House of Commons

Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign

Affairs and International Development Committees

Scrutiny of Arms Exports (2012): UK Strategic

Export Controls Annual Report 2010, Quarterly

Reports for July to December 2010 and

January to September 2011, the Government's

Review of arms exports to the Middle East and

North Africa, and wider issues

First Joint Report of Session 2012–13

Second Report from the Business, Innovation and Skills Committee of Session 2012–13 Fourth Report from the Defence Committee of Session 2012–13 First Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee of Session 2012–13 Second Report from the International Development Committee of Session 2012–13 Volume II Oral and written evidence and the Committees' correspondence with Ministers

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 2 July 2012 HC 419-II Incorporating HC 1697, Session 2010-12 Published on 13 July 2012 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited £18.50

The Committees on Arms Export Controls

The Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Development Committees are appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and any associated public bodies.

Current membership BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS: Mr Adrian *§, Mr Brian Binley, Paul Blomfield, Katy Clark*, Julie Elliott, Rebecca Harris, Margot James*, Simon Kirby, Ann McKechin*, Mr David Ward, Nadhim Zahawi*

DEFENCE: Rt Hon James Arbuthnot§, Mr Julian Brazier, Thomas Docherty, Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson*, John Glen*, Mr Dai Harvard, Mrs Madeleine Moon, Penny Mordaunt,* Sandra Osborne, Sir Bob Russell, Bob Stewart*, Ms Gisela Stuart

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: , Rt Hon Sir John Stanley* ( of the Committees’ concurrent meetings), Richard Ottaway§, Rt Hon Mr Bob Ainsworth, Mr John Baron, Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell, Rt Hon Ann Clwyd*, Mike Gapes*, Mark Hendrick, Andrew Rosindell, Mr Frank Roy, Rory Stewart*, Mr Dave Watts* (left Committee 25/6/2012)

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Bruce*§, Hugh Bayley, Richard Burden*, Mr Sam Gyimah, Richard Harrington, Pauline Latham, Jeremy Lefroy, Mr Michael McCann, Alison McGovern, Fiona O’Donnell*, Chris White*

* Member who participated in the inquiry leading to this Report § Chair of a participating Committee

Powers The Committees are departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in Standing Order No 152. The powers of the Committees to work together and agree joint reports are set out in Standing Order No. 137A. These Standing Orders are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committees are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committees (including news items) are on the internet at http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/other- committees/committee-on-arms-export-controls/.

Committee staff The current staff of the Committees are Keith Neary (Clerk), Vanessa Hallinan (Committee Assistant), and Alex Paterson (Media Officer)

Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 2420; the Committees’ email address is [email protected]

Witnesses

Monday 23 January 2012 Page

Roy Ibister, Team leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, Oliver Sprague, Programme Director, Military Security and Police, UK, and Martin Butcher, Policy Adviser, Arms Campaign, Oxfam GB Ev 1

David Hayes, Chairman of EGAD, David Hayes Export Controls, Bernadette Peers, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd, Brinley Salzmann, Secretary of EGAD, ADS Group Ltd, and Barry Fletcher, Executive Committee Member of EGAD, Fletcher International Export Consultancy Ev 9

Tuesday 7 February 2012

Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and President of the Board of Trade, Tom Smith, Head of the Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, and Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation Ev 16

Rt Hon William Hague MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sarah MacIntosh, Director of Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and David Hall, Deputy Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

List of printed written evidence

1 Dr Neil Cooper, Peace Studies, University of Bradford Ev 33 2 Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) Ev 36 3 Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD)s Ev 40; Ev 54 4 UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG) Ev 43; Ev 58 5 The Rt Hon Vince Cable MP Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills Ev 56 6 Amnesty International UK Ev 56; Ev 57

The Committees’ correspondence with Ministers

CAEC’s correspondence with Ministers since the last Report (HC686) published on 5 April 2011.

Date From To Subject Evidence reference 07/04/2011 Alistair Burt Chairman The Committees’ 2011 Report HC686 62 14/07/2011 Chairman Foreign Secretary Review of Arms Exports 63 18/07/2011 Chairman Foreign Secretary CAAC’s questions on the Government’s Response Cm 8079 to the Committees’ 63 2011 Report HC686 21/07/2011 Chairman Foreign Secretary US/UK Defence Trade Cooperation 65 30/07/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman Review of Arms Exports 66 05/08/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman US/UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty 66 05/09/2011 Chairman Vince Cable Anders Breivik 67 30/09/2011 Foreign Secretary Chairman CAEC’s questions on the Government’s Response Cm 8079 to the Committees’ 2011 Report HC686, and 67 questions on the Review of Arms Exports 143 01/10/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman Review of Arms Exports 19/10/2011 Chairman Foreign Secretary The Government’s Annual Report on Arms Exports 143 2010 HC 1042 24/10/2011 Chairman Foreign Secretary 2010 Q3 & Q4 questions and answers 148 08/11/2011 Vince Cable Chairman Anders Breivik 149 21/11/2011 Chairman Vince Cable Priority Markets list 149 21/11/2011 Chairman Foreign Secretary Review of Arms Exports and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human 149 Rights Guidance 08/12/2011 Vince Cable Chairman Priority Marketslist 149 09/12/2011 Foreign Secretary Review of Arms Exports and Overseas Security and 150 Justice Assistance Human Chairman Rights Guidance 15/12/2011 Foreign Secretary Chairman Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human 150 Rights Guidance 16/12/2011 Chairman Foreign Secretary 2010 Q3 & Q4 questions and answers 151

Date From To Subject Evidence reference 16/12/2011 Chairman Foreign Secretary The Government’s Annual Report on arms exports 151 2010 HC 1042 16/12/2011 Chairman Vince Cable Guy Savage 151 07/01/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman The Government’s Annual Report on arms exports Annex 11 2010 HC 1042 10/01/2012 Chairman Vince Cable "Brass plate" companies, Pre-licensed registration of arms brokers, Extra- 152 territoriality 16/01/2012 Chairman Foreign Secretary Internal repression 152 17/01/2012 Chairman Foreign Secretary Thor Liberty 154 19/01/2012 Vince Cable Chairman Guy Savage 154 25/01/2012 Chairman Foreign Secretary 154 02/02/2012 Vince Cable Chairman "Brass plate" companies, Pre-licensed registration of arms brokers, Extra- 155 territoriality 02/02/2012 Vince Cable Chairman Thor Liberty 156 06/02/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman Internal repression Thor Liberty 156 China 06/02/2012 Vince Cable Chairman Priority Markets list 163 06/02/2012 Alistair Burt Chairman Embargo on Somalia 164 08/02/2012 Alistair Burt Chairman Export of Tasers 164 13/02/2012 Vince Cable Chairman Trade Exhibitions 165 20/02/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human 165 Rights Guidance 20/02/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman Trident 166 20/02/2012 Alistair Burt Chairman Westminster Hall Human Rights debate follow-up - 166 Human rights, Consolidated Criteria, 21/02/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman 2010 Q3 & Q4 questions and answers 167 28/02/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman Bahrain and 178 08/03/2012 Vince Cable Chairman Lord Alton's Re-Export 56 Controls Bill 21/03/2012 Alistair Burt Chairman National Counter Annex 12 Proliferation Strategy 2012– 2015 26/03/2012 Vince Cable Chairman Trade Exhibitions 180 181 16/04/2012 Chairman Foreign Secretary Bahrain and Yemen 26/04/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman Argentina arms exports 181 26/04/2012 Alistair Burt Chairman arms exports 181

Date From To Subject Evidence reference 183 01/05/2012 Foreign Secretary Chairman Bahrain and Yemen

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2010–12 First Joint Report Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic HC 686 (Cm 8079) Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation

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Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 1

Oral evidence

Taken before the Committees on Arms Export Controls on Monday 23 January 2012

Members present: Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Malcolm Bruce Ann McKechin Richard Burden Penny Mordaunt Katy Clark Bob Stewart Ann Clwyd Mr Dave Watts Mike Gapes Chris White John Glen ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Roy Ibister, Team leader, Small Arms and Transfer Controls, Saferworld, Oliver Sprague, Programme Director, Military Security and Police, Amnesty International UK, and Martin Butcher, Policy Adviser, Arms Campaign, Oxfam GB, gave evidence.

Chair: Mr Ibister, Mr Sprague and Mr Butcher, scope of transfers to be regulated of prior welcome to you. You will be glad to see that we have authorisation of transit or trans-shipment across a a good turnout from the Committees for you. Just country’s territory. It would be hard for a nation to before we start, one new document has come into the meet its obligations under the ATT if it did not know public domain in the last few days; it would not be what weapons or other equipment were being shipped reasonable for us to put questions to you on it, but we across its territory by another country. The recent are certainly interested in having your views about it. events in have highlighted this question of It is the Government’s publication Overseas Security transit, and we will come back to that later. and Justice Assistance: Human Rights Guidance, and But, as I say, overall we view the paper as a good we would be grateful for any views you would like to basis for negotiation this coming summer. It is the put to us by way of written evidence as to how result of two years’ hard work, and we feel that it satisfied—or possibly not so satisfied—you are with should be the paper that the negotiators work from in the Government’s position on human rights guidance. the summer. There are some moves to block this— However, we are going to start with some questions there are one or two states that just do not want the on the arms trade treaty. Mike Gapes is going to lead paper to be used at all and others that would like it to off for us. be used as an aide-mémoire—and we would hope that the Government will resist those pressures and stand Q1 Mike Gapes: Thank you, Chairman. up very firmly for the paper as the basis for You all understand very well the arms trade treaty and negotiations in the summer. what has been going on; it has been on the agenda for seven, eight or 10 years, and we are coming to the Q2 Mike Gapes: Does either of you want to add conclusion of the process. I understand that a anything? preparatory meeting is coming up next month, and Oliver Sprague: I would just second what my there was one recently. At the last one, the Chair colleague, Martin, said. For Amnesty, it is essential produced a draft paper, and I would be interested in that the potentially lethal end of law enforcement your assessment of that paper—what is in it and what equipment—tear gas, crowd control is not in it, and whether it meets all the essential etc.—is within the scope of the treaty, as we human rights and humanitarian issues or is inadequate have seen in the conflicts in Bahrain, Egypt and . in any way. These things are used and they contribute to death and Martin Butcher: The Chair’s paper that was produced serious human rights violations. It seems odd that you at the end of the last PrepCom, in July last year, is could classify something by the nature of what it is. broadly a good document. There are some gaps in it, For example, the fact that it is a munition may well and one glaring gap would be the absence from scope be covered, but the fact that it is a tear gas munition of police and internal security equipment. We feel that means that it might not be, so that creates an the need for the regulation of that, and its inclusion in inadvertent loophole. The same applies to police and the ATT, has been shown very clearly in the Arab internal security vehicles. You could create a loophole spring. We also have some concerns that there is no in the scope by painting something blue, which in mention in the criteria for export controls of gender- effect says, “This is not a military vehicle; it is a based violence or armed violence outside conflict. police vehicle.” Those are the things on scope that we There are also one or two other problems. For want to see tightened up. example, brokering is mentioned only in the sense that At the moment, the requirements on transparency in you need to register brokers, not that the deals they the Chair’s paper have no explicit reference to make do need to be licensed. There is no mention in the public the reporting of Government arms transfers. If cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

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23 January 2012 Roy Ibister, Oliver Sprague and Martin Butcher that is the case, we as a civil society, you as is somewhat rudderless, shall we say. Certainly parliamentarians and other Governments will find it if the UK, as a member of the P5—that grouping is very difficult to scrutinise a Government’s increasingly emphasised in negotiations as an implementation of their treaty obligations. A important bloc—had been taking a very active lead in commitment for public transporting on arms transfers pushing the humanitarian goals that were set for the is pretty important. ATT back in 2006, it is entirely conceivable that progress would have been better, yes. Q3 Mike Gapes: You said, Mr Butcher, that it is not Mike Gapes: We were told by— entirely what you would like, but you have also said Chair: Mike, this must be the last question. that a number of countries are resistant to even this. Is it going to be extremely difficult to strengthen this Q5 Mike Gapes: It will be the last one. text from what is in the Chair’s draft into something We were told by Alistair Burt that there would be an that we would find more acceptable? “equally high-powered successor” to Ambassador Martin Butcher: It depends a little bit on what John Duncan, but that has not happened. We are now happens at the next PrepCom. The next PrepCom has told that we are taking our eye off the ball a little. Is three days set aside for procedural issues and two days the gap being filled by any other country? Are the set aside for substantive issues. If the procedural part Americans taking the lead now, or is there a problem, does not enlarge to swallow the whole week, which it as you have hinted, that nobody is pushing the full, may do, we will have a couple of days’ debate. Up to tough agenda that we need? now, the Chair has taken the view that anything that Martin Butcher: America is certainly taking a lead in is raised by a solid number of countries gets added to the negotiations now, but it is not necessarily the lead the text and nothing gets taken away. We still have that we would like to see. The Americans have one last chance to throw some extra material in there. actively described wanting a treaty that is short and Roy Ibister: I think you are right; it is going to be stripped down to the bare essentials, and that does very hard. To me, that makes it even more important not necessarily meet a lot of the goals that have been that states such as the UK are stepping up to the plate elaborated over the past years. now and speaking out for a very strong document. If Oliver Sprague: For example, the American version they do not, there are some serious risks that things of the treaty probably will not have, if you understand will not just not strengthen, but weaken significantly. their statements made on the floor of the UN, small arms ammunition in it. A treaty without Q4 Mike Gapes: May I take that point further? We ammunition—the thing that kills most people—in it have had discussions since the election and the change seems extremely challenging and problematic. Will it of Administration, and also with the pending actually save lives if it does not have ammunition in retirement of Ambassador John Duncan. We have it? They want the treaty to have fluffy, vague rules highlighted this in previous sessions. I take it from the around the criteria. document that you have sent us that you are concerned For example, in the current UK and EU system, and about what you describe as a roll back of the UK in the current Chair’s draft, we have “Thou shalt not position. How serious has that been, and is it one of authorise transfers where there is a risk that they will the reasons why the Chair’s draft is not stronger? contribute to serious violations of human rights, Martin Butcher: On the roll back, from the public undermine sustainable development, etc.” The US and pronouncements of the Government, you would not other Governments are very clear that they want to necessarily know that there has been a roll back. The remove “Thou shalt not authorise” and change it to public statements that are made are good statements, “We shall take these things into consideration”. What but behind the scenes there has definitely been a that means is that you are free to ignore them when decrease in activity. In the past two months, we have you want to, so what you end up with is that arming been extremely concerned that Jill Morris, who was serious human rights violators, war criminals etc. head of counter-proliferation at the Foreign Office and becomes optional, and that is something that we the lead on ATT, has left that post for a temporary cannot support. secondment to a more senior post in the Foreign Chair: Thank you. We have a lot of ground to cover Office. We were told at the time she left that she in the time that we have for points that we want to would be coming back in time to prepare for the next put to you and on which you will want to respond to PrepCom, but in the past couple of days, we have us, so if you could make your answers reasonably been told that no decision has been made at the crisp, I would be grateful. We are going to move on Foreign Office as to whether she will come back. The to the Arab spring and Malcolm Bruce has some effect of that has been that there has been no senior questions about that. civil servant at the FCO for the last two months co- ordinating work on the ATT. Q6 Malcolm Bruce: We obviously discussed this You can put that together with other meetings and before at the last session, and you were expressing discussions we have had with people in government. your criticism of the fact that we had supplied arms We know, for example, there is very little ministerial to a number of countries. In your submission this time, focus at BIS on the ATT. At the MOD, there is very you have repeated that, specifically mentioning little civil servant focus. Ministers have had actively Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. You say “While to seek out briefings on the ATT to get any opinion many export licences to these destinations were out of their civil servants about what is happening. revoked when the uprisings began the UKWG We have been concerned that, at this vital time, the believes that the licences should have been refused in cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 3

23 January 2012 Roy Ibister, Oliver Sprague and Martin Butcher the first place”. That is kind of history, but what about of equipment to , and you quote Saudi now? Are there places with which we are currently Arabia’s involvement in neighbouring— trading, considering trading or promoting trading that Roy Ibister: As a general rule, I would say that I am you would specifically highlight as either convinced that there are cases where the sales have inappropriate, or at least a cause for concern? been ill-advised, but I do not have the information to Roy Ibister: It is a little tricky to know what is locate to the individual transfer, so I can only look at happening now with licensing policy in Arab spring the pattern, and the pattern is very disturbing. countries because the data are falling behind a bit. We Oliver Sprague: We have raised, for example—I think have anxieties that there is a willingness to go back to in two Committee evidence sessions now—the role business as usual in the area, even though the Arab that the Saudi air force played in bombing northern spring is far from over. Obviously, we have made the Yemen, and we have been assured by the Government point in the past that licences to Saudi Arabia, for that, in their view, those attacks were proportionate example, seem to carry on regardless of the situation and lawful, although at the same time they were in the country, and that is what we have seen over the telling us that they found it incredibly difficult to get last year, despite Saudi involvement in Yemen a on the ground to find out exactly what went on. At couple of years ago and despite the Saudi support for the same time, we subsequently learned that the State the Bahrain regime. As we understand it, there is a Department gave a serious dressing down to the Saudi small amount of protest going on in Saudi Arabia, but Arabian authorities on precisely this point, protest is illegal in Saudi Arabia, so it seems very hard questioning them with satellite imagery and for any kind of protest movement to gain a foothold. demanding answers about why they had So, certainly there, I think, there is a problem, and it indiscriminately bombed certain areas in violation of is going to be very interesting over the next three to . So you have to ask why was it that six months to see what seems to be happening with the UK licensing authorities had a different view from the export licensing practice in the region, because the US about the conduct of those hostilities. It is there was certainly a dip to some of these countries, striking to us that there have been no revocations at but we need to see if that is sustained. all of any export licences, including for fighter jets, when there does appear to be a case for looking at evidence of misuse as to Saudi, and when there have Q7 Malcolm Bruce: The Minister, as you remember, been a number of other revocations for other countries made a very bullish speech before the Arab spring in the region such as Bahrain, Libya, Egypt, Tunisia erupted on us, and then rather qualified it afterwards. etc. First of all, you indicated that you think that they might be going back to business as usual, even though Q9 Mr Watts: Can we just say a few words about it is not entirely clear where the regimes are heading, effectiveness? You are saying that in recent times but you specifically mention Saudi Arabia, and I think there has been a dip of sales to some of these in your submission you express the view that wider countries. Is there any evidence that that dip is considerations appear to be focused on Saudi Arabia. affecting just us or our colleagues, or are countries I am really trying to press you: do you actually believe finding a way round the system? Are they able to that we should not be exporting small arms to Saudi supply themselves regardless of what sanctions are put Arabia? Is that your view as a group? in place by the UK and its allies? Roy Ibister: I am a supporter of the notion of case-by- Roy Ibister: I will have a stab at answering the first case licensing, so I would be loth to make a sweeping half of that question at least. The UK is better than statement to say that there should never be small arms most in the timeliness of its reporting, but in most exported to Saudi Arabia. However, looking at the cases, at this early stage of 2012, we do not have any pattern of exports to Saudi Arabia—the scale and information in terms of official statistics from other range of equipment that is sent, including small arms countries about what they exported or licensed for and light weapons, and the fact that there is virtually export in 2011. Those statistics will start to come never a licence refusal—if you match it against the through later in the year, so it is early days on that. profile of Saudi as a country, I just find it very hard to believe that there should not be a little more Q10 Mr Watts: In the past, when sanctions have restraint shown when it comes to Saudi Arabia, been applied, have they been effective? I am trying to although I am not saying there should be an embargo get to the bottom of whether anything that has not got on Saudi Arabia. everyone’s support is likely to be effective. Oliver Sprague: Obviously, this is the general Q8 Malcolm Bruce: I take the point, but I am principle that underlies the moves for an arms trade actually pressing you on the case. You say you believe treaty. The argument that if you do not sell the arms in a case-by-case statement. Do you believe, from someone else will is given to us time and time again, your point of view, that there is a case to be made? and in one context it is sort of true, so you need to Again, I quote the working group report: “This leads look at these things from an international point of UKWG to conclude that in the case of Saudi Arabia, view. But it is also important from a national point of other strategic, economic or political interests are view that the UK has obligations not to sell weapons deemed more important than transfer criteria relating where there is a clear risk that they will be used for to human rights, armed conflict and international serious violations of human rights law. That is a humanitarian law.” I read that as an implication that matter of law, and a matter of the right thing to do, so you really don’t believe we should be selling this kind whether or not other countries choose to ignore these cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

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23 January 2012 Roy Ibister, Oliver Sprague and Martin Butcher things, that does not mean in any way that the UK is managed properly, and what is their capacity to apply not obligated to follow through on that policy. the rules. If you ask that question in the context of somewhere like Libya, you come up virtually every Q11 Richard Burden: I would like to follow that, if time with the answer no—no, these should not be sold possible, to get any views you have about the kind of weapons because they do not have the capacity to use risk assessment the UK does or does not do. You made them properly. the point in relation to Saudi Arabia that there was an instance of bombing. Somehow, a risk assessment has Q12 Chair: You have come on to what is going to be been done saying that, since then, there has been no our next topic: the Government’s arms export policy substantial risk that would provoke any revocation. review in the context of the Arab spring, and in We have come across other cases where we have relation to the countries in North Africa and the asked questions about the way particular arms exports Middle East. from the UK, or which originate in the UK, have been There are two questions I want particularly to put to used in other countries in ways that would be against you. First, there is a distinct lack of clarity to the the UK’s consolidated criteria, and the Government Committees as to how extensive this review was have said, “Oh yes, we agree with that, but, in the within Government—the Secretary of State is coming future, we will look at things on a case-by-case basis.” before us shortly, so we will be able to put questions It seems that we spend our entire time shutting the to him on that—but there was even more obscurity to stable doors after the horses have bolted. Do you get us as to how far bodies outside the Government were any sense of how the risk assessments are done? involved. Can you tell us briefly what your NGOs’ Roy Ibister: Something that was revealed, or implied, degree of involvement was in the review? by some of the statements that have come out from Roy Ibister: Minimal. We had one meeting when we the Government since the Arab spring is that the were given some information about what the Foreign evidence of past misuse plays too large a part in the Office had been thinking during the first stage of the Government’s assessment process. Clearly, it is not an review. It was just as it was about to put its views to easy job, but the idea of looking at the risk of future Ministers, and that was it. use seems to be not significant enough. If you look at the export review that has been carried out and at the Q13 Chair: Was the meeting at the Government’s Foreign Secretary’s statements that have come out of initiative or at your own? the reporting on the review, they seem very much Martin Butcher: We had been requesting consultation focused on what we do next time to shut the stable meetings for some time—requests that were not met. door as quickly as possible once the horses start I cannot remember whether the FCO then asked us to bolting. Again, the idea of how you anticipate does come in for a briefing. not seem to be at the centre of concern. Certainly, where risk is not imminent, or is a little more difficult Q14 Chair: So the totality of your involvement was to calculate, it feels as if the Government struggle one meeting, which you were probably responsible for with that. I think more work needs to be done on that. pressing for. Oliver Sprague: If you look at their response to the Roy Ibister: I think it was probably that we were Arab spring and the review of export licences—as asking if there was going to be a consultation process regards the actual details of what they are going to as there was previously with the review of the Export do; I take the security and justice assistance paper on Control Act a couple of years back, which we think board—there are substantial areas that they have was a very good model of us, the industry and the identified and agreed need looking at. One is risk Government working together. It is hard to remember assessment and whether we need a new, enhanced risk exactly, but I have a feeling that it might have been assessment. The second is around end-use monitoring that, instead of consultation, the Government offered and whether we need to improve that. There is a to have us in to give us a bit of a run through what commitment to increase transparency further. All they had been coming up with. these things—the involvement of greater ministerial Oliver Sprague: We also had a letter, or more than oversight in the process, including on open licences— one letter, that said that there would be a round are important. All these things suggest to me that there table—with us and the industry, I assumed—about the is an acceptance that, in certain places, they have got thinking and the outcome of the review, but that didn’t that risk assessment wrong. I would echo what Roy happen either. says: far too often, we get answers that say there is no evidence of the use of British equipment. That is not Q15 Chair: Thank you. the question that should be asked. The question in the I come to my second question. The facts clearly criteria is about evidence of equipment of this kind or demonstrate that this is the area, certainly numerically, any kind, so the fact that tear gas has been used in of the biggest single misjudgment as to the degree of these countries means that tear gas should be on the risk in selling particular weapons, ammunition, etc. to list of very problematic equipment to be selling. That particular countries when there was a risk that they is only one factor. The evidence of previous misuse is could be used for internal repression. This is, only one of many factors, and I would argue that you numerically, the biggest single misjudgment that has need to look at the capacity of the end user to apply been made since the creation of the modern export the norms and the rules—for example, the UN rules licensing system, given the fact that this has resulted on policing, the various human rights instruments on in the revocation of 160 arms export licences that are accountability, how those units and armed forces are extant. That is unprecedented in the modern export cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

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23 January 2012 Roy Ibister, Oliver Sprague and Martin Butcher licensing system. Those are the figures and the details on that particular case. Could you please discontinue that we have put together as the Committees for with that? licences granted from 1 January 2009. The question I Oliver Sprague: Okay. May I say, without going into wish to put to you is: given that background, how specific details, that you may want to check the confident or not are you from the Foreign Secretary’s wording of the brokering and trafficking legislation, response as to the outcome of the Government’s and what it covers and does not cover, because that export policy review that misjudgments on that scale is the centre of the appeal? If it does fall, there are will never happen again? implications for the wording of the legislation that we Roy Ibister: I would say that I do not have confidence have all helped to generate. I will leave it there. that they will not happen again. I would imagine that things will be a bit tighter. After something goes Q19 Ann Clwyd: I am sorry to have put you in that wrong, things get a bit tighter. What tends to happen position. There are a very large number of licensed is that as time goes on, if nothing terribly bad happens, revocations this time, which suggests that the whole the relaxation sets in. Unless the system changes, licensing system is fundamentally flawed, which you there is always the risk that something will go wrong have already touched on. Do you agree that there is a again in the future. I have no particular reason to say fundamental flaw and what is it? If there is one, how when or where that should be, but that is certainly a can it be rectified? risk unless you change the way you operate. Oliver Sprague: The answer to the revocations is a Martin Butcher: I would agree with that. yes and no. I know that that is an unhelpful argument. Chair: We will move on now to the issue of the The fact that the Government are able to revoke a licences that have been revoked. Ann Clwyd will lead licence when things that were unforeseen go wrong is on this one. a helpful thing in an export control system. The fact that they have had to revoke so many indicates a Q16 Ann Clwyd: It is many years since I was last problem with the initial licensing. For the reasons that on this Committee, but it seems to me that I am we have outlined in a previous argument, the way they hearing exactly the same things that I heard 10 years have applied risk and the way, maybe, other political, ago when we had the same arguments and excuses. It strategic and economic factors have come into the appears that the very existence of the Committee is an licensing decision process have meant that, in some enormous con. It is conning Parliament and the public because the Government will do exactly what they instances, they have got those judgments wrong. want. If they want to sell to repressive regimes, there Roy Ibister: I suppose there does seem to be a flaw— is very little that we can do to stop them. You talked whether it is fundamental, I do not know. But maybe about breaking the law. If you think that the I could start with another positive statement. The fact Government are breaking the law, what action can be that this brokering case was actually in the courts was taken against them? You are NGOs. What action will because there are now laws on brokering in the UK NGOs be able to take against the Government? that did not used to exist, and there have been other Oliver Sprague: There is always recourse to things prosecutions. That is an example of where there has such as judicial review. They are not always been positive change to the UK system, and we successful, but they have been successful in a number welcome that. But in terms of the flaw, it has to be of export control matters going back through the recognised that the system is going to require years. I remember many years ago the Pergau Dam judgment, and there will be occasions when bad issue. Very recently, the Government lost the case on judgments are made. Two different people with the whether there should be an order to control death same facts in front of them, operating in good faith, penalty drugs to the , so there are these can come to different conclusions—that is certainly remedies that can be pursued. This is where I could something that can happen. interject with something, if I may. Something rather I suppose it is the scale of this that suggests that important happened last week of which the something bigger has gone wrong here. The way that Committees need to be aware. A very important the system seems to work is that a licence will be brokering and trafficking case collapsed in the courts granted unless there is a reason it should not be and it is now going to the Court of Appeal to test the granted—if you cannot give me a good enough reason judgment. It appears to have been thrown out— why I cannot award this licence, it is going through. There are a number of countries out there—they have Q17 Chair: Mr Sprague, can you name the parties to not reached the point at which it would be appropriate help the Committees? to subject them to embargo—that are particularly Oliver Sprague: Yes, it was Gary Hyde over a sensitive. It would be helpful if the thinking behind trafficking and brokering case to supply 40,000 AK47 licensing flipped so that licences would be refused rifles from China to . My understanding of that unless you could give a reason why they should be particular case is that it is now subject to review granted—things like the fact that they meet a clear because the judge has ordered that the defence was and legitimate defence need. I am also thinking of made— some of Ollie’s lines about having confidence in the capacity of the recipient to follow their obligations Q18 Chair: I am sorry, but I have just been advised under international law. If there could be that kind that you may be starting to encroach on the sub judice of change, it would be interesting to see where that rule, so I do not think that we will go into any details took us. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

Ev 6 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

23 January 2012 Roy Ibister, Oliver Sprague and Martin Butcher

Q20 Ann Clwyd: Should we therefore be revoking serious human rights violations. Where they are licences to Saudi Arabia, given its human rights abuse different is that under the consolidated criteria, the record? Should we be willing to sell them more arms? Government only have to take into account things Roy Ibister: I would personally probably put Saudi such as international humanitarian law. Under the Arabia in the category where there are a number of common position, they have to deny an export licence problems that make it a problematic destination, to the where there is a clear risk that the items will be used point where licences should be considered on the basis against international law, so there is a “take into that I was suggesting and you start off from the point account” versus a “thou shalt not”. There is also an of view that we are not going to issue the licence exemption in criterion 2, or a difference in the UK unless they can justify why an exception should be consolidated criteria, that says it is okay for weapons made. to go for internal security uses to preserve law and Oliver Sprague: It is important to add that in the order against, for example, acts of terrorism and so review there is hope of putting in a new process that on. Obviously, it is qualified and justified, but that is a halfway house; they want to introduce a new permissive language is not reflected in the common suspension clause into the licensing so that as soon as position. trouble happens, you can suspend a licence, rather I guess the last one that may be relevant to the case on than formally revoking it. I guess our concern with Saudi is that the phrase that is used in the consolidated that is that it may not apply to the shipping, transport criteria is that “full weight” should be given to the etc., and that it only refers to the licence processing. UK’s national interests. Full weight seems to imply If you are going to suspend something, make sure you something that is important in its significance. In the are suspending everything so you do not have common position, it is a much lower, “states shall shipments on the dockside waiting to go. You should consider this”. It does not use the language, “full also suspend those. weight”. In those three or four areas, there is a The other thing I would say is that this is why difference and there should not be. It says in the improvements in reporting become even more Export Control Act 2002 that the Government should important. For all these things, there are basic answers issue guidance, so it should be fairly straightforward we and the Committee want to know, such as who is to replace the EU rules that we have all agreed to with the end user, what is the exact nature of the equipment the consolidated criteria that were introduced in 1997. and how will it be used? We still do not have that in our reports. There were reports in the press last week Q23 Penny Mordaunt: Anything further to add? of more arms and military export licences going to Roy Ibister: There are a couple of areas. Corruption Bahrain and Egypt, but without the context to explain is probably under- described in the criteria and it what exactly this equipment is, it is almost impossible would be useful if that could be elaborated on. I would for us to analyse these things, other than in a critical also like to see some kind of reference to governance. way. Exactly how that would work I am not entirely sure, but I think that a lot of work has been done on Q21 Ann Clwyd: Finally, some of us remember the governance since the criteria were agreed. The arms to inquiry—the Scott inquiry. Have we language in the criteria is almost 20 years old. It stems learned anything since then? Could there be another from about ’92. There has been a lot of development inquiry similar to the Scott inquiry—on the Arab on managing fragile and conflict-affected states, so spring, for example? bringing in some kind of governance aspect into the Martin Butcher: To take one case, say Libya where criteria could be useful. So those are a couple of the political considerations seem to be at least in some other ideas. way similar. In the 1980s, Iraq was considered to be Chair: We are now going on to the recent trade an important ally, a bulwark for security in the region. exhibition. Post the thaw in relations with Gaddafi, it was considered necessary to bring Libya into the Q24 Ann McKechin: Just a specific question for international community. It does seem that similar you, Oliver. I know that Amnesty and a number of kinds of wishful thinking went on in terms of the NGOs have been critical of these trade fairs and of nature of the regime and the way it would act and the fact that you appear to be the ones who are those pigeons came home to roost. At this point, there policing the stalls and finding the literature that the is nothing to say that that will not happen again authorities cannot seem to find themselves. What do somewhere else. you think DSEi and the Government should be doing Chair: We will move on now to the issue of the to improve the scrutiny of these types of trade fairs? consolidated criteria. Penny Mordaunt will lead for us. Oliver Sprague: I was doing a bit of checking on this particular issue. Since new laws were introduced— Q22 Penny Mordaunt: What changes, if any, would let’s be fair and say in 2004, when some of the torture you want to see to the consolidated criteria? equipment, the brokering and trafficking stuff came Oliver Sprague: Most importantly, the current EU in—there have been companies advertising stuff in common position is supposed to be reflected in UK apparent contravention of those laws at every fair law and it is not because the UK still uses the common since. I could provide you with a list of all the criteria. The common criteria are different from the companies. All those have been found either by civil EU code in a number of important respects. Both say society groups like ourselves, investigative journalists, that you should not issue an export licence where or, in the case of the cluster munitions this year, a there is a clear risk that the items will be used for Member of Parliament. The Committees in the past cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 7

23 January 2012 Roy Ibister, Oliver Sprague and Martin Butcher have made a number of recommendations about the Q28 Chair: Just on that, you will acknowledge that, need for the authorities, because they are there in great mercifully in this free, democratic country, it is not numbers at the fair, to take policing and enforcement the politicians who decide on prosecutions. It is the more seriously. It is still a problem. It has been a Crown Prosecution Service. problem since 2004 and it is still a problem now. Oliver Sprague: Certainly, if I was the organiser of a trade fair and two times in a row a large manufacturer Q25 Ann McKechin: Is it improving to any extent? brought material on cluster munitions, I would want Oliver Sprague: I would say that it is worse. I would that company to not be allowed to show its products say that what happened this year—it was me that at the subsequent one. raised the issue of the Ordnance Factories Chair: That happily brings us to our next subject, having cluster munitions in its general product which is cluster munitions. literature in 2009. This year it came back with a specific brochure with it on. It not only repeated the Q29 John Glen: Given the Europe Minister’s offence, but repeated it worse. reiteration of the Government’s desire to see a global ban on cluster munitions on 9 November in the House Roy Ibister: You have to say, whose is the first stall of Commons and the defeat of the attempt to weaken that you are going to go to, if you are checking this the controls in place at the conference in , can stuff and if you are responsible for this kind of thing? you say how you feel about the Government’s position Oliver Sprague: And the company that was doing the as taken in Geneva and whether you agree with it? torture equipment was displaying brochures from Martin Butcher: We were very pleased in the end another company, to be fair, but that brochure was all with the position that the Government took at the over the top of its stall. It had a double-page spread CCW on the proposed protocol 6, covering cluster of leg irons, gang chains and belly chains. They may munitions. We felt that the adoption of protocol 6 have been called something slightly different, but it would have weakened the international law in this was pretty obvious what they were. Anyone who is area, so we were very pleased that the Government aware of the UK’s prohibition, back from 1997, on stood up strongly for the cluster munitions ban and these kinds of goods, should have thought, “Double- for that principle that these weapons should not be page spread? I don’t think that that should be on the used. Also, at the Commonwealth Heads of stall.” It was groups such as Amnesty that found that; Government meeting there was a promotion of the it was not the people policing the fair. cluster munitions convention by the Government to other members of the Commonwealth, so we were Q26 Ann McKechin: Are you aware of any incident very pleased with that. where the authorities have found literature and have There is a cautionary tale, which preceded that good then prohibited exhibitors? news, which I might apply also to the arms trade Oliver Sprague: I am not aware of that, but it does treaty for the coming months. Ministers came very not mean that they have never done it. late to take a position on protocol 6. Until the point Ann McKechin: You are not aware of that. Thank when Ministers made a political decision that they you very much. were not going to support it, the assumption had been by civil servants that the Government would support it, because the Americans were asking for that Q27 Chair: When you said that you thought that the support. position had got worse, do you attribute that in any way to Government policy or do you attribute it Q30 John Glen: Given that they did not, what simply to administrative incompetence? material difference does that make? Oliver Sprague: I certainly do not think that it is Martin Butcher: We have no evidence at the moment Government policy to allow companies to exhibit that it makes a material difference, for example in the torture equipment or cluster . It is very clear ATT negotiations or that it made a difference for the from Government policy and cross-party support that CCW. However, we would say that it does show that these things are banned, illegal and should not be it might be better for Ministers to take a very active there. There is clearly a problem with the role in giving political guidance across Departments— enforcement, policing and subsequent action that they for example, on the ATT—early. are taking against transgressors, because they are doing it again, and it is not getting better. Q31 John Glen: Even though they secured the Roy Ibister: May I add very briefly that where the outcome that you recognise as being the right one and policy seems to kick in is what happens after that they stood up against the Americans in the end, something is found? I can believe that it is just an you felt that their tactics prior to taking a position administrative bungle if it is happening in the first were not robust enough? place, but we have cases here where the law has been Martin Butcher: It was not that the Government’s broken and there is documentary evidence that the law tactics were not robust enough; it is just that civil has been broken. As far as we are aware, there has servants, without guidance, were going along doing never been a prosecution on the basis of this. Maybe what they thought the Government wanted, when if the Government policy got a little more active on actually the Government wanted something prosecution for the next DSEi, it would make completely different. In the case of the ATT, it would exhibitors a little more cautious about what they are be great if, as we discussed earlier, more robust willing to display. political guidance were given early and often, rather cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

Ev 8 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

23 January 2012 Roy Ibister, Oliver Sprague and Martin Butcher than leaving it all to the last minute. In this case, it amended the regulation to include death penalty worked. It would not necessarily in the future in drugs, so we should all be very thankful and other forums. supportive of that work. It has also banned sting sticks and hand-applied electric shock devices, such as Q32 John Glen: Oliver and Roy, is there anything electric shock belts and spiked batons, and put them else you want to say? in the regulation. Roy Ibister: What happened with the clusters puts the The interesting thing is that the Government make UK in an interesting position in terms of the ATT. great play of the fact that that followed national action There was a bit of bad blood going on among the by the UK, which already puts sting sticks and hand- delegates when this was happening and, in a way, the applied electro-shock weaponry in its national UK has ended up sort of in the middle of that. I just regulations. As I understand it, there has been no wonder whether, if that bad blood carries over into the formal movement on the end-use provision. next negotiation, which will be for the ATT, the UK Remember that it is wider than just the death penalty; may find itself in a potentially bridge-building it is about torture, cruel and degrading treatment, and position of having almost had a foot in both camps, if the death penalty. It is a catch-all clause that says that you like. Again, I would hope that the UK might look if you are aware that your products will facilitate those at how it could take advantage of that through the prohibited acts, you need to seek a licence to do that ATT negotiations. trade. We have often argued that if traction is not forthcoming at EU level, and given that it has been a Q33 John Glen: I think I am right in saying that, in commitment of the UK Government since 2008 to do the past, you have expressed some concern about the so, they should introduce it nationally. I think the very indirect financing of the production of cluster fact that national action in the UK on sting sticks and munitions. Could you set out your views on the electro-shock devices has had an impact in influencing present Government’s position, how it is different the EU position on these things is reason to do it. from the previous Government’s and what your precise concerns are on that? Q35 Chair: I am going to finish with what is a key Oliver Sprague: As we are short of time, I will not policy question before the Committee. I want to read go into why indirect financing is a problem, other than out the very clear policy statement made by the to make the basic point that that is how the financing Foreign Officer Minister, Alistair Burt, on 18 of cluster bombs takes place. Largely, it takes place February in which he summarised the present through indirect financing—loans that you give to the Government’s policy on the licensing of arms that producers of cluster bombs and other munitions. could be used for internal repression. I also want to When the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Bill was read out what Peter Hain said when the last going through Parliament last year, the Opposition— Government announced the consolidated criteria in a now the Government—introduced a specific written answer on 26 October 2000. amendment in the Lords to put indirect finance into Alistair Burt said, and I believe that it absolutely the Bill. They withdrew that amendment, I assume correctly reflected the position of the previous because they were satisfied with the previous Government, that the “longstanding British position is Government’s assertion that it would work with clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there industry, with civil society and with the Government is a clear risk that the proposed export might provoke to develop a code of conduct or robust guidelines or prolong regional or internal conflicts,”—this is aimed at ending indirect finance, with a view to critical—“or which might be used to facilitate internal legislating if that process was not successful. repression.” In other words, the policy had two legs— From my discussions with a number of high street the clear risk threshold, and also “which might be and financiers who are caught up in this used to facilitate internal repression.” That I believed loophole, they are looking to the Government to start absolutely correctly reflected what Peter Hain had said that process. It is my understanding that the on 26 October 2000 when, before he listed the Government have decided, for whatever reason, not to criteria—as you know, it includes a very clear pursue that process. I think it would be very helpful statement about the clear risk—it is prefaced by this if they were to do so. I am at a loss to know why they wording: “An export licence will not be issued if the haven’t, because they certainly haven’t engaged with arguments for doing so are outweighed by the need to any of the banking or financial sectors working on comply with the UK’s international obligations and cluster munitions or cluster munitions issues. commitments”—this is the crucial wording—“or by concern that the goods might be used for internal Q34 Chris White: My question is to ask whether you repression or international aggression, or by the risks have received any information about the EU to regional stability, or other considerations as Commission’s examination of the regulations on described in these criteria.” torture end-use controls, noting that we were told that Both Ministers and both Governments made it clear this would take place in November at the end of last that there is the clear risk threshold, and there is the year. might-be-used-for-internal-repression threshold. My Oliver Sprague: There is actually some very good question is: do you believe, notwithstanding what news here, and some news that we are not clear about. Alistair Burt said on 18 February, that the Government There has been a change. Just last week, BIS are changing the policy and resting on clear risk only? introduced a new notice to exporters that now makes Oliver Sprague: I guess we go back to what we said death penalty drugs subject to export licensing. It has in our previous answers. We think there is a genuine cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 9

23 January 2012 Roy Ibister, Oliver Sprague and Martin Butcher problem with the word “evidence”. We think that they chunkier that can be used, that should be easier for have been interpreting too often “clear risk” to mean Governments and decision makers to use. The “might “evidence”. It does not mean evidence, it means clear be used” is potentially vague to the point where it risk. Evidence is one thing out of many that you becomes easy to cast it to one side. I don’t know that; would look to. It is the implementation and it is just my supposition. I worry that the language is a interpretation of the policy that may be at fault here. bit too vague to be useful when it comes to a decision- Roy Ibister: It is difficult; those two clauses put making process. together. I tried to write them down so I could get Martin Butcher: I would just add that in the case of them right. If those two clauses put together are Libya, we have all been at meetings where we have interpreted in the way that I would interpret them that said that there might be a risk that equipment would creates a very high threshold. There are any number be used for the wrong purposes. The phrase has of ways of interpreting those words: “goods might be constantly come back to us that there is no evidence used for internal repression”. In a way, you could say that British equipment has been misused. It is a that there is always a risk that a good could be used reliance on what has gone on in the past, as we have for internal repression. Therefore, that they might be said in evidence before. used can apply in every circumstance. Chair: Mr Ibister, Mr Sprague and Mr Butcher, thank People interpreting this are going to struggle with that. you all very much indeed. It has been most helpful; It is the clear risk side of it that gives something we are grateful to you.

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: David Hayes, Chairman of EGAD, David Hayes Export Controls, Bernadette Peers, Compliance Manager, Strategic Shipping Company Ltd, Brinley Salzmann, Secretary of EGAD, ADS Group Ltd, and Barry Fletcher, Executive Committee Member of EGAD, Fletcher International Export Consultancy, gave evidence.

Chair: Mr Hayes, Ms Peers, Mr Salzmann and Mr process. At the end of the day, we did not have any Fletcher, thank you for coming to the Committees. We input into the policy review at all. We are waiting to have a number of issues we want to raise with you. have a meeting with the Foreign and Commonwealth We want to start with the arms trade treaty. Office so that we can have a greater understanding about the implementation of the new policy because Q36 Mike Gapes: As you heard the previous we are coming across companies that are looking at questions, I am not going to repeat them. However, at potential business opportunities in the Middle East the point we are at now, assuming that the arms trade and North Africa, and they do not know whether to treaty is broadly in line with the draft that is under go for them because they do not know whether the consideration, do you think it will be beneficial to British Government will approve them. Therefore, law-abiding, responsible arms exporters, or do think there is an information vacuum, and I have heard of a there could be any adverse consequences for your case where a British company thought that there was member companies? Brinley Salzmann: Our perception of the draft treaty a blanket prohibition on exporting anything to the as it currently stands is that, while there is still a lot Middle East and North Africa and as a result was of work to be done to finalise it, we do not see thinking of walking away from a potential business anything that would necessarily inhibit the activities opportunity for the supply of some innocuous of legitimate and responsible companies. We are not equipment to . Therefore, we are trying to work quite sure how effective it is going to be against the with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to get a illicit arms dealers out there, but we want it to be as briefing so that we have a better understanding of robust as possible, effective and able to be what the implementation actually means and so that implemented. Part of that implementation process is British companies can interpret for themselves what for nations that have effective export controls in place the new policy is. to provide a helping hand to those countries that do David Hayes: It is very easy, with the benefit of 20:20 not have such effective systems so that they can bring hindsight, to look at licensing decisions that were them up to speed on how to go about it. made in the period that is covered by the review and to criticise those decisions as being in some way Q37 Chair: On the Government’s review of the arms defective without giving adequate weight to the fact export policy in the context of North Africa and the that the decisions were made on the basis of the Middle East, which is where it came from, will you give us your views as to the adequacy or otherwise of information that was available to the licensing the outcome of that review, as reported in the Foreign authority and the advisers at the time. If we are talking Secretary’s written statement? about a standard individual licence, licences typically Brinley Salzmann: When the policy review was have a two-year life and a lot can happen in two years. announced back in February, we made occasional The decision may well have been valid based on the approaches to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office criteria at the time, and to look at the decision itself to see when both industry and the NGOs were going as being defective, merely because the situation to be brought into the fold as part of the consultation changed, is perhaps not the right perception. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

Ev 10 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

23 January 2012 David Hayes, Bernadette Peers, Brinley Salzmann and Barry Fletcher

Q38 Chair: We have just heard from the NGOs that, Q42 Malcolm Bruce: What we are trying to find out following requests that they put to the Government, is whether there is an objective test you can apply that they got a meeting with officials before the review gets beyond just the political. was concluded. From what you have just been saying David Hayes: I do not think there is, which is one of to us, are we right in supposing that, in fact, you made the reasons why we have consistently opposed the no request to the Government for a meeting with them idea of privatising the actual export licensing function. before the review was concluded, and that you The export licensing function is inherently political certainly got no offer of a meeting with Government and is therefore in the province of the Government. officials before the review was concluded? Barry Fletcher: I am in quite a good position to be Brinley Salzmann: No, we did not have any meetings able to make a comment on this, as an ex-adviser on with Government officials before the review was whether export licences should be issued when I was concluded. We are now trying to catch up by trying to working for the Government. You are faced with an set a date for a meeting where we can be briefed on extremely difficult situation on a day-to-day basis, the outcome of the policy and its implementation. with hundreds of applications in front of you—some are a lot easier than others—and with the facts as you have them at the time. I know that there has been talk Q39 Chair: Do you think that you should have been about risk, but most advisers have to work on the asked by the Government for a meeting before they facts—it cannot be on hearsay or on what you have reached their conclusions? read in the press; it has to be on the information you Brinley Salzmann: In the spirit of the consultation have. You are putting forward just one opinion on regarding the Export Control Act, we thought that it whether you think the ECO should or should not issue would be common sense for both the industry and the a particular licence. I would invite every one of you NGOs to be brought into the fold and to be part of the to be put in that position just for one day to see how consultation process. We were unpleasantly surprised difficult it is. by the fact that we were not brought into the process There are bound to be mistakes, and I applaud the at all and that we had to wait for the result of the Government for having taken retrospective action review to be announced. with these licences. I think that is far better, because Barry Fletcher: I think that it would have been those decisions that a licence should be issued were sensible for them to have had words with us. taken at the time, and immediately when the situation changed, the Government did what I think they should Q40 Malcolm Bruce: Just picking up on the point be applauded for—they did something about it. It does made by Mr Hayes, is not the crux of the problem of not matter what the policy is or whatever the guidance what has happened over the last 18 months to do with is. When it comes to actual decisions, unless you want getting a balance between what might happen and to hold up every licence application for six months, what does happen and, indeed, about how you there probably is not an easy answer to making the approach a regime to which you might be selling right decision every time. arms? It is a little bit about the question that Richard David Hayes: You touched earlier on whether things Burden was asking about risk assessment. To put it are improving. The situation in relation to the Arab crudely, if you are in the business of selling arms, you spring was certainly a vast improvement on the want the biggest possible market but, on the other situation when and Pakistan were in danger of hand, you do not want things to come back to bite severe conflict many years ago. Certain export you. Given that the Government are not consulting licences were revoked then and certain ones were not. you, do you get the fact that the Government’s They were not even revoked—when licences expired, difficulty is actually being prepared to say—this is a they were not renewed—so whether or not you had a political difficulty—“We just don’t think we should licence to export your equipment to a given country deal with this regime because there are too many at that time was purely and simply a function of the uncertainties”? That creates a political context that renewal date of your licence. This time, the Government took a quite clear decision that all makes it almost impossible to get a regime that licences to those countries that were of concern would actually works in anything other than retrospect—in be reviewed and revoked where necessary; they did other words, it does not work until the situation blows not simply rely on what was effectively a random up in your face. number. David Hayes: Yes, that is a fair description. It is an Barry Fletcher: If I may also make another point, unenviable task to look at a licence decision that is there was mention by the NGOs of the number of going to have a life of two years, unless the licence is refusals. Do not ever get misled that a refusal is revoked, and to try to satisfy yourself that you have always of a licence application. There is the F680 considered all possible scenarios that could develop approval system, which gives people prior advice on over the course of the life of that licence. whether they are likely to get a licence. This is used extensively by manufacturers of military equipment. Q41 Malcolm Bruce: Does not that ultimately mean Therefore, it is not unusual, having got the advice that that an awful lot of these decisions will be political there is no way that they are going to get a licence, and based on a given Government’s political for them never to apply for one. philosophy and also their foreign policy judgments at any given time? Q43 Ann Clwyd: Mr Fletcher, you explained the David Hayes: Inevitably so, yes. difficulties of making decisions on licences. Can I ask cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

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23 January 2012 David Hayes, Bernadette Peers, Brinley Salzmann and Barry Fletcher how good your intelligence was? Where did it come and it would give the compliance unit better scope to from? target the non-compliant companies, as opposed to Barry Fletcher: Yes, you may ask. Various sources. I going after the compliant companies that are making am still subject to the Official Secrets Act, even the correct records and entering the data. So, we though I have retired from the civil service. should have bigger fences around the more sensitive Chair: This is a public meeting and you are right to equipment perhaps, and we should target enforcement reflect that. We come now to the export control system much better than we are at the moment. and the ECO. Ann McKechin is going to lead off. David Hayes: There is another issue of concern around enforcement. We are aware of companies— Q44 Ann McKechin: Your organisation has been members of our organisation—that have spent critical of the bureaucracy that your members considerable sums on export compliance and made encounter. You mentioned the very low number of voluntary disclosures to HM Revenue and Customs refusals, although I was interested to hear Mr when they themselves have discovered errors—we are Fletcher’s analysis that there is actually a pre- not talking about egregious errors here. We are seeing procedure, which is likely to take a lot of them out. situations where these companies, which are going In your submission, you call for a review of the forward with voluntary disclosures of things they control system. What outcome would you like to see themselves are picking up, are being hit with quite if such a review occurred? How would the system significant compound penalties, yet other companies operate in a way that allowed effective control of out there, which might fairly be described as some of the problems we have been talking about recidivist, just get warning letter after warning letter today while reducing the regulatory burden? after warning letter. We are not in possession of all the David Hayes: The key has to be that the Government facts. We have to assume that Revenue and Customs take a more risk-based approach to export licensing. Prosecutions Office is in possession of the facts. If we are in a situation where a high 90% of standard Looking at it from our perspective, that does seem individual licences are still being approved, within rather odd. It is also getting to the stage where it could that high 90% of the total licence population, there be viewed as a disincentive to companies to come have to be a lot more exports that could, with very forward with disclosures. little additional risk, be made under open licensing. Barry Fletcher: In most cases, you have to realise that the voluntary disclosure that are made would not Q45 Ann McKechin: Could you give us some be picked up by a compliance inspection because they indication of what type of applications those would are so deep in the paperwork and often of a technical be, or which countries would be involved? nature. They are being completely honest. David Hayes: That is very difficult. To give you an example, a licence was issued in October 2010—the Q47 Ann McKechin: Do you think that the expertise OGEL (Military Goods). There was an OGEL and capacity of the current staff who deal with available before, which was called the OGEL enforcement are better or worse than they were five (Military Goods: Government or NATO End-Use), but years ago? a lot of exports were being made, particularly among David Hayes: The capacity is certainly worse, but that multinational companies in the EU, that were going, is true of the whole of Government in view of the for example, out of the UK to a partner company in current financial situation. the EU for some processing to be carried out, before Barry Fletcher: They are doing their best in a very coming back into the UK and subsequently being built difficult situation. into a finished product, which would be exported again, subject to UK licensing. You could not use the Q48 Ann McKechin: In terms of their judgment and previous OGEL because the requirement was that the of how they react to contraventions of the rules, you end user be a Government or NATO. The decision seem to suggest that if some are placed in front of was taken that there was a group of countries where them by voluntary disclosure, it is much easier to say our acceptance of their export control systems was that that needs a target. such that we did not actually have to insist that the Barry Fletcher: You must appreciate that the length end user in that country be a Government. We need to of time that a compliance officer is with a company is look at other classes of exports that fall within those a matter of hours. To find most of these voluntary sorts of criteria. disclosures takes weeks of work, going through every single piece of paper and looking against the criteria Q46 Ann McKechin: Are there any other changes on the licence that is being used. It is not usually that that could happen to this system? there has been exporting without a licence. In most Bernadette Peers: Enforcement could certainly be cases, the wrong licence has been used or something improved. There is a better way of enforcing than just of that nature. That is so complicated. They could hide having a compliance officer—or inspector now—go those facts and they would never come to light unless to the company and audit the paper records. If any Customs went in and did a complete and utter export is going outside the EU, a customs entry has investigation of the company. They are trying to do to be made and data regarding the export licence have their best by saying, “We are doing a complete audit to go into a certain box so that customs can see at of our company and this is what we have found.” export what is going where and can collect data to Bernadette Peers: Customs enforcement has check on whether it is a legal export and what licence increased slightly at the airports. We have seen more has been applied for. That could satisfy the NGOs, shipments being stopped and examined than we were cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

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23 January 2012 David Hayes, Bernadette Peers, Brinley Salzmann and Barry Fletcher seeing five years ago, so that is certainly happening, Q50 Chair: Am I right in deducing from what you but I do not think that we are seeing more are saying that there is complete unanimity within prosecutions. We are in the business of trying to make EGAD that you do not want the Government to our companies compliant, so it would back up and introduce a charging system? Or might there possibly reinforce our message if Government also said, “We be those within your membership who are saying, on are going to take this seriously,” and have some the basis of he who pays the piper calls the tune, that prosecutions, civil penalties or warning letters. if the ECO became dependent on the industry’s funding, it might be more pliant to the industry’s Q49 Chair: Ann, I am very sorry but because Katy wishes. has just temporarily left us, we are not quorate. I will David Hayes: I would like to think that we lack just carry on if I may, and hopefully anticipate the members who would be so naive. question that you might have been putting. What is Barry Fletcher: There was derision even within the your view on the invitation or the consideration that executive committee of EGAD when it was initially the Government are giving that the industry should voiced that it might come in, but they were under a finance the Export Control Organisation? misapprehension that we were going to be given a David Hayes: We can see the situation that the Export better service, and therefore there would be more Control Organisation is in, and we recognise the people employed. When we were told no, it would be problems that it has, but the way that the charging exactly the same number of people, and then there was originally being considered, before it was recently was an argument about how they would probably have shelved, was quite simply unworkable for a number to have three or four people just looking after the of reasons. First, the sorts of figures that were being money side of things, and therefore there were going bandied about were £300 per standard individual to be fewer people handling licensing issues , they export licence and £3,000 per open individual export changed their views quite quickly. licence. Unfortunately, there is no correlation between the value of a product and its export control status, so Q51 Ann McKechin: Thank you, Chair, for filling in it is perfectly possible to need a £300 export licence so competently. If you look at the Government’s for a £10 widget. The economics of that just do not annual report, there is a clear deteriorating trend in the make sense. Companies would simply source their last few years in the percentage of SIELs processed products elsewhere. It would drive the manufacturing within the 20 working days limit, and the 60 working of that type of product out of the UK because days, and also for appeals, but there also appear to be manufacturing in the UK would quite simply not be substantially more applications. The figures show that viable. Companies in the dual-use sector—not the in 2007 the number finalised was 9,647, but in 2010 military sector—could arrange their affairs so that that increased to 16,723. Could you give me your they quite simply applied for their licences in another thoughts about the cause of the deterioration in EU member state. Provided their goods are controlled processing, what remedy you would suggest, and in annexe 1, the export licence is a community perhaps relate that to the fact that we seem to be licence, so the licence can be applied for in Italy or having, year on year, an increase in the number of the Czech Republic when the goods are actually being applications. physically exported from the UK. It was not David Hayes: A number of factors are in play. It particularly well thought out in terms of the impact or the feasibility. would be nice to think that part of the increase in licence applications is increased awareness, and that Bernadette Peers: A source of revenue, to come back to the Customs entry, is to fine the agent or the more people who should be applying for licences are exporter for making a false entry, or an incorrect entry, applying. There is the problem that we have already and then you have a source of revenue that could spoken about, which is the large percentage of licence come back to Government to help funding. It would applications that really should not be licence improve enforcement. It would improve agents’ applications at all and should be under some form of behaviour, which is not very good, on behalf of their open licensing. Companies that either can’t or won’t, exporters. It is a source of funds to Government to because of a lack of confidence in their ability to use assist them to recruit more staff. these licences, go down that road and use them. There David Hayes: We put a paper with estimated income are staffing reductions. Obviously, the ECO is a lot in to the Committee some time ago. It was on the smaller now than it once was. premise that the Export Control Organisation would For a time, a particular area where there were staffing be an agency, but regardless of whether the ECO is shortages was in the technology assessment unit, an agency or not, the argument remains valid. which of course is the first step. Apart from the initial Conceptually, the advantage of such a system is that, check of the licence application, the first step is the by definition, charging for licences only catches that technical assessment and whether the item needs a population of companies that are already compliant. licence. We are all familiar with the scenario that They are already on the Government’s radar and when you take on new staff, the first thing that already applying for licences. The rogue companies happens is you get an even further deterioration in out there that are operating below the radar would performance, because of the training demand of the make sure that they stayed there, and get even lower. new staff. I think that all those factors taken together They would avoid the cost of compliance altogether have led to the situation that you describe. and enjoy an increased competitive advantage over the Barry Fletcher: Because of the lack of staff, one of companies that were complying. the things that went on the backburner was the open cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

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23 January 2012 David Hayes, Bernadette Peers, Brinley Salzmann and Barry Fletcher individual export licences for companies, which also Obama’s statement, you could see the tone behind it. meant an increase in individual licences. We were fully supportive, because the issue of dual Chair: We come now to the UK/US defence trade co- and third-country nationals was and is a major one for operation treaty. UK companies and other foreign countries’ companies. We were fully supportive of plans to try Q52 Penny Mordaunt: It has been suggested that the to rectify this with these new proposals, but when the treaty may be weighted in the US’s favour. First, I State Department came out with its proposals in wanted to ask for your views on that. If you think that, August 2010, we were not enamoured of what it was what are the implications for UK companies? proposing. The devil was in the detail and it was not Secondly, you have informed us that Pathfinder testing going the way that we wanted. Eventually, we worked of the treaty would end early this year and that a very closely with the British Government—the decision to implement the treaty would then be made. Ministry of Defence; the Department for Business, First, are you still in favour of its implementation and, Innovation and Skills; the Foreign and secondly, do you think that full implementation of the Commonwealth Office, and a number of other treaty will still take place? Departments—to try to put in place some Brinley Salzmann: I think that the decision will be implementation plans for the dual and third-country made to implement the treaty. I believe that the MOD nationals, under the proposed ITAR changes. I think will have to make a decision about whether it wants we are generally happy with the solution that came of to implement it on 29 February. The implementation that, which the British Government managed to date will be Monday 2 April, as far as I aware. So negotiate with the US Government. much political capital has been used up on both sides That being said, we have to a careful eye on of the Atlantic that it is almost inconceivable that they all of the proposals from the US Government about will not go ahead and implement the treaty. The first different aspects of the export control reform process. part of your question was about whether the US side The next battle we will have to fight is almost would benefit more than the UK side. The public certainly on part 129 of the ITAR changes, with regard consultation process was launched late last year by the to wording for the brokering controls under ITAR, US State Department, seeking public comments on the where I think the lack of definition contained in the implementation plans for both the UK treaty and the new proposed wording under ITAR is a matter of Australian treaty, and the State Department took in all some concern for us. Again, we will be looking to those responses and published them on its website. I work with the British Government to try to see what think that you can clearly see for yourself that the US we can do to address that. industry’s viewpoint is—if you describe it as lukewarm, you are being overly positive. US industry Q54 Ann Clwyd: You have also indicated concerns is not over-enamoured with the proposals for the that DE&S and the MOD have a lack of understanding treaty. Some of the respondents to the US State of the implications of ITAR, and that there is a need Department have clearly stated, “Thank you for all to raise awareness. How do you suggest that is done? your work, but, having looked at the implementation Brinley Salzmann: We have suggested to some MOD plans, we are going to carry on with ITAR routes and officials that we, EGAD, would be happy to work with normal licences, because we do not want to have a them on trying to address the lack of awareness, by more complicated dual-licensing compliance system perhaps having workshops in Abbey Wood to try to in place.” UK industry’s viewpoint and US industry’s build up some awareness of US export control issues. viewpoint are both very critical of what has come out There seems to be a broad range and spectrum of of it. We think that the treaty itself is a fantastic perceptions about what the implications are of the re- document. The problem is the implementation export control aspects of US regulations. arrangements under the treaty, which underscore it We have heard of some very interesting statements and, to a major extent, undermine the treaty and the that have come out of some parts of Abbey Wood. potential benefits that could have come out of it. Therefore, we need to get in there to try to address Chair: Now, the US proposals on dual and third- this as much as possible. There are some people in the country nationals. Ministry of Defence, especially in Abbey Wood, who are experts in it and know the subject backwards. We Q53 Ann Clwyd: You have expressed concerns, need to work with them to try to get their colleagues apparently, about the implementation of the recent up to the same level of proficiency, knowledge and amendments to ITAR, especially their implications as expertise on what ITAR means and its implications. far as UK firms are concerned, as well as about Bernadette Peers: These are serious implications for compliance with human rights and other regulations industry, because they are in a position where the and their possible impact on UK firms. Would you MOD is telling them, “You can do this.” Of course, like to enlarge on that? industry cannot do that; they are not Government. Brinley Salzmann: The US export control reform They are going to fall foul of ITAR. The implications process was launched a few years ago and we have for their industry are quite severe if they are found to been very supportive of it in principle. For the most be in breach of ITAR. It is the lack of knowledge on part, of course, the devil is in the detail. You have to the part of the MOD officers that is dictating what see the detail of what is being proposed by the US they can and can’t do from a basis of ignorance. It is State Department for the US export control reforms. quite a serious problem. When we looked at Barack Obama’s speech in early Brinley Salzmann: We have heard of threatening 2010 and Bob Gates’ statement, building on Barack letters being sent to British companies by the MOD, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

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23 January 2012 David Hayes, Bernadette Peers, Brinley Salzmann and Barry Fletcher saying, “If you don’t do this now,”—and if they do Q57 Chris White: You have expressed this act, they will be in breach of ITAR regulations— disappointment with the slow progress of the “it will colour all of our commercial relationships with implementation of the intra-Community directive. you, and we will not award any contracts to you What do you think the Government should be doing again.” to speed up that process? Chair: Now we will come back to this side of the Brinley Salzmann: We were very concerned when, Atlantic: the UK- defence and security co- despite the fact that we had an advantage in Europe— operation treaty. with regard to us getting in place a suite of over 40 open general export licenses, which is basically the Q55 Mike Gapes: The treaty was signed between the model for the Union general export authorisations that UK and France towards the end of last year. It talks the will be introducing. We should about the sharing and pooling of materials and have been in the forefront of trying to implement the intra-Community directive as speedily as possible, but equipment, building joint facilities, ensuring market then, I believe, the Export Control Organisation access and industrial and technological co-operation. identified the fact that they hit a few potholes on route, It does not talk about apple pie. How are the so we are not actually in the forefront. We are still up discussions developing on the implementation of that with the leading group, but we are not in the forefront since it was signed in 2010? What are you doing to of introducing these new controls. make British exporters aware of the potential benefits As Bernadette said, the ICT directive is meant to be of this co-operation with France? implemented on, I think, 30 June this year. Hopefully, Brinley Salzmann: There have been a number of the UK will catch up with the other countries, and we meetings and video conference calls between the will be in the forefront of introducing it on time, but British and the French parties over the intervening certainly some proposals that came out caused us months to flesh out the implementation plans for that problems, especially with regard to technical treaty. We have had sight of only the export controls assistance. There is going to be a measure of control side of that. At the behest of the French we organised over technical assistance in the military sector, which a small gathering of experts from both sides in Paris of course, under UK national regulations, we do not on 17 October to look at the issues. We briefed them have at the moment, for the most part. on UK export controls and how they worked, and they briefed us on French export controls and how they Q58 Chair: You in EGAD have understandably worked. Then we formed up into working groups to always been very concerned that your good repute discuss various aspects of what we had discussed and should not be tarnished by British people overseas what had been aired. Out of those workshops came getting involved in arms trade transactions that would proposals for possible changes to the practices of be criminal offences if they were committed inside the both sides. UK. We, as a Committee, over a long period, have The plan is for the initial meeting to be followed up been very strong on extending extra-territoriality to with a further meeting in London some time in April. the arms export business. Indeed, under the previous As yet, we do not have a date for that meeting to Government, we led the way on this and got a series take place, to discuss pursuing potential easing of the of concessions in this respect. However, the current bureaucratic situation with regard to Anglo-French extra-territoriality provisions are by no means defence trade. comprehensive and you will be aware that in our last report, we recommended that the Government extend Q56 Mike Gapes: Is the bureaucratic situation worse extra-territoriality to all items on the military list in on the French side than it is on ours? category C. Is EGAD supportive of that particular policy position? Brinley Salzmann: Yes. We have in place the open David Hayes: No, we are not, for a variety of reasons. general export licensing system. Of course, for a lot Extra-territoriality is really a last resort, in legislative of that, most British trade with France would be terms. It is very difficult to enforce, to the extent that covered by OGELs, and also, British companies could even under ITAR, the US, with all its resources, has apply for OIELs and things like that. The problem is never brought an extra-territorial prosecution. We do that if you are working on a joint venture project with not believe that there is a point or a purpose in having the French, the same situation does not apply the other legislation there just for the sake of it, almost as way. Therefore, it is very difficult to work on a joint window dressing. If we cannot enforce it effectively, programme if information is going to the French, but it should not exist. the French have difficulty trying to get licences to There is a danger that UK nationals will become engage in technical discussions with us. unemployable in large parts of the world. Do we really Bernadette Peers: As of June next year, they will be want to license the activities of a UK employee of part of the intra-Community transfer directive and BAE Systems based in and arranging the from that point, they can have open licences for movement of military aircraft components to France? certain things within the EU. That might improve the Full extra-territoriality implies just that: there would process slightly, but they are only for repair, be full extra-territoriality over all the actions relating exhibition and so on, not necessarily for what the to everything on the military list by every British treaty would want. However, perhaps once they have national, wherever they were in the world and some, they can expand on those. whatever the circumstances. Our position is that that Chair: We come now to intra-Community transfers. would do more damage than good. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o001_th_Corrected transcript - CAEC 23 January 2012.xml

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23 January 2012 David Hayes, Bernadette Peers, Brinley Salzmann and Barry Fletcher

Q59 Chair: But as you are aware, the previous Q60 Chair: On the issue of enforcement, you will be Government—rightly, in the then Committee’s view— aware that in a previous report, the Committee brought in a major use of extra-territoriality judicial included as an annex a complete list of all the criminal provisions in respect of a range of weapons and arms. extra-territoriality provisions which exist on the Are you saying to us that EGAD would wish to see statute book. There is a very substantial body of the whole of that repealed? legislation in this area covering child abuse, Brinley Salzmann: No, because we were working trafficking, drugs, various forms of criminality and with non-governmental organisations on these terrorism. I have to say that I am somewhat puzzled proposals, and we tried to work with them to focus that you raised the difficulties about enforcement the trade controls and the extra-territorial aspect of when so much of the legislation covers some very the trade controls on the areas of greatest concern. broad areas of potential criminality and activity that Therefore, we are all supportive of that, but we think are already on the statute book. that to try to expand it across the entire military list Brinley Salzmann: In the areas which you are would be fraught with potential problems. commenting on, they are blanket prohibitions. You do Barry Fletcher: Absolutely. It is just the very nature not apply for licences. Therefore, there is a difference of the fact that it is across the whole of the military between a blanket prohibition and trying to galvanise list. You are all aware that the US, for instance, is regulatory authorities to go after people who break taking a lot of stuff off its ITAR military list and those, as opposed to people having to apply for putting it on to their dual-use list, which emphasises licences to do that. that not all countries consider the same things to be David Hayes: There is no legitimate form of child goods controlled on a military list. It would make it abuse. extremely difficult if we got into a situation in which Chair: Thank you very much. Do any of my nuts, bolts and washers were controlled on the military colleagues want to add anything? list, and some poor UK guy somewhere negotiating Mr Hayes, Ms Peers, Mr Salzmann and Mr Fletcher, for nuts, bolts and washers was caught up in the thank you very much indeed for your evidence this legislation. But to focus it like we have agreed is a afternoon. It is much appreciated. good idea. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SE] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

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Tuesday 7 February 2012

Members present: Sir John Stanley (Chair)

Richard Burden Ann McKechin Katy Clark Bob Stewart Ann Clwyd Mr Dave Watts Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson Chris White Mike Gapes Nadhim Zahawi John Glen ______

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills and President of the Board of Trade, Tom Smith, Head of the Export Control Organisation, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, and Chris Chew, Head of Policy, Export Control Organisation, gave evidence.

Q61 Chair: Secretary of State, may we welcome you Vince Cable: That was part of the reasoning behind to your first but, I hope, by no means last appearance the consolidated criteria. Like you, I was in before the Committees on Arms Export Controls? We Parliament in 2001 and 2002, when we debated this, have a significant number of issues that we want to and I led for my party on it at the time when we raise with you in the course of your hour with us, so incorporated the consolidated criteria into British we will crack straight on with our questions. First, we procedures. They set out grounds such as regional want to deal with the issue of trade delegations and conflict and human rights, as well as sustainable priority markets. I have to make the point that I did development, which we should take into account in write to you, and you did reply that the final list of the licensing process. If, indeed, the supply of arms your priority markets would be with us before you does contribute directly, or can be said to contribute, gave evidence to us, but we have not yet received it, to repression in those countries or to fuelling regional so we have to work on a provisional list. conflict, we would use the licensing system to stop Vince Cable: Yes, that is correct. that.

