Ultimately, Congress in mid-June of 1781 officially ordered Convention prisoners incarcerated in Pennsylvania.562 Most of the remaining British Convention troops following their relocation from Fredericktown under Wood’s charge remained confined in prisoner barracks at York and Lancaster, Pennsylvania until the war’s end.

Congress further spread the Convention Army across the terrain to withhold them from advancing British forces in the South after ordering the British Convention Army officers moved from Fredericktown to Connecticut. In March of 1781, Congress ordered under Wood’s command the remaining British officers to be marched to the town of

Simsbury to be better housed. Furthermore, Congress ordered Brunswick and Hessian officers paroled to Frederick County Virginia, but their troops would stay at the

Winchester barracks.563 Wood did not reveal to the remaining Convention Army officers

560 JCC, 1774-1789, February 24, 1781, XIX: 193.

561 JCC, 1774-1789, May 23, 1781, XX: 529-530.

562 JCC, 1774-1789, June 12, 1781, XX: 630.

563 War Office to Colonel James Wood, Superintending the Convention Prisoners, March 24, 1781, ed. J. Hall Pleasants, Archives of Maryland, XLVII: 145-147; for Congress’s official resolution 254

his instructions from Congress to separate the officers from their troops until “things are ripe to prevent a great desertion.”564 After the American revolutionaries divided British officers from their troops following the march, American revolutionaries surprised the prisoners. For instance, Anburey noted in his diary a regiment of Continentals deposited

British Convention troops at the Lancaster prison barracks before they marched the junior officers and their servants onward for Connecticut.565 During the war’s final years, the

Revolutionaries confined portions of the army with other prisoners of war mostly in

Pennsylvania and northern Virginia. The Revolutionaries placed an unknown number of the German captives in Massachusetts. In 1782, Riedesel learned some of the German

Convention troops resided in Rutland with only a few officers until their release at the war’s conclusion.566

The Revolutionaries broke up the Convention Army as a threatening fighting force by dispersing the remaining captives throughout America’s large geographical space. This allowed Congress and the Continental Army to withhold the captives as an army following their incarceration in Albemarle County. Many of the 2,500 prisoners who marched from Camp Albemarle for Maryland and Pennsylvania deserted and no longer as an army proved to be a threat to American independence. Security and escapees remained troublesome for Congress and state governments responsible for the prisoners because they did not want deserters to freely roam the countryside and cause

concerning the Convention Army’s relocation arrangements, see JCC, 1774-1789, March 23, 1781, XIX: 301. 564Thomas Johnson to Lee, March 30, 1781, ed. J. Hall Pleasants, Archives of Maryland, XLVII: 153. 565 Anburey, Travels Through the Interior Parts of America, II: 294-295.

566 Von Eelking, Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 151.

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trouble, join American regiments, and replenish British ranks. For instance, in February of 1781, the Board of War reported to Congress that unguarded British Convention prisoners in Maryland freely collected supplies and roamed the countryside wherever they wanted. The Board of War admitted a large number “daily desert.” Hence, the

Board of War at that time recommended Congress find a more permanent location that could provide provisions and guards for the captives.567 Precise figures are unknown, but many captives remained in America after the conflict.

Although American forces struggled to manage the prisoners, their use of the terrain had allowed them to release the remaining captives at their discretion after six years in confinement. In October of 1781, the defeat of Lord Cornwallis’s army at

Yorktown and Gloucester largely ended British military operations in North America.

Surrounded by a much larger joint American and French force, Cornwallis surrendered his entire 7,000 man army at Yorktown as unconditional prisoners of war following his defeat to Washington.568 Ultimately, the loss of Cornwallis’s army convinced the British government to end hostilities and accept American independence. After American and

British negotiators slowly finalized their preliminary peace proposals in the late fall of

1782, Congress returned Convention Army prisoners. After leaving Maryland until the

567 JCC, 1774-1789, February 26, 1781, XIX: 195-196; German captives also escaped often in Winchester, see Wood to Lee, March 30, 1781, ed. Pleasants, Archives of Maryland, XLVII: 154.

568 Lord Charles Cornwallis to Clinton, October 20, 1781, Correspondence Between His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, KB. and Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis (New York: B.F. Stevens, 1781), Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no. 43953. 61-67; for American revolutionaries’ celebrations of the British loss at Yorktown, see Nathan Fiske, An Oration Delivered at Brookfield, Nov. 14, 1781. In Celebration of The Capture of Lord Cornwallis and His Whole Army at York-Town and Gloucester, in Virginia, By the Combined Army Under The Command of His Excellency General Washington, on the 19th of October, 1781 (Boston: printed by Thomas and John Fleet, 1781) Early American Imprints, Series I: Evans, 1639-1800. no. 17153. 3-8.

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war’s conclusion, the scattered Convention Army prisoners mostly resided in the

Revolutionaries’ primary detention towns of Winchester, Lancaster, York, Reading, and

Rutland. The prisoners would still face hardships in these towns. In 1781, Corporal

George Fox recalled in his memoirs that many Convention Army troops caught yellow fever at their barracks in Lancaster from refugees released from Philadelphia jails and

“died like rotten sheep.”569 Nevertheless, most Convention Army captives would remain confined in York and Winchester until the war’s conclusion.

