Chapter Six ‘The War in South Africa’ (November 1899) Karl Kautsky

In this article, dealing with the (11 October 1899–31 1902), Kautsky argued that two forces arose out of the decline of ‘Man- chesterism’ (liberalism) in England: socialism and imperialism. He pointed out that imperialism was making ‘even more rapid progress than socialism’ and was becoming ‘the primary means of arresting the development of the latter’. It should be empha- sised, though, that Kautsky still understood imperi- alism in its then-current meaning as ‘the creation of a “Greater Britain”, a huge world empire’ surrounded by protectionist tariffs, which offered the prospect, although temporary at best, of improving economic conditions for the workers.

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‘The War in South Africa’1

The fortunes of war are changeable; and if, as we write, they stand now on the side of Transvaal, they may well stand on the side of the Englishmen by the time these lines reach our readers. But this much is

1. Kautsky 1899c. 156 • Karl Kautsky already certain: the war will not be a military parade to Pretoria. If it is a life- and-death struggle for the Boers, it will not, in any case, be a mere frontier- war for their opponents, one that passes by like the campaigns against the Afridis and Matabeles without producing any deep impression. It is already an historical event that has imposed the greatest sacrifices on England and most profoundly aroused and stirred the entire civilised world. Such wars tend to be accompanied by profound consequences that their authors did not foresee and often did not wish for, consequences that suddenly impress a new character upon political and social development. Must we expect something similar from the Boer War? If the Englishmen finally prevail, as is still likely given their enormous superiority, that would mean a triumph for the English capitalist clique that plotted the War; a triumph not only over the resistance of the Boers, who are not ready to give up willingly their land with its treasures, but also over the capitalists of other nations – the Germans, the French and the Russians, who grew so indignant about the encroachments of the Englishmen in South Africa because they could not take their place. But the defeat of the Boers would also mean, first of all, a strengthening of the position of the capitalist class within England itself. To be sure, the power of the democratic states of Europe against absolut- ist Russia must grow at the same time. That aspect [of the question] could make us come to terms with [the prospect of] an English victory, but one must not overestimate it. Support is not to be expected from England for the democratic trends on the European continent. Then again, Russia is today no longer the most dangerous threat to European freedom. Its gaze hardly turns to the west, where it can grab nothing. Each territorial expansion westwards and even southwards in Europe would be for Russia a source of difficulties, an element of weakness, not of strength. And the tsarist régime has enough to do with its internal difficulties. But, if Russia has become less dangerous for Western Europe, England has progressively ceased to be the most decided opponent of Russia, and for good reasons. At sea, England is a match for any enemy. But, up to now, it has not been given to any state over the long run – though many circles in Germany seem to have forgotten it – to be a military power of the first rank simulta- neously on land and sea. England is weak as a land-power, and thus it is exposed above all to Russia, which already borders on India. There lies the