Q62 Chair: When will you be able to send us the Q65 Mr Watts: But does it not concern you that, final list? before the Arab spring, we were out there trying to Vince Cable: I am sorry, but I will have to ask sell arms to countries that turned out to be quite officials what stage we have got to with that. It is in volatile? Are you not increasing the risk that that will my private office, as I understand it, so it is imminent, continue to be the case if there is not a more joined- and we will get it to you as soon as possible. I am up approach and if, where there is an element of sorry you have not already had it. concern, you do not treat it as a top priority in relation Chair: Thank you. to sales and the export trade? Vince Cable: The countries concerned were not Q63 Mr Watts: Secretary of State, why is your volatile, as I recall it. One can have different views Department targeting Iraq, Libya, Pakistan and Saudi about what the Governments were like, but they were Arabia as priority markets for arms exports, when, at not volatile. In the case of Libya, the previous the same time, the FO has listed them as countries of Government had built up a close relationship with it. concern? Where is the joined-up government in that? One can question whether that was wise or not, but Vince Cable: Well, there is no absence of joined-up they did that, and it included some defence government. We work jointly with the Foreign Office arrangements as part of the process of helping Gaddafi on all of this. The vast majority of countries that we get away from weapons of mass destruction. Tunisia export arms and security equipment to are fully was a regime that was not democratic but was not democratic; there is no question over human rights. In unstable. In the report that the Foreign Secretary those countries where there is, and you listed some of prepared and which he gave to the Department in them, we apply the controls selectively. If there is any October, we did go over the processes that led to the question that they could be used for, say, human rights award of licences in those countries and their abuse, the licensing provision is there to operate, subsequent revocation. I think that the conclusion was under advice from the post and from our colleagues very clear, and certainly one that I supported, which in Government. So there is a fully joined-up approach; was that the processes were robust enough and we it is just that, in those countries, a selective approach were able to act to revoke licences—I think 158 in the is adopted. event—to prevent any flows of arms under them. Your starting premise, which is that these countries Q64 Mr Watts: Would it not be wise to reduce the were unstable, was not right. Indeed, the new process amount of arms flowing into countries that are we have introduced today and which in the written regarded by the Foreign Office as being of concern? ministerial statement—the suspension process—is Is it not just adding fuel to the fire to encourage people designed to deal with the instability problem. If there to sell more arms to those countries? is something happening that we do not fully cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 17

7 February 2012 Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Tom Smith and Chris Chew understand and is worrying, the process can be Subsequently, I received a further letter from the suspended until we have greater clarity on it. Foreign Secretary of 30 September in which he said in relation to each of these three subjects, “The Q66 Katy Clark: British-made surveillance Government (the Department of Business, Innovation technology has been used both in and . The and Skills) will update the Committees regarding European Union has now prohibited the export of developments on these issues before the Committees surveillance technology to Syria. The Foreign start taking further evidence.” By a matter of hours, Secretary has promised a ban in relation to Iran. Can you have fulfilled the Foreign Secretary’s timetable. you talk us through where we are in terms of Iran and You sent me a letter last night, which covers those that prohibition, and whether it is in place yet? three items. I must put it to you that it is unacceptable Vince Cable: I cannot talk you through the data of it. that nine months after the Committees have made We do not export arms to Iran. There is not a trade carefully considered, precise recommendations on boycott of Iran, but we do not encourage trade in these three subjects, just within a few hours of your general to Iran. As you know, with the European coming in front of the Committees, we should have Union strictures, there are quite severe controls on had your letter in response. We are not going to what we can trade with Iran. There are difficult issues question you further on these items today, because the of some dual-use cases. Quite difficult decisions are Committee needs time to consider what you said in involved in the export control business, and we have your letter. We may well wish to put some questions tried to manage them as best we can. Certainly to you before we produce our report, but I have to nothing that fuels weapons of mass destruction, register with you that the length of time that the armaments in Iran or repression would be allowed Government have taken to respond on these three through the licensing process. A similar, tough important policy issues is unacceptable to these approach in licensing applies in Syria, but I do not Committees. know whether the officials want to add to that. Vince Cable: I can only apologise on behalf of the Department and the Government that you have been kept waiting so long. I accept that that is not good. I Q67 Katy Clark: You say that no surveillance cannot remember the exact wording of the letter that technology is being exported to Iran. was sent to you, but I think in relation to “brass plate” Tom Smith: Basically, when the whole issue of companies, a lot of the activity that is being surveillance technology first arose, the priority was to undertaken involves confidential security issues. We act very fast in respect of Syria because that was have undertaken to provide the Committee with a where the EU was working on the sanctions. We confidential briefing on what is actually happening in would have now a list in place. It is not perfect. It was that area—equally, in relation to some of the broking partly because of the speed at which we did it and activities as well if that is helpful. I certainly partly because it was the usual process of getting 27 apologise on behalf of the Government for the delays countries to agree it. We have decided that we will in response. take this list forward. We will improve it. We will look Chair: We are going to move on now to the important to apply it possibly in an interim at the UK level in issue of torture end-use control. respect of Iran, but while pushing very strongly for this to be incorporated the next time the human rights Q69 Chris White: Secretary of State, we welcome element of the EU sanctions on Iran are worked on, the Government’s stance on pushing the EU to which I am expecting to be over the next few months. toughen up the rules on torture end-use control. What Vince Cable: Sorry, I did not hear the word will you be doing to ensure the EU acts on your “surveillance” in your question. I thought that it was wishes in this area? a more general question. I know that Lord Alton has Vince Cable: We have got past the point of getting come up with some very helpful suggestions on that, the principle accepted that there have to be tough end- and we are following them through. We certainly do use controls on torture equipment. The issue is now not want equipment or software, which is the issue largely a technical one of definition and enforcement, here, to go that could be used to support repression in and there have been a lot of discussions with the either country. Commission about how we draw this to a conclusion. I don’t know whether you want to update us on what Q68 Chair: I want to come to three items where the is happening. Committees are really very disappointed with the Tom Smith: Of course. What we have been focusing length of time that the Government have taken to on, really, over the past year, is getting very specific respond to our specific recommendations. These three pieces of torture equipment added to the relevant EU items are our recommendations in relation to “brass regulation, because that is where the most pressing plate” companies, our recommendation in our report priorities have been. That is particularly in relation to published in April 2011 on pre-licence registration of drugs being supplied to the United States for arms brokers and, to us, the very important issue of executions, but I believe there were some other items extra territoriality. In their response to our report in in the update that was agreed just before Christmas on command 8079, the Government replied to our the basis of Commissioner Ashton’s proposal. We recommendations on each of those three subjects, “We know that the Commission is going to be doing a are giving careful consideration to the CAEC broader review of the torture goods regulation. Chris, recommendations in the light of recent events and will I think this year it is planning— revert later this year.” Chris Chew: In the first half of this year. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Ev 18 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

7 February 2012 Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Tom Smith and Chris Chew

Tom Smith: Yes. On that point, we know that the with the problem that the American states might just question of a horizontal end-use control is going to be start using a different anaesthetic. What we will do, on the table, and we look forward to pursuing that as we have been doing over the past year, is to work then. quite closely with Reprieve, which has excellent sources of intelligence about what is going on, both Q70 Chris White: While this review is ongoing, will in the US and elsewhere, so we can identify the threats the UK take unilateral action to introduce controls? and take action before it is too late. Tom Smith: That is quite a difficult one. We do not have national end-use controls at the moment. The Q74 Chair: Secretary of State, could you just clarify precedents that we have on weapons of mass the evidence we have just taken there? Are your destruction and on the use of military items in officials and you saying to us that the existence of the embargoed destinations both operate at EU level. EU regulation will make it superfluous, or not, for the There are difficult legal questions about doing this UK to consider extending your regulation that brings kind of thing at national level. There are also difficult controls to the thiopental? practical questions, if we were to take action just by Tom Smith: On the thiopental and the pentobarbital, ourselves, because of the ease of circumvention. As I yes that is correct. said, our strong preference would be to push the Chris Chew: On the sodium thiopental and the European Commission into having a full debate on sodium pentobarbital, yes. this within the European Union. There are good signs that after perhaps being a bit slow over the past year, Q75 Ann Clwyd: The EU has been dragging its feet it is moving on this whole range of issues now over for a very long time, hasn’t it? In 2008, the previous the next couple of months. Government were talking to the EU about doing exactly the same thing. Why has it taken all this time? Q71 Chris White: Would you say we are taking the What makes you think that they will suddenly speed lead on this? up? Tom Smith: On execution drugs? Absolutely, we did. Vince Cable: All I can say is that when it came to my Vince Cable: May I add to that? When I was first attention, and to Government attention here, through approached by Mr Stafford Smith, who was the the lawyers representing the execution victims, we solicitor for one of the potential execution victims in acted immediately, using the powers that we had in the United States, we looked at how we could possibly the UK. We have now had agreement at European help with this problem. He alleged that certain level to adopt those export controls, so I have no chemicals in the UK could potentially be used, and we used whatever powers we could to act on it. One complaint about the speed with which the European of the positive developments over the past few months Union has acted in this case. is that I think five of the potential execution drugs have now been accepted by the European Commission Q76 Ann Clwyd: You mentioned Reprieve. I am told to be subject to export control in order to cut off any that all our embassies, in every country, have human possible abuse. rights experts within them, but we cannot quantify the numbers. We can quantify the numbers of arms Q72 Chris White: Thank you. To extend that attachés in the various countries, and their ranks, but particular topic on the banning of chemicals, we cannot find out how many human rights experts particularly sodium thiopental to the United States, there are. Why are you depending on Reprieve for will this ban be extended past the date that it ceases your information when, surely, there should be to have effect, on 13 April 2012, and will it be someone based at the embassy in Washington who extended to other countries? could also be following up these issues? Vince Cable: In principle, yes. There was a specific Vince Cable: We will certainly check how far the purpose for introducing the ban—it was not a British embassy and consulates in the States have temporary gesture. If there is a genuine threat of abuse been involved in this, but my recollection is that we in this case, we would of course extend it. dealt with the legal representatives of the individuals Chris Chew: The control on sodium thiopental now involved. applies to exports from the EU to all destinations, Tom Smith: It is a team effort. There are things that because it has been adopted into EU regulation. The we are better placed to find out, and there are other control is already worldwide on that particular drug, things occasionally. Reprieve has a particular angle, and on sodium pentobarbital. which is the dogged pursuit of individual state Vince Cable: And it is not time-limited. authorities under US freedom of information law. We Chris Chew: And it is not time-limited. work together well. Chair: Secretary of State, we will now turn to the Q73 Chris White: So the framework is there for that Export Control Organisation, and Nadhim Zahawi will drug. Would it be widened out to other similar ask you about your policy on the charging issue. chemicals, which could be used in similar cases? Chris Chew: If there is evidence that those drugs are Q77 Nadhim Zahawi: The issue of charging for the likely to be used in execution by lethal injection, we processing of arms’ export licences has been raised will consider that case by case. recently. You told us in your response last year—in Tom Smith: The EU regulation has a list of what it last year’s report—that you expected to hold a full calls fast-acting barbiturates—in other words, dealing consultation later on “this year”, i.e. in 2011. Has that cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 19

7 February 2012 Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Tom Smith and Chris Chew consultation taken place? If not, when is it due to news, compared with the news I was able to give the start? Committee last year, is that we have started turning Vince Cable: We are not proceeding with this. We this around. In 2010, we actually did 63.9% of have decided not to introduce charging for the licences in 20 working days. In 2011, we did 65.4%. foreseeable future. The decision has been made, so the The median processing time for a licence last year whole consultation process is not necessary. We may was 15 working days, as opposed to—this gets very return to it, but for the foreseeable future we are not mathematical, but I think it was 16 point something introducing charging. in 2010. That is partly because we have finally managed to stem this inexorable increase in individual Q78 Nadhim Zahawi: So the consultation is not licence applications. As I think you know, we got happening. 9,600 in 2007. That went all the way up to 16,700 in Vince Cable: No, we had lots of informal 2010. Well, it was 15,700 in 2011 and we actually consultation. I certainly discussed this with the managed to succeed in what we have been trying to leading business groups, among others, and they made do for a little while, which was to allow exporters to their views very clear. As I say, we are not proceeding do more business under open licences. That is quite a with charging for the foreseeable future. positive trend. I am not 100% happy with our performance last year. I think we still measure very Q79 Chair: Secretary of State, that is a very well against other export control authorities around interesting policy announcement that you have just the world in a variety of ways—I can go into some given us. more of that if the Committee is interested—but we Vince Cable: I thought it was well known already. have various plans in train in terms of increased efficiency and increased customer focus. I am hopeful Q80 Chair: Members of the Committee have that the story that we deliver next year will be expressed some concerns about going down that route. significantly better. It would be helpful to us to know what it was that made you decide against introducing charging for the Q83 Ann McKechin: As you may be aware, when use of the ECO. we took evidence from EGAD it was not quite so keen Vince Cable: There are pros and cons. The advantage about the open entry licence and it was complaining of it was that there is a lot of administrative cost about the degree of bureaucracy that very standard associated with the process. The Department wants to licence requests were having to comply with. It said maintain that at a high-quality level and the user fee that there was enormous scope for a review of the seemed a sensible way of doing that. The reason system, particularly an assessment of the risk factor against it, which has prevailed for the time being, is that you put on applications and, accordingly, what that it is an additional burden, particularly on small level of criteria that you set to applicants to meet and medium-sized companies, and we wanted to before their licence was granted. I just wondered avert that. whether you had any plans, as part of your bid to Chair: Thank you. That moves us very conveniently enhance your record this year, to carry out a more on to the issue of the resources available to ECO. Ann strategic review. McKechin is going to lead on that. Tom Smith: There are two things we are doing, really. We are looking at the scope for increased coverage of Q81 Ann McKechin: According to the information published in the recent annual reports of ECO, the open licensing, which is one of the things that EGAD average response time for processing licences is was talking about. In fact, we have one ready to go increasing, but what is also increasing is the actual very soon. It is very technical, in the nature of these number of cases that have been finalised. What steps things, but what it does is to add to the scope of open are you taking to reverse the trend and to deal with the licensing some technology which has been de- additional number of licences that you are processing? controlled by the international regimes, but where EU Vince Cable: I will ask the head of ECO to deal with law has not quite caught up. For example, that relates that, but my understanding is that, although there are to issues such as components for standard some major cases where there has been an argument cryptographic technology, like the components for a about delay, performance has been improving. wireless router, which for some reason in the past Something of the order of two thirds of all cases are have required an individual export licence. We are cleared within the 20 days. hoping that by things like that we can take hundreds of export licence applications out of the system Q82 Ann McKechin: Well, 82% in 2006 were annually. The reason why we have sometimes had to finalised within 20 working days, and it is now only tread carefully really touches on the questioning at the 63%. That suggests to me a substantial decline in beginning of this session, because we have to make standards. sure that we apply exactly the right level of risk Vince Cable: Perhaps you can explain, Tom. Although assessment to each one. There is constantly a balance it is not ideal and we do not claim that it is ideal, I between a quick answer for business and making sure thought there had been some improvement. that we do not cut corners. Tom Smith: You are absolutely right in terms of the Chair: In a moment, we will come to the wider issue past trend. Basically, what we have had over the past of the Government’s arms exports policy review, but few years is a steady increase in the volume of export before we get there we want to turn to the military licences and, yes, performance has suffered. The good end-use control issue. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Ev 20 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

7 February 2012 Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Tom Smith and Chris Chew

Q84 Richard Burden: There have been—and the They are not particularly transparent for business and last Government voiced—some concerns about the they are not easy to enforce. They can be difficult to limits on the current controls in terms of what they understand, and if you try to make them do too much, did not cover, whether it be complete items that may you can run into problems with enforcement. I think not have been strategically controlled but could have that where there is consensus for action in the EU, been of significant use to embargoed destinations or it is very much in respect of exports to embargoed any exports of those sort of things to non-controlled, destinations. I think we would struggle to get non-embargoed destinations. In our last report, we acceptance for a much wider range of countries with, expressed some concern that the work that was being more generally, human rights concerns. done under the previous Government may not be being continued. If we understood it correctly, the Q87 Richard Burden: So, what you are saying, and answer that came back was that the EU is now looking this might be relevant to some of the later questions, at this, that it has published a green paper and that we is that in terms of there being any effective end-use are looking at that to solve it. The question really is: control on components for possible chemical, where are the responses to the green paper up to? biological and nuclear weapons—that is what we are What are we seeking from that, and when would you dealing with—if a place was not on an embargoed list, see the review being concluded? even if we felt that— Vince Cable: There is a commitment to end-use Tom Smith: I am sorry to interrupt you. I look at Mr control, but perhaps you could give us the detail? Chew for correction here, but there is separate end- Tom Smith: Yes. You are absolutely right, Mr Burden, use control in the EU dual-use goods regulation that we do favour an expansion of the current military end- relates to items of use in weapons of mass destruction. use control in the EU dual-use regulation. We have an So that is not limited to embargoed destinations. opportunity now that has not really been there for the past couple of years, which is that the Commission is Q88 Chair: Lord Alton has made representations to effectively reviewing the whole framework of the the Committee that the Government business dual-use regulation, following the publication of its managers are blocking House of Commons green paper. The formal UK response to the green consideration of his Re-export Controls Bill. Are the paper has been published and it includes, as a formal Government seeking to block House of Commons UK proposal, an expansion of the military end-use consideration of that Bill, and if so, why, Secretary control. Again, this is being taken forward in broader of State? discussions on the dual-use regulation over the next Vince Cable: I hope not, but I simply do not know. I few months. It is fair to say that nothing works at will consult the Government managers in the other light-speed in Brussels, but we are hopeful that there place, where this is an issue, but I do not know the is now movement where there was not previously answer to the question. I hope that that isn’t the case. movement. I referred to Lord Alton earlier. He is clearly making a very helpful contribution to this whole debate. Q85 Richard Burden: Just so that we can be clear Chair: Thank you. We will now move on the UK-US for the record, can you let us know what the changes defence trade co-operation treaty. are that we are seeking? Tom Smith: Perhaps I could ask Mr Chew on this Q89 Mike Gapes: Secretary of State, as you are point? aware, the initial signing of this arrangement was by Chris Chew: We have proposed that the military end- Tony Blair and George Bush in 2007. The US Senate use control would apply to complete items going to took three years to bring in the necessary legislation, embargoed destinations and also to complete items but it did so with conditions, which have caused some that are to be modified into military items, neither of concern. We have had evidence recently from the which are covered by the current end-use control. That Export Group for Aerospace and Defence, which says is the proposal that we have made to the Commission. that there are concerns, both in the UK industry and in the US about what is going to happen with this Q86 Richard Burden: What about control of exports defence co-operation treaty in practice, and there is to non-embargoed destinations? dissatisfaction on both sides about how it is going to Chris Chew: The proposal we have made applies only be implemented. What is your assessment of where to embargoed destinations. we are at the moment, and what can we do to make Richard Burden: Because that second area is sure that UK companies benefit from this and that the something where concern has been raised. Why are US does not, in effect, carry on creating restrictions we not making any— for our companies exporting to the US market? Chris Chew: The control would apply if the items Vince Cable: We did regard the agreement as positive are going to a non-embargoed destination for ultimate for the UK, and my understanding is that what is delivery to an embargoed destination. The concern happening at the moment is that the MOD is having a would be that if we applied it to all destinations, it whole series of seminars with British companies, in would potentially be very broad and would catch a order to make sure that they understand the whole range of activity that we are not particularly significance of the treaty and that it works for them. concerned about. There is a lot of detailed work going on with UK Tom Smith: The concern from my perspective is that firms. end-use controls are essential—they are an essential Tom Smith: Essentially, the MOD is running a series club in our bag—but they have their shortcomings. of pathfinder projects to help those UK companies that cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 21

7 February 2012 Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Tom Smith and Chris Chew are most likely to be interested. I think it is fair to say promotional literature for cluster bombs. Similar that what we are finding is that the specialist concerns about both producers have been raised at arrangements in the bilateral defence trade treaty are past exhibitions. UKWG raised with the Committees better suited to companies in some areas than in in its submission to last year’s inquiry that these others, and in parallel we are working closely with the organisations had advertised cluster bombs at DSEi in US Government on President Obama’s broader export 2009 and were under investigation. I find it incredible, control reforms, which would involve moving some if they have transgressed in the past, that they should products out of the scope of the international trade in come back and exhibit such things again— arms regulations into the more sympathetic promotional literature for cluster bombs—when we Department of Commerce scrutiny. So, with a clearly have a strong view about the use of those combination of all these measures, we are looking to munitions. Surely it is not up to NGOs and individual get a better working arrangement together between the UK and the US systems. MPs to find out these things. They have also found, for example, restraint items such as leg irons and belly Q90 Mike Gapes: When will the new treaty start to chains. Why does the DSEi’s compliance unit not spot have an impact? We were told that it would be early these things? Why is it left to others? 2012. How early is that going to be? Vince Cable: If offences are being committed, it is up Chris Chew: The current date for bringing the treaty to our authorities to ensure that we jump on them into force is the end of March 2012—so, within a quickly and take action. I have not been to the couple of months. exhibition, so I am just going by second-hand reports. My understanding is that Caroline Lucas and others Q91 Mike Gapes: At the same time, Mr Smith has had identified material that was highly offensive but just referred to this other US export control that was not illegal to advertise. I may be wrong, but amendment. Concerns are also being expressed about that was my understanding. What the Government whether that will have a negative impact, and there authorities have done in the case of this privately run has been a call from the industries in this country for exhibition is to say to the organisers that this is not a pause in the implementation, so that our acceptable and should be withdrawn. There is a lot of Government can have a dialogue with the Americans. close observation of what happens at that exhibition. It Is that likely to happen? Are the Americans likely to is not run by the Government and we cannot therefore listen? directly control what it displays. There is a lot of Tom Smith: We very much hope so, because we had stuff—not just in the arms field—that is very offensive good results working with them on a previous but not illegal. It is a question of bringing pressure to measure about the treatment of third-country nationals bear on the organisers. This is my first year of in US law. To be fair, business groups were specifically calling for a pause on one specific item: a exposure to this problem; I will try to ensure that we proposal by the Department of State to change the pay it close attention next time there is an exhibition. definition of brokering under the ITAR. There is quite a lot of support in principle among UK companies for Q95 Ann Clwyd: I am very interested that an MP the broader reform of the US military list—the fact got in there in the first place. In the long time past, I that some very non-sensitive project products are have tried to get in and been refused admission. I currently on the US military list and therefore subject wonder why no prosecutions have taken place if they to the full rigours of the ITAR. That is something we are selling stuff that is illegal. Why have no all on both sides of the Atlantic support. prosecutions taken place? Vince Cable: I will ask the officials to answer that. Q92 Mike Gapes: Is there a formal UK Government As the exhibition is privately organised, admission is response to the Americans’ proposals? I understand not something we control. Clearly, if there are that the comment has to be made by next month or offences, we must act on it. I will ask what the state next week. of play is. Tom Smith: Yes, that is something that we have Tom Smith: First, specifically on DSEi 2011, I know already been speaking about to the State Department. I say “we”, that is the MOD with the Washington that the relevant authorities are looking in the usual embassy. way to see whether offences have been committed and, if so, what should be done about them. You will Q93 Mike Gapes: So the MOD is the lead understand that I had better not say more about Department on this? particular cases. I also understand, as the Secretary of Tom Smith: Yes, they are. State alluded to, that it is not necessarily a criminal Chair: We come now to the DSEi trade exhibition offence to display a brochure, even if it is clearly for issues. something that we would never give an export licence to. That is the distinction. There is no way that we Q94 Ann Clwyd: I have been to some of these would ever issue an export licence for leg irons, exhibitions and identified things that should never cluster munitions or stuff like that from the UK. When have been there. I notice that Caroline Lucas this year we see this stuff being advertised—sometimes we found that two Pakistani companies—Pakistan catch it first, because we patrol DSEi quite closely— Ordnance Factories and Pakistan’s Defence Export we put a stop to it, but that is really where it has Promotion Organisation—had both displayed got to. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Ev 22 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

7 February 2012 Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Tom Smith and Chris Chew

Q96 Ann Clwyd: But this fair took place in Chair: Secretary of State, we want to come to the September; it is now February. What has been important issue of the outcome of the Government’s happening in the meantime? review of arms export controls and policy. We will Tom Smith: I am really sorry, but I cannot go into return to this in a few minutes, when the Foreign detail about what may or may not be happening on Secretary comes before us, from the standpoint of the individual bits of enforcement action. It is FCO’s responsibilities. Of course, we will focus our complicated by the fact that displaying a brochure is questions to you in relation to your responsibilities. not always of itself illegal. Q103 Mr Donaldson: Secretary of State, what Q97 Ann Clwyd: If it is a brochure selling torture contribution did your Department make to the export equipment, which we would not give an export licence policy review that was led by FCO? Did you feel that to, that’s fine, is it? this was sufficient? Tom Smith: It is not fine, and that is why we shut the Vince Cable: Yes. It was a fully integrated stands down the moment we see them. operation—we shared the process and concurred with Chris Chew: But it is not necessarily illegal. the outcome. There was no division between the two Tom Smith: It is not necessarily a criminal offence to Departments. display the brochure. Q104 Mr Donaldson: What are the implications of Q98 Ann Clwyd: This last year, no stands were shut the review on the Export Control Organisation and the down, were they? future issuing of licences, especially to countries that Tom Smith: Yes, they were. If you were interested in have issues about human rights? the detail, I would want to take that away and write Vince Cable: We drew two forward-looking to the Committee. I understand that two stands were conclusions, both of which are reflected in the written shut down this year and a similar number were shut ministerial statement I made today. The first was that down in 2009. There always seems to be the odd where you have an unstable situation, where it is not exhibitor who does not quite get the message, but, as I clear where the politics is heading, we need something said, it is a separate question whether those exhibitors more effective than revoking licences or not. That is actually committed criminal offences, because they why the suspension mechanism has been introduced. may not have. The second lesson we learned from this, in terms of how BIS applies the export control system, is that Q99 Ann Clwyd: If you will write, because we will there clearly is an appetite for more information and be returning to this, I am sure. for transparency, and I think that is absolutely right. Vince Cable: Yes, indeed. We have indicated that there are a variety of practical ways in which we can try and meet that—by insisting Q100 Chair: We would like to take up the offer that that applicants for licences give more information has been made to write to us in more detail, please. about the equipment, or whatever it is, how it is going Vince Cable: Yes, and I can understand. I would have to be used and where—and that there is more reacted in the same way had I been aware that that information that we think can be released without the was being displayed. abuse of commercial confidentiality, and we will try Chair: If we could have that written addition pretty to do what we can to do that. We want to consult the soon, because we are drafting our report. Thank you. NGOs and industry about how much we can get out, Tom Smith: indicated assent. and we want an independent assessor/auditor looking at the process that we operate in our Department. All Q101 Mr Watts: Do I take it that someone can those things do not necessarily affect policy, but they advertise products that would be illegal for an export would improve the process and we think that is one licence and then supply them from a third nation? I of the positive conclusions we got out of this review. cannot see a reason why anyone would have a brochure with such equipment in unless it was telling Q105 Chair: Secretary of State, you say in your the potential customers that they could purchase it written statement today, in relation to the Foreign from that company. Secretary’s announcement on 13 October last year on Tom Smith: I guess that must be right. If people bring the outcome of the review: “It concluded that there literature to a fair, it is because they are selling it. That were no fundamental flaws with the UK strategic is why we shut that down as soon as we catch it. export licensing system. We share this view.” I have It does get into this very technical question: is just to say I am surprised that you said that. I think displaying the brochure caught by export control or whether there were fundamental flaws in the system by brokering law? is open to question, but surely it cannot be in doubt that there were fundamental flaws over the judgments Q102 Ann McKechin: If there is such a loophole in used in the system, because unless there were no the law, would the Government be minded to change fundamental flaws in the judgments, you would not it so that the loophole is closed? have had to revoke 158 extant arms export licences. Vince Cable: If there is a loophole in the law that is Do you agree that there were fundamental flaws in very clear and can be dealt with, certainly in principle, the judgments? I would be up for changing it. There would be Vince Cable: No, I do not agree with that, because if legislative issues, but that is a perfectly fair question, I were to, I would effectively be saying that the and that would be the right response. absence of perfect foresight is something for which cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 23

7 February 2012 Rt Hon Dr Vince Cable MP, Tom Smith and Chris Chew we have to apologise, and I do not think we can. The Q107 Chair: May I turn finally to the issues of intra- best judgments were made in the circumstances of the community transfers within the EU? Are you time and with the information that was available. We disappointed at the rate of implementation of the EU do not have perfect foresight. It is clear that the directive in this area, or are you satisfied with it? situation changed in ways that were not expected by Vince Cable: Maybe officials can help with that again. any observers of the scene, but the system responded Tom Smith: Chairman, we and others in Europe are effectively and the revocation of licences took place. well on course to implement the intra-community What we have accepted is that, where you have transfer directive by the deadline in June. In an ideal conditions of uncertainty, we need a speedier and world, we would have hit the interim deadline of more flexible mechanism, and that is what we are transposition, which was last year, but it is very now introducing. important that we get this right. The reason I am confident is that the directive is very largely modelled Q106 Chair: If you do not accept that there were on UK practice. As such, it will not require major fundamental flaws in the judgments, would you accept changes to UK export controls. But there are a couple that the decisions and judgments taken at the time— of issues in there, such as the regulation of technical and we have tracked those since the beginning of assistance, on which we want to consult very carefully 2009—were based on a seriously over-optimistic, with industry to be sure that we are not unwittingly rose-tinted view of authoritarian police state regimes? creating unnecessary burdens. Vince Cable: I do not think they were based on an Chair: Secretary of State, our thanks to you and to over-optimistic interpretation of what was happening. Mr Smith and Mr Chew for the evidence you have In relation to authoritarian regimes, I stated our given to us today. We shall want to pursue a number position at the very beginning. We do do trade and we of items further with you by correspondence before do do trade in armaments with Governments that are we produce our report. Thank you very much indeed. not democratic and have a bad human rights record. Vince Cable: Thank you, and I apologise again for the We use the licensing regime to very carefully slow replies to your letter. We will try to ensure that distinguish between different uses. We would stop any that improves in the future. armaments going to reinforce the repression of human Chair: The Committee is adjourned until such time rights, so that the licensing regime is used selectively as the Foreign Secretary appears. He is due to start with oppressive Governments, but we do business giving evidence at 6 o’clock, but if he appears before with oppressive Governments and there is no that, we shall commence straight away. denying that.

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Rt Hon William Hague MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sarah MacIntosh, Director of Defence and International Security, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and David Hall, Deputy Head, Counter-Proliferation Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.

Q108 Chair: Foreign Secretary, may we welcome necessary, I may need to request a meeting with you you to your first appearance in front of the on this if we cannot resolve it in correspondence. Committees on Arms Export Controls? May we also Mr Hague: On those points, Mr Chairman, we sent welcome Miss Sarah MacIntosh and Mr David Hall? you quite a lot last night. One of those letters is in Foreign Secretary, we have received a substantial lieu of an opening statement, of course. If you prefer, body of letters from you in the last 24 hours, some I can make an opening statement. The three things of which arrived only this morning. That places the that I attached were responses to quite recent letters, Committees in a difficult position, and I must register which we responded to more quickly in order to get the fact that that is not an acceptable performance as them before the Committees met. On the other matter, far as the Committees are concerned. We need time to of course we are looking very hard at what you raised consider the responses that you send to us. I have to on 24 October. That requires further consideration highlight particularly one item that is still outstanding. across the Government, but we will get a reply to you As you are aware, there are unresolved discussions as soon as we can. with your Department on the proposal, which I put to you, as to how we deal with the declassification of Q109 Chair: I do recognise that some of the items answers that you give to the important questions that you sent yesterday are relatively recent requests, but we put to you on the basis of the quarterly information also, as I pointed out to the Business Secretary, who provided by the Government on arms export licence has just been in front of us, in relation to three items approvals and refusals. on which we made specific recommendations in our You said in your letter to me of yesterday: “I hope report nine months ago on the issue of pre-licence shortly to be able to send you a substantive response registration of arms brokers, on brass plate companies to your letter of 24 October.” This has been and extra-territoriality, although you wrote to me outstanding for months. This is time-critical as far as promising a reply on that by the end of last year, we the Committees are concerned. I trust we will be received no such reply until the early hours of this receiving your response in the next few days. I hope morning, when it came from the Business Secretary. I it will meet the proposal that I have put to you. If must put that on the record to you. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Ev 24 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

7 February 2012 Rt Hon William Hague MP, Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall

Secretary of State, I want to start with what is a major concerned when we see a large number of revocations, policy issue, if not the major policy issue for our which is why we had the review. It does not of itself Committees, which is whether there has been a change mean that the system is wrong, because when in Government policy on the approval of arms export circumstances change, there can be revocations. I licences for arms and ammunition and military believe that these are important changes in equipment that could be used for internal repression. procedures, but it does not mean that there will never We took a deliberate decision in our report of last be a revocation again; we cannot know that. April to publish in full, as annex 1, the written answer that was given by the then Minister of State in the Q111 Richard Burden: I can understand that. I guess Foreign Office, Peter Hain, on 26 October 2000 in we could go round in circles on whether or not the which he set out in full the consolidated criteria for system is flawed. In a sense, as the correspondence arms exports. from the in recent times indicates, what we As far as arms exports that involve weapons that could have been pursuing a little bit is whether or not the be used for internal repression are concerned, your judgments that are built into the system are robustly junior Minister, Alistair Burt, in his press release founded. If what you are saying is that there will be statement on 18 February last year, entirely accurately more substantial checks done earlier to make sure that and correctly summarised the previous Government’s we are not constantly shutting the stable door after the position carried forward by the present Government horse has bolted, I should like to get a bit more of a on policy in this area. He summarised that accurately sense about where that would make a difference. Let in these words: “The longstanding British position is me give you an example. On 18 July last year, if I clear. We will not issue licences where we judge there understand correctly, you said that there was no is a clear risk the proposed export might provoke or evidence that any of the exports to some of the prolong regional or internal conflicts, or which might countries that we have been talking about had been be used to facilitate internal repression.” Foreign misused. Now are you saying that that was your best Secretary, has that policy changed, or is it as correctly knowledge at the time, but that if the situation were stated by Mr Alistair Burt? to arise again, you would expect more checks to be Mr Hague: That is still the policy. The “or”, as you done, so you are not so confident about that statement have pointed out on other occasions, is important. now. Or are you still saying that there was no Chair: It is profoundly important, Foreign Secretary, evidence, and there is still no evidence, that there and I am glad that you have acknowledged that. That was misuse? enables us to move on to the next important policy The reason I ask that question is that a couple of years issue, which is the outcome of your export policy earlier, in 2009, after the Gaza conflict, the former review into exports to North Africa and the Middle Foreign Secretary authorised quite a substantial check East. on exports that had gone to , and he had concluded that, quite possibly, even though the Q110 Richard Burden: Secretary of State, I am a licences had been given in good faith, British-made or little confused as to exactly what this review has British-supplied equipment had been used for revealed. What has the review done to ensure that purposes for which they should not have been used. arms are not licensed to authoritarian regimes or Which is it? Are we saying that what you said last regimes that may contribute to internal repression? year was based on your knowledge at the time, and What has it done to ensure that the kind of revocations that we probably did not have enough knowledge, or that we saw last year do not happen again? are you saying that we did, in which case, how does Mr Hague: It has done quite a lot of things. It made the new system change it? a few proposals of which you are familiar from my Mr Hague: Well, I called for the review—Alistair written statement in October, which have now been Burt and I both referred to the review, and we set the implemented. One of them, which the Business review going—before some of the later issues in the Secretary may have talked about, is the new licensing Arab spring. This was last February or March. There suspension mechanism. There is also increased you are referring to my statement of 18 July, which I oversight by Ministers, which is quite a substantial expanded on in a letter to the Chairman on 1 October increase. In 2009, there were 24 applications overseen to say that, while there is no evidence of the misuse by Ministers—24 submissions. In the last year, there of British-supplied arms and related items, you cannot will be 153. That is a sixfold increase in ministerial actually prove that. You cannot really prove it either oversight of applications in 2011 compared with 2009. way. In the case of Libya, for instance, there was an On top of that, it has led us to put new requirements uncorroborated report of the use of one piece of on Foreign Office posts of more end-use monitoring, British equipment, but after that report, export licensing, specific training for desk officers, our embassy in Tripoli closed and we were not able new security and justice assistance guidance to to confirm that any further. provide a more accurate picture of human rights There were other items sold to Libya that may have situations in high-risk countries and more systemic been used, but we cannot prove that. We do not have use of many sources of information, including from evidence of that, and of course we have to bear in NGOs and other organisations, to assess those mind that in Libya we destroyed munitions stores. We situations. destroyed military units that were presenting any All of that has changed, but your question begs threat to the population. A huge amount of another question, because you are saying to avoid their equipment was destroyed. We have not seen any revocations on the same scale. Of course we are all hard evidence on that, but nevertheless, for all the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 25

7 February 2012 Rt Hon William Hague MP, Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall reasons discussed by the Committees, it is common Mr Hague: The results of the review are what I sense that when this situation arises you think, “Well, published in the written statement in October. That is can we tighten this up? Has there been a failure in the the ministerial decision, although I accepted all the system?” The review concluded that while there was proposals of the review, so they are all there in the no fundamental problem in the system, it could be review. The rest of the review is an internal Foreign improved; more decisions could be taken at a more Office document; we do not normally publish those. senior level, and more work could go into identifying problems at an earlier stage. Q116 Mr Watts: Secretary of State, do you not find I do not want to go on too long in answering this it strange that your Department has got Iraq, Libya, question, but there is a cautionary note to add to that: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as areas in a list of neither this country, nor the United States, nor , concerns? You are concerned about those countries, nor the Libyans predicted what was going to happen yet BIS is targeting all those four countries as priority in Libya. We will always have the problem that we areas for the export of arms. Is there not a will not be able to predict what happens several years contradiction between what it is doing and what you down the road. are doing? Mr Hague: Which ones did you mention? Iraq, Libya Q112 Richard Burden: Would you say that now the and Saudi Arabia? new, more cautious approach is in place, it is already Mr Watts: Iraq, Libya, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. being implemented in respect of, say, Saudi Arabia? Mr Hague: Let’s take a couple of those countries to Mr Hague: The new procedures are implemented for illustrate the policy. the whole world. It is not a change of policy; it is a change of procedures in implementing a well Q117 Mr Watts: Well, let’s take Iraq and Libya, established policy to apply the consolidated guidance because I do not think that anyone would think that effectively. they were stable regimes. Mr Hague: Well, Libya is a new situation entirely; it Q113 Mr Donaldson: Secretary of State, we have is still subject to an arms embargo that we uphold and been told by both NGOs and the Export Group for were instrumental in passing. The only things that we Aerospace and Defence that they were not consulted have provided to Libya that fall into these categories during the arms export review. Why were they not are body armour and de-mining equipment, which are exempt from the arms embargo. It is not inconsistent consulted? to promote a wider commercial relationship with Mr Hague: This is an internal review. This is my Libya and to provide equipment of that kind. The Department giving me advice, which it does every day relationship with Libya has changed three times over on a vast range of subjects. The officials are free to the past decade. The policy has changed three times, talk to whomever they want. They may wish to under the previous Government and under this comment on it themselves, but it is an internal review Government. That is the position with Libya. within the Foreign Office, making recommendations The position as regards Pakistan—sorry, you wanted to me. Sarah, do you want to expand on that? to talk about Iraq. The position as regards Iraq—I will Sarah MacIntosh: There was some consultation. The find the list of what we are currently exporting to head of the Counter-Proliferation Department met Iraq—is that it is a country with a right to self- with NGOs on 14 November last year, and with defence. It is a country with a great deal of internal industry on 15 November. I think that you were political problems. All the exports have to be assessed there, Dave. under the consolidated criteria, but it does not mean David Hall: Yes, I was at those meetings. There were that nothing should be exported to Iraq. informal consultations, giving information about how the review was going ahead. Prior to that, Jill Morris, Q118 Mr Watts: I was not suggesting that it should the head of the CPD at the time, met a number of not be doing some selling to them, but is it not strange NGOs. We meet a number of these NGOs on a regular for BIS to declare that those countries are priority basis on export control issues. We are aware of and areas for the sale of exports? interested in their views on the system. Mr Hague: No. Iraq has a booming energy industry Sarah MacIntosh: We have further consultations to for the future, with plans to raise its oil production to do, both with NGOs and industry, on the between 3 million and 4 million barrels a day. It is implementation of the system. One recommendation very important that oil companies such as BP and that is coming out of the review is to create a new are involved in a country like that. Of course, department with responsibility for export controls. We for any country that wants to raise its prosperity and are recruiting the head of that department, hopefully export and have profitable investments in the rest of this month. As soon as that is done, there will be the world, such opportunities cannot be neglected. further consultations. There is the case of Saudi Arabia, which is a classic case that is often raised. In the Foreign Office, we Q114 Mr Donaldson: Might that include EGAD as say clearly that we have human rights concerns over well? women’s rights, the rights of foreign labourers and so Sarah MacIntosh: Absolutely, it would. on in Saudi Arabia, but the vast majority of British defence exports to Saudi Arabia—by value, probably Q115 Mr Donaldson: Will you be publishing the 99%—relate to the provision of Typhoon aircraft and results of the review? the updating of Tornado aircraft. Those are not cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Ev 26 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

7 February 2012 Rt Hon William Hague MP, Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall relevant to our concerns about those rights. That is shows that the whole policy is wrong in upholding the why it is possible to be on a list of countries of consolidated guidance. One could make an concern and for there to be a strong trading argument—I think, Mr Chairman, that you will relationship with that country. perhaps come on to make it—that that guidance is not correct, and that there should be other criteria. On Q119 Chair: Foreign Secretary, may I come back to upholding the criteria about not provoking or your conclusions in the arms export policy review? prolonging internal conflict, internal repression or Can you clarify for the Committees whether or not regional conflict, I believe it is a robust system, but it you considered the judgments that led to the granting needed its procedures improved, and every effort of export licences—158 of which have had to be needed to be made to try to forecast situations like revoked—to be perfectly fair and reasonable at the this. I stress again that, as I have mentioned to the time they were made? Is that your position? Committee a couple of times, we will not always Mr Hague: Yes. succeed in forecasting that correctly.

Q120 Chair: And faced with the same position, Q122 Chair: Just one last question on this from me. would you make exactly the same judgments today? You have focused, in the outcome of the review, very Mr Hague: Yes. Hindsight is always a useful thing. much on taking new powers, possibly quite To put this in perspective, these are 158 licences expeditiously, to suspend licences that have already among, annually, about 17,000 licences that are been granted, but is the key issue not that it will considered. That is the proportion that we are talking already be too late? As I said in the Westminster Hall about. When you look back at them in more detail, debate, if you are suspending, then by definition the you will see that some of them—I think about a sixth bullets have bolted, and we sell a great deal of of them—were for exhibition or demonstration ammunition. Should you not be focusing on the point purposes. The majority of the equipment concerned when the initial judgment is made? In most cases, was for communication purposes of one sort or suspension will, by definition, be after the weapons another, and some of it was in conjunction with and ammunition have left this country. security sector training, including human rights Mr Hague: There would be cases in a suspension training. There was, for instance—this was started when the goods had not been delivered and had not under the previous Government—a police training left. It is still open to us to revoke licences, rather than programme with the Libyan police, and crowd control to suspend them. The idea here is, first of all, to equipment was exported to Libya as part of that provide a new tool of suspension, rather than training programme and not handed over until the continuing or revoking, so that when it is not clear training was complete. In the context of the policy what we should do, we can have a broader suspension that the previous Government began, rightly, to turn at great speed, executed across all the relevant Libya away from weapons of mass destruction Departments. We can do that while we consider how programmes, and to re-engage with Libya in the to proceed. It is also a good means of signalling to western world, that sort of relationship was a correct exporters that conditions are deteriorating, and that the judgment at the time. likelihood of securing licences is falling. It is a means of signalling to countries that their deteriorating Q121 Chair: So you do not believe, Foreign conditions are starting to have an impact on their Secretary, that one of the lessons to be learned is that ability to procure goods, and it is also a means of the revocations that have been made, which are of an signalling to other licensing countries that we are unprecedented number in this particular context, call for an altogether less rosy-tinted and less over- tightening controls. optimistic view of what are authoritarian, police-state The introduction of a rapid suspension mechanism is regimes? There is abundant historical evidence from a good idea. It is not a substitute for revoking where around the world that an authoritarian, police-state necessary, or for making the right decision in the first regime can, in certain circumstances, turn nasty—or, place—of course it isn’t—but it may provide a useful as we are seeing in Syria, very nasty indeed—but additional tool when we face a difficult situation. apparently that is not colouring your future policy. Mr Hague: You are quite right that, while I am saying Q123 Mike Gapes: The letter you sent to the Chair that we should put the 158 out of 17,000 in yesterday includes a helpful annexe that lists a number perspective, it is also an unprecedented number. One of countries to which we seem to be still selling can argue that from either direction. In the case of armaments. One of them is Yemen; another is some countries, no licences have needed to be Bahrain; and a third is Syria. That is how I read the revoked. In the case of Syria and Yemen, I think it is letter. Given what has happened in Yemen, is it wise no licences at all. still to be exporting anything of a military nature to David Hall: Half those revocations were for Libya. the regime there? Given what has happened in Mr Hague: Half the revocations were for Libya, Bahrain, is it right that we continue to export anything where a different policy was in force from what was there? As for Syria, there is a reference to military there before, or what we would recommend with cargo vehicles in the annexe. May I have clarification? hindsight to improve relationships with Libya. These Are we exporting components or military cargo were part of that policy. I think we have to understand vehicles to Syria? and respect that that policy was engaged in by the Mr Hague: No, definitely not. I am not sure what Mr previous Government from 2004. I do not think that Gapes is looking at there. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 27

7 February 2012 Rt Hon William Hague MP, Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall

Mike Gapes: This is the letter that you sent on 6 Mr Hague: Well, it is the response I gave to Mr Watts February to the Chair, with an annexe. earlier. In a case like Saudi Arabia, we do not hide the Nadhim Zahawi: It says it is “for Libya and not for fact that we have human rights concerns, nor do we Syria”. hide that fact when we discuss general affairs and Mike Gapes: That is what I am seeking clarification foreign affairs with the Saudis. We are applying here on. The way it is worded is ambiguous. the consolidated criteria. As I mentioned earlier, the Mr Hague: Syria is subject to an EU arms embargo. vast majority of the equipment sold to Saudi Arabia Mike Gapes: This relates to before the EU arms is in the aerospace area—Typhoon and Tornado embargo, and it is to do with revocations. aircraft—and that is not relevant to our concerns about Chair: Foreign Secretary, I picked up on this; you women’s rights, and the rights of foreign labourers in took the opportunity to correct an answer from Mark Saudi Arabia. Prisk, who referred to Syria when he meant Libya. It is important to remember that the applications allow us to make a decision on a case-by-case basis, so of Q124 Mike Gapes: In which case I withdraw my course if an application fell foul of the criteria in any reference to Syria, but my point about Yemen and country with whom we have not revoked any licences, Bahrain remains. we would not grant it. Mr Hague: Looking at the figures for the second and third quarters of 2011 for these countries, in the case Q129 Katy Clark: What about other types of of Syria, since it is subject to an EU arms embargo, equipment that perhaps are more obviously used in there were very few applications anyway. Sarah may internal repression? Have licences been allowed to wish to add to the point about Syria. proceed in relation to such equipment for Saudi Sarah MacIntosh: I was going to talk about Yemen. Arabia? Mr Hague: There were never many applications with Mr Hague: No is the general answer. We have not regard to Yemen. There were no such exports recorded refused any licences, and key exports are components in that period to Yemen. Any figures that may appear for vehicles, including some light armoured vehicles to you may relate to an earlier period of counter- for the Saudi Arabian national guard, and Canadian terrorism training for security forces in Yemen, which light armoured vehicles. Perhaps 99% by value is for would include the provision of some equipment. That aerospace. Such vehicles have not been used for any training was completed. In the case of Bahrain purposes that would conflict with the guidance, either through last year, the items that were exported include in Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, nor has there been any those for sporting use, telecoms, or training aircraft, assessment that there is a clear risk of them being used but nothing that would fall within the criteria that we in that way. have just been discussing. Q130 Katy Clark: In relation to Bahrain, obviously Q125 Mike Gapes: It would perhaps be helpful, it is quoted on many occasions that British-made subsequent to the letter that you sent to the Chairman, equipment was used, so what reassessment has there if you could send us further clarification to make it been in the light of that, and how has it affected absolutely clear what the position is with regard to your policy? Yemen and Bahrain. Mr Hague: We do not have any evidence that British Mr Hague: Absolutely. It sounds as though further equipment has been used in Bahrain, so there is no clarification is needed, so we will do that. information that UK-supplied equipment has been Chair: Perhaps we could have it fairly quickly, used in breach of the criteria in Bahrain, but we Foreign Secretary, because we are in the process of revoked quite a lot of licences. We revoked 41 drafting our report. licences within a few days of the unrest beginning in I am going to move on to the issue of where licences Bahrain. Again, all exports are assessed on a case-by- have been revoked and where they have not. case basis. A few moments ago, I mentioned the sort of things that would still be exported to Bahrain— Q126 Katy Clark: We have heard about the 158 sporting goods, training aircraft and things of that revocations that were provided in a list to the kind. Committee last year, and your letter today goes into more detail. Have there been any further revocations Q131 Katy Clark: But do you accept that UK-made beyond the 158? armoured personnel carriers were sent to Bahrain? Mr Hague: No. Mr Hague: Were sent to Bahrain?

Q127 Katy Clark: So, for example, there have been Q132 Katy Clark: That Saudi Arabia sent— no revocations to Saudi Arabia. Mr Hague: Those are the Saudi ones I was talking Mr Hague: No, there have been no revocations to about earlier. Yes, but the Saudi forces that went to Saudi Arabia. Bahrain did not take part in any of the internal affairs of Bahrain. They were sent to guard installations Q128 Katy Clark: What do you say to people who under the Gulf Co-operation Council agreements. say that there seems to be a great deal of They did not encounter any unrest, and were not inconsistency, particularly from a human rights involved in dealing with any unrest in Bahrain. So, approach, in relation to the approach to different again, they in no way fell foul of our clearly countries? What is your response to that? established criteria. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Ev 28 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

7 February 2012 Rt Hon William Hague MP, Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall

Q133 Chair: Foreign Secretary, just on this subject, Q135 Chair: Yes, Foreign Secretary, but that does one of the questions that we put to you was to ask not answer the particular question that the Committees you to list all the extant arms export licenses to Saudi have put to you. It is one thing to look at the global Arabia and you provided the Committees with that application of the results of your review. We put a information and, indeed, we have made that public; it different recommendation to you, that you should is a very extensive list. I quoted from your response extend your review to authoritarian regimes in the Westminster Hall debate on 20 October and I worldwide. Why did you not accept that quoted this particular group of arms export licences recommendation? among the pages and pages of them that you helpfully Mr Hague: For this reason, Mr Chairman, this is a listed for us, as follows: “assault rifles, blank worldwide review. It is about our policy towards all ammunition, components for assault rifles, regimes of any kind. If you are saying should we have components for general purpose machine guns, had a particular study of authoritarian regimes— components for machine pistols, components for pistols, components for rifles, components for semi- Q136 Chair: That was the recommendation of this automatic pistols, components for submachine guns, Committee. We asked you to extend your review not general purpose machine guns, machine pistols, just to authoritarian countries in North Africa and the pistols, rifles, semi-automatic pistols, submachine Middle East, but to authoritarian countries worldwide. guns, training small arms ammunition”. That was our recommendation, and you chose not to You, a few moments ago, agreed with the Alistair Burt accept it. statement on 18 February last year—that he was correct when he said in the second part of his answer Mr Hague: Yes, because it was not confined to the that the Government “will not issue licenses…which Middle East. If we implement thoroughly, as we might be used to facilitate internal repression.” How, certainly intend to do, the changes in procedures that in such a country, with the serious known tensions I talked about earlier—more systematic reporting of between the Sunni majority there in control and the human rights risks, using a wider range of Shi’a minority, can you square that policy statement information, more systematic use of predictive tools with that list of approved extant export licences which and the requirement of end-use monitoring by I have just read out? overseas posts—it will capture what is going on in Mr Hague: That is, of course, an important matter of authoritarian regimes, as well as the rest of the world. judgment of what is the internal situation or could be So, of course they are included; what is going on all the internal situation in Saudi Arabia. I think as the over the world is included in these changes of Amnesty International report said in December 2011, procedures. on the subject of demonstrations in Saudi Arabia, there were not enough details about these recent Q137 Chair: The Committees understand that the incidents to conclude whether the security forces used outcome of the review is going to be applied globally excessive force in response to violent acts—what by the Government, but the issue that the Committees appeared to be violent acts—on the part of some of put to you was that you should extend your review to the protesters. I do not think, on the basis of that, we authoritarian regimes worldwide—authoritarian can conclude that any of those items will be used for regimes in Africa, in Asia and conceivably in one or internal repression or internal conflict or regional two countries in South America—and ask yourselves conflict. One could have an argument about that, but the same questions that you have posed to yourselves we have not come to that conclusion. on North Africa and the Middle East: do all the extant Chair: Foreign Secretary, we are going to move on to export licences that we have granted to these an important recommendation which we made in our authoritarian regimes still comply with criteria 2 and last report, in which we recommended that you should 3? You have not done that. Why not? extend your review of arms export policy to Mr Hague: It is a global review. I go back to the same authoritarian regimes worldwide. answer. Really you are saying that there should be a bigger change in policy. Q134 Chris White: Secretary of State, extending that, we were just thinking it should not just be the Middle East and North Africa, it should be to Q138 Chair: No, we are saying that there should authoritarian regimes worldwide. Why was this have been a bigger change in the geographical scope recommendation not implemented? of the review that you carried out. Mr Hague: Our review covers our global policy— Mr Hague: I am saying that there is no limit to its covers the whole thing, whatever the nature of the geographical scope. Every kind of regime and every regime. Of course, it is events in the Middle East and kind of country is captured in this review. Clearly, we North Africa that have given rise to it. But this is a do not have a meeting of minds here, and I have not change to our procedures overall, including seen any other country where we should change our authoritarian regimes. As the Chairman has pointed policy and revoke the licences, because the out, such issues can arise in other countries as well. circumstances have not changed. We focused the So for the purposes of this policy, we are not only review on practical change, and I have adopted all the concerned with authoritarian regimes. The change in recommendations of the review. I think I see what the procedures that I have announced and that Vince Committee is getting at, but we chose to do it in a Cable has been talking about, are changes in different way. I did not agree with the procedures globally. recommendation of the Committee. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

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7 February 2012 Rt Hon William Hague MP, Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall

Chair: We come now to the human rights guidance aircraft for Egypt precisely because they had been that the Government have issued in the context of used in an intimidatory way and that was identified by overseas security assistance. posts and reported.

Q139 Ann Clwyd: Before we come to that, you have Q141 Ann Clwyd: On the human rights guidance, mentioned end-use monitoring a number of times. It you wrote to the Chair of the Committee saying that always falls glibly off the lips of officials, but what the FCO had published guidance on assessing human does it actually mean? Who does the end-use rights indications when the Government made monitoring? In any country I have been involved in I decisions regarding the provision of security and have never been able to identify the people who do justice assistance overseas. You said it “will ensure the end-use monitoring. greater consistency in the human rights approach to Mr Hague: As you think it falls glibly off the lips of security and justice assistance overseas…whilst officials, I shall ask the officials to answer that meeting HMG’s national security priority…consistent question. Which one of you would like to do that, with a foreign policy based on British values including how we are improving it? including human rights.” Are we able to see that David Hall: In the assessments that we make of guidance as a Committee, or is it an internal licence applications, we talk extensively to our document? network of posts, and we expect those posts to inform Mr Hague: I do not think there is any problem with our assessments as they look to the future and based you seeing the guidance. on past evidence. Part of that information is what has happened to the kit that we have previously licensed. Q142 Ann Clwyd: What impact do you think it will That is what they do. They give us information based have when considering applications for arms licences? on their own investigations and on the extensive Mr Hague: This is about providing security and discussions with the Governments and the recipients justice assistance, which can be related to arms for the of that equipment, which informs our licence reasons we were discussing earlier. I was describing assessments. how, in the case of Libya, there were licences that Sarah MacIntosh: There are various parts of overseas related to a training programme. So the linkage here posts that do that. The defence sections would is that the specific reference to the consolidated typically have relationships with the armed forces of criteria is contained in checklist A, as it is called, of the countries they are in, and they will be going into the guidance, which requires staff to consult the their barracks and participating in their exercises. consolidated criteria where the provision of equipment They will be seeing the equipment and will be talking is part of the assistance. So although it is intended that to people who would use it. Political sections will be information sought under this guidance can be used to doing the same with, for instance, police forces. They help make decisions relevant to arms exports, the will be discussing doctrine and will know what is specific test set out in the consolidated criteria must happening. They might also have security sectoral apply when there is a question of exporting arms. reform teams working directly with the organisations and will know what they are doing with the Q143 Ann Clwyd: But the checklist specifies it is equipment. They will be taking a feed from non- not intended to cover the export of military or security governmental organisations, and they will be watching equipment. Is that right? media reporting as well. Mr Hague: It is linked to it. They are clearly related issues and therefore checklist A of the guidance refers Q140 Ann Clwyd: I need a lot of convincing on that, to the consolidated criteria. There will be security and because I remember very well when we were selling justice assistance programmes that do not involve the arms to , which was using Hawk aircraft to provision of equipment, of course, but where they do, intimidate people in East Timor. There was supposed it is necessary to refer across to the guidance as well. to be end-use monitoring there as well. Actually, the Sarah MacIntosh: It is not intended that the guidance East Timorese were able to spot aircraft; it wasn’t should in any way substitute for the strict application anybody at any of our posts. I know our embassy in of the criteria through the export licensing process. It Indonesia was rather a long way from East Timor. would only be an addition to it. Nevertheless, we were always assured that Hawk Mr Hague: It is additional guidance, really. On top of aircraft were not being used there, yet they certainly the consolidated criteria, this is additional guidance. were being used to intimidate the population of East Timor. Q144 Chair: Foreign Secretary, I just want to take In the same way, I feel that our equipment given to that point a little further. In the Westminster Hall the Saudis, who are present in Bahrain, can also debate on 26 January on the Foreign Affairs intimidate protests. If you have that sort of build-up— Committee’s human rights report and the Government a foreign country in your own country—it is, again, response to it, I referred specifically to the human very threatening and intimidating and can have almost rights guidance that your Department has issued in the the same effect as actually using it against the context of overseas security assistance. I made the population. point that, in your guidance, you detail what you Sarah MacIntosh: The Indonesia evidence predates describe as “security institutions”—you go on to my engagement with this. The example that I can give define them—that are going to be in receipt of this relates to Egypt last year, when the Foreign Secretary assistance. I quoted that you say “The institutions and the Business Secretary revoked licences for typically (but not exclusively) of relevance in this cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Ev 30 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

7 February 2012 Rt Hon William Hague MP, Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall context are: armed forces, police, gendarmeries, Q146 Mike Gapes: But, last year, we asked your paramilitary forces, presidential guards, intelligence Minister, Alistair Burt, about this issue and about who and security services (military and civilian)”—it goes was going to replace Ambassador Duncan when he on. I went on to express surprise and, indeed, dismay retired. We were assured that an equally high-powered that there did not appear to be any reference in the successor would be placed in-post in the same guidance to the need to conform to the consolidated position, somebody of equal seniority and capability. criteria. Yet I understand that the head of the counter- Subsequent to what I said in Westminster Hall, our proliferation department, Jill Morris, was moved out ever-alert Clerk pointed out that I had made an error, of that post two months ago, to do another job, and for which I apologise, and that buried away in a has not been replaced; and that the ambassador for microscopic footnote on page 14 of the guidance it the Conference on Disarmament, Jo Adamson, was does indeed say to officials conducting their checklist announced yesterday to be the leader of the delegation that it “is not intended to cover the export of military in New York next week, but there is no decision yet or security equipment. If the provision of equipment on who is to deal with these matters in the period is part of your assistance, you must consult the between now and the final conference in July, to Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria.” I put which you referred. There is certainly a perception by it to you, Foreign Secretary, particularly as you have people who study these things closely that you are said specifically in front of the Committees that downgrading and taking your eye off the ball at this assistance is provided through the making available of critical moment, as we go into the New York meeting equipment, which could include items within the arms next week and the final stages of the process. export control area, that you should reconsider Mr Hague: Sometimes people like to develop whether this crucial sentence should be promoted particular perceptions, but there is no basis for that. from being dismally put in microscopic print in a Yes, staff do move around. A lot is going on in the footnote to having very strong prominence in your world. human rights guidance. Mr Hague: That may be a very good suggestion. We Q147 Mike Gapes: Who is in charge now on the will have a look at that. arms trade treaty? Chair: Thank you. We will now move on to the arms Mr Hague: Sarah can describe. We are restructuring trade treaty. the counter-proliferation department to increase the senior management resource working on the arms Q145 Mike Gapes: Foreign Secretary, the last trade treaty, and on export control issues more Government, from 2004 onwards, played a major, generally. So there is not going to be a shortage of leading role in trying to get a legally binding senior staff. Sarah, do you want to describe these international Arms trade treaty. It introduced and personnel changes? sponsored a resolution in the UN General Assembly in 2006, and, according to the UK Working Group on Sarah MacIntosh: Jill Morris—as you know—the Arms, since 2006 “the UK has been widely perceived former head of the counter-proliferation department as the lead government on this Treaty process”. Can I has moved to eurozone work temporarily. That job has put it to you that that is no longer the case and that been backfilled with two officials: one more senior, many countries around the world believe, in the words Peter Hayes, the former ambassador in , and of evidence that we have received, that the Foreign Martin Hill, the deputy high commissioner in Ottawa. Office’s priority has been “significantly reduced” and that the UK has “rolled back” its leadership and Q148 Mike Gapes: Is that up until the conference in activity on the Arms trade treaty? July or is that just for the interim? Mr Hague: You will not be surprised to hear that I do Sarah MacIntosh: That is an interim arrangement that not agree with that. We are very firmly committed to is in place now. As I mentioned earlier, one part of securing a robust, effective and legally binding Arms the recommendations of the review of export licensing trade treaty. The last Government did a good job on is the creation of a new department within the this. I will regularly say that, and I think there is directorate of defence and international security, strong cross-party agreement on that. We are aiming which will be the export control department. It will for a treaty that covers all conventional weapons, have two primary functions: the export control including small arms, light weapons, and ammunition. licensing system and the arms trade unit, and the arms We are coming up to the negotiating conference, trade treaty negotiations. That is an additional SMS1, which is due to take place in July this year. At the which is the same level as Ambassador Jim Duncan moment, we are raising this frequently—bilaterally was previously. That is an additional resource at that and multilaterally. We are playing an active role in all level. It will be devoted to these two issues. We are the preparatory committee meetings. We co-ordinate in the process of recruiting those. Peter and Martin on this within the P5 and the Security Council and in have been backfilling that gap. The continuity the EU. We have provided project funding for a range throughout has been provided by me as the director, of related projects, including research on by Dave Hall, as the deputy head of the counter- implementation issues. We have a cross-Whitehall proliferation department with responsibility for both team working on it, and many of the officials sitting those two issues and by Ambassador Adamson who alongside me and behind me are closely involved in has replaced Ambassador Duncan at the conference the negotiation of this. on disarmament. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 31

7 February 2012 Rt Hon William Hague MP, Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall

Q149 Mike Gapes: Do you agree—perhaps the continue to do so through the negotiating conference Foreign Secretary could comment—with the and beyond. perception that, just at the key moment, the week before you have this meeting coming up, there is not Q153 John Glen: At the review conference on a permanent person there and there is no continuity cluster munitions in November, it was reported that therefore? You are restructuring at this time and, there was a move by Israel, China, Russia and understandably, you are sending somebody off to deal Pakistan to insert a weaker alternative. That was with the eurozone crisis. There may be big fish to fry resisted, I think, by the British Government. Could there, but this is the critical moment in this you explain what the consequences of that will be? negotiation, yet we haven’t got the person in place Given that there seems to be an emerging difference who is going to be there to take through this process of opinion on how to deal with that matter, what will for the next few vital months. the UK Government do to bring the US and those Mr Hague: We have a lot of senior people dealing other countries into line with the agreement and the with this, and are upgrading this in the way that Sarah way of thinking that we have as a Government? describes. I cannot promise you that we never move Mr Hague: We did resist that. Together with the vast around in the Foreign Office, but this is going to majority of states, we engaged in the discussion receive a great deal of senior management time and aiming for a draft protocol 6, which would be attention, and ministerial time and attention. I can complimentary to the convention and not undercut it assure you that we are very strongly committed to or provide a permanent lesser commitment, with this. No Governments have raised with me any lack significant and demonstrable humanitarian benefit. We of readiness or willingness on the part of the United had the final negotiation in December, which failed to Kingdom Government, but if some want to have a achieve consensus, so we have to keep working on it. word me about which Governments have this We want to continue to take all possible opportunities perception, we will soon put it right. to encourage universal adherence to the convention. It was disappointing that there was not sufficient Q150 Mike Gapes: One final question: are we going consensus in December. David might want to add to for a robust treaty or are we allowing the US and that from the counter-proliferation department. others to take the lead and come out with a weaker David Hall: We are keen to stay true to the gold treaty than would have been the case if we had been standard that is the Oslo convention on cluster in the lead? munitions, while bringing major producers closer to Mr Hague: We are going for a robust treaty. We have that gold standard. That was the negotiation that was maintained the ambition expressed under the previous protocol 6, and we will continue to work with those Government. There is a range of views within the major producers to bring them closer to the CCM permanent five members of the Security Council on gold standard. this, and part of our job is to raise the level of Mr Hague: Of course it was debatable whether we ambition across the other members of the Security should go for or settle for something that fell short of Council and, indeed, other nations. that but could be agreed, or whether we should keep arguing for the gold standard. We thought about that Q151 Mike Gapes: How optimistic are you that, if long and hard, and decided that the position of the UK there were a range of views—given how the P5 have should remain that we wanted to go for the gold been split on a number of other questions recently— standard. we are actually in danger of ending up with an arms trade treaty that is not effective because of certain Q154 Nadhim Zahawi: In terms of harmonising EU countries resisting small arms being included, for member states’ arms export policies, what changes, if example? any, would you like to see to the consolidated criteria Mr Hague: That is too early to say. We do want them and the EU common position on arms exports? How to be included, as I mentioned earlier. I think that the would you ensure that those changes are implemented trajectory of these talks at the moment is going in in Europe? How confident are you that you can the right direction, but I cannot give you a percentage deliver? chance of success on that item. We will do our utmost Mr Hague: There is good co-ordination in Europe. to have a robust and ambitious treaty, one that will There is a monthly meeting in Europe about the have cross-party support in the . enforcement of the consolidated criteria. Of course, there are differences between the consolidated criteria Q152 Mr Donaldson: Will you be providing training and the EU common position. They principally relate and briefing on the arms trade treaty to your personnel to criteria in both documents concerned with respect in overseas posts? Will they, in turn, be engaged in for human rights, but the EU Council common raising these matters at all relevant bilateral meetings? position is fully applied in our export licensing Mr Hague: They are already substantially engaged. process. The decisions we make are fully in accord Do you want to add any detail on that? with the provisions of the EU common position, so, Sarah MacIntosh: An additional answer to Mr from a policy point of view, I am satisfied with that. Gapes’s question is that the FCO uses its network as It does require regular, rigorous co-ordination to make one of its most powerful lobbying tools, so although sure that the effect of the policy is approximately the we are having some change in the departmental same across the whole European Union. arrangements in London, the network is in place. It Chair: Foreign Secretary, thank you for your has been lobbying on the arms trade treaty and will evidence today, and Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:15] Job: 019699 Unit: PG02 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_o002_th_corrected transcript - CAEC 7 Feb 12.xml

Ev 32 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

7 February 2012 Rt Hon William Hague MP, Sarah MacIntosh and David Hall thank you for your contributions. Foreign Secretary, additional written answers that we want from you, we look forward to receiving from you, in the very please. Thank you. near future, the outstanding material, including the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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Written evidence

Written evidence from Dr Neil Cooper, Peace Studies, University of Bradford SUBMISSION TO COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS: ARMS TRADE AND THE LESSONS OF HISTORY1 Abstract 1. Much of the discussion on the Arms Trade Treaty tends to locate it as (a) part of a set of post-Cold War initiatives to regulate the defence trade (UN Arms Register, UN Programme of Action on Small Arms etc) and (b) as a creature of campaigning work by NGOs supported by like-minded states and certain defence industry actors. These factors are certainly important in understanding both the genesis of the ATT agenda and the modalities of the negotiation process. However, for a more nuanced understanding of the ATT and both its potentials and disadvantages it is necessary to also locate the current negotiations in a much longer history of attempts to develop international regulation of the arms trade, the factors that underpinned such initiatives and the problems they encountered. This submission will therefore (a) review some of the lessons that can be derived from earlier attempts to regulate the international defence trade and (b) draw on this longer history to evaluate both the limits and potentials of any future ATT.