After agreeing to a preliminary treaty of peace, Congress unsurprisingly allowed

Washington to manage the release of the remaining Convention captives and other prisoners of war. In the spring of 1783, Congress officially approved of the Treaty of

Paris’s preliminary articles and in Article 7 agreed that all prisoners would be freed from their confinements. Washington and Secretary of War Benjamin Lincoln, a veteran of the Saratoga campaign and former prisoner of the British following his army’s defeat and capture in 1780 at Charleston, South Carolina, that spring received authority from

Congress to make preparations with the British for the release of “all land prisoners.”570

After obtaining congressional authority, Washington in April of 1783 began making arrangements for the Convention Army and all other enemy prisoners’ release by contacting the British army’s commander-in-chief, Sir Guy Carleton. Washington wrote

Carleton on April 21 and estimated that around 4,500 total enemy prisoners remained confined at the detention sites in Pennsylvania and 1,500 captives, children, and women

569 Houlding and Yates, “Corporal Fox’s Memoir of Service, 1766-1783,” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, LXVIII: (1990): 165.

570 JCC, 1774-1789, April 15, 1783, XXIV: 241-243 & 249; for Washington informing his officers of the war’s end, see Washington to The General Officers of the Army, April 17, 1783, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XXVI: 328-329.

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in Fredericktown and Winchester. This included non-Convention Army prisoners held by the Americans. In the same letter, Washington allowed Carleton to choose how

British and German prisoners would be transferred to British controlled New York City since many would have to march a lengthy distance to reach there.571 Carleton replied that the British would have to settle for marching the prisoners overland rather than by sea since most Royal Navy ships were needed to evacuate British headquarters in New

York City and move his army’s “tonnage.”572 A few weeks later, Carleton “absolved” all

American officers held by the British “from their paroles,” so they could return to

American lines.573

America’s space and the years of confinement had proved challenging for the

Convention Army prisoners because few remained. The British army gradually retrieved the remaining captives during the spring and summer of 1783. Carleton and his officers worked with the Americans for their return. On April 30, Carleton officially dispatched

Brigadier General Alured Clarke, the future commander-in-chief of British forces in

India, for Philadelphia to retrieve prisoners of war “from their present locations in

Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia to Elizabethtown, New Jersey, in order to make whatever arrangements may be necessary, and to prevent any irregularities which disorderly persons may be disposed to commit.” Clarke had to determine preparations with Lincoln and provide instructions to Carleton’s junior officers, who he had assigned to escort the prisoners from their confinement locations to British headquarters. Clarke

571 Washington to Carleton, April 21, ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XXVI: 345-347.

572 Carleton to Washington, April 24, in note # 81, see ed. Fitzpatrick, WGW, XXVI: 348.

573 Carleton to Brigadier General Alured Clarke, May 15, 1783, Carleton Papers, microfilm vol 69, 7684, 1.

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had orders to report anything of significance during the captives’ return.574 The process of releasing Brunswick, Hessian, and British Convention prisoners occurred surprisingly without any catastrophes for either side.

America’s large geographical space did not impede American revolutionaries from returning Convention Army captives. The return of Convention captives, however, did require American and British army authorities to coordinate logistics and provisions to move the captives across the terrain. During the spring and summer of 1783, Carleton sent German officers to retrieve the Brunswick and Hessian captives held in

Fredericktown, Lancaster, and Rutland. Carleton had orders from King George III to send the German troops to Europe.575 Thus Brunswick and Hessian captives of the

Convention Army would not return to Europe with Riedesel and the other German divisions in Canada. In late June, Riedesel explained to Carleton his disappointment that

“our prisoners of war will not be united with me before I leave the province,” but he dispatched a German officer, a Lieutenant Reineking, “to accompany our prisoners (when they are exchanged) to Germany.”576 However, the last Brunswick Convention captives had already returned to British headquarters. After the Germans’ arrival in New York

City, Carleton placed the first of these prisoners on British transport vessels to sail for

574 Instructions to Brigadier General Alured Clarke, April 30, 1783 , Carleton Papers, microfilm vol 68, 7595, 1-3.

575 Carleton to Riedesel, June 6, 1783, in Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 170.

576 Riedesel to Carleton, June 21, 1783, in Memoirs, Letters, and Journals of Major General Riedesel, trans. Stone, II: 172-173.

