SHSH Commentary on the December 2013 Nigeria

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SHSH Commentary on the December 2013 Nigeria THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE HOME OFFICE, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS © Still Human Still Here 2013 13th December 2013 A Commentary on the December 2013 Nigeria Operational Guidance Note This commentary identifies what the ‘Still Human Still Here’ coalition considers to be the main inconsistencies and omissions between the currently available country of origin information (COI) and case law on Nigeria and the conclusions reached in the December 2013 Nigeria Operational Guidance Note (OGN) issued by the UK Home Office. Where we believe inconsistencies have been identified, the relevant section of the OGN is highlighted in blue. An index of full sources of the COI referred to in this commentary is also provided at the end of the document. This commentary is a guide for legal practitioners and decision-makers in respect of the relevant COI, by reference to the sections of the Operational Guidance Note on Nigeria issued in December 2013. Access the complete OGN on Nigeria here. The document should be used as a tool to help to identify relevant COI and the COI referred to can be considered by decision makers in assessing asylum applications and appeals. This document should not be submitted as evidence to the UK Home Office, the Tribunal or other decision makers in asylum applications or appeals. However, legal representatives are welcome to submit the COI referred to in this document to decision makers (including Judges) to help in the accurate determination of an asylum claim or appeal. The COI referred to in this document is not exhaustive and should always be complemented by case-specific COI research. Contents 3.16 The Niger Delta p.2 3.17 Fear of cults, gangs and vigilante groups (including fear of juju, student confraternities p.10 and bakassi boys) 3.18 Boko Haram p.14 3.19 Religious persecution p.34 3.20 Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) p. 51 3.21 Victims of trafficking p.55 3.22 Forced marriage p.63 3.23 Gay men and lesbians p.66 3.24 Prison conditions p.76 2.2 Actors of Protection p.85 2.3 Internal Relocation p.94 Witchcraft p.112 APPENDIX Useful sources to consult on the security and humanitarian situation in Nigeria p.122 Index of sources p.124 1 THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE HOME OFFICE, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS © Still Human Still Here 2013 3.16 The Niger Delta The conclusion for this main category of claim states: Excerpt from the December 2013 Nigeria OGN 3.16.7 Conclusion. Whilst applicants from the Niger Delta may face harassment and ill-treatment at the hands of the security forces who work to protect the interests of the oil industry, they are unlikely to be able to establish that they face treatment amounting to persecution based solely on their residence there. Applicants who are able to demonstrate that they face a level of harassment and ill- treatment amounting to persecution at the hands of the security forces in the Niger Delta are unlikely to be able to seek redress from the authorities. Such applicants, however, have the option to relocate internally to another area of the country outside of the Niger Delta where they will not be of continuing interest to the security forces feared. Therefore, a grant of asylum or Humanitarian Protection will not be appropriate for this category of claim. The conclusion for this main category of claim asserts that applicants can escape the threat of persecution from the security forces by relocating outside of the Niger Delta. Note the position of the UNHCR Guidelines on internal relocation in cases raising the state as the agent of persecution: UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 4: "Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 23 July 2003 […] I. The Relevance Analysis […] b) Is the agent of persecution the State? National authorities are presumed to act throughout the country. If they are the feared persecutors, there is a presumption in principle that an internal flight or relocation alternative is not available. […] The conclusion for this main category of claim also only raises the ‘safety’ or ‘relevance’ criteria of internal relocation; the reasonableness of internal relocation is not addressed. For analysis on this point, see section 2.3 Internal Relocation. The conclusion addresses the risk arising from state security forces, but does not mention the risk arising from armed groups in the Niger Delta. This is despite the Treatment section of the OGN documenting the practice of kidnap for ransom by armed groups (at paragraphs 3.16.5 and 3.16.6). The following additional non-exhaustive, illustrative COI from the past 12 months further documents kidnappings perpetrated by armed groups in the Niger Delta: Kidnapping by armed gangs in the Niger Delta Jamestown Foundation, Militancy in the Niger Delta Becoming Increasingly Political – A Worry for 2015, 14 November 2013, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 11 Issue: 21 As oil bunkering, piracy, and kidnapping in the Niger Delta has continued or worsened over the course of the year, the general instability has increasingly politicized militants in the region, exacerbating a growing problem for the central government. The more political mindset of the militants has entailed an intensification of the rhetoric emanating from the Delta, marking an evolution in the aims of the militant networks in the region. The more political - and religious - justifications cited in their threats indicate that the militants are pursuing loftier goals in recent times than the mere pragmatic economic benefits derived via oil theft, which since the 2009 amnesty has been the prime driver of local criminal behavior. In such an environment, 2015 looms large, not only because of the contentious presidential elections that year, but also because the stipend payments and training protocols of the 2009 amnesty officially expire in 2015. To be sure, instability and criminal activity has not stopped and several significant incidents have occurred in recent months. On September 6, unknown gunmen kidnapped the nation's second-most senior Anglican archbishop, Ignatius Kattey, and his wife near their residence in Port Harcourt. Similarly, on 2 THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE HOME OFFICE, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS © Still Human Still Here 2013 September 11, a traditional ruler in southeastern Edo state was kidnapped from his palace. Shell has likewise experienced significant disruptions in output due to criminal activity over the past several months. In mid-October, the firm decried the level of oil theft and claimed it had been forced to defer some 300,000 barrels of oil per day. A total of 189 crude theft points were repaired on the Trans-Niger Pipeline (TNP) and the Nembe Creek Trunk Line (NCTL) between January and September of this year, and the TNP line has been closed down at least five times since early July due to leaks from crude oil thefts. An official for the Nigerian branch of Shell called for a more concerted effort to protect the lines and lamented what was "turning out to be a dangerous development in the Niger Delta" (Daily Trust [Lagos], October 15). Criminal activity offshore has also reached dangerous levels. A report from early October noted that the amount of money stolen via piracy had reached $100 million since 2010 as the militants have streamlined their operations and tactics, leading to a highly successful attempt rate and many significant heists. [1] A recent report noted further that piracy attacks off Nigeria's coast had increased by a third year-on-year. [2] MEND-affiliated criminals also claimed the high-profile kidnapping of two U.S. sailors off Nigeria's coast in late October (Bloomberg, October 25). Perhaps of greater importance is the transformation of the underlying motivation for these incidents. Prior to the amnesty, while profit was undeniably an aim, MEND-affiliated militants were primarily politically motivated. As a result, many of the attacks did not involve monetary gain and were direct assaults on personnel and energy installations with the goal of destroying output and forcing the government to address the needs of the local population. For the past several years, brazen theft has by- and-large supplanted the former political ideology of the pre-amnesty militants and the bunkering and distribution of oil became deeply engrained as a strategy for economic livelihood within the delta. Currently, MEND and similarly motivated groups appear to be assuming an increasingly political stance in their activity. Always an attractive means of earning income, opportunistic criminal activity in the Delta (kidnapping, oil bunkering and piracy) may become a form of political protest once again. A few recent incidents demonstrate this trend: The kidnapper of Archbishop Kattey claimed that the kidnappings in the Delta and elsewhere were intended "to draw the attention of the Federal Government to the sufferings of the people of Kokori and Urhobo at large" and cited the "continuous cheating of our people by the Federal Government," noting that "for over 50 years now, they have been drilling oil from our community… yet we have nothing to show for it." He went on to threaten to shut down all well heads in the area if his demands for development were not met (The Guardian, September 19).
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