Contextualising the ATT 2. The ATT is the latest in a long line of attempts to regulate the international arms trade, many of which pre-date the end of the Cold War. This includes the 1890 Brussels Act; the 1919 St Germain Convention and the 1925 Geneva Traffic Act (neither of which received enough ratifications to enter into force); the 1950 Tripartite Declaration and Near East Arms Co-ordinating Committee established to operationalise the Declaration and the US/Soviet Conventional Arms Transfer Talks in the late 1970s. This submission will discuss the lessons to be derived from the first four of these initiatives. 3. The 1890 Brussels Act was principally an anti-slavery agreement but also included restrictions on the exports of firearms, powder and ammunition aimed at preventing their use in the slave trade and limiting their “pernicious and preponderating part” in “internal wars between the native tribes.2 Support for the treaty was generated, in part, by what today would be described as a pan-European civil society campaign rooted in ethical concerns for the colonised. The treaty was also agreed in a period that saw the development of bans or restrictions on weapons such as Dum Dum bullets whose use was considered to be morally questionable. To this extent the treaty might be said to have reflected a values-based approach to arms regulation that, in its concern with arms and morality, if not in its language, bears some similarity with the agenda of “humanitarian arms control” that has emerged in the post-Cold War era. However, British government support for the Act was as much a function of concerns about the impact of a burgeoning small arms trade to Africa on security and prosperity. As one British colonial official noted at the time, restrictions on the firearms trade to Africa reflected imperial concern to “avoid the development and pacification of this great continent …..[being] carried out in the face of an enormous population, the majority of whom will probably be armed with first-class breech-loading rifles”.3 4. It should also be noted that the Brussels Act and initiatives to restrict morally problematic weapons actually took place in an era generally characterised as having “the fewest restraints and regulations on the arms trade in modern history”.4 One lesson from this period then, is that international regulation to govern the defence trade is not always consonant with a shift to a more restrictive or “ethical” approach to defence exports in general. 5. The 1919 St Germain Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition was motivated in part by Allied concern to prevent surplus weapons stocks from World War One being cascaded down to problem actors. Additionally, it also mirrored the Brussels Act in that its aim, as summarised by a sceptical US official, was “to diminish the power of resistance of the natives to the spread and consolidation of the authority of certain powers”.5 Accordingly, the 1919 convention imposed far stricter restrictions on sales to areas of concern to the imperial powers and a ban on arms shipments to “any country which refuses to accept the tutelage under which it has been placed”.6 Indeed, even though the convention never came into force the European powers informally agreed to carry out its provisions in Africa and the Middle East. Entry into force was not achieved mainly because the US refused to ratify the agreement. This was due to: American concerns about the impact of proposed restrictions on supplies to non-signatories in its Latin American backyard; concerns about implementation requirements that envisaged the provision of information to a Central 1 This submission draws on research on the history of arms trade regulation funded by the British Academy and TREAT. 2 Cited in Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, New York: Scribners, p. 1329. 3 Cited in R.W. Beachey, “The arms trade in East Africa in the late nineteenth century”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1962, p. 453. 4 Keith Krause and Mary K. MacDonald, “Regulating Arms Sales Through World War II”, in Burns, op. cit, p. 712. 5 Office of the Foreign Trade Adviser, April 7 1922. 6 David R. Stone, “Imperialism and Sovereignty: The League of Nations’ Drive to Control the Global Arms Trade”, Journal of Contemporary History, 35 (2), 2000: 213–230. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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Information Office under the auspices of the League of Nations; and a sense that the agreement was at odds with America’s laissez faire approach to the regulation of private business. 6. Further negotiations led to what became the Geneva Traffic Convention of 1925. Once again however, the Convention failed to achieve the necessary ratifications to come into effect. Some states did ratify the convention unconditionally (eg China, Egypt and ) but others did so on condition that it was ratified by certain other states. This, combined with opposition from importers and the failure of the US to ratify until the mid-1930s effectively doomed the convention. Nevertheless, the negotiations did have important legacy effects that should not be overlooked. In particular, proposals for a licensing system for defence exports discussed at both St Germain and Geneva were widely adopted by individual states particularly in the 1930s as the crisis of capitalism created a space for campaigners to reprise earlier criticisms of the role played by arms merchants prior to World War One. 7. There are a number of lessons to be drawn from the 1919 and 1925 initiatives: (i) Agreement is good but ratification is paramount. (ii) The US has a poor history of ratifying conventional arms trade agreements, either failing to do so completely (the Brussels Act, St Germain) or only doing so late in the day (the Geneva Traffic Act). Of course, past behaviour is not necessarily a predictor of future behaviour. (iii) Following on from the latter point, don’t ignore the power of Congress. (iv) A successful agreement will require buy-in from key non-producers and importers. (v) Implementation issues can help bury a treaty if not thought through but implementation agendas (eg in the form of licensing requirements) may also survive after death. (vi) Timing is key to a formal agreement: an agreement that was too early for the US in 1919 and 1925 was too late for everyone else by the mid-30s. (vii) A failed initiative can be revived and even failed treaties may be successful in developing normative consensus on key principles to govern the arms trade. Thus, whilst ratification is paramount and timing is key, agreement should not be pursued simply for its own sake. Dead treaties can be reborn and even if they are killed off again, they can still have important legacy effects. 8. The Cold War is generally characterised as a virtual free-for-all in terms of intra-bloc arms sales. However, there were strong restraints imposed on East-West transfers of defence and dual-use goods both at the national level and in fora such as COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls). An additional initiative in this period was the 1950 Tripartite Declaration between the US, Britain and France. This aimed to regulate defence sales to the Middle East and was given substance through the creation of the top secret Near Easter Arms Control Committee (NEACC) as a forum for consultation between the three states (and, from December 1955, Italy). There was also a more informal arrangement by which states such as Canada and regularly provided information on sales to the region and occasionally consulted with the US on specific sales. The guiding rationale for the Declaration and the creation of NEACC was to (a) strengthen the ability of states in the Middle East to resist Soviet aggression and (b) to maintain an arms balance between Israel and the Arab states. In addition the NEACC Charter also noted that decisions on arms sales would take into account the role of arms transfers in internal security and included a commitment that arms aid should not have a detrimental effect on spending to support economic and social development. In effect however, the concerns regarding internal stability and development became dead letter elements of the regime, only rarely being discussed. Even the ability of states to resist Soviet aggression was rarely considered explicitly. In practice, the regime essentially focussed on maintaining an arms balance between Israel and the Arab states, with the French arguing (prior to Suez) that Israel was at a disadvantage and the US maintaining Israel already had superior military forces. Although NEACC continued meeting well into the 1960s, after the Suez crisis it effectively became more of a diplomatic ritual than a meaningful policy forum. 9. There are a number of observations that can be made about the operation of the regime: (i) Arms transfer decisions were essentially considered through the lens of inter-state/intra-regional security rather than values. There was little linkage made, as in the Brussels Act, between regulating trade and fostering civilisation, nor to internal security (despite the token reference in the NEACC document). Effectively this was a Cold War regime that simply applied the dominant metaphor of superpower balance to the Middle East arena. In addition, it was mainly major weapons sales that were problematised rather than the threats to colonial order posed by small arms that were the principal concern in earlier efforts to regulate the defence trade. This highlights the way discussions on regime creation and implementation are influenced by contemporary models of thinking that are so central to the era that they are simply assumed rather than become the object of discussion. (ii) Formal membership of a regime is not the only indicator of its success as other actors may be encouraged to adopt certain regime practices. (iii) In the early years of the regime, when it operated relatively successfully, export decisions were not discussed in simple binary terms of approval or rejection. Instead, the alternative of either reducing deliveries or spacing them out over a longer period were a regular form of cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 35

compromise. There is a risk that actors can “game” such a system if it becomes formalised but it is, nevertheless, important to acknowledge this as an approach that may have merit in certain cases. (iv) The process of implementation can transform commitments made on paper into dead letter commitments. This again highlights the importance of ensuring good implementation frameworks and transparency (something missing in the case of NEACC); (v) The ultimate failure of the Tripartite Declaration highlights the difficulties of implementation even when a regime consists of a small group of relatively like-minded states. The challenges for an expanded regime are obvious. (vi) Discussions on sales to Israel were made more difficult because, as the French complained, there was no commonly agreed methodology for measuring either balance or the impact of a particular arms transfer on an armaments balance. It is highly unlikely that such an agreed methodology will emerge as part of any ATT agreement. However, the UK government could support work outside of the ATT framework designed to develop and promote model methodologies that could be used to frame discussions on eg the sustainable development or human rights implications of particular transfers. This could represent an important supplement to any formal agreement. (vii) Sales agreements made prior to the Declaration were permitted. Consequently, transfers were approved that were contrary to the principles of the regime and these sales were then cited as justification for additional exports on the grounds they were needed in order to resurrect an armaments balance that had been upset by the original transfers. This may be a problem faced by any putative ATT.

The Current Framework of International Regulation

10. It is important to be realistic about the difference any future ATT is likely to have on defence export licensing practices, not least because overly optimistic claims may influence both the politics of negotiation and judgements about the effectiveness of any treaty that emerges. There are a number of factors that suggest the treaty may, in the short-term, have a relatively limited impact on global approaches to export licensing.

11. First, it is sometimes suggested that the absence of a global agreement means the international arms market is unregulated. However, much of the discussion on the ATT has assumed that any criteria agreed will be less restrictive than either those operated by the EU or the USA. Between them, these actors account for an estimated 64% of major weapons sales in the period 2006–10.7 In addition, it seems likely that states will retain responsibility for interpreting any criteria agreed. As noted above, even a narrowly drawn regime such as the Tripartite Declaration was often unable to reach agreement on what common criteria meant in practice. Differences in interpretation of supposedly common criteria have also been a feature of the EU Code/Common Position. In the short-term therefore, the effect at the global level, on the practice of export licensing decisions may not be as significant as supporters hope and critics fear.

12. Second, the post-Cold War growth in formal international regulation has, ironically, coincided with a relative decline in certain kinds of restraint, particularly with regard to the willingness of states to impose qualitative restrictions on the sale of top-of-the-range equipment. This is largely a function of the fact that commercial arguments for sales have grown in salience relative to ideological or security arguments against them. Indeed, it is worth noting that defence suppliers in the UK and Europe have, at least in part, supported the ATT on the assumption that common global export criteria would help them gain market share by reducing the comparative advantage other suppliers gain from being less scrupulous about who they sell to. At the same time, it has also been suggested that the defence companies of countries that are perceived to operate less rigorous export policies (eg China) may benefit from the “kitemark” effect of an ATT and either be able to sell into new markets or to raise prices. Clearly, both of these views about the effects of the ATT cannot hold at the same time, but they again point to the fact that supporters who envisage the ATT introducing significant restraints on the global defence market may be disappointed, at least in the short-term.

13. Third, formal international regulation (sometimes presented as part of efforts to restrain the defence trade) has also coincided with active efforts to reduce the regulatory restraints governing arms sales. Notable recent initiatives along these lines include the commitment of the Obama administration to overhaul the US export control system, the defence trade cooperation treaties signed by the US with the UK and Australia and the EU directive on intra-community transfers which aims to simplify export procedures to member states. For better or worse, this process is likely to continue irrespective of the outcome of negotiations over the ATT.

14. Fourth, partly because of the factors noted above, the post-Cold War proliferation of formal international regulatory initiatives aimed at managing the defence trade has done little to constrain global defence exports in absolute terms. For example, global exports of major conventional weapons were 24% higher in real terms for the period 2006–2010 than for the preceding 2001–05 period.8 7 SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2011, Oxford: OUP, 2011, p. 273 and 285. 8 Ibid., p. 271. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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15. Despite the factors noted above however, there are still arguments for supporting the attempt to develop an ATT: (i) One of the notable successes of the negotiations to date has been that they have already helped nurture an epistemic community of experts who are beginning the long process of developing a common language and sets of expectations about how to regulate the defence trade. Indeed, initiatives such as the EU’s support for UNIDIR’s programme of regional seminars on the ATT have already begun to facilitate this process and should be maintained. (ii) Whilst problem arms sales may be a function of corruption or deliberate state policy, they can sometimes simply reflect poor knowledge of international regulation or inadequate state capacity. To the extent that the ATT process addresses this issue by building in funding for capacity-building initiatives there are likely to be clear benefits. (iii) It is clear that any eventual ATT will essentially be four treaties in one (a trade treaty, a national security treaty, a human security treaty and an implementation treaty). An ATT that turns out to be more of a trade treaty than a human security treaty may be of questionable worth. However, as long as the human security and implementation dimensions remain relatively strong there is the potential for any future ATT to establish both a relatively high set of normative principles by which to judge defence exports and some kind of framework for discussing adherence to such principles. If such a treaty is eventually agreed then, over the medium to longer term, this may possibly help promote a new normative consensus capable of influencing both the practice of formal members and even non-members. October 2011

Written evidence from the Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) 1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) in the UK works to end the international arms trade, which has a devastating impact on human rights and security, and damages economic development. CAAT believes that large scale military procurement and arms exports only reinforce a militaristic approach to international problems. Established in 1974, CAAT receives around 80% of its funding from its individual supporters. 2. The First Joint Report of Session 2010–11 by your Committees for Arms Export Controls (CAEC), published on 5 April 2011, and the chapter on Arms Exports in the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report on “The FCO’s Human Rights Work 2010–11”, published on 20 July 2011, made very important contributions to the discussion about the UK’s arms export policy. CAAT was particularly pleased that both looked at the contradiction between the increased emphasis on government personnel exploring commercial opportunities, including the promotion of arms exports, and the upholding of human rights. The Government’s responses to both reports was, however, quite inadequate. 3. Your Committees’ new inquiry is most welcome. This submission to it looks at the Review of export controls; the continuing promotion of military exports; sales and licensing to some specific countries; the DSEI arms fair; and arms industry jobs.

The Review 4. CAAT read with profound disbelief Foreign Secretary William Hague MP’s statement of 18 July 2011, in which he reported the findings at the conclusion of the Review into licences granted for export of equipment to the Middle East and North Africa. Your Committees’ initial statement in response, which emphasised the scale of the misjudgement by both the and Labour governments, provided, in contrast, an injection of reality. 5. As your Committees said, direct evidence of an obvious piece of UK supplied equipment in human rights abuse is unlikely to be seen by an official observer. Also disingenuous was the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) use of the term “platforms”, thus limiting the type of weaponry its Review was purported to have covered. 6. Given the range of goods licensed for export to governments which suppressed protest, it strains credulity that there was no “misuse” of the equipment. Worryingly, there is no indication that such evidence was pro- actively looked for. This means that the Foreign Secretary’s statement lacks the credibility that was accorded that of the former Foreign Secretary, David Miliband MP, on 21 April 2009 (Hansard, col 8/9ws), on the use of UK-supplied equipment by Israel in Gaza. This latter examined in detail all the equipment licensed, much of it components. It indicated whether the UK government thought the equipment had been used by Israel in its operations, might have been used, or almost certainly was not. In contrast, William Hague’s statement is unpersuasive and lacking in substance. 7. Also, even now, there is also no clarity about which government departments were involved in the Review. In answer to a parliamentary question on 26 April 2011 (Hansard, col 378w) Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt MP said: “The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is leading this internal review in close consultation with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Ministry of Defence.” cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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8. However, in an answer to a Freedom of Information request dated 12 August 2011, and seen by CAAT, an official at the Counter Proliferation Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) suggested that the review had, so far, been limited to the FCO. Rejecting a request for a copy of the Review, the official said: “The review is a FCO document that provides information, advice and proposals to the Foreign Secretary; The review contains detailed information on the export licensing system, which is based on risk assessment. A detailed public understanding how this is done could potentially undermine the risk assessment process, as well as the export licensing system; The outcome of the review has yet to be discussed by relevant Ministers; Although the review concluded that further work is needed on how we operate certain aspects of our exports, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for BIS (who leads on export controls) had yet to consider and agree how this should be done; Any proposals stemming from the review would need to be discussed and agreed by relevant Ministers, but this had not yet happened; Following such a discussion, agreed proposals might lead to policy changes to our export controls. No discussion had yet taken place about any policy changes, or how these might be delivered.” 9. That the Review was limited to the FCO appears to be confirmed by a letter CAAT’s lawyers received from the Export Control Organisation (ECO) of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) dated 18 August 2011. This said: “The review ... was an internal FCO review and BIS was not involved in the review.” 10. The whole Review process appears confused. It needs to be made transparent, otherwise it does not augur well for the future which requires a clear understanding of what happened in the past. 11. The publicly available data of the ECO also leaves unanswered questions even where some export licences to a particular country were revoked in February 2011. Taking Bahrain as an example, some licences were revoked for small-arms ammunition and for equipment employing cryptography and technology for the use of employing cryptography. Others with the same description were not. It is possible there is a good explanation for this, but it is not available to the interested observer.

Business as usual—continuing the arms export promotion 12. The UK government’s arms sales unit is UK Trade and Investment’s Defence and Security Organisation (UKTI DSO). There are just under 160 civil servants in UKTI DSO while all other identified sectors have a combined total of around 140 UKTI staff devoted to them. This is despite arms accounting for less than 1.5% of UK exports. 13. UKTI DSO’s list of priority markets for 2010–11 was , Australia, , Brunei, India, Iraq, , , Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, , , the and the USA. (Hansard, 28.6.10, Col. 418–9W). A letter to CAAT from UKTI DSO dated 4 May 2011 confirmed that the list remained extant with only Libya removed, on 22 February 2011. 14. Military exports, even when never used, carry with them a message of UK support for the recipient or sales target. It was, therefore, unfortunate to say the least, that Prime Minister David Cameron MP, should have toured the Gulf States and Egypt at the time of the major pro-democracy protests in February 2011 accompanied by representatives from eight military and aerospace companies. 15. At the same time, Defence Minister Gerald Howarth MP, was attending an arms fair in Abu Dhabi, where 93 UK arms companies were promoting their wares with the assistance of 15 staff of UKTI DSO staff which co-hosted a British pavilion with the trade association AeroSpace, Defence, Security (A|D|S). 16. Another aspect of UKTI DSO’s promotional work is to hold informal buffet lunches with A|D|S where the industry can meet newly appointed UK Defence Attachés. Hosted by UKTI DSO’s Senior Management Team, one such lunch on 8 September 2011enabled the companies to meet attachés taking up posts covering Australia, Bahrain, Brunei, , Israel, Kenya, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Yemen. 17. Also on 8 September 2011, the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry held a meeting on the “Middle East: a vast market for UK defence and security companies” on 8 September. Two of the speakers were from UKTI DSO. As well as highlighting opportunities in Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain was mentioned as a “top destination”. 18. Defence Secretary Liam Fox MP told the industry on 13 September 2011 that: “Defence and Security exports play a key role in promoting our foreign policy objectives—building relationships and trust, sharing information and spreading values—these things cannot be measured in monetary terms on a balance sheet alone.” However, as the examples above show, the “spreading of values”, at least in terms of democracy and human rights, appears absent from the decisions as to where UKTI DSO’s efforts are concentrated. It is this complete absence of ethics in the sales promotion effort that has inevitably led to the routine and seemingly indiscriminate approval of licences for the export of military equipment to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Saudi Connection 19. Beginning in the 1960’s, and especially since the signing of the Al Yamamah contracts in the mid- 1980’s, the relationship between the governments of Saudi Arabia and the UK and the company that is now cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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BAE Systems is at the heart of the UK’s arms exports. It seems that nothing, and certainly not human rights’ considerations, can be allowed to jeopardise this.

20. The deals with Saudi Arabia are co-ordinated by the Ministry of Defence Saudi Armed Forces Project (MODSAP). This is based in the the UK Ministry of Defence and in 2010–11 cost £57.41 million. As at 1 April 2011, their composition was as shown in the table below. Number of based in the UK 75 Number of military personnel based in the UK 46 Number of civilians based in Saudi Arabia 32 Number of military personnel based in Saudi Arabia 60

(Information from MODSAP, 2.8.11)

21. The costs are reimbursed by the Saudi Arabia. This means that the autocratic Saudi Arabian government is paying for 107 UK civil servants and 106 members of the UK armed forces.

22. In March 2011 Saudi Arabia sent scores of UK-made armoured personnel carriers into Bahrain in support of the latter’s government’s bloody suppression of pro-democracy protesters. The armoured vehicles, marketed as Tacticas, were manufactured by BAE’s Land Systems Division in Newcastle Upon Tyne with final assembly taking place in Belgium. Although the UK government revoked some licences to Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia at the time of the “Arab Spring”, not one licence was revoked with regards to Saudi Arabia.

23. Even if the Tacticas or other UK-supplied equipment has not been used against protesters in Bahrain, and we cannot tell if they have been, the Saudi presence in that country increases the capacity of the Bahraini authorities to suppress protests.

24. While there has not been the level of overt protest in Saudi Arabia as in some other areas of the Middle East and North Africa, on 3 October 2011 Saudi police were reported to have used live ammunition to disperse protesters in a village in the east of the country injuring some protesters. It is unlikely that this will be the only such event in a country synonymous with repression and autocratic rule. It is perhaps worth noting here that the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2010 ranks Saudi Arabia at 160 out of 167, even below Libya which was ranked at 158.

25. The UK’s reputation as an advocate for human rights is undermined by its military commercial links with the Saudi authorities. The lessons from the support given to Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Gadaffi in Libya need to be heeded and the promotion and export of military equipment to Saudi Arabia stopped immediately.

The United Arab Emirates

26. The United Arab Emirates is also ranked as an authoritarian regime on the Democracy Index 2010. This did not prevent it from becoming a UKTI DSO “priority market” in 2010–11 and the recipient of an increasing amount of UK weaponry. Export licences to the value of £254.1 million were granted in 2010. The Export Credits Guarantee Department gave £113.4 million cover for the export of a multi-role tanker transport bought by the UAE armed forces.

27. As with Saudi Arabia, UAE armed forces entered Bahrain in support of the Government when the regime faced opposition from its own people. CAAT is concerned about the potential consequences of the UK building yet another military commercial relationship with a regime which denies freedom and human rights to its citizens.

Libya

28. On 11 September 2011, the Sunday Telegraph revealed attempts to sell sniper rifles to Libya in the months immediately prior to the uprising there. Manroy Engineering and Accuracy International were said to be willing to host visits to the UK by Libyan officials. From the time the European Union arms embargo on Libya was lifted in 2004, UK governments had enthusiastically promoted military sales to Tripoli. UKTI DSO’s predecessor, the Defence Export Services Organisation, opened an office in Tripoli in January 2006 and then Prime Minister Tony Blair visited in 2007 signing an Accord on a Defence Cooperation and Defence Industrial Partnership.

29. Papers found abandoned (Sunday Telegraph 25.9.11) in Tripoli show UKTI DSO securing an invitation for one of Gaddafi’s sons, Khamis, to the Queen’s Official Birthday reception in June 2010. The 10,000 strong Khamis Brigade, which was to attempt to crush rebellions in Benghazi and Misurata, had been a customer for UK arms. Clearance for the training of some of the Brigade’s members by the SAS had been given in January 2009.

30. When an authoritarian regime falls, there are other dangers too. Not least, in Libya, there is no clear indication of which body or bodies currently possess the weaponry supplied from the UK. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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The Arms Fair Invites 31. The biennial Defence and Security Equipment international (DSEi) exhibition took place from 13 to 16 September 2011 at the ExCel Centre in London’s Docklands. DSEi was supported by UKTI DSO and Liam Fox MP, the Defence Secretary, gave a speech on the first day while his colleague, the Defence Equipment Minister Peter Luff MP, spoke later in the week. 32. In the light of the “Arab Spring”, CAAT was keen to learn which overseas governments had received official invitations. BIS Minister Mark Prisk MP said: “The following countries have been invited to send official government defence and security delegations to Defence and Security Equipment International 2011 (DSEi11): Australia, Austria, , Brazil, Brunei, , Canada, , Czech Republic, Denmark, , , France, Germany, Ghana, , Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, , New Zealand, , Pakistan, , , Republic of Korea, , , , , , Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, , UN, USA, NATO.” (Hansard, 7.6.11, col 220/1w) CAAT was pleased, but surprised, to find that none from the Middle East and North Africa were included. 33. However, DSEi’s VIP briefing document said “125 individual invitations have been extended to 61 countries so far.” The complete list was finally published by UKTI DSO on 12 September 2011, the day before DSEi started. The additional countries invited were: Algeria, , Bahamas, Bahrain, , , Egypt, , Iraq, Ireland, , , Kuwait, , Malaysia, Mexico, , Nigeria, Oman, Philippines, , Saudi Arabia, , Thailand, United Arab Emirates, . 34. CAAT is still trying to ascertain why, unusually, so many invitations were extended after an official list was issued. It is, however, noteworthy that many “embarrassing” governments feature on the later list. Although attendance at DSEi does not mean that export licences will necessarily be forthcoming, the official invitations are an indication as to the countries the UK government wishes to promote military equipment to and thus bears some analysis. 35. Of the 63 invitees, 14 were “authoritarian regimes” on the Democracy Index 2010. These are Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Vietnam. Five invitees have been identified by the FCO as countries with “the most serious wide-ranging human rights concerns”. These are Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. Eight invitees were in a “major armed conflict” in 2010 (as identified by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)— Colombia, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Turkey and the USA. 36. Comparing the invitation list to that of the previous DSEi in 2009, eight countries were invited which had not been on the earlier occasion: Bahamas, Croatia, Georgia, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Nigeria and Ukraine. Three countries were not invited in 2011 which had been in 2009—China, and, unsurprisingly, Libya. 37. The DSEi arms fair also facilitates the promotion of military equipment manufactured outside the UK, with more than 1,300 exhibitors coming from many countries including Pakistan. The DSEi organisers closed the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) stand and Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organisation Pavilion as Caroline Lucas MP discovered that these had, in contravention of the rules, displayed promotional literature containing references to cluster munitions. The UK export licensing regulations would not cover sales from POF to, for example, Bahrain or Vietnam. 38. It is shameful that an event such as the DSEI arms fair continues to be held in the UK and is supported by the UK government. CAAT hopes that the delay in issuing the full invitation list indicates that at least some part of the Government felt some unease about inviting representatives of authoritarian regimes to shop for military equipment in London and that this might be the last arms fair on UK soil.

Arms Industry Jobs 39. One of the main reasons given for continuing to export arms is employment. Despite all the support which it receives from the Government, BAE’s UK workforce is in long-term decline and its role in the UK economy is unexceptional. Jane’s Defence Weekly (20.4.11) projects that BAE’s military manufacturing employment will decrease from the March 2011 figure of 32,700 to 18,900 in 2015. 40. Export orders are unlikely to change this as the trend is for more goods to be made or assembled in the purchasing country. For example, the £700 million deal signed during Prime Minister David Cameron’s visit to India in July 2010 was for 57 Hawk aircraft to be manufactured under licence there by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. The number of UK jobs to be supported by the deal was said to be just 200. 41. At the end of September 2011, BAE announced 3000 job losses. Nearly 900 of these are at Brough, home of Hawk production. This is about two thirds of the workforce there and there are suggestions that Brough could close. CAAT hopes this might provide the impetus necessary for change. Many of BAE’s employees possess valuable skills which could be better used, especially as there is a shortage of engineers. 42. One need for the skills is renewable energy technologies. Unlike the stagnant arms market, the renewables market is expanding rapidly, but there needs to be Government investment in order for UK industry to claim cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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a substantial share of the market. With climate change seen by many, including some in government, as the biggest threat the UK faces, investing in renewable energy rather than the arms industry is a win-win situation. October 2011

Written evidence from the Export Group for Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) RE: NEW INQUIRY BY THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS INTO STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS In response to the Committee’s request of 8 September 2011 for evidence to its new inquiry for its consideration, we would submit the following comments, in summary: Charging—we welcome the UK Government’s reported intention to reconsider this proposal; Current Status of UK Export Controls—we are still receiving numerous complaints from companies about delays in the processing of licence applications; UK Export Control Policy Review—we are concerned that we have not been consulted on this policy review by the FCO; UK Export Control System Review—we stand ready to provide input into the ECO on a possible systemic review (separate to the above FCO Policy review) aimed at making the UK’s export control system more efficient; Technical Assistance—we are concerned at proposals coming out of the EU to introduce controls in this area; Intra-Community Transfers—we are concerned that progress on the EU’s intra-community transfers directive has not been as smooth as it should have been; UK/US Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty—we are reassured that the UK MoD is approaching implementation of the Treaty in a mature and carefully-considered way; US Proposals on Dual and Third Country Nationals—we believe that this issue has now been effectively dealt with in a way which has clearly demonstrated the wisdom and benefit of constructive engagement between the Government and Industry on an issue of common concern; US Export Control Reform—we are extremely supportive of the export control reform proposals which have been coming out of the USA; Anglo-French Treaty—we are constructively engaging with our French counterparts and our respective Governments to identify potential solutions which would make bilateral defence trade between the UK and France as easy as possible; Arms Trade Treaty—we continue to remain engaged, as the negotiations leading towards the framing and adoption of an effective ATT are reaching a conclusion; “Red Tape Challenge”—this has been a useful initiative, which has merely served to emphasise the extent of the UK’s national limitations, when so much relevant new legislation has been coming out of the EU; Awareness of ITAR—we have been “interested” in hearing about some recent pronouncements which have been emerging from the UK MoD, which have merely served to reveal in sharp focus the degree of confusion that exists there on ITAR issues. More detailed comments on the above issues are as follows:

Introduction The Export Group for Aerospace & Defence (EGAD) is a UK-based not-for-profit making special interest industry group, founded in September 2004, focusing exclusively on all aspects of export and trade control matters. EGAD is the only dedicated national industrial body in the UK dealing exclusively with export control issues. EGAD operates under the joint auspices of ADS Group Ltd, the British Naval Equipment Association (BNEA), INTELLECT and the Society of Maritime Industries (SMI). A dedicated website (www.egad.org.uk) has been created at the request of the group’s Executive Committee and with guidance from its Awareness Outreach Activities Sub-Committee, that is intended to become the first port of call for companies as the source of user-friendly basic, initial guidance on all aspects of export and trade controls, created by like-minded people to help compliance staff within companies. It seeks to identify potential sources of help, and ideas for problem solving, and presents easy steps to “bite-sized compliance”. The website has been kept simple, and, in addition to providing information on EGAD, itself, seeks to present a practical and simple step-by-step guide on understanding export and trade controls, and addressing the fundamental questions which companies ask: when do I need an export licence and how do I go about trying to obtain and use one? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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EGAD has also created, with Cranfield University, a series of externally-accredited training courses in export control compliance, at four levels, running from very basic awareness (appropriate for all company staff) up to a Master’s equivalent course (for senior export control compliance managers within companies). For further information, details on these are available at: www.strategicexportcontrols.org/index.cfm.

EGAD welcomes this opportunity to contribute to the open consultation around Strategic Export Controls; CAEC invited comment on several specific areas, the response of EGAD to those areas, is detailed below:

1. Charging

1.1. We welcome the fact that the UK Government is apparently re-considering its previous proposals to introduce a charging system for the submission of export and trade control licence applications from April 2012. We believe that this decision is the correct one for the Government to have taken, given the serious impact that the introduction of such a charge would have had on UK exports of strategic goods (ie not just exports from the UK Defence Industry), especially those of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the current, highly challenging global economic climate.

1.2. However, we realise that this proposal is not going away (as this is at least the third time that it has been raised since the 1996 Green Paper). UK Industry would welcome the opportunity to work with Government to formulate proposals that address effectively the issue of funding for those UK Government departments most heavily involved in the export controls process, so that a truly effective and administratively efficient system can be formulated which may achieve this.

2. Current Status of UK Export Controls

2.1. Whilst it is perceived that the current export control system, and especially the turnaround of licence applications, has recovered to a certain extent over the past year, we are concerned that this minor improvement has been due to efforts by the Export Control Organisation (ECO) and its advisory departments to put additional effort and resources into the processing of Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) applications. This has been at the expense of some other aspects of the wider UK export control system (especially the demise of the “Rating” system earlier this year, and the detriment of the Open Individual Export Licensing—or OIEL— system).

2.2. Also, some of the new Open General Export Licences (OGELs) which have been issued have proven to be so unfathomable to interpret as to dissuade even expert export control practitioners from registering for them.

3. UK Export Control Policy Review

3.1. To date we are unaware of any consultations, informal or formal, which have been related to the announced Foreign & Commonwealth Office Review of the UK’s Defence Export Policy, which is reported to have been being taking place since early-2011.

3.2. We would, naturally, be keen to have had some input to this review, and would have stood ready to assist in it, but, at present, are awaiting some formal announcement from the FCO.

4. UK Export Control System Review

4.1 There are, two aspects to the UK’s Export Control System: 1) the policy side focuses on what UK companies should be permitted to sell to whom around the World, which is the predominant focus of attention for the Non-Governmental Organisations, the media, the public and many UK politicians, and 2) there is the systems and procedures side, which deals with when a company (or individual) needs an export or trade control licence and how they should go about trying to obtain and use one, which is the predominant focus for most people in UK Industry. Therefore, we believe that there would be as strong an interest in any potential review of how the UK’s export control system operates from those in Industry whose commercial activities are governed by it, as there would be in the overall policy, itself.

4.2 We believe that there is enormous scope for the further review of the UK’s export control system to be undertaken, in order to alleviate much of its current burden; the numbers of licence refusals have remained extremely small (at c.1%, or so) , and we are certain that there must be a large swathe of current SIELs which could be safely and responsibly removed from the scope of the current SIEL system, and placed within the ambit of the OGEL or OIEL systems, instead. As the workload on the ECO and its advisory departments has risen, the need for such a review has become increasingly pressing.

4.3 We must emphasise that we are not seeking the movement of SIEL cases where there is the remotest doubt, based on past experience, that a licence would be issued by Government, but merely the movement of those cases where a licence will inevitably be granted. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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5. Technical Assistance 5.1. The new proposals from the European Commission to introduce some form of technical assistance controls across Europe, as part of the “Intra-Community Transfers Directive” are causing concern. At present UK Defence Companies are not subject to such controls, although we understand that a number of our European partners are. 5.2. We would urge the UK Government to oppose the introduction of such controls, and, if these efforts were to fail, that they must ensure that the parameters of these new controls, and the definitions that they use must be as clear and simple as possible.

6. Intra-Community Transfers 6.1. We are disappointed that progress towards the adoption of the new ICT arrangements has been as slow as it has been, and remain convinced that it could have been achieved faster than has turned out to be the case. 6.2. The considerable potential benefits that the ICT presents in significantly reduced nugatory bureaucracy for companies across the EU, and, thus, for speeding up the European supply chains for UK firms, mean that UK Industry supports the aim behind this initiative, if not the current status with its delivery.

7. UK/US Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty 7.1 We have been engaged with the UK MoD on discussions about how best to test the implementation of the Treaty, and have put forward a number of UK companies who may be prepared to undertake “Pathfinder” testing of the Treaty, and its implementation, as well as providing fora at which speakers from the UK Government (and especially the UK MoD) can brief representatives of UK Industry on the latest developments. 7.2 We are hopeful that the “Pathfinders” will be successfully concluded, and that, as a result, the decision will be made early in 2012 to go ahead and implement it fully, as we seriously believe that this Treaty offers considerable benefits to the UK MoD and Industry. However, we must ensure that we are in a position to make an informed decision on whether to go ahead and implement the Treaty, and that we are aware of any and all potential unforeseen pitfalls which we could come across.

8. US Proposals on Dual and Third Country Nationals 8.1. On 15 August 2011 the new US Regulations on ITAR controls impacting on dual and third country nationals came into force. Since January 2011 a UK MoD-led British Government team had been having a series of meetings with leading experts from UK Industry (facilitated by EGAD) to discuss what the UK was going to be doing to implement these new regulations. As a result of these efforts, the UK has been one of the very few countries to have put into place interpretations, guidance and comprehensive plans for the implementation of these new regulations. 8.2. We regard this as having been a model for future consultations on similar topics of equal importance which may arise. However, there are still concerns, especially in the light of the MoD legal adviser’s refusal to confirm otherwise, that the implementation of screening arrangements as required to use the exemption at Part 126.18(c)(2) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations may continue to conflict with UK employment and human rights legislation, thereby exposing UK companies to legal risk.

9. US Export Control Reform 9.1. We remain hugely supportive and enthusiastic about the enormous potential benefits for all parties which may arise from the on-going export control reform process which is underway in the USA, if this is able to reach full fruition and implementation, as envisaged.

10. Anglo-French Treaty 10.1. There have been discussions, under the framework of the Defence and Security Co-operation Treaty between the French Republic and the UK, of 2 November 2010, of how defence trade and cooperation between these two countries can be further expanded upon, and these discussions will be continuing, within the context of the EU’s own proposals to make intra-community transfers of defence and security goods less bureaucratically-burdensome. EGAD fully supports these efforts to reduce the bureaucracy which is currently inherent in bilateral defence trade and collaboration between the UK and France, as we would with all of our other countries who are deemed not to be destinations of concern in of themselves, and also to have in place effective national export control systems and procedures to prevent potential diversion to undesirable third parties elsewhere.

11. Arms Trade Treaty 11.1. We remain engaged with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) as the negotiations towards the final agreement on an international ATT come to fruition, hopefully at the July 2012 Conference at the , in New York. We are supportive of the philosophy which underpins the ATT discussions, which we cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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hope result in the framing and adoption of a Treaty which will be as effective as possible in curbing the activities of irresponsible proliferators. 11.2. We are of the view that the final ATT needs to be kept as simple as possible, so as to enable it to have any chance of being able to be implemented around the World in a consistent way by nations who are signatories to it, many of whom will, of necessity, require considerable support and assistance in trying to put in place the necessary and robust control systems and procedures which will be essential.

12. “Red Tape Challenge” 12.1 EGAD welcomed the launch of the UK Government’s “Red Tape Challenge”, one facet of which deals with export licensing (http://www.redtapechallenge.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/export-control/). 12.2 In practice, most of the current (and many of the potential future) problems in this regard are outside of the control of the UK Government, and, in fact, emanate from the EU Commission, and specifically from EU law. This means that a more effective method to cutting red tape would be for stronger UK representation at EU level against the introduction of such measures.

13. Awareness of ITAR 13.1. Industry is concerned at the lack of an understanding of the implications of ITAR within DE&S, and the UK MoD, and confusion on re-export and re-transfer matters under ITAR. In some instances this would have placed the IPT’s decision in direct conflict with ITAR rules. Industry would suggest that there is a need to raise awareness within the DE&S, and other parts of UK MoD, of the legal implications of decisions taken by IPTs that have export control consequences. 10 October 2011

Written evidence from the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG) Introduction 1. The world is now in the run-up to the negotiating Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Since 2006, the UK has been widely perceived as the lead government on this Treaty process, which has the potential for significant positive humanitarian and human rights impact. However, UK profile and activity has significantly reduced in recent months, with potentially negative results in the final Treaty, and the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG)9 recommends the Government to urgently scale up its ATT work. 2. The UKWG on Arms believes that recent events in the Middle East and North Africa have exposed certain weaknesses in UK arms transfer policy and practice. We further maintain that the recent internal review of UK export control policy was flawed in terms of process and has failed to properly acknowledge and address these weaknesses. This memorandum contains a number of suggestions as to how UK policy could be amended and recommends that the Government should henceforth adopt a much more inclusive approach to reform. 3. In addition, this memorandum considers several other issues, such as illegal activities at the Defence & Security Equipment International exhibition, the involvement of UK financial institutions in cluster munitions production, and the introduction of a ‘torture end-use’ control.

Recommendations Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations 4. The UK Government needs to urgently reprioritise its leadership role on the ATT. The Government must treat the ATT as a key diplomatic priority and make more resources available at both the political level (through engagement by Ministers) and at senior official level. 5. The Government must in particular reassert striving for a Treaty that will have positive humanitarian and human right benefits. While the Government should continue to work to bring sceptical states into the ATT mainstream, we urge it not to compromise on essential Treaty elements, eg in relation to human rights and international humanitarian law and a comprehensive scope, in the interests of universal acceptance. 6. The Government should continue to promote the current Chair’s Paper as the starting document for the ATT Diplomatic Conference, and must resist attempts by sceptics to water-down this paper. 7. The Government should throw its full weight behind ensuring that the whole ATT Diplomatic (negotiating) Conference, and not just the Committee of the Whole, is open to civil society, and should revert to including an NGO representative, as well as an industry representative on its ATT delegation. 9 The UK Working Group on Arms comprises Action on Armed Violence, Amnesty UK, Article 36, Omega Research Foundation, Oxfam and Saferworld. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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UK arms transfer policy and practice 8. Having failed to involve external stakeholders in the UK export control review process so far, the UK Government should engage fully with these stakeholders as the recommendations of the review are developed and implemented. This engagement could be in the form of workshops that would allow for discussion of the results so far and for further improvements to be made, with a clear timetable for the process to identify when these changes will be completed and implemented. 9. Arms transfer licensing policy must be adjusted so that it: is brought in line with the actual criteria used to grant licences with a shift in focus from “evidence of previous misuse” to “risk and likelihood” in the risk analysis process; ensures the context within which arms may be used is included in such analysis; takes full account of the capacity of the proposed end-user to use equipment in accordance with international obligations; takes a longer-term and broader attitude to risk including consideration of governance issues; engages with other relevant Government processes and initiatives, eg the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS); better utilises external expertise; and reduces scope for licensing decisions to give undue weight to political, strategic or economic factors. 10. The UK Government should immediately update its arms export licensing criteria to accurately reflect its obligations under the 2008 EU Common Position, which contains much stronger commitments on transfer licensing than those currently employed. 11. The Government should consider developing a list of particularly sensitive ‘countries of concern’ to which additional licensing safeguards, such as making licensing decisions based on a ‘presumption of denial’, could be applied. 12. As part of its commitment to improve scrutiny of security and justice assistance in the future, the Government should disclose the evaluation of the training received by the Libyan Police in 2007 and respond to the CAEC’s 2008 recommendation on this issue. 13. The Government should provide to the CAEC details of what evidential standards it utilises when checking end-use issues relating to UK arms transfers, including details of how monitoring is undertaken, what checks are actually carried out and by whom, and how information is collated, assessed and analysed when making conclusions about the potential misuse of UK-supplied equipment. 14. To allow meaningful scrutiny of the Government’s implementation of its arms transfer policy, continued improvements are necessary on the quality of information provided in its annual, quarterly and online reporting. Improvements should include qualitative information such as the types, quantities and end-users or end-uses of UK-licensed equipment for all licence types, including open licences. Such improvements would also be of considerable benefit to the Government when explaining seemingly controversial licensing decisions, especially in difficult cases.

Defence & Security Equipment International exhibition 15. The UKWG suggests that the CAEC request information on the scope and nature of compliance checks before and during all UK defence and security exhibitions. 16. To prevent future promotion of cluster munitions, the Government should prohibit any state that has not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not signed a written guarantee that they (or any subsidiary or partner) do not produce cluster munitions or their components, from attending any trade event in the UK. 17. Any company guilty of displaying illegal promotional literature should be required to in future submit all promotional materials for explicit approval by exhibition organisers. 18. Any company guilty of repeated illegal promotion should be refused permission to exhibit in future, with the length of their ban based on the severity of the malpractice and remedial action taken by the company. 19. In light of the apparent clear breaches of UK legislation, the UKWG call on the Government to launch immediate investigations into Beechwood Equipment Ltd, Pakistan Ordinance Factories and the Nammo Group and prosecute any company found to be in breach of UK legislation. 20. We urge the Government to confirm its intention to honour existing commitments made by the previous government to end indirect financial support for cluster munitions.

EU Common Position Review 21. We urge the UK Government to continue to press the European Commission and EU Member States to urgently introduce a torture end-use ‘catch all clause’ through an amendment to EC Regulation 1236/2005. 22. If, after the EU Commission’s November 2011 discussions on amending the EC Regulation, there is no progress on establishing the end-use clause and in light of almost four years of delay, there is a strong case for a torture end-use control to be introduced unilaterally at a UK level (thereby setting an example for EU partners to follow), in concordance with the UK Government’s previous statement that it would consider introducing such a control independently. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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23. We also urge the UK to continue its efforts to strengthen EC Regulation 1236/2005 to broaden the range of equipment covered, specifically by updating the annexes on prohibited equipment (Annex 2), eg to include all drugs used in lethal injection, and controlled equipment (Annex 3), so as to reflect developments in the security equipment market.

Detailed Analysis Arms Trade Treaty negotiations 24. The UKWG is concerned that the resources devoted and priority accorded to the ATT in the FCO at this vital stage in the run-up to final negoitations have been significantly reduced. During July 2011 PrepComs and the 2011 UN First Committee, other supportive States (including major UK allies) have been telling us at the UN that their impression is that the UK has “rolled back” in its leadership and activity on the ATT. Comments tend to focus on UK interventions on the ATT being notably much less substantial than in previous years, a reduction of political profile, and an absence of senior official activity. 25. It is noteworthy that there is no longer a dedicated post of lead ATT negotiator for the FCO with the ending of the post of Multilateral Disarmament Ambassador in July 2011. The lead role has shifted to the Head of the FCO’s Counter-Proliferation Department, who would appear to have a large number of other demands on her time and attention. While we have worked closely with the UK since 2006 on the ATT, there has been less interaction with the FCO during 2011. Moreover, although we have previously received assurances from UK Ministers that there would be no reduction in ATT resourcing or activity (see last CAEC evidence session with Minister Alistair Burt) this has not been borne out in practice. Similarly, we are concerned that other important UK departments and ministries, such as BIS and the MOD, are failing to allocate the resources necessary to ensure the UK does all it can to deliver a meaningful Treaty. 26. These factors appear to be both reducing UK influence in the process, which in turn affects the level of drive to achieve a strong humanitarian and human rights oriented Treaty. The UK’s reduced profile on the ATT internationally and at the UN is leading other states to assume that UK support for an ATT with a clear humanitarian and human rights focus is waning. 27. It should be underlined that the UK has much at stake in these negotiations. The ATT is an extremely significant multilateral treaty (the most significant treaty in 30 years, according to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs), which as Alistair Burt noted in March 2011, “has the potential to prevent human rights abuses, reduce conflict and make the world a safer place”.10 28. Because the UK has been perceived internationally as the main initiator and driver of the ATT, whatever the outcome in July 2012 it will reflect on UK diplomacy; it is therefore in the UK interest to ensure a robust treaty, rather than a weak and ineffective one. To be effective the ATT must include: — clear humanitarian and human rights goals and objectives; — comprehensive scope (all conventional weapons, components and ammunition and potentially lethal weapons used in policing and internal security) and all types of transactions; — strong criteria against which arms transfer applications are assessed, based on human rights and international humanitarian law and socio-economic development; and — transparent and practical implementation mechanisms. 29. We welcome the fact that the UK is working to bring P5 members China and Russia, which so far have not been convinced of the merits of a robust Treaty, into the ATT mainstream. However we urge the Government not to compromise on essential elements, eg in relation to human rights and international humanitarian law and a comprehensive scope, in the interests of getting universal acceptance. We recognise the give-and-take nature of negotiations, but the Treaty must retain its humanitarian and human rights orientation if it is to have impact on the millions affected by conflict and armed violence every year. 30. To achieve these goals, the Government must put its full weight behind the negotiations, including not only adequate staff resources but also concerted political engagement especially from FCO but from all departments concerned, including BIS, DFID and MOD. We would also recommend greater parliamentary engagement, which could, for example, include participation by the CAEC at the Diplomatic Conference next July to reinforce the message of UK support for a strong result. 31. Three ATT Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs) have so far been held, in advance of a one- month Diplomatic (negotiating) Conference scheduled for July 2012. The key output of the most recent PrepCom (July 2011) was an informal Chair’s Draft Paper which, although not containing all that the UKWG would like, includes many of the essential elements of a humanitarian and human rights-focused ATT. The Chair’s Draft Paper is not written as a treaty per se, but there are detailed provisions regarding inter alia the scope of weapons, types of transfers, criteria governing transfers and implementation mechanisms. 32. It is planned that the final PrepCom, scheduled for February 2012, will establish the rules of procedure for the Diplomatic Conference. Key among the deliberations of the PrepCom will be a decision about how the 10 http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=560974582 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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Chair’s Draft Paper (which has no formal status) may be used in the final negotiations. We urge the UK to continue to promote the current Chair’s Draft Paper as the starting document for the Diplomatic Conference. 33. In addition, the final PrepCom will decide on whether the negotiations will be open or closed, ie whether civil society will be able to attend as observers. We urge the UK Government to push very strongly for this— a number of sceptical governments are likely to seek closed negotiations. The Government has recognised the important role of global civil society in the ATT process at both the national and international (UN) level. This has included financial support for NGO activity at the UN, which has been recognised as mutually beneficial in terms of outreach and technical support. This is particularly so for conflict-affected States, which are often less-capacitated than big European delegations. The UK also had an NGO representative on its ATT delegation from 2008–2010, and we urge that this practice be resumed.

Recommendations 34. The UK Government needs to urgently reprioritise its leadership role on the ATT. The Government must treat the ATT as a key diplomatic priority and make more resources available at both the political level (through engagement by Ministers) and at senior official level. 35. The Government must in particular reassert striving for a Treaty that will have positive humanitarian and human right benefits. While the Government should continue to work to bring sceptical states into the ATT mainstream, we urge it not to compromise on essential Treaty elements, eg in relation to human rights and international humanitarian law and a comprehensive scope, in the interests of universal acceptance. 36. The Government should continue to promote the current Chair’s Paper as the starting document for the ATT Diplomatic Conference, and must resist attempts by sceptics to water-down this paper. 37. The Government should throw its full weight behind ensuring that the whole ATT Diplomatic (negotiating) Conference, and not just the Committee of the Whole, is open to civil society, and should revert to including an NGO representative, as well as an industry representative on its ATT delegation.

MENA and the Arab Spring UK arms transfers to MENA 38. As the 2010–2011 Committees on Arms Export Control (CAEC) Report pointed out, the recent uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) threw a spotlight on UK arms transfer policy and government promotion of arms exports. We support the request in the Report for further information regarding exports to the particular countries in the MENA region that experienced uprisings and the request to the Government to state what changes it will implement to minimise the risk of UK arms being used for internal repression by authoritarian regimes.11 39. The Government’s decision to review UK export policy was therefore very welcome, however we have concerns about the way the review has been carried out. While there are some positives to which we can point in the Foreign Secretary’s statement of 13 October in which he announced the outcome of the review, there are also a number of unanswered questions as well as a suggestion that export policy will continue to be too reactive. Ultimately, we fear that the nettle has not been fully grasped. 40. In 2008 the CAEC expressed concern regarding the licensing of the export of water cannons and armoured-personnel carriers to Libya in 2007. The CAEC received the following reassurance from the Government: “the Libyan Police … had successfully completed, and been assessed against, appropriate training on the use of this equipment and best practice in public order situations…Independent assessors from the UK MoD Police and Humberside Police evaluated this training. HMG considered the level of risk that the goods would have been used contrary to Criterion 2 to have been mitigated to an acceptable level by the training and evaluation.”12 41. Despite this reassurance the CAEC stated that: “We have misgivings about these exports to Libya. In this case with Libya’s poor record on human rights there is a risk that the exports could be misused … “In responding to this Report we recommend that the Government explain whether in issuing export licences for armoured personnel carriers and water cannons to Libya it made an exception to its policy to refuse an export licence if the issue of a licence is assessed to be inconsistent with the Consolidated Criteria and whether it will carry out end-use monitoring in the case of these exports to Libya.”13 42. As far as the UKWG is aware no Government response was received. 11 ‘First Report: Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation’, CAEC, 5 April 2011, para. 131, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmquad/686/68614.htm#a17. 12 ‘First Joint Report of Session 2007–2008, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2008): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2006, Quarterly Reports for 2007, licensing policy and review of export control legislation’, CAEC, Para 87, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmquad/254/25408.htm. 13 Ibid., Paras 89 and 90. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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43. The concerns expressed by the CAEC in 2008 have unfortunately been borne out by the violent suppression of protests in countries including Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to all of which, in 2010, the Government granted export licences for equipment that could be used to facilitate internal repression. While many export licences to these destinations were revoked when the uprisings began the UKWG believes that the licences should have been refused in the first place due to the risk of the goods being misused. 44. Two particular exports demonstrate how UK equipment could be used to facilitate human rights violations. UK company NMS International sold 10 armoured vehicles to Libya having first obtained a UK export licence.14 It is not known when these vehicles were exported but some of these vehicles were identified on the streets of Libya in February 2011 during a Government crackdown against protesters. The UK Government has repeatedly claimed there is no evidence of UK equipment being used in Libya, yet we draw the Committees’ attention to the video footage and photographs documented by Amnesty International showing distinctive armoured crowd-control vehicles patrolling the streets of Libya in February 2011, crowd-control vehicles licensed for sale by the UK Government.15 We believe this is clear evidence of the use of British equipment against civilians in Libya. Amnesty International first drew the Government’s attention to this material in February 2011; we are unclear on what basis this has been dismissed. 45. In January 2011, the UK-arm of US-based General Dynamics were fulfilling a contract to upgrade communications systems for , and armoured personnel carriers (however the upgrade was not completed before the company pulled out of the contract). These vehicles were for the Khamis Brigade, which was among those elements of the Libyan security services directly involved in putting down the Libyan uprising.16 46. We are also concerned over the UK Government’s stated wish to promote arms exports and that this may trump human rights concerns. In 2010 at the Libyan arms exhibition LIBDEX the UK pavilion was co- sponsored by UKTI DSO and NMS International. At least 50 UK companies exhibited, including those that sell sniper rifles, crowd-control ammunition, armoured vehicles and electrified razor wire. The UK pavilion at the February 2011 IDEX fair in UAE featured companies selling crowd-control equipment and armoured vehicles. In February 2011 David Cameron visited Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman along with senior representatives from BAE Systems, Thales UK and Qinetiq. The UKWG questions whether the Government should be giving this level of support to UK companies to help them secure contacts to export equipment to authoritarian regimes. We are also concerned that such high-level and aggressive support for UK arms exports could corrupt the export licensing process, as officials are clearly placed in a difficult position if they are refusing licences for deals that have already been promoted at the political level. 47. Also noteworthy is that although, as mentioned above, the Government revoked many licences for transfers to Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, no licences were revoked for transfers to Saudi Arabia. UKWG members have previously presented evidence that the Saudi air force was involved in indiscriminate attacks against civilians in Northern Yemen in late 2009. Eyewitness testimony, including photographic evidence detailed sustained and intensive bombardment by Saudi Arabian planes reported to have killed hundreds of people, caused widespread damage to homes and infrastructure and displaced up to 280,000 people.17 This evidence subsequently corroborated by information obtained from released US diplomatic cables from 7 February 2010, which detailed specific concerns over attacks against civilians including satellite imagery reportedly showing a bombed medical clinic.18 48. In a letter to the Chair of the CAEC in February 2010, FCO Minister Alistair Burt admitted the use of UK-sourced aircraft by the Saudi Air Force in attacks but went on to state that “after consulting a number of information sources” the Government had concluded that these attacks were proportionate.19 In light of available evidence, it is hard to see how this assessment by the Government was reached. More information regarding the identity of the information sources and the nature of the evidence to which the Minister referred might be useful in this regard. 49. In March 2011, footage emerged of Saudi Arabia sending UK-supplied Tactica armoured vehicles to Bahrain. Given the UK Government’s decision to revoke a large number of licences for transfers to Bahrain due to serious and substantial risk over the likely misuse of UK-supplied equipment in the current crackdown, it is unclear why there has been no action to revoke relevant export licences to Saudi Arabia. There is no evidence that either Saudi military action in Yemen, or its involvement in the brutal crackdown in Bahrain has resulted in any tightening of licensing policy or the revocation of any arms export licences. This leads UKWG 14 ‘UK firm defends Libya military sales’, , 21 February 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/uk- firm-defends-libya-military-sales. 15 ‘Libya: UK Government may have licensed crowd control equipment used to crush protesters’, Amnesty International,22 February 2011, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=19274. 16 ‘Exclusive: Documents detail Western arms firm's Libya deal’, , 7 September 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/ 09/07/us-libya-generaldynamics-idUSTRE7862ZA20110907. 17 See Amnesty International evidence to the CAEC, paragraphs 50–54 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/ cmselect/cmquad/686/686we05.htm. 18 ‘Saudi Arabia: Renewed Assurances on Satellite Imagery, Embassy Riyadh’, Cable Reference ID #10RIYADH159, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10RIYADH159.html. 19 ‘First Joint Report of Session 2010–2011, Scrutiny of Arms Export Controls (2011): UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation’, CAEC, paras 128 and 129, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmquad/686/68614.htm. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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to conclude that in the case of Saudi Arabia, other strategic, economic or political interests are deemed more important than transfer criteria relating to human rights, armed conflict and international humanitarian law. 50. All of these point to the fact that a review was badly needed, and the Government is to be commended for responding so quickly. However, the way the review has unfolded gives cause for concerns, in terms of both process and substance.

Export Policy Review The process 51. The Foreign Secretary’s statement of 13 October, in which he announced the outcomes of the 2011 UK export control review, notes that “the Government will continue to work to improve public information on defence and security exports, including enhanced transparency of routine export licensing decisions and how we respond during a crisis.”20 However the review itself has been anything but transparent. Despite a statement by Thomas Drew, Director for National Security, Directorate for Defence and Strategic Threats in the FCO, during evidence from Foreign Office Minister Jeremy Browne to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, that NGOs were consulted during the course of the first stage of the review21, there has been no consultation to date with external stakeholders (be they from civil society, industry or parliament). NGOs were given an informal briefing on progress in the review by civil servants once the first set of recommendations had been sent to ministers, but despite numerous requests, at no point were consultations held. We are unclear as to why this is the case, as past reviews of export control policy and legislation, at both UK and EU levels, have benefited greatly from external inputs. We conclude that so far the process has been deeply unsatisfactory, and hope that, moving forward, a much wider and deeper review of transfer licensing policy and its implementation will take place.

Substance—first stage 52. The Foreign Secretary’s statement to Parliament on 18 July on the completion of the first stage of the review revealed a number of flaws.22 He stated that “no evidence” of misuse of UK-supplied equipment had been found during the Arab Spring. However, arms exports are supposed to be denied if there is a risk that their transfer may have certain negative consequences (including internal repression). The Foreign Secretary’s statement suggests this stage of the review focused primarily on ascertaining whether UK-supplied equipment was used for internal repression during the Arab Spring. However, whether or not UK-sourced equipment was misused, there was a clear risk that it could have been, as seems to have been acknowledged by the cancellation of so many licences. 53. The Foreign Secretary elaborated on the abovementioned remarks, noting that “consultations with our overseas posts revealed no evidence that any of the offensive naval, air or land-based military platforms used by Governments in North Africa or the Middle East against their own populations during the Arab Spring, were supplied from the UK.”23 54. This statement is problematic in a number of respects. First, it supposes that licensing decisions are based on evidence of previous misuse of UK-licensed equipment. But as is clearly established in the Consolidated Criteria, the UK system is risk-based, not evidence-based. Certainly officials should look at the previous use of similar equipment, but this should be only one of many factors that make up an overall risk assessment. Moreover, an implication of the Foreign Secretary’s statement is that instances of misuse of non- UK-sourced equipment are not relevant to the UK assessment process. We find it hard to believe that UK licensing authorities would ignore misuse simply because it involved equipment supplied from elsewhere, but the Foreign Secretary’s statement does suggest that this may at least be regarded of less import. 55. We are also concerned that the Government appears to have relied for its evidence on its own overseas posts. It is not clear how, in a dangerous and fast-moving environment, when violence was been employed in a wide range of geographically dispersed locations, and given that identifying items such as ammunition, components and sub-systems is difficult at the best of times, overseas posts would be in a position to make any kind of authoritative claims about the use of UK-supplied equipment. This clearly raises questions about exactly what the UK Government means when it speaks of “evidence” in these contexts. What kind of evidence is “admissible”; is evidence required to a standard equivalent to that for a criminal prosecution; is absence of evidence being used as evidence of absence; is there any positive evidence that equipment was not misused? 56. A detailed examination of the second quotation above from the Foreign Secretary’s statement, which seems to elaborate upon the first quotation, raises further questions. “Consultations with our overseas posts revealed no evidence that any of the offensive naval, air or land-based military platforms used by Governments 20 ‘Foreign Office review of export policy’, Foreign & Commonwealth Office press release, 13 October 2011, http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=PressS&id=669255682. 21 Thomas Drew, Director for National Security, Directorate for Defence and Strategic Threats, FCO, ‘Minutes of Evidence, The FCO's Human Rights Work 2010–11’, Foreign Affairs Committee, 23 May2011, qu. 104, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/964/11052302.htm. 22 UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague MP, ‘Statement to Parliament’, Hansard, cols 78–79, 18 July 2011, http://services.parliament.uk/hansard/Commons/bydate/20110718/writtenministerialstatements/part008.html. 23 Ibid., col. 79. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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in [MENA] against their own populations … were supplied from the UK.”24 This implies that any confidence the Government may have that UK-supplied equipment was not misused was limited only to “platforms”. This leaves out many other kinds of military and security equipment, including the equipment which was the stated subject of the review, ie “equipment that might be used for internal repression, in particular crowd control goods”25, and which it is clear were being used against populations in MENA. 57. Moreover, the answer to a parliamentary question recently asked by CAEC Chair Sir John Stanley reveals that the only equipment falling within this category of “offensive naval, air or land-based military platforms” that has been licensed for transfer to Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia or Yemen since 1999 is 12 armoured personnel carriers.26 The more information comes to light about this issue, the more disingenuous the Government’s statement appears. 58. An examination of the use of UK-supplied armoured vehicles in Libya and aircraft by Saudi Arabia in Yemen is also revealing in terms of the way the Government uses the idea of “evidence” selectively to justify its licensing decisions. In the Libyan case, the Government appears to have discounted video and photographic “evidence” of misuse of equipment. In the Saudi case, the Government has accepted Saudi assurances that the use of force was necessary and proportionate, when evidence on the ground would suggest otherwise.

Substance—second stage 59. The second stage of the review does seem to start to address some of the real problems exposed by the Arab Spring, however in many respects the Foreign Secretary’s statement of 13 October raises as many questions as it answers.27 In addition, the impression remains that at its core the review has been more about enabling a quicker and more appropriate response to rapidly moving events as and after they happen, rather than about anticipating possible developments and thereby avoiding problematic decisions in the first place. 60. The UKWG sees the sense and value in the Government being more responsive to rapidly changing circumstances. We welcome the introduction of a mechanism to provide for rapid suspension of licences as necessary, and congratulate the Government on boosting its commitment to end-use monitoring. Linking decisions about arms transfers to other relevant issues such as security and justice assistance is eminently sensible, as is the commitment to greater transparency. 61. It is also extremely difficult to argue against a commitment to enhanced assessments against export control criteria, more orderly and systematic information-gathering and application of controls or increased oversight by Ministers, all of which are promised in the Foreign Secretary’s statement. 62. However, it is far from clear from the statement how any of this is going to work in practice, as no substantive details of any of the proposed changes are given. Participation of external stakeholders and/or more details of how all this is to be operationalised would give more confidence that this will significantly strengthen the system. It is perhaps telling that while the 13 October statement advises that guidance issued to officials on assessing the human rights implications of overseas security and justice assistance will be made public, there is no commitment to publish guidance on how, for example, export control assessments or information- gathering will be enhanced. 63. The statement refers to the “introduction of a revised risk categorisation, based on objective indicators and reviewed regularly”28, but there is no indication of what this will mean in practice. What are the indicators; who will conduct the reviews, how and how often? The revised risk categorisation will allow “specifically for Ministerial scrutiny of open licences to ensure that the benefits of open licensing can be maintained while keeping the associated risks to acceptable levels”29, but Ministers already have the option to scrutinise open licences, while the notion of acceptable levels of risk is left unexplained. 64. Ultimately, the Foreign Secretary’s statement suggests not enough attention has been paid to one of the main weaknesses of the current system: an apparent difficulty in looking ahead to risks that are not obvious or imminent. As mentioned, there is repeated language in the statement about being responsive to and keeping pace with rapidly changing circumstances. This is of course important, but the first duty of an arms transfer control system is to anticipate trouble, and not just react to it.

The Need for Further Change 65. Analysis of UK arms transfers authorised to MENA and of the response to the Arab Spring suggest the Government currently makes its licensing decisions through an assessment of the immediate risks of misuse or diversion, based on a predominantly internal and relatively isolated analysis of the proposed end-user and the situation in and around the recipient country. By all accounts great store is set on the “evidence” of how 24 Ibid., emphasis added. 25 Ibid., col 78. 26 Answer by Mark Prisk MP, Minister for Business, Innovation and Skills, to Parliamentary Question from Sir John Stanley MP, Hansard, col. 443W, 12 October 2011, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111012/text/ 111012w0003.htm#11101264000153. 27 ‘Foreign Office review of export policy’, op. cit. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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the same or similar equipment licensed for transfer by UK authorities has been used by the same end-user in the past. The MENA experience also suggests the UK system assumes too readily that historical absence of armed conflict per se is a guarantor of future security and that the current behaviour of the recipient will remain constant regardless of how the security environment or context might change. Moreover, a comparison between licensing policies for transfers to Saudi Arabia compared to, for example, Bahrain or Libya tends to confirm our long-held concern that perceived strategic and economic interests are sometimes privileged above the rigorous application of the UK’s Consolidated Criteria. 66. The UKWG argues that the UK’s approach needs to change in several ways, most of which are inter- related. (a) Licensing assessments must not focus only on the immediate situation. Much military equipment retains its utility for a number of years, even decades. Situations in-country inevitably change over time, and risk assessments need to be based on this understanding and an extended time horizon. Assessments need to identify the currents moving below the surface that could bode ill for the future. (b) The Government should move away from its heavy apparent reliance on ‘evidence’ of past misuse, which by its very nature is backward-looking and in any event has been used selectively, to a forward-looking balance-of-probability/risk-based approach. It is also crucial to examine the capacity of the recipient to use and manage equipment lawfully and proportionally and to demonstrate an ability to implement international legal obligations and relevant standards related to the use of force. For example, as events in Libya indicate, regimes with a history of brutality against or a violent lack of respect for the human rights of their populations are clearly unlikely to exercise restraint where they perceive existential threats. (c) There should be much greater involvement of external actors as part of the licensing-assessment process. Engaging with expert non-governmental opinion, including in-country, should be encouraged. Information from different sources should be judged on its merits; the opinions or guarantees of a state should not be accepted merely because they come from a state. Information- sharing and -exchange processes with allies (eg from the EU) should be improved. (d) The temptation to privilege perceived economic and strategic interests over the Consolidated Criteria must be resisted. The same high standard of care and attention to detail should be applied regardless of the destination. The human rights of citizens in large UK export markets are of no less significance than of those in small markets. (e) Licensing criteria and policy need to be updated to properly embrace the concept of joined-up government and to take into account developments in other relevant fields since the criteria, largely unchanged since 1998, were first developed. The reference in the Foreign Secretary’s latest statement to security and justice assistance is welcome, but more can be done. The UK’s 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) at one point refers explicitly to export licensing, while the BSOS definition of “stability” could usefully help inform the licensing process. Recent thinking on governance issues could also usefully be brought into transfer-control decision-making. 67. Some possible specific actions that the UK Government could consider introducing to help improve controls in line with the points made above are set out below. The UKWG would welcome the opportunity to elaborate upon these ideas and discuss them in detail with the Government and other interested parties, for example at the type of workshops recommended above.

(a) List of “countries of concern” 68. The Cabinet Office conducts a six-monthly review of ‘Countries at Risk of Instability’. As part of BSOS, the Government is to produce an annually-reviewed “internal Watchlist of those fragile countries in which we assess the risks of conflict and insecurity are high and where the UK has significant interests at stake”.30 UK activity in Watchlist countries will be systematically reviewed to “ensure that [the] overall approach to building stability is realistic, appropriately resourced [and] fully integrated”.31 As well, BSOS will establish an Early Warning System examining “countries in which political, economic and security shocks over the next 12 months could trigger violence”, to be summarised every six months in a new Early Warning Report.32 The BSOS notes that “these materials could usefully inform [BIS’s] work on export licensing.”33 69. Drawing upon these and other government sources as appropriate, which would assist in the process of joining up arms transfer policy to other government activity, the UK arms transfer licensing system should develop its own list of ‘countries of particular concern’ in the context of arms transfers. This list would be different to the BSOS Watchlist, as it would need to take into account all of the UK’s transfer criteria and not just focus on fragile states or be limited to countries where the UK has significant interests at stake. However the UKWG recommends that a judgement on whether a country meets the BSOS test of ‘stability’ would be one extremely useful launching point for deciding whether a state should be on an arms transfer control ‘countries of concern’ list. 30 ‘Building Stability Overseas Strategy’ (BSOS), Department for International Development, Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, July 2011, para. 7.4, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/publications/annual-reports/bsos-july-11. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., para. 7.3. 33 Ibid., para. 7.6. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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70. According to BSOS, stability: “can be characterised in terms of political systems which are representative and legitimate, capable of managing conflict and change peacefully, and societies in which human rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs are met, security established and opportunities for social and economic development are open to all. This type of “structural stability”, which is built on the consent of the population, is resilient and flexible in the face of shocks, and can evolve over time as the context changes.”34 71. Note that such a list would not serve as a replacement for embargoes; decisions about transfers to non- embargoed states on such a list would still be made on a case-by-case basis, but we would expect extra care to be taken in these cases (see below). Note that states not on the list would still need to be subject to no less rigorous application of the criteria than is currently the case.

(b) Governance 72. The MENA situation exposed the brittle nature of regimes that could be regarded as failing the BSOS stability test. Related to this is the issue of governance. Considerable work has been done in recent years in attempting to define good and bad governance. There is little in the current Consolidated Criteria that reflect these developments, but governance issues may give an important clue as to those states that might be at risk of violence or conflict in the longer term, as well as to the way in which the state may respond to internal disturbance, which are exactly the types of issue that the current UK transfer control system struggles to address effectively. 73. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) may be of interest in this regard. They cover 213 countries and territories, and consider six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. They draw upon hundreds of individual variables, taken from a wide variety of existing sources.35 The indicators for Libya, for example, demonstrate there have long been major governance issues, in both 2009 and 2010 the country scoring in the zero-tenth percentile of all countries for voice and accountability and control of corruption, and the tenth to twenty-fith percentile for government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law. In 2010 Libya fell into the twenty-fifth to fifthieth percentile for political stability and absence of violence. 74. The UKWG urges the Government to consider how governance issues could be better included in the licensing assessment process, potentially through amendment to exiting criteria or the addition of a new criterion.

(c) Presumption of denial 75. The UKWG would recommend developing a policy of “presumption of denial” for transfers to states on the list of “countries of concern”. This would still involve a case-by-case approach, but instead of the current practice of approving a licence application unless there is a specific reason for refusing it, the Government should refuse licences unless a legitimate defence need can be demonstrated, and the applicant can satisfy the government that the equipment will be used only in support of that need.

(d) Development of interactive database with partner governments 76. Information-exchange and -sharing with partner governments is seriously underdeveloped. Modern digital data-management systems for information-sharing with other licensing authorities are nowhere to be seen. Licence denials are periodically shared by CDR at the EU level, but beyond that information-sharing relies on personal contacts. These are by definition arbitrary, and subject to sudden dislocation with changes in personnel. They do not allow for the development of institutional memory. There is, for example, no systematic sharing of information on assessments of risks to certain end-users, countries or region; on problematic trade routes, brokers or transporters; on situation of unauthorised end-use, end-users, or problematic re-export. Better information-sharing could be used to identify spikes or unusual patterns in a purchasers’ or end-users’ efforts to procure controlled items from different states. All this information could be of critical importance with regard to the assessment of certain licence applications and should be shared among EU partner governments to ensure that, where the UK adopts a position of restraint, this is not inadvertently undermined by other governments who share the same values and objectives. Better information-sharing would not only improve decision-making, but could, if well-managed, reduce the efficiency and therefore the workload of licensing officials. The UK should urgently push for a major attitudinal and technological shift in information-sharing and -exchange with its EU and other partners.

(e) Use of external expertise 77. The point was made above that the decision-making process would benefit from greater use of external experts and information sources. Licensing officials need to become more proactive in seeking out this expertise. Outsiders who follow arms issues are an obvious resource, but regional and country experts, who 34 Ibid., Introduction. 35 “World Governance Indicators 1996–2011”, available on the World website but produced independently by Daniel Kaufman, Brookings Institution; Aart Kraay, World Bank Development Research Group; and Massimo Mastruzzi, World Bank Institute, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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may have no knowledge of arms trade issues in particular but have a detailed political, historical and/or cultural understanding, may still be able to provide valuable information about context, which is critical if licensing decisions are going to become more forward looking. There are various ways outside expertise could be tapped, for example through seminars at which a range of experts could talk about regional situations and likely developments. In the interests of efficiency, these could potentially involve partners from other licensing authorities in EU Member States.

Recommendations 78. Having failed to involve external stakeholders in the review process so far, The UK Government should engage fully with these stakeholders as the recommendations of the review are developed and implemented. This engagement could be in the form of workshops that would allow for discussion of the results so far and for further improvements to be made, with a clear timetable for the process to identify when these changes will be completed and implemented. 79. Arms transfer licensing policy must be adjusted so that it: is brought in line with the actual criteria used to grant licences with a shift in focus from “evidence of previous misuse” to “risk and likelihood” in the risk analysis process; ensures the context within which arms may be used is included in such analysis; takes full account of the capacity of the proposed end-user to use equipment in accordance with international obligations; takes a longer-term and broader attitude to risk including consideration of governance issues; engages with other relevant Government processes and initiatives, eg BSOS; better utilises external expertise; and reduces scope for licensing decisions to give undue weight to political, strategic or economic factors. 80. The UK Government should immediately update its arms export licensing criteria to accurately reflect its obligations under the 2008 EU Common Position, which contains much stronger commitments on transfer licensing than those currently employed. 81. The Government should consider developing a list of particularly sensitive “countries of concern” to which additional licensing safeguards, such as making licensing decisions based on a “presumption of denial”, could be applied. 82. As part of its commitment to improve scrutiny of security and justice assistance in the future, the Government should disclose the evaluation of the training received by the Libyan Police in 2007 and respond to the CAEC’s 2008 recommendation. 83. The Government should provide to the CAEC details of what evidential standards it utilises when checking end-use issues relating to UK arms transfers, including details of how monitoring is undertaken, what checks are actually carried out and by whom, and how information is collated, assessed and analysed when making conclusions about the potential misuse of UK-supplied equipment. 84. To allow meaningful scrutiny of the Government’s implementation of its arms transfer policy, continued improvements are necessary on the quality of information provided its annual, quarterly and online reporting. Improvements should include qualitative information such as the types, quantities and end-users or end-uses of UK-licensed equipment for all licence types, including open licences. Such improvements would also be of considerable benefit to the Government when explaining seemingly controversial licensing decisions, especially in difficult cases.

Trade Fairs 85. The Defence and Security Equipment International Trade Fair (DSEi) was held in London 13–16 September 2011. Three stands were closed due to the occupants marketing equipment classed as Category A goods36 in the Export Control Order (2008), the advertising of which is therefore subject to enhanced trade controls and prohibited under DSEi’s own guidelines.37 Similar concerns have been raised with previous committees, most notably in 2007 and 2010.38 It is not acceptable that such illegal products continue to identified by NGO researchers, journalists and MPs and not compliance or enforcement specialists working for event organisers and the UK authorities. Yet again we are seeing evidence that enforcement of existing UK legislation and resources and capacity to monitor and police defence exhibitions are clearly not adequate.

Torture Equipment 86. Beechwood International, a UK based trading company, was found to be clearly advertising in their brochure oversized leg cuffs, waist chains, lead chains and “the enhanced transport restraint system” (which combines waist chains and cuffs with leg cuffs) on behalf of US company CTS-Thompson. 39 Restraints such 36 The UK operates a three tiered categorisation system in relation to trade controls. All equipment subject to a licensing requirement is assigned a categorisation. Category A goods are those classified as requiring the most stringent controls (controls are exercised over all activities relating to the trade in such equipment). This category covers, inter alia, cluster munitions, equipment used in executions and ‘torture equipment.’ 37 ‘Compliance and Eligibility to Exhibit’, DSEi Website, http://www.dsei.co.uk/Content/Compliance-and-Eligibility-to-Exhibit/3/. 38 See UKWG submission: 2007 Review of the Export Control Act, 28 September 2007, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/ pubdocs/070928%20UKWG%20Submission%20ECA%20Review.pdf; and Evidence submitted by the UK Working Group on Arms, 2 February 2011, paras 34–36, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmquad/writev/arms/m5.htm 39 CTS-Thompson Handcuffs and Restraints Product Catalogue. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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as these are classed as torture equipment under UK legislation and therefore subject to the enhanced controls, which cover promotional literature such as product brochures and catalogues.