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Europe in early June. An unknown number of other former German Convention Army captives boarded transports for Europe after arriving in New York later that summer.577

British and American army authorities worked together to facilitate British

Convention Army captives’ movement through America’s space. In May of 1783, following Clarke’s arrival in Philadelphia, Lincoln determined the logistical and security arrangements to march British prisoners from Philadelphia, Lancaster, Winchester,

Fredericktown, and Yorktown to Elizabethtown and then cross the Hudson River to

British controlled Staten Island. Lincoln specifically planned for Clarke’s officers and their escorts to march the divisions of prisoners from each of the sites by different routes to British headquarters. American escorts would march “each division” and a single quartermaster attended to supply and wagon arrangements at the larger detention areas of

Yorktown, Lancaster, and Winchester. Lincoln also allowed ill and infirm captives to remain at their barracks in Philadelphia “until a passage by water is provided for them.”578

Unlike previous relocations, American administration and supply shortages did not undermine the final marches of British Convention Army prisoners from

Pennsylvania to New York City because both sides cooperated with the other. Over the summer of 1783, the remaining British Convention captives returned to New York City from mostly Pennsylvania by marching with other prisoners of war. In late May, Clarke informed Carleton that prisoners were on their way to New York City. He requested

577 Ibid., 174 & note # 1;Riedesel’s memoirs placed the number of Brunswick and Hessian captives at likely around 900 in 1783, see 173; for German captives leaving Frederick that May, see Von Eelking, The German Allied Troops in the War of North American Independence, 260.

578 Lincoln to Clarke, May 5, 1783, Carleton Papers, microfilm vol 68, 7629, 1-6.

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boats for the ill captives’ progress, but their numbers were small.579 Nevertheless, in the summer of 1783, the prisoners’ march over America’s geographical space would not prove to be a hindrance. For instance, Fox recalled in his memoirs that on May 10 many of the remaining British Convention prisoners with an American escort started marching

180 miles from their camps at York, named Indulgence and Security, to New York City.

The captives would press onward to Elizabethtown and after meeting Clarke there march to British headquarters. By the end of May, British prisoners had arrived at British headquarters after crossing the Hudson River from Elizabethtown to nearby Stanton

Island.580 After six years, these few remaining British prisoners were finally released and returned to their lines.

After six years of prisoners’ deaths and escapes, the final return of the British

Convention Army prisoners revealed America’s large space had contributed to diminishing the size of the Convention Army. Sampson wrote that Clarke only returned to New York City 511 British Convention Army troops from Burgoyne’s army of originally 8,000. Throughout the summer and fall of 1783, the prisoners evacuated and sailed for Europe with other regiments of the British army. In addition, small numbers of

British Convention Army escapees continued entering New York City for their pay and returning to Europe until eventually the British army evacuated in late 1783.581 Only about 1,500 of the 6,300 who had laid down their arms at Saratoga returned to Europe

579 Clarke to Carleton, May 27, 1783, Carleton Papers, microfilm vol 70, 7785, 1 & 2.

580 Houlding and Yates, “Corporal Fox’s Memoir of Service, 1766-1783,” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, LXVIII: (1990): 167.

581 Sampson, Escape in America, 180-183. 261

with the evacuating British and German forces. Thus by the end of the conflict, the

American revolutionaries were not controlling many of the Convention Army captives.

Therefore, American revolutionaries’ multiple uses of America’s space concerning the Convention Army reveal a few overall points. The American revolutionaries’ use of space as a strategic means to defeat and control the Convention

Army became a critical factor for the Americans. They could not have taken care of the captive army without moving the captives to other locations and obtaining necessary natural resources throughout the countryside. America’s geographical space also provided American forces many locations to contain the prisoners far from the British. In addition, moving and dispersing the captives provided the American revolutionaries with an immediate advantage over the British army. British commanders could not rescue the prisoners without risking their forces and capture themselves. The British lacked the manpower and resources to control much of the countryside. For instance, Clinton proved unable to catch Washington’s escorts during the march from Massachusetts to

Virginia because his force could not safely maneuver beyond their own lines in New

York. Thus the Americans’ relocations of Convention Army prisoners following

Burgoyne’s defeat deprived the British army of soldiers and ultimately reduced its chances of winning the war.

America’s geographical space also contributed to the Revolutionaries’ problems to effectively provide resources to the Convention Army prisoners. Administration and logistic problems made it difficult for the Revolutionaries to move resources over the large terrain and supply the captives. The Americans, however, obtained more accommodations and provisions by moving the prisoners from Massachusetts to Camp

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Albemarle and dispersing them to various detention sites across Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut during the war’s final years. These encampments provided Congress and the state governments’ additional accommodations and food resources. Nevertheless, administration difficulties and desertion remained problematic for the Revolutionaries at the encampment. For the only time during the war, Convention Army prisoners at Camp

Albemarle largely constructed their own separate community and accommodations in a rural environment. In spite of food shortages, America’s vast space allowed the

Convention Army’s jailors to contain the prisoners over six years by systematically moving them to various detention sites.

The Convention Army’s story specifically highlights the role space played for the

Revolutionaries during the Revolution. American forces began the process of using

America’s geographic space by systematically retreating to strengthen their forces to defeat Burgoyne’s army during the 1777 northern campaign in eastern New York. Their use of the terrain and natural resources resulted in the British army’s disastrous defeat and surrender at Saratoga. Burgoyne’s defeat changed the course of the war when the

British lost an entire army. Burgoyne increased his chances of defeat in several ways.

His invasion plans did not adequately address the problem of moving an army through the countryside because of his confidence American forces could not overcome a British army. British strategy never overcame the problems America’s space brought their army because controlling territory, logistics, and communications remained troublesome.

