DOES JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE MATTER? A STUDY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION IN AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME WEI CUI ABSTRACT Lawsuits against the government form a part of the regular functioning of legal systems in democratic countries, and respond- ing to such lawsuits constitutes an unavoidable part of governance. However, in the context of authoritarian regimes, administrative litigation has been viewed as a distinctively valuable institution for promoting the rule of law and individual rights. Moreover, the ju- diciary is portrayed as the keystone to this institution and to the rule of law in general: the more powerful and competent is the ju- diciary, the more it is able to “constrain government” through judi- cial review. Through empirical and comparative analyses of over two decades of administrative litigation in China against one of the state’s essential branches, tax collection, I challenge the utility of this normative conception of administrative litigation. Using con- ceptual tools that apply across legal systems and regulatory areas, I show that while litigant behavior as well as the regulatory envi- ronment offer useful explanations of litigation patterns such as case volume and the plaintiff win rate, the relevance of judicial Associate Professor, Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. Author email:
[email protected]. I am grateful to Eric Hou and Xiang Fangfang for excellent research assistance and to Zhiyuan Wang for assistance with statistical analysis. I have benefited from comments by Cheng Jie, Jiang Hao, Liu Yue, Pit- man Potter, Wang Yaxin, Wei Guoqing, and audiences at the Sydney Chapter of the Australian Branch of the International Fiscal Association, Northwestern Uni- versity Law School, the Canadian Law and Economics Association Annual Meet- ing in 2014, and the 2016 Annual Comparative Law Work-in-Progress Workshop at the University of Illinois Law School on earlier drafts.