Cluster Munitions 87. The stands belonging to Pakistan Ordinance Factories (POF) and the Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO) of Pakistan were closed for displaying promotional material for cluster munitions. It was subsequently found that another company, Nammo Talley, a fully owned subsidiary of the Nammo Group, whose promotional material was on the Nammo Stand, also included references to cluster munitions in their literature.40 In all of these cases the references to banned equipment was prominently displayed. Nammo are currently decommissioning the UK’s supply of cluster munitions, the fact that promotional material referencing 155 mm Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) appeared on the stand at the DSEi 2011 event shows a clear disregard for UK regulations. When presented with the information by civil society organisations, Nammo apologised for an error in their promotional literature, stating they no longer manufacture components used in cluster munitions. 88. These findings, and the fact that a Russian company, Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (FSUE SRPE Bazalt) advertised cluster munitions at Farnborough International Air Show 201041, call into question the compliance checks undertaken by the relevant agencies and organisers both prior to the opening of the event, and during defence exhibitions. In the case of Pakistan Ordinance Factories, not only is it widely known that the company manufactures cluster munitions, but promotional literature for their 155mm Base Bleed DP-ICM (Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munition) was found on their stall at DSEi 2009. Amnesty International alerted the organisers of the exhibition, Clarion, of the matter at the time. The very same was even more prominently displayed at DSEi 2010. This company in particular should have been subjected to stringent compliance checks and calls into question the assurances given to Amnesty in 2009 that robust action would be taken. Both cases were raised by UKWG in our 2010 submission to the CAEC.

Recommendations 89. The UKWG suggests the CAEC request information on the scope and nature of compliance checks before and during all UK defence and security exhibitions. 90. To prevent future promotion of cluster munitions, the Government should prohibit any state that has not signed and ratified the Cluster Munitions Convention, and any company that has not signed a written guarantee that they (or any subsidiary or partner) do not produce cluster munitions or their components, from attending any trade event in the UK. 91. Any company guilty of displaying illegal promotional literature should be required to in future submit all promotional materials for explicit approval by exhibition organisers. 92. Any company guilty of repeated illegal promotion should be refused permission to exhibit in future, with the length of their ban based on the severity of the malpractice and remedial action taken by the company. 93. In light of the apparent clear breaches of UK legislation, the UKWG call on the Government to launch immediate investigations into Beechwood Equipment Ltd, Pakistan Ordinance Factories and the Nammo Group and prosecute any company found to be in breach of UK legislation.

Cluster Munitions: Finance and Investment 94. The Government must continue to support the eradication of cluster munitions. It is of concern that despite tabling a specific amendment on ending indirect financial support during the passage of the UK’s ratification of the Cluster Munitions Convention legislation in Spring 2010, it appears to be have rejected the previous governments commitment on developing extra controls on preventing indirect finance via a multi stakeholder review process. A number of large financial institutions have already indicated their desire to work with stakeholders to develop a policy framework in this area, while a number of UK-based financial institutions, including the group, HSBC and AVIVA have recently strengthened policies on investments in companies involved in the production of cluster munitions.

Recommendation 95. We urge the Government to confirm its intention to honour existing commitments made by the previous government to end indirect financial support for cluster munitions.

Torture End-Use Control 96. The UKWG welcomed the UK Government’s February 2008 policy commitment to introduce a new EU wide end-use control for goods used in torture. In 2008, the Government stated that: 40 The Nammo catalogue references the 155mm M864 DPICM Base Burner Projectile which is a cluster munition. 41 Evidence submitted by the UK Working Group on Arms, op. cit., para 35. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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“We will be asking the Commission to introduce a control where the exporter will be required to submit an export licence application where they have reason to believe, or have been informed, that the items could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”42 97. We are alarmed that progress on this end-use control (first announced almost four years ago) has effectively stalled. Since our evidence to the CAEC last year, the UKWG is pleased that the UK Government has taken further unilateral action and placed export controls on sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride for use in lethal injection drugs to the US. We note, however, that this control only covers exports to the US and not other countries where these drugs could be used to carry out executions. We again state that if the Government had delivered on its 2008 commitment in this area, it would have been able to control exports of lethal injection drugs or items, as soon as it became known that they were being used in executions. 98. On 20 October 2011, BIS minister Mark Prisk, told MPs during a Westminster Hall debate on arms export controls that the UK Government has written to Baroness Ashton on strengthening EC Regulation 1236/ 2005 with regard to drugs used in carrying out the death penalty and on the Torture end-use clause. He advised that she has replied that the EU Commission would begin looking at amending the control list annexes to the EC regulation in November 2011 and would examine the merits of the proposed torture end-use control in that context.43 At the time of writing, the exact status of these efforts is not known.

Recommendations 99. We urge the UK Government to continue to press the European Commission and EU Member States to urgently introduce a torture end-use “catch all clause” through an amendment to EC Regulation 1236/2005. 100. If, after the EU Commission’s November 2011 discussions on amending the EC Regulation, there is no progress on establishing the end-use clause and in light of almost four years of delay, there is a strong case for a torture end-use control to be introduced unilaterally at a UK level (thereby setting an example for EU partners to follow), in concordance with the UK Government’s previous statement that it would consider introducing such a control independently. 101. We also urge the UK to continue its efforts to strengthen EC Regulation 1236/2005 to broaden the range of equipment covered, specifically by updating the annexes on prohibited equipment (Annex 2), eg to include all drugs used in lethal injection, and controlled equipment (Annex 3), so as to reflect developments in the security equipment market. October 2011

Supplementary written evidence from the Export Group from Aerospace and Defence (EGAD) RE: NEW INQUIRY BY THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS INTO STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS Many thanks for inviting us to give oral evidence to the Committee, on 23 January. Just to follow up on a few issues, which arose at that session, we hope that the following comments may be helpful: General Comment: EGAD represents a particularly well-informed constituency of industry representatives. We realise that some members of the Committee may have been influenced by the myths which abound, both generically and, more specifically, about Industry’s attitudes to export control compliance. What we are seeking is to establish a proper and sensible working relationship with relevant British Government departments, getting across the fact that, not only are we on the same side, but a lot closer than some (or, indeed, many) may think or portray. They are the regulators, we are the regulated; we understand that, but it is in all our interests to work together and agree, wherever possible, thereby helping to ease the nugatory burden on Industry, maintain/ increase exports, etc and achieve compliance—at a time of severe budget restraint, on both sides, but especially within Government. We can contribute significantly and positively, provided dialogue is carried out in a focussed and meaningful way. Exhibitions: We can confirm that our representatives have personally seen a number of staff from the Export Control Organisation, the UK Ministry of Defence, Foreign & Commonwealth Office and HM Revenue & Customs ( to name but three) going around a number of major exhibitions in the UK, such as the Defence & Security Equipment International (DSEi) and the Farnborough International Airshow (FIAS), to name but two. These staff have been extremely active in seeking out exhibiting firms, in collaboration with the exhibition organisers, and ensuring that these companies are obeying our laws, as well as the organisers’ own robust regulations about what can and what cannot be promoted at these events. 42 ‘Export Control Act 2002: Review of Export Control Legislation (2007)—Government’s End of Year Response’, Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, December 2008, http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file49301.pdf. 43 Mark Prisk MP, ‘Westminster Hall Debate: Arms Export Controls’, Hansard, 20 October 2011, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111020/halltext/111020h0001.htm#11102035000002 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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We are aware of a number of informal compliance enforcement actions which have been undertaken against exhibitors at these events since 2004. The very warmly welcomed additional compliance enforcement monitoring activity which is undertaken by the likes of Amnesty International is hugely beneficial, in our view, in helping to “sweep up” what has not already been spotted by the Government experts. US Export Control Amendments: We briefly touched on our concerns during our evidence session relating to the fact that on 19 December 2011 the US Department of State finally released its “Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Registration and Licensing of Brokers, Brokering Activities, and Related Provisions” proposals for public consultation, which are available to see at: www.pmddtc.state.gov/ FR/2011/76FR78578.pdf. The deadline for responses is Friday 17 February 2012. Whilst the existing US regulations to control brokering are not as well-defined as many would like, the new proposals, are open to even wider interpretation. As such, they carry significant risk to UK Industry’s competitiveness and exposure to US extraterritorial reach. These concerns are also shared by EU and US Industry. Four broad areas of concern arise from these proposals: — The term “Broker” includes any person engaged in brokering activities and is no longer limited to those “who act as an agent for others”. This is much wider than any definition used by the UK and in the EU; — A much broader range of activities are defined as brokering: financing, transportation, freight forwarding, or taking of any other action that facilitates the manufacture, export, or import of a defence article or defence service; — Foreign persons outside the US would be caught where the above activities involve a US origin defence article, even if these articles are already covered by an existing US export authorisation. This would include any marketing, including potentially the activities of trade organisations, such as ADS, BNEA, Intellect and SMI, in support of UK Industry; — Registration with the US Department of State of any “Broker” will be required at an annual cost of US$2,250 and the identification of all participating parties in a transaction together with their names, addresses, and other information that may be contrary to UK and EU data protection laws. We believe that these proposals could result in: — Those who do not currently regard themselves as being “Brokers”, including those who are exporting to the US, or operating in support of their corporate affiliates, being required to register; — Commercially confidential information being provided to the Department of State before a contract has been concluded when prior approval of brokering activities is required; — Undermining the UK Government’s stated “Red Tape” commitment to reduce bureaucracy; — A huge extension to the US State Department’s extraterritorial reach and ability to interfere in the activities and policies of non-US entities. Whilst we in UK, US and European Industry will be submitting our own views on the proposals by 17 February, we feel very strongly that comment must also come from Governments. We have been told there are three communities the Department of State will listen to: The White House, Congress and Allied Governments. To that end, Industry associations in Europe will be working with us to engage the 6 Governments from the Letter of Intent. Industry, therefore, is seeking for HMG intervention at an appropriate level to achieve a pause and to allow adequate time for a meaningful Government-to-Government dialogue to take place prior to any final new rule being published. Extraterritorial Regulations: Whilst we are aware that the UK does have in place a number of statutes which seek to exert an extraterritorial jurisdictional reach over the activities of UK nationals overseas, these are in areas such as drug smuggling, paedophilia, bribery & corruption, terrorism, etc, as outlined in Annex 3 (Extra- territoriality (offences)) of the Committee’s latest report (of April 2011)—see: www.publications.parliament.uk/ pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmquad/686/68617.htm. As we sought to point out, all of the offences listed in this annex are blanket prohibitions, rather than activities for which those involved can and do seek official licence approvals from the UK Government to be allowed to undertake them, and all of them are areas in which all responsible people everywhere would agree should be prevented from taking place. Therefore, any attempt to extend this concept to the export of normal and standard defence/security materiel and services from one country to another is fraught with problems, in our view, as this is not held in the same degree of universal abject revulsion and contempt as the above activities are, and are, indeed, actively supported and encouraged by most Governments around the World. Therefore, the potential imposition of such measures by the British Government would be fraught with legal, political and technical problems, which, in our view, would have to be very carefully thought through before being introduced. Strategic Export Controls Training: EGAD and Cranfield University have jointly developed some training courses to address the perceived need for staff in UK defence and dual-use companies on strategic export control issues. These come at four levels, running from: Level 1—a c.30-minute on-line basic training course relevant for all staff in such companies; Level 2—a c.50-minute on-line slightly more detailed training course relevant for relevant “points of contact” within companies who need a little bit more information; Level 3—a cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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combination of the Level 2 course, plus a day’s worth of face-to-face training by some leading experts, which is relevant for export control staff in companies; and Level 4—a module from an MSc course, which is relevant for senior export licensing staff within companies. If it would be in any way potentially beneficial, we would be delighted to arrange for any Members of the Committee who may be interested, the ability to take advantage of either the Level 1 or the Level 2 course for free. We hope that the Committee may be interested in the above additional evidence. 3 February 2012

Supplementary written evidence from The Rt Hon Vince Cable MP Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills LORD ALTON OF LIVERPOOL’S PRIVATE MEMBERS BILL (RE-EXPORT CONTROLS) At the oral evidence session taken before the Committees on Arms Export Controls on 7 February 2012, you informed me that Lord Alton of Liverpool had made representations to the Committees that the Government is blocking House of Commons consideration of his Private Members Bill (Re-Export Controls). You asked if that is the case and if so why. I said that I would look into the matter and report back to you. Lord Alton’s Bill, tabled in May 2010, proposed an amendment to the Export Control Act 2002 so that I would be required to make an order to prohibit or regulate the re-export of controlled goods subsequent to their original export from the UK. The Government does not want UK origin goods, once exported, to be re-exported for undesirable uses. But we believe that we already tackle this to the extent that we can through our current export licensing system. As the Committees know, the risk of undesirable re-export is embedded in our assessment of licence applications (criterion seven of the consolidated criteria). Where the risk of such a re-export is sufficiently high, an export licence will not be granted. If a re-export of concern comes to light we can and do factor that in to our assessment of subsequent licence applications for similar goods to that destination. Once a good has left the UK, it is in practice under the jurisdiction of the destination country. We would be claiming that UK export controls applied, whereas in reality we would have no powers to enforce them. We are concerned that the effect of Lord Alton’s proposals would be to impose statutory obligations (backed by criminal penalties) on persons outside the UK, solely on the basis that they had purchased UK origin goods and technology. In our view such obligations would go against the UK’s long-stranding opposition to extra- territorial jurisdiction, and would in reality be unenforceable and therefore ineffective. For the reasons set out above, the government decided to oppose Lord Alton’s Bill. The Bill received its First Reading in the Lords on 26 May 2010. It received its Second Reading in the Lords on 3 December 2010, with Baroness Wilcox formally expressing reservations on behalf of the Government. The Bill received its Third Reading in the Lords on 12 January 2011 and First Reading in the Commons on 27 January 2011. The Bill was scheduled for Second Reading in the Commons on 13 May 2011 but it did not receive time for debate on the day and the Bill was opposed. The Bill was then due for debate on 21 October 2011 but the order to read the Bill lapsed on that day. We understand that the sponsor of the Bill in the Commons did not make it known if he was present in the Chamber when the short title of the Bill was read out. As a consequence, the Bill was not moved for Second Reading. For completion I should note that the sponsors of the Bill have made representations to the Government requesting that the Bill would be allowed to move to a House of Commons Second Reading Committee. Aside from the rarity of such referrals, our responses have reiterated the Government’s opposition to the Bill, and that Ministers have not been minded to allow the Bill to proceed to a Second Reading Committee on that basis. March 2012

Supplementary written evidence from Amnesty International UK The recent collapse of a UK prosecution dealing with the brokering and trafficking of small arms and ammunition to Nigeria in 2007. This supplementary evidence deals with a recent UK court case involving the brokering and trafficking of substantial quantities of small arms and ammunition to Nigeria from China in 2007. The case involved UK gun dealer Gary Hyde. The subsequent collapse of the case on 19 January 2012 raises a number of issues about existing UK legislation relating to brokering and trafficking activities. At the time of writing (April 2012), the case has been referred to the Court of Appeal and its outcomes not known. My Hyde was charged with breaching article 4.2 and article 4.3 of the 2003 Export of Goods (Control Order) relating to contract negotiations and payments made for these services without the necessary trade control licences. The 2007 deal involved the brokering of 40,000 AK assault rifles, 30,000 rifles, 10,000 9mm pistols and some 32 million rounds of ammunition to Nigeria from China. The court case never disputed that cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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Mr Hyde was involved in this deal, nor that he and his business partner, German national Karl Kleber received some $1.3 million pounds in payment to a bank account in Liechtenstein.44 The case collapsed after Mr Hyde’s Defence team successfully argued that he was not responsible for initiating contract negotiations, but was merely taking over a deal and contract that had already been negotiated. The Judge accepted the arguments that the 2003 Export Goods (Control) Order should only be considered in terms of negotiating new contracts and therefore both article 4.2 relating to contract negotiations, and any subsequent payments made for involvement in this existing contract (article 4.3) could not be considered.45 The Jury was discharged on Thursday 19 January 2012 with Judge Loraine-Smith concluding that the case had to “fail in law”.46 Amnesty remains concerned that such a narrow definition of brokering and trafficking activities could set a dangerous precedent for future and pending cases. Amnesty does not believe that it was ever the intention of the UK government to limit Brokering activities solely to the negotiation of new contracts nor limit fees or payments received for contract negotiations. We believe that the law was intended to capture “any” activity, including payments or related benefits received for any act calculated to move controlled goods from one third country to another. There were certain exemptions relating only to finance, sole involvement in transport and general promotional and marketing activities, but these were not activities undertaken by Mr Hyde in relation to this deal. — We urge the Committee to seek urgent clarifications as to the actual scope of existing Brokering legislation and if necessary, amend existing Secondary legislation to ensure that it is clear that ALL brokering activity, not that limited purely to new contract negotiations; and ALL payments and related benefits will apply to the whole spectrum of brokering activities and not limited to just new contract negotiations.

Extraterritorial Considerations It was accepted in evidence, that My Hyde was engaging in the movement of these weapons into Nigeria from China and that he received payment for these activities to offshore bank accounts. It was however, successfully argued that some of the negotiations took place wholly overseas and therefore were not subject to prosecution. At the time the activities took place, Small arms and light weapons were not subject to extraterritorial applications, unless the destination was subject to an arms embargo. Whilst Amnesty accepts that similar items are now subject to full extraterritorial controls, by virtue of them being placed in Category B of current UK export controls, this same situation would apply to anyone engaged in brokering or trafficking activities for Category C goods. Amnesty remains concerned that UK registered companies, at the very minimum, should not avoid trade controls applicable to any goods, including Category C goods, by virtue of them doing business overseas in cases where a UK company is directly facilitating the deal, by for example using letter head and/or other documentation bearing UK company addresses as part of the negotiations. Amnesty urges that the law is amended at the earliest opportunity to close this loophole. — Full extraterritorial trade controls, at a minimum should apply to any UK registered company where that company is directly involved in brokering activities. Any UK company using its paper work or its company trading name to facilitate deals should automatically be captured under Trade Control legislation for all controlled goods, including Category C items. April 2012

Supplementary written evidence from Amnesty International UK The New FCO Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance The UK can provide an important role in providing technical assistance to security and justice institutions overseas. This assistance can help to ensure that those institutions are more efficient and effective and also that they comply with international human rights standards or by improving compliance with those obligations. It is welcome that the guidance applies to both case specific assistance and broader capacity building. It is a positive development that the FCO are now thinking seriously about the human rights impact of these kinds of projects. However, the UK Government has in the past been criticised for working with or providing assistance to security agencies which continue to have very poor human rights records, such as the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh. The recognition of these risks and the drafting and publication of the guidance is welcome; as is the need for all projects to assess human rights and IHL risks, but the guidance itself is not drafted to ensure that the government does not engage in conduct which might result in serious human rights violations. The guidance requires Ministers only to be consulted if there is a serious risk that the assistance might directly or significantly contribute to a violation of human rights. As written, it could still allow Ministers to 44 “North Yorkshire arms dealer arranged gun shipment” BBC News, 10 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england- york-north-yorkshire-16491412 45 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/2765/pdfs/uksi_20032765_en.pdf 46 “Gary Hyde arms deal collapses”, BBC News, 19 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-york-north-yorkshire- 16635869 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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authorise cooperation which might allow involvement in human rights violations or in the face of evidence that there is a serious risk that UK action will result in human rights violations. Officials are also required to consider steps which might mitigate human rights of IHL risks which have been identified. Whilst many are sensible, they also include the provision of assurances from the host Government and/or recipient institution with the relevant standards. Amnesty has already documented its concerns about the credibility of assurances relating to the use of torture, from governments or institutions which routinely practice torture and would be extremely cautious on relying on such assurances where torture, cruel inhuman and degrading treatment are at stake. The guidance provides that a mitigating factor might be that UK personnel should not supervise, instruct or otherwise provide direct support to investigations where there is a serious risk of torture/CIDT. — In these respects, the guidance is not consistent with other guidance and criteria relating the provision of arms and related equipment, which stipulates a clear obligation to deny such provision where there are substantial risks that those items will contribute to serious violations. Amnesty recommends that the guidance contains clear obligations to deny the provision of security and justice assistance where there is a substantial risk that such provision will result in serious human rights violations. The sections on Weapons Handling and provision are of concern. As currently written, it merely asks for a view to be received from FCO, BIS or MOD, on whether arms gifted or supplied as part of Security and Justice Assistance might be used in contravention of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. It is imperative that the guidance clearly specifies that no arms or related equipment should ever be supplied where there are clear risks that those weapons might breach the existing criteria, for example by contributing to internal repression or serious violations of human rights or international law. — The section on weapons handling should be re-written to ensure that the provision of any arms or related equipment supplied or gifted as part of any security and justice assistance measures must be formally assessed against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. Where the assessment is that such arms risk being used in violation of these criteria, the guidance must specify that arms and related equipment must not be supplied. 19 April 2012

Supplementary evidence from the UK Working Group on Arms (UKWG) OVERSEAS SECURITY AND JUSTICE ASSISTANCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDANCE 1. Announcing the results of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) internal review of UK arms export control policy in October 2011, the Foreign Secretary committed to publishing guidance for all UK Government officials on ensuring the UK’s overseas security and justice assistance meets its human rights obligations and values. This guidance, the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA): Human Rights Guidance was published in December 2011. In an oral evidence session on 23 January 2012, the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) requested that witnesses from the UK Working Group on Arms, of which Saferworld is a member, submit supplementary written evidence responding to this guidance.

Overview 2. Saferworld works in 18 countries across the Horn of Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East to improve national and local security and justice systems. We believe security and justice should be seen as basic services, and that they should be provided in an effective, fair and accessible manner. The primary objective of security and justice services should be to deliver long-term, sustainable peace and security for communities. 3. In 2011, the Arab Spring drew attention to the security and justice assistance which the UK and other states have provided to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. This had included not only the transfer of security and defence equipment, but also training and technical assistance. For example: — It has been reported that documents uncovered in Tripoli apparently indicate that British Special Forces provided training to Libya’s Khamis Brigade under Colonel Qadhaffi’s rule, while MI6 provided intelligence to Libya which led to the arrest and torture of political dissidents. — The Ministry of Defence (MOD) has delivered training to the Yemeni Central Security Force Public Order Battalion and the Yemeni Counter Terrorism Unit. — the UK has trained Bahraini security forces in crowd control techniques, among other skills, at the Defence Academy, Shrivenham, and Sandhurst College, Camberley. 4. It is not clear in all of these and other cases whether units or officers trained by the UK Government have been responsible for human rights abuses. In Yemen, for example, while the Government has indicated that it has seen no evidence that the Yemeni security forces in receipt of training by the UK have been involved in human rights violations against peaceful protesters, it is not clear what efforts have been made to seek out such evidence. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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5. The Government is right to recognise that there can be serious risks associated with providing security and justice assistance overseas, including very real risks to human rights and peace and stability, as well as the possibility of creating the damaging perception that the UK is reinforcing regimes which are illegitimate, unaccountable and fail to respect the rights of their citizens. It is therefore to be welcomed that the Government has published guidance on how it intends to mitigate these risks. 6. However, there is much more to implementing effective security and justice programming overseas than simply mitigating possible risks to human rights. As the Government recognises in its Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), security and justice assistance has the potential to make an important contribution to promoting peace and stability overseas. The human rights guidance should therefore be incorporated into a practical set of operational guidelines for ensuring that not only does such assistance do no harm, but it helps to build sustainable peace and security. 7. It is also notable that the guidance does not set out what is meant by “overseas security and justice assistance”, and it appears to refer to narrowly conceived “train and equip”-type interventions. This submission sets out a broader definition, which Saferworld hopes will be considered as the guidance is reviewed in April 2012. 8. Furthermore, it is concerning that this guidance was not made public until now, and that it is not clear for how long this guidance has been in operation. It is also of concern that it appears only to have been developed and applied by the FCO, and not by the Department for International Development (DFID), MOD and the Stabilisation Unit, who deliver the majority of UK overseas security and justice assistance.

Recommendations 9. The following is a summary of Saferworld’s recommendations, which are further elaborated in the rest of this submission. — Potential risks to human rights should be treated as one of many important considerations when planning and designing security and justice interventions overseas. HMG has made a number of policy commitments in relation to security and justice assistance across different strategies and policy documents. The human rights guidance should be incorporated into a single operational toolkit which addresses the practical challenges of putting these many commitments into practice. — The review of the OSJA guidance scheduled for April 2012 should make explicit what is meant by “overseas security and justice” in this context, setting out the full range of interventions to which the guidance applies. Saferworld recommends that security and justice assistance should be conceived more broadly than just “train and equip” programmes, including both demand- and supply-side assistance and encompassing formal and informal security and justice systems. — The UK Consolidated Criteria should remain the sole basis on which decisions about arms transfer licensing are made, regardless of whether other types of security and justice assistance are delivered alongside them. — All decisions to provide overseas security and justice assistance should be based on a thorough analysis of the country context which goes beyond human rights concerns; the new cross- departmental strategic conflict analysis tool provides a means of doing this. — In identifying potential risks to human rights, a broad range of actors in the country in question should be consulted, including local civil society. — HMG should conduct thorough, transparent investigations into cases where UK security and justice assistance may have facilitated human rights abuses, to better understand where weaknesses in the risk assessment/mitigation process may lie. — More detailed guidance is needed to give practical recommendations on overcoming challenges to implementation. — The review of the OSJA should be conducted in consultation with stakeholders both inside and outside HMG, including in DFID and MOD as well as FCO.

Security and Justice Assistance and Arms Transfers 10. The UK already has criteria for making decisions on licensing the transfer of security and defence equipment, in the form of the UK Consolidated Criteria. This should remain the sole basis on which decisions are made regarding arms transfers. In some cases security and defence equipment is sold or gifted as part of a package including other types of assistance—for example, provision of training in crowd control methods has been referenced as justification for the export of armoured vehicles to Libya. However, it is important to be realistic about the extent to which such training will reduce the risk of misuse. Such training should in no way be seen as overriding the need to robustly implement the Consolidated Criteria. Saferworld’s views on possible changes to the Criteria and how the existing Criteria can be better applied are summarised in the written evidence submitted by the UK Working Group on Arms to the current CAEC inquiry. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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11. The rest of this submission focuses on other types of security and justice assistance apart from the transfer of equipment. The recommendations are intended to apply to all overseas security and justice assistance regardless of whether the transfer of equipment takes place alongside this assistance.

Departmental Responsibility 12. While the Foreign Secretary’s statement of 13 October 2011 indicated that the Government would publish guidance in late 2011 “for all HMG officials on assessing the human rights implications of our overseas security and justice assistance”, the guidance document published on 15 December makes clear that it is currently applied only by the FCO, but that it will be reviewed in April 2012, after which time it will be applied to all government departments. 13. Currently, the majority of UK overseas security and justice assistance is provided by DFID, MOD and the Stabilisation Unit, with only a minority of support provided by FCO. It is therefore concerning that there does not appear to have been cross-departmental guidance on the delivery of security and justice assistance until now. 14. Saferworld looks forward to the production of cross-departmental guidance, and hopes that the review scheduled for April 2012 will be conducted in consultation with external actors—something which was noticeably missing from the 2011 FCO review of arms export control policy. In this regard, Saferworld welcomes the announcement that the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills will hold a review of its arms export control processes, on which it will “seek the views of interested parties, including the representatives of exporters and non-governmental organisations.”

What is Security and Justice Assistance? 15. The guidance states that it should be applied to “both case specific assistance and broader, often longer term capacity building assistance”, but nowhere does it specify what types of assistance fall within this category. The term “security and justice assistance” is often used to refer to programmes that train and equip military, police and counter-terrorist units, but security and justice assistance can and should be much broader than that. 16. For example, security and justice assistance should focus not just on the “supply side”—the providers of security and justice services—but also on the “demand side”. Empowering civil society groups and communities to become involved in the oversight and decision-making of how their security and justice services are delivered can be a crucial means of ensuring that security and justice providers respect human rights and contribute to peace and stability. Such measures should be seen not just as a means of mitigating risks associated with UK-provided “train and equip” programmes, but as useful intervention in their own right for building stability overseas. 17. In addition, security and justice systems include much more than just the armed forces and police—they also justice institutions such as courts and prison systems, oversight bodies such as parliamentary committees and independent complaints commissions, and in many contexts there are also “non-statutory” security forces such as militias, private security companies and informal justice mechanisms such as paralegal committees and “traditional” mechanisms such as Afghan shuras. 18. As the guidance is reviewed, Saferworld recommends that it should set out what is meant by security and justice assistance in this context. This should be a broad definition encompassing supply- and demand-side assistance, and looking at the whole of security and justice systems.

Assessment of the OSJA Guidance 19. The following sections assess the set out in the guidance for assessing the situation, identifying and mitigating risks.

Assessing the Situation in-country 20. The OSJA rightly recommends that any decision to deliver security and justice assistance must be based on an assessment of the country context. The set of questions given in this section aim to identify whether, if the UK was to deliver security and justice assistance in a particular country, this would pose a risk to human rights. 21. Security and justice assistance is one of many tools which the UK has at its disposal to meet its objectives overseas, whether those relate to poverty reduction, human rights, conflict prevention or UK national security concerns. Therefore, before asking whether security and justice assistance in a given context would pose a risk to human rights, it is necessary to first ask the broader question of whether, in the country context, security and justice assistance is the most appropriate intervention the UK could make to achieve its objectives. The possible risk to human rights should be one of several important sub-questions to this central question which— depending on the UK Government’s objectives in the given context—might also include: — What are the root causes of conflict and instability in the country? — What are the causes of radicalisation and/or terrorism in the country? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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— How do communities perceive the formal and informal security and justice services they currently receive—if any? — What kinds of support are being provided by other donors, and how would UK support complement it? — How would security and justice assistance fit into the UK’s broader theory of change for the country? 22. The Government’s new cross-departmental conflict analysis would be the obvious place for this type of analysis to be undertaken, and should form the basis for all decisions on providing overseas security and justice assistance.

Identifying Risk 23. This section of the guidance provides a useful list of risks to which security and justice assistance may contribute. However, more detail on the nature of those risks and how the Government believes this assistance could either increase or reduce them would help to make this a more useful operational document. For example, highlighting the risk that it could “undermine the principles of conflict prevention as defined in HMG’s [BSOS]” would benefit from an explanation of how the many principles laid out in the BSOS—a 40 page document—could be undermined by security and justice assistance. 24. In identifying these risks, understanding the relationship between security and justice systems and the communities they serve is vitally important. Local non-state actors, including local civil society organisations and community members themselves, can provide vital information in this regard. A diverse range of non-state actors from all sections of society should be routinely consulted when such assessments are made. HMG need not gather of this information itself—other donors, local and international civil society organisations can also gather such information.

Mitigating Risk 25. The third checklist in the guidance, which sets out steps which could be taken to mitigate any risks identified, requires considerable elaboration as to how these steps should be carried out in order to be made effective. 26. For example, one suggestion is that “assurances have been or will be obtained from the host Government and/or recipient institution/unit before the start of the project or programme on compliance with the relevant international human rights and/or IHL standards.” However no guidance is given on how the credibility of such assurance should be assessed, or how states which breach such agreements should be held accountable. 27. In the case of Yemen, FCO Minister Jeremy Browne has stated that, “before providing any military support or training to Yemeni forces, the UK Government seeks assurances that these forces will not be deployed on operations outside of their mandate or in breach of human rights.” However, given the poor human rights record of the Yemeni regime, it is difficult to see how such assurances could be deemed credible. As the UK Government acknowledges , Yemeni security forces have used indiscriminate violence against peaceful protesters since the beginning of the present uprising in February 2011, and while the UK Government has seen no evidence that UK-trained units or officers have been involved in the crackdown, the overall pattern of behaviour by the Yemeni regime gives little reason to believe that, when considering whether and how to deploy security forces, it would be constrained by assurances it has given to other states. 28. Situating decisions on whether to deliver security and justice assistance within process that includes thorough analysis of conflict dynamics, state-society relations and the nature of the regime would provide a solid base of evidence on which to assess the credibility of such assurances. HMG should also bear in mind that training individual units will only have a limited impact, particularly in contexts where the broader regime is unaccountable and lacks respect for human rights. 29. In cases such as this where questions have been raised about whether states in receipt of UK security and justice assistance may have used it to violate human rights, Saferworld urges the Government to thoroughly investigate whether this was the case, and to publish its findings. Gaining an understanding of how steps to mitigate risk have succeeded or failed in the past would be invaluable in assessing the mitigation measures set out in the guidance.

A Holistic Approach to Security and Justice Assistance 30. As mentioned above, risks to human rights are one of many important considerations when designing overseas security and justice interventions. 31. The BSOS acknowledges that “security forces may be seen as sources of insecurity or oppression”—as is recognised in the OSJA guidance—but also that “effective and accountable security and better access to justice that is seen to be effective make people feel safe in their daily lives. They give an entrepreneur the confidence to invest, and provide people with the means to resolve conflicts before they escalate.” cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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32. While it is important that the human rights risks associated with overseas security and justice assistance should be mitigated, Saferworld recommends that this guidance be incorporated into a toolkit which also sets out in practical terms how overseas security and justice assistance can be made to effectively contribute to conflict prevention and development, as well as human rights. This would help to facilitate a whole of government approach in which FCO, DFID, MOD and the Stabilisation Unit work from the same guidance. 33. HMG has a range of other policy frameworks and strategies which either directly reference or have clear implications for overseas security and justice assistance, including the BSOS, DFID’s Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper, HMG’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security and DFID’s Strategic Vision for Women and Girls, to name a few. These national strategies and plans also sit alongside international policy documents and commitments such as the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States and the World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development. A single practical toolkit addressing the challenges of delivering overseas security and justice assistance, based on evidence of best practice from HMG’s programming experience, would provide a useful means of synthesising and operationalising HMG’s commitments and objectives under these different policy frameworks in order to facilitate coherent and consistent implementation across departments.

About Saferworld 34. Saferworld is an independent international NGO that works to prevent violent conflict and promote co- operative approaches to security. We believe everyone should be able to lead peaceful, fulfilling lives free from insecurity and armed violence. 35. We always seek to work constructively with others and do not usually engage in public campaigning. While we are not a traditional development agency, we seek to understand and influence the relationship between conflict, security and international development. 36. Saferworld has 85 full- and part-time staff and advisers working on our geographic programmes and in our policy and advocacy programme, funding and communications, and operations departments. Saferworld’s main office is in London and we have regional offices in Africa, Asia and Europe. Our funding for 2010–11 was around £6.8 million—mainly in the form of government grants from Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. 10 February 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office The Government welcomes the Committee on Arms Export Control’s Report on UK Strategic Export Controls, published on 5 April 2011. We will carefully study the Report and the recommendations contained therein. As you are aware, the Foreign Secretary announced to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 16 March that the Government would review its policy and practice with regard to the export of crowd control equipment. This review, on which the Government will report to Parliament after Easter, addresses a number of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the Committee’s Report. The Government will also, in accordance with standard practice, respond to all of the conclusions and recommendations in the Report by Command Paper within two months. I understand that discussions are currently under way to find a mutually convenient date in June for the Committee’s export control visit to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Counter Proliferation Department. I look forward to welcoming you and the Committee then. 7 April 2011

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Caroline Lucas MP I am writing following a constituent’s enquiry about the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, which was recently ratified by the US Congress. As you will know, the Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty was negotiated to facilitate cooperation between the UK and US Governments by removing the need for US export licences for less sensitive categories of technology, destined for UK or US Government end-use only. The Treaty is described by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills as representing a significant change to how UK/US defence exports are managed allowing as it does the movement and transfer of equipment and information between pre-approved US and UK government agencies and contractors without International Traffic in Arms Regulations export licenses. As the BIS departmental notice to exporters (2010/ 30) goes on to say, the quid pro quo for the removal of the need for export licences is that while Treaty material is in the UK it will be protected under the Official Secrets Act. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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I should, therefore like to know what oversight the Parliamentary Committee on Arms Export Controls will have of these new arrangements, including whether the committee will seek, or be provided with information regarding: The import and export of defence articles between the approved communities in the US and the UK. Any onward movement of articles originally traded under the cooperation treaty to entities outside of the approved communities covered by the cooperation treaty (including, for example, in order to provide for modification or maintenance of such articles). Further such information as is required to provide full oversight of the cooperation treaty. I look forward to your response. 29 June 2011

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Following our private word in the House this week, I should be grateful if you could confirm that you will be making an Oral Statement to the House giving the outcome of the Government’s review of arms exports to North Africa and the wider Middle East announced by Alistair Burt in February. You said that the timing of this Oral Statement was likely to be in the week of Monday 5 September. This timing would be most helpful. I mentioned to you that I would be abroad on parliamentary business for the whole of the week of 12 September. 14 July 2011

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office At its meeting of 11 July, the Committees on Arms Export Controls considered the Government’s response to our inquiry into the Scrutiny of Arms Exports 2011 UK Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2009, Quarterly Reports for 2010, licensing policy and review of export control legislation. The Committees agreed questions relating to your response as set out in Annex A to this letter. The Committees also attach a series of questions relating to the review of Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression. These questions are attached as Annex B. I would be grateful if I could receive a response to these questions no later than 30 September. The Committees will be making this letter public. I am copying this letter to the. Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Secretary of State for International Development and the Secretary of State for Defence.

Annex A QUESTIONS RELATING TO CM8079—GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CAEC ANNUAL REPORT The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government’s Response.

Paragraph 2—The Government’s Arms Exports Review 1. Why is the FCO not in close consultation with DFID as well as with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Ministry of Defence on its arms exports review? 2. By what date does the Government expect to have reported back to Parliament on its arms exports review? 3. The Government has now chosen to give a particular focus in its arms exports review to “crowd control goods”. What arms and categories of arms does the Government consider to be “crowd control goods”? 4. Why has the Government apparently restricted the scope of its review by giving it a particular focus on “crowd control goods” when no such restriction was made when the FCO Minister Alistair Burt first announced the review on 18 February?

Paragraph 3—The Treaty on US/UK Defence Cooperation 1. Will the Government provide the CAEC with the list of “pathfinder” projects to implement The Treaty on US/UK Defence Co-operation when agreed between the UK and US Governments? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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2. By what date does the Government expect to provide the CAEC with its further note on the implementation of The Treaty on US/UK Defence Cooperation? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further Evidence.

Paragraph 4—The Performance of the Export Control Organisation 1. By what date will the Government be reporting its findings following its review of the Open General Export Licence (OGEL) system and whether there will be consultation with outside bodies in the course of this review? It is hoped that the Government will report to the Committees before the Committees start taking further Evidence. 2. By what date will the Government be starting its full consultation on the possibility of the Export Control Organisation being funded by its customers? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further Evidence.

Paragraph 6—“Brass Plate” Companies 1. By what date does the Government expect to “revert” to the CAEC on “Brass plate” companies? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further Evidence.

Paragraph 7—Pre-licence Registration of Arms Brokers 1. By what date does the Government expect to “revert” to the CAEC on pre-licence registration of arms brokers? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further Evidence.

Paragraph 8—Extra-territorial Arms Export Controls 1. By what date does the Government expect to “revert” to the CAEC on extra-territorial arms export controls? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further Evidence.

Paragraph 9—Military End-use Control 1. Will the Government provide the Committees with details of the UK proposal for an expanded Military End-Use Control and of the EU Commission’s Green Paper as part of the preparation for the 2012 review of the EU Dual-Use Regulation?

Paragraph 10—Torture end-use Controls 1. Will the Government provide the Committees with a copy of the letter of 12 April 2011 that the Minister for Business Mark Prisk MP wrote to the EU High Representative, Baroness Ashton, on torture end-use controls and with a copy of Baroness Ashton’s reply when available?

Paragraph 11—Sodium Thiopental 1. Given the further shipments of sodium thiopental for capital punishment executions were reportedly made from the UK to the US during the one month from 28 October to 30 November that it took the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills to bring into force an Order under section 6 of the Export Control Act 2002 controlling the export of sodium thiopental from the UK to the United States, given also that under the applicable federal law it is not currently lawful to import sodium thiopental into the United States for medical purposes and also that sodium thiopental is virtually unused for legitimate medical purposes in the US, why did the Government not impose a Control Order immediately for a temporary period whilst the Leigh Day & Co representations were investigated and assessed?

Paragraph 14—Compound Penalties 1. The Government’s Response fails to answer the Committees’ recommendation that the Government makes public its criteria used for imposing compound penalties and how the amounts of such penalties are calculated. Will it now do so?

Paragraph 15—Compound Penalties 1. In how many cases to date involving breaches of arms export controls has a publicity clause been included in a compounding agreement?

Paragraph 16—The Arms Trade Treaty 1. In what specific ways is the UK continuing to play a leading role in the UN process on the Arms Trade Treaty so that an effective, legally binding international Treaty is secured? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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Paragraph 17—The Arms Trade Treaty 1. Which of the other Permanent Members of the UN Security Council—namely China, France, Russia and the US—are, like the UK, also committed to achieving the strongest possible Arms Trade Treaty with the broadest possible scope, including ammunition? 2. Will the Government provide a further note to the Committees on what it considers would be the most effective way in which the Arms Trade Treaty could address the issue of corruption? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further Evidence.

Paragraphs 19 and 20—Bribery and Corruption 1. Will the Government confirm that if it becomes aware of corruption in arms deals it will, regardless of whether there is a risk of diversion or re-export under Criteria 7, take appropriate action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010?

Paragraph 24—Saudi Arabia and Yemen 1. Why does the Government consider that, notwithstanding the events this year, in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, that the arms and components of arms that could be used for internal repression and which have been approved for export to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as detailed in Annex 4 of the Committees’ Report, remain in line with the Criteria and have not therefore been revoked by the Government?

Annex B QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE REVIEW OF GOVERNMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE WITH REGARD TO THE EXPORT OF EQUIPMENT THAT MIGHT BE USED FOR INTERNAL REPRESSION 1. Since the Government announced its arms export licence review on 18 February 2011 into licences approving arms exports to countries in North Africa and the Middle East, how many (a) SIEL and (b) OGEL licences have been revoked in respect of each country; and what was the date of revocation in each case? 2. In respect of each of the licences revoked what was the item of military goods and quantity of them that had previously been granted an export licence? 3. In respect of each of the licences revoked, what was the value of each order which has had its licence revoked? 4. In respect of each country for which licences have been revoked, how many (a) single and (b) open licences remain unrevoked; and what (i) quantities of which military goods and (ii) military services are covered by each of those licences? In each case, what was the value of these goods and services? 5. Having regard to the Government’s information made public to date, why have no (a) individual and (b) open licences been revoked for exports to: (a) Saudi Arabia. (b) Syria. (c) The Yemen. In respect of each of the above countries what quantities of which military goods and which military services remain approved for export to them, and what is the value of these goods and services? 18 July 2011

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office I attach this letter of 29 June that I have received from Caroline Lucas in my capacity as Chair of the Committees on Arms Export Controls. As you will see, Caroline Lucas’ letter has already been copied to you and the other three Secretaries of State concerned. Notwithstanding what is said in the second paragraph of Caroline Lucas’ letter about the movement and transfer of defence export equipment and information between the UK and US without export licences and about the Official Secrets Act, I trust you will be able to assure me unequivocally that the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty will not result in any reduction in the current disclosures both on the BIS and FCO websites and to the Committees on Arms Export Controls relating to exports of controlled goods from the UK to the US. In your reply, please could you also respond to each of the three bullet points in the third paragraph of Caroline Lucas’ letter. 21 July 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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Annex Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Caroline Lucas MP I am writing following a constituent’s enquiry about the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty, which was recently ratified by the US Congress. As you will know, the Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty was negotiated to facilitate cooperation between the UK and US Governments by removing the need for US export licences for less sensitive categories of technology, destined for UK or US Government end-use only. The Treaty is described by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills as representing a significant change to how UK/US defence exports are managed allowing as it does the movement and transfer of equipment and information between pre-approved US and UK government agencies and contractors without International Traffic in Arms Regulations export licenses. As the BIS departmental notice to exporters (2010/ 30) goes on to say, the quid pro quo for the removal of the need for export licences is that while Treaty material is in the UK it will be protected under the Official Secrets Act. I should, therefore like to know what oversight the Parliamentary Committee on Arms Export Controls will have of these new arrangements, including whether the committee will seek, or be provided with information regarding: The import and export of defence articles between the approved communities in the US and the UK. Any onward movement of articles originally traded under the cooperation treaty to entities outside of the approved communities covered by the cooperation treaty (including, for example, in order to provide for modification or maintenance of such articles). Further such information as is required to provide full oversight of the cooperation treaty. I look forward to your response. 29 June 2011

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letters of 14 July, concerning the FCO Review of Export Control Policy, and of the 18 July concerning the Government’s Consolidated Response to the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) Annual Report 2011. On the FCO Review of Export Control Policy, you will now have seen the Written Ministerial Statement which was laid before Parliament on 18 July. This Statement provided Parliament with an update on the Review. In it, I stated the Review’s conclusion that further work is needed on how we operate certain aspects of our export controls. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills has responsibility for our export licensing operations. He and I will consider how this should be done. Once that process is complete I will update the House on proposals, but I am unable to confirm exactly when this might happen at present. In respect of your letter of the 18 July, I can confirm that the Government will provide answers to the questions that the CAEC have raised in Annexes A and B of that letter by 30 September, as you have requested. In addition, the Government will provide, by the same date, the supplementary responses to the CAECs’ Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2010 questions, that you requested during your meeting with FCO and BIS officials on the 21 July. I understand from the officials involved that this was a very positive and constructive meeting, and that officials from both the FCO and BIS will be working even more closely with the CAEC and its officials over the coming months to ensure that the information flow on arms export controls is as efficient and transparent as possible. 30 July 2011

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 21 July about the US-UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty. I can assure you that the Treaty will not lead to any change in the level of disclosure about exports of controlled goods from the UK to the US on departmental websites or our regular information exchanges with the Committees on Arms Export Controls. Exports from the UK to the US under the Treaty will continue to be licensed and, as now, it is expected most such exports will be under Open General Export Licence (OGEL). The fact that we have committed to a Treaty-specific OGEL should only have minimal impact in this respect. The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills will of course continue to report on individual licences granted and to provide general information on OGELs in the same way and to the same extent that they do now, regardless of whether the exports or transfers are under the Treaty or not. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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In response to the points raised by Caroline Lucas, the Government will continue to provide information to the Chair of the Committees on Arms Export Controls in a transparent and timely manner, allowing them to continue their vital role examining the UK’s strategic export controls. 5 August 2011

Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills Following a report in the media (The Sunday Telegraph of July 31) that Mr Anders Breivik procured items from the UK, the CAEC wishes to know: 1. Whether any breaches of procedures or legislation relating to controlled goods occurred. 2. Whether in the light of this report the Government will be making any changes to its procedures or legislation relating to controlled goods. In addition, following the various reports alleging that Mr Breivik used “dum-dum” bullets, the Committees wish to know whether the Government has any evidence that these bullets, components of these bullets, or equipment for making these bullets or their components were procured from the UK. 5 September 2011

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office I am writing further to my letter of 30 July concerning additional questions raised by the Committees on Arms Export Controls in response to the Government’s Command Paper Cm8079. It is my pleasure to forward to the Committees the attached response which addresses the additional questions attached to your letter of 18 July. Additionally, I am enclosing the government’s supplementary responses to the Committees’ Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 questions that you requested at your meeting with FAC) and BIS officials on 21 July. The government continues to give a high priority to the work of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, and to value greatly its role in scrutinising UK strategic arms exports. We are committed to continuing work closely and constructively with the Committees, and to addressing the issues raised by the Committees in a transparent, comprehensive and timely manner. 30 September 2011

Annex A QUESTIONS RELATING TO CM8079 GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CAEC ANNUAL REPORT The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government’s Response.

Paragraph 2—The Government’s Arms Exports Review 1. Why is the FCO not in close consultation with DFID as well as with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Ministry of Defence on its arms exports review? The FCO works closely with DFID on arms export controls. DFID was fully consulted on the FCO Review of Export Controls Policy.

2. By what date does the Government expect to have reported back to Parliament on its arms exports review? The Foreign Secretary provided an update on the review to Parliament on 18 July through a Written Ministerial Statement. He said that the review concluded that further work is needed on how we operate certain aspects of our export controls. The Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (who has responsibility for our export licensing operations) are considering how this should be done. Once that process is complete the Foreign Secretary will update the House on proposals, but we are unable to confirm exactly when this might happen at present.

3. The Government has now chosen to give a particular focus in its arms exports review to “crowd control goods”. What arms and categories of arms does the Government consider to be “crowd control goods”? There is no comprehensive list of “crowd control goods” but some equipment carries a risk of being used for internal repression (rather than legitimate public order needs or external defence); this includes: — CS grenades, tear gas canisters, crowd control ammunition. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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— Water cannons. — Anti-riot shields. — Body armour. — Shotguns, small arms, semi-automatic pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, and ammunition. — Armoured personnel carriers, armoured fighting vehicles.

4. Why has the Government apparently restricted the scope of its review by giving it a particular focus on “crowd control goods” when no such restriction was made when the FCO Minister Alistair Burt first announced the review on February 18? The announcement of the review and its focus was made during the Foreign Secretary’s appearance before the FAC on 16 March 2011. The focus on “crowd control goods” was a result of incidents during the Arab Spring, as well as the issues raised by the Foreign Affairs Committee about equipment being sold to Gulf states for external defence, and concerns about those states using that equipment against their domestic populations. For example, Mr Baron MP sought a Government commitment to say: “When it comes to those specific arms that can be used against a domestic population, the Government will promise to undertake a full review to ensure that we don’t make the mistakes of the past”? Mr Hague confirmed that “We will have a review. There is no doubt about that. The area to concentrate on is the one you are talking about. I will go that far to meet your request”.

Paragraph 3—The Treaty on US/UK Defence Cooperation 1. Will the Government provide the CAEC with the list of “pathfinder” projects to implement The Treaty on US/UK Defence Cooperation when agreed between the UK and US Governments? Pathfinder projects will be used to test the efficacy and appropriateness of the full range of national processes, practice, guidance and training, which have been developed in consultation with the US, and to test the application and utility of the Treaty ahead of full implementation. There are seven jointly agreed Pathfinder projects; five nominated by the UK and two by the US. The UK Pathfinder projects are: Chinook, Apache, Rivet Joint (UK Air Seeker) and Bowman, with one “Pathfinder” nomination from Industry (a sale to the US Navy by Aish Technologies Ltd) to test the bilateral nature of the Treaty by exporting equipment from the UK to the US. The US “Pathfinder” projects are: F22 Raptor engines and V22 Osprey Tiltrotor. In addition, the clearance process required to enable facilities operated by UK non-governmental entities to join the “Approved Community” will also be tested. Aish Technologies Ltd, Rolls Royce Ltd and Wiltshire Ballistics will provide “Pathfinder” facilities for the Approved Community process. Industrial participation in the Pathfinder process is key to ensuring that the UK MOD and US DoD Industrial partners are similarly prepared for Treaty Implementation. The UK MOD Implementation Team have worked with the Aerospace Defence Security Trade Association to ensure that Government plans for Treaty implementation are understood and that Industry’s views are taken into account.

2. By what date does the Government expect to provide the CAEC with its further note on the implementation of the Treaty on US/UK Defence Cooperation? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further evidence The Pathfinders were formally notified to the Defence Suppliers Forum ahead of the 1 September start date for the testing period and were discussed at the National Defence Industrial Association’s annual Quadrilateral (UK, Canada, US and Australia) conference on 12 September 2011. Pathfinder testing and Approved Community trials will conclude by November 2011, which will enable the UK and US Governments to determine whether the Treaty’s processes are robust and effective. Upon completion of the Pathfinder testing and “Approved Community” trials we will provide a further note to the Committee.

Paragraph 4—The Performance of the Export Control Organisation By what date will the Government be reporting its findings following its review of the Open General Export Licence (OGEL) system and whether there will be consultation with outside bodies in the course of the review? It is hoped that the Government will report to the Committees before the Committees start taking further evidence, The Government has conducted a first phase of the review of Open General Export Licences, which has concluded that there is scope for increasing the use of existing OGELs—with benefits both for exporters and for the ECO—through a number of measures, including: (i) creation of a “plain English” OGEL template; (ii) standardisation of the terms and conditions of OGELs; (iii) improvements to the OGEL Checker online self-help tool; and (iv) a study into ways of improving transparency in relation to the use of OGELs. A draft of the “plain English” OGEL has already been shared with industry representatives and their reaction was favourable. We will continue to consult cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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industry and others on an informal basis during the course of the review. We will provide the Committees with a further report at the end of the year.

1. By what date will the Government be starting its full consultation on the possibility of the Export Control Organisation being funded by its customers? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further evidence. We have been discussing with exporters the possibility of charging for export licences. These informal discussions will continue. We will open a full public consultation as and when this becomes a firm Government proposal with a timetable for implementation.

Paragraph 6—“Brass Plate” Companies 1. By what date does the Government expect to revert to the CAEC on “Brass plate” companies? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further evidence The Government (the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills) will update the Committees regarding developments on these issues before the Committees start taking further evidence.

Paragraph 7—Pre-licence Registration of Arms Brokers 1. By what date does the Government expect to revert to the CAEC on pre-licence registration of arms brokers? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further evidence The Government (the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills) will update the Committees regarding developments on these issues before the Committees start taking further evidence.

Paragraph 8—Extra-territorial Arms Export Controls 1. By what date does the Government expect to revert to the CAEC on extra-territorial arms export controls? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further evidence The Government (the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills) will update the Committees regarding developments on these issues before the Committees start taking further evidence.

Paragraph 9—Military End-use Control 1. Will the Government provide the Committees with details of the UK proposal for an expanded Military End-Use Control and of the EU Commission’s Green Paper as part of the preparation for the 2012 review of the EU Dual-Use Regulation? The UK proposal would be for an amendment to Article 4(2) of Council Regulation (EC) 428/2009 as follows: “An authorisation shall be required for the export of dual-use items not listed in Annex 1 if the purchasing country or country of destination is subject to an arms embargo decided by a common position or joint action adopted by the Council or a decision of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or an arms embargo imposed by a binding resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations and if the exporter has been informed by the authorities referred to in paragraph 1, or has reason to believe, that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for a military end-use. For the purposes of this paragraph ‘military end-use’ shall mean: Intended for the military, paramilitary, security or police forces in a destination subject to an arms embargo or to an entity involved in procurement, manufacture, maintenance, repair or operation on their behalf. An authorisation shall not be required if the items in question are medical supplies and equipment, food, clothing and other consumer goods.” The European Commission’s Green Paper on dual-use export controls is attached (Flag A). Note: The European Green Paper can be found at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/june/ tradedoc_148020.pdf

Paragraph 10—Torture End-use Controls 1. Will the Government provide the Committees with a copy of the letter of 12 April 2011 that the Minister for Business Mark Prisk MP wrote to the EU High Representative, Baroness Ashton, on torture end-use controls and with a copy of Baroness Ashton’s reply when available? Mark Prisk’s letter is attached (Flag B). Although this letter is primarily about the export of drugs to the United States for the purpose of lethal injection, it does specifically refer to torture end-use controls in the final paragraph. We are yet to receive a reply from Baroness Ashton. Note: For Flag B see Ev 142. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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Paragraph 11—Sodium Thiopental 1. Given the further shipments of sodium thiopental for capital punishment executions were reportedly made from the UK to the US during the one month from 28 October until 30 November that it took the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills to bring into force an Order under Section 6 of the Export Control Act 2002 controlling the export of sodium thiopental from the UK to the United States, given also that under the applicable federal law it is not currently lawful to import sodium thiopental into the United States for medical purposes and also that sodium thiopental is virtually unused for medical purposes in the United States, why did the Government not impose a Control Order immediately for a temporary period whilst the Leigh Day & Co representations were investigated and assessed? As detailed in our earlier response, sodium thiopental is an anaesthetic which is widely used in medicine throughout the world but is also used by some States in the US to anaesthetise prisoners prior to execution. From the time that the allegation came to light on 28 October 2010 that some US States had attempted to source sodium thiopental from the UK for the purposes of execution, the Government investigated this case as a priority. While continually affirming the Government’s opposition to the death penalty, Dr Vince Cable, in his capacity as Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, declined to impose exports controls on the drug immediately, as his primary concern was that he should not take action which might cause delays in the export of a medicine which could be needed by patients. The Committees are right to cite that the discoveries that it was illegal under applicable federal law to import sodium thiopental into the US for medical purposes, and that sodium thiopental was virtually unused for legitimate medical purposes in the US at that time, were the key developments that led to Dr Cable’s decision on 29 November to impose an export control Order. The Government does not agree that we were slow to act on these facts, which were not known when the issue first came to light on 28 October and were not established upon the commencement of Judicial Review proceedings on 17 November. Indeed our initial research indicated that sodium thiopental is a medicine that is used widely throughout the world and that was borne out by its inclusion in the World Health Organisation’s Essential Medicines List. Moreover, prior to the commencement of Judicial Review proceedings we received a witness statement from a practising anaesthesiologist in the US who indicated that, prior to the national shortage of the drug, sodium thiopental was used at least in some parts of the United States, in particular in obstetric anaesthetics. The discoveries that it was illegal to import sodium thiopental into the US for medical purposes, and that sodium thiopental was virtually unused for legitimate medical purposes in the US at that time, were made by us in the course of our intense research for the Judicial Review. As soon as these facts became sufficiently clear on the weekend of 27 November, Dr Cable took decisive action to impose the export control Order, which came into force on 30 November.

Paragraph 14—Compound Penalties 1. The Government’s Response fails to answer the Committees’ recommendation that the Government makes public its criteria used for imposing compound penalties and how the amounts of such penalties are calculated. Will it now do so? Section 152 of the Customs and Management Act 1979 allows the Commissioners to compound any proceedings under the customs and excise Acts. In effect this allows the Commissioners to enter into an agreement with an offender to settle the matter out of court as an alternative to initiating legal proceedings. An offer to compound proceedings is only made in cases where there is sufficient evidence that would support criminal proceedings with a reasonable prospect of success. When considering whether to offer a compound penalty, HMRC takes account of all factors including the seriousness of the offence and the best interests of law enforcement. For instance HMRC would be more likely to offer a compound settlement if the court was likely to impose a small or nominal penalty or the offence resulted from a genuine mistake or misunderstanding. However, a compound settlement would not normally be offered in cases involving: — assaults on, or obstruction of, officers; — persistent offenders; — an offender who is subject to a suspended prison sentence or is on parole for a comparable offence; and — other related offences which are being considered by Customs, Police or other government departments. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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HMRC cannot impose a compound penalty and the exporter is under no obligation to accept an offer. If an exporter does not believe that he should pay a compound penalty, or he does not agree that the amount of the penalty is fair or proportionate to the offence, then he can have his case heard in a magistrate’s court.

Calculation of the offer to compound HMRC officers consider all relevant factors in each individual case when calculating the sum to be offered as a compound settlement. Although not exhaustive, the following factors are taken into account: — the seriousness of the alleged offence; — whether fraudulent intent can be proven; — the extent of the offender’s efforts to perpetrate the alleged offence; — the type and value of any goods involved; — the offender’s previous history; and — the level of penalties known to have been imposed by courts for similar offences. No compound penalty can exceed the maximum monetary penalty laid down in law for the offence in question.

Paragraph 15—Compound Penalties 1. In how many cases to date involving breaches of arms export controls has a publicity clause been included in a compounding agreement? All compounding agreements for arms export controls have a standard publicity clause, which sets out HMRC’s policy on confidentiality and disclosure in such cases. HMRC’s policy is generally not to publicise the names of individuals or companies accepting compound settlements. However, we reserve the right to publicise details where there is an over-riding public interest. This is a longstanding Government policy, the details of which are set out in Hansard in a written statement by the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Mr Peter Lilley on 26 April 1989 (column 560). The text of this statement is reproduced below. Hansard: 26 April 1989 (column 560)

Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 Mr Quentin Davies: To ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will make a statement on the circumstances in which the commissioners of Customs and Excise will disclose particulars of cases where proceedings for offences are compounded under section 152 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. Mr Lilley: Section 152 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 is the most recent re-enactment of the commissioners’ long-standing power to compound proceedings, that is to offer an alleged offender the option of paying a penalty out of court rather than be prosecuted. This power is used to resolve the majority of customs or excise offences, and enables them to be dealt with efficiently and effectively without burdening the courts or tying up Customs staff in lengthy court hearings. Hitherto, details of compounded settlements have not usually been made public. The commissioners, having reviewed their policy on disclosure of compounded settlements, have decided that in respect of settlements made on or after 1 June 1989, details will be disclosed in the following circumstances: (a) It will be the Commissioners’ invariable practice to disclose details to other Government Departments whose statutory responsibilities are directly affected; and (b) to the courts for sentencing purposes after conviction, in cases where there has been an earlier compounded settlement for a similar matter within the time limits specified for offences by the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. The commissioners will also disclose compounded settlements under two other circumstances: (c) to employers when it is apparent that the nature of the employment has facilitated the offence; or (where drugs offences or indications of serious alcohol abuse are involved, the nature of the employment or duties requires a high degree of unimpaired judgement or faculties; and (d) in response to enquiries from Parliament or the media about cases which have excited public attention, if disclosure is considered to be in the public interest. In all cases, persons considering an offer to compound for an alleged offence will be warned when the offer is made that details of the settlement may be disclosed in the circumstances set out at (a) to (d) above. The commissioners have considered the recommendation of Lord Keith of Kinkel’s committee on the “Enforcement Powers of the Revenue Departments” (Cmnd. 9440), that the names of all persons making compounded settlements and particulars of the settlements should be published, subject to discretion to withhold the names of persons making full spontaneous voluntary disclosure of their offences. The policy now to be adopted reflects the commissioners’ conclusion that, other than in the particular circumstances already cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

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described, it would not be equitable or make the best use of their resources or those of the courts to depart from the present general principle of non-disclosure. The commissioners’ general policy of non-disclosure of details of their dealings in individual cases will therefore continue to apply to cases which do not come within the circumstances described above. I am satisfied with this outcome of the commissioners’ review.

Paragraph 16—The Arms Trade Treaty 1. In what specific ways is the UK continuing to play a leading role in the UN process of the Arms Trade Treaty so that an effective, legally binding international Treaty is secured? The UK has maintained its leading international position on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in a number of ways; including bilateral outreach, active engagement in the Preparatory Committee meetings and through proactive multilateral interaction with the P5 and the EU. Significant funding for ATT related projects has also been provided, covering areas such as capacity building in developing states and research into technical aspects of the Treaty. The UK will continue to play a leading role as efforts intensify ahead of the crucial Negotiating Conference in 2012.

Paragraph 17—The Arms Trade Treaty 1. Which of the other Permanent Members of the UN Security Council—namely China, France, Russia and the US—are, like the UK, also committed to achieving the strongest possible Arms Trade Treaty with the broadest possible scope, including ammunition? The recent Preparatory Committee meeting in July saw the first joint P5 statement in support of the UN process on an ATT. France and the US are firmly committed to securing a strong ATT, covering all conventional weapons. However, the US still has concerns about the inclusion of ammunition in an ATT’s scope. Russia and China still have some significant concerns about an Arms Trade Treaty, and have different views on what should constitute the Treaty’s final scope.

2. Will the Government provide a further note to the Committees on what it considers would be the most effective way in which the Arms Trade Treaty could address the issue of corruption? It is hoped that this will be before the Committees start taking further evidence The Government is still considering the most effective way of addressing the issue of corruption in the context of an ATT. It may be that this could be achieved most effectively through the Treaty’s implementation mechanisms, by introducing a requirement for signatories to take necessary measures to combat corruption in relation to arms transfers covered by an ATT. However, the Government remains open to other suggestions regarding how an ATT could address this issue effectively.

Paragraphs 19 and 20—Bribery and Corruption 1. Will the Government confirm that if it becomes aware of corruption in arms deals it will, regardless of whether there is a risk of diversion or re-export under Criteria 7, take appropriate action under the provisions of the Bribery Act 2010? Yes. The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) has lead responsibility for investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery. They decide whether or not to pursue an investigation, in collaboration with the City of London Police’s Overseas Anti-Corruption Unit. The Government, civil servants and the public should report allegations of bribery and corruption by companies or individuals directly to the SFO (e-mail: OverseasCorruptionPsfo.gsi.gov.uk). They are also able to discuss issues informally http://www.sfomov.uk/ bribery—corruptionithe-sfo’s-response/where-should-i-report-corruption.aspx.

Paragraph 24—Saudi Arabia and Yemen 1. Why does the Government consider that, notwithstanding the events this year, in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, that the arms and components of arms that could be used for internal repression and which have been approved for export to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as detailed in Annex 4 of the Committees’ Report, remain in line with the Criteria and have not therefore been revoked by the Government? Events of the Arab Spring have underlined the importance of ensuring that exports of UK defence equipment are subject to careful scrutiny. The Government takes its export responsibilities very seriously, and operates one of the most rigorous arms export control regimes in the world. All export licence applications are considered against the Consolidated EU and UK Export Licensing Criteria on a case by case basis, and in the light of prevailing circumstances. We pay particular attention to allegations of human rights abuses in our assessment. Each assessment takes into account the intended end use of the equipment, the behaviour of the end user, the risk of diversion and the prevailing circumstances in the country concerned. The Government reacted quickly to events of the Arab Spring, reviewing all licences to all countries affected, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. The Government moved swiftly to revoke licences where cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 73

evidence existed that licences were no longer in line with the Consolidated Criteria. As the decisions to revoke licences demonstrate, our export licensing policy and process allow us to respond quickly and robustly to changing facts on the ground. Furthermore, one licence covering sporting gun ammunition for Syria was in fact revoked following the introduction of sanctions. At review, each application was considered against the Consolidated Criteria on a case by case basis taking into account the circumstances in the country concerned, the end user, and the likelihood that the product could be used to support internal repression. Revocations are also dependent on the number and type of goods reviewed which vary from country to country reflecting the export applications received and approved. For some countries like Syria and Yemen a small number of applications are received, and pre-existing concerns led to there being very few extant licences to review. The reviews identified that there were significant differences between how Arab Governments reacted to the call for reforms. For example, the Syrian army’s brutal repression of Syrian protestors differed markedly from the actions of the Saudi Arabian National Guard troops. We have no evidence that Saudi forces who were deployed to Bahrain as part of the Peninsula Shield Force, at the request of the Bahraini Government, did anything other than protect key installations. Where a review was prompted by the repressive actions of law enforcement officials policing demonstrations in a country, it was consistent with the Criteria that licences for end users who had no role in policing demonstrations and were unlikely to help police demonstrations in the future, should remain in place. The reviews also recognised that some types of equipment may be associated with far greater risks than others. For example machine guns could be deployed for internal repression far more easily than components for naval equipment. The Criteria were applied consistently, but the different circumstances, including in relation to the issues referred to above, meant that different conclusions were reached as regards different countries and end users. This result is inevitable given the case by case analysis we conduct. In line with our standard export licensing policy for all destinations the Government continues to monitor the situation across the Middle East, and will continue to take into account any changes in circumstances in its assessment of future export licence applications or further reviews of existing licences.

Annex B Questions Relating to the Review of Government Policy and Practice with regard to the Export of Equipment that might be used for Internal Repression 1. Since the Government announced its arms export licence review on 18 February 2011 into licences approving arms exports to countries in North Africa and the Middle East, how many (a) SIEL and (b) OGEL licences have been revoked in respect of each country; and what was the date of revocation in each case? (a) Bahrain 23, Libya 61, Syria 1 (b) Bahrain 14, Bahrain & Egypt 4, Egypt 3, Libya 7 See Table 1 and 2 for details of revocation dates.

2. In respect of each of the licences revoked, what was the item of military goods and quantity of them that had been previously granted an export licence? See Table 1 and 2 for details.

3. In respect of each of the licences revoked, what was the value of each order which had its licence revoked? See Table 1 and 2 for details.

4. In respect of each country for which licences have been revoked, how many (a) single and (b) open licences remain unrevoked; and what (i) quantities of which military goods and (ii) military services are covered by each of those licences? In each case, what was the value of these goods and services? (a) SIELs (a) Bahrain: — Total number of SIELs 51 (49 Permanent and two Temporary). — Military SIELs 31 (None Temporary and 31 Permanent). (b) Libya: — Total number of SIELs 18 (12 Permanent and six Temporary). — Military SIELs 5 (five Temporary and None Permanent). cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/019699/019699_w054_michelle_AE52.xml

Ev 74 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

(c) Syria: — Total number of SIELs 6 (six Permanent & None Temporary). — Military SIELs 0 (None Temporary and None Permanent). OIELs (a) Total OIELs Bahrain 52 (29 Military OIELs). (b) Total OIELs Egypt 63, (31 Military OIELs). (c) Total OIELs Libya 9, (four Military OIELs). (d) Total OIELs Syria 8, (No Military OIELs). See Tables 3 (a) and 3 (b) for (i) and (ii) and (b) for details of value of licences. Also, see Table 4 for details of OIELs.