Additionally, Burgoyne pieced together a slow moving army constructed for positional and siege warfare rather than striking and moving quickly. The British government had

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approved Burgoyne’s invasion plans because their previous strategies proved unsuccessful.

As Burgoyne won a series of small tactical victories, American forces took advantage of the large terrain by means of retreating and stripping the Hudson Valley of food provisions. Their strategy delayed Burgoyne’s advance and prevented American forces from being defeated before they could reorganize in force. America’s large geographic space and American force’s defensive measures combined made Burgoyne’s army vulnerable following the battles of Freemans Farm and Bemis Heights. Hence,

Burgoyne could not safely retreat, and the rough countryside created difficult conditions for opening communications and coordinating with Clinton. Gates’s convention allowed him to disarm Burgoyne’s army and prepare Albany’s defense from a potential British attack. Thus the convention provided Gates with a convenient means to cease hostilities in accordance to the rules of war and officers’ honor culture.

The Convention Army’s incarceration in Massachusetts revealed American forces limited space made impossible to contain the captives. Housing space and provisions became a liability rather than an asset during the Convention Army’s march from

Saratoga to Boston and confinement in Massachusetts. Eastern Department officers and

Massachusetts government’s limitations created impossible circumstances to control prisoners and curb disorder. Gates contributed to the problems of housing and supplying the captives following the convention. He could not fulfill his treaty commitments and focused more on defending Albany. Before Massachusetts’s officials could make adequate preparations, Gates moved the 6,000 plus captives to the agreed embarkation

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port of Boston. The Americans had to improvise arrangements during the march from

Saratoga to Boston.

Heath and the Massachusetts Council attempted to cease the housing space and provision difficulties, but could not overcome the region’s facility and resource limitations. They had to place much of the army in insufficient barracks on Prospect and

Winter Hills. Expanding parole boundaries for officers, seeking rooms at Harvard, dispersing British captives to Rutland, obtaining essentials from the Continental Army and British, and ransoming Burgoyne all proved inadequate. Heath and local authorities’ various efforts to strengthen security arrangements at the barracks broke down because they did not have sufficient guards and resources to implement a proper system. Heath’s attempts to arrest troublesome prisoners proved unsuccessful in improving discipline or decreasing the number of escapees. In addition, the arrest and trial of Colonel Henley after he stabbed British Corporal Reeves and the search of the barracks for hidden weapons did not reduce quarrels between the prisoners and their jailors. The escape of over 1,000 prisoners only increased the Americans’ fears and need for more space. Many desertions combined with the deaths of a an unnamed Brunswick soldier and British

Lieutenant Brown at the hands of guards further diminished the Eastern Department and

Massachusetts’s government’s chances of controlling the prisoners as an army in

Cambridge. The Eastern Department and Massachusetts governments’ attempts to recapture escapees and encouragements for the populace to return them did not stop the discipline problems. Ultimately, administrative difficulties and their insufficient space created conditions for violence and desertion and led to Congress ordering the

Convention Army moved from Massachusetts.

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Congress contributed to using America’s geographic space as a means to control the Convention Army by ordering Washington to secure and move the prisoners from

Massachusetts to Virginia. Congress’s actions placing the army under congressional supervision and ordering its relocation allowed Continental Army troops to control and supply the prisoners in a more secure space. The delegates relied on the countryside as a means to contain and provide for the captives since the fledging government proved unsuccessful in developing an incarceration system and administrative infrastructure to directly manage them in more developed areas. Congress proved unable to strengthen its administrative capacity and mold a dependable system for the reasons that it relied on local communities to maintain prisoners and passed contradictory orders. As a struggling government, Congress focused more on constructing an army and other administrative concerns. Commissaries and local officials often ignored Congress’s orders and exchanged prisoners. Despite creating specific departments to manage prisoner concerns,

Congress’s shorthanded and underfunded departments could not secure and supply the

Convention Army in Massachusetts. Congress could not even force Burgoyne to produce a directory of Convention Army prisoners’ names and descriptions for its records in

Massachusetts.

Both Washington and Gates increased Congress’s control over the Convention

Army after they pushed the delegates to hold it under congressional control to prevent the

British from rescuing the captives. Congress gradually gained authority over the prisoners after refusing to change ports and investigated potential British convention violations. The Congress further strengthened its control after accusing Burgoyne of violating his treaty commitments and parole. Its accusations provided official excuses to

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hold the Convention Army under a congressional thumb and avoid earning a dishonorable reputation among its allies. Congress officially controlled the army after voiding the Convention of Saratoga’s embarkation accord and ordering the prisoners remain in America until the British government ratified the treaty. After gaining control of the Convention Army, Congress for strategic purposes ordered Washington to move the prisoners around 700-miles from Cambridge to Charlottesville. Congress tightened its hold on the army after refusing Phillips’ ransom exchange proposals. Ultimately, these actions and orders reduced the Convention Army as a threat and made it more difficult for the British to retrieve their soldiers.