5. Having regard to the Government’s information made public to date, why have no (a) individual and (h) open licences been revoked for exports to: (a) Saudi Arabia (b) Syria (c) Yemen In respect of each of the above countries what quantities of which military goods and which military services remain approved for export to them, and what is the value of these goods and services? Please refer to the answer to Annex 1 Paragraph 24 Q1 for an explanation as to why licences to Saudi Arabia and Yemen have not been revoked. As referred to in the above answer, one licence for Syria has been revoked. Please refer to Tables 3 (a) and 3(b) (i) and (ii) for details of existing licences and their value, and Tables 4(a) and (b) for details of OIELs. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 75 for wall and door breaching projectile launchers control ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition artillery, weapon cleaning equipment, technology for artillery cryptography use of equipment employing cryptography semi-automatic pistols (1), components(2), for semi-automatic components pistols, assault forammunition, rifles weapon assault sights rifles, weapon cleaning equipment, small arms communications equipment,cameras, military military communications equipment video recording equipment, military Table 1 SIEL REVOCATIONS SINCE 18 FEBRUARY 2011 Ultimate End Qatar,Qatar automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, military parachutist equipment 24/02/201124/02/2011 Abu18/02/2011 Dhabi,18/02/2011 Bahrain Abu18/02/2011 Kuwait, Dhabi, Bahrain, Bahrain Kuwait,18/02/2011 Bahrain Bahrain18/02/2011 Bahrain18/02/201118/02/2011 Bahrain18/02/2011 £30,50018/02/2011 Bahrain18/02/2011 £123,708 Bahrain18/02/2011 Bahrain18/02/2011 Bahrain Bahrain18/02/2011 Bahrain Bahrain military18/02/2011 , components components for for military Bahrain transport18/02/2011 aircraft military parachutes, £10,010 components Bahrain for £1,590 £3,539 Bahrain18/02/201118/02/2011 £4,61318/02/201118/02/2011 £1,604,000 Bahrain components Bahrain for military £1,812 aircraft Bahrain navigation equipment components £1,198 for military Bahrain aircraft small navigation arms £3,100 equipment ammunition, non-sporting shotgun ammunition, £1,314,485 training ammunition wall £211,596 and artillery, weapon door mountings, breaching components £22,289 projectiles, for non-sporting artillery, equipment shotgun £84,832 for ammunition, the crowd use of small £1,116,684 arms ammunition tear gas/irritant cryptographic ammunition, software, training equipment anti-armour tear £6,190 employing ammunition, gas/irritant cryptography small ammunition arms cryptographic ammunition software, equipment employing cryptography £16,470 equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing software cryptography, cryptographic for software, £2,715 software the for the use £1,287 of equipment £118,048 employing cryptography, equipment cryptographic software £219,781 employing submachine guns (2), components for submachine guns, sporting rifles (2), technology for the use technology equipment of for employing equipment the cryptography employing use cryptography equipment of employing equipment cryptography, employing imaging cryptography cameras, components for military Revocation Date Destination User Value of Export ARS Description of Goods cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 76 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence weapon sights the use of testimaging equipment cameras, for weapon weapon sights, sights, weapon test sight equipment mounts for weapon sights, DefenceCommitee General (Libya) Ministry ofDefenceProcurement Department of the Armed Peoplethe of Jamahiriya JAMAHIRIYA Great inert smoke hand grenades,NAVY inert signal flares, inert smoke canisters, illuminators, inert inert stun grenades, inertForce thunderflashes People’s CommitteeGeneralDirectorate for the Security use of weaponContract sights, direct view imagingPurchase equipment, of weapon sight mounts, and People’s CommitteeGeneral sights, Security goods treated for for signature suppression forCivil military use, technologyAuthority for Aviation Ultimate End 21/02/201118/02/201122/02/2011 Bahrain Bahrain Belgium23/02/201122/02/2011 Denmark France22/02/2011 (Libya) Temporary £16023/02/2011 France France £5,00023/02/2011 (Libya) £50,00025/02/2011 Military £32,000 inert Italy chaff, inert decoy flares Italy £10 (Libya) The imaging Great cameras imaging £37,572 cameras 25/02/2011 (Libya) components for anti-armour LIBYAN £403,448 Italy25/02/2011 (Libya) Libyan Air weapon £3,400 night sights, Italy equipment (Libya) for the use of direct General weapon view £9,800 sights, imaging technology equipment, for weapon night sights, weapon day and night components (Libya) for optical target surveillance equipment General £4,114 components for optical target surveillance (Libya) equipment Libyan £4,780 unfinished products for optical target acquisition equipment components for airborne radars Revocation Date Destination User Value of Export ARS Description of Goods cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 77 ammunition, training teardoor breaching gas/irritant projectile ammunition, launchers ammunition for wall and and door breaching projectilesmall launchers arms ammunition, crowd control ammunition ammunition, training teardoor breaching gas/irritant projectile ammunition, launchers, ammunition for wall and s committee s committee ` ` Force People forSecurity People General forSecurity General General Committee People’s General Security for Socialist People’s LibyanJamahiriya Arab Socialist People’s LibyanJamahiriya Arab Ultimate End 24/02/201124/02/2011 Italy Italy25/02/2011 Italy25/02/2011 Italy24/02/2011 (Libya) Libyan Air £5,000 (Libya) Italy24/02/2011 General £2,171,240 (Libya) Italy02/03/2011 General £47503/03/2011 components for aircraft radars (Libya) direct view imaging Libya equipment 03/03/2011 Libya03/03/201103/03/2011 (Libya) £25 Libya Libya Great cryptographic04/03/2011 software £54,780 Libya (Libya) Libya Great £0 tear gas/irritant weapon ammunition cleaning equipment £227,860 components £3,918 for semi-automatic pistols, training small arms ammunition £179,116 £2,757,094 small arms ammunition, crowd control ammunition small £2,757,094 arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant small tear ammunition, arms crowd ammunition, control tear gas/irritant ammunition gas/irritant ammunition, crowd ammunition, crowd control small arms control ammunition, training ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear ammunition for wall gas/irritant ammunition, crowd control Revocation Date Destination User Value of Export ARS Description of Goods cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 78 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence military infrared/thermal imagingtarget equipment, equipment surveillance forequipment the equipment, use of components optical for optical target surveillance equipment communications equipment, softwareequipment, for military the electronic useand equipment, of intelligence military commandcontrol communications equipment, communications control and artilleryoperation computers, intelligence scenarios command software, communications software forcommunications equipment the modelling of military defensive equipment thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon night sights Ultimate End 02/03/2011 Libya18/02/201118/02/201122/02/201122/02/2011 Libya18/02/2011 Libya Libya18/02/2011 Libya18/02/2011 Libya18/02/2011 Libya Libya Libya18/02/201118/02/201118/02/2011 Libya £142,80018/02/201118/02/2011 Libya18/02/2011 Libya18/02/2011 Libya £98,06418/02/2011 Libya £36,30818/02/2011 Libya £10,000 optical Libya £22,000,000 target18/02/2011 surveillance Libya £6,850 equipment, military Libya cameras,18/02/2011 laser £155,00018/02/2011 rangefinders, Libya £1,897,321 imaging18/02/2011 cameras 8578609.47 components for18/02/2011 spacecraft combat Libya aircraft weapon cleaning18/02/2011 equipment Libya18/02/2011 Libya ground Libya vehicle military software communications Libya for military equipment, the helmets military use communications of military £10,573,625 Libya radio jamming communications equipment, radio equipment, jamming equipment equipment £13,633 for £1,000 the use £1,000 of £7,065 military military £8,429 communications equipment, £360 equipment £11,000 for the £1,120 software for use the use of of military technology communications for military £864,000 equipment the use technology of for military the infrared/thermal use imaging equipment of equipment employing military £500 cryptography infrared/thermal imaging equipment equipment employing £1,500,000 cryptography £1,900,000 components blank/inert for ammunition assault rifles, £58,830 components for NBC machine £38,500 guns protective/defensive weapon night £1,621,550 equipment, sights, imaging cameras, components weapon sight mounts, for military laser infrared/ radar NBC equipment laser equipment protective/ radar for equipment the use of sniper rifles components for anti-armour missiles optical components target for surveillance anti-armour equipment missiles Revocation Date Destination User Value of Export ARS Description of Goods cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 79 ground equipment, components for military aircraft ground equipment communications equipment,technology for military themilitary cargo use of communications vehicles,containers military equipment, cargo military vehicles, technology technology containers, for for themilitary the communications use equipment of use ofequipment, military software for the useelectronic of equipment, military communications military equipment,employing military containers, cryptography, software equipmentgenerators for the employing use cryptography, of military equipment field ground vehicle militarymilitary communications equipment, communications equipment equipment,military for software communications the for equipment, usecommunications the of command equipment, military use and electronic controlof of equipment, military software vehicles, ground electronic for military vehicle equipment, thecryptography, use software equipment for thecommunications employing use of cryptography, equipment, equipmentequipment employing components test for equipment military for military communications equipment, equipment for the use of weapon daymilitary and infrared/thermal night imaging sights mounts, equipment, weapon imaging day and cameras, night weapon sights sight Ultimate End 18/02/201118/02/201118/02/2011 Libya Libya Libya18/02/201118/02/2011 Libya Libya18/02/2011 Libya £29,660 £764,96018/02/2011 £800,53118/02/201118/02/201118/02/2011 Libya18/02/2011 Libya18/02/2011 technology for Libya the military £4,343 use aircraft18/02/2011 of ground Libya optical equipment, target technology surveillance equipment for Libya military the £8,539,684 use18/02/2011 of communications Libya military aircraft equipment, Libya software for18/02/2011 the Libya18/02/2011 use £16,941,990 of components military for ground military vehicle communications Libya military equipment, communications equipment for equipment, Syria the military use communications of ground vehicle military communications equipment, equipment for the use of £1,000 £30,000 £27,600 £1,000 £50,000 £1,250 £864,000 body armour £864,000 small arms ammunition software for the use of military components communications for £40 equipment surface-to-air technology missiles, for components the for use £26,760 multi-role of missiles naval NBC weapon communications respirators equipment night sights, imaging weapon night cameras, sights, military equipment for infrared/thermal the imaging use of weapon day and night sights, military cargo anti-riot/ballistic vehicles, shields components for military cargo vehicles Revocation Date Destination User Value of Export ARS Description of Goods cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 80 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Table 2 use ofcommunications, military communicationscommunications equipment, equipment technology for the development of military military communications equipment explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition,… ML13d, NLR, PL5001b OIEL REVOCATIONS SINCE 18 FEBRUARY 2011 11/09/2012 11/09/201206/06/2011 24/07/2011 helmets 22/05/2011 28/02/2011 sights, weapon sights 20/10/201528/07/2015 military utility vehicles, technology31/02/2012 for the use of components military for utility weapon vehicles night sights, components for weapon sights communications equipment, military communications equipment, military helmets, software for the Valid from 11/03/2014 military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of 11/03/2014 12/08/2015 simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating 09/02/2016 constructions for ballistic protection of military systems, military helmets 1A005, ML13b, ML13c, 23/02/1123/02/1124/02/1123/02/11 Bahrain23/02/11 Bahrain23/02/11 Bahrain22/02/11 Bahrain09/03/11 Bahrain 12/09/2007–30/03/11 Bahrain 12/09/2007– Bahrain 07/06/2006– Civil body armour Bahrain 25/07/2006– ballistic shields, body armour, Bahrain suits, 23/05/2006– civil technology body for armour, the components use for of body weapon 28/02/2006– armour, sights, military weapon technology for sights the use of weapon 20/10/10– night sights, rifles, technology shotguns, for small the use arms of ammunition, weapon sporting 28/07/2010– sights, gun weapon ammunition, components night sporting for rifles, military weapon utility sights vehicles, 1/02/2007– military utility vehicles, components technology for for the equipment gun production employing of cryptography laying (Dual-Use) equipment, components components for for military military image communications equipment, intensifier components equipment, for test equipment for military Revocation Date Destination to Dates ARS Description of Goods 09/03/1125/02/11 Bahrain Bahrain 11/03/2009– software for the use of military communications software equipment, for software military to communications simulate equipment, the technology function for of the use of software for military 09/03/1122/02/11 Bahrain Bahrain 11/03/2009– 12/08/2010– equipment employing cryptography (Dual-Use) CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire 22/02/11 Bahrain 09/02/2011– ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 81 03/05/201104/07/201118/01/2012 Software for the use10/01/2012 of military communications for equipment test equipment for22/05/2011 military communications equipment 28/07/2011 technology for the use11/05/2015 of military distress signalling equipment 27/01/2016 the use of aircrew15/04/2013 protective masks ...... 22/03/2015 ground vehicle military communications11/11/2013 equipment, military communications aircraft equipment ground equipment ...... 27/05/2013 control and intelligence equipment29/08/2011 ...... communications equipment, 26/02/2011 military communications equipment ... engineer equipment, components for mine clearing equipment ...... Valid from 01/03/1101/03/1104/03/1104/03/11 Bahrain/Egypt01/03/11 Bahrain/Egypt01/03/11 Bahrain/Egypt12/05/11 04/05/2006– Bahrain/Egypt23/02/11 05/07/2006– Egypt23/02/11 18/01/2007– Egypt Software for23/02/11 the use 11/01/2007– of Egypt components military for communications25/02/11 military equipment, communications Technology equipment, Libya for components equipment for the for military the25/02/11 development use helmets, of of components military distress Libya signalling components equipment, military01/03/11 for 23/05/2006– distress signalling equipment military Libya distress signalling24/02/11 28/07/2006– equipment, military Libya distress 11/05/2010– signalling military parachutes, equipment, military Libya parachutist equipment, technology 27/01/2011– for aircrew the use protective of Libya masks, military components parachutes for 15/04/2008– aircrew Equipment protective employing masks, cryptography Libya components (Dual-Use) for equipment 22/03/2010– for equipment employing cryptography, equipment for 11/11/2008– the components use for military of transport military aircraft, equipment communications for 27/05/2008– equipment, the use artillery of computers, military bombing transport aircraft, computers, military command 30/08/2006– and software control vehicles, for command military communications communications 27/02/2006– equipment, software technology for for the the use use of of components military software for communications for equipment equipment, military for software the to technology use simulate for of the the mine use function of clearing of military equipment, communications equipment components for military field Revocation Date Destination to Dates ARS Description of Goods cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 82 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence £627 £759 £253 £692 £404 £552 £1,816 £4,845 £5,984 £3,638 £1,068 £4,443 £2,390 £5,123 £1,510 £6,724 £15,500 £40,429 £72,300 £76,230 £19,900 £15,840 £115,000 £115,000 £361,500 £1,161,185 £2,357,700 £1,403,060 Table 3(a) ALL EXTANT SIELS equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions BahrainBahrain artillery, components for artillery, inertial equipment equipment for the use of artillery, technology for artillery, weapon mountings £1,248,000 BahrainBahrainBahrainBahrainBahrainBahrainBahrainBahrain equipment employingBahrain cryptography, software inertial for equipment Bahrain equipment employing cryptography corrosion resistantBahrain chemical manufacturing components equipment forBahrain military training components aircraft forBahrain military aircrew components breathing forBahrain equipment military aero-engines small armsBahrain ammunition X-ray accelerators Bahrain body armour,Bahrain civil body technology armour, forBahrain components equipment for employing body corrosion cryptography armour, resistantBahrain direct chemical view manufacturing training imaging equipment handBahrain equipment grenades components forBahrain military training corrosion aircraft resistantBahrain chemical manufacturing equipment equipment employingBahrain cryptography, software equipment for employingBahrain the cryptography, use technology of components for equipment forBahrain equipment employing military employing cryptography aircrew cryptography components breathing forBahrain equipment combat aircraft small armsBahrain ammunition gun silencers, sporting guns components (2), forBahrain sporting military guns aircrew components (3) breathing forBahrain equipment military training inertial aircraft equipment Bahrain equipment employingBahrain cryptography, software corrosion for resistant equipmentBahrain chemical employing £16,896 manufacturing cryptography equipment equipment employingBahrain cryptography components forBahrain launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for components the for use combat of aircraft components launching/handling/control for military training components aircraft for chemical £21,000 agent components detection for equipment, military technology training for components aircraft the for use combat of aircraft components chemical for agent military detection training equipment components aircraft for military training aircraft £233,080 £1,232,387 £6,108 £20,339 £101,108 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 83 £85 £210 £100 £426 £609 £845 £3,122 £2,662 £1,937 £1,875 £1,840 £6,390 £3,523 £2,100 £3,454 £5,622 £1,190 £43,354 £32,579 £272,023 £850,000 Total Value of Export Licences £161,408,911 Total Value of Export Licences £1,678,383 explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment the simulation of military operation scenarios small arms training equipment Libya corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment LibyaLibyaLibyaLibyaLibyaLibyaLibya cryptographic software Libya cryptographic software, equipmentLibya employing equipment cryptography, employing software cryptography for the components use for of militaryLibya equipment improvised employing explosive cryptography deviceLibya decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, software military enabling improvised equipmentLibya to function asLibya forward observer/target components recognition for training assaultLibya equipment, rifles, gun software components mountings, for for machine softwareLibya machine guns for guns, cryptographic (1), training software sniper smallLibya rifles arms (1), components ammunition weapon for cleaning militaryLibya equipment, small weapon arms sights training equipment, military cryptographic small software, arms equipment training employing cryptographic £2,032,500 equipment, cryptography, software, software software equipment for for employing the the inertial cryptography, use use equipment software £63,500 of of for equipment military the neutron employing use generators cryptography of equipment equipment employing employing cryptography cryptography, software equipment for employing the cryptography, use software of equipment for equipment employing the employing cryptography, use cryptography software of £2 equipment for equipment employing the employing cryptography use cryptography of equipment employing cryptography £26,414 £77,093,000 £77,093,000 £1,107 £51,439 £354,000 £1,520,000 £1,970,000 BahrainBahrainBahrainBahrainBahrainBahrainBahrainBahrain equipment forBahrain the use shotguns of (2), aircraftBahrain small cannons arms software ammunition forBahrain the use components of for militaryBahrain military aero-engines training components aircraft forBahrain military training equipment aircraft employingBahrain cryptography components for all-wheel drive equipment vehicles employing with cryptography, ballistic software protection shotguns for (5), the small use arms of high ammunition equipment performance employing air cryptography traffic small control arms software ammunition equipment employing cryptography technology for the use equipment of employing equipment cryptography employing cryptography £1,620 Bahrain general military aircraft components cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 84 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence £20 £814 £858 £1,444 £9,970 £3,864 £5,548 £4,595 £6,679 £1,019 £2,882 £11,880 £12,140 £25,000 £19,379 £28,397 £18,712 £96,609 £40,920 £57,559 £13,454 £850,000 £819,930 £282,217 £120,513 £199,209 £1,757,232 £1,480,438 £2,707,500 £1,250,000 £1,250,000 £116,250,000 Total Value of Export Licences £5,130,544 equipment for military cameras YemenYemenYemenSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia military cameras, equipmentSaudi for Arabia the use bodySaudi of armour Arabia military cameras, military technologySaudi aero-engines for Arabia the use combatSaudi of aircraft Arabia military cameras, test cryptographicSaudi software, Arabia equipment employing equipmentSaudi cryptography employing Arabia cryptography componentsSaudi for Arabia corrosion resistant chemicalsSaudi chemical used Arabia manufacturing for equipment general chemicalsSaudi laboratory used Arabia work/scientific for research general componentsSaudi laboratory for Arabia work/scientific frigates research componentsSaudi for Arabia military communications componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia military surveillance £85,858 componentsSaudi aircraft for Arabia armoured fighting cryptographicSaudi vehicles software, Arabia equipment employing softwareSaudi cryptography for Arabia the use weaponSaudi of sights Arabia military aero-engines imagingSaudi cameras Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia military surveillance militarySaudi aircraft improvised Arabia explosive device militarySaudi disposal improvised Arabia equipment explosive device componentsSaudi disposal for Arabia equipment armoured personnel equipmentSaudi carriers employing Arabia cryptography general naval vessel components military communications equipment corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing components equipment for corrosion resistant technology chemical for manufacturing the equipment use cryptographic of software, equipment equipment employing employing cryptography cryptography £4,669 £15,354 Yemen equipment employing cryptography SyriaSyriaSyriaSyriaSyria equipment employing cryptography equipment employing cryptography, software general for laboratory the equipment use of equipment equipment employing employing cryptography cryptography equipment employing cryptography £2,415,000 Syria personal protective equipment cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 85 £0 £745 £700 £641 £550 £100 £390 £5,603 £1,199 £9,626 £5,757 £5,000 £1,092 £3,971 £12,000 £61,063 £34,500 £33,655 £15,285 £535,074 £331,000 £787,950 £147,000 £882,000 £2,636,456 improvised explosive device disposalrangefinders, equipment, military improvised devices explosive fordevice device initiating disposal disposal explosives, equipment, remotely military night operated firing vision vehicles, sets, goggles laser military helmets, military improvised explosive identification equipment, components forimprovised military explosive firing device sets, jammingdisposal improvised equipment, equipment, explosive military technology device firing for disposal sets, the remotely military use operated helmets, of vehicles, military military improvised improvised explosive explosive device device disposal equipment ground vehicle military communications equipment Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia technologySaudi for Arabia the use imagingSaudi of cameras Arabia air-to-air missiles, technology componentsSaudi for for Arabia the marine use position components ofSaudi fixing for handling Arabia equipment gun equipment mountings for semiconductor air-to-air process missiles equipment equipment employing cryptography cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptographicSaudi cryptography, software Arabia software for the componentsSaudi use for Arabia of corrosion equipment resistant bombSaudi employing chemical suits, Arabia cryptography manufacturing components equipment forSaudi military Arabia improvised explosive deviceSaudi disposal Arabia equipment, equipmentSaudi for Arabia the use of equipmentSaudi military employing Arabia cryptography componentsSaudi for Arabia armoured personnel equipmentSaudi carriers employing Arabia cryptography, software equipment for £5,661,000 employing the cryptography, use software of cryptographic for equipment software, the employing equipment use cryptography employing of components £2,464,568 cryptography equipment for employing military cryptography transport componentsSaudi aircraft for Arabia military transport militarySaudi aircraft aircraft Arabia navigation equipment accessoriesSaudi for Arabia improvised explosiveSaudi device Arabia disposal £636,775 remotely operatedSaudi vehicles, Arabia bomb suits,Saudi civil Arabia explosive detection/ weaponSaudi night Arabia sights softwareSaudi for Arabia the simulation corrosionSaudi of resistant Arabia military chemical operation manufacturing scenarios components equipment for military utility armouredSaudi vehicles plate Arabia swarmingSaudi ropes Arabia cryptographicSaudi software Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia military communications components equipment for ground vehicle military communications £356,687 equipment, £16,061,354 components corrosion for resistant military chemical communications manufacturing components equipment, equipment for £2,194,588 armoured personnel components carriers for armoured personnel general £1,872 carriers naval vessel components £321,040 Saudi Arabia components for military surveillance aircraft cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 86 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence £42 £42 £507 £867 £326 £187 £261 £140 4,584 £4,038 £6,297 £6,622 £2,639 £7,962 £1,500 £6,373 £1,000 £1,000 £5,000 £12,337 £25,000 £12,587 £70,000 £42,266 £19,690 £224,880 £400,000 £161,240 £162,000 £432,995 £34,753,391 ground vehicle military communications equipment the use of ballistic test equipment, technology for the use of ballistic test equipment Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia corrosionSaudi resistant Arabia chemical manufacturing softwareSaudi equipment for Arabia the use componentsSaudi of for Arabia inertial NBC equipment respirators componentsSaudi for Arabia military communications corrosionSaudi equipment resistant Arabia chemical manufacturing componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia frigates militarySaudi communications Arabia equipment militarySaudi communications Arabia equipment hydrophones Saudi Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia NBC clothing equipmentSaudi employing Arabia cryptography cryptographicSaudi software Arabia equipment employing cryptography swarmingSaudi ropes Arabia deuteriumSaudi compounds Arabia militarySaudi communications Arabia equipment thyristors components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components cryptographic for software, military equipment communications employing deuterium equipment, cryptography, compounds software for the ballistic use test of equipment, equipment components employing for cryptography ballistic test equipment, equipment for the use of ballistic test equipment, software for £84,820 £2,342,945 £66 Saudi Arabia corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment Saudi Arabia deuterium solutions Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia corrosion resistant cryptographicSaudi chemical software Arabia manufacturing equipment deuteriumSaudi compounds Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia projectile launchers equipmentSaudi for Arabia the development deuteriumSaudi of compounds Arabia equipment employing cryptography equipmentSaudi employing Arabia cryptography, software neutron forSaudi generators the Arabia use of componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia employing military cryptography communications ground equipment vehicle military communications components equipment for corrosion resistant equipment chemical employing manufacturing cryptography equipment cryptographic software cryptographic software components for military navigation equipment, military navigation equipment £2,724,368 £3,881 £600,000 £2,375 £900,559 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 87 2 3 £88 £20 £243 £120 £382 £382 £743 £3,984 £1,500 £8,783 £9,625 £9,968 £5,000 £11,902 £52,787 £81,900 £49,839 £14,444 £16,537 £10,714 £14,469 £47,400 £10,201 £15,891 £98,264 £355,067 £151,424 technology for the production of decoy flares guided decoying equipment explosive device disruptors, military firing sets, military improvisedambulances, explosive technology device for disposal thetechnology equipment use for of the armoured use personnel of carriers, military technology ambulances for the use of command and control vehicles, Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia electronicsSaudi cooling Arabia fluids chemicalsSaudi used Arabia for general chemicals laboratory used work/scientific for research general deuteriumSaudi laboratory compounds Arabia work/scientific research components for corrosion resistant cryptographicSaudi chemical software, Arabia manufacturing equipment equipment employing chaff,Saudi cryptography decoy Arabia flares equipmentSaudi for Arabia the productionSaudi of Arabia chaff, equipment for technologySaudi the for Arabia production the of productionSaudi decoy of Arabia flares, chaff, technology technology for for components the the for production production military of of utility components chaff, chaff helicopters for equipment, military technology transport for equipment aircraft the employing production cryptography of cryptographic software components for combat aircraft accessories for improvised explosive device disruptors, components for improvised explosive device disruptors, improvised £250,000 £52,500 £129,52 £19,184 Saudi Arabia deuterium compounds Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia cryptographicSaudi software, Arabia equipment employing equipmentSaudi cryptography employing Arabia cryptography, software components forSaudi for the Arabia military use utility of chemicalsSaudi vehicles equipment used Arabia employing for cryptography general softwareSaudi laboratory for Arabia work/scientific the research use cryptographicSaudi of software Arabia training equipment for equipmentSaudi electronic employing Arabia warfare cryptography equipment equipmentSaudi employing Arabia cryptography chemicalsSaudi used Arabia for pharmaceutical/healthcare corrosionSaudi production resistant Arabia chemical manufacturing equipmentSaudi equipment employing Arabia cryptography ground vehicle military communications biotechnology equipment equipment graphite materials, nuclear grade cryptographic graphite software components for frigates components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment £4,498,220 £1 £22,770 Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, armoured personnel carriers, command and equipment control employing vehicles, cryptography military £42,556,23 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 88 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence 2 £1 720 £911 £621 £731 £621 £303 £500 £270 £1,600 £1,322 £6,983 £2,469 £6,040 £1,029 £3,088 £9,743 £16,849 £15,319 £31,250 £37,800 £26,596 £107,838 £172,000 £628,200 £3,411,756 £1,903,320 £1,000,000 £1,321,250 £10,494,958 £23,270,335 initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors equipment, components for inertuse bombs, of components military for guidance/navigation training equipment, bombs, military equipment training for equipment, the technology use for of bombs bombs, equipment for the Saudi Arabia accessories for improvised explosive device disruptors, components for improvised explosive device disruptors, devices for £119,48 Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia equipment employing cryptography, software components for for the bombs, use components of for equipment combat employing aircraft, cryptography components for equipment for the use of military guidance/navigation £276,254, £773,400 Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia general militarySaudi vehicle Arabia components devices forSaudi initiating Arabia explosives components forSaudi Arabia software forSaudi the Arabia simulation components of for militarySaudi armoured operation Arabia personnel scenarios military carriers infrared/thermalSaudi imaging Arabia equipment components forSaudi frigates Arabia components forSaudi frigates Arabia corrosion resistantSaudi chemical Arabia manufacturing corrosion equipment resistantSaudi chemical Arabia manufacturing equipment equipment employingSaudi cryptography Arabia components forSaudi turrets Arabia corrosion resistantSaudi chemical Arabia manufacturing deuterium equipment compounds Saudi Arabia corrosion resistantSaudi chemical Arabia manufacturing corrosion equipment resistantSaudi chemical Arabia manufacturing components equipment forSaudi combat Arabia naval deuterium vessels compounds Saudi Arabia corrosion resistantSaudi chemical Arabia manufacturing cryptographic equipment software Saudi Arabia equipment employingSaudi cryptography Arabia components forSaudi ground Arabia vehicle components military for communicationsSaudi military equipment Arabia communications components equipment forSaudi military Arabia infrared/thermal equipment imaging for equipment the use corrosion of resistant military chemical communications manufacturing equipment weapon equipment night sights components for military combat hydrophones, vehicles, underwater signature hydrophone suppression cable fittings/coatings/treatments components systems for for military military use communications equipment £8,891 Saudi Arabia corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 89 0 £485 £618 £1,500 £1,200 £1,495 £1,000 £1,500 £1,000 £1,000 £1,000 £1,337 £8,938 £1,492 £1,500 £11,450 £15,310 £55,180 £38,213 £18,000 £46,542 £215,703 £129,275 identification equipment, components forexplosive military device equipment decoying/detection/disposal/jamming for equipment,explosives, initiating equipment improvised explosives, for explosive components the device formilitary use disposal military helmets, of remotely improvised military military operated improvised equipmentimprovised vehicles, explosive for explosive military device initiating device equipment decoying/detection/disposal/jamming jamming fordisposal/jamming equipment, equipment, initiating equipment radio technology explosives, controlled for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/ treatments for military use identification equipment, components forexplosive military device equipment decoying/detection/disposal/jamming for equipment,device initiating equipment decoying/detection/disposal/jamming explosives, for equipment, components the explosives forremotely use detection military operated of equipment, improvised vehicles, military improvised improvised improvisedhelmets, explosive explosive explosive military device device improvised disposal disruptors, explosiveexplosive military device device equipment decoying/detection/disposal/jamming jamming for equipment, equipment initiating radio explosives, controlled military improvised Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia cryptographic software technology for the development compound of semiconductor air-to-surface precursor missiles chemicals components for military combat accessories vehicles for improvised explosiveSaudi device Arabia disposal remotely operatedSaudi vehicles, Arabia bomb suits,Saudi civil Arabia explosive detection/Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia equipmentSaudi employing Arabia cryptography equipment employing cryptography, software cryptographic for software the use of cryptographic equipment software employing cryptography cryptographic software cryptographic software cryptographic software £369,967 £24,034 Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia equipment employing cryptography, software components for for the military use combat of vehicles equipment employing cryptography £518,122 Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia deuteriumSaudi compounds Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia military support componentsSaudi aircraft for Arabia military communications componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia combat naval componentsSaudi vessels for Arabia military helicopters components for military helicopters cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptographic cryptography software components for military radars equipment employing cryptography components for military combat vehicles, components for military support vehicles, signature suppression fittings/coatings/ £54,61 Saudi Arabia accessories for improvised explosiveSaudi device Arabia disposal remotely operated vehicles, bomb suits, civil explosive detection/ deuterium compounds £693,941 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 90 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence £28 £129 £100 £620 £616 £1,000 £3,626 £5,891 £1,000 £1,500 £2,000 £1,500 £8,815 £6,500 £11,680 £15,000 £50,199 £24,090 £17,630 £33,240 £78,750 £95,309 £58,000 £30,700 £335,600 £317,550 £1,499,003 £1,873,149 air vehicles cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights use, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia gun mountings, sporting guns deuteriumSaudi (1) solutions Arabia equipmentSaudi employing Arabia cryptography, software civilSaudi for unmanned Arabia the air use vehicles, ofSaudi guidance equipment Arabia equipment employing for cryptography civil componentsSaudi unmanned for Arabia air sniper vehicles, rifles,Saudi launch gun Arabia support mountings, equipment small for arms componentsSaudi civil ammunition, for Arabia unmanned sniper military rifles combat radioSaudi (1), vehicles controlled Arabia technology improvised for explosive sniper componentsSaudi device rifles, for Arabia jamming weapon combat equipment naval cryptographicSaudi vessels software, Arabia equipment employing componentsSaudi cryptography, for software Arabia military for communications the componentsSaudi equipment use for Arabia of weapon equipment sights cryptographic employingSaudi software cryptography Arabia biotechnologySaudi £100,000 equipment Arabia technologySaudi for Arabia military communications componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia military helicopters componentsSaudi for Arabia equipment employing cryptographicSaudi cryptography, £32,001 software cryptographic Arabia software, equipment componentsSaudi employing for Arabia cryptography radar equipment cryptographicSaudi software, Arabia equipment employing componentsSaudi cryptography for Arabia aircraft military equipmentSaudi communications employing Arabia equipment cryptography componentsSaudi for Arabia £48,823 aircraft £3,115 military componentsSaudi communications for Arabia equipment ground vehicle equipmentSaudi military employing Arabia communications cryptography equipment componentsSaudi for Arabia machine guns componentsSaudi for Arabia corrosion resistant imagingSaudi chemical cameras Arabia manufacturing equipment militarySaudi electronic Arabia equipment, military corrosionSaudi guidance/navigation resistant Arabia equipment chemical manufacturing electronicsSaudi equipment cooling Arabia £633,130 fluids components for military aircraft chemicals ground used equipment for general components laboratory for work/scientific turrets research corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing hand equipment grenades direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights, goods treated for signature suppression for military £72,295 £407,094 £12,561 £1,839,080 Saudi Arabia cryptographic software cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 91 0 £5 £347 £310 £300 £490 £188 £228 £3,627 £3,605 £6,137 £3,570 £7,644 £1,221 £9,520 £1,168 £1,150 £8,688 £1,300 £3,158 £16,020 £17,586 £19,195 £60,400 £51,600 £15,000 £13,417 £30,800 £15,696 £15,500 £25,000 £49,152 £336,075 £200,520 £850,378 £1,573,833,315 Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia cryptographicSaudi software, Arabia equipment employing corrosionSaudi cryptography resistant Arabia chemical manufacturing componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia water cannons componentsSaudi for Arabia military combat deuteriumSaudi vehicles compounds Arabia equipmentSaudi employing Arabia cryptography componentsSaudi for Arabia military guidance/navigation componentsSaudi equipment, for Arabia military combat guidance/navigation naval equipment militarySaudi vessels airborne Arabia equipment imagingSaudi cameras Arabia combatSaudi aircraft, Arabia military airborne softwareSaudi equipment for Arabia military video commandSaudi recording communications Arabia equipment control and gunSaudi intelligence silencers Arabia software imagingSaudi cameras Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia military aircraft componentsSaudi ground for Arabia equipment military aircraft equipmentSaudi ground employing Arabia equipment cryptography equipmentSaudi employing Arabia cryptography, software components forSaudi for equipment Arabia military employing aero-engines cryptography deuteriumSaudi compounds Arabia smallSaudi arms Arabia ammunition radioSaudi jamming Arabia equipment, software corrosionSaudi replicating resistant Arabia controlled chemical telecommunications manufacturing equipment rangefindingSaudi equipment equipment Arabia chemicalsSaudi used Arabia for £336,785 pharmaceutical/healthcare cryptographicSaudi production software, Arabia equipment employing corrosionSaudi cryptography resistant Arabia chemical manufacturing corrosionSaudi equipment resistant Arabia chemical manufacturing biotechnologySaudi equipment equipment Arabia NBCSaudi protective/defensive Arabia equipment componentsSaudi for Arabia military communications inertial equipment equipment inertial equipment components for ground vehicle corrosion military resistant communications chemical equipment manufacturing corrosion equipment resistant chemical manufacturing corrosion equipment resistant chemical manufacturing equipment £45,792 £2,400,000 Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia military image recording/processing equipment, equipment weapon for night the sights, use weapon of sights weapon night sights, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sights £366,70 £366,700 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 92 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence £932 £932 £602 £845 £4,117 £5,000 £6,000 £9,200 £8,500 £1,800 £2,309 £11,850 £24,404 £42,080 £32,500 £22,980 £130,986,109 Total Value of Export Licences £2,286,348,214 Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi components Arabia for military improvisedSaudi combat explosive Arabia aircraft, device military decoying/detection/disposal/jamming airborneSaudi corrosion equipment equipment Arabia resistant chemical manufacturingSaudi corrosion equipment Arabia resistant chemical manufacturingSaudi corrosion equipment Arabia resistant chemical manufacturingSaudi cryptographic equipment Arabia software Saudi components Arabia for military supportSaudi components aircraft Arabia for military supportSaudi components aircraft Arabia for military supportSaudi components aircraft Arabia for military supportSaudi equipment aircraft Arabia employing cryptography Saudi software Arabia for military image components recording/processing for equipment, military technology support corrosion for aircraft resistant military chemical image manufacturing recording/processing components equipment equipment for military support components aircraft for military support components aircraft for military support corrosion aircraft resistant chemical manufacturing equipment £115 £5,000 Saudi Arabia corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 93 £627 £759 £253 £692 £404 £552 £100 £426 £609 £845 £4,845 £5,984 £3,638 £4,443 £5,123 £1,510 £6,724 £1,937 £1,875 £1,840 £6,390 £2,100 £3,454 £40,429 £72,300 £76,230 £19,900 £15,840 Goods Value Total Value of Export Licences £2,801,555 Table 3(b) EXTANT MILITARY SIELS equipment for munitions, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions End Use CountriesBahrainBahrainBahrain Goods BahrainBahrainBahrainBahrainBahrain artillery, componentsBahrain for artillery, components equipment for forBahrain military the training use components aircraft of forBahrain artillery, military technology aircrew for components breathing artillery, forBahrain equipment weapon military mountings aero-engines small armsBahrain ammunition body armour,Bahrain civil body training armour, hand componentsBahrain grenades for body components armour, for direct military view training components imaging aircraft for equipmentBahrain military aircrew components breathing forBahrain equipment combat aircraft small armsBahrain ammunition gun silencers,Bahrain sporting guns components (2), forBahrain sporting military guns aircrew (3) components breathing forBahrain equipment military training components aircraft forBahrain launching/handling/control equipment forBahrain munitions, £1,248,000 equipment for components the forBahrain use combat of aircraft components launching/handling/control forBahrain military training components aircraft forBahrain chemical agent components detection forBahrain equipment, military technology training for components aircraft the forBahrain use combat of aircraft components chemical forBahrain agent military detection training equipment components aircraft forBahrain military training general aircraft militaryBahrain aircraft components equipment forBahrain the use shotguns of (2), £1,232,387 aircraft small cannons arms software ammunition for the use components of for military £21,000 military aero-engines training components aircraft for military training components aircraft for all-wheel drive shotguns vehicles (5), with small ballistic arms protection small ammunition arms ammunition technology for the use of equipment £20,339 employing cryptography cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 94 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence £20 £700 £550 £5,548 £4,595 £6,679 £1,019 £1,199 £1,444 £11,880 £12,140 £19,379 £28,397 £18,712 £40,920 £282,217 £120,513 £535,074 £819,930 Goods Value £116,250,000 Total Value of Export Licences £907,232 Total Value of Export Licences £141,462 equipment for military cameras explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment the simulation of military operation scenarios small arms training equipment Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia combatSaudi aircraft Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia corrosion resistant components chemicalSaudi for manufacturing Arabia frigates equipment componentsSaudi for Arabia military communications components equipment Saudi for Arabia military surveillance components aircraft Saudi for Arabia armoured fighting software vehicles Saudi for Arabia the use weapon ofSaudi sights military Arabia aero-engines componentsSaudi for Arabia military surveillance military aircraft Saudi improvised Arabia explosive device military disposalSaudi improvised equipment Arabia explosive device components disposalSaudi for equipment Arabia armoured personnel general carriers Saudi naval Arabia vessel components militarySaudi communications Arabia equipment componentsSaudi for Arabia corrosion resistant technology chemicalSaudi for manufacturing Arabia the equipment use components of for equipment military employing surveillance cryptography technology aircraft for the use components of for air-to-air gun missiles, mountings technology components for for the corrosion use resistant components of chemical for handling manufacturing armoured equipment equipment personnel for components carriers air-to-air for missiles military transport aircraft £4,669 £5,661,000 £15,354 £1,872 YemenYemenYemen components for military cameras, equipment for the use body of armour military cameras, military technology aero-engines for the use of military cameras, test £85,858 End Use CountriesLibyaLibya Goods LibyaLibyaLibya components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, software military enabling improvised equipment to function as forward observer/target components recognition for training assault equipment, rifles, gun software components mountings, for for machine software machine guns for guns, components (1), training for sniper small military rifles arms small (1), ammunition arms weapon training cleaning equipment, equipment, military weapon small sights arms training equipment, software for the use of military £63,500 £2 £26,414 £1,107 £51,439 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 95 £0 £100 £390 £261 4,584 £5,757 £3,971 £6,297 £6,622 £2,639 £6,373 £34,500 £33,655 £15,285 £25,000 £12,587 £42,266 £52,787 £81,900 £787,950 £147,000 £882,000 £400,000 £161,240 £432,995 Goods Value ground vehicle military communications equipment ground vehicle military communications equipment the use of ballistic test equipment, technology for the use of ballistic test equipment technology for the production of decoy flares guided missile decoying equipment End Use CountriesSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia Goods Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia military transport militarySaudi aircraft aircraft Arabia navigation equipment weaponSaudi night Arabia sights software for the simulation componentsSaudi of for Arabia military military operation utility scenarios armouredSaudi vehicles plate Arabia swarmingSaudi ropes Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia military communications componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia ground vehicleSaudi military Arabia communications equipment, components componentsSaudi for for Arabia military armoured communications personnel components equipment, carriers Saudi for Arabia armoured personnel general carriers Saudi naval Arabia vessel components componentsSaudi for Arabia NBC respirators componentsSaudi for Arabia military communications components equipment Saudi for Arabia frigates military communications equipment militarySaudi communications Arabia equipment components for NBC clothing swarming ropes £321,040 military communications equipment components for ground vehicle military communications equipment, components ballistic for test military equipment, communications components equipment, for ballistic test equipment, equipment for the use of ballistic test equipment, software for £84,820 £66 Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia corrosion resistant components chemicalSaudi for manufacturing Arabia projectile equipment launchers componentsSaudi for Arabia military communications ground equipment vehicle military communications componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia corrosion resistant components chemical for manufacturing military equipment navigation componentsSaudi equipment, for Arabia military corrosion navigation resistant equipment chaff, chemical decoy manufacturing flares equipment equipment for the production of chaff, equipment for technology the for production the of production decoy of flares, chaff, technology technology for for components the the for production production military of of utility chaff, chaff helicopters equipment, technology for the production of £250,000 £52,500 £3,881 £900,559 £2,375 £19,184 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 96 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence 2 2 0 £1 £911 £270 £618 £1,600 £1,322 £6,983 £9,743 £8,938 £1,492 £1,200 £11,902 £11,450 £47,400 £98,264 £15,319 £37,800 £26,596 £38,213 £18,000 £15,310 £355,067 £151,424 £107,838 £172,000 £628,200 £1,903,320 £1,000,000 £1,321,250 Goods Value explosive device disruptors, military firing sets, military improvised explosive device disposal equipment initiating explosives, improvised explosive device disruptors treatments for military use End Use CountriesSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia Goods components for military transport components aircraft for combat aircraft accessories for improvised explosive device disruptors, components for improvised explosive device disruptors, improvised £129,52 Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia components for military utility software vehicles for the use ground of vehicle training military equipment communications for components equipment electronic for warfare frigates equipment components for corrosion resistant accessories chemical for manufacturing improvised equipment explosive device disruptors, components for improvised explosive device disruptors, devices for £119,48 £1 £22,770 Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia generalSaudi military Arabia vehicle components devicesSaudi for Arabia initiating explosives componentsSaudi for Arabia turrets softwareSaudi for Arabia the simulation components ofSaudi for military Arabia armoured operation personnel scenarios military carriers Saudi infrared/thermal Arabia imaging equipment componentsSaudi for Arabia frigates componentsSaudi for Arabia frigates componentsSaudi for Arabia turrets componentsSaudi for Arabia combat naval components vessels Saudi for Arabia ground vehicle components militarySaudi for communications Arabia military equipment communications components equipment Saudi for Arabia military infrared/thermal equipment imagingSaudi for equipment Arabia the use weapon ofSaudi night military Arabia sights communications equipment componentsSaudi for Arabia military combat components vehicles,Saudi for signature Arabia military suppression communications fittings/coatings/treatments components equipment Saudi for for Arabia military military use support components aircraft for military communications componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia combat naval componentsSaudi vessels for Arabia military helicopters components for military helicopters components for military radars components for military combat vehicles, components for military components support for vehicles, military signature combat technology suppression vehicles for fittings/coatings/ the development of air-to-surface missiles £8,891 £54,61 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 97 0 £5 £100 £300 £490 £3,626 £5,891 £1,000 £8,815 £6,500 £6,137 £3,570 £7,644 £1,221 £11,680 £55,180 £15,000 £50,199 £24,090 £17,630 £30,700 £16,020 £17,586 £19,195 £15,000 £317,550 £1,873,149 Goods Value £1,573,833,315 cleaning equipment, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights use, technology for equipment for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights End Use CountriesSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia Goods Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia componentsSaudi for Arabia military combat gunSaudi vehicles mountings, Arabia sporting guns componentsSaudi (1) for Arabia sniper rifles,Saudi gun Arabia mountings, small arms componentsSaudi ammunition, for Arabia sniper military rifles combat radioSaudi (1), vehicles controlled Arabia technology improvised for explosive sniper componentsSaudi device rifles, for Arabia jamming weapon combat equipment naval componentsSaudi vessels for Arabia military communications componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia weapon sights technologySaudi for Arabia military communications componentsSaudi equipment for Arabia military helicopters componentsSaudi for Arabia equipment employing componentsSaudi cryptography, for cryptographic Arabia aircraft software, military equipment componentsSaudi communications employing for Arabia equipment cryptography aircraft military componentsSaudi communications for Arabia equipment ground vehicle components militarySaudi £32,001 for communications Arabia machine equipment guns components for corrosion resistant militarySaudi chemical electronic Arabia manufacturing equipment, equipment military componentsSaudi guidance/navigation for Arabia equipment military aircraft componentsSaudi ground for Arabia equipment turrets handSaudi grenades Arabia directSaudi view Arabia imaging equipment,Saudi equipment Arabia for the use militarySaudi of image Arabia weapon recording/processing sights, equipment, equipment goods weaponSaudi for treated night Arabia the for sights, use signature weapon components ofSaudi suppression sights for weapon Arabia £633,130 for water night military cannons sights, componentsSaudi military for Arabia infrared/thermal military imaging combat components equipment, vehicles Saudi for weapon Arabia military night guidance/navigation sights, components equipment,Saudi weapon for military Arabia sights combat guidance/navigation naval equipment military vessels Saudi airborne Arabia equipment combatSaudi aircraft, Arabia military airborne software equipment Saudi for Arabia military video command recording communications equipment control and gun intelligence silencers software £72,295 components for military aircraft £366,70 components ground for equipment military aircraft components ground for equipment military aero-engines small arms ammunition £407,094 £1,839,080 £12,561 £336,785 £366,700 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 98 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence £9,520 £8,688 £1,300 £5,000 £6,000 £9,200 £8,500 £1,800 £2,309 £11,850 £32,500 £850,378 Goods Value £130,986,109 Total Value of Export Licences £1,849,536,870 End Use CountriesSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia Goods Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi radio Arabia jamming equipment, softwareSaudi rangefinding replicating Arabia equipment controlled telecommunicationsSaudi NBC equipment Arabia protective/defensive equipment Saudi components Arabia for military communicationsSaudi components equipment Arabia for ground vehicleSaudi components military Arabia for communications military equipment improvisedSaudi combat explosive Arabia aircraft, device military decoying/detection/disposal/jamming airborneSaudi components equipment equipment Arabia for military supportSaudi components aircraft Arabia for military supportSaudi components aircraft Arabia for military support components aircraft for military support software aircraft for military image components recording/processing for equipment, military technology support components for aircraft for military military image support recording/processing components aircraft equipment for military support components aircraft for military support aircraft £2,400,000 £5,000 £115 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 99 eof s, software tion of s equipment, echnology osive device trol ary ification ment, test e use of ground ications quipment, fication equipment, nt for the use of g sets, test equipment for ss signalling equipment Table 4 EXTANT OIELS equipment for the userecognition/identification of equipment, ground fire based controlequipment, radars, equipment, software equipment software for for for the thefor the use use the development of of use of ground fire of firefor based control recognition/identification control the radars, equipment, equipment, equipment, use software equipment technology software of for forequipment for for military the the for the the sonar use use fire use use detection of of control of ofequipment equipment, military naval equipment, fire fire technology sonar radars, test control con for detection equipment equipment equipment, the equipment, for for technology use software the ground for of for us based the naval the radars, usecomponents radars, use test of for technology of equipment ground improvised for naval for based explosive the radar detection naval radars, device use equipment, radars, t detection of improvised test equipment, recognition/identification explosive equipment components equip device for for disposal recognition/ident improvised equipment explosive device disposal equipment, improvised expl military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment military firing sets based radars, technology for the use of ground based radars, test equipment for ground based radars equipment, military helmets, softwaretechnology for for the the use developmentmilitary of of helmets, military military technology communications helmets, for equipment,communications technology the technology equipment for use for the of the production military development of communications of military equipment, military communications technology communication equipment, for technology the for use the of produc military helmets, test equipment for milit BahrainBahrain Technology for the use of improvised explosive device detection equipment, Technology equipment for for the the use use of of improvised military explosive distress device signalling disposal equipment, e military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of equipme BahrainBahrain components for military transport components aircraft for fire control equipment, components for ground based radars, components for naval radars, components for recognition/identi Bahrain components for military distress signalling equipment, military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distre Bahrain components for military firing sets, equipment for the use of military firing sets, military devices for initiating explosives, military firin Bahrain components for ground based radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, software for th Bahrain components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military commun Bahrain components for military training aircraft cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 100 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence onents nt of ejector ry aircraft ectronic of military nt for the use e use of ent of military nt, technology logy for the itary training duction of logy for the equipment, ts for military or the use of pment for airborne or the production of technology for the equipment, quipment, software for ipment, military nic warfare equipment, evices for initiating components for military distressutility signalling helicopters, equipment, ejector components seats,parachutes, for general technology military military for parachutes, aircraft the componentsseats, components, development for technology military of military for aircraft combat training the groundfor aircraft, aircraft, development equipment, the technology componen of military development for general distress of thetraining military signalling military development aircraft, aircraft equ distress of technology components, signalling combat for technologycombat equipment, helicopters, the for helicopters, technology technology development the technology for for of development for the theproduction military of the development developme of utility military production of military helicopters, aircraft of military aircraft technology groundmilitary ejector parachutes, ground for equipme parachutes, seats, technology equipment, the technology technology for technology production for for theuse for of the the developm of the combat production production combat production aircraft, of of aircraft, of technologycomponents, military general technology military f technology training military for distress for aircraft, aircraft the signalling the technology components,use use equipment, use for techno of of technology of the military combat for military production parachutes, helicopters, the aircraft of technology technology pro ground military for for equipment, utility the the technology helicopters, use use for of of the military ejector use training seats, of aircraft, technology military technology for distress for the signalling the use equipment,ML5d, use of techno PL5017, of general Software military milita and utility Technology helicopters specified by themilitary following electronic entries equipment, of softwareground Part for based I the radars, of use technology theequipment of for Main ground the Order: based use radars, of software military for electronic the equipment, useamp; test of b, equipment military b, for electronic b1a, ground equipment, b1b, based technology b1c, radars, for b1d, test th c, equipment d, for e, military f, el g, h & i explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiatingthe explosives use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment components for equipment forfor the equipment use for of thecomponents aerial use for target of equipment, test military components equipmentof training for for aerial aircraft, equipment airborne target components for electronic equipment, for theaircraft, warfare equipment military use technology equipment, for training of for components the aircraft, airborne the for usetraining components electronic use training of aircraft, for warfare of airborne airborne technology test equipment, aerial electronic electronic for equipment comp electronic target warfare warfare the for equipment, warfare equipment, equipment, use aerial technology equipment, equipme equipment of target for training for training the airborne the airborne use electronic use electronic of warfare of warfare airborne equipment military equipment, electronic training test warfare aircraft, equipment equipment, mil for technology aerial for target the equipment, use test equi BahrainBahrainBahrainBahrain civil body armour ballistic shields, body armour, Goods, bomb ML10a, suits, ML10b, civil ML10d bodyBahrain to armour, components ML10g, for ML10h4, body ML10h6, components armour, ML10h7, for military ML11a, ground helmets ML14, based ML15b,Bahrain radars, ML16, components ML17l, for ML21a, military ML21b1 electronic and equipment, ML22a, equipment ML5a for to the use of Goods ground specified based by radars, the equipment following f entries of the components EGTTPTA(C)O: for ML4b, military ML10a, devices ML11, for ML14, initiating ML15b, explosives, ML16, equipment ML17l, for ML21a, the ML5a, use PL5017, of and military ML22 devices a for & initiating explosives, military d Bahrain components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground BahrainBahrainBahrainBahrain aerialBahrain target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, cryptographic components software, for technology missile for scoring components the equipment, for use decoy improvised of flares, explosive cryptographic aircraft missile device software cannons, scoring disposal components e equipment, for improvised aerial aircraft explosive target cannons device equipment, disposal airborne equipment electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electro cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 101 nents for ry aircraft f training dars, lators, ilitary components nverters, t, ipment, rgeting , test et designator corders, tic piloting for military ry training itary training , components easures ing aircraft, are equipment, , components for res equipment, raft, components test equipment for bing computers, essories for ories for military onents for military optical target eting equipment, r sensor data vices for initiating tary improvised uipment for military for imaging counter- airborne electronic warfare equipment, components forfor aircraft military radars, video components recordingequipment for equipment, for military components the aircraft for use navigationequipment training of equipment, for equipment aerial components the for target for use electronic equipment,equipment military of countermeasures equipment for training military equipment, for electronic airc aircraft components the countermeasuresaircraft, navigation for use equipment, military equipment, weapons of equipment video equipment simu airborne for recording for electronictechnology the equipment, the warfare for use technology use equipment, the of for of equipment use weaponstechnology the military for of simulators, for use video the aircraft military the of recording use radars, aircraft use aerial equipment, oftechnology technology navigation of target equipment aircraft for for equipment, equipment, military for ra the the milita technology video the use use forequipment recording use of of the for equipment, o weapons military use aircraft technology simulators, aircraft of radars, fortraining test navigation airborne test the equipment equipment equipment, electronic equipment use for for technology warf for of electronic aerial forequipment, military training countermeasures target the weapons aircraft equipment equipment, equipment, use simulators navigation for test test of equipment, electronic equipment equipment military test countermeasures for for train equipment equipmen airborne weapons for electronic simulators,explosives, military warfare training components video equipment equipment for recording for military equipment, devices electronic firing for counterm sets, initiating components explosives,explosive for explosive device military ordnance disposal improvised disposal equipment, explosive equipment, test device military equipment disposal devices for equipment, forcountermeasures military equipment initiating equipment, devices for explosives, accessories for the military for initiating useaccessories firing imaging explosives of for sets, countermeasure/counter-countermeasures m military mili equipment, cameras, accessoriesinfrared/thermal accessories for imaging for imaging equipment, military countermeasu accessoriesmilitary image for video intensifier military recording equipment, photographic equipment, accessoriesdesignator equipment, accessories for equipment, accessories for military accessories for night imaging for militaryrecorders, vision radar optical video accessories goggles, equipment, target processing for accessories access surveillance equipment, sensor for equipment,training acc integration optical accessories aircraft, equipment, target for accessories acquisition accessories optical for equipment,aircraft for target weapon accessories radars, simulators tracking control for aircrew for equipment, systems, protective military accessorieschaff airborne masks, training fo equipment, electronic anti-g/pressure aircraft, components warfare suits, accessories for equipment,equipment, automatic for airborne airborne components piloting training electronic refuelling for systems eq warfare equipment, aircraft for equipment,systems airborne radars, parachuted components for targ components loads, for parachuted for bomb airborne loads,in aircrew handling refuelling components confined protective equipment, equipment, for areas, masks, bom components bombing components components forfor computers, for for airborne film components equipment anti-g/pressure ta processing for for suits, equipment, ejectorimaging the components components seats, countermeasure/counter-countermeasures use for for components equipment, of automa helmet for components militarycomponents mounted equipment for aero-engines, for display for imaging components military equipment, the countermeasures for aero-engines, components operation equipment,military equipment components for of components aircraft for for imaging milita for pressure the military counter-countermeasures liquid refuellers, use equipment,containers, aircraft oxygen components of compo components ground co for military for equipment, military training military componentscomponents aircraft aircraft, flying for for pressurised helmets, military military breathing components aircraft infrared/thermal equipment,for for navigation imaging components military military equipment equipment, for photographic image components military equipment, intensifiervideo for cameras, components equipment, recording military comp for components equipment, parachutes, military for components componentsequipment, training military for for components aircraft, imaging night military for components radar vision parachutist optical for equ components goggles, equipment target military for components surveillance video sensor for equipment, processing integration optical components equipment, Bahrain aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for BahrainBahrain accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for accessories military for de airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 102 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence d all ii] re- ust 4] RDX ng pable of at res, ent for arios, coy flares, pment for air- es equipment, ft, test d propellant on equipment t in confined ry aircraft ground ms, software for , optical target imaging equipment, aircraft, weapon or tanker aircraft ng aircraft, software ment, technology for o processing ry training aircraft, military cameras, ive vehicles with ballistic aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for air-to-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for de control equipment for fragmentationareas, rockets, equipment control for equipment theto-air for use missiles, practice of handling bombs, military equipment ejectorpractice aero-engines, for seats, bombs, equipment bombs, equipment helmet for handling for mounted theimaging equipment the display use countermeasures for operation equipment, of equipment, decoy of imaging military launching flares, militarylaunching counter-countermeasures training equipment handling aircraf equipment, equipment aircraft, for equipment imaging for film air-to-air for countermeasure/counter-countermeasur processing missiles,equipment, fragmentation rockets, equipment, launching military rockets, launching handling equipment aircraft handling equipment equi for navigation equipm military for bombs, equipment, containers, practice launching military military bombs, equipment aircraft flying liquid formilitary pressure helmets, oxygen decoy parachutes, refuellers, military converters, fla military military image military parachutist aircraftequipment, intensifier aero-engines, equipment, pressurised military equipment, milita military breathing video military parametric equipment, recording imagingsurveillance technical equipment, radar equipment, databases, night equipment, optical military vision military target photographicenabling goggles, infrared/thermal tracking equipment, equipment optical equipment, military to target sensor vide acquisition function datathe equipment, as recorders, modelling optical military sensor of target training integration military designatorsoftware aircraft, equipment, operation equipment for software simulators scenarios, the for for software simulation military militaryequipment for of training traini for the weapon aircraft, military modelling systems, software training ofcontrol software for aircraft, weapon systems for the test systems, the evaluation models software use of for for of weapon the the military syste development simulation training of of aircraft, military military technology training operation for aircraft, scen the training use equipment of for military military training training aircra goods related to landmines;or [3] HMX Man explosive Portable materialspecified Air or by Defence explosive ML7a Systems material or MANPADSRockets containing and ML7b and RDX test and Unmanned or equipment/production associated Airborne HMX; equipment/software/technologyleast technology; Vehicle [5] therefor a [6] systems Chemicals [ 300km Complete including specified range; rocket Cruiseentry in [7] systems Missile vehicles Schedule Complete including Systems/Remote and 1 subsystems Ballistic Piloted equipment ofrocket designed Missile Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance designed the engines or Systems/Space Drones or Chemical having modified Launch ca modified Weapons a for Vehicles/Soundi Conventionvectors therefor total the and control and impulse rocket systems; electronics capacity systems [vi] equipmentfor of specified weapon specially the 1.1MNs; in or designed goods [iv] 6 warhead for specified guidance above safing/arming/fuzing/firing re-entry in sets as mechanisms; vehicles; 6/7 capable follows: [8] [iii] above; of [i] Specially solid [9] achieving individual designed or Software system rocket production liqui specially accuracy stages; facilities designed of [ or of 3.33% producti modified or for less the of use the of range; goods [v] specified thr in 6/7/8 above protection, technology for military support vehicles components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components forelectronic military warfare utility equipment helicopters, components f Bahrain goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 an Bahrain components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for milita BahrainBahrain components for small arms components ammunition, for small all-wheel arms drive ammunition vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel dr BahrainBahrain military improvised explosive device components disposal for equipment, electronic military warfare utility equipment, vehicles equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equip cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 103 eof ility elicopters, s, software pters, or the use al auxiliary echnology osive device e nents for trol ished roduction of f fast attack ification ment, test are for the ipment, ipment for aero engines ation equipment, rs, components for for military utility ary aircraft ground for the use of ets, test equipment for signalling equipment helicopters, equipment for theof development combat of helicopters, combat equipmentequipment, helicopters, for military equipment the parachutes, for use production thedevelopment of equipment development of military for of combat utility combat components helicopters, helicopters,software helicopters, for software general for production combat for military the equipment helicopters, the aircraft production for equipmentsoftware development components, of components f for of military combat for the components aero-engines, helicopters, combat use for milit combat software helicopters, of combat helicopters, for softw military helicopters, technology the utility software for productioncomponents helicopters, for the of for technology the production components combat for production of for helicopters, the ofhelicopters, combat combat technology development combat technology helicopters, helicopters, for of helico for technology software the combat the for forhelicopters, use helicopters, use the the technology of technology of production use for components for equipmemt of of the for thecombat for combat combat use combat development helicopters, the helicopters, h of helicopters, of test use technology general technology compo equipment of fordevelopment military for for combat the of aircraft the components helicopters, p components components, use for technology for technology ofproducts combat for combat for components for helicopters, the helicopters, the for military test use unfinished use military utility models of products of ut helicopters for equipment for military the for combat aircraft development the helicopters, ground of use unfinished equipment, combat of products test helicopters, military for equ test utility military modelsequipment aero-engines, for for unfin th the userecognition/identification of equipment, ground fire based controlequipment, radars, equipment, software equipment software for for for the thefor the use use the development of of use of ground fire of firefor based control recognition/identification control the radars, equipment, equipment, equipment, use software equipment technology software of for forequipment for for military the the for the the sonar use use fire use use detection of of control of ofequipment equipment, military naval equipment, fire fire technology sonar radars, test control con for detection equipment equipment equipment, the equipment, for for technology use software the ground for of for us based the naval the radars, use radars, usenaval test of technology of auxiliary equipment ground for naval vessels, for based the radar components naval radars,craft, use for radars, t technology of patrol test for recognition/identification craft, equipment the equip vessels, general for use technology naval recognition/ident of for vessel frigates, the components, technology use technology for of for the patrol the use craft usecomponents of of for landing corvettes, improvised craft, technology explosive technologydetection for device for equipment, the detection the improvised use equipment, use explosive o components of device for mine disposal improvised hunters, equipment explosive technologymilitary device for distress disposal the signalling equipment, use equipment, improvised of technology expl nav for the use of military distress signalling equipment military firing sets EgyptEgypt military parachutes, military parachutist components equipment, for technology fire for control the equipment, use components of for military ground parachutes Egypt based radars, components for naval radars, components for recognition/identific Egypt components for corvettes, components forEgypt fast attack craft, components for frigates, componentsEgypt for landing craft, Technology components for for the mine use hunte of improvised explosive device detection equipment, Technology for equipment the for use the of use improvised of explosive military device distress disposal signalling components equ equipment, for military military distress aero signalling engines, equipment, equipment technology for for the the use use of of military equipment aero engines, military aero engines, technology for the use of military EgyptEgypt components for military distress components signalling for equipment, military military firing distress sets, signalling equipment equipment, for technology the for use the of use military of firing military sets, distress military devices for initiating explosives, military firing s Egypt components for combat helicopters, components for general military aircraft components, components for military aero-engines, components cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 104 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence al ng ne quipment t oes, torpedoes, ld t, r the use or torpedo r the use of tion of s equipment, or the use of gy for the se of ary ectronic g equipment, e use of the use of ent for laser get designator he use of test e use of test ations ing aircraft training replica of aircraft aircrew protective components for mine countermeasuresengineer equipment, equipment, equipment mine for clearingof the equipment, mine use mine clearing of countermeasures equipment, minetechnology equipment, technology clearing for minefield for equipment, the breaching the general use vehicles, use military of technology of vehicle mine for general components, clearing the military military equipment, useequipment, vehicle fie technology of military components, for equipment helmets, technology the fo software fortechnology use for the for of the use the mine use of development countermeasuresmilitary of military of equipment helmets, military field military technology communications engineer helmets, for equipment, equipmen communications technology the technology equipment for use for the of the production military development of communications of military equipment, military communications technology communication equipment,masks, for technology anti-g/pressure the for suits, use the components ofequipment, produc for military replica combat helmets, air aircraft, test tocannons, components equipment air software for for missiles, for military milit replica the training air use aircraft, to of military surface combat flying missiles, aircraft helmets, replica simulators, military air technology train to for surface the rockets, use replica of anti-ship combat missiles, aircraft replica simulators bombs, launching equipment, components fortraining torpedoes, equipment, equipment equipment for forsweeping the the equipment, use use mine of of sweeping mineequipment naval equipment sweeping training mines, training equipment, equipment, equipment equipment, equipment software fortechnology software for for the for for the the use the the use use of use use ofmines, of torpedo of of mine technology naval launching mine mine sweeping for mines, equipment, sweeping sweeping equipment the software equipmentfor equipment, equipment, use for for mine technology software of the the sweeping for for torpedo use use equipment the thetorpedo launching of of training use use launching equipment, torpedo torpedoes, equipment, of of equipment, technology launching mi test mine mine torpedoes for equipment, equipment sweeping sweepi the software for equipment use for naval training of the mines, equipment, torpedoes, use test technology test of equipment for equipment torped for the for torpedo use mine launching of sweeping equipment, nav equipment, test test equipment e for military electronic equipment, softwareground for based the radars, use technologyequipment of for ground the based use radars, of software military for electronic the equipment, useamp; test of b, equipment military b, for electronic b1a, ground equipment, b1b, based technology b1c, radars, for b1d, test th c, equipment d, for e, military f, el g, h & i equipment for optical targetequipment acquisition for equipment, optical software target forsoftware tracking the for equipment, use the technology of use foracquisition test of the equipment, equipment test use technology for equipment of for opticalsoftware for software the target for missile for use designator the jamming the of equipment, use equipment, useuse software software of technology of of for for test for test test the th equipment the equipment equipment usetest for use for for of equipment optical of laser missile test for target software range jamming equipment tracking optical for finder,range equipment, for equipment, target the technology finder, technology optical designator technology use fo test for target equipment, for of equipment designator the technology theequipment, test for equipment, use for use test equipment missile technology of the of equipment for jamming for test use test for optical equipment, the equipment of equipment optical targe test u for test for target equipment optical tracking equipment laser for target equipment for range optical acquisition optical finder, target equipment, technolo target acquisition technology tracking equipment, f equipment, test test equipment equipm for optical tar Egypt components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, components for mine clearin EgyptEgypt components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communicationsEgypt equipment, military communic aerial target equipment, air to surface rocket launching equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling components equipment, for mine sweeping equipment, components for mine sweeping equipment training equipment, components for naval mines, components f Egypt components for ground based radars, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for EgyptEgypt Goods specified by the following entries of the software EGTTPTA(C)O: for ML4b, the ML10a, use ML11, of ML14, test ML15b, equipment ML16, for ML17l, laser ML21a, range ML5a, finder, PL5017, software and for ML22 the a use & of test equipment for missile jamming equipment, software for t Egypt software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 105 ines, of ent for or the easures measures es uipment for aging ared/thermal omponents military ogy for the use ts, components chnology for the gy for the use of ng helmets, ipment, software for ary electronic ners, military electronic ices for initiating aft ground equipment, aff equipment, components software to simulate the function of military communicationsequipment, equipment military aircraft pressurisedtechnology breathing for equipment, the military useof communications of military equipment, military electronic military aircraft equipment, electronic pressurised technology equipment, breathing for military equipment, the flyi technology usemilitary for of parachutes, the military technology use flying for ofparachutes, helmets the military technology use communications for of equipment, the ejector technol use seats, of technology military for training the aircraft use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiatingfor explosives airborne refuelling equipment,for components fire for control attack equipment,imaging alerting/warning components equipment, equipment, for equipment components imaging for forcountermeasures countermeasures the combat equipment, equipment, operation aircraft, military components of components aero-engines, forequipment, military for military military military aircraft ejector aircraft aero-engines, flying in sea ground components helmets, confineduse equipment, for military areas, of military military infrared/thermal fire combat aircraft infr imaging control aircraft pressure equipment, equipment, refuellers, military guided military parachutes, missile contai software decoyingthe for equipment, use the im of use aerial of target combat equipment, aircraft, technology te for the use of aerial target equipment for naval mines, componentstorpedoes, for equipment torpedoes, for components theequipment for use for training of the equipment mine use forcountermeasures countermeasures of mine equipment, equipment, torpedoes, sweeping mine equipment equipment equipment, sweeping forequipment, for equipment equipment, the software the for software use for use the for of the of usetraining the mine use training of equipment use sweeping of equipment launching for of equipment, mine for equipm mine launching equipmentequipment, sweeping mine sweeping equipment for technology equipment, sweeping equipment, for the for software equipment, technology torpedoes, use the for launchinguse for software of use the equipment of the for naval of use for training use the m mine of torpedoes, equipment of useequipment, sweeping naval mine for launching of test equipment, mines, mine equipment mine equipment technology software sweeping for counter for for formine equipment, torpedoes, mine the the sweeping test technology sweeping use use equipment, equipment for equipment, of of torpedoes, for the test naval torpedoes, training launching use equipment mines, software equipment equipment of for technology for for for mine naval for the mine torpedoes, counterm mines, the use sweeping test test use equipment equipment equipment of for for torpedoes, mine torpedoes, technology countermeasur test f equipment for training eq EgyptEgypt components for military aircraft pressurisedEgypt breathing equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for milit components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military components training for aircraft, military ejector devices seats, for military initiating aircr explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military dev Egypt software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technolo Egypt airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons,Egypt aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warningEgypt equipment, ch aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components components for for launching missile equipment scoring for equipment, torpedoes, decoy components flares, for missile mine scoring countermeasures equ equipment, components for mine sweeping equipment, c cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 106 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence ontrol al sonar sile rs, ld t, use of r the use r electronic ilitary signalling or naval decoying onents for g equipment, for command val gun uipment for ts for tropospheric t, equipment for the ces for initiating l equipment for training aircraft, or tanker aircraft for military tary improvised ft, military navigation utting charges, non-military communications control and intelligencewarfare equipment, equipment, components components for forequipment, corvettes, fast components components attack for for craft, military defensivenaval components inflatable systems communications for craft, against equipment, frigates, components NBC components componentsequipment, for agents, for for components military components naval heavy for navigation fo engines, machine semi-automatic equipment,surface-to-air components guns, pistols, components missiles, for components components for control naval for for naval equipment gun militaryuse surface-to-air acoustic for mountings, distress of missiles, equipment, surface-to-surface components corvettes, components comp missiles, for equipment forsurface-to-air defensive naval for surface-to-surface missiles, systems radars, the missiles, general against components use contro naval NBC forsurface-to-air of vessel agents, nav missiles, fast components, electronic launching attack handling warfare equipment craft,equipment, equipment equipmen for equipment naval for surface-to-surface for acoustic surface-to-surface missiles, the equipment, missiles,mountings, military use naval heavy naval distress of communications machine radars, signalling frigates, equipment, guns, naval equipment, equipmentcommunications naval launching sonar military for equipment, electrical eq equipment, inflatable the test equipment, semi-automatic cra use equipment naval pistols, of for electronic surface-to-air naval naval equipment, missiles, radars, radars, naval surface-to-surface equipment test engines, missiles, for equipment na test the for equipment surface-to-air missiles equipment, equipment for thesystems, use technology of for weapon thedecoying control use equipment, systems, of test software guided equipment for missile for the decoying weapon use equipment, control of technology systems guidedexplosives, for missile components the decoying for use equipment, military ofdevices software firing weapon for for sets, control initiating the components systems, explosives, useexplosive for test explosive of device military equipment ordnance weapon disposal improvised for disposal c equipment, explosive guided equipment, test device mis military equipment disposal devices for equipment, for military equipmentscatter initiating devices for communications explosives, for the equipment, military initiating use equipment firingsoftware explosives of for sets, for m the mili naval use radars,radars, of technology tropospheric ground for scatter based ground communications radars, based equipment equipment radars, for technology the for use naval of radars, naval test radars, equipment software for for ground ground based based radars, rada test equipment f components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components f detonators, non-military firing sets, shaped charges, underwater telecommunications systems components for mine countermeasuresengineer equipment, equipment, equipment mine for clearingof the equipment, mine use mine clearing of countermeasures equipment, minetechnology equipment, technology clearing for minefield for equipment, the breaching the general use vehicles, use military of technology of vehicle mine for general components, clearing the military military equipment, use vehicle fie technology of components, for equipment technology the fo for use the of use mine of countermeasures military equipment field engineer equipmen EgyptEgypt components for improvised explosive components device for disposal guided equipment, missile improvised decoying explosive equipment, device components disposal for equipment weapon control systems, decoy flares, equipment for the use of guided missile Egypt NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components EgyptEgypt accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosiveEgypt ordnance disposal equipment, components for military accessories devi for ground based radars, accessories for naval radars, components for ground based radars, components components for for naval combat radars, aircraft, componen components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military EgyptEgypt components for military aero-engines cutters/severing tools, detonating cord, devices for initiating explosives, explosives, linear cutting explosive charges, linear shaped c Libya components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, components for mine clearin LibyaLibya gyroscopes, technology for the software use for of military gyroscopes communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 107 of software of software of software of software of software al auxiliary tware, raphic f fast attack ent employing ent employing ent employing ent employing ent employing of equipment gy for the use of ment employing e hunters, components for software to simulate the function of military communications equipment employing cryptography cryptography cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use software, equipment employing cryptography,technology software for for the the use use of of equipment equipment employing employing cryptography cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic sof naval auxiliary vessels, componentscraft, for technology patrol for craft, thevessels, general use technology naval of for vessel frigates, the components, technology use technology for of for the patrol the use craft use of of landing corvettes, craft, technology technology for for the the use use o of mine hunters, technology for the use of nav LibyaLibyaLibya cryptographic software, technology for components the for use improvised of explosive cryptographic cryptographic device software software, disposal equipment equipment, employing improvised cryptography, explosive software device for disposal the equipment use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use Libya software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technolo Libya cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equip Libya & SyriaSyria heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed hydrophone arrays components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Syria components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Syria components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Syria components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Syria components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Syria Technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptog SyriaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia cloth treated heading for sensors signature for components suppression hydrophone for for arrays, military military hydrophones, transport use, components towed aircraft clothing for hydrophone treated corvettes, arrays for components signature for suppression fast for attack military craft, use components for frigates, components for landing craft, components for min Saudi Arabia military airborne cargo handling equipment, military airborne cargo strops, military parachutes cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 108 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence ld t, r the use tion of s equipment, nt of ejector osive device ry aircraft iles rtoair ary ent of military nt, technology logy for the duction of logy for the ts for military or the production of learing equipment, technology for the sal equipment, onents for military mmunications ipment, military r military surveillance le handling/launch ound equipment, firing sets, test equipment for components for improvised explosivedetection device equipment, detection improvised equipment, explosive components device for disposal improvised equipment explosive device disposal equipment, improvised expl components for mine countermeasuresengineer equipment, equipment, equipment mine for clearingof the equipment, mine use mine clearing of countermeasures equipment, minetechnology equipment, technology clearing for minefield for equipment, the breaching the general use vehicles, use military of technology of vehicle mine for general components, clearing the military military equipment, useequipment, vehicle fie technology of military components, for equipment helmets, technology the fo software fortechnology use for the for of the use the mine use of development countermeasuresmilitary of military of equipment helmets, military field military technology communications engineer helmets, for equipment, equipmen communications technology the technology equipment for use for the of the production military development of communications of military equipment, military communications technology communication equipment, for technology the for use the of produc military helmets, test equipment for milit military firing sets aircraft, components for militaryutility training helicopters, aircraft, components components for for tanker military aircraft, transport general aircraft, military components aircraft for components military utility aircraft, comp components for military distressutility signalling helicopters, equipment, ejector components seats,parachutes, for general technology military military for parachutes, aircraft the componentsseats, components, development for technology military of military for aircraft combat training the groundfor aircraft, aircraft, development equipment, the technology componen of military development for general distress of thetraining military signalling military development aircraft, aircraft equ distress of technology components, signalling combat for technologycombat equipment, helicopters, the for helicopters, technology technology development the technology for for of development for the theproduction military of the development developme of utility military production of military helicopters, aircraft of military aircraft technology groundmilitary ejector parachutes, ground for equipme parachutes, seats, technology equipment, the technology technology for technology production for for theuse for of the the developm of the combat production production combat production aircraft, of of aircraft, of technologycomponents, military general technology military f technology training military for distress for aircraft, aircraft the signalling the technology components,use use equipment, use for techno of of technology of the military combat for military production parachutes, helicopters, the aircraft of technology technology pro ground military for for equipment, utility the the technology helicopters, use use for of of the military ejector use training seats, of aircraft, technology military technology for distress for the signalling the use equipment, use of techno of general military milita utility helicopters equipment, technology for themissiles, production technology of for anti-armour the missile production handling/launching of equipment, components technology for for air the to production surface of missiles, components technology for for ai the production of components for anti-armour miss Saudi Arabia Technology for the use of improvised explosive device detection equipment, Technology for the use of improvised explosive device dispo Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military search and rescue aircraft, components fo Saudi Arabia components for military communications equipment, componentsSaudi for Arabia test equipment for military communications equipment, military co technology for the production of air to air missile handling/launching equipment, technology for the production of air to surface missi Saudi Arabia components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, components for mine c Saudi Arabia components for military firing sets, equipment for the use of military firing sets, military devices for initiating explosives, military Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft gr cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 109 n hnology ing mprovised tary ent, gent st g equipment, y for the use l agent or the use of iological agent , test equipment for air-to- components for issiles he use of air-to- issiles, missiles, for the use of air-to- r the use of military pment for the use of ing aircraft training replica of aircraft ipment, technology ce missiles control ns equipment, on equipment, replica air- omponents for biological pment, aircrew protective missiles launching equipment, air-to- agent detection equipment, componentscomponents for for chemical improvised agent explosivedetection detection device equipment, equipment, detection equipment components equipment, for forequipment, components the chemical equipment for use agent for military of detection the electronicexplosive chemical equipment use equipment, device agent training of equipment detection detection equipm military for equipment, equipment,detection electronic the military equipment equipment, equipment, use electronic for software equipment of equipment, the for for biologica software software use the the for for of use use the the chemical of of use use agentequipment, chemical test of military detection technology agent equipment equipment electronic equipment for detection for for equipment, train the equipment, chemicalof the software use software agent chemical use for of for detection agent of the biological the equipment, detection chemical usefor agent use i equipment agent of the detection of training detection b use equipment, chemical equipment, equipment, of technology agentequipment technology software improvised for detection for for for explosive the equipment the the the device use trainin use use usedetection detection of of of of equipment, equipment, chemical chemical equipment test test technology agent agent for equipment equipment for detectionfor detection the for for the equipment, test equipment, use chemical chemical use technolog equipment test of agent agent of for equipment chemical detectio detection military chemical for agent equipment electronic agent biological detection training equipment, detection agent equipment, equipment, technology equipment detection tec test for equipment, equipment the test for use equipment military of for electronic te chemical equipment a equipment, replica air tocannons, air software missiles, for replica the air use to of surface combat missiles, aircraft replica simulators, air technology to for surface the rockets, use replica of anti-ship combat missiles,equipment, aircraft replica components simulators bombs, for air-to-surfacesurface missiles missiles handling simulators, equipment, components componentscomponents for for for air-to-surface air-to-surface inert missiles missiles air-to-surface trainingmilitary launching missiles, equipment, navigation equipment, components components equipment, components for for components militaryair-to-surface equipment for missiles, communications for replica inert equipment, the air-to-surface air-to-surface components missiles, useto-surface missiles, for components of missiles, military military for air-to-surface software communications electronic m test for equipment, equipment, surface equipment the military missiles for use electronic handling air-to-surface of equipment, equipment, missiles,simulators, air-to-surface military software equi missiles, software navigati for software for the for thecommunications use the use equipment, of use of software air-to-surface of air-to-surface missiles for missiles air-to-surfacereplica launching the missiles training air-to-surface equipment, use control missiles, equipment, software of equipment, technology software forfor military software for for the the electronic the the use use equipment, use use of of software of ofsurface air-to-surface air-to-surface for air-to-surface inert missiles m missiles the missiles, air-to-surface simulators, handling use technology missiles, technology equipment,technology of for software for technology for military the fo the for the navigation use use the use equipment, ofnavigation of use of software air-to-surface equipment, air-to-surface of military f missiles missiles technology air-to-surface communications control training for missiles equipment, equ equipment, the launching technology technology use equipment, for for of technology the the replica for use use air-to-surface t of missiles, of military test inert electronic equipment air-to-surface equipment, for technology air-to-surface for missiles the use of mili masks, anti-g/pressure suits, components for combat aircraft, components for military training aircraft, military flying helmets, military train surface missiles simulators, air-to-surface missiles training equipment, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for air-to-surfa technology for the use of military communications equipment,amp; test b, equipment b, for b1a, military b1b, communications b1c, equipment b1d, c, d, e, f, g, h & i Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia cryptographic software aerial target equipment, air to surface rocket launching equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equi Saudi Arabia detection equipment, chemical agent detection equipment, chemical agent detection equipment training equipment, c Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia civil body armour air-to-surface missiles, air-to-surface missiles control equipment, air-to-surface missiles handling equipment, air-to-surface Saudi Arabia components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for the use of military communicatio Saudi Arabia Goods specified by the following entries of the EGTTPTA(C)O: ML4b, ML10a, ML11, ML14, ML15b, ML16, ML17l, ML21a, ML5a, PL5017, and ML22 a & cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 110 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence t r the use of or the use of gy for the se of logy for the ogy for the use ent for laser get designator e use of test ng helmets, re for the use of test chnology for the use of craft ground equipment, r military electronic ary training aircraft, nd equipment, technology for ary devices for initiating equipment for optical targetequipment acquisition for equipment, optical software target forsoftware tracking the for equipment, use the technology of use foracquisition test of the equipment, equipment test use technology for equipment of for opticalsoftware for software the target for missile for use designator the jamming the of equipment, use equipment, useuse software software of technology of of for for test for test test the th equipment the equipment equipment usetest for use for for of equipment optical of laser missile test for target software range jamming equipment tracking optical for finder,range equipment, for equipment, target the technology finder, technology optical designator technology use fo test for target equipment, for of equipment designator the technology theequipment, test for equipment, use for use test equipment missile technology of the of equipment for jamming for test use test for optical equipment, the equipment of equipment optical targe test u for test for target equipment optical tracking equipment laser for target equipment for range optical acquisition optical finder, target equipment, technolo target acquisition technology tracking equipment, f equipment, test test equipment equipm for optical tar the use of military aero-engines software to simulate the function of military communications equipment equipment, military aircraft pressurisedtechnology breathing for equipment, the military useof communications of military equipment, military electronic military aircraft equipment, electronic pressurised technology equipment, breathing for military equipment, the flyi technology use for of the military use flying of helmets military communications equipment, technol technology for the use of military training aircraft software for the useuse of of combat combat aircraft, aircraft, technology test for equipment the for development combat of aircraft combat aircraft, technology for the production of combat aircraft, techno explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives Saudi Arabia software for the use of test equipment for laser range finder, software for the use of test equipment for missile jamming equipment, softwa Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia software for military communications software equipment, for technology the for use the of use military of communications software equipment, for software military to communications simulate equipment the function of military communications equipment, te Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia combat aircraft, components for components combat for aircraft, combat technology aircraft, for equipment the for production the of production combat of aircraft combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military air Saudi Arabia components for military training aircraft, equipment for the useSaudi of Arabia military training aircraft, technology for the production of milit components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft grou Saudi Arabia components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military communications equipment, components fo Saudi Arabia components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, milit Saudi Arabia components for inertial equipment, inertial equipment cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 111 nt, onverters, s, software xygen borne aging e for the use of weapon the use of ared/thermal rocessing bat aircraft, aircraft, f aircraft mbat aircraft, craft pressure logy for the are for the use se of combat cations identification infrared/thermal ts, components les, launching are for the use itary aircraft the use of ry flying , software for the chnology for the processing data recorders, g equipment, e of airborne onents for airborne ners, military electronic breathing equipment, military communications ent, chaff equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector sea for fire control equipment,imaging components equipment, for equipment imaging forcountermeasures countermeasures the equipment, equipment, operation military components of aero-engines, forequipment, military military military military aircraft aircraft aero-engines, flying in ground components helmets, confineduse equipment, for military areas, of military military infrared/thermal fire airborne aircraft infr imaging control refuelling pressureanti-g/pressure equipment, equipment, equipment, refuellers, suits, military guided technology military technology parachutes, missile for contai for software decoyingaircraft, the the for equipment, technology use use the im for of of use the aircraftuse attack of use cannons, of alerting/warning combat of technology fire equipment, aircraft, ejector for control technology te technology seats, the equipment, for for technology use technology the the for of for use use the aircrewrefuellers, the of of use protective technology use chaff military of masks, equipment, for of aero-engines, equipment technology technology the guidedhelmets, technology for for for use missile technology for the the of decoying for the operation u military equipment, the use of containers, technology use of military technology for of military aircraft for the military aircraft in the use infrared/thermal ground confined use of imaging equipment, areas, of imaging equipment, technology techno military countermeasures technology for electronic equipme for the equipment, the use technology use of for of military the military air use parachutes of milita equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, chaff, chaff equipment, comp surveillance equipment, components forequipment, airborne components targeting for equipment, aircraft componentscomponents missile for for protection aircraft ejector systems, cannons, seats,components components components components for for for for military aircraft aircraft imaging aero-engines, radars, militarycomponents countermeasures components components communi for equipment, for for military components military chaff image for equipment,equipment, aircraft intensifier laser components components head-up equipment, rangefinders, for for displays, components components co military componentsequipment, for for video for components military liquid recording military for infrared/thermal oxygen equipment, aircraft weapon imaging c equipment components pressurised control equipment, for for breathin systems, components the optical components for production targetequipment for military acquisition of for weapon video equipment, combat air-to-surface sights, p components aircraft, missiles, decoy formilitary imaging launching flares, recognition/ aircraft countermeasures equipment ejector ground equipment, for seats, equipment, laser bombs,military environmental military rangefinders, liquid flying test aircraft launching oxygen helmets, facilities head-up equipment converters, military forequipment, displays, for military image com military military air-to-air aero-engines, intensifier missi video aircraft military equipment, recording navigation aircraftelectronic military equipment, equipment, flight warfare infrared/thermal optical military equipment, imaging target aircraft software equipment, acquisitionof pressurised for military equipment, aircraft the parachutes, recognition/identification military use military equipment, communicationsuse of video software equipment, of airborne for software combat surveillance the for aircraft, equipment, us equipment the software software for use for for the of the the production aircraftfor use use of missile the of of combat protection use ejector airborne aircraft, systems, of seats, targetingconverters, software software equipment, launching software software for for softw equipment for for the the for the the use useground air-to-surface use use of of missiles, equipment, of of imaging aircraft software software environmental military countermeasures radars for for testof aero-engines, equipment, the the facilities military software software use use for aircraft for for of of combat pressurised the the launchingimaging military aircraft, breathing use use equipment equipment, aircraft software equipment, of of for software head-up for software military laser bombs, for displays,of for aircraft rangefinder software the software optical the flight for use for target use data the of the acquisition of recorders, usesoftware military use equipment, military software of for video of software image for liquid the processing military for intensifier the o use equipment, aircraft thecontrol equipment, use of software navigation use systems, software of test for equipment, of software for mil equipment the softw optical for thesurveillance for use target the use equipment, military of tracking use of technology aero-engines, military equipment, of military for software video software weapon the for recording for sights, use the equipment, the technology of use softwar use for airborne of of the targeting training test use equipment, equipment equipment of technology for for airborne for combat combat electronic the aircraft, warfare use software equipment, of for technology aircraft the for cannons, use the technology use for of the air use o Saudi Arabia airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipm Saudi Arabia airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 112 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence ghts, test or the use ary aero- craft, r the use of of optical raft, technology ngines, ilitary utility ights o-surface uipment, use of software f equipment for oying/detection/ for the use of ology for the ressurised tility helicopters hutes, signal flares, ile decoying/detection/ of military training aircraft, nd equipment, technology for jamming equipment, components forhelicopters, military general aircraft military navigation aircraftsoftware equipment, components, for components military the for aircraft use militarythe ground of utility use equipment, military helicopters, of military utility equipment military aircraftjamming helicopters, for utility navigation equipment, technology the helicopters, equipment, technology for use technology military for the offor for parac the use m the the use of use use of aircraft of offor military military military general the aircraft communications parachutes, military use ground equipment, technology aircraft of equipment, technology for components, military technology for the technology utility for the use for helicopters, the use of the technology use o military use for of utility of the military helicopters, guided use aircraft technology missile of navigation for dec test equipment, the equipment use for of military signal utility flares, helicopters, technology test for equipment the for military u the use of military aero-engines technology for the use of military training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft military communications equipment, technology for the use of aircraft missile protection systems, technology for the use of aircraft radars, techn use of aircrew protectivetechnology masks, for technology the for usetechnology the of for use decoy the of flares, use anti-g/pressureof technology of suits, laser for equipment technology rangefinders, the for for technology usemissiles, the the for of technology production use the ejector for of of use seats, the combat chaff,engines, of technology technology use aircraft, technology launching for for of technology for equipment the the launching for the for use usemilitary equipment the use air-to-air of of aircraft for use missiles, of environmental combat head-up bombs, of technology military test air displays, technology imaging forbreathing aircraft facilities technology for countermeasures the equipment, flight for for the equipment, use technology data combat the use technology of for recorders, airc military use of f launching the technology infrared/thermal of liquid equipment use for imaging military oxygen for of the equipment, aircraft converters, air-t technology military use technology navigation technology for flying of for equipment, for the helmets, military the technology the use technology aircrafttarget use for use of for ground tracking of the of military the equipment, equipment, military use milit video use technology technology parachutes, oftechnology recording of for technology military for equipment, military the for aircraft the technology image use the p use for intensifier ofequipment use of the equipment, test for of training use technology equipment combat military equipment of fo for aircraft, video for optical combat test processing combat target aircraft, equipment eq acquisition aircraft, technology for equipment, technology for military technology for the aero-engines, for the use training the use of equipment use of test for weapon equipment combat control for aircraft, systems, military weapon technology aero-e control for systems, the weapon use s of weapon si Saudi Arabia aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for guided miss Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi components Arabia for improvised explosive general device military disposal aircraft equipment, components improvised components explosive for device all-wheel disposal drive equipment components vehicles for with military ballistic aero-engines, protection equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft grou Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia technology for the development components of for air-to-surface military missiles, training technology aircraft, for equipment the for use the of production air-to-surface of missiles military training aircraft, technology for the production cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 113 ded missile , components ector seats, radar the production t, software for tary video use of ejector on of guided ent, components ftware for the software for the on of ejector seats, r chaff equipment, ountermeasures sensor data ipment, software for , software for the s for aircraft radars, ircraft pressurised rgeting equipment, f test equipment for aircraft radars, , software for the n of military flying tary video processing quipment, military on of military aircraft are for the production ary aircraft flight data he production of ised breathing siles, launching recorders, signature ary video recording re for the production of ressurised breathing ff, chaff equipment, military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraftcomponents radars, for aircrew airborne protective electronic masks, warfare anti-g/pressurefor equipment, suits, aircraft components attack cannons, for alerting/warning components airborne equipment, for surveillance cha components aircraft equipment, for military components aircrew communications for protective equipment, airborne masks, components targeting equipm components components for for for aircraft combat anti-g/pressure missile aircraft, suits, protection components components systems,of for for component combat ejector attack aircraft, seats, alerting/warning components components equipment, for for componentsdecoying equipment electronic fo equipment, for countermeasures components the equipment, for use components imaging of forfor countermeasures combat equipment liquid equipment, aircraft, for oxygen components components converters, for for components laser equipmentbreathing for rangefinders, for equipment, military components the components aero-engines, for use for components laser of military for warning ejectorequipment, flying military detectors seats, components helmets, aircraft components for components head-up for military for displays, gui infrared/thermal military componentsrecording imaging image for equipment, equipment, intensifier military components components equipment, a for for components optical military forrecorders, target video military acquisition components processing imaging equipment, for equipment, components test components for equipment for recognition/identificationelectronic for mili equipment, countermeasures combat components equipment, aircraft, for equipment components for forseats, the weapon goods production control treated of systems, for combat components signature aircraft, forequipment, suppression equipment weapon laser for for sights, rangefinders, military the decoy laser use, use flares, warning guided of ej equipment detectors, missile combat for launching decoying aircraft, bombs, equipment equipment, equipment liquid for guided for oxygen air-to-air missile the missiles,recorders, converters, detection launching military materials equipment, equipment aircraft for imaging for ground reduced c air-to-surface equipment, electromagnetic mis equipment, military reflectivity military aircraft for containers, head-up military military displays, use, field military militaryinfrared/thermal generators, aircraft aero-engines, imaging military navigation milit equipment, flying equipment, military helmets, military parachutes, military aircraftequipment, military image p optical parametric intensifier target technical equipment, acquisition databases, military equipment, military imaging productionsuppression video radar technology coatings processing e for for equipment, combat military milit aircraft, use, recognition/identificationairborne signature equipment, electronic suppression sensor warfare fittings data equipment, for software militarysoftware for use, for the signature the production suppression production of treatments of airborne forsoftware aircraft surveillance military for cannons, equipment, use, the software software softwa production for for of the theproduction aircrew production production of protective of of chaff masks, aircraft airborne equipment, software missile ta software for protection forsoftware the systems, the for production software production the of for of production anti-g/pressure the combat of suits, production aircraft,the equipment software of software production for for for of the the the equipment production production production for of of ofmissile the combat chaff decoy detection use aircraft, flares, equipment, of software software software ejector for for for seats, the theproduction the software production producti of production for of launching of the equipment equipment imaging production for for countermeasures of theof air-to-air equipment, guided use missiles, launching software missile of software equipment for decoying combat for for the equipment, aircraf the bombs, production software productionproduction software of for of of for laser the launching military the rangefinders, producti equipment aircraft production for flight of air-to-surfacehead-up data liquid missiles, displays, recorders, oxygen softw software software converters, for for software the the forequipment, production production the software of of production for military military of the aircraft aircraft military production navigation ground aero-engines,helmets, of equipment, equipment, so software military software software for containers, for for the software the the production for production producti the of the of production military production military of image of aircraft military intensifier military pressur parachutes, equipment, fieldequipment, software software generators, software for for software for Saudi Arabia airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 114 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence are for the use of of combat ic warfare for the use of uction of combat ion of laser r the production airborne seats, technology gy for the use of equipment for the tion of optical aircraft, e of weapon technology for the itary t data recorders, logy for the use of or air-to-surface -engines, the use of aircrew craft missile aft missile ware for the use of ing equipment, ry aircraft navigation chnology for the d/thermal imaging e production of anti- est equipment for r the use of military ession treatments for ology for the ers, technology for the hing equipment for oftware for the use of production of military suppression coatings t navigation control systems, software for the production of weapon sights, software for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, software for the use of surveillance equipment, software for theprotection use systems, of software airborne for targeting equipment, the softwarecombat use for aircraft, of the software aircraft use for radars, of the software aircraftuse use for cannons, of of the software combat ejector use for aircraft, seats, of the software software anti-g/pressure useguided for for suits, of missile the the software aircr detection use use for equipment, of of the software equipment equipment uselaunching for for for of equipment the the the chaff equipment, for use use production s air-to-air of of of missiles, imaging ejector combat softwarebombs, countermeasures seats, aircraft, for software equipment, software software the for software for for use the for the the of use the use use launchingsoftware of use of of equipment for liquid of guided for the oxygen laser missile air-to-surface use converters, rangefinders, decoying missiles, of software software equipment, softwareequipment, military for softw for software aircraft the the for ground use use the equipment, of of use software military launc image of for aero-engines, intensifier military the software equipment, aircraft use for software pressurised of the for breathing military usemilitary the equipment, aircraft of parametric use software head-up military technical of for displays, aircraft databases, military the software fligh software infrared/thermal use forsoftware for imaging of the for the equipment, military use the use software field of use of for generators, milita of military the softwarecombat optical video use fo aircraft, target processing of acquisition software equipment, military equipment, for software parachutes, software the for soft forsights, use the the technology of use use for test of of the equipment military recognition/identification production for video equipment,production of military record software of airborne aero-engines, for aircraft electronic software the cannons, warfare for use technology equipment, the ofprotection for technology use t systems, the for of technology production the weapon for of production control the aircraft of systems,g/pressure production military airborne software suits, of communications targeting for equipment, technology aircraft equipment, the te for radars, technology us the technology fortechnology production for the for of the production the chaff, production of technology production of air for of aircrew theaircraft, decoy protective production technology flares, masks, of for technology technology chaff the for for equipment, production the th technologyfor of production for the equipment of the production for ejector production of the seats, of goods use technology combat production treated of for of for combat the guided signature aircraft, production missile suppression technology of detection for for equipmentrangefinders, equipment, military the for technology technology use, production the for for technology of prod the the for equipment production production the formissiles, of of production the technology launching imaging of use for equipment countermeasures guided of the for equipment, missile ejector production air-to-air technology decoying missiles,of of for equipment, technology materials launching the for for equipment product the reduced for production electromagnetic bombs, ofaircraft reflectivity technology launching ground for for equipment equipment, military the f technology use, production for technology ofequipment, the for liquid technology production the oxygen for of production converters, the military of technology production aircraft military fo production of head-up aero-engines, of military displays, technology military aircraft technology for field pressurised for the generators, breathing theequipment, technology equipment, production technology for technology of for the for military the production the aircraf production of productionproduction of military of of military flying military military parachutes, helmets, contain video technology technology processing for fortarget equipment, the the acquisition technology production production equipment, for of of technology the military military for production parametric infrare thefor of technical production military military databases, of use, video techn recognition/identification technology recording equipment, for equipment, technologymilitary the technology for use, production for the technology of the production for signature produc of the suppression signature technology production fittings for of for the test military production equipment use, of for technologyequipment, weapon combat for technology control aircraft, the for systems, technology production the technology for of use for the signaturecommunications of the production suppr equipment, airborne production of technology targeting of test equipment, for weapon equipment technology the si cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 115 bat onents duced laser f training dars, lators, , test t, of military nt for the use , test y video ment for chnology for for the use of itary training se of military ry training ce missiles, easures ing aircraft, are equipment, nt, technology hnology for the quipment, ology for the use raft, components equipment, test equipment for pment for airborne the use of combat aircraft, ctronic warfare equipment, s for airborne electronic technology for the use of guided missile detection equipment, technology for the use of imaging countermeasures equipment, technology for the use of rangefinders, technology for thetechnology use for of the launching useelectromagnetic equipment of reflectivity for launching for air-to-air equipment missiles, militarytechnology for technology use, for bombs, for technology the technology the for use for useaircraft the of the of pressurised use military use launching breathing of aircraft of equipment equipment, militaryof head-up liquid for technology aero-engines, military displays, oxygen air-to-surfa for technology flying technology converters, the for helmets, for technologythe use the technology the for use of use for use the of military of the of use military containers, militaryrecording use military of parametric technology aircraft equipment, of aircraft materials technical for ground technology military navigation for databases, the e for infrared/thermal equipment, re for technology use the imaging technology the for of use equipment, for use the military of technology the of use fieldsignature optical for u signature of generators, suppression target the suppression military techn acquisition treatments use coatings video equipment, for ofmilitary for processing technology military military aero-engines, military equipment, for use, parachutes, technology use, technology the technology te for technology for useequipment for the for the of for the use the use recognition/identification military use of use of equipme aero-engines, of weapon of militar unfinished test control signature products equipment systems, suppression for for technology fittings combat combatmilitary for for aircraft, aircraft, aircraft the military weapon technology ground use use, control for equipment, of technology use systems, the technology weapon of weapon use for sights, combat sights of the test aircraft, testaircraft, production equipment technology equip technology of for for for combat combat the the aircraft, aircraft use use technology of of for equipment military the for aero-engines, production the technology of production for military of the aero-engines, combat use tec aircraft, of technology military for aircraft the ground use equipment of equipment for the use of com components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, comp for equipment for thecomponents use for of test military equipmentof training for aerial aircraft, airborne target components electronic equipment, foraircraft, warfare equipment military technology equipment, for training for components the aircraft, the for usetraining components use training of aircraft, for of airborne airborne technology test aerial electronic electronic for equipmentelectronic target warfare warfare the for equipment, warfare equipment, equipment, use aerial technology equipment, equipme equipment of target for training for training the airborne the airborne use electronic use electronic of warfare of warfare airborne equipment military equipment, electronic training test warfare aircraft, equipment equipment, mil forfor technology aerial military for target video the equipment, recording use equipment test equipment, for equi components the for useequipment training of for equipment aerial the for target use electronic equipment,equipment of countermeasures equipment for military equipment, for electronic aircraft components the countermeasuresaircraft, navigation for use equipment, military equipment, weapons of equipment video equipment simu airborne for recording for electronictechnology the equipment, the warfare for use technology use equipment, the of for of equipment use weaponstechnology the military for of simulators, for use video the aircraft military the of recording use radars, aircraft use aerial equipment, oftechnology technology navigation of target equipment aircraft for for equipment, equipment, military for ra the the milita technology video the use use forequipment recording use of of the for equipment, o weapons military use aircraft technology simulators, aircraft of radars, fortraining test navigation airborne test the equipment equipment equipment, electronic equipment use for for technology warf for of electronic aerial forequipment, military training countermeasures target the weapons aircraft equipment equipment, equipment, use simulators navigation for test test of equipment, electronic equipment equipment military test countermeasures for for train equipment equipmen airborne weapons for electronic simulators, military warfare training video equipment equipment recording for equipment, electronic counterm warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training airc Saudi Arabia components for combatSaudi aircraft, Arabia components forSaudi military Arabia aero-engines, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components equipment for for combat aircraft, aerial general target military equipment, aircraft airborne components electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne ele Saudi Arabia aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, component cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 116 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence e ns ications f military ilitary anker aircraft, ngines, r the use of or the use of for the tion equipment, oduction of landing ology for the use of tary improvised ature suppression for ry devices for initiating onents for military ilitary systems, military ection systems, technology pment, components for explosives, components for militarydevices firing for sets, initiating components explosives,explosive for explosive device military ordnance disposal improvised disposal equipment, explosive equipment, test device military equipment disposal devices for equipment, fortransport military equipment initiating aircraft, devices for explosives, components for the military for initiating usecraft, firing military explosives of equipment sets, utility m for mili aircraft, theproduction equipment production of for of military the military utility productionmilitary search aircraft, of search and equipment airborne and rescue for refuelling rescue aircraft,airborne the equipment, aircraft, equipment refuelling use equipment equipment for equipment, of for for the technology airborne themilitary the production for refuelling pr transport use of the equipment, aircraft, of military use equipment technology military transport of for for transport aircraft, landing the the aircraft, equipment craft, use use equipment technology of of for for landing military the the craft, utility use use equipment aircraft of of f military military utility search aircraft, and techn rescue aircraft, technology fo helmets aircraft radars, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for ground based radars, components for military aero-e components for military aircraftcomponents head-down for displays, military components cameras,general for components military military for aircraft aircraft military components, head-up communications military displays, equipment, aircraft components components navigation for forfor equipment, military military test military aircraft transport equipment communications naviga aircraft, for equipment components aircraft for missile t protection systems, test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems military use, military communicationscommunications equipment, equipment, simulators software for forequipment, military the technology communications use for equipment, of the softwaresuppression military use for for communications of the military equipment, equipment use use, softwareequipment for of technology for the equipment for the use for the use of the use of military use of simulators communications o military for equipment, communications military technology equipment, communicatio for technology the for use the of use goods of treated simulators for for signatur military commun Saudi Arabia components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for landing craft, components for military searchSaudi and Arabia rescue aircraft,Saudi comp Arabia components for combat aircraft ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of m Saudi Arabia accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for milita Saudi Arabia airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for aircraft military communications equi Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia components for test equipment for aircraft missile components protection for systems, military software communications for equipment, the equipment use for of the test use equipment of for military aircraft communications missile equipment, prot goods treated for sign cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 117 eapon s n night nt, y systems, test igence software, nts for weapon sights, e use of ballistic test s, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for thetechnology use for of the equipment use for of the military use transport of aircraft military transport aircraft,equipment technology for for military the helmets use of military aircraft ground equipme equipment, test equipment for armoured plate, test equipment for body armour, test equipment for constructions for ballistic protection of militar equipment for the usesights, of technology weapon for sights, thesights, gun use technology laying of for equipment, gun the military laying use image equipment, of intensifier technology weapon equipment, for sight technology the mounts, for use technology the of for use military the of image use equipment intensifier of for equipment, weapon the technology sights, use for weapon of the night w use sights, of weapon weapo sight mounts, weapon sight software for the usecommunications of control command and and intelligence control equipment vehicles, technology for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia ballistic testSaudi equipment, Arabia components for ballistic test equipment, software for the components use for of military ballistic aero-engines, components test general for equipment, military gun technology aircraft laying for components equipment, th components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, compone Saudi Arabia components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft component Saudi Arabia command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intell cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 118 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence nents for ry aircraft components nverters, res, ent for ipment, arios, rgeting et designator corders, tic piloting coy flares, pment for air- es equipment, for military ft, test itary training , components , components for res equipment, t in confined ry aircraft ground bing computers, essories for ories for military ms, software for , optical target onents for military imaging equipment, optical target aircraft, weapon eting equipment, r sensor data ng aircraft, software o processing uipment for military military cameras, ries for imaging counter- countermeasures equipment, accessories foraccessories imaging for countermeasure/counter-countermeasures military equipment, cameras, accessoriesinfrared/thermal accessories for imaging for imaging equipment, military countermeasu accessoriesmilitary image for video intensifier military recording equipment, photographic equipment, accessoriesdesignator equipment, accessories for equipment, accessories for military accessories for night imaging for militaryrecorders, vision radar optical video accessories goggles, equipment, target processing for accessories access surveillance equipment, sensor for equipment,training acc integration optical accessories aircraft, equipment, target for accessories acquisition accessories optical for equipment,aircraft for target weapon accessories radars, simulators tracking control for aircrew for equipment, systems, protective military accessorieschaff airborne masks, training fo equipment, electronic anti-g/pressure aircraft, components warfare suits, accessories for equipment,equipment, automatic for airborne airborne components piloting training electronic refuelling for systems eq warfare equipment, aircraft for equipment,systems airborne radars, parachuted components for targ components loads, for parachuted for bomb airborne loads,in aircrew handling refuelling components confined protective equipment, equipment, for areas, masks, bom components bombing components components forfor computers, for for airborne film components equipment anti-g/pressure ta processing for for suits, equipment, ejectorimaging the components components seats, countermeasure/counter-countermeasures use for for components equipment, of automa helmet for components militarycomponents mounted equipment for aero-engines, for display for imaging components military equipment, the countermeasures for aero-engines, components operation equipment,military equipment components for of components aircraft for for imaging milita for pressure the military counter-countermeasures liquid refuellers, use equipment,containers, aircraft oxygen components of compo components ground co for military for equipment, military training military componentscomponents aircraft aircraft, flying for for pressurised helmets, military military breathing components aircraft infrared/thermal equipment,for for navigation imaging components military military equipment equipment, for photographic image components military equipment, intensifiervideo for cameras, components equipment, recording military comp for components equipment, parachutes, military for components componentsequipment, training military for for components aircraft, imaging night military for components radar vision parachutist optical for equ components goggles, equipment target military for components surveillance video sensor for equipment, processing integration optical componentsaircraft, equipment, equipment, target for components components acquisition components optical for equipment, for target weapon componentscontrol simulators tracking control for equipment for equipment, systems, optical for military components control targ fragmentation training forareas, equipment rockets, aircraft, sensor equipment for control components data for air-to-air equipment for re missiles, theto-air for training control use missiles, practice equipment equipment of handling bombs, for for military equipment ejector mil bombs,practice aero-engines, for seats, control bombs, equipment bombs, equipment equipment helmet for handling for for mounted theimaging equipment the de display use countermeasures for operation equipment, of equipment, decoy of imaging military launching flares, militarylaunching counter-countermeasures training equipment handling aircraf equipment, equipment aircraft, for equipment imaging for film air-to-air for countermeasure/counter-countermeasur fragmentation processing missiles,equipment, fragmentation rockets, equipment, launching military rockets, launching handling equipment aircraft handling equipment equi for navigation equipm military for bombs, equipment, containers, practice launching military military bombs, equipment aircraft flying liquid formilitary pressure helmets, oxygen decoy parachutes, refuellers, military converters, fla military military image military parachutist aircraftequipment, intensifier aero-engines, equipment, pressurised military equipment, milita military breathing video military parametric equipment, recording imagingsurveillance technical equipment, radar equipment, databases, night equipment, optical military vision military target photographicenabling goggles, infrared/thermal tracking equipment, equipment optical equipment, military to target sensor vide acquisition function datathe equipment, as recorders, modelling optical military sensor of target training integration military designatorsoftware aircraft, equipment, operatio Saudi Arabia accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accesso cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 119 ii] re- ust 4] RDX ng logy for pable of at eof ols, pistols, L4 and all for the use of d propellant on equipment craft, technology equipment for the y for military aircraft or tanker aircraft stols, components for chnology for the mbat vehicles, military y for the use of combat r military aircrew litary training aircraft, nents for military radars, the use of air-to-surface nd equipment, technology for goods related to landmines;or [3] HMX Man explosive Portable materialspecified Air or by Defence explosive ML7a Systems material or MANPADSRockets containing and ML7b and RDX test and Unmanned or equipment/production associated Airborne HMX; equipment/software/technologyleast technology; Vehicle [5] therefor a [6] systems Chemicals [ 300km Complete including specified range; rocket Cruiseentry in [7] systems Missile vehicles Schedule Complete including Systems/Remote and 1 subsystems Ballistic Piloted equipment ofrocket designed Missile Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance designed the engines or Systems/Space Drones or Chemical having modified Launch ca modified Weapons a for Vehicles/Soundi Conventionvectors therefor total the and control and impulse rocket systems; electronics capacity systems [vi] equipmentfor of specified weapon specially the 1.1MNs; in or designed goods [iv] 6 warhead for specified guidance above safing/arming/fuzing/firing re-entry in sets as mechanisms; vehicles; 6/7 capable follows: [8] [iii] above; of [i] Specially solid [9] achieving individual designed or Software system rocket production liqui specially accuracy stages; facilities designed of [ or of 3.33% producti modified or for less the of use the of range; goods [v] specified thr in 6/7/8 above pistols, components for rifles,rifles, components semi-automatic for pistols, semi-automatic submachine pistols, guns, components training for small submachine arms guns, ammunition general purpose machine guns, machine pist development of control equipmentthe for development unmanned of air remote vehicles, control technology equipment for for the unmannedcomponents development air for of vehicles military guidance transport equipment aircraft, for components unmanned for air military vehicles, utility techno aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components f missiles aircraft, test equipment for combat aircraft military aero-engines combat vehicles, technology for military combat vehicles components for military training equipment breathing equipment, components foruse military of helicopters, combat components aircraft,military for equipment aircrew military for breathing support the equipment, aircraft,military use equipment components training of for for aircraft, combat the military general helicopters,ground use training military equipment equipment, of aircraft, aircraft for technology military components, the for helicopters,for technology use military equipment military for of aircrew for training combat military breathing the aircraft aircraft, aircraft equipment, use technology ground technology of for equipment, for military combat equipment military support helicopters, for helicopters, aircraft, technolog the technology equipment us for military support air Saudi Arabia goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by M Saudi Arabia assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pi Saudi Arabia technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicle engines, technology for the development of civil unmanned air vehicles, te Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for mi Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technolog Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia components for military improvised components explosive for device military disposal radars, equipment, components military military for software, improvised military technology explosive aero-engines, for components device components military for disposal for radars military equipment military combat support vehicles, aircraft equipment for the production of military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of military co Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia inertial equipment technology for the development of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the production of air-to-surface missiles, technology for Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation components equipment, for components combat for aircraft, military components helicopters, for compo combat helicopters, components for military aircraft groundSaudi equipment, Arabia components fo Saudi Arabia cryptographic software components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft grou cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 120 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence aphy of software of software of software of software of software tware, raphic ying hy ry electronic ent employing ent employing ent employing ent employing ent employing ent employing of equipment of cryptographic ection/disposal ipment, technology for parachutes and equipment quipment, munitions/ combat aircraft, technology forequipment equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technologyequipment for milita ordnance detection/disposal equipment, software for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for munitions/ordnance det cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cryptography, technology for thefor use the of use cryptographic of software, equipment technology employing for cryptography the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use software, equipment employing cryptography,technology software for for the the use use of of equipment equipment employing employing cryptography cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic sof cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography employing cryptography software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptogr Saudi Arabia components for ejector seats, components forYemen military parachutes and equipment, components for military training aircraft, military components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Saudi Arabia components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, equipment for the use of munitions/ordnance detection/disposal e Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military electronic equ Yemen components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Yemen components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Yemen components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Yemen components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm Yemen Technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptog Yemen components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptograp YemenYemenYemen cryptographic software civil body armour components for, components for equipment employing cryptography, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment emplo YemenYemen gyroscopes, technology for the components use for of equipment gyroscopes employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipm YemenYemen components for inertial equipment, cryptographic inertial software, equipment equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use YemenYemen heading sensors for hydrophone cryptographic arrays, software, hydrophones, equipment towed employing hydrophone cryptography, arrays software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 121 of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography Yemen cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 122 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence eof s, software tion of s equipment, echnology osive device trol ary ification ment, test e use of ground ications quipment, fication equipment, nt for the use of g sets, test equipment for ss signalling equipment Table 4(b) EXTANT MILITARY OIELS equipment for the userecognition/identification of equipment, ground fire based controlequipment, radars, equipment, software equipment software for for for the thefor the use use the development of of use of ground fire of firefor based control recognition/identification control the radars, equipment, equipment, equipment, use software equipment technology software of for forequipment for for military the the for the the sonar use use fire use use detection of of control of ofequipment equipment, military naval equipment, fire fire technology sonar radars, test control con for detection equipment equipment equipment, the equipment, for for technology use software the ground for of for us based the naval the radars, use radars, usecomponents test of technology of for equipment ground for naval improvised for based the radar explosive naval radars,detection use device radars, t equipment, of detection test improvised recognition/identification equipment, equipment explosive equip components for device for recognition/ident disposal improvised equipment explosive device disposal equipment, improvised expl military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distress signalling equipment military firing sets based radars, technology for the use of ground based radars, test equipment for ground based radars equipment, military helmets, softwaretechnology for for the the use developmentmilitary of of helmets, military military technology communications helmets, for equipment,communications technology the technology equipment for use for the of the production military development of communications of military equipment, military communications technology communication equipment, for technology the for use the of produc military helmets, test equipment for milit BahrainBahrain Technology for the use of improvised explosive device detection equipment, Technology for equipment the for use the of use improvised of explosive military device distress disposal signalling e equipment, military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of equipme BahrainBahrain components for military transport components aircraft for fire control equipment, components for ground based radars, components for naval radars, components for recognition/identi Bahrain components for military distress signalling equipment, military distress signalling equipment, technology for the use of military distre Bahrain components for military firing sets, equipment for the use of military firing sets, military devices for initiating explosives, military firin Bahrain components for ground based radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for the use of ground based radars, software for th Bahrain components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communications equipment, military commun Bahrain components for military training aircraft cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 123 onents nt of ejector ry aircraft ectronic of military nt for the use e use of ent of military nt, technology logy for the itary training duction of logy for the equipment, ts for military or the use of pment for airborne or the production of technology for the equipment, quipment, software for ipment, military nic warfare equipment, evices for initiating components for military distressutility signalling helicopters, equipment, ejector components seats,parachutes, for general technology military military for parachutes, aircraft the componentsseats, components, development for technology military of military for aircraft combat training the groundfor aircraft, aircraft, development equipment, the technology componen of military development for general distress of thetraining military signalling military development aircraft, aircraft equ distress of technology components, signalling combat for technologycombat equipment, helicopters, the for helicopters, technology technology development the technology for for of development for the theproduction military of the development developme of utility military production of military helicopters, aircraft of military aircraft technology groundmilitary ejector parachutes, ground for equipme parachutes, seats, technology equipment, the technology technology for technology production for for theuse for of the the developm of the combat production production combat production aircraft, of of aircraft, of technologycomponents, military general technology military f technology training military for distress for aircraft, aircraft the signalling the technology components,use use equipment, use for techno of of technology of the military combat for military production parachutes, helicopters, the aircraft of technology technology pro ground military for for equipment, utility the the technology helicopters, use use for of of the military ejector use training seats, of aircraft, technologyML5d, military technology for PL5017, distress for the Software signalling the use and equipment, use of Technology techno specified of general by military milita the utilitymilitary following helicopters electronic entries equipment, of softwareground Part for based I the radars, of use technology theequipment of for Main ground the Order: based use radars, of software military for electronic the equipment, useamp; test of b, equipment military b, for electronic b1a, ground equipment, b1b, based technology b1c, radars, for b1d, test th c, equipment d, for e, military f, el g, h & i explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiatingthe explosives use of aerial target equipment, technology for the use of aerial target equipment components for equipment forfor the equipment use for of thecomponents aerial use for target of equipment, test military components equipmentof training for for aerial aircraft, equipment airborne target components for electronic equipment, for theaircraft, warfare equipment military use technology equipment, for training of for components the aircraft, airborne the for usetraining components electronic use training of aircraft, for warfare of airborne airborne technology test equipment, aerial electronic electronic for equipment comp electronic target warfare warfare the for equipment, warfare equipment, equipment, use aerial technology equipment, equipme equipment of target for training for training the airborne the airborne use electronic use electronic of warfare of warfare airborne equipment military equipment, electronic training test warfare aircraft, equipment equipment, mil for technology aerial for target the equipment, use test equi BahrainBahrainBahrain ballistic shields, body armour, Goods, bomb ML10a, suits, ML10b, civil ML10d bodyBahrain to armour, components ML10g, for ML10h4, body ML10h6, components armour, ML10h7, for military ML11a, ground helmets ML14, based ML15b,Bahrain radars, ML16, components ML17l, for ML21a, military ML21b1 electronic and equipment, ML22a, equipment ML5a for to the use of Goods ground specified based by radars, the equipment following f entries of the components EGTTPTA(C)O: for ML4b, military ML10a, devices ML11, for ML14, initiating ML15b, explosives, ML16, equipment ML17l, for ML21a, the ML5a, use PL5017, of and military ML22 devices a for & initiating explosives, military d Bahrain components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft ground BahrainBahrainBahrainBahrain aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components components for for improvised missile explosive scoring aircraft device equipment, cannons, disposal decoy components equipment, flares, for improvised aerial missile aircraft explosive target scoring cannons device equipment, e disposal airborne equipment electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne electro cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 124 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence nents for ry aircraft f training dars, lators, ilitary components nverters, t, ipment, rgeting , test et designator corders, tic piloting for military ry training itary training , components easures ing aircraft, are equipment, , components for res equipment, raft, components test equipment for bing computers, essories for ories for military onents for military optical target eting equipment, r sensor data vices for initiating tary improvised uipment for military for imaging counter- airborne electronic warfare equipment, components forfor aircraft military radars, video components recordingequipment for equipment, for military components the aircraft for use navigationequipment training of equipment, for equipment aerial components the for target for use electronic equipment,equipment military of countermeasures equipment for training military equipment, for electronic airc aircraft components the countermeasuresaircraft, navigation for use equipment, military equipment, weapons of equipment video equipment simu airborne for recording for electronictechnology the equipment, the warfare for use technology use equipment, the of for of equipment use weaponstechnology the military for of simulators, for use video the aircraft military the of recording use radars, aircraft use aerial equipment, oftechnology technology navigation of target equipment aircraft for for equipment, equipment, military for ra the the milita technology video the use use forequipment recording use of of the for equipment, o weapons military use aircraft technology simulators, aircraft of radars, fortraining test navigation airborne test the equipment equipment equipment, electronic equipment use for for technology warf for of electronic aerial forequipment, military training countermeasures target the weapons aircraft equipment equipment, equipment, use simulators navigation for test test of equipment, electronic equipment equipment military test countermeasures for for train equipment equipmen airborne weapons for electronic simulators,explosives, military warfare training components video equipment equipment for recording for military equipment, devices electronic firing for counterm sets, initiating components explosives,explosive for explosive device military ordnance disposal improvised disposal equipment, explosive equipment, test device military equipment disposal devices for equipment, forcountermeasures military equipment initiating equipment, devices for explosives, accessories for the military for initiating useaccessories firing imaging explosives of for sets, countermeasure/counter-countermeasures m military mili equipment, cameras, accessoriesinfrared/thermal accessories for imaging for imaging equipment, military countermeasu accessoriesmilitary image for video intensifier military recording equipment, photographic equipment, accessoriesdesignator equipment, accessories for equipment, accessories for military accessories for night imaging for militaryrecorders, vision radar optical video accessories goggles, equipment, target processing for accessories access surveillance equipment, sensor for equipment,training acc integration optical accessories aircraft, equipment, target for accessories acquisition accessories optical for equipment,aircraft for target weapon accessories radars, simulators tracking control for aircrew for equipment, systems, protective military accessorieschaff airborne masks, training fo equipment, electronic anti-g/pressure aircraft, components warfare suits, accessories for equipment,equipment, automatic for airborne airborne components piloting training electronic refuelling for systems eq warfare equipment, aircraft for equipment,systems airborne radars, parachuted components for targ components loads, for parachuted for bomb airborne loads,in aircrew handling refuelling components confined protective equipment, equipment, for areas, masks, bom components bombing components components forfor computers, for for airborne film components equipment anti-g/pressure ta processing for for suits, equipment, ejectorimaging the components components seats, countermeasure/counter-countermeasures use for for components equipment, of automa helmet for components militarycomponents mounted equipment for aero-engines, for display for imaging components military equipment, the countermeasures for aero-engines, components operation equipment,military equipment components for of components aircraft for for imaging milita for pressure the military counter-countermeasures liquid refuellers, use equipment,containers, aircraft oxygen components of compo components ground co for military for equipment, military training military componentscomponents aircraft aircraft, flying for for pressurised helmets, military military breathing components aircraft infrared/thermal equipment,for for navigation imaging components military military equipment equipment, for photographic image components military equipment, intensifiervideo for cameras, components equipment, recording military comp for components equipment, parachutes, military for components componentsequipment, training military for for components aircraft, imaging night military for components radar vision parachutist optical for equ components goggles, equipment target military for components surveillance video sensor for equipment, processing integration optical components equipment, Bahrain aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, components for BahrainBahrain accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for accessories military for de airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accessories cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 125 d all ii] re- ust 4] RDX ng pable of at res, ent for arios, coy flares, pment for air- es equipment, ft, test d propellant on equipment t in confined ry aircraft ground ms, software for , optical target imaging equipment, aircraft, weapon or tanker aircraft ng aircraft, software ment, technology for o processing ry training aircraft, military cameras, ive vehicles with ballistic aircraft, components for weapon control systems, control equipment for air-to-air missiles, control equipment for bombs, control equipment for de control equipment for fragmentationareas, rockets, equipment control for equipment theto-air for use missiles, practice of handling bombs, military equipment ejectorpractice aero-engines, for seats, bombs, equipment bombs, equipment helmet for handling for mounted theimaging equipment the display use countermeasures for operation equipment, of equipment, decoy of imaging military launching flares, militarylaunching counter-countermeasures training equipment handling aircraf equipment, equipment aircraft, for equipment imaging for film air-to-air for countermeasure/counter-countermeasur fragmentation processing missiles,equipment, fragmentation rockets, equipment, launching military rockets, launching handling equipment aircraft handling equipment equi for navigation equipm military for bombs, equipment, containers, practice launching military military bombs, equipment aircraft flying liquid formilitary pressure helmets, oxygen decoy parachutes, refuellers, military converters, fla military military image military parachutist aircraftequipment, intensifier aero-engines, equipment, pressurised military equipment, milita military breathing video military parametric equipment, recording imagingsurveillance technical equipment, radar equipment, databases, night equipment, optical military vision military target photographicenabling goggles, infrared/thermal tracking equipment, equipment optical equipment, military to target sensor vide acquisition function datathe equipment, as recorders, modelling optical military sensor of target training integration military designatorsoftware aircraft, equipment, operation equipment for software simulators scenarios, the for for software simulation military militaryequipment for of training traini for the weapon aircraft, military modelling systems, software training ofcontrol software for aircraft, weapon systems for the test systems, the evaluation models software use of for for of weapon the the military syste development simulation training of of aircraft, military military technology training operation for aircraft, scen the training use equipment of for military military training training aircra goods related to landmines;or [3] HMX Man explosive Portable materialspecified Air or by Defence explosive ML7a Systems material or MANPADSRockets containing and ML7b and RDX test and Unmanned or equipment/production associated Airborne HMX; equipment/software/technologyleast technology; Vehicle [5] therefor a [6] systems Chemicals [ 300km Complete including specified range; rocket Cruiseentry in [7] systems Missile vehicles Schedule Complete including Systems/Remote and 1 subsystems Ballistic Piloted equipment ofrocket designed Missile Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance designed the engines or Systems/Space Drones or Chemical having modified Launch ca modified Weapons a for Vehicles/Soundi Conventionvectors therefor total the and control and impulse rocket systems; electronics capacity systems [vi] equipmentfor of specified weapon specially the 1.1MNs; in or designed goods [iv] 6 warhead for specified guidance above safing/arming/fuzing/firing re-entry in sets as mechanisms; vehicles; 6/7 capable follows: [8] [iii] above; of [i] Specially solid [9] achieving individual designed or Software system rocket production liqui specially accuracy stages; facilities designed of [ or of 3.33% producti modified or for less the of use the of range; goods [v] specified thr in 6/7/8 above protection, technology for military support vehicles components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components forelectronic military warfare utility equipment helicopters, components f Bahrain goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by ML4 an Bahrain components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for milita BahrainBahrain components for small arms components ammunition, for small all-wheel arms drive ammunition vehicles with ballistic protection, components for military support vehicles, technology for all-wheel dr BahrainBahrain military improvised explosive device components disposal for equipment, electronic military warfare utility equipment, vehicles equipment for the use of electronic warfare equipment, software for electronic warfare equip cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 126 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence eof ility elicopters, s, software pters, or the use al auxiliary echnology osive device e nents for trol ished roduction of f fast attack ification ment, test are for the ipment, ipment for aero engines ation equipment, rs, components for for military utility ary aircraft ground for the use of ets, test equipment for signalling equipment helicopters, equipment for theof development combat of helicopters, combat equipmentequipment, helicopters, for military equipment the parachutes, for use production thedevelopment of equipment development of military for of combat utility combat components helicopters, helicopters,software helicopters, for software general for production combat for military the equipment helicopters, the aircraft production for equipmentsoftware development components, of components f for of military combat for the components aero-engines, helicopters, combat use for milit combat software helicopters, of combat helicopters, for softw military helicopters, technology the utility software for productioncomponents helicopters, for the of for technology the production components combat for production of for helicopters, the ofhelicopters, combat combat technology development combat technology helicopters, helicopters, for of helico for technology software the combat the for forhelicopters, use helicopters, use the the technology of technology of production use for components for equipmemt of of the for thecombat for combat combat use combat development helicopters, the helicopters, h of helicopters, of test use technology general technology compo equipment of fordevelopment military for for combat the of aircraft the components helicopters, p components components, use for technology for technology ofproducts combat for combat for components for helicopters, the helicopters, the for military test use unfinished use military utility models of products of ut helicopters for equipment for military the for combat aircraft development the helicopters, ground of use unfinished equipment, combat of products test helicopters, military for equ test utility military modelsequipment aero-engines, for for unfin th the userecognition/identification of equipment, ground fire based controlequipment, radars, equipment, software equipment software for for for the thefor the use use the development of of use of ground fire of firefor based control recognition/identification control the radars, equipment, equipment, equipment, use software equipment technology software of for forequipment for for military the the for the the sonar use use fire use use detection of of control of ofequipment equipment, military naval equipment, fire fire technology sonar radars, test control con for detection equipment equipment equipment, the equipment, for for technology use software the ground for of for us based the naval the radars, use radars, usenaval test of technology of auxiliary equipment ground for naval vessels, for based the radar components naval radars,craft, use for radars, t technology of patrol test for recognition/identification craft, equipment the equip vessels, general for use technology naval recognition/ident of for vessel frigates, the components, technology use technology for of for the patrol the use craft usecomponents of of for landing corvettes, improvised craft, technology explosive technologydetection for device for equipment, the detection the improvised use equipment, use explosive o components of device for mine disposal improvised hunters, equipment explosive technologymilitary device for distress disposal the signalling equipment, use equipment, improvised of technology expl nav for the use of military distress signalling equipment military firing sets EgyptEgypt military parachutes, military parachutist components equipment, for technology fire for control the equipment, use components of for military ground parachutes Egypt based radars, components for naval radars, components for recognition/identific Egypt components for corvettes, components forEgypt fast attack craft, components for frigates, componentsEgypt for landing craft, Technology components for for the mine use hunte of improvised explosive device detection equipment, Technology for equipment the for use the of use improvised of explosive military device distress disposal signalling components equ equipment, for military military distress aero signalling engines, equipment, equipment technology for for the the use use of of military equipment aero engines, military aero engines, technology for the use of military EgyptEgypt components for military distress components signalling for equipment, military military firing distress sets, signalling equipment equipment, for technology the for use the of use military of firing military sets, distress military devices for initiating explosives, military firing s Egypt components for combat helicopters, components for general military aircraft components, components for military aero-engines, components cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 127 al ng ne quipment t oes, torpedoes, ld t, r the use or torpedo r the use of tion of s equipment, or the use of gy for the se of ary ectronic g equipment, e use of the use of ent for laser get designator he use of test e use of test ations ing aircraft training replica of aircraft aircrew protective components for mine countermeasuresengineer equipment, equipment, equipment mine for clearingof the equipment, mine use mine clearing of countermeasures equipment, minetechnology equipment, technology clearing for minefield for equipment, the breaching the general use vehicles, use military of technology of vehicle mine for general components, clearing the military military equipment, useequipment, vehicle fie technology of military components, for equipment helmets, technology the fo software fortechnology use for the for of the use the mine use of development countermeasuresmilitary of military of equipment helmets, military field military technology communications engineer helmets, for equipment, equipmen communications technology the technology equipment for use for the of the production military development of communications of military equipment, military communications technology communication equipment,masks, for technology anti-g/pressure the for suits, use the components ofequipment, produc for military replica combat helmets, air aircraft, test tocannons, components equipment air software for for missiles, for military milit replica the training air use aircraft, to of military surface combat flying missiles, aircraft helmets, replica simulators, military air technology train to for surface the rockets, use replica of anti-ship combat missiles, aircraft replica simulators bombs, launching equipment, components fortraining torpedoes, equipment, equipment equipment for forsweeping the the equipment, use use mine of of sweeping mineequipment naval equipment sweeping training mines, training equipment, equipment, equipment equipment, equipment software fortechnology software for for the for for the the use the the use use of use use ofmines, of torpedo of of mine technology naval launching mine mine sweeping for mines, equipment, sweeping sweeping equipment the software equipmentfor equipment, equipment, use for for mine technology software of the the sweeping for for torpedo use use equipment the thetorpedo launching of of training use use launching equipment, torpedo torpedoes, equipment, of of equipment, technology launching mi test mine mine torpedoes for equipment, equipment sweeping sweepi the software for equipment use for naval training of the mines, equipment, torpedoes, use test technology test of equipment for equipment torped for the for torpedo use mine launching of sweeping equipment, nav equipment, test test equipment e for military electronic equipment, softwareground for based the radars, use technologyequipment of for ground the based use radars, of software military for electronic the equipment, useamp; test of b, equipment military b, for electronic b1a, ground equipment, b1b, based technology b1c, radars, for b1d, test th c, equipment d, for e, military f, el g, h & i equipment for optical targetequipment acquisition for equipment, optical software target forsoftware tracking the for equipment, use the technology of use foracquisition test of the equipment, equipment test use technology for equipment of for opticalsoftware for software the target for missile for use designator the jamming the of equipment, use equipment, useuse software software of technology of of for for test for test test the th equipment the equipment equipment usetest for use for for of equipment optical of laser missile test for target software range jamming equipment tracking optical for finder,range equipment, for equipment, target the technology finder, technology optical designator technology use fo test for target equipment, for of equipment designator the technology theequipment, test for equipment, use for use test equipment missile technology of the of equipment for jamming for test use test for optical equipment, the equipment of equipment optical targe test u for test for target equipment optical tracking equipment laser for target equipment for range optical acquisition optical finder, target equipment, technolo target acquisition technology tracking equipment, f equipment, test test equipment equipm for optical tar Egypt components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, components for mine clearin EgyptEgypt components for military communications equipment, components for test equipment for military communicationsEgypt equipment, military communic aerial target equipment, air to surface rocket launching equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling components equipment, for mine sweeping equipment, components for mine sweeping equipment training equipment, components for naval mines, components f Egypt components for ground based radars, components for military electronic equipment, equipment for the use of ground based radars, equipment for EgyptEgypt Goods specified by the following entries of the software EGTTPTA(C)O: for ML4b, the ML10a, use ML11, of ML14, test ML15b, equipment ML16, for ML17l, laser ML21a, range ML5a, finder, PL5017, software and for ML22 the a use & of test equipment for missile jamming equipment, software for t Egypt software for military communications equipment, technology for the use of software for military communications equipment cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 128 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence ines, of ent for or the easures measures es uipment for aging ared/thermal omponents military ogy for the use ts, components chnology for the gy for the use of ng helmets, ipment, software for ary electronic ners, military electronic ices for initiating aft ground equipment, aff equipment, components software to simulate the function of military communicationsequipment, equipment military aircraft pressurisedtechnology breathing for equipment, the military useof communications of military equipment, military electronic military aircraft equipment, electronic pressurised technology equipment, breathing for military equipment, the flyi technology usemilitary for of parachutes, the military technology use flying for ofparachutes, helmets the military technology use communications for of equipment, the ejector technol use seats, of technology military for training the aircraft use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiatingfor explosives airborne refuelling equipment,for components fire for control attack equipment,imaging alerting/warning components equipment, equipment, for equipment components imaging for forcountermeasures countermeasures the combat equipment, equipment, operation aircraft, military components of components aero-engines, forequipment, military for military military military aircraft ejector aircraft aero-engines, flying in sea ground components helmets, confineduse equipment, for military areas, of military military infrared/thermal fire combat aircraft infr imaging control aircraft pressure equipment, equipment, refuellers, military guided military parachutes, missile contai software decoyingthe for equipment, use the im of use aerial of target combat equipment, aircraft, technology te for the use of aerial target equipment for naval mines, componentstorpedoes, for equipment torpedoes, for components theequipment for use for training of the equipment mine use forcountermeasures countermeasures of mine equipment, equipment, torpedoes, sweeping mine equipment equipment equipment, sweeping forequipment, for equipment equipment, the software the for software use for use the for of the of usetraining the mine use training of equipment use sweeping of equipment launching for of equipment, mine for equipm mine launching equipmentequipment, sweeping mine sweeping equipment for technology equipment, sweeping equipment, for the for software equipment, technology torpedoes, use the for launchinguse for software of use the equipment of the for naval of use for training use the m mine of torpedoes, equipment of useequipment, sweeping naval mine for launching of test equipment, mines, mine equipment mine equipment technology software sweeping for counter for for formine equipment, torpedoes, mine the the sweeping test technology sweeping use use equipment, equipment for equipment, of of torpedoes, for the test naval torpedoes, training launching use equipment mines, software equipment equipment of for technology for for for mine naval for the mine torpedoes, counterm mines, the use sweeping test test use equipment equipment equipment of for for torpedoes, mine torpedoes, technology countermeasur test f equipment for training eq EgyptEgypt components for military aircraft pressurisedEgypt breathing equipment, components for military communications equipment, components for milit components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes, components for military components training for aircraft, military ejector devices seats, for military initiating aircr explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, military dev Egypt software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technolo Egypt airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons,Egypt aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warningEgypt equipment, ch aerial target equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components components for for launching missile equipment scoring for equipment, torpedoes, decoy components flares, for missile mine scoring countermeasures equ equipment, components for mine sweeping equipment, c cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 129 ontrol al sonar sile rs, ld t, use of r the use r electronic ilitary signalling or naval decoying onents for g equipment, for command val gun uipment for ts for tropospheric gy for the use of t, equipment for the ces for initiating l equipment for training aircraft, or tanker aircraft for military tary improvised ft, military navigation utting charges, non-military communications control and intelligencewarfare equipment, equipment, components components for forequipment, corvettes, fast components components attack for for craft, military defensivenaval components inflatable systems communications for craft, against equipment, frigates, components NBC components componentsequipment, for agents, for for components military components naval heavy for navigation fo engines, machine semi-automatic equipment,surface-to-air components guns, pistols, components missiles, for components components for control naval for for naval equipment gun militaryuse surface-to-air acoustic for mountings, distress of missiles, equipment, surface-to-surface components corvettes, components comp missiles, for equipment forsurface-to-air defensive naval for surface-to-surface missiles, systems radars, the missiles, general against components use contro naval NBC forsurface-to-air of vessel agents, nav missiles, fast components, electronic launching attack handling warfare equipment craft,equipment, equipment equipmen for equipment naval for surface-to-surface for acoustic surface-to-surface missiles, the equipment, missiles,mountings, military use naval heavy naval distress of communications machine radars, signalling frigates, equipment, guns, naval equipment, equipmentcommunications naval launching sonar military for equipment, electrical eq equipment, inflatable the test equipment, semi-automatic cra use equipment naval pistols, of for electronic surface-to-air naval naval equipment, missiles, radars, radars, naval surface-to-surface equipment test engines, missiles, for equipment na test the for equipment surface-to-air missiles equipment, equipment for thesystems, use technology of for weapon thedecoying control use equipment, systems, of test software guided equipment for missile for the decoying weapon use equipment, control of technology systems guidedexplosives, for missile components the decoying for use equipment, military ofdevices software firing weapon for for sets, control initiating the components systems, explosives, useexplosive for test explosive of device military equipment ordnance weapon disposal improvised for disposal c equipment, explosive guided equipment, test device mis military equipment disposal devices for equipment, for military equipmentscatter initiating devices for communications explosives, for the equipment, military initiating use equipment firingsoftware explosives of for sets, for m the mili naval use radars,radars, of technology tropospheric ground for scatter based ground communications radars, based equipment equipment radars, for technology the for use naval of radars, naval test radars, equipment software for for ground ground based based radars, rada test equipment f components for military transport aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components f detonators, non-military firing sets, shaped charges, underwater telecommunications systems components for mine countermeasuresengineer equipment, equipment, equipment mine for clearingof the equipment, mine use mine clearing of countermeasures equipment, minetechnology equipment, technology clearing for minefield for equipment, the breaching the general use vehicles, use military of technology of vehicle mine for general components, clearing the military military equipment, use vehicle fie technology of components, for equipment technology the fo forsoftware use the to of use simulate mine of the countermeasures military function equipment field of engineer military equipmen communications equipment EgyptEgypt components for improvised explosive components device for disposal guided equipment, missile improvised decoying explosive equipment, device components disposal for equipment weapon control systems, decoy flares, equipment for the use of guided missile Egypt NBC filters, chaff, chaff equipment, command communications control and intelligence equipment, components for chaff equipment, components EgyptEgypt accessories for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for explosiveEgypt ordnance disposal equipment, components for military accessories devi for ground based radars, accessories for naval radars, components for ground based radars, components components for for naval combat radars, aircraft, componen components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military EgyptEgypt components for military aero-engines cutters/severing tools, detonating cord, devices for initiating explosives, explosives, linear cutting explosive charges, linear shaped c Libya components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, components for mine clearin LibyaLibya software for military communications software equipment, for technology the for use the of use military of communications software equipment, for software military to communications simulate equipment the function of military communications equipment, technolo cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 130 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence ld t, r the use al auxiliary tion of s equipment, osive device iles rtoair ary f fast attack learing equipment, sal equipment, onents for military mmunications r military surveillance e hunters, components for le handling/launch firing sets, test equipment for naval auxiliary vessels, componentscraft, for technology patrol for craft, thevessels, general use technology naval of for vessel frigates, the components, technology use technology for of for the patrol the use craft use of of landing corvettes, craft, technology technology for for the the use use o of mine hunters, technology for the use of nav components for improvised explosivedetection device equipment, detection improvised equipment, explosive components device for disposal improvised equipment explosive device disposal equipment, improvised expl components for mine countermeasuresengineer equipment, equipment, equipment mine for clearingof the equipment, mine use mine clearing of countermeasures equipment, minetechnology equipment, technology clearing for minefield for equipment, the breaching the general use vehicles, use military of technology of vehicle mine for general components, clearing the military military equipment, useequipment, vehicle fie technology of military components, for equipment helmets, technology the fo software fortechnology use for the for of the use the mine use of development countermeasuresmilitary of military of equipment helmets, military field military technology communications engineer helmets, for equipment, equipmen communications technology the technology equipment for use for the of the production military development of communications of military equipment, military communications technology communication equipment, for technology the for use the of produc military helmets, test equipment for milit military firing sets aircraft, components for militaryutility training helicopters, aircraft, components components for for tanker military aircraft, transport general aircraft, military components aircraft for components military utility aircraft, comp equipment, technology for themissiles, production technology of for anti-armour the missile production handling/launching of equipment, components technology for for air the to production surface of missiles, components technology for for ai the production of components for anti-armour miss LibyaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia cloth components treated for for improvised signature components explosive suppression for device for military disposal military transport equipment, use, components aircraft improvised clothing for explosive treated corvettes, device for components disposal signature for equipment suppression fast for attack military craft, use components for frigates, components for landing craft, components for min Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia military airborne cargo handling Technology equipment, for military the airborne use cargo of strops, improvised military explosive parachutes device detection equipment, Technology for the use of improvised explosive device dispo Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military search and rescue aircraft, components fo Saudi Arabia components for military communications equipment, componentsSaudi for Arabia test equipment for military communications equipment, military co technology for the production of air to air missile handling/launching equipment, technology for the production of air to surface missi Saudi Arabia components for equipment for the use of mine clearing equipment, components for military field engineer equipment, components for mine c Saudi Arabia components for military firing sets, equipment for the use of military firing sets, military devices for initiating explosives, military cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 131 n hnology ing mprovised ent, gent st nt of ejector g equipment, y for the use ry aircraft l agent ent of military nt, technology logy for the iological agent , test equipment duction of logy for the ts for military or the production of ing aircraft training replica of aircraft technology for the ipment, military ound equipment, omponents for biological pment, aircrew protective components for military distressutility signalling helicopters, equipment, ejector components seats,parachutes, for general technology military military for parachutes, aircraft the componentsseats, components, development for technology military of military for aircraft combat training the groundfor aircraft, aircraft, development equipment, the technology componen of military development for general distress of thetraining military signalling military development aircraft, aircraft equ distress of technology components, signalling combat for technologycombat equipment, helicopters, the for helicopters, technology technology development the technology for for of development for the theproduction military of the development developme of utility military production of military helicopters, aircraft of military aircraft technology groundmilitary ejector parachutes, ground for equipme parachutes, seats, technology equipment, the technology technology for technology production for for theuse for of the the developm of the combat production production combat production aircraft, of of aircraft, of technologycomponents, military general technology military f technology training military for distress for aircraft, aircraft the signalling the technology components,use use equipment, use for techno of of technology of the military combat for military production parachutes, helicopters, the aircraft of technology technology pro ground military for for equipment, utility the the technology helicopters, use useagent for of of detection the military ejector equipment, use training seats, components ofcomponents aircraft, technology for military for technology for chemical distress improvised for the agent signalling explosive the usedetection detection equipment, device use of equipment, equipment, techno detection of general equipment components equipment, military milita for forequipment, components utility the chemical equipment for helicopters use agent for military of detection the electronicexplosive chemical equipment use equipment, device agent training of equipment detection detection equipm military for equipment, equipment,detection electronic the military equipment equipment, equipment, use electronic for software equipment of equipment, the for for biologica software software use the the for for of use use the the chemical of of use use agentequipment, chemical test of military detection technology agent equipment equipment electronic equipment for detection for for equipment, train the equipment, chemicalof the software use software agent chemical use for of for detection agent of the biological the equipment, detection chemical usefor agent use i equipment agent of the detection of training detection b use equipment, chemical equipment, equipment, of technology agentequipment technology software improvised for detection for for for explosive the equipment the the the device use trainin use use usedetection detection of of of of equipment, equipment, chemical chemical equipment test test technology agent agent for equipment equipment for detectionfor detection the for for the equipment, test equipment, use chemical chemical use technolog equipment test of agent agent of for equipment chemical detectio detection military chemical for agent equipment electronic agent biological detection training equipment, detection agent equipment, equipment, technology equipment detection tec test for equipment, equipment the test for use equipment military of for electronic te chemical equipment a equipment, replica air tocannons, air software missiles, for replica the air use to of surface combat missiles, aircraft replica simulators, air technology to for surface the rockets, use replica of anti-ship combat missiles, aircraft replica simulators bombs, masks, anti-g/pressure suits, components for combat aircraft, components for military training aircraft, military flying helmets, military train Saudi Arabia biological agent detection equipment, chemical agent detection equipment, chemical agent detection equipment training equipment, c Saudi Arabia aerial target equipment, air to surface rocket launching equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne refuelling equi Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for ejector seats, components for military aircraft gr cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 132 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence t r the use of tary or the use of gy for the se of or the use of ogy for the use ent for laser get designator e use of test for air-to- components for issiles he use of air-to- issiles, missiles, ng helmets, for the use of air-to- r the use of military pment for the use of ipment, technology re for the use of test ce missiles control ns equipment, chnology for the use of on equipment, replica air- r military electronic ary training aircraft, missiles launching equipment, air-to- equipment, components for air-to-surfacesurface missiles missiles handling simulators, equipment, components componentscomponents for for for air-to-surface air-to-surface inert missiles missiles air-to-surface trainingmilitary launching missiles, equipment, navigation equipment, components components equipment, components for for components militaryair-to-surface equipment for missiles, communications for replica inert equipment, the air-to-surface air-to-surface components missiles, useto-surface missiles, for components of missiles, military military for air-to-surface software communications electronic m test for equipment, equipment, surface equipment the military missiles for use electronic handling air-to-surface of equipment, equipment, missiles,simulators, air-to-surface military software equi missiles, software navigati for software for the for thecommunications use the use equipment, of use of software air-to-surface of air-to-surface missiles for missiles air-to-surfacereplica launching the missiles training air-to-surface equipment, use control missiles, equipment, software of equipment, technology software forfor military software for for the the electronic the the use use equipment, use use of of software of ofsurface air-to-surface air-to-surface for air-to-surface inert missiles m missiles the missiles, air-to-surface simulators, handling use technology missiles, technology equipment,technology of for software for technology for military the fo the for the navigation use use the use equipment, ofnavigation of use of software air-to-surface equipment, air-to-surface of military f missiles missiles technology air-to-surface communications control training for missiles equipment, equ equipment, the launching technology technology use equipment, for for of technology the the replica for use use air-to-surface t of missiles, of military test inert electronic equipment air-to-surface equipment, for technology air-to-surface for missiles the use of mili surface missiles simulators, air-to-surface missiles training equipment, components for air-to-surface missiles, components for air-to-surfa technology for the use of military communications equipment,amp; test b, equipment b, for b1a, military b1b, communications b1c, equipment b1d, c, d, e, f, g, h & i equipment for optical targetequipment acquisition for equipment, optical software target forsoftware tracking the for equipment, use the technology of use foracquisition test of the equipment, equipment test use technology for equipment of for opticalsoftware for software the target for missile for use designator the jamming the of equipment, use equipment, useuse software software of technology of of for for test for test test the th equipment the equipment equipment usetest for use for for of equipment optical of laser missile test for target software range jamming equipment tracking optical for finder,range equipment, for equipment, target the technology finder, technology optical designator technology use fo test for target equipment, for of equipment designator the technology theequipment, test for equipment, use for use test equipment missile technology of the of equipment for jamming for test use test for optical equipment, the equipment of equipment optical targe test u for test for target equipment optical tracking equipment laser for target equipment for range optical acquisition optical finder, target equipment, technolo target acquisition technology tracking equipment, f equipment, test test equipment equipm for optical tar software to simulate the function of military communications equipment equipment, military aircraft pressurisedtechnology breathing for equipment, the military useof communications of military equipment, military electronic military aircraft equipment, electronic pressurised technology equipment, breathing for military equipment, the flyi technology use for of the military use flying of helmets military communications equipment, technol technology for the use of military training aircraft Saudi Arabia components for military communications equipment, military communications equipment, software for the use of military communicatio Saudi Arabia air-to-surface missiles, air-to-surface missiles control equipment, air-to-surface missiles handling equipment, air-to-surface Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia Goods specified by the following entries of the software EGTTPTA(C)O: for ML4b, the ML10a, use ML11, of ML14, test ML15b, equipment ML16, for ML17l, laser ML21a, range ML5a, finder, PL5017, software and for ML22 the a use & of test equipment for missile jamming equipment, softwa Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia software for military communications software equipment, for technology the for use the of use military of communications software equipment, for software military to communications simulate equipment the function of military communications equipment, te Saudi Arabia components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military training aircraft, technology for the production of milit Saudi Arabia components for military aircraft pressurised breathing equipment, components for military communications equipment, components fo cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 133 nt, onverters, s, software xygen aging the use of ared/thermal rocessing bat aircraft, logy for the mbat aircraft, craft pressure logy for the are for the use se of combat cations identification ts, components les, launching the use of ry flying , software for the chnology for the processing data recorders, g equipment, e of airborne onents for airborne ners, military electronic breathing equipment, craft ground equipment, nd equipment, technology for ary devices for initiating military communications ent, chaff equipment, components the use of military aero-engines software for the useuse of of combat combat aircraft, aircraft, technology test for equipment the for development combat of aircraft combat aircraft, technology for the production of combat aircraft, techno explosives, test equipment for military devices for initiating explosives for airborne refuelling equipment, components for attack alerting/warning equipment, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector sea for fire control equipment,imaging components equipment, for equipment imaging forcountermeasures countermeasures the equipment, equipment, operation military components of aero-engines, forequipment, military military military military aircraft aircraft aero-engines, flying in ground components helmets, confineduse equipment, for military areas, of military military infrared/thermal fire airborne aircraft infr imaging control refuelling pressureanti-g/pressure equipment, equipment, equipment, refuellers, suits, military guided technology military technology parachutes, missile for contai for software decoyingaircraft, the the for equipment, technology use use the im for of of use the aircraftuse attack of use cannons, of alerting/warning combat of technology fire equipment, aircraft, ejector for control technology te technology seats, the equipment, for for technology use technology the the for of for use use the aircrewrefuellers, the of of use protective technology use chaff military of masks, equipment, for of aero-engines, equipment technology technology the guidedhelmets, technology for for for use missile technology for the the of decoying for the operation u military equipment, the use of containers, technology use of military technology for of military aircraft for the military aircraft in the use infrared/thermal ground confined use of imaging equipment, areas, of imaging equipment, technology techno military countermeasures technology for electronic equipme for the equipment, the use technology use of for of military the military air use parachutes of milita equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, chaff, chaff equipment, comp surveillance equipment, components forequipment, airborne components targeting for equipment, aircraft componentscomponents missile for for protection aircraft ejector systems, cannons, seats,components components components components for for for for military aircraft aircraft imaging aero-engines, radars, militarycomponents countermeasures components components communi for equipment, for for military components military chaff image for equipment,equipment, aircraft intensifier laser components components head-up equipment, rangefinders, for for displays, components components co military componentsequipment, for for video for components military liquid recording military for infrared/thermal oxygen equipment, aircraft weapon imaging c equipment components pressurised control equipment, for for breathin systems, components the optical components for production targetequipment for military acquisition of for weapon video equipment, combat air-to-surface sights, p components aircraft, missiles, decoy formilitary imaging launching flares, recognition/ aircraft countermeasures equipment ejector ground equipment, for seats, equipment, laser bombs,military environmental military rangefinders, liquid flying test aircraft launching oxygen helmets, facilities head-up equipment converters, military forequipment, displays, for military image com military military air-to-air aero-engines, intensifier missi video aircraft military equipment, recording navigation aircraftelectronic military equipment, equipment, flight warfare infrared/thermal optical military equipment, imaging target aircraft software equipment, acquisitionof pressurised for military equipment, aircraft the parachutes, recognition/identification military use military equipment, communicationsuse of video software equipment, of airborne for software combat surveillance the for aircraft, equipment, us equipment the software software for use for for the of the the production aircraftfor use use of missile the of of combat protection use ejector airborne aircraft, systems, of seats, targeting software software equipment, launching software for for softw equipment for the the for the use use air-to-surface use of of missiles, of imaging aircraft software environmental countermeasures radars for test equipment, the facilities software use for for of combat the launching aircraft, use equipment software of for for laser bombs, rangefinder software for the use of liquid o Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia combat aircraft, components for components combat for aircraft, combat technology aircraft, for equipment the for production the of production combat of aircraft combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military air Saudi Arabia components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft grou Saudi Arabia components for military devices for initiating explosives, equipment for the use of military devices for initiating explosives, milit Saudi Arabia airborne refuelling equipment, aircraft cannons, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equipm Saudi Arabia airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 134 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence or the use ary aero- f optical borne e for the use craft, of weapon raft, technology the use of aircraft, f aircraft arachutes, ilitary utility aft, ning o-surface use of software f equipment for gy for the use oying/detection/ infrared/thermal aft navigation are for the use itary aircraft ology for the tility helicopters hutes, signal flares, ile decoying/detection/ of military training aircraft, nd equipment, technology for jamming equipment, components forhelicopters, military general aircraft military navigation aircraftsoftware equipment, components, for components military the for aircraft use militarythe ground of utility use equipment, military helicopters, of military utility equipment military aircraftjamming helicopters, for utility navigation equipment, technology the helicopters, equipment, technology for use technology military for the offor for parac the use m the the use of use use of aircraft of offor military military military general the aircraft communications parachutes, military use ground equipment, technology aircraft of equipment, technology for components, military technology for the technology utility for the use for helicopters, the use of the technology use o military use for of utility of the military helicopters, guided use aircraft technology missile of navigation for dec test equipment, the equipment use for of military signal utility flares, helicopters, technology test for equipment the for military u the use of military aero-engines converters, software for the use of military aero-engines, software for the use of military aircraft flight data recorders, software for the use of mil ground equipment, software forof the military use aircraft of pressurisedimaging military breathing equipment, aircraft equipment, software head-up software for displays,of for the software optical the use for target use of the acquisition ofsoftware military use equipment, military for video of software image the processing military for intensifier use equipment, aircraft thecontrol equipment, of software navigation use systems, software test for equipment, of software for equipment the softw optical for thesurveillance for use target the use equipment, military of tracking use of technology aero-engines, military equipment, of military for software video softwaremilitary weapon the for recording for communications sights, use the equipment, the equipment, technology of use softwar use technology foruse airborne of of for the of targeting training test the use equipment, aircrew equipment equipment use of technology protective for fortechnology of airborne for masks, combat combat for aircraft electronic the technology aircraft, the missile warfare use for software use protection equipment, oftechnology the for of systems, technology aircraft for use the decoy technology for cannons, the of use flares, for the technology use anti-g/pressureof technology the use for of suits, laser for use of the equipment technology rangefinders, the of air use for for technology use aircraft o missiles, the the for of radars, technology production use the ejector techn for of of use seats, the combat chaff,engines, of technology technology use aircraft, technology launching for for of technology for equipment the the launching for the for use use equipment thethe use air-to-air of of for use use missiles, of environmental combat bombs, of of technology military test air technology imaging military for aircraft facilitiesequipment, for countermeasures aircraft the flight for technology the equipment, ground use data combat for use technology equipment, of recorders, airc the of f of technology launching technology use liquid military for equipment for of oxygen image the for military converters, intensifier use air-t technology aircraft technology equipment, of for pressurised for technology military the breathing the for aircraft use equipment, usetarget the head-up of technology of acquisition use displays, military for milit equipment, of technology video the technology military fortechnology processing use for infrared/thermal the for equipment, of the imaging use the technology military use equipment, of use for flying ofweapon technology military of the helmets, optical control for aircr test use technolo target systems, the equipment of tracking technology useequipment for military equipment, for of for military video technology the military combat aero-engines, recording for use p aircraft, technology equipment, the of weapon for technology use weapon control the for of sights, systems, use the test test weapon of use equipment equipment sights training o for for equipment combat combat for aircr aircraft, combattechnology test aircraft, for equipment technology the for for use military of aero-engines, military trai training aircraft, test equipment for military training aircraft Saudi Arabia aircraft military communications equipment, components for aircraft military communications equipment, components for guided miss Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi technology Arabia for theSaudi development components Arabia of for air-to-surface military missiles,Saudi training technology Arabia aircraft, for equipment the for useSaudi the of components Arabia production air-to-surface for of missiles improvised military explosive training general device aircraft, military disposal technology aircraft equipment, for components improvised components the explosive for production device all-wheel disposal drive equipment components vehicles for with military ballistic aero-engines, protection equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft grou cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 135 quipment aser he use of uipment for ircraft, nents for sile decoying res for military or the , software for ting apon control roduction of mponents for roduction of ary aircraft ment for air-to- or the ion systems, software for the software for the isplays, software for military arning ectromagnetic sing equipment, or the production ipment for bombs, tary parametric oftware for the ve masks, software n technology for ession fittings for itary flying helmets, aft head-up displays, ipment, chaff, chaff military communications equipment, aircraft missile protection systems, aircraft radars, aircrew protective masks, anti-g/pressure suits, attack alerting/warning equ equipment, components for airborneequipment, electronic components warfare for equipment, aircraftcomponents components cannons, for for components aircraft airborne for radars, surveillanceequipment, aircraft components equipment, components military for components for communications aircrew for chaff equipment,equipment, protective airborne equipment, components components masks, targe components for for components for aircraft equipment for combatfor missile for anti-g/pressure aircraft, the protect the suits, components use production components for ofrangefinders, of for ejector ejector components combat attack seats, seats, for aircraft, alerting/w components components laser components foraircraft for warning for electronic head-up guided detectors, equipment countermeasu displays, missile components for components decoyingimage for the for equipment, intensifier liquid use military components equipment, oxygen of aircraft for components converters, combatmilitary pressurised imaging for components aircraft, video breathing countermeasures military for components processing equipment, equipment, imaging military for equipment, components componentsrecognition/identification radar aero-engines, e components for for equipment, equipment, components for military l components components military flying for forsystems, video helmets, sensor military components recording components data infrared/thermal for equipment, recorders, imaging weapon componentsequipment components equipment, sights, for for for compo decoy optical the test flares, target use equipment acquisitionequipment, ejector of for equipment, guided seats, combat combat co missile electronic aircraft, aircraft, detection countermeasuresair equipment components equipment, equipment, missiles, for for imaging equipment launching the we countermeasures for equipment usereflectivity equipment, the for of for laser production air-to-surface ejector military rangefinders, of missiles, seats, use, laser combat launchingmilitary goods military warning a equipment aircraft treated aero-engines, detectors, for navigation for military launching bombs, equipment, signaturemilitary aircraft equip liquid military suppression image flight oxygen aircraft for intensifier data converters, pressurised military equipment, recorders, materialstechnical breathing use, military military for databases, equipment, guided imaging aircraft reduced military military mis radar ground el video containers,combat equipment, equipment, processing military aircraft, military military equipment, field recognition/identification infrared/thermal aircr military generators, equipment, imagingmilitary video mil sensor equipment, use, recording data military signature equipment, recorders, parachutes, suppression opticalof signature mili treatments target airborne suppression acquisition for surveillance coatings equipment, military equipment, for productio production use, software military of software for use, aircraft for the signature missile thefor production suppr protection production the of systems, of production airborne software airborne of targetingcombat for electronic equipment, anti-g/pressure aircraft, the warfare software suits, software production equipment, for software for of software theproduction for the aircraft f production of the production radars, of combat production of software aircraft aircraft, ofejector decoy for cannons, software chaff, seats, flares, the software for software software production for the for for of thethe production the the aircrew production production of production production protecti of of equipment of of chaff imaging forair-to-air guided ejector equipment, countermeasures the missiles, missile seats, software equipment, use software decoying software for software of for equipment, for thesoftware for combat the software the p for the aircraft, production for production the production software of the of production of for launchingflight production equipment of laser the equipment data of f liquid rangefinders, production for recorders, guided oxygen software of air-to-surface software missilefor converters, for equipment missiles, for detection the software the for software the equipment production for production t for production of the of theproduction of military production launching production of military aircraft of eq of military aircraft navigation military launching containers, groundproduction equipment, aero-engines, equ software equipment, of software software for software military for for the for image the themilitary production the intensifier production production parachutes, of production equipment, of of software military of software military milit for field militarysoftware for aircraft the generators, aircraft for the pressurised production software head-up the production breathing of for d production of equipment,production milit Saudi Arabia airborne electronic warfare equipment, airborne surveillance equipment, airborne targeting equipment, aircraft cannons, aircraft cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 136 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence se of laser uipment, signature e for the for reduced use of chnology for e use of etection r the quipment for production of eapon control aircraft e use of rocessing aft missile equipment for uipment, ssiles, software ogy for the use f chaff, r the production s, technology oftware for the d/thermal y aero-engines, dars, technology ead-up displays, ft radars, ion of signature ipment, e for the use of ircraft ground logy for the hnology for the gnature the production of signature suppression treatments for military use, software for the production of test equipment for combat aircraft, software fo of test equipment forsystems, military software aero-engines, for software thesurveillance for production equipment, the of software production weapon for ofprotection sights, the unfinished systems, software use products software for of for for theuse airborne combat the use of targeting aircraft, use of equipment, combat software of airborne software aircraft, forequipment aircraft electronic for software the for radars, warfare the for production the software equipment, use the of use for software ofequipment, use w of the for aircraft software of combat use the cannons, for ejector aircraft, of use software the seats,rangefinders, software anti-g/pressure of for use software software for suits, airborn the of for for the software use guided the the use for offor missile use use of the aircr the detection of of equipment use use equipment, equipment launching for of of software foruse equipment the chaff launching for the equipment, of for use equipment the production s military air-to-air of for use of missiles, aircraft ejectorsoftware bombs, of combat software flight seats, for software imaging aircraft, for data software the for countermeasures software the recorders, for use the equipment, for usemilitary software the of use software the of field for use military of for launching generators, the of aircraft liquid the equipment software use guidedsoftware navigation oxygen u for for of missile for equipment, converters, air-to-surface the military decoying the software software mi use aircraft use for forequipment, of ground of the the software military equipment, military use use for image software parachutes, of of the intensifier forrecognition/identification software military military use equipment, the equipment, for aircraft aero-engines, of software use software the pressurised softwar military for of for use breathingsoftware video the military the of equipment, for recording use aircraft use military softwar the equipment, of h of parametric use software militarytechnology test technical of for infrared/thermal for equipment databases, weapon the imaging the for software control use eq production combat formilitary systems, of of aircraft, the communications software optical airborne software use equipment, for target targeting for of acquisition technology the equipment,technology the military equipment, for use technology for use video software the of for the of p for production weapon the production test th technology of sights, production of equipment for aircraft technology of aircrew for the missile for aircraft protective militar production protection the cannons,the masks, of systems, production technology production technology chaff technology of for of for equipment, for airborne the ejector the technologythe the electronic production seats, production for use production warfare of technology of the of of eq for anti-g/pressure production combat aircra suppression the suits, of aircraft, for production technology combat technology military of for aircraft, for use, equipment the technologyequipment, the technology for production for technology production for the o the for of the production production the equipmentproduction production of of production for of of combat decoy of the launching guided aircraft, flares, imaging use equipment missile technology te production countermeasures of for decoying for of equipment, ejector air-to-air equipment, the launching technology seats, missiles, technology production equipment for technology technologyelectromagnetic for of for the for for reflectivity the e bombs, production the the for production technology of production production military ofequipment, for laser of of use, guided technology the rangefinders, goods launching technology missile for production technology treated equipment for d the of fo for fortechnology the production liquid air-to-surface for production of oxygen missiles, the of military converters, tec production militaryproduction aircraft technology of aero-engines, of head-up for military technology military displays, the aircraft for field technology productionimaging pressurised the generators, for of equipment, breathing production technology the materials technology equipment, of for production for technology militaryfor the of the for a the production military production the production of aircraft of production of military navigationoptical military of military flying equ target parachutes, military video helmets, acquisition technology containers, processing technology equipment, for techno suppression equipment, for technology the coatings technology the for production for for production the of military the of productionsuppression military use, production military of treatments parametric technology of infrare recognition/identification for technical for military equipment, military database military the video technology use, ae cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 137 bat ejector onents duced laser pment for t, , test pment, of military nt for the use y video ment for chnology for for the use of itary training se of military ce missiles, nt, technology hnology for the quipment, ology for the use equipment, pment for airborne the use of combat aircraft, ctronic warfare equipment, use of aircrew protective masks, technology for the use of anti-g/pressure suits, technology for the use of chaff, technology for the use of chaff equi technology for the usethe of production combat of aircraft, combatseats, technology aircraft, technology for technology for the for the usetechnology the use of for use of decoy the of goods flares, use equipmentrangefinders, treated technology of for technology for for guided the for signature the missile use the suppression usetechnology detection of use for of for equipment, combat of military ejector the technology aircraft, launching use, seats, use for technologyelectromagnetic equipment technology technology of the for reflectivity for for for launching use the for air-to-air the the equipment of use missiles, military use usetechnology for imaging of technology use, of of for bombs, countermeasures equipment for technology guided equi the technology equipment, for the for missile use for technology the useaircraft the decoying of the for use of pressurised use equipmen military use the of launching breathing of aircraft of use equipment equipment, militaryof head-up liquid of for technology aero-engines, military displays, oxygen air-to-surfa for technology flying technology converters, the for helmets, for technologythe use the technology the for use of use for use the of military of the of use military containers, militaryrecording use military of parametric technology aircraft equipment, of aircraft materials technical for ground technology military navigation for databases, the e for infrared/thermal equipment, re for technology use the imaging technology the for of use equipment, for use the military of technology the of use fieldsignature optical for u signature of generators, suppression target the suppression military techn acquisition treatments use coatings video equipment, for ofmilitary for processing technology military military aero-engines, military equipment, for use, parachutes, technology use, technology the technology te for technology for useequipment for the for the of for the use the use recognition/identification military use of use of equipme aero-engines, of weapon of militar unfinished test control signature products equipment systems, suppression for for technology fittings combat combatmilitary for for aircraft, aircraft, aircraft the military weapon technology ground use use, control for equipment, of technology use systems, the technology weapon of weapon use for sights, combat sights of the test aircraft, testaircraft, production equipment technology equip technology of for for for combat combat the the aircraft, aircraft use use technology of of for equipment military the for aero-engines, production the technology of production for military of the aero-engines, combat use tec aircraft, of technology military for aircraft the ground use equipment of equipment for the use of com components for equipment for the use of aerial target equipment, components for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment, comp for equipment for thecomponents use for of test military equipmentof training for aerial aircraft, airborne target components electronic equipment, foraircraft, warfare equipment military technology equipment, for training for components the aircraft, the for usetraining components use training of aircraft, for of airborne airborne technology test aerial electronic electronic for equipmentelectronic target warfare warfare the for equipment, warfare equipment, equipment, use aerial technology equipment, equipme equipment of target for training for training the airborne the airborne use electronic use electronic of warfare of warfare airborne equipment military equipment, electronic training test warfare aircraft, equipment equipment, mil for technology aerial for target the equipment, use test equi Saudi Arabia components for combatSaudi aircraft, Arabia components forSaudi military Arabia aero-engines, equipment for the production of combat aircraft, components equipment for for combat aircraft, aerial general target military equipment, aircraft airborne components electronic warfare equipment, components for aerial target equipment, components for airborne ele cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 138 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence e f training ns ications f military dars, lators, ilitary t, anker aircraft, , test ngines, r the use of or the use of ry training easures ing aircraft, are equipment, for the raft, components test equipment for tion equipment, oduction of landing ology for the use of tary improvised ature suppression for ry devices for initiating onents for military ilitary systems, military ection systems, technology pment, components for s for airborne electronic for military video recordingequipment equipment, for components the for useequipment training of for equipment aerial the for target use electronic equipment,equipment of countermeasures equipment for military equipment, for electronic aircraft components the countermeasuresaircraft, navigation for use equipment, military equipment, weapons of equipment video equipment simu airborne for recording for electronictechnology the equipment, the warfare for use technology use equipment, the of for of equipment use weaponstechnology the military for of simulators, for use video the aircraft military the of recording use radars, aircraft use aerial equipment, oftechnology technology navigation of target equipment aircraft for for equipment, equipment, military for ra the the milita technology video the use use forequipment recording use of of the for equipment, o weapons military use aircraft technology simulators, aircraft of radars, fortraining test navigation airborne test the equipment equipment equipment, electronic equipment use for for technology warf for of electronic aerial forequipment, military training countermeasures target the weapons aircraft equipment equipment, equipment, use simulators navigation for test test of equipment, electronic equipment equipment military test countermeasures for for train equipment equipmen airborne weapons for electronic simulators, militaryexplosives, warfare training video components equipment equipment recording for for equipment, military electronicdevices firing counterm for sets, initiating components explosives,explosive for explosive device military ordnance disposal improvised disposal equipment, explosive equipment, test device military equipment disposal devices for equipment, for military equipmenttransport initiating devices for aircraft, explosives, for the components military initiating use for firingcraft, explosives of military sets, equipment m utility mili for aircraft, theproduction equipment production of for of military the military utility productionmilitary search aircraft, of search and equipment airborne and rescue for refuelling rescue aircraft,airborne the equipment, aircraft, equipment refuelling use equipment equipment for equipment, of for for the technology airborne themilitary the production for refuelling pr transport use of the equipment, aircraft, of military use equipment technology military transport of for for transport aircraft, landing the the aircraft, equipment craft, use use equipment technology of of for for landing military the the craft, utility use use equipment aircraft of of f military military utility search aircraft, and techn rescue aircraft, technology fo warfare equipment, components for aircraft radars, components for military aircraft navigation equipment, components for military training airc helmets aircraft radars, components for combat aircraft, components for ejector seats, components for ground based radars, components for military aero-e components for military aircraftcomponents head-down for displays, military components cameras,general for components military military for aircraft aircraft military components, head-up communications military displays, equipment, aircraft components components navigation for for equipment, militaryfor military military aircraft test transport communications naviga equipment aircraft, equipment for components aircraft for missile t protection systems, test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems military use, military communicationscommunications equipment, equipment, simulators software for forequipment, military the technology communications use for equipment, of the softwaresuppression military use for for communications of the military equipment, equipment use use, softwareequipment for of technology for the equipment for the use for the use of the use of military use of simulators communications o military for equipment, communications military technology equipment, communicatio for technology the for use the of use goods of treated simulators for for signatur military commun Saudi Arabia accessories for explosiveSaudi ordnance Arabia disposal equipment, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, components for milita components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for landing craft, components for military searchSaudi and Arabia rescue aircraft, comp Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft ballistic shields, body armour, bomb suits, civil body armour, components for body armour, constructions for ballistic protection of m Saudi Arabia aerial target equipment, airborne electronic warfare equipment, aircraft radars, components for aerial target equipment, component Saudi Arabia airborne refuelling equipment, components for airborne refuelling equipment, components for aircraft military communications equi Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia components for test equipment for aircraft missile protection components systems, for software military for communications the equipment, use equipment of for test the equipment use for of aircraft military missile communications prot equipment, goods treated for sign cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 139 eapon s nents for n night ry aircraft components nverters, ipment, nt, rgeting et designator corders, tic piloting coy flares, pment for air- for military itary training , components y systems, test , components for res equipment, t in confined bing computers, essories for ories for military onents for military optical target eting equipment, r sensor data igence software, nts for weapon sights, uipment for military ries for imaging counter- e use of ballistic test s, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for thetechnology use for of the equipment use for of the military use transport of aircraft military transport aircraft,equipment technology for for military the helmets use of military aircraft ground equipme equipment, test equipment for armoured plate, test equipment for body armour, test equipment for constructions for ballistic protection of militar equipment for the usesights, of technology weapon for sights, thesights, gun use technology laying of for equipment, gun the military laying use image equipment, of intensifier technology weapon equipment, for sight technology the mounts, for use technology the of for use military the of image use equipment intensifier of for equipment, weapon the technology sights, use for weapon of the night w use sights, of weapon weapo sight mounts, weapon sight software for the usecommunications of control command and and intelligence control equipment vehicles, technology for the use of command and control vehicles, technology for the use of command countermeasures equipment, accessories foraccessories imaging for countermeasure/counter-countermeasures military equipment, cameras, accessoriesinfrared/thermal accessories for imaging for imaging equipment, military countermeasu accessoriesmilitary image for video intensifier military recording equipment, photographic equipment, accessoriesdesignator equipment, accessories for equipment, accessories for military accessories for night imaging for militaryrecorders, vision radar optical video accessories goggles, equipment, target processing for accessories access surveillance equipment, sensor for equipment,training acc integration optical accessories aircraft, equipment, target for accessories acquisition accessories optical for equipment,aircraft for target weapon accessories radars, simulators tracking control for aircrew for equipment, systems, protective military accessorieschaff airborne masks, training fo equipment, electronic anti-g/pressure aircraft, components warfare suits, accessories for equipment,equipment, automatic for airborne airborne components piloting training electronic refuelling for systems eq warfare equipment, aircraft for equipment,systems airborne radars, parachuted components for targ components loads, for parachuted for bomb airborne loads,in aircrew handling refuelling components confined protective equipment, equipment, for areas, masks, bom components bombing components components forfor computers, for for airborne film components equipment anti-g/pressure ta processing for for suits, equipment, ejectorimaging the components components seats, countermeasure/counter-countermeasures use for for components equipment, of automa helmet for components militarycomponents mounted equipment for aero-engines, for display for imaging components military equipment, the countermeasures for aero-engines, components operation equipment,military equipment components for of components aircraft for for imaging milita for pressure the military counter-countermeasures liquid refuellers, use equipment,containers, aircraft oxygen components of compo components ground co for military for equipment, military training military componentscomponents aircraft aircraft, flying for for pressurised helmets, military military breathing components aircraft infrared/thermal equipment,for for navigation imaging components military military equipment equipment, for photographic image components military equipment, intensifiervideo for cameras, components equipment, recording military comp for components equipment, parachutes, military for components componentsequipment, training military for for components aircraft, imaging night military for components radar vision parachutist optical for equ components goggles, equipment target military for components surveillance video sensor for equipment, processing integration optical componentsaircraft, equipment, equipment, target for components components acquisition components optical for equipment, for target weapon componentscontrol simulators tracking control for equipment for equipment, systems, optical for military components control targ fragmentation training forareas, equipment rockets, aircraft, sensor equipment for control components data for air-to-air equipment for re missiles, the for training control use practice equipment equipment of bombs, for for military ejector mil bombs, aero-engines, seats, control equipment equipment equipment for for for the the de use operation of of military military training aircraf aircraft, film processing equipment, handling equi Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia ballistic testSaudi equipment, Arabia components for ballistic test equipment, software for the components use for of military ballistic aero-engines, components test general for equipment, military gun technology aircraft laying for components equipment, th components for military image intensifier equipment, components for weapon night sights, compone Saudi Arabia components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft component Saudi Arabia command and control vehicles, command communications control and intelligence equipment, command communications control and intell Saudi Arabia accessories for airborne targeting equipment, accessories for bombing computers, accessories for film processing equipment, accesso cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 140 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence ii] re- ust 4] RDX ng pable of at ols, pistols, res, L4 and all ent for arios, es equipment, ft, test d propellant on equipment ry aircraft ground ms, software for , optical target imaging equipment, aircraft, weapon or tanker aircraft ng aircraft, software o processing stols, components for mbat vehicles, military military cameras, y for the use of combat litary training aircraft, the use of air-to-surface to-air missiles, handling equipment for bombs, handling equipment for decoy flares, handling equipment for fragmentation rockets, handling equipm practice bombs, helmet mountedimaging display countermeasures equipment, equipment, imaging launchinglaunching counter-countermeasures equipment equipment, equipment for imaging for air-to-air countermeasure/counter-countermeasur fragmentation missiles,equipment, rockets, launching military launching equipment aircraft equipment for navigationmilitary for bombs, equipment, containers, practice launching military military bombs, equipment aircraft flying liquid formilitary pressure helmets, oxygen decoy parachutes, refuellers, military converters, fla military military image military parachutist aircraftequipment, intensifier aero-engines, equipment, pressurised military equipment, milita military breathing video military parametric equipment, recording imagingsurveillance technical equipment, radar equipment, databases, night equipment, optical military vision military target photographicenabling goggles, infrared/thermal tracking equipment, equipment optical equipment, military to target sensor vide acquisition function datathe equipment, as recorders, modelling optical military sensor of target training integration military designatorsoftware aircraft, equipment, operation equipment for software simulators scenarios, the for for software simulation military militaryequipment for of training traini for the weapon aircraft, military modelling systems, software training ofcontrol software for aircraft, weapon systems for the test systems, the evaluation models software use of for for of weapon the the military syste development simulation training of of aircraft, military military technology training operation for aircraft, scen the training use equipment of for military military training training aircra goods related to landmines;or [3] HMX Man explosive Portable materialspecified Air or by Defence explosive ML7a Systems material or MANPADSRockets containing and ML7b and RDX test and Unmanned or equipment/production associated Airborne HMX; equipment/software/technologyleast technology; Vehicle [5] therefor a [6] systems Chemicals [ 300km Complete including specified range; rocket Cruiseentry in [7] systems Missile vehicles Schedule Complete including Systems/Remote and 1 subsystems Ballistic Piloted equipment ofrocket designed Missile Vehicles/Target Drones/Reconnaissance designed the engines or Systems/Space Drones or Chemical having modified Launch ca modified Weapons a for Vehicles/Soundi Conventionvectors therefor total the and control and impulse rocket systems; electronics capacity systems [vi] equipmentfor of specified weapon specially the 1.1MNs; in or designed goods [iv] 6 warhead for specified guidance above safing/arming/fuzing/firing re-entry in sets as mechanisms; vehicles; 6/7 capable follows: [8] [iii] above; of [i] Specially solid [9] achieving individual designed or Software system rocket production liqui specially accuracy stages; facilities designed of [ or of 3.33% producti modified or for less the of use the of range; goods [v] specified thr in 6/7/8 above pistols, components for rifles,rifles, components semi-automatic for pistols, semi-automatic submachine pistols, guns, components training for small submachine armscomponents guns, ammunition for general military purpose transport machine aircraft, guns, components machine for pist military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components f missiles aircraft, test equipment for combat aircraft combat vehicles, technology for military combat vehicles Saudi Arabia goods specified by Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Export Control Order 2008 excluding: [1] Goods specified by PL5001; [2] Landmines specified by M Saudi Arabia assault rifles, blank ammunition, components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for machine pi Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for mi Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for test equipment for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technolog Saudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi ArabiaSaudi components Arabia for military improvised components explosive for device military disposal radars, equipment, components military military for software, improvised military technology explosive aero-engines, for device components components military disposal for for radars equipment military military combat support vehicles, aircraft equipment for the production of military combat vehicles, equipment for the use of military co Saudi ArabiaSaudi Arabia inertial equipment technology for the development of air-to-surface missiles, technology for the production of air-to-surface missiles, technology for cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 141 eof for the use of ry electronic craft, technology ection/disposal equipment for the y for military aircraft r military aircrew nents for military radars, ipment, technology for parachutes and equipment quipment, munitions/ nd equipment, technology for combat aircraft, technology forequipment equipment for the use of combat aircraft, technology for military aircraft ground equipment, technology for milita military aero-engines ordnance detection/disposal equipment, software for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, technology for munitions/ordnance det components for military training equipment breathing equipment, components foruse military of helicopters, combat components aircraft,military for equipment aircrew military for breathing support the equipment, aircraft,military use equipment components training of for for aircraft, combat the military general helicopters,ground use training military equipment equipment, of aircraft, aircraft for technology military components, the for helicopters,for technology use military equipment military for of aircrew for training combat military breathing the aircraft aircraft, aircraft equipment, use technology ground technology of for equipment, for military combat equipment military support helicopters, for helicopters, aircraft, technolog the technology equipment us for military support air equipment Saudi Arabia components for ejector seats, components for military parachutes and equipment, components for military training aircraft, military Saudi Arabia components for munitions/ordnance detection/disposal equipment, equipment for the use of munitions/ordnance detection/disposal e Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military aircraft ground equipment, military electronic equ Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aircraft groundSaudi equipment, Arabia components fo components for military aero-engines, equipment for the use of military aero-engines, military aero-engines, military aircraft grou Saudi Arabia components for combat aircraft, components for military guidance/navigation equipment, components for military helicopters, compo cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 142 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