By secretly preparing and moving Convention Army prisoners from

Massachusetts to Charlottesville, American revolutionaries successfully and strategically took advantage of America’s size. The large terrain proved beneficial for the Americans because Clinton’s force had limited troops and resources to both hold territory and pursue the Convention Army from New York City to Charlottesville without recklessly endangering his troops and the British army’s stronghold. Clinton’s unsuccessful rescue attempt at Fishkill only reduced British chances of retrieving the remaining Convention troops since the Americans marched them well beyond their enemy’s strongholds.

Washington’s and Heath’s security, supply, and logistical relocation preparations in

Massachusetts allowed American forces to avoid potential delays and facilitate

Convention captives’ movement. The two generals successfully obtained commissaries and militiamen from each state the captives marched through. Furthermore, Washington and Heath carefully ensured that America’s geographic space would prove advantageous

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for them without any major problems because they secretly mapped a route and oversaw sickly prisoners moved from Massachusetts to Virginia by ship.

Washington’s security arrangements in Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania ruined the British army’s best chance to rescue Convention prisoners. Washington replaced unreliable militiamen with Continental Army regiments and covertly placed provisions along the route to continue their march. He placed Continental soldiers to control critical roads and scout the Hudson River to watch for British advances and capture deserters from warning the enemy in New York City. Furthermore, Washington took the unprecedented step of relocating nearly his entire army to Fishkill to maintain the fast pace. Washington ordered Bland to keep the prisoners moving under all circumstances, which overcame troubles in Pennsylvania with militia and state authorities discarding congressional orders. His and Bland’s combined supervision efforts kept the

Convention Army prisoners’ marching route and exact location unknown to the British.

Ultimately, moving the captives deprived the British of troops they desired for their forces and strategically secured the prisoners. Thus the march increased American chances for victory since they avoided reengaging the Convention Army on the battlefield before the British rescued many of the prisoners.

Although several administrative and operational failures impeded American efforts to secure Camp Albemarle, the Americans’ oversaw the Convention Army prisoners establish their own community space. The encampment allowed them to more securely contain and provide for the Convention Army in a community space.

Imprisoning Convention prisoners in Albemarle County proved important. The encampment deprived the British of soldiers for two years, and the county’s rural location

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provided American forces a locale to control prisoners far from large towns where they had to compete for supplies. Bland’s security measures included using the countryside after he created a system for his dragoons and guards to secure the camp and catch deserters. As in Massachusetts, however, poor planning, security lapses, and facility and provision shortages plagued efforts to secure prisoners. Many prisoners escaped from the camp trying to make their way for British lines. Despite efforts to catch them, the rough terrain made finding them difficult. The prisoners compensated for the Americans’ limitations by constructing much of their encampment, growing food, and building a community space in the Virginian woods. Despite the troubles with the camp, the

Continental Army and Virginian government succeeded in containing the prisoners as an army at Camp Albemarle. American forces continued using America’s space during the war’s final years via moving and dispersing Convention Army prisoners into northern

Virginia, Maryland, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts until the British government agreed to terms in 1783.

Studying the confinement of the Convention Army is important for the following reasons. It shows that space became an important and unexpected asset for the

Americans to capture and control the Convention Army. Congress, as a new government, struggled to survive and needed to maximize advantageous circumstances whenever possible. Consequently, Congress and state governments responsible for the Convention

Army’s security and supplies drew upon their landmass to influence their decision making process because no single community could adequately secure 6,000 potential soldiers from the British. Hence, Congress turned to America’s geographical space as a valuable strategic means to obtain more accommodations, food provisions, and finding

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additional confinement locations following the housing and provision problems in

Massachusetts. After Congress’s decision in 1778 to oversee Convention captives and move them from Massachusetts to Virginia, Congress worked with the Continental Army and state governments to control and secure the burdensome prisoners far from the

British.

For the Americans, using space became an unexpected way to compensate for their administrative and supply limitations. They proved, however, to be resilient under difficult conditions by continuously moving the army to obtain more resources to build camps and maximize supply stores. They also compensated for their limitations and desperation to manage the captives by allowing them to gather natural resources and build their own encampments for survival and supervision purposes in Virginia and

Maryland. Furthermore, how the Revolutionaries used space was a factor in undermining a superior foreign invader by moving Convention prisoners to different locations rather than withhold them solely in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. This allowed them to more effectively control the largest British army to lay down its arms before Yorktown. Thus the Convention Army’s incarceration shows that American forces could effectively take advantage of their terrain in warfare.

Nonetheless, the Convention Army’s detention shows Americans’ limitations over the course of the war. The army turned into a troublesome challenge for the reasons that they had few preparations in place for the direct management of thousands of prisoners. Yet American struggles with prisoners of war were not unique during the eighteenth century. Like the Americans, British commanders experienced great pains managing prisoners because they lacked accommodations and resources at their

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strongholds and in port towns in Britain and other places. The British controlled little of the American countryside, thus, senior officers had to manage prisoners inside their lines and controlled areas. Over the course of the war, the British incarcerated thousands of prisoners anywhere possible.