Letter to Baroness Ashton, High Representative of the European Union, European Commission from Mark Prisk MP, Minister of State for Business and Enterprise, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills

EXPORT OF DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF LETHAL INJECTION

I am writing to inform you of the UK’s intention to introduce a control on the export of pancuronium bromide, potassium chloride and sodium pentobarbital to the US. This will complement our existing control on sodium thiopental. The UK Government calls on the Commission to propose an amendment to the Export of Torture Goods Regulation to apply this control on an EU basis.

As you may know, the UK introduced a control on the export of sodium thiopental to the US in November last year. This followed the revelation that correctional authorities in the US had been sourcing this drug from the UK to overcome a shortage in the US.

The UK Government took the view, consistently with our stated policy of opposition to the death penalty, that we wished to prevent this trade. We also established that this measure would not hamper legitimate trade in sodium thiopental for medical purposes between the UK and the US: it was clear that there was none, nor any prospect of any. We took a deliberate decision to restrict the scope of this control only to exports to the US: sodium thiopental continues to be used as an anaesthetic in medical procedures in a number of developing countries, so we did not wish to disrupt the supply of this essential medicine by placing any kind of restriction on exports from the UK.

We have now, at the request of the campaigning group Reprieve, considered the case for extending this export control to cover the other drugs used in the US lethal injection process. Most US states that carry out lethal injection use a three drug cocktail consisting of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Furthermore, the state of Oklahoma has carried out one execution using the veterinary anaesthetic sodium pentobarbital, and we understand that more states are considering changing their execution protocols to allow the use of this drug as an alternative to sodium thiopental.

Following a consultation with interested UK parties, we have again determined that a control on the export of these drugs to the US would not hamper legitimate medical trade. I have therefore decided to extend our control to cover these three additional drugs, and will shortly be laying the necessary Order before Parliament.

The UK Government has felt obliged to act at national level because of the urgency of the situation. However, we recognise the desirability of action at EU level to ensure that the playing field is level and that the controls imposed by individual Member States cannot be circumvented by the movement of these drugs within the Single Market. Our preferred solution would be for an EU-wide control on the export of these drugs to the US (and indeed to any other country that practises lethal injection) to be incorporated into Regulation 1236/2005 (the “Torture Goods Regulation”).

My officials stand ready to discuss this with yours. We would also welcome the opportunity to explore the possibility of a horizontal “end use control” on the export of goods for the purpose of torture or capital punishment. 12 April 2011

Note: For the completion of the evidence Baroness Ashton’s reply to Mark Prisk’s letter (above) is included below.

Letter from Baroness Ashton, High Representative of the European Union, to Mark Prisk MP, Minister of State for Business and Enterprise, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills

Dear Minister,

Thank you for your letter. I would like to apologise for the delay in answering you but there have been a few developments on the issue.

In your letter, you suggested that an EU-wide control on the exports of pharmaceuticals used in lethal injections to the US and other countries applying the death penalty through lethal injection should be incorporated into Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005.

I would like to confirm that the Commission has started the process of reviewing the content of the Annexes of Regulation 1236/2005, which is expected to be finalized by the end of the year. Further examination of the need to review the scope of the Regulation will be undertaken shortly. 14 September 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 143

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

It was good to see you again at the Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on 7 September, and to resume our debate about the highly important issue of UK export controls in the context of the “Arab Spring”.

You raised the legitimate concern that some controlled equipment, exported from the UK to Libya before February this year, may have been used by Qadhafi’s forces for internal repression. In the light of your comments I have taken another very careful look at my Written Ministerial Statement of 18 July.

My statement reflected the conclusions of the FCO Review of Export Controls Policy in regard to the whole MENA region. This was intended as an update to Parliament before the summer recess. When I provide a fuller report of the outcome of the Review I will give more detail and address the points you have made over the last several months.

The review found that, despite the UK’s position as the world’s second largest arms exporter and the widespread unrest and conflict of the Arab Spring, information suggesting misuse of controlled military goods from the UK was limited to uncorroborated reports of the use of UK-origin crowd control equipped vehicles in Libya. Our Ambassador in. Tripoli reported at the time that the Post had only one report of possible use of a British-supplied riot control vehicle. Contacts told Post that regular police units, who were the principal recipients of UK equipment and training, were being held in reserve while other internal security forces were deployed. We subsequently closed our Embassy in Tripoli, making further investigation during the conflict impossible.

All relevant FCO officials and Ministers were involved in the Review, which took account of the views of other Whitehall Departments as well as different parts of the FCO. The review also considered reporting from our Posts in the region, as well as media and NGO accounts.

As you have rightly pointed out it is difficult to gather firm information on the ground and some pieces of equipment, by size and end-use, are clearly more difficult to identify than others. Licenses granted to Libya in earlier circumstances included such items as small arms and ammunition, as well as surveillance and military communications equipment. We cannot prove that these UK exports were not used by either side in the conflict, and I accept that there is a risk that some were. But it remains the case, as I said in my statement, that we have no evidence that any UK supplied equipment was actually used, and therefore that statement remains accurate.

Monitoring of end-use is an important element of the overall system, and one of the issues I know you and the Committees have raised consistently. One of the FCO Review outcomes under consideration is enhanced end-use monitoring through our network of Posts, particularly in high risk countries. This may improve our information, but there will always be practical and resource limitations.

I greatly appreciate the good work you and your colleagues on the. Committees on Arms Export Controls are doing. It is vital that we maintain robust and transparent export controls, while at the same time supporting the British defence and security industry. It remains my intention to announce improvements to our export control policy once I have concluded discussions with Government colleagues, particularly the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, who has responsibility for our export licensing system and operations. I look forward to further discussion, and it is my intention to give oral evidence to your Committees on Arms Export Controls at the Annual Inquiry early in the New Year.

I am copying this letter to Richard Ottaway. 1 October 2011

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

The Committees on Arms Export Controls are considering the Government’s report United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2610 (HC 1402) and have agreed questions relating to that report, as set out in Annex A to this letter.

I would be grateful to receive the Government’s answers to these questions no later than 30 November.

The Committees will be making this letter and the Annex public.

I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Secretary of State for International Development and the Secretary of State for Defence. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Annex A QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE GOVERNMENT’S REPORT—UNITED KINGDOM STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS ANNUAL REPORT 2010—HC1042 The paragraph numbers follow those in the Government’s report.

Ministerial Foreword 2nd Paragraph On what grounds does the Government consider that its commitment to increasing arms exports on the one hand, and promoting democracy and human rights abroad on the other, are mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually conflicting, agendas?

Ministerial Foreword 5th Paragraph In what specific ways has the present Government extended transparency on arms exports data compared with the previous Government?

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.1 Does the Government accept that the scale and content of its revocation of extant arms export licences to countries in North Africa and the Middle East as detailed in Annex 1 of the Government’s Response (Cm 8079) to the Committees on Arms Export Controls Report published on 5 April 2011 represent a serious failure by BIS, FCO, MOD, DFID, HMRC and UKBA to fulfil the first Guiding Principle of the Export Licensing Community’s Joint Mission Statement namely: “We shall implement effectively the UK’s framework of strategic export controls so as to ensure that sensitive goods and technology are kept out of the wrong hands?”.

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.2 In respect of each of the extant arms export licences to countries in North Africa and the Middle East which have now been revoked, as detailed in Annex 1 of Cm. 8079, which were, and which were not: (a) Referred to the FCO overseas post concerned for assessment against Criteria 2 and 3 before the licence was granted? (b) Referred to FCO Ministers for a final recommendation, and what was their recommendation in each case and the date of their recommendation?

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.2 (a) Which strategic export licence applications, and for what goods and to which countries, were referred to DFID in 2010 for that Department’s specific expertise and advice? Of those applications, which were granted and which were refused, and which were granted contrary to the advice of DFID? (b) Which of the arms export licence applications to countries in North Africa and the Middle East which have now been revoked, as detailed in Annex 1 of Cm. 8079, were referred to DFID for that Department’s specific expertise and advice, and what was DFID’s advice in each case?

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.3 What steps will the Government take to inform the Committees on Arms Export Controls of any amendments to strategic exports control legislation it has decided to make by way of secondary legislation?

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.3 Will the Government’s relaxation of the UK’s national controls on explosives-related items to bring them into line with EU controls increase the risk that such items exported from the UK may be used for internal repression or against the Armed Forces of the UK or those of other NATO and EU member countries?

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.3 (a) Is the Order introducing a control on the export to the USA of sodium thiopental used in some states in the USA in the process of execution by lethal injection going to be extended beyond the maximum of 12 months? (b) What has been the European Commission’s response to the British Government’s request that sodium thiopental be added to the items in the EU’s so-called “torture Regulation” for which export authorisation is required? cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.3 On 27 October 2010 a new EU Regulation imposing restrictive measures against Iran came into force— Council Regulation (EU) 961/2010 of 25 October 2010. Will the UK Government be introducing any new or amending any existing legislation in order to comply with the Regulation?

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.3 On 9 November 2010 Mark Prisk MP, Minister for Business, announced to Parliament that the Government would only issue licences for Annex IV items in the most exceptional circumstances. What could those circumstances be?

Section 1—Domestic Policy Paragraph 1.4 (a) The Government has made the policy change that from 1 July 2010 all applications for Standard Individual Export Licenses (SIELs) must contain a declaration from the end-user that the goods will not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred to a destination subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargo where to do so would be a breach of the terms of that embargo. Why did that policy change apply only to Standard Individual Export Licence applications, and not all applications for strategic exports? (b) From 1 July 2010 all End-User Undertakings must contain a declaration by the end-user that the goods will not be re-exported or otherwise re-sold or transferred to a destination subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargo. How is this monitored and enforced?

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.6 Is the Department for Business intending to make any further developments to the ECO website in order to aid exporters? If so, what is envisaged?

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.7 The ratio of errors found during compliance visits is relatively high. What steps are being taken to reduce the instances of compliance misuses?

Section 1—Domestic Policy, Paragraph 1.9 (a) In how many of the 134 cases of seizures in 2010 of strategic goods in breach of licensing requirements were prosecutions for strategic export offences initiated? (b) Why were only five prosecutions successful?

Section 2—International Policy, Table 2.3 Why is the Department for International Development only consulted when assessing an arms export licence application against Criteria 8, and not when assessments are made against Criteria 2, 3 and 4?

Section 2—Case Studies, Paragraph 2.4 The Government produced in its Report case studies of export licence applications for: 1. body armour and night vision goggles that were to be used by Private Security Companies in , 2. a single armoured personnel carrier for demonstration/evaluation for the Nigerian Police Force, and 3. shields and body armour for use by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kyrgyzstan. Why has the Government selected as its Case Studies relatively insubstantial export licence applications compared with the previous Government which in its 2008 Report included as a Case Study an application for an export licence for Armoured Personnel Carriers and components for the Libyan police?

Section 2—Arms Trade Treaty, Paragraph 2.5 When does the Government anticipate agreement to the Arms Trade Treaty? What are the main issues still to be resolved to enable a consensus to be reached?

Section 2—Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Paragraph 2.6 Which states attended the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States considering the implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects? cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Section 2—Cluster Munitions, Paragraph 2.7 Which countries have now ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions prohibiting the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions?

Section 2—Wassenar Arrangement, Paragraph 2.8 (a) Which states and international organisations participate in the Wassenar Arrangement dealing with the accumulation and transfer of conventional weapons? (b) The report states that “the UK plans to play a full and leading role in the Assessment Year process” for the Wassenaar Agreement. What actions will be or have been taken to fulfil this statement?

Section 2—UN Register of Conventional Arms, Paragraph 2.9 (a) Which UN member states make reports to the UK Register of Conventional Arms? (b) What specific steps is the Government taking to try to ensure that more UN member states do so, and on an up-to-date annual and accurate basis, and also with the full details required by the UN?

Section 2—Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Paragraph 2.10 (a) Which are the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group seeking to reduce global nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapons development, and promoting effective safeguards and the protection of existing nuclear materials? (b) The 2011 Plenary of the Nuclear Suppliers Group took place in Holland. What were the main outcomes from this session?

Section 2—The Academic Technology Approval Scheme (ATAS), Paragraph 2.11 (a) Which are the Institutes of Higher Education (IHEs) in the UK participating in The Academic Technology Approval Scheme seeking to protect certain sensitive technologies relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and their means of delivery from possible misuse by proliferators? (b) Which are the “sensitive subjects” at each participating Institute of Higher Education for which foreign students seeking to study them must first obtain an ATAS certificate? (c) Why does the Government consider that the need to protect at UK Institutes of Higher Education certain sensitive technologies relating to WMD and their means of delivery from possible misuse by proliferators arises only in the case of foreign students?

Section 2—Australia Group, Paragraph 2.12 Which are the current participants in the Australia Group to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological agents and dual-use manufacturing equipment?

Section 2—Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Paragraph 2.13 (a) Which countries are Partners in the Missile Technology Control Regime co-ordinating their export licensing efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD capable unmanned delivery systems? (b) What was the outcome of the Plenary held in Buenos Aires in April 2011?

Section 2—Gifted Equipment Paragraph 2.15 and Table 2.4 (a) Does the Government attach the same controls and conditions to the equipment it gifts to overseas governments as it attaches to arms export licences it grants to commercial exporters? (b) Is the Government requiring from governments to whom it is gifting equipment the same end- use declaration it introduced from 1 July 2010 for commercial exports as described in paragraph 1.4 of the Annual Report 2010? (c) Does the Government retain the right to require the return of equipment it gifts if the controls and conditions attached to the gift are not complied with? (d) What were the functions of the Laboratory Equipment gifted to the Iraq Ministry of Interior in 2010? (e) What were the functions of the Law Enforcement Equipment gifted to the Government of Yemen in 2010? cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Section 3—Background to Export Licence Decisions, Paragraph 3.1 (a) Why is the provision of technical assistance where the provider knows or has been made aware that the technical assistance will be used for “WMD Purposes” only controlled outside the EU, and not inside the EU also? (b) Why is the rating given to items that the exporter has been told, knows or suspects are or may be intended for “WMD Purposes” described as “End-Use” and not “WMD End-Use”? (c) Why is the transfer of technology by any means where the person making the transfer knows or has been made aware that the technology is for “WMD Purposes” only controlled outside the EU, and not inside the EU also?

Section 3—General Note on Licensing Data, Paragraph 3.2 (a) What are the “certain conditions” that have to be met if controlled goods being transhipped through the UK en route from one country to another pre-determined destination are made exempt from control? (b) Why is there no Open Individual Transhipment Licence? (c) Why do Trade Controls not apply to software and technology?

Section 3—Information on SIELs, SITLs, OIELs, SITCLs and OITCLs, Paragraph 3.3

Why are the exporters holding Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) not asked to provide details of the value of goods they propose to ship?

Section 3—Paragraph 3.5 and Table 3.6. Reasons for Refusals and Revocations of SIEL and SITCL Applications (a) Will the Government state the number of revocations in this table, and in the case of each revocation the goods concerned, the country of destination, and the Criterion (using the same 11 categories as in Table 3.6) under which the licence was revoked? (b) Will the Government state in the case of each refusal in this table the goods concerned, the country of destination, and the Criterion (using the same 11 categories as in Table 3.6) under which the application was refused? (c) Will the Government provide the same information for refusals and revocations of OIELs and OITCLs, and in the same format as that requested for SIELs and SITCLs in a) and b) immediately above.

Section 3—Open General Export Licences (OGELs), Paragraph 3.7 and Table 3.7 (a) What are the shipments and destinations that are eligible for OGELs and what are the “certain conditions” that have to be met for an OGEL? (b) Why are there a small number of Open General Transhipment Licences for which registration with BIS’s Export Control Organisation is not required and what are the details of these licenses?

Section 3—Performance in Processing Licence Applications, Paragraph 3.8 (a) The number of SEILS processed within 20 working days fell significantly from the previous two years, resulting in missing the target. What was the reason for this fall and what steps have or are being taken to rectify the situation? (b) The target for the number of appeals to be completed within 20 working days was also not met and was significantly down from the previous two years. Why and what is being done to ensure that the target is met in the future?

Annex C

INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR THE UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Will the Government provide a revised copy of Annex C with all explanatory notes that are currently missing, or unclear, included or clarified as necessary? 19 October 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Thank you for your letter of 30 September with which you enclosed the Government’s answers to the CAEC’s questions as set out in Annexes A and B to my letter to you of 18 July together with the Government’s answers to the CAEC’s questions on the Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2010 Arms Export Licensing information provided by the Government.

I am grateful to Ministers and to their officials for the work put in to provide the Committees with the information requested and by our deadline of 30 September.

I also welcome the commitment you made in your latest letter “to continuing to work closely and constructively with the Committees and to addressing the issues raised by the Committees in a transparent, comprehensive and timely manner.” I also wish to see the maximum possible transparency with as much information as possible being made accessible to Parliament and to the public at large.

Against this background, I am disappointed and concerned that the Government’s answers to the Committees’ Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2010 questions have all been stamped “Restricted for CAEC eyes only”—both for the Section A answers relating to public material as well as for the Section B answers relating to restricted material.

I will deal with the Section A and Section B material in turn.

Section A

QUESTIONS RELATED TO PUBLIC MATERIAL

At first sight, I see nothing in the Government’s answers that would justify classifying them as Restricted. I should be grateful therefore for your agreement that all the Government’s answers to the questions related to public material for Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2010 can be published by the Committee together with the Committee’s questions.

If you consider that any redactions need to be made for any of these answers, please could we be provided with a list of these and the reasons for each of them.

For future Quarters, I should be grateful if the answers to Section A Questions relating to public material could be sent in non-classified form. If the Government wishes to offer any supplementary information to explain its answers further, this could be sent in separate classified form.

Section B

QUESTIONS RELATED TO RESTRICTED MATERIAL

Whilst I can see that some of the information in the answers should certainly be classified, for example xxx xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xx xx xxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxx xx xxxxxxxxx xx xxxx xx xx xxx xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxx xxxxxxx x xxxxx x xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxx xx xxx xxxxxxxxxxx xx xxx xxxxxxx x xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxx xx xxxxxxx xx xx xxxxxxx xx xxxxxxxxxx.

I should be grateful therefore if the Committees could be provided with a further copy of the Government’s Section B answers for Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2010 with the wording which you consider should be redacted square bracketed and the justification for the proposed redaction in each case. I would hope that we could rapidly reach agreement on these redactions so that the Section B answers, as redacted, could be published with the Committee’s questions at an early date.

For the future, I suggest that the Section B answers should similarly come to us in two versions, the first with the whole of the text marked “Restricted—for CAEC eyes only”, and the second with the same text and classification but with the Government’s proposed redactions square bracketed and the explanation for each redaction. The Section B answers, with the agreed redactions, would then be published in unclassified form along with the Section A answers for each quarter.

I should be grateful to know at an early date that the Government and the Committees can now proceed to handle the Government’s answers to the Committees’ questions for both Section A and Section B material as I have set out above. 24 October 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills Thank you for your letter of 5 September regarding a report in the Sunday Telegraph of 31 July that alleged that Andert Breivik procured items from the UK. I apologise for the delay in replying but my office did not receive your letter until 1 November. The items Mr Breivik is said to have obtained from the UK are 500g of sulphur powder and a basic workshop vice valued at £12. Neither of these items is subject to export control and both are widely available for sale to the public in the UK and elsewhere. We have seen no evidence that Mr Breivik obtained, or sought to obtain, controlled goods—including ammunition of any sort or any related components or equipment—from the UK. I am confident that there has been no breach of export control procedures or legislation in respect of Mr Breivik. We were all shocked and saddened by the events in Norway in July. The Government is determined to ensure that arms and ammunition and the materials for making explosives of the sort used by Mr Breivik do not fall into the wrong hands. However I do not believe that imposing export controls on items as commonplace and freely available as these would be an effective or proportionate response to this tragic event. 8 November 2011

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills William Hague has advised me that the “UK Trade & Investment Defence & Security Organisation (UKTI DSO) has not published a list of priority markets for 2011–12, as this is under review, but plans to do so later in the year”. I should be grateful if UKTI DSO’s list of priority markets for 2011–12 could be made available to the Committees on Arms Export Controls immediately it is published. It would be helpful to the Committees if this could be before our next Oral Evidence session on 12 December, and most certainly before William Hague and you give evidence to the Committees on 7 February. 21 November 2011

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office The Committees on Arms Export Controls will be grateful for a copy of the report made to Ministers at the conclusion of the Government’s review of arms exports. If there is material in the report that is commercially confidential, it would be acceptable for this to be separated out and provided to the Committees in a RESTRICTED annex in the usual way. In your Written Ministerial Statement of 13 October you said that “guidance will be issued for all HMG officials on assessing the human rights implications of our overseas security and justice assistance. We will make this guidance public later this year.” The Committees wish to have a copy of this guidance as soon as it is made public. 21 November 2011

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills Thank you for your letter of 21 November 2011 requesting that the UK Trade & Investment Defence & Security Organisation (UKTI DSO) list of priority markets be made available to the Committee on Arms Export Controls. UKTI DSO is currently conducting a review of priority markets, and allowing time for necessary information gathering and consultation with stakeholders, it will not be available before the early part of 2012. I will provide the list to the Committee in advance of the Ministerial evidence session on 7 February 2012. I would not expect the new list to change drastically from the 2010 version as shown in the table below. Algeria Japan Pakistan Australia Kuwait South Korea Brazil Libya Saudi Arabia Brunei Malaysia Turkey India Mexico UAE Iraq Oman USA cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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8 December 2011

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 21 November about the Government’s review of arms exports and guidance on overseas security and justice assistance. You may recall that on 6 September I provided a response to a written parliamentary question 69541 from Douglas Alexander confirming that the review of arms exports was an internal Foreign and Commonwealth Office review and so would not be published. This remains the position and we do not therefore plan to place the Review in the Library of the House, or make this available to Committees in full or in part. The Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance is an important tool to ensure that the Government’s overseas assistance work supports our values and is consistent with our human rights obligations. We remain committed to publication of the Guidance before the end of 2011 and will send a copy to the Committees as soon as it is finalised. 9 December 2011

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office On 13 October, I announced in a Statement to the House the conclusions of the Government’s review of policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression, in light of events in the Middle East and North Africa. I also announced that the Government had considered how we could strengthen our decision making when we provide security and justice assistance overseas. I said that guidance on assessing the human rights implications of such assistance would be issued to all government officials and that it would be published before the end of 2011. A copy of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human Rights Guidance has now been deposited in the Library of the House. I am pleased to attach a copy of the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Guidance to this letter. The Guidance is part of a package of improvements that responds to the lessons of this year, and our wider commitment to strengthen and uphold the record of the United Kingdom as a defender and. promoter of human rights and democracy. This Guidance will assist HMG staff who are called upon to advise on security and justice matters overseas. It will ensure greater consistency in the human rights approach to security and justice. assistance overseas across HMG; it will assist in the identification and consideration of applicable legal obligations; and it will ensure that our security and justice activities, whilst meeting HMG’s national security priority, are also consistent with a foreign policy based on British values including human rights. UK security and justice assistance to international partners to tackle threats such as terrorism, serious organised crime and conflict, and to support sustainable development, remains crucial to implementing our foreign policy and development priorities. As well as strengthening our relationships with other governments and increasing our prospects for future cooperation with security institutions, this type of work can have a direct impact on our national interests. For example, the Strategic Defence and Security Review recommended that HMG increase efforts to tackle the terrorist threat: at source, overseas. Our Counter Terrorism Programme aims to do just this by increasing the capacity of overseas authorities, such as the police, military and intelligence, to detect, investigate and disrupt terrorist threats. At times, this will mean working with countries, institutions or units where we have concerns about their adherence to and respect for human rights and democracy. Often, it is these countries or institutions where security and justice assistance is most needed. While it is in our national interest to continue to provide such assistance, in doing so we must ensure that such assistance supports our values and is consistent with applicable domestic and international human rights obligations. Today’s publication of the OSJA Guidance is a reflection of our determination to ensure that when we provide assistance in these countries, we do so in a manner that promotes, rather than undermines, human rights and democracy. Making these decisions is not always straightforward. While UK justice acid security assistance can help achieve both security and human rights objectives in a given country, it can also present a variety of human rights risks. The OSJA Guidance was produced in order to provide practical support to government officials making these difficult decisions. It provides a clear framework to help officials identify the human rights risks, propose appropriate measures to mitigate these risks and produce a final assessment. It also sets out when the decision to provide assistance should be taken by senior personnel or Ministers. The Guidance covers case specific assistance such as the deployment of specialist police officers to assist with an. investigation, as well as broader capacity building assistance. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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The Government is committed to tackling issues related to security and human rights in an open and transparent way. This is why we published the Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Security Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Related to Detainees. And it is why we have taken the decision to publish the Overseas Security and justice Assistance Guidance today.

The OSJA Guidance already applies to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and is currently being rolled out to other government departments. An internal review of the guidance will take place in April 2012.

We welcome comments from members of the Committees on Arms Export Controls. I am also sending a copy of this letter to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 15 December 2011

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I attach a further copy of my letter to you of October 24 to which I requested a reply “at an early date”.

In the interests of transparency, to which both the Government and the Committees have stated that they are committed, the Committees wish to make public forthwith the Government’s answers to the CAEC’s questions on the Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2010 Arms Export Licensing information by the Government subject to the procedure for redactions set out in my letter.

I should be grateful therefore for your response to my letter not later than by the time the House returns on January 10. 16 December 2011

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I attach a copy of my letter to you of 19 October in which I requested the Government’s answers to the questions from The Committees on Arms Export Controls arising from the Government’s report United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2010.

I requested the Government’s answers to the CAEC’s questions no later than 30 November.

I should be grateful if you could ensure that the CAEC receives the Government’s answers no later than the return of the House on 10 January.

I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Secretary of State for International Development and the Secretary of State for Defence. 16 December 2011

Letter from the Chairman of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills

It was reported in The Independent on December 1 that Mr Guy Savage had been arrested and that “an arsenal of weapons including assault rifles and ammunition” had been found both at his home in Pinner, Middlesex and at his business premises in Northolt. It is also reported that he has been accused of smuggling weapons to Iraq and the Middle East.

Please could you tell me whether you consider that this case has exposed any weaknesses in the present arms export control legislation or procedures, and, if so, what action the Government will take.

For convenience, I attach a copy of the report in The Independent. 16 December 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills To each of the Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) recommendations in its last Report (HC686) on “Brass Plate” companies, Pre-licensed registration of arms brokers and Extra Territorial Arms Export Controls, the Government in its Response (Cm8079) gave the same reply as follows “We are giving careful consideration to the CAEC recommendations in the light of recent events and will revert later this year”. The Foreign Secretary under his covering letter to me of 30 September replied to a series of questions from the CAEC arising from the Government’s Response in Cm8079. For each of the three subjects named above the reply was that “The Government (the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills) will update the Committees regarding developments on these issues before the Committees start taking further evidence”. I am extremely concerned that over nine months have elapsed since the CAEC made its conclusions and recommendations on these three important subjects public in its last Report and the Government has thus far failed to provide any response to them in contravention of the well-established procedures and timetable for Government Departments to respond to Select Committee recommendations. I should be grateful if you could ensure that the Committees have the Government’s Response to the CAEC’s conclusions and recommendations on each of these three subjects no later than Thursday 19 January as the Committees start taking further evidence on Monday 23 January. I am copying this letter to the Secretary of State for Defence, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for International Development. 10 January 2012

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 30 September with which you enclosed as Annex B the Government’s Answers to The Committees on Arms Export Controls’ (CAEC) Questions relating to the review of Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression together with the following Tables: Table 1: Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) Revocations since 18 February 2011 Table 2: Open Individual Export Licence (OIEL) Revocations since 18 February 2011 Table 3(a): All Extant SIELs Table 3(b) Extant Military SIELs Table 4: Extant OIELs Table 4(b): Extant Military OIELs I attach as an Annex to this letter the Questions arising from Annex B to your letter to me of 30 September to which the CAEC wishes to have the Answers before you and Vince Cable give Oral Evidence to the CAEC on 7 February. Please may we have the Government’s Answers no later than Friday 27 January. This letter and the Government’s Answers will be made public. If there is any supplementary information that you wish to provide to CAEC on a classified basis, this will be handled separately in the usual way. I am copying this letter and the Annex to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for International Development.

Annex SIEL Revocations Have there been any SIEL revocations additional to those set out in Table 1? If so, please provide the details as in Table 1.

OIEL Revocations Have there been any OIEL Revocations additional to those set out in Table 1? If so, please provide the details as in Table 1.

Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Qatar In Table 1, details are provided of arms export licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar. The CAEC asked for details of all extant arms export licences in respect of each country for which licences have been revoked. No details of extant arms export licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar appear in any of Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 or 4(b). Please could these details be provided for Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b). cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Bahrain Why are there arms export licences still extant for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography have been revoked (Tables 1 and 2)? Why are there arms export licences still extant for small arms ammunition (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for small arms ammunition have been revoked (Tables 1 and 2)? Why are there arms export licences still extant for body armour (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for body armour have been revoked (Table 2)? Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Bahrain listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIEL’s “now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3”, this being the Government’s “Reason for Revocation” for every revoked arms export licence listed in Annex 1 of the Government’s Response (Cm 8079) to the CAEC’s last Report (HC 686)?

Egypt Why are there arms export licences still extant for military communications equipment (Tables 4 and 4(b)) when licences for military communications equipment have been revoked (Table 2)? Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Egypt listed in Tables 3(a), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Libya Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Libya listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Saudi Arabia Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Saudi Arabia listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Syria Is the figure of only one arms export licence revocation to Syria stated in Annex B, paragraph 1, this being for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles, correct given that a further licence revocation of small arms ammunition to Syria was detailed by the BIS Minister Mark Prisk in his Written Answer to Sir John Stanley on October 10 (Column 258W)? Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Syria listed in Table 4 with values for SIELs, including the licences relating to equipment employing cryptography, contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Tunisia Why were the arms export licence revocations to Tunisia detailed in the Government’s Response (Cm 8079) not included in Table 1 and/or 2? The CAEC asked for details of all extant arms export licences in respect of each country for which licences have been revoked. No details of extant arms export licences to Tunisia appear in any of Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 or 4(b). Please could these details be provided for Tunisia in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b).

The Yemen Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to The Yemen listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), and 4 with values for SIELs, including licences relating to equipment employing cryptography, military cameras and body armour, contravene Criteria 2 and 3?

Updating of Extant Arms Export Licences Since Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) were submitted to the CAEC, what further arms export licences have been approved to countries in North Africa and the Middle East for which licences have been revoked? Please could the details be provided in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b). 16 January 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office I am writing in respect of the attached report in The Independent of 22 December 2011 and of all related information held by the Government. The Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC) would be grateful for your answers to the following questions before Vince Cable and you give Oral Evidence to CAEC on 7 February. 1. On what date was the “Thor Liberty” registered as a British-flagged ship, was the company that made the registration a UK registered company, and, if so, on what date did this company last file its Annual Report and Accounts and the names of its Directors at Companies House and in respect of which financial year? 2. Would the explosives and the surface-to-air missiles found on board the “Thor Liberty” in Finland when the ship was on its way to Shanghai constitute a breach of the EU arms embargo on China if exported from the UK? 3. Do the explosives and the surface-to-air missiles found on board the “Thor Liberty” in Finland when the ship was on its way to Shanghai fall within or outside the ambit of the current UK legislation on extra-territoriality relating to arms exports? 4. Does the Government consider in relation to this matter that any UK person(s) may have committed a breach of UK arms export controls legislation that may be indictable under the provisions of current UK legislation on extra-territoriality? 5. What discussions have taken place between the UK Government, the British police and the Crown Prosecution Service on this matter? CAEC will of course be glad to receive any additional information that the Government wishes to provide in its response to this letter. I am writing in the same terms to Vince Cable and am also copying this letter to the Director of Public Prosecutions for any comments he may wish to make to CAEC. The Committee may decide to make these letters public in due course. 17 January 2011

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills Thank you for your letter of 16 December about the article in The Independent on 1 December relating to the arrest of the British arms dealer Mr Guy Savage and whether this exposed any weaknesses in UK arms export control legislation and procedures. I hope you will understand that I do not consider it would be appropriate for me to comment on these issues while the Home Secretary is still considering her decision on whether to allow the extradition of Mr Savage to the US to face charges of breaching US controls. I am aware that any statement made by the Government on this matter could potentially prejudice his prospects of a fair trial in the US if extradition does go ahead. 19 January 2012

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office The quarterly Arms Export Licence approvals published by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for first three quarters for 2011 included the following licence approvals of arms exports to China: 1 January–31 March 2011: — body armour; — equipment for the production of military communications equipment; — general military vehicle components; — small arms ammunition (two licences); — technology for military communications equipment; and — weapon sights. 1 April–30 June: — aircraft military communications equipment (two licences); — components for combat aircraft (two licences); — components for combat naval vessels; — components for military aero-engines; cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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— components for military patrol/assault craft; and — unfinished products for military aero-engines (two licences). 1 July–30 September: — body armour; — technology for military communications equipment (two licences); — cryptographic software; — equipment employing cryptography; — aircraft military communications equipment; — components for combat helicopters; and — components for military helicopters.

Please would you provide the Committees with an explanation of why licences were granted for the export of these arms to China notwithstanding The UK/EU Consolidated Criteria and the declaration by the Madrid European Council on 27 June 1989 that established an arms embargo on China.

The Committees have noted that the UK Government’s interpretation of the embargo, as stated in the quarterly Arms Export Licence approvals, is that the embargo applies to: “lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles; specially designed components of these items and ammunition; military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms; and any equipment which might be used for internal repression.”

A copy of this letter is also being sent to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.

The Committees would be grateful for your reply before Vince Cable and you give Oral Evidence to the Committees on 7 February. 25 January 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills

I look forward to giving evidence to the Committee next Tuesday.

I am aware that there is one outstanding issue on which you have asked for a letter from me prior to the evidence session. This, as set out in your letter of 10 January, is the question of our approach to three inter- related issues: preregistration of arms brokers, “Brass Plate Companies” and the extra-territorial application of arms brokering rules.

In terms of our overall approach to these issues, I think that the UK regulatory framework governing arms brokers is now broadly speaking in good shape. Those activities which should be licensable are licensable.

On the specific question of extra-territorial law enforcement, I am always inclined to be wary of going too far down this route. I think extra-territoriality can be justified in the case of the most undesirable types of activity conducted by UK nationals overseas: in other words, normally activity that we would seek to prohibit, not activity that we would seek to license. I am not so far convinced that it would be right to extend the reach of UK law to cover all trade in defence goods, including the least sensitive, by UK nationals. But I am open to hearing your views on this point.

Looking forward, the main challenge that I see in the area of arms brokers and “brass plates” is one of enforcement. The Government has had some successes in recent years. But it is an ongoing challenge: the fact that a company may be flouting the law does not necessarily mean that we can always catch them, gather the evidence and present a case that will convince a court.

With this in mind, I would be happy to offer the Committee a briefing with officials where they would be able to pursue some of these issues in more detail, and where appropriate in confidence.

The Committee might be interested in combining this with a visit to the Export Control Organisation in my Department, which could include a demonstration of the licensing process. I understand that you and your colleagues have not had the opportunity to see this in action since the introduction of the SPIRE system.

I will be happy to explore these questions with you next week. 2 February 2011 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills Thank you for your letter of 17 January regarding a report in The Independent newspaper of 22 December 2011. The report alleged that a British-flagged merchant vessel—the Thor Liberty—had been impounded in Finland because it was suspected of carrying a cargo of explosives and surface-to-air missiles to China in breach of Finnish export control law and, as you suggest in your letter, in breach of the EU arms embargo on China. You also ask whether there has been a breach of UK trade controls. I am pleased to be able to set the record straight on this story. The Thor Liberty is registered in the Isle of Man but it is owned and operated by a Danish company, Thorco Shipping NS. This company does not have an office in the UK and is not registered at Companies House. According to other media reports the ship’s captain and crew were Ukrainian. I have seen no reports suggesting that any UK person—as defined in the Export Control Act 2002—was involved in any way in the transfer or supply of these goods. It follows that there can have been no breach of UK trade controls. Turning now to the vessel’s cargo, the “160 tonnes of explosives” comprised a consignment of a substance called picric acid. While this is indeed used as an explosive it is not listed in any UK or EU strategic export control list. A licence is therefore not required under strategic export control legislation for the export of picric acid from the UK or the EU to any destination, and export of this substance to China would not be a breach of the EU arms embargo on China. Surface-to-air missiles do of course require an export licence. However the 69 Patriot missiles were actually being exported from Germany to South Korea. The German government has stated that these missiles were the final consignment under a long-standing agreement between the two countries and while all necessary export licences had been obtained before the goods left Germany it seems that there was no transit licence in place to allow transit of the goods through Finland. The Finnish government has confirmed that a transit licence has now been issued so that the missiles may be delivered to South Korea. I trust that this is sufficient to reassure you that there has been no breach of UK trade controls and no breach of the EU arms embargo on China. I am copying this letter to William Hague and the Director of Public Prosecutions. 2 February 2011

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 25 January on exports to China, your letter of 17 January on the vessel “Thor Liberty”, your letter of 16 January on questions arising from Annex B of the Government’s Answers to earlier CAEC questions about equipment that could be used for internal repression, and our letter of 24 October concerning the classification of Government responses to the Committees’ questions concerning Quarters 3 and 4 2010. We are committed to continuing to work closely and constructively with the CAEC. The Committees play an important role in scrutinising Government policy on arms exports and are an important vehicle for building public confidence in our export licensing regime. I enclose: Annex A—a response to your letter of 16 January; Annex B—a response to your letter of 17 January; Annex C—a response to your letter of 25 January. I hope shortly to be able to send you a substantive response to your letter of 24 October. In the meantime, I enclose a copy of the Statement that the Business Secretary and I laid before Parliament this week as part of our efforts to increase transparency. I look forward to seeing you and the CAEC on 7 February. I propose not to make an opening statement, knowing your desire to allot as much time as possible for Members’ questions. But I would like to take the opportunity in this letter to outline briefly some thoughts on export licensing and the importance of this in relation to Britain’s economy and industry. Effective arms export controls are central to both the UK’s security and prosperity. They ensure that we always act in accordance with our values of promoting human rights and democracy. I believe that defence and security exports that comply with the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria arc both legitimate and important. All countries have the right to an effective, secure defence. The Government uses its export licensing powers to ensure that Britain only licences defence exports that comply with the Consolidated Criteria. Our defence and security sectors are important areas for British jobs and for our economic recovery. UK Trade & Investment (UKTI) report that Britain’s defence and security sectors employ over 600,000 people and cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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export over ES billion worth of goods and services a year. But the importance of the sector does not mean ignoring our values, including the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. I maintain that Britain has one of the most robust licensing systems in the world, with human rights and freedoms at his heart. The Government responded swiftly to the Arab Awakening and revoked a number of licences. These revocations were correct and responsible decisions to take in the light of changed circumstances, this does not mean that the original licensing decisions were flawed or misjudged. Given the significant changes in the region, it is right and reasonable that risk assessments be updated and licences that no longer are consistent with the Consolidated Criteria need to be revoked. We have looked to further strengthen the system following the FCC) Review; we are making progress on implementing the proposals. In my Written Ministerial Statement of 13 October, I described the measures I am taking to strengthen further our already robust system. Implementation is well underway and I [will] this week announce to the House that the new suspension mechanism is now ready for use. The new mechanism allows immediate licensing suspension to countries experiencing a sharp deterioration ha security or stability, thus ensuring that export licensing policy is more responsive to rapidly changing circumstances overseas. Suspension may not be automatic or invoked lightly, but triggered for example when conflict or crisis conditions change the, risk suddenly, or make conducting .a proper risk assessment difficult. We are firmly committed to securing agreement this year on a robust and effective, legally binding Arms Trade Treaty to regulate the international trade in conventional arms. This remains a priority for us and we will be working hard over the coming months towards that goal with a reinforced team in our newly created Arms Export Policy Department, who will continue their regular dialogue with NGOs, Industry and civil society on this and. other export licence issues.