American forces had no way to secure the Convention Army from the British without relying on America’s space. Using the countryside as a means to defeat and secure the Convention Army provided the Continental Army and their militia allies with advantages the British could not overcome. The Americans would have never defeated

Burgoyne’s army without systematically withdrawing from posts to gather reinforcements and maneuver near Saratoga. In addition, had the Convention Army prisoners remained confined near Boston, the prisoners would have revolted as an army against their captors. Furthermore, American forces remained weak over the course of the war; thus, a fighting Convention Army may have delayed their victory and independence. If the Americans had not repeatedly moved the army, the British army during their campaigns would have likely regained Convention captives as an army in either Massachusetts or Virginia.

Studying how American forces confined Convention Army prisoners shows that space played a contributing role in the outcome of the Revolution. American revolutionaries demonstrated that space could become a valuable asset or obstacle for an unprepared fighting force. Although the British army was the most powerful European military force in the mid-eighteenth century, their troop and resource shortages hampered senior officers’ operations and efforts to rescue Convention Army prisoners. America’s space only impeded British communications and logistics, which made facilitating

271

operations troublesome. Convention prisoners’ retrieval remained important for the

British. Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton all planned to void the convention treaty and return the Convention Army to the battlefield. Hence, for the Americans incarcerating the Convention Army shaped the military circumstances of the war because its confinement diminished British capacity to free up soldiers for campaigns. Withholding

Convention Army captives from the British did not alone win the war, but contributed to wearing down an already overextended foreign army that required more troops to defeat

American forces.

This study’s definition of space provides historians a fresh approach regarding the impact of space and its influence on the American Revolution. It reveals how space as a conception connected American revolutionaries’ attempts and actions to defeat a formidable foreign adversary and control prisoners of war. How Congress and American forces used space to defeat and control Convention Army captives adds to historians’ definitions of space during revolutionary and British colonial period in the context of warfare and prisoners of war. Therefore, space was more for the Americans than imperial connections of politics, power, order, spatial mobility, identity, knowledge, culture, size, territory, place, landscape, maps, political boundaries, symbols, and geographical expansion. Furthermore, focusing on the role space played for American revolutionaries could lead historians to explore its influence on other military conflicts.

Understanding how space undermined the British army provides another avenue for military planners and historians to explore how a weaker power compensates for its limitations. The implications of how an army views and uses space would likely prove

272

useful for historians in studying both past and future conflicts in regard to power, innovation, and strategy.

273

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Sampson, Richard. Escape in America: The British Convention Prisoners 1777-1783. Chippenham, Witshire: Picton Publishing, 1995.

Sankey, Margret. Jacobite Prisoners of the 1715 Rebellion: Preventing and Punishing Insurrection in Early Hanoverian Britain. Burlington: Ashgate, 2005.

Sarles Jr., Frank B. and Charles E. Shedd. Edited by John Porter Bloom and Robert M. Utley. Colonials and Patriots: Historic Places Commemorating our Forbearers, 1700-1783. Washington: U.S. Dept of the Interior, 1964.

Shy, John W., A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Smith, Paul H., Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964.

Spring, Matthew. With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America. Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008.

Springer, Paul. America’s Captives: Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror. Lawrence Kansas: University Press, of Kansas, 2010.

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Starkey, Armstrong. European and Native American Warfare in America, 1675-1815. Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998.

______.War in the Age of the Enlightenment, 1700-1789. Wesport CT and London England: Praeger, 2003.

Steele, Henry Commager and Richard B. Morris, eds. The Spirit of Seventy-Six: The Story of the Revolution as Told by Participants. 1958; reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1995.

Steele, Ian. Betrayals: Fort William Henry Massacre. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

______. “Surrounding Rites: Prisoners on Colonial North American Frontiers.” Hanoverian Britain and Empire: Essays in Memory of Phillip Lawson. eds. Stephen Taylor, Richard Conners, and Clyve Jones, 137-157. Woodbridge England and Rochester NY: Boydell Press, 1998.

Stern, Mark Abott. David Franks: Colonial Merchant. University Park PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.

Tuan, YI-Fu. Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977.

Wallace, Millard. Appeal to Arms: A Military History of the American Revolution. New York: Harper, 1951.

Watt, Gavin K., Rebellion in the Mohawk Campaign: The St. Leger Expedition of 1777. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2002.

Weigley, Russel F., The American Way of War: A History United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1973.

White, Richard. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Willcox, William B., Portrait of a General: Sir Henry Clinton in the War of Independence. New York: Knopf, 1964.

Secondary Articles

Anderson, Olive. “American Escapes from British Naval Prisons During the War of Independence.” The Mariner’s Mirror 41 (1955): 238-240.

______. “The Treatment of Prisoners of War in Britain during the American War of Independence.” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 28 (1955): 63-83. 288

Batchelder, Samuel F., “Burgoyne and His Offices in Cambridge 1777-1778.” Cambridge Historical Society Cambridge: Published by the Society, 1925, XIII: 17-80.

Becker, Laura. “Prisoners of War in the American Revolution: A Community Perspective.” Military Affairs 46, no.4 (1982): 169-173.