Annex A Thank you for your letter of 16 January attaching Questions arising from Annex B of the Government’s Answers to the Committees questions relating to the review of Government policy and practice with regard to the export of equipment that might be used for internal repression (my letter of 30 September refers). It is now my pleasure to forward to the Committees the attached response which answers Questions in your letter of 16 January, our answers are in italics.

SIEL Revocations 1. Have there been any SIEL revocations additional to those set out in Table 1? If so please provide the details as in Table 1 No.

OIEL Revocations 2. Have there been any OIEL Revocations additional to those set out in Table 1? If so, please provide the details as in Table 1 No.

Abu Dhabi, Kuwait Qatar 3. In Table 1, details are provided of arms export: licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar, The CAEC asked for details of all extant arms export licences in respect of each country for which licences have been revoked. No details of extant arms export licences to Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar appear in any of the Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 or 4(b). Please could these details be provided for Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 or 4(b)? The two licences which were revoked for Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar included Bahrain as a destination and were revoked for this reason only. As there have been no reports of civil unrest in Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar and we judged that licences for these countries would still be consistent with the Criteria. Licences have not been revoked for these countries unless they are linked with another destination for which licences are being revoked.

Bahrain 4. Why are there arms export licences still extant for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography have been revoked (Tables 1 and 2)? Table 3(a) and 3(b) identifies extant SIELs for Bahrain. There are still it extant licences for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptoloaphy. Seven of these licences were granted for civil end use for telecommunications systems, internet/network connectivity and data connectivity. The remaining four licences are for Government end use to be used as a telecommunications system between two buildings and for internet cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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connectivity. Following the review of licences for Bahrain in 2011 we judged that these licences remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of the export.

5. Why are there arms export licences still extant for small arms ammunition (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for small arms ammunition have been revoked (Tables 1and 2)? Table 3(a) and 3(b) identifies extant SIELs for Bahrain. There are five extant licences for small arms . These licences are for sporting shooting and vermin control. Following the review of licences for Bahrain in 2011 we judged that these licences remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of the export.

6. Why are there arms export licences still extant for body armour (Tables 3(a) and 3(b)) when licences for body armour have been revoked (Table 2)? Table 3(a) and 3(b) identifies extant SIELs for Bahrain. There is one extant licence for a small quantity of body armour for personal protection use only. Following the review of licences for Bahrain in 2011 we judged that this licence remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of the export.

7. Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Bahrain listed in Table 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs “now contravenes Criteria 2 and 3”, this being the Government’s “Reason for Revocation” for every revoked arms export licence listed in Annex 1 of the Government’s Response (Cm 8079) to the CAEC’s last Report MC 686)? We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Bahrain. In line with normal practice, export licences for Bahrain are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.

Egypt 8. Why are there arms export licences still extant for military communications equipment (Tables 4 and 4(b)) when licences for military communications equipment have been revoked (Table 2)? Extant licences for military communications equipment Table A and 4 (b) identifies export licences (OIELs) that are still extant for military communications equipment (three in total). These permit i) temporary exports of software modules for use during exhibitions, demonstrations, consultancy and personal use by company employees ii) software for military equipment to authorised agents, value added resellers and area partners for marketing and support purposes in country iii) communications equipment and subassemblies for military use such as software for headset. Following the review of licences for Egypt in February 2011 we judged that these licences remained consistent with the Criteria following a consideration of the goods, end user and purpose of the export.

Revoked licences for military communications equipment Table two identifies two applications for Military communications equipment and software for military communications equipment. -These two OIELs were revoked following the review of Egypt extant licences in February. We noted that the goods would offer capability for situational awareness, command and control. Furthermore the second OIEL contained goods for military helmets and components for an integrated helmet system. As the OIELs permitted export to government linked end users, which would in practice enable exports to the internal security forces and the police we judged that these applications were no longer consistent with the Criteria and the Government would request SILL licences for exports of this nature.

9. Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Egypt listed in Tables 3(a), 4. And 4. (b) With values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3? We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Tables 3(a), 4 and 4(b) contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Egypt. In line with normal practice, export licences for Egypt are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.

Libya 10. Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences for Libya listed in Tables 3(a), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3? We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Libya. In line with normal practice, export licences for Libya are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Saudi Arabia 11. Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Saudi Arabia listed in Tables 3(a), 4 and 4(b) with values for SIELs contravene Criteria 2 and 3? We are clear that the identified was do not contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We examined extant licences following the unrest in Saudi Arabia and we were satisfied that licences remained and continue to remain consistent with the Criteria. To date, there is no evidence that UK supplied equipment has been used in breach of the Criteria in Saudi Arabia, or in Bahrain where Saudi forces were deployed to protect installations as part of the Peninsula Shield force, at the legitimate request of the Bahraini Government. In line with normal practice, export licences for. Saudi Arabia are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground

Syria 12. Is the figure of only one arms export licence revocation to Syria stated in Annex B, paragraph 1, this being for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles, correct given that a further licence revocation of small arms ammunition to Syria was detailed by the BIS Minister Mark Prisk in his Written Answer to Sir John Stanley on October 10 (Column 258W)? There has been one licence revocation for Syria for small arms ammunition. The licence for military cargo vehicles and components for military cargo vehicles is in fact a licence that was revoked for Libya and not for Syria.

13. Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Syria listed in Table 4 with values for SlELs, including the licences relating to equipment employing cryptography, contravene Criteria 2 and 3? We are satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences listed in 4 contravene Criteria 2 and 3. We continue to monitor the situation in Syria. In line with normal practice, export licences for Syria are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.

Tunisia 14. Why were the arms export licence revocations to Tunisia detailed in the Government’s Response (Cm 8079) not included in Table 1 and/or 2? Tables 1 and 2 were produced in answer to a question which asked about revocations made since the Government announced its review of licences on 18 February 2011. The licences in question were revoked earlier.

15. The CAEC asked for details of all extant arms export licences in respect of each country for which licences have been revoked. No details of extant arms export licences to Tunisia appear in any of Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 or 4(b). Please could these details be provided for Tunisia in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b)? As noted above the tables were produced in response to a question which excluded the Tunisia revocations and therefore we did not include details of the extant licences for Tunisia. Tables with details of extant licences for Tunisia similar to those provided for other countries are enclosed with this reply.

Yemen Is the Government still satisfied that none of the extant arms export licences to Yemen listed in Tables 3(a); 3(b) and 4 with values for Sins, including licences relating to equipment employing cryptography, military cameras and body armour, contravene Criteria 2 and 3? We are clear that the identified extant SIEI, licences for equipment employing cryptography, military cameras, and body armour do not contravene Criteria 2 and 3. In line with normal practice, export licences for Yemen are kept under constant review and every licence is scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground.

Updating of Extant Arms Export Licences Since Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4 and 4(b) were submitted to the CAEC, what further arms export licences have been approved to countries in North Africa and the Middle East for which licences have been revoked? Please could the details be provided in the same format as in Tables 3(a), 3(b), 4? And 4(b). The Government has revoked no further licences since the last tables were provided. Details of all export licences issued are provided by HMG on a quarterly basis at the BIS Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website which can be found at. https://www.exportcontroldb.berrzov.uk/engifoxisdh/SDBHOME. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Table 4(a) EXTANT OIELS: INCLUDING TUNISIA Search Countries Outcome Goods Ars ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE cryptographic software (Tunisia) ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, (Tunisia) software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography ISSUE (Bahrain), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE heading sensors for hydrophone arrays, hydrophones, towed (Tunisia), hydrophone arrays ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Tunisia) software for the use of military communications equipment, software to simulate the function of military communications equipment, technology for the use of software to simulate the function of military communications equipment ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Libya), ISSUE software for military communications equipment, technology (Tunisia) for the use of software for military communications equipment ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Tunisia) cutters/severing tools, detonating cord, devices for initiating explosives, explosives, linear cutting explosive charges, linear shaped cutting charges, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, shaped charges, underwater telecommunications systems ISSUE (Egypt), ISSUE (Tunisia) heading sensors for hydrophone arrays ISSUE (Tunisia) components for equipment employing cryptography, cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography ISSUE (Tunisia) components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft ISSUE (Tunisia) components for military radars, software enabling equipment to function as military radars, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars

Table 4(b) EXTANT MILITARY OIELS: INCLUDING TUNISIA Search Countries Outcome Goods Ars ISSUE (Tunisia) components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of military transport aircraft, general military aircraft components, military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of military, transport aircraft, technology for the use of military aircraft ground equipment, technology for the use of military transport aircraft ISSUE (Tunisia) components for military radars, software enabling equipment to function as military radars, technology for military guidance/navigation equipment, technology for military radars

Table 3(a) EXTANT SIELS: TUNISIA End User Countries Goods AN Tunisia chemicals used for pharmaceutical/healthcare production —Tunisia components for aircraft radars Tunisia components for control equipment for man portable air defence systems Tunisia equipment employing cryptography Tunisia military helmets Tunisia components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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End User Countries Goods AN Tunisia corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment Tunisia animal pathogens Tunisia equipment employing cryptography Tunisia equipment employing cryptography

Table 3(b)

EXTANT MILITARY SIELS: TUNISIA End User Goods Am Countries Tunisia components for aircraft radars Tunisia components for control equipment for man portable air defence systems Tunisia military helmets Tunisia components for military improvised explosive device disposal equipment

Annex B

Thank you for your letter of 17 January concerning the vessel “Thor Liberty” which, according to media reports, had been impounded in Finland because it was suspected of carrying a cargo of explosives and surface- to -air missiles to China in breach of Finnish export control law and, as you suggest in your letter, in breach of the EU arms embargo on China.

I understand that the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills will send you a substantive response on behalf of the Government soon.

Annex C

Thank you for your letter of 25 January in which you raise concerns about the. Arms Export licence approvals for China that were published by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills for the first three quarters of 2011.

All export licences are strictly assessed against the terms of Consolidated Criteria and the EU Arms Embargo, including the possibility of diversion. Please be assured that we take the China arms embargo very seriously and are confident that it was not breathed in the cases that you have highlighted.

All export licences for China are not only assessed against Criteria One of the Consolidated Criteria which covers our commitment to the EU Arms Embargo, but also taking into account the remaining Criteria. A full assessment is carried out covering a number of factors including the nature of the goods, the stated end-use and end-user, the risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user, the risk of the proposed export being used for internal repression, and regional peace, security and stability.

We receive a large number of licence applications for China and the majority are for end users in the commercial, low-cost/mass production, industrial or scientific research and development fields. Some items are military rated but are not caught by The EU Arms Embargo, such as military rated items for non-lethal purposes ie industrial components or NBC equipment for use by environmental agencies.

The UK interpretation of the China Arms Embargo covers: — Lethal weapons such as machine guns, large calibre weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets and missiles. — Specially designed components of the above and ammunition. — Military aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armoured fighting vehicles and other such weapons platforms. — Any equipment which might be used for internal repression.

Please note components of complete military platforms such as helicopters and aircraft are not covered by the Embargo.

We have taken each of the general goods descriptions in your letter and have endeavoured to provide you with further details that will explain the nature of the “goods” and therefore the reason for approval. These are attached in the Annex to this letter. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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BREAKDOWN OF LICENCES APPROVED FOR CHINA Body Armour The goods were for use by a global technical textile manufacturing company with a site in China capable of producing low cost manufacturing. The armoured vests were sent for testing at a police facility. After testing they would be damaged to the point of destruction and sent back to the supplier in the UK for examination and study. There were no criteria 2 concerns in this case as there was no clear risk of internal repression.

Equipment for the Production of Military Communications Equipment The goods in this case (Multi Socket Connection Box and Frontier 1600 Cable Test Box) were Equipment Test Units to be used in the manufacture of cable assemblies which would then be incorporated into headsets for worldwide distribution by the exporter in the UK. There were no criteria concerns raised.

General Military Vehicle Components The equipment exported under this licence was Lightweight Crew Seats to a University for research into whether the seats would be suitable for internal and military security vehicles but not for “military vehicle projects”. There was no clear risk that the proposed export would be used for internal repression. The interpretation of the embargo has consistently been taken to mean that whilst the lethal weapons or whole weapon platforms may be embargoed non-lethal equipment or components of weapons platforms are not. Therefore, these seats were not covered by the embargo.

Small Arms Ammunition In the two cases highlighted, the equipment was for sporting and training purposes and for the sporting purpose of target shooting. In both cases, the equipment was supplied by a specialist manufacturer of sporting ammunition. The ammunition supplied were sports shooting cartridges, specially designed for training and sporting purposes. Sports ammunition is not caught under the arms embargo and as there was no clear risk of diversion, no criteria 2 concerns were raised. The interpretation of the embargo has consistently been taken to mean that whilst the lethal weapons or whole weapon platforms may be embargoed non-lethal equipment or components of weapons platforms are not. This product is not caught by the UK interpretation of the arms embargo on China.

Technology for Military Communications Equipment In this case, the goods exported were technical drawings for use in the manufacture (moulding) of parts to be used on cable assemblies. The end user is a global electronics manufacturing services (EMS) provider that serves original equipment manufacturers in technology-related industries such as communications and computer hardware. Singapore is one of their manufacturing sites. The moulded parts would be returned to Singapore who will then integrate them into headsets. These headsets will be distributed globally by the exporter in compliance with UK Export Control. This was confirmed by the British manufacturer. There were no criteria concerns in this case as the moulds were due to be returned to Singapore.

Weapon Sights These goods were telescopic sights originally designed for target shooting purposes (day time, not night vision). In this instance the goods were being returned to the original manufacturer in China as they were faulty. They were being returned for study and evaluation of defects and subsequent scrapping. The equipment was therefore deemed exempt from the China arms embargo.

Aircraft Military Communications Equipment In one case, the applicant was returning the unaltered items (antennas) to the manufacturer as they were beyond economic repair. As such the parts were not expected to be fitted into any form of aircraft. As the goods were faulty and did not pose any risks, there were no criteria concerns. In the other case, the items were analogue aircraft band transceivers capable of working in Amplitude Modulation on both the Civilian 108–135 MHz Aircraft band and the Military 225–400MHz aircraft band. The transmitters were to be used by the end user for communication during construction and maintenance of a communications network and an EUU check confirmed they would not be used for military purposes. Open sources indicated that the end user is a provider of communication access equipment and network solutions. As the civil end use was considered legitimate, there were no criteria concerns raised for this application.

Components for Combat Naval Vessel/Components for Military Patrol/Assault Craft In both cases, the goods in question were propeller shaft seals and spares that do not fall under the arms embargo. We will allow non lethal equipment with a military end use to be exported. These parts were standard components originally designed for commercial cruise liners 40 years ago and had not been designed or modified for military use. They would not provide any enhancement of combat capabilities once fitted onto the cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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vessels. As the parts have a degree of wear and tear these seals are routinely inspected and replaced once they have deteriorated.

Unfinished Products for Military Aero-engines

The products were spare parts for the aero-engine and Rear end Forgings for an Engine. The components were sent to China to be machined to a certain specification by the exporter in the UK and will be used for spares, with eventual incorporation into the engines by the ultimate end user, the exporter, based in the UK. Despite the classification of military, this equipment is for industrial purposes only. The UK interpretation of the embargo has consistently been taken to mean that whilst the lethal weapons or whole weapon platforms may be embargoed, non-lethal equipment or components of weapons platforms are not. These products did not fall under the categories listed above and is therefore not caught by the arms embargo on China as the current UK interpretation stands.

Cryptographic Software and Equipment Employing Cryptography

End users in these cases were consumer services and the products were dual use. Some examples are: — In two cases the equipment would be used for patient monitoring and care in emergency rooms, intensive care and critical care units and incorporated into a wireless application for a portable medical device for use in hospitals. — In some cases the equipment was used for a support system for smartcards based around a banking payment system, whilst other equipment was used to enable secure internet connectivity across communications networks.

Components for Combat and Military Helicopters

These were for commercial and civilian end use. Some examples are: Two disposable filter elements that were exported for permanent exhibition use in China initially for a Heli Expo Show, whilst a Fan Assembly Unit exported for scientific research into the potential use on a commercial airship. Other goods exported were automatic reservoir bleed valves used to release entrapped air and/or other gases during repair and overhaul of components in aircraft.

These valves were parts of a hydraulic system which the end user would use to release gas after carrying out tests and are therefore a maintenance tool. The goods were low specification and would not add to the capabilities of a military aircraft. The export of such components and any resulting military aircraft operations is too far removed in cases such as this, so there were no criteria 4 concerns. 6 February 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills

UK TRADE & INVESTMENT DEFENCE & SECURITY ORGANISATION (UKTI DSO) LIST OF PRIORITY MARKETS

In my letter to you of 8 December 2011, in response to your letter of 21 November, I said I would make available to the Committees on Arms Export Controls the UKTI DSO list of priority markets once a review of them had been completed.

This has now happened, and the new list of priority markets is: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Europe/NATO/ EU (as a collective market), India, Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Qatar, Oman, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, UAE and USA.

Based on an assessment of the priorities of UK industry, Algeria, Brunei, Iraq, Mexico and Pakistan have been removed from the list of priority markets.

I would be very happy to discuss this with you when I appear in front of the Committees tomorrow. 6 February 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office We spoke this morning about export licence applications for Somalia and I agreed to follow up in writing. Whilst preparing the responses to the Committees’ questions on Q2 2011, it came to our attention that there had been a potential breach of UN sanctions relating to a licence issued for Somalia. The goods in question were body armour for a humanitarian organisation. When assessing the application the export had been considered as temporary when it should have been considered as permanent. As a result the incorrect exemption under the arms embargo was applied and the Sanctions Committee were not notified of the proposed export. A review of all Somalia applications identified a further two cases where the Sanctions Committee should have been notified. Both of these were for licences in 2009 authorising the export of armoured vehicles for the protection of UNICEF staff. We have carried out a review of applications for a number of other embargoed countries from 1 January 2009 onwards. I am satisfied that these three cases were isolated administrative errors and there is no wider systemic failure in our handling of export licence applications for embargoed countries. Licences for humanitarian or protective equipment are routinely approved by the UN Sanctions Committee. The Committee is being notified of these cases today, with an assurance of the importance that the UK attaches to our obligations under the UN arms embargo. In the meantime, the humanitarian organisation due to receive the protective equipment has agreed to delay any further exports until the exemption is formally granted by the UN Sanctions Committee. We are fully aware of the need to ensure that this error is not repeated and all applications for Somalia will continue to receive very careful scrutiny against the terms of the embargo. 6 February 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office I thought that I should write to provide you with notice of my intention to issue before the House on 9 February a Written Ministerial Statement about a change in the general policy on the current ban on the export of Tasers from the UK. You will be aware that the policy of a total ban on the export of Tasers was reviewed by FCO Ministers in 2006, 2007 and 2009, with a decision being made to maintain the ban each time. I have given further consideration to this issue and have agreed that we will maintain the current ban on the export of Tasers from the UK but allow certain limited, explicit exceptions to this general policy. I have agreed this change to address the operational difficulties for British Police Forces caused by current Government policy on the export of Tasers, by allowing these Forces to procure, transfer and deploy Tasers in certain limited and explicit circumstances, while maintaining the very restrictive approach to these exports more generally. This change will also allow our Police Forces in the Channel Islands to comply more fully with HM Inspectorate of Constabulary recommendations. Exports will be approved on the understanding that any envisaged use by those British Police Forces would be in line with the standards required of UK mainland Police Forces. Operational difficulties can now be overcome by a narrowly defined exception that specifies the precise circumstances when particular entities would be permitted to export this equipment. This allows the Government to retain its strong stance on restricting the export of goods with a high risk of misuse for human rights abuses or human repression, while being consistent with the policy governing the use of Tasers by UK mainland Police Forces. I have agreed this change on the understanding that we will only approve licence applications for the export of Tasers where they are consistent with this very narrow definition of exceptions to the general UK export control policy to ban all exports of this equipment. The policy will be kept under review in fine with the Home Office’s Scientific Development Branch’s responsibility for monitoring and reviewing the use of Tasers by all British Police Forces. This decision will also aid the operational effectiveness of mainland Police Forces by allowing the return of unwanted and faulty Tasers to overseas manufacturers. The export of Tasers other than to Police Forces in Crown Dependencies, and certain Overseas Territories, or for return to the manufacturer, remains prohibited. I had intended to issue this statement before Christmas, but more time was required for further cross- Whitehall consultation. This has now concluded and the statement can now be issued. I am copying this letter to Richard Ottaway. 8 February 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills

FOLLOW UP TO ORAL EVIDENCE TO THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS

I welcomed the opportunity to give oral evidence to the Committees on Arms Export Controls earlier this week. I agreed to follow up in writing on several points.

First, I would like to apologise that the Committees did not receive my letter regarding the UKTI Defence & Security Organisation (DSO) priority markets for 2011–12. I have attached the letter sent on Monday 6 February 2012 for the Committees’ information.

During my evidence session, the Committees asked about certain events at the “Defence and Security Equipment International” (DSEI) Exhibition in September 2011.

This exhibition is a commercial event organised by the company Clarion Events. My department issued an Open Individual Trade Control Licence to Clarion Events to cover any activities which might take place at DSEI which might fall under the heading of “acts calculated to promote the supply or delivery of military goods from one overseas country to another” and therefore require a licence.

The terms and conditions of this licence made clear that no “Category A” goods—which would include cluster munitions and torture equipment—were to be exhibited at the exhibition. As has been the practice at past exhibitions, my Department and officials from other Government Departments worked closely with Clarion Events to assist them in ensuring that these conditions were adhered to.

On 14 September 2011, it came to the attention of Clarion that the company Beechwood Equipment were displaying on their stand a brochure which included certain Category A items. Clarion closed the stand with immediate effect.

On 15 September, Clarion were notified that literature promoting cluster munitions had been found in material from both the Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO) of Pakistan and also the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF). Having consulted the relevant Government departments Clarion immediately closed the DEPO pavilion, which included the POF stand.

Both cluster munitions and leg shackles are classified as category A goods and are subject to control under the Export Control Order 2008. Under Article 21, it is prohibited for persons carrying out activities in the United Kingdom or United Kingdom persons anywhere in the world to “...(c) do any act calculated to promote the supply or delivery of any category A goods, where that person knows or has reason to believe that such action or actions will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country”.

To successfully prove an offence has been committed, HMRC would need to show that the company’s action “will, or may, result in the removal of those goods from one third country to another third country”. Having an item listed in a catalogue may not in itself be sufficient to prove an offence has occurred. HMRC officers must make a judgement on the appropriate enforcement action to take based on the details of each case, including what action is proportionate and what is in the best interests of law enforcement. In these cases officers judged that the action taken by the organisers was proportionate and appropriate and there were not sufficient grounds to take further action. The Committee also asked whether allowing people to exhibit catalogues for equipment whose export was prohibited represented a “loophole” in the law. I have asked my officials to look into this and I will write to the Committees again with my conclusions. 13 February 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I undertook at the Committees’ recent Oral Evidence Session, to provide a copy of our Overseas Security and Justice Assistance (OSJA) Guidance. I enclose a copy.

The Guidance can also be found online at: http://ww.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/global-issues/human-rights/osja-guidance-151211.pdf

I was grateful for your suggestion that we promote more prominently in the Guidance the need to refer to the Consolidated Criteria when looking at the provision of equipment as part of security and justice assistance. I have asked my officials to reflect this when the Guidance is next reviewed in April. 20 February 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 30 January in which you posed questions relating to the “sub-strategic” capability of Trident. The term “sub-strategic” as it pertains to nuclear weapons has been used in NATO since the 1980s to refer to intermediate and short-range nuclear weapons. Between 1966 and 1998 the UK fulfilled this role principally through the WE177 air-launched bomb. Other systems included nuclear weapons aboard surface . These have now all been withdrawn, (the last WE177 was decommissioned in March 1998), and the Trident-based weapons system is now the UK’s only nuclear weapons system. Since the Trident system came into service, we have had some flexibility in the scale of any use of our nuclear deterrent. This flexibility stems from an ability to vary the number of missiles and warheads which might be used and the ability to employ a reduced yield from our nuclear warhead. We plan to retain this since baying a degree of flexibility in the potential scale of its use makes our “deterrent more credible against the range of nuclear threats we may face in the future.” What has changed is the way in which we describe this capability and this is where we currently differ slightly from NATO terminology. Since 2007 the British Government has ceased to refer to a sub-strategic capability in relation to Trident. This is for the simple reason that we believe any use of our deterrent would be strategic in intent and in effect. Since the British Government no longer uses the phrase “sub-strategic” to describe this capability and there exists no internationally agreed definition of what comprises a sub-strategic nuclear capability, the British Government ascribes no specific range to the term “sub-strategic”. As regards your final question, we do not consider that any of the capabilities of Trident represent a potential breache to the terms of the intermediate-range nuclear forces Treaty (INF). 20 February 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your valuable contribution to the FAC’s recent Westminster Hall debate on the FCO’s 2010 Command Paper on Human Rights and Democracy. You made a number of salient points, which I shall try to answer below. You asked firstly why it is that the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Human Right Guidance (“OSJA Guidance”) guidance we published recently contained no reference to women’s rights. As we made clear in the Guidance, the document was not intended, as an exhaustive list of all possible human rights violations nor of all the mitigation steps that might be appropriate in a particular situation but is a way of ensuring that a consistent approach to the consideration of human rights implications is taken.. The document is intended as a working document. The Guidance does however refer specifically to sexual violence and human trafficking, issues which affect women and girls in particular; and more broadly, the need to protect and promote women’s rights is mainstreamed throughout the Guidance. The Guidance also lists the persecution of an identifiable group as a specific potential violation that should be considered. This is intended to include persecution on the grounds of gender as well as on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, etc. The FCO is currently holding an internal review of the Guidance, which will include a review of those elements that deal with gender issues. The review will focus on how the Guidance has been implemented and whether any further changes need to be made to ensure the Guidance, is effective, and user-friendly. The review will also be an opportunity for users of the Guidance to provide feedback on the content of the Guidance, including the extent to which it supports our goal of protecting and promoting women’s rights. You also asked about the lack of reference to the Consolidated Criteria on arms exports in the Guidance. In fact, reference to the Consolidated Criteria can be found on page 9, in Checklist A, the practical tool intended to assist staff to apply the Guidance. In footnote 2, which appears in full on the first page of Checklist A, the Guidance states: “The Checklist is not intended to cover the export of military or security equipment although much of the information relevant to this Guidance will be relevant to assessments made under the Export Licensing Criteria. If the provision of equipment is part of your assistance, you must consult the Consolidated Arms Export Licensing Criteria.” Although it is intended that information sought under this Guidance can be used to help make decisions under the Consolidated Criteria, the specific tests set out in the Consolidated Criteria and the processes already in place to deal with arms exports must apply when there is a question of exporting arms. It is therefore important that staff should be specifically directed to the Consolidated Criteria and the departments with expertise in this area when faced with decisions on arms exports.” You also suggested that the Government had “gone soft” on Bahrain in view of its strategic importance. I want to assure you that this is not the case. Although Bahrain is a key ally, we do not hesitate to express cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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disagreement with the Bahrain authorities where we feel it to be necessary. We have therefore made it clear to them that the civil rights of peaceful opposition figures, along with the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, must be respected. We have also said that we expect the Bahrain Government to meet its human rights obligations by ensuring its citizens can exercise the universal human rights and freedoms to which they are entitled and to which it has committed. The King of Bahrain met the Prime Minister in December following the publication of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. Their discussions focussed on the King’s plans to implement reforms in the country, during which the Prime Minister emphasised the importance of strengthening respect for human rights in Bahrain. He urged the King to deliver swiftly on the commitments he has made to implement the recommendations from the Inquiry and to drive forward reform and reconciliation in the country, engaging with the opposition as part of that process. We continue to encourage the Bahraini Government to ensure there is greater accountability against those that commit human rights abuses. I am asking for a copy of this letter to be placed in the Library of the House. Copies will also be sent to Richard Ottaway as Chairman of the FAC and to Andrew Rosindell, who chaired our debate on 26 January. 20 February 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committee from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letters of 24 October and 16 December 2011 about the Government’s answers to the CAEC’s questions on the Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 2010 Arms Export Licensing information provided by the Government. As I mentioned at our recent discussion at the CAEC Oral Evidence session on 7 February, your letter and proposals raised some important issues regarding the handling of classified material that we provide to the Committees. My officials have been working to clarify our procedures to allow us to provide the Committees with as much unclassified information as possible in response to their questions, supplemented by classified information where necessary to further inform the Committees’ thinking and understanding of the issues. Vince Cable and I have said we wish to be as open as possible on these issues, both in the interest of thorough public scrutiny of arms exports and of inspiring greater public confidence in the process. The challenge is, as you appreciate, to provide the Committees with as much helpful and comprehensive information as we can from a range of sources, while balancing this with the different sensitivities including our national security. To this end, and to facilitate publication of information by the Committees, my officials have recast the information already provided to you for Quarters 3 and 4 for 2010, into an unclassified paper containing a set of responses to Section A questions, drawn from (ii) a classified paper that provides responses to all the Committees’ Section A and B questions. I enclose a set of papers for each quarter. The classified paper clearly specifies which part of an answer is classified and which is not. We hope you will respect the reasons why we set the responses out in this way. The responses are the product of very careful consideration and these papers should provide the Committees with as full as picture as possible of the issues. The unclassified paper provides information that the Committees may release into the public domain. The classified paper is for the Committees’ own use and provides details of some of the underlying information that we are not able to disclose publicly, but which will hopefully give the Committees greater confidence in that licensing decisions are soundly based. I trust that this solution provides the transparency that you seek.

REQUESTS FOR WRITTEN INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS Quarterly Report for July–September 2010 Section A: Questions Related to Public Material Question: Angola: OIEL refused for americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non- military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets;

Response: This OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs due to potential Criterion 5c (risk of reverse engineering) and Criterion 7 (risk of diversion) concerns under The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Question: Argentina: SIELs issued for components for destroyers, components for military utility helicopters and products containing plutonium-239.

Response: (a) The goods (components for destroyers) were components to complete repairs. The Government concluded at the time of approval that despite previous hostilities there were no Criterion 5 concerns. (b) The goods in this application (components for military utility helicopters) were for helicopters used in civil search and rescue operations. Approval was therefore recommended in the absence of any sustainable reason under the Criteria to the contrary. (c) The goods (samples containing plutonium-239) were for use in a worldwide environmental radioactivity proficiency (blind) test exercise. The countries who took part in this proficiency test were then granted the correct accreditation. The Government considered that no criteria thresholds were breached. Question: : OIEL refused for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software, technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of software for the use of equipment employing cryptography. Specifically, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why this OIEL was refused when two apparently identical OIELs were issued;

Response: This OIEL was rejected because of concerns related to the value of the goods proposed for export. The exporter was asked to apply for SIELs instead. Subsequently OIELs were approved as the values of the exports did not raise any Criterion 8 concerns, otherwise being similar to the previous OIEL. Question: Bahrain: OIEL issued for CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades

Response: The application was approved in August 2010. On the basis of the evidence available at the time we concluded that there was no clear risk that these goods might be used for internal repression or diverted to an undesirable end-use. The Government reviewed export licences to Bahrain in February 2011 in light of the changed circumstances in that country. As a result Bahrain was removed as an eligible destination from this OIEL. Question: Bulgaria: OIEL issued for americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non- military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets

Response: This application was for equipment to be used by, or under the supervision or instructions of employees of, a private company in provision of oilfield production services. The application therefore presented no Criteria concerns. Question: China: SIELs issued for technology for the use of military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment employing cryptography (33 licences), equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography (9 licences) and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography; Question on China Revised by CAEC: Given that there have reportedly been a number of large-scale cyber attacks emanating from Chinese jurisdiction in recent years, the Committees would be grateful to know why, inter alia, three SIELs (Single Export licences) for cryptographic software were granted, rather than refused under Criterion 5 (equipment which could be used against the UK) of the Consolidated Criteria.

Response: Licences for cryptographic software were granted for export to [commercial] telecommunications companies who supply secure communications, for example wireless network connectivity, secure broadband networks and business radio networks. These applications were in line with the Consolidated Criteria. The exports in question cannot be used to mount cyber attacks. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Question: China: The Committees would also be grateful for further information about why two SIELs were issued for China for computer analogue to digital equipment, given that two SIELs for identical equipment were refused;

Response: The two SIELs granted for computer analogue to digital equipment were for civil end-uses such as provision of wireless communications & networking. These applications raised no concerns against the Consolidated Criteria. The two licences were rejected under Criteria 5 and 7 as the equipment was a high specification and there was a clear risk of diversion to the military. Question: Colombia: OIEL refused for bomb suits, civil body armour, components for bomb suits, components for civil body armour, components for explosive ordnance disposal equipment, demolition devices, explosive ordnance disposal equipment, improvised explosive device disposal equipment, military devices for initiating explosives, military firing sets, military helmets, mine detection equipment, non-military firing sets;

Response: This OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELS due to potential Criterion 7 (risk of diversion) concerns under The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. This was based on the type of equipment to be supplied and the situation in Colombia at the time of the application. Question: Hong Kong Administrative Region: SIELs issued for cryptographic software (8 licences) equipment employing cryptography (20 licences), equipment for the development of equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, semiconductor process equipment, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography (8 licences);

Response: A majority of these applications were for cryptographic software and equipment employing cryptography for communications companies who supply secure communications, for example to provide banks with secure network data transfer. Only one licence was issued for imaging cameras and one issued for semiconductor process equipment. Both were issued to Universities for civil research purposes into medical science and electronics. All these applications were assessed against the Consolidated Criteria and we had no concerns for the stated end use and end users. Question: India: SIELs issued for components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment, corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment (3 licences)

Response: (a) Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment. This was equipment to be used in manufacturing a chemical which is used as a fungicide and parasiticide. (b) Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment. The application related to a part which was to be incorporated into equipment used in a steel manufacturing plant. (c) Corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment. This was equipment to be used in an oil refinery. (d) Components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment. This equipment was spare parts for other equipment exported for end use in an oil refinery. Question: Revised CAEC Question on Iran: Given the existence of an extensive regime of international sanctions against Iran, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why SIELs were granted, inter alia, for materials testing equipment and valves. The Committees note that other licence applications for these items were refused during this period.

Response: Some applications were for goods controlled on the UK national control list (PL9009—civil aircraft and equipment) Such civil aviation equipment is not caught by any of the sanctions regimes against Iran and we assessed there was no clear risk of the goods being used for internal repression or being diverted to military end-use. Other licences granted related to exports where an export licence was required for normally non- controlled goods under the WMD End-Use control. The licences were approved because in each case it was assessed there was no clear risk of the goods being used in a programme of concern. Question: Iraq: OIEL refused for equipment employing cryptography; cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 170 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

Response: The application for an OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs. The goods were intended for Government-linked end-users and this raised concerns that the goods may potentially be used for military applications. As a result, and because there is still an arms embargo against Iraq, we decided that an open licence was not appropriate for this type of export. This is consistent with the approach we have taken for other such OIEL applications for Iraq for this kind of equipment. Question: Israel: SIELs issued for components for naval electronic warfare equipment (2 licences), naval electronic warfare equipment, imaging cameras and nuclear grade graphite;

Response: Naval electronic warfare equipment These goods were for use in . We have no evidence to suggest that the use of this class of by the Israeli Defence Forces would cause concern under the Consolidated Criteria.

Imaging cameras Applications included: (a) equipment being returned to the Israeli manufacturer after demonstration in the UK. The unit was a demonstration unit which was originally manufactured in Israel and so would not supply Israel with additional capability it did not already have. Therefore the export did not raise concerns under the Criteria. (b) a camera intended for academic experimental research. Given that these goods were intended for use in a university for research purposes we had no concerns under the Criteria. (c) an application for a temporary SIEL for a camera for use by the applicant’s distributor in Israel to be demonstrated in Jerusalem and compared to standard CCTV cameras. As the goods were to be returned to the UK the application did not raise concerns under the Criteria. (d) a camera being returned to Israel after repair carried out by the UK manufacturer. The camera was to be used for research purposes by a scientific institute. Therefore the export did not raise concerns under the Criteria. (e) an application for a temporary SIEL for a camera to be loaned for demonstration to potential clients for commercial applications. The goods were to be returned to the UK. Therefore the export raised no concerns under the Consolidated Criteria.

Nuclear grade graphite These goods are to be machined into consumable products (crucibles, dies etc) to be used in the metallurgical industry. Given the legitimate end-use of these goods this export raised no concerns under the Consolidated Criteria. Question: Israel: OIELs refused for: (a) americium-241, devices for initiating explosives, hydrophones, linear cutting explosive charges, materials containing natural uranium, materials containing thorium, neutron generators, non-military detonators, non-military firing sets, oxidisers, technology for the use of devices for initiating explosives, technology for the use of linear cutting explosive charges, technology for the use of non- military detonators, technology for the use of non-military firing sets; (b) software for the use of test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems, test equipment for aircraft missile protection systems;

Response: Given the nature of the goods and the destination the applications for OIELs were rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs instead so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports. Question: Kenya: Temporary OIEL issued for technology for the development of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the development of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the development of nuclear reactors, technology for the production of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the production of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the production of nuclear reactors, technology for the use of nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, technology for the use of nuclear reactor fuel element fabrication equipment, technology for the use of nuclear reactors;

Response: This temporary OIEL application was made to cover the transmission of information (technology) to a number of overseas destinations including Kenya. The intended recipient of this information was an individual employed by a UK energy company. The purpose of the information transfers was to enable him to undertake cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 171

work whilst travelling overseas and remain contactable. The licence was granted as there were no Consolidated Criteria concerns on this end use. Question: Lebanon: OIEL refused for equipment employing cryptography;

Response: The application for an OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs. The goods were intended for Government-linked end-users and this raised concerns that the goods may potentially be used for military applications. As there is a UN Arms Embargo on Lebanon we decided that an open licence was not appropriate for these exports. Question: Libya: SIELs issued for crowd control ammunition (three licences), small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition (two licences), equipment employing cryptography and neutron generators.

Response: Crowd control ammunition, small arms ammunition, tear gas/irritant ammunition These applications were approved with the proviso that the goods would not be released to Libyan control until after successful completion of a training programme. The training was audited by MOD police officials and our Post in Tripoli confirmed that the training was carried out successfully. We concluded that there was no clear risk that the goods would be used for internal repression in contravention of Criterion 2. All these applications have subsequently been revoked.

Equipment employing cryptography This application was for equipment to be demonstrated at a defence and security exhibition. The equipment was to remain under the exporters control at all times whilst abroad. This temporary licence was subsequently revoked.

Neutron generators The neutron generator was a tool to be used to gather geological data. The equipment was to remain under the control of the exporter’s (an international company) employees at all times. Question: Malaysia: OIEL refused for CS hand grenades, demolition charges, demolition devices, exploding simulation devices, fire simulation equipment for small arms ammunition, illuminators, military devices for initiating explosives, signal flares, signal hand grenades, smoke ammunition, smoke canisters, smoke generators, smoke hand grenades, stun grenades, tear gas/irritant ammunition, tear gas/riot control agents, thunderflashes, training anti-aircraft ammunition, training hand grenades.

Response: Given the nature of the goods and the destination the OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports to specific end-users. Question: Russia: OIEL refused for components for armoured fighting vehicles, components for armoured personnel carriers, components for combat aircraft, components for combat helicopters, components for military aero-engines, components for military search and rescue aircraft, components for military surveillance aircraft, components for military training aircraft, components for military utility aircraft, components for military utility helicopters, components for military utility vehicles, components for naval engines, components for patrol craft, components for tanker aircraft.

Response: Given the nature of the goods and the destination this OIEL was rejected and the exporter advised to apply for SIELs so that greater scrutiny could be given to specific exports to specific end-users. Question: Saudi Arabia: SIEL issued for components for combat aircraft.

Response: The goods were components for end-use by the Royal Saudi Air Force. In assessing the application we took all relevant information into account including the events during the Saudi-Yemen border conflict in 2009. We concluded that there was no clear risk that the goods might be used in internal repression, external aggression or diverted to an undesirable end-use. Question: Turkey: SIELs issued for components for combat aircraft (two licences), toxins and products containing plutonium-239. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 172 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

Response:

NB. When researching the answer to the above question we found six SIELs issued for components for combat aircraft. Details of all these applications can be found below.

Applications included: (a) The export licence application was for parts to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate end user was a third party government. The proposed export did not raise any concerns against the Criteria. (b) The export licence application was for parts to be used in a combat aircraft. The Government judged that the equipment would be used for legitimate national defence and NATO operation purposes only and therefore did not raise concerns under the Criteria. (c) The export licence application was for parts to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate end user was a third party government. The criteria thresholds were not met and the equipment could not be directly linked to any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region. (d) The goods exported were spare parts for a combat aircraft. The FCO considered that criteria thresholds were not met for this export licence application. (e) The export licence application was for parts to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate end user was a third party government. The criteria thresholds were not met and the equipment could not be directly linked to any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region. (f) The export licence application was for parts to be installed in equipment in a combat aircraft. The ultimate end user was a third party government. The criteria thresholds were not met and the equipment could not be directly linked to any possible diversion, tensions or abuses in the region. (g) The “toxins” were for use in the veterinary medicine department of a major university. The Government considered that they would be used for legitimate scientific purposes and there were no concerns under the Criteria. (h) The products containing Plutonium-239 were for use in a worldwide environmental test exercise by an end-user who was assessed to be the competent national authority to handle these goods. The FCO considered that this sample would be used for legitimate scientific purposes and there were no concerns under the Criteria. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Department for International Development Ministry of Defence

REQUESTS FOR WRITTEN INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS

Quarterly Report for October-December 2010

Section A: Questions Related to Public Material Question: Bahrain: For which of the items approved for export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked?

Anti-armour ammunition, components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of launching/handling/control equipment for munitions equipment for the use of sniper rifles, gun silencers, launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, small arms ammunition, sporting guns.

Response:

Of the licences issued in Q4, licences for the following goods have been revoked: components for launching/handling/control equipment for munitions, equipment for the use of sniper rifles, small arms ammunition.

Question: Bahrain: In addition, for which of the items approved for temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have all of these items been returned to the UK? If so, when, in each case, did this take place?

Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 173

Response: We revoked a temporary SIEL for equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts that had been originally issued in Q4 2010. It should be noted that for temporary SIELs exporters are obliged to return the goods within 12 months from the date of issue of the licence and they should contact us to inform us when the goods have been returned. It is not our practice to revoke temporary licences, as this potentially removes the obligation to return the goods to the UK, however in the case referred to above circumstances allowed us to do so. Question: Bahrain: Have either of the two OIELs granted during this period been revoked? If so, please specify which ones and why the decision was taken.

Response: Neither of the two OIELs issued during this period have been revoked. Question: : Why was a SIEL granted for imaging cameras, rather than (as were other items applied for during this period) refused under the terms of either or both Criteria 2 and 3 of the Consolidated Criteria?

Response: The equipment in question was rated as dual-use and the licence was approved in January 2011. The stated end-user was a municipal fire department and the stated end-use was fire fighting for civilian use. The Government was satisfied that this was the intended purpose. Question: : Given the human rights situation in Chad and neighbouring countries, why was an OITCL granted for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection and components for all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, rather than refused under the terms of any, all or some of Criteria 2, 3 and 4 of the Consolidated Criteria?

Response: The vehicle and components were to be used for protection of staff of an international organisation. After considering all the information available, we judged the risk threshold under criterions 2, 3 and 4 was not met. Question: China: Given the human rights record of the Chinese Government, why was a SIEL granted for small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of either the EU Arms Embargo or Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?

Response: The goods in question were sporting gun ammunition for a sporting end-use. Approval of this application was consistent with our previous advice and interpretation that sporting ammunition is not caught under the EU Arms Embargo. No clear risks were identified to suggest such sporting-gun ammunition would raise Criteria 2 concerns. Question: Djibouti: Given the human rights record of the Government of Djibouti, why were SIELs granted for assault rifles, gun silencers, semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition and sniper rifles, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?

Response: These goods are for use by private security companies who are undertaking maritime security work on behalf of commercial shipping companies in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden. We therefore judged there was not a clear risk that such weapons would be used in contravention of Criterion 2 as they were not for use by the armed forces or internal security forces of Djibouti. Question: Egypt: For which of the items approved for export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Body armour, components for military electronic equipment, components for military radars, components for optical target acquisition equipment, components for optical target surveillance equipment, military helmets and imaging cameras

Response: None of the SIELS granted for exports to Egypt during this quarter have been revoked. Question: Egypt: In addition, for which of the items approved for temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have all of these items been returned to the UK? Equipment for the use of weapon day and night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon day and night sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 174 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

Response: None of the SIELS granted for exports to Egypt during this quarter have been revoked. Question: Hong Kong: Given the human rights record of the Government of China, how were concerns about diversion under Criteria 7—and then by extension, Criteria 2—of the Consolidated Criteria allayed with regard to the SIELs granted for assault rifles, body armour, components for body armour, components for machine guns, machine guns, pistols and imaging cameras?

Response: Criterion Two and Criterion Seven are criteria of concern for licence applications for Hong Kong but for the SIELs referenced we were satisfied that the applications did not breach the Consolidated Criteria for the following reasons: (a and b) The imaging cameras were for cameras for use at university and their proposed end use raised no criteria concerns. (c) The body armour and related equipment were to be used by the Hong Kong Government Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government, which has autonomy from the Chinese Central Government on matters of public order, including policing and correctional services. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that the export would contravene the criteria. (d) This application for assault rifles was for out of service ex-Russian military equipment for use in the film industry. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that the export would contravene the criteria. (e) This application was for body armour and related equipment to be used by the Hong Kong Government Special Administrative Region (SAR) Government, which has autonomy from the Chinese Central Government on matters of public order, including policing and correctional services. We therefore judged that there was no clear risk that the export would contravene the criteria. (f) This application was for the demonstration and onward sale of imaging cameras for the municipal fire and rescue services. There had been previous exports of this equipment direct to the Chinese fire services. Question: Israel: Given the actions of the Government of Israel in the Palestinian Occupied Territories in recent years, the Committees would be grateful for further information regarding the following SIELs that were granted during this period: all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection, components for unmanned air vehicles, launching/handling/control/support equipment for unmanned air vehicles, military utility vehicles, small arms ammunition.

Response: Applications included: (a) These goods were components for unmanned air vehicles for use in a UK military programme. Therefore we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and the licence was granted. (b) This small arms ammunition was for use by athletes for training and competitions at national and international level. Therefore we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and the licence was granted. (c) These all-wheel drive vehicles with ballistic protection were to be used for the protection and safety of staff of an international media organisation. Therefore we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns And the licence was granted. (d) This military utility vehicle was a concept model for demonstration purposes only. Therefore we had no Consolidated Criteria concerns and the licence was granted. Question: Jordan: Given that there have been pro-democracy protests in Jordan since the beginning of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for further information about how end-use is being monitored regarding the following SIELs that were granted during this period: assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for combat aircraft, components for military combat vehicles, components for military support aircraft, components for military support vehicles, components for military utility vehicles, military combat vehicles, pistols, small arms ammunition and technology for the use of military combat vehicles

Response: The best means of ensuring that goods are not misused is to conduct a rigorous assessment at the licence application stage. This includes careful examination of the information on the proposed end use and end user of the goods. The primary purpose of any monitoring of equipment once it has left the UK is to generate information to assist the risk assessment of other current or future similar applications. UK Overseas Posts have standing instructions to report misuse of UK-origin defence equipment. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 175

We also take account of a variety of different reporting on end-use which includes reports coming from NGOs, human rights organisation reports, media reporting, and intelligence reports. Posts overseas are instructed to report to the FCO any misuse of UK-supplied equipment. Question: Kazakhstan: Given the human rights record of the Government of Kazakhstan, why was a SIEL granted for small arms ammunition, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?

Response: The goods in question were sporting gun ammunition intended for sporting end-use by civilian end-users. As such the proposed export did not raise Criterion 2 concerns. Question: Kenya: Given that many observers judge that there is a clear risk of renewed violence in Kenya in the context of the 2012 national elections, why were SIELs granted for air guns, components for military support vehicles, components for military training aircraft, components for pistols, components for rifles, military support vehicles, pistols, rifles, small arms ammunition, weapon sights, rather than refused under the terms of Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria? In asking this question, the Committees note that SIELs for components for semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols, semi-automatic pistols and technology for the use of semi-automatic pistols were refused on precisely these grounds. For the same reason, the Committees would be grateful for further information about why SITCLs for bombs, components for air-to-surface rockets and small calibre artillery ammunition were granted during this period.

Response: All applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis against the Consolidated Criteria. Consideration of the prevailing circumstances in the country, the human rights records of the end user and the risk of internal repression (Criterion 2) are prevalent in our assessments. But for the SIELs referenced below the decision to issue the licences (except for two licences referred to in the question that were refused) were reached after concluding that there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 and that none of the other Criteria were engaged. (a) We received an application for military support vehicles intended for end use by an international organisation. There were no Criterion 2 concerns and the application was therefore approved. (b) We received an application for components for repairing ex-military vehicles for civil end use by a private company in the tourism industry. There were no Criterion 2 concerns and the application was therefore approved. (c-f) We received several applications for rifles, pistols and small arms ammunition that were for private individuals and intended for their own end use. There were no Criterion 2 concerns and the applications were therefore approved. (g) We received an application for components for training Aircraft for end use by the Air Force. There was no clear risk under the Criteria for this end use or end user. The application was therefore approved. (h) We received an application for air guns and pistols for onward sale to police and military officers and other individuals authorised to possess firearms. The application was refused in part (pistols) under Criterion 2 because we judged that there was a clear risk that these goods might be used in internal repression if supplied to the Kenyan Police. The application was issued in part for air guns as there was no clear risk under Criterion 2 for use by private individuals for sporting purposes. (i) We received an application for pistols for onward sale to police and military officers and other individuals authorised to possess firearms. The application was refused under Criterion 2 because we judged that there was a clear risk that these goods might be used in internal repression if supplied to the Kenyan Police.

Why SITCLs for bombs, components for air-to-surface rockets and small calibre artillery ammunition were granted during this period This was a single licence for assorted types of ammunition intended for use by the military. There is no evidence of such goods being used against the civilian population and no clear risk identified under Criterion 2. Question: Libya: For which of the items approved for permanent export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Body armour components for combat aircraft military equipment for initiating explosives cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, software for the use of equipment employing cryptography, direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights weapon sight mounts, weapon sights. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 176 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

Response: All licences issued for body armour, components for combat aircraft, military equipment for initiating explosives, direct view imaging equipment, equipment for the use of weapon sights technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights weapon sight mounts and weapon sights were subsequently revoked. Some licences for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography and software for the use of equipment employing cryptography remain extant as they were issued to civil end users for civil end use and raised no Consolidated Criteria concerns when all extant Libya licences were reviewed in Q1 2011. Question: Libya: In addition, for which of the items approved for temporary export below have SIELs subsequently been revoked? Have all of these items been returned to the UK? Anti-riot/ballistic shields, assault rifles, components for assault rifles, components for automatic piloting systems for parachuted loads, components for gun mountings, components for machine guns, components for military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/disposal/jamming equipment, components for military parachutes, gun mountings, inert chaff, inert decoy flares, inert illuminators, inert signal flares, inert smoke canisters, inert smoke hand grenades, inert stun grenades, inert thunderflashes, machine guns, military combat vehicles, military communications equipment, military improvised explosive device decoying/detection/ disposal/jamming equipment, military parachutes, military parachutist equipment, military utility vehicles, semi-automatic pistols, sniper rifles, sniper rifles, software enabling equipment to function as forward observer/ target recognition training equipment, software for software for the simulation of military operation scenarios, training small arms ammunition, weapon cleaning equipment, weapon sights, equipment employing cryptography, imaging cameras, cryptographic software, equipment for the use of weapon night sights, imaging cameras, military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts.

Response: The licences referred to were for temporary export for exhibition at the LibDex Exhibition which took place in Tripoli in November 2010 and was a trade show for the safety and security industry. All the above licences were either revoked or surrendered. All but one exporter has assured us that the goods have been returned. This exporter has been unable to confirm the current location of the equipment they exported for the exhibition. Question: Libya: The Committees would also be grateful to know whether the OIEL granted during this period has been revoked.

Response: The OIEL issued during this period has not been revoked. This OIEL was for cryptographic software, equipment employing cryptography, technology for the use of cryptographic software and technology for the use of equipment employing cryptography. It was decided not to remove Libya from this OIEL (other destinations were covered by the licence) as the goods were dual-use products for onward supply to civilian and business end users. Question: : Given that the capital, Maputo, saw riots in September 2010 in which a number of civilians were shot dead, why was a SIEL granted for body armour and components for body armour, rather than refused under Criteria 2 of the Consolidated Criteria?

Response: The stated end user on this application was an organisation specialising in the clearing of land mines. The Government considered that as the goods would be used for humanitarian purposes the proposed export did not raise concerns under the Criteria. Question: Oman: Given that there was some unrest in Oman during the first quarter of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for more information about why none of the SIELs granted for the items below have been revoked as part of the Government’s review of arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa. How strong are the assurances received regarding end-use? Components for weapon sight mounts; components for weapon sights; equipment for the use of sniper rifles; gun mountings; gun silencers, semi-automatic pistols, small arms ammunition, sniper rifles sniper rifles, technology for sniper rifles. The Committees raise the same issues with regard to one of the OIELs granted during this period, which covers the following items: Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier, equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence Ev 177

technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights The Committees raise the same issues with regard to the SITCL granted during this period for components for assault rifles.

Response: We examined all extant export licences for Oman following the limited unrest in the country, and were satisfied that all licences granted for Oman remained, and continue to remain, consistent with the Criteria. In line with normal practice, export licences are kept under review and scrutinised in light of changing facts on the ground. Question: Saudi Arabia: Given that there was some unrest in Saudi Arabia during the first quarter of 2011, the Committees would be grateful for more information about why none of the SIELs granted for the items below have been revoked as part of the Government’s review of arms sales to the Middle East and North Africa. Why does the UK believe that the assurances relating to end-use will not be breached? Components for military combat vehicles, components for military communications equipment, components for military helicopters, components for military infrared/thermal imaging equipment, equipment for the use of bombs, equipment for the use of military communications equipment, ground vehicle military communications equipment , military communications equipment, software for military communications equipment, technology for bombs, weapon night sights, imaging cameras The Committees raise the same issues with regard to one of the OIELs granted during this period, which covers the following items: Components for gun laying equipment, components for military image intensifier, equipment, components for weapon night sights, components for weapon sights, equipment for the use of weapon sights, gun laying equipment, military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of equipment for the use of weapon sights, technology for the use of gun laying equipment, technology for the use of military image intensifier equipment, technology for the use of weapon night sights, technology for the use of weapon sight mounts, technology for the use of weapon sights, weapon night sights, weapon sight mounts, weapon sights

Response: We examined all extant export licences for Saudi Arabia during the spring, and were satisfied that all licences granted for Saudi Arabia remained, and continue to remain, consistent with the Criteria. To date, there is no evidence that UK supplied equipment has been used in breach of the Criteria in Saudi Arabia, or in Bahrain where Saudi forces were deployed to protect installations as part of the Peninsula Shield force, at the legitimate request of the Bahraini Government. In line with normal practice, export licences are reviewed when there has been a significant change of circumstances on the ground. Question: : The Committees would be grateful for further information about how the SIEL granted for military equipment for initiating explosives is consistent with the arms trade sanctions currently in place. The Committees raise the same issue regarding the OITCL granted for: Promoting the supply of Category B goods, promoting the supply of military goods, promoting the supply of pepper sprays for self protection, promoting the supply of portable anti-riot devices, promoting the supply of tear gas for self protection and promoting the supply of tear gas/riot- control agents

Response: This SIEL was for military equipment for initiating explosives. As they are non-lethal items for humanitarian use they fall under the exemption set out in paragraph 9 of UNSCR 1556 (2004) which states that the arms embargo shall not apply to “Supplies of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian, human rights monitoring or protective use, and related technical training and assistance”. The OITCL was approved for the insurance of de-mining equipment for an NGO operating in Sudan. Question: Tunisia: The Committees would be grateful for information about why two SIELs for equipment employing cryptography were granted.

Response: Both licences were granted for supply to commercial entities for civil end use and did not raise any concerns under the Criteria. Question: United States: The Committees would be grateful for further information about the OIEL granted for toxins. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

Ev 178 Committees on Arms Export Controls: Evidence

Response:

We approved two OIELs with a stated civil end-use. We had no Criterion 1 concerns about these applications.

Question: : The Committees note that this country entry appears to be missing from the pivot report. They would be grateful to receive this information and ask that the report be duly corrected.

Response:

Unfortunately there was an error in the published report, for which we apologise. We are working to correct the error. However, the correct data may be obtained by creating a bespoke report from the searchable database.

Question: Finally, with regard to Open General Export Licences (OGLs), as per the table on pages 9–10 of the pivot report, please provide more information about the OGL named “X”, for which there were two registrations during this period; and give explanations for why a number of OGLs were revoked in full during this period.

Response:

The OGEL “X” allows the export of certain dual-use items to certain destinations, subject to the terms and conditions set out in the licence. Information about the licence and a copy of the licence is available on the export control pages of the BusinessLink website.

The Table shows all Open General Licences in full, including those that have been revoked. The appearance of a revoked licence in this Table does not indicate that the licence was revoked in this period. We would welcome the Committees’ views as to whether fully revoked licences should be excluded from this Table completely or whether it would be helpful to include them with the date of revocation. Regarding the three revoked licences the reasons for revocation are as follows: Computers—revoked in September 2009—this licence authorised the export of certain high performance computers. However, changes to the control parameters agreed in the Wassenaar Arrangement meant that the coverage of the licence was minimal and feedback from exporters indicated that the licence was not used. Therefore it was revoked. Vintage Military Vehicles—revoked November 2009—was replaced by the Historic Military Vehicles and Artillery Pieces OGL in order to allow the export of a wider range of goods including artillery pieces and vehicles more than 50 years old where they are intended for historic re-enactment or commemorative events, private battlefield tours or private recreational purposes to all EU Member States plus Channel Islands and Norway, and providing they are returned to the UK within three calendar months. Open General Trade Control Licence (OGTCL)—revoked in April 2009—replaced by the OGTCL (Category C goods) and OGTCL (Small Arms) following the changes in the trade controls introduced in the Export Control Order 2008. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Department for International Development Ministry of Defence 21 February 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

At the CAEC Evidence Session on 7 February I undertook to write with further information about the type of equipment which is being exported to Yemen and Bahrain.

I enclose lists of all the types of licences which have been approved and refused for both Countries in 2011. All applications are assessed carefully against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria. As you will see from the lists we will only export equipment if we are satisfied that it will not be used for internal repression, taking into account the equipment and specified end user.

I have included information for the whole of 2011 in order to ensure that the Committees have as full a picture as possible and in view of your request to receive this information quickly. I believe this will best answer your question, but ask that you bear in mind the fact that BIS have not yet completed the normal process of rigorously checking the data for the fourth quarter of the year. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Annex Export Licences for Bahrain in 2011 Three SIELs for Bahrain were refused in 2011 for: — communications equipment; — components for armoured personnel carriers; and — anti-riot/ballistic shields. These applications were refused due to concerns that the goods could be used for internal repression (Criterion 2 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria).

Equipment Licensed for Export to Bahrain in 2011 SIELs approved in 2011 Dual Use Items — corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment for civil end use; — communications equipment for civil end use; — communications equipment for Government end use (to be used as a telecommunications system between two buildings and for internet connectivity); — inertial equipment for mapping civil end use; — NBC detection equipment for chemical agent detection for the Government; — air traffic control software for civil aviation authorities; — toxin test kit for the detection of toxins in food samples for civil end use; and — x-ray accelerators for screening purposes.

Military Rated Goods — military aircraft ground crew breathing equipment, engines and components for Hawk aircraft for use by the Government; — body armour for personal use by a named individual; — small quantities of small arms ammunition, guns, rifles and silencers for sporting shooting and vermin control; — military radars for Government end use; — artillery and equipment for naval or coastal use by the Government; and — non-lethal training hand grenades for Government end use. They are designed as an aid to basic military training to produce a realistic loud report and a bright flash. They are not designed for use in crowd control.

OIELs approved in 2011 Dual Use Items — inertial equipment for mapping for use on civil aircraft; — hydrophone arrays for the oil and gas industry; — corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment for civil end use; — radioactive sources for civil end use.

Military Rated Goods — tyres and inner tubes for combat aircraft, combat helicopters, military surveillance aircraft, military training aircraft, military — transport aircraft, military utility aircraft military utility helicopters and tanker aircraft for Government end use; — engines for installation onto trainer and combat aircraft for Government end use; — military improvised explosive device disposal equipment and military utility vehicles for defusing devices for Government end use; — electronic warfare equipment for naval intelligence gathering, threat warning and naval surveillance for Government end use; — aircraft cannon to be used on aircraft for Government end use; — small arms ammunition for sporting shooting; — components for all wheel drive vehicles for the repair and replacement of parts for Government end use; cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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— general naval vessel components for Government end use; and — communications equipment for temporary export to support sales. No OIELs for Bahrain were rejected in 2011. Since January 2011, 23 single licences and 18 open licences for Bahrain have been revoked.

Export Licences for Yemen in 2011 We receive very few export licence applications for Yemen. Equipment licensed for export in 2011:

SIELS approved in 2011 Dual Use Items — a portable chemical identifier returned after repair in the UK to be used by the security authorities in Yemen.

Military Rated Goods — body armour and one vehicle to be used by UN personnel; — armoured vehicle for use by the UN; — one engine for the C130 Hercules military transport aircraft used in Yemen to assist international partners.

Open Licences Approved components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment to a civil end user. Two SIELS for Yemen were refused in 2011 for: — body armour — riot shields These applications were refused due to concerns that the goods could be used for internal repression (Criterion 2 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria). No export licences for Yemen were revoked in 2011. 28 February 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from the Rt Hon Vince Cable MP, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills FURTHER FOLLOW UP TO ORAL EVIDENCE TO THE COMMITTEES ON ARMS EXPORT CONTROLS In my letter to you of 13 February, which followed up on points made about Defence and Security Equipment International (DSEi) 2011 during my oral evidence to the Committees on 7 February, I said that I would write further on the issue of whether the fact that the display of brochures related to “Category A” goods was not necessarily illegal represented a “loophole” in the law. I have looked into the matter and would like to take this opportunity to report back to you. As things stand, I am not persuaded that the law should be changed. The Government’s intention is to work through the organisers of the DSEi conference to make clear to all exhibitors, especially those who have displayed unacceptable material in the past, that we will not permit them to exhibit material relating to “Category A”, goods. If unacceptable material is found on display, we will ensure that the exhibition stand in question is closed down. I think that this, and not criminal prosecution, is a fair and proportionate response. As I said in my previous letter, there are two issues: firstly, it is necessary to prove a link between the display of the brochure, and the eventual movement of the goods between two overseas countries; and secondly, the fact that HMRC must act in a way that is proportionate and in the best interests of law enforcement when deciding what, if any, action to take. In all the cases of this type that have come to light, HMRC have concluded that closure of the exhibitor’s stand by the event organiser was proportionate and that no further action was appropriate. We could legislate to widen the scope of the controls on advertising and promotion, in order to remove the link between the act of promotion and the movement of goods between overseas countries, but the additional test of whether a criminal prosecution was in the public interest would still need to be met, and I am not convinced that in practice it could be. It is important to consider the scale of the problem. DSEi attracts around 1300 exhibitors. Despite the best efforts of officials from several Departments and of the organisers in ensuring that exhibitors are aware of relevant UK law, it is of course a matter for regret that one or two exhibitors simply do not get the message. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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But it must be emphasised that such infringements have been relatively limited, with only one or two incidents of this kind occurring at each event. As an alternative to regulation, I have however asked my officials in the Export Control Organisation to work even more closely, alongside colleagues in other Government Departments, with the organisers of DSEi both in advance of, and during, the next DSEi event in 2013 in order to prevent such occurrences and to be even more diligent in our policing of the event. 26 March 2012

Letter from the Chair of the Committees to the Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of February 28 with further information about the type of equipment which is being exported to Yemen and Bahrain. This was helpful to have. At the end of your letter you asked me to bear in mind the fact that BIS have not yet completed the normal process of rigorously checking the data for the fourth quarter of the year. The Committees on Arms Export Controls may wish to publish the further information you have provided. I should be grateful, therefore, that if there are any amendments to the information attached to your letter of 28 February, following the checking of the data for the fourth quarter of the year by BIS, I should be grateful for a copy of the further information as amended by 30 April. 16 April 2012

Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office I am writing to advise you about a change in our export controls to Argentina. The Business Secretary has today laid before the House a Written Ministerial Statement relating to a tightening of our export controls to Argentina. I enclose a copy. Since 1998 our approach has been to refuse exports which would allow Argentina to enhance her military capabilities but to approve licences for goods which maintained existing capability. As members of the Committees are aware from our responses to questions on the BIS quarterly reports, our exports to Argentina have included components for aircraft and naval vessels for maintenance purposes. In view of recent Argentine actions aimed at the economic interests of the Falkland Islanders, the Government has concluded that it is now appropriate to review this policy. With effect from today we are introducing new restrictions on the export of licensable trade and brokering to the Argentine military. In future no licences will be granted for military or dual use goods for military end users in Argentina unless there are compelling exceptional reasons to do so. Extant licences will be reviewed with a view to revoking any which are not consistent with this new policy. I am copying this letter to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee for information. 26 April 2012

Letter to the Chairman of the Committees from Alistair Burt MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Egypt and Arms Export Licensing The presidential elections in Egypt are due to take place next month. I thought it would be helpful to provide you with a view of the current political situation, together with information on how we are handling export licence applications to that country.

Current Political Situation There continues to be frustration among the political class about the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) handling of the transition. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is increasing the pressure on the interim government and threatening to call for its replacement by one based on Parliamentary representation, through a vote of no-confidence This reflects increasing public signs of tension between the MB and the SCAF. The parliamentary elections marked an important step in Egypt’s political transition. The MB’s block, Democratic Alliance, secured about 47% of the seats in the Lower House and the Salafi alliance 24%. Secular/ liberal groups have about 16%, former regime elements 3%, and other parties and independents the rest. Elections for the Upper House passed peacefully, and delivered another commanding Islamist performance: the MB secured 58% of the seats, and the Salafis 25%. cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Voting for Presidential elections is scheduled for 23/24 May, final results on 21 June and handover to civilian rule by 1 July. The Supreme Presidential Electoral Committee (SPEC) announced on 14 April 12 that ten of the 23 Presidential candidates had been disqualified, including the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Khairat el Shater, former Head of Intelligence Omar Suleiman, the Salafist Hazem Abou Ismail, and the Head of the Ghad party Ayman Nour. We understand that the SPEC has now upheld rulings disqualifying all ten candidates.

On 24 March, both Houses of the Egyptian Parliament elected the Constitutional Assembly (CA) in charge of drafting Egypt’s new Constitution. Many of the liberal and secular parties walked out in protest at what they regarded as Islamist domination of the process and the nominees. On 10 April, an Egyptian Court suspended the CA—as a result of a lawsuit filed by activists and liberals. It now seems unlikely that the drafting of the new Constitution will be in place before the handover of power on 1 July. We believe it is important that the drafting of a new Constitution is completed through an inclusive process, and delivers a Constitution which represents the interests of all the Egyptian people.

There are a number of areas where we have concerns about human rights in Egypt. These include limits imposed by the authorities on freedom of expression; the use of unacceptable violence against peaceful protesters; an increase in the number of prosecutions of bloggers and activists for criticising the authorities; increasing use of military trials for civilians; virginity tests on women and allegations of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment at the hands of the security services.

In May 2010 amendments had been introduced to limit the application of the Emergency Law to terrorism and drugs crimes. However, on 11 September 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) reinstated the full powers of the Emergency Law, as a response to growing concerns about the security situation, including the storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo.

Freedom of association has been progressively restricted over the past year, with some civil society groups, particularly those working on human rights and transparency, facing Government obstruction and harassment. This culminated in raids on 29 December against local and international NGOs accused of taking foreign funding illegally while not being properly registered. Employees of these NGOs were summoned to stand trial and placed under a travel ban. On 1 March, after intense negotiations and US lobbying, the Egyptians lifted the travel ban on some NGO staff, allowing US nationals to leave Egypt, However, broader NGO issues (registration requirements, harassment of Egyptian NGO staff) and wider concerns about the commitment of the SCAF and Egyptian government to democracy remain.

We continue to raise these and other concerns with the Egyptian authorities. Export Licences for Egypt.

You will already be aware that, as events unfolded in Egypt in February 2011, the Government urgently reviewed all existing export licence applications and those already issued. We started a revocation process within three days of the events unfolding. We revoked 36 individual licences and removed Egypt as a destination from eight open licences, with immediate effect. The goods included components for aircraft, components for armoured personnel carriers and secure communications equipment.

Subsequently we have taken steps to ensure that export licence applications for Egypt are scrutinised very carefully. Applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the current political situation and other events on the ground, factoring in the latest information and analysis from our Embassy in Cairo. We pay particular attention to and make a full assessment of the risk that goods might be used in internal repression (Criterion 2) and/or used to aggravate existing tensions in the country (Criterion 3).

Given the use of excessive force against demonstrators in Egypt, all applications for police and military end- users are scrutinised particularly carefully. Ministers have been and continue to be consulted on all applications for equipment where there is a potential risk that the goods could be used for internal repression. Taking into account the end user and the nature of the equipment, applications will only be approved where we are satisfied that there is not a clear risk that the goods might be used in contravention of Criteria 2 and 3.

We are aware of reports that UK-manufactured tear gas has been used in Egypt. No licences for the export of tear gas to Egypt have been granted since 1999. Since that time UK export controls have been radically overhauled including through the passing of the Export Control Act 2002 and the adoption of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria.

I am also copying this to Richard Ottaway, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 26 April 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [10-07-2012 15:16] Job: 019699 Unit: PG03

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Letter to the Chair of the Committees from Rt Hon William Hague MP, First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Thank you for your letter of 16 April about the type of equipment which is being exported to Yemen and Bahrain. BIS have now finalised the data for the fourth quarter of 2011 and there is one amendment to the list enclosed with my letter of 28 February. An Open Licence for components for corrosion resistant chemical manufacturing equipment for export to Yemen was ultimately refused by the Government (not approved as stated in the earlier list). The preliminary data sent in February was based on information available to us at that time but checking revealed a subsequent status update to the licence in question. I enclose a suitably amended list of licences approved and refused for Bahrain and Yemen during 2011. I have no objection to the Committees publishing this information. 1 May 2012

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