Beroth. Janet. “The Convention of Saratoga.” The New York Historical Society Quarterly Bulletin 8, no.3 (1927): 257-280.

Bowie, Lucy Leigh. “German Prisoners During the American Revolution.” Maryland Historical Magazine 40 (1945): 185-200.

Chase, Philander D., “Years of Hardships and Revelations: The Convention Army at the Albemarle Barracks, 1779-1781.” The Magazine of Albemarle County History 41 (1983): 9-53.

Clark, Jane. “Responsibility for the Failure of the Burgoyne Campaign.” The American Historical Review 35, no.3 (1930): 542-559.

______. “The Convention Troops and the Perfidy of Sir William Howe.” American Historical Review 37, no.4 (1932): 721-730.

Cogliano, Francis. “We All Hoisted the American Flag:” National Identity among American Prisoners in Britain during the American Revolution.” Journal of American Studies 32, no.1 (1998): 19-37.

Conway, Stephen. “The British Army, ‘Military Europe,’ and The American War of Independence.” The William and Mary Quarterly 67, no.1 (2010): 69-100.

Cray, Robert F., “Commemorating the Prison Ship Dead: Revolutionary Memory and the Politics of Sepulture in the Early Republic, 1776-1808.” The William and Mary Quarterly 56, no.3 (1999): 565-590.

Fleming, Thomas. “Gentlemen’s Johnny’s Wondering Army.” American Heritage 24 (1972): 10-15 & 89-93.

Graves, Joan Ellett. “The Virginia Sojourn of the Convention Troops.” The Magazine of Albemarle County 41 (1983): 137-148.

Halttunen, Karen. “Grounded Histories: Land and Lanscape in Early America.” The William and Mary Quarterly 68, no.4 (2011): 513-532.

Huntington, T.R. “The Convention Army Site in Retrospect,” The Magazine of Albemarle County 41 (1983): 4-8.

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Knight, Betsy. “Prisoner Exchange and Parole in the American Revolution.” The William and Mary Quarterly 48, no.2 (1991): 201-222.

Lee, Wayne E., “Early American Ways of War: A New Reconnaissance, 1600-1815.” The Historical Journal 44, no.1 (2001): 269-289.

Lemisch, Jesse. “Jack Tar in the Streets: Merchants Seamen in the Politics of Revolutionary America.” The William and Mary Quarterly 25, no.3 (1968): 371- 407.

______. “Listening to the ‘Inarticulate’: William Widger’s Dreams and the Loyalties of American Revolutionary Seamen in British Prisons.” Journal of Social History 3 no.1 (1969): 1-29.

Lindsey, William R., “Treatment of American Prisoners of War During the Revolution.” The Emporia State Research Studies 22, no.1 (1973): 5-32.

Lingley, Charles. “The Treatment of Burgoyne’s Troops Under the Saratoga Convention.” Political Science Quarterly 22, no.3 (1907): 440-459.

McDonnell, Michael A., “Class War? Class Struggles During the American Revolution in Virginia.” The William and Mary Quarterly 63, no.2 (2006): 305-344.

Miller, Ken. “A Dangerous Set of People”: British Captives and the Making of Revolutionary Identity in the Mid-Atlantic-Interior.” Journal of the Early Republic 32, no.4 (2012): 565-601.

Nobles, Gregory. “Straight Lines: Mapping the Political Order of the Anglo-American Frontier.” The Journal of American History 80, no.1 (1993): 9-35.

Phifer, Richard. “Campaign to Saratoga.” Military Heritage 2, no.1 (2000): 40-51.

Powers, Sandra. “Studying the Art of War: Military Books Known to American Officers and Their French Counterparts during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century.” The Journal of Military History 70, no.3 (2006): 781-814.

Prelinger, Catherine. “Benjamin Franklin and American Prisoners of War in England During the American Revolution.” The William and Mary Quarterly 32, no.2 (1975): 261-294.

Ranlet, Phillip. “In the Hands of the British: The Treatment of American POWS During the War of Independence.” The Historian 62, no.4 (2000): 731-757.

Shammas Carole. “The Space Problem in Early United States Cities.” The William and Mary Quarterly 57, no.3 (2000): 505-542.

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Starkey, Armstrong. “Paoli to Stony Point: Military Ethics and Weaponry During the American Revolution.” Journal of Military History 58, no.1 (1994): 7-27.

Sterling, David. “American Prisoners of War in New York: A Report by Elias Boudinot.” The William and Mary Quarterly 13, no.3 (1956): 376-393.

Stevens, Mary K., “The Convention Troops in Connecticut.” Connecticut Quarterly 3 (1897): 144-149.

Wall, Alexander. “The Story of the Convention Army, 1777-1783.” The New York Historical Society Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1927): 67-97.

Webler, Robert. “Braunschweig and Hessen-Hanau Captives from Burgoyne’s Army Marching Through New England to Prisons-August-November 1777.” Journal of the Johannes Schwalm Historical Association, Inc 7, no.3 (2003): 1-16.

Dissertations

Denn, Robert John. “Prison Narratives Of The American Revolution.” PhD diss., Michigan State University, 1980.

Dixon, Martha W., “Divided Authority: The American Management Of Prisoners In The Revolutionary War, 1775-1783.” PhD diss., University of Utah, 1977.

Dzurec, David. “An entertaining narrative of…cruel and barbarous treatment”: Captivity, narrative, and debate in the early American Republic, 1775-1816.” PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2008.

Grady, Robert, F. “The Evolution Of Legal And Classical Concern For The Prisoner Of War.” PhD diss., Catholic University of America, 1970.

Knepper, George. “The Convention Army, 1777-1783.” PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1954.

Krebs, Daniel. “Approaching the enemy: German captives in the American War of Independence, 1776--1783.” PhD diss., Emory University, 2007.

Miller, Kenneth. “Dangerous guests: Enemy captives and American national identity in Revolutionary Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1760-1783.” PhD diss., University of California Davis, 2006.

Moody, John Wesley. “British Prisoner of War During the American Revolution.” Masters thesis, University of West Georgia, 2002.

Patrick, Rembert. “British Prisoners of War in the American Revolution.” Masters thesis, University of North Carolina, 1934.

291

Pope, Johnathan. “Law, tradition, and treason: Captured Americans During the American Revolution, 1775-1783.” MA thesis, University of New Brunswick, 2003.

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APPENDIX A

CONVENTION OF SARATOGA

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Articles of Convention Between Lieutenant General Burgoyne and Major General Gates, in Burgoyne, ed. O'Callaghan M.D, Orderly Book of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne, 144- 148.

1. The troops under Lieutenant General Burgoyne to march out of their camp with the honors of war, and the artillery of the entrenchments, to the verge of the river where he old fort stood, where the arms and artillery are to be left; the arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers.

2. A free passage to be granted to the army under Lieutenant General Burgoyne to Great Britain on condition of not serving again in North America during the present contest; and the port of Boston is assigned for the entry of transports to receive the troops, whenever General Howe shall so order.

3. Should any cartel take place, by which the army under Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, or any part of it, may be exchanged the foregoing article to be void, as far as such exchange shall be made.

4. The army under Lieutenant General Burgoyne to march to Massachusetts Bay by the easiest, most expeditious, and convenient route; and to be quartered in, near or as convenient as possible to Boston, that the march of the troops may not be delayed when transports arrive to receive them.

5. The troops to be supplied on their march, and during their being in quarters with provisions by General Gate’s orders, at the same rate of rations as the troops of his own army, and if possible the officers’ horses and cattle are to be supplied with forage at the usual rates.

6. All officers to retain their carriages, bat-horses, and other cattle, and no baggage to be molested or searched; Lieutenant General Burgoyne giving his honor that there are no public stores secreted therein. Major-General Gates will of course take the necessary measures for the performance of this article; should any carriages be wanted during the march for the transportation of officers’ baggage, they are if possible to be supplied by the country at the usual rates.

7. Upon the march, and during the time the army shall remain in quarters in Massachusetts Bay, the officers are not as far as circumstances will admit to be separated from their men. The officers are to be quartered according to rank, and are not to be hindered assembling their men for roll calling and other purposes of regularly.

8. All corps whatever of General Burgoyne’s army, whether composed of sailors, artificers, batteaumen, drivers, independent companies, and followers of the army, of whatever country, shall be included in the fullest sense and utmost extent of the above articles and comprehended in every respect as British subjects.

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9. All Canadians and persons belonging to the Canadian establishment, consisting, of sailors, batteaumen, artificers, drivers, independent companies, and many other followers of the army, who come under no particular descriptions, are to be permitted to return there. They are to be conducted immediately by the shortest route to the first British post on Lake George, are to be supplied with provisions in the same manner as other troops, and are to be bound by the same condition of not serving during the present contest with Great Britain.

10. Passports to be immediately granted for three officers not exceeding the rank of captains, who shall be appointed by Lieutenant General John Burgoyne and carry dispatches to Sir William Howe, Sir Guy Carleton, and Great Britain by way of New York and Major General Gates engages the public faith that these dispatches shall not be opened. These officers are to set out immediately after receiving their dispatches, and are to travel the shortest routes and in the most expeditious manner.

11. During the stay of the troops at Massachusetts Bay, the officers are to be admitted on parole, and are to be permitted to wear their side arms.

12. Should the army of Lieutenant General Burgoyne find it necessary to send for their clothing and other baggage to Canada, they are to be permitted to do it in the most convenient manner, and necessary passports granted for that purpose.

13. These articles are to be signed and exchanged tomorrow morning at 9 o’clock and the troops under Lieutenant General Burgoyne are to march out of their entrenchments at 3 o’clock in the afternoon. Camp at Saratoga 16th Oct. 1777

(Signed) Horatio Gates Major General

To prevent any doubt that might arise from Lieutenant General Burgoyne’s name not being mentioned in the above treaty, Major General Gates here by declares that he is understood to be comprehended in it, as fully as if his name had been specifically mentioned.

(Signed) Horatio Gates

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