UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

A Growing Disconnect: Can the Contemporary Terrorism Literature Explain Domestic Homegrown Terrorism?

by

Michael G. Zekulin

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY, ALBERTA

JUNE, 2012

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The past several years have seen an increase in the number of Islamic inspired terrorist attacks targeting western democratic states. However, the individuals planning and conducting these attacks are not representatives or members of foreign terrorist groups. Instead, those perpetrating these attacks are citizens or long standing residents of those states and thus these attacks can be considered to be "domestic homegrown" terrorism. This dissertation examines this phenomenon and makes several observations. First, an in- depth examination of the modern and contemporary terrorism literature and case study analysis reveals that domestic homegrown terrorism challenges our understanding and conceptualization of terrorism since these recent attacks cannot be explained by the lliterature. Domestic homegrown terrorist attacks demonstrate key differences among four elements emphasized in the literature: role of leadership, role of the organization, socialization and the group dynamic. Second, this dissertation creates a definition of domestic homegrown terrorism which can serve as a basis for further discussion and analysis. Third, it identifies why the distinction and definition of domestic homegrown terrorism is important for those in the field of terrorism studies as well as government officials and policymakers. Domestic homegrown terrorism represents a growing threat and this dissertation provides a framework for future discussions on how it is different from terrorism previously seen and some of the challenges its unique form may pose.

ii Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the many people who directly or indirectly influenced and assisted me complete my PhD and this dissertation.

My supervisor Dr Gavin Cameron played an invaluable role shaping, guiding and supporting the dissertation. I would also like to thank him for his patience and feedback during our many discussions. I would also like to acknowledge the members of my supervisory committee Dr. Rob Huebert and Dr. Brenda O' Neill for reading countless drafts and always providing clear advice and suggestions which improved the final project. Additionally I would like to thank the two external examiners Dr. Harry Hiller and Dr W. Andy Knight for their time and efforts.

While the PhD and dissertation will be mine in name, it would not have been possible without the love, support and patience of my family. My wife Catherine set aside her own career aspirations and devoted her time to our family as well as my children Xavier and Lillian who sacrificed many "daddy" hours and allowed me to finish this project. I must also mention my parents who had every reason to give up on me but tirelessly supported and encouraged me. For mom and dad the good news is there are no more degrees left to pursue. For my wife the good news is you will never hear me utter the words "just one more year" ever again.

More generally, I would like to thank all of my teachers and professors who encouraged me through the years and a special thank you to Dr. Julian Schofield who strongly encouraged me to pursue graduate studies. I must also include the staff and faculty of the Department of Political Science for all of their help and instruction throughout my degree. A special thanks to Judi Powell, Ella Wensel and Bonnie Walter who provided invaluable assistance on nearly a daily basis over the course of my studies.

Finally I would like to thank my friends and colleagues who over the years have impacted me on some level professionally. These include fellow graduate students and office mates. A special thanks to my former office mate Dr Andrew Banfield who I am convinced to this day enjoyed exercising his red pen at my expense.

iii Table of Contents

Abstract ii Acknowledgements iii Table of Contents iv List of Figures ix List of Abbreviations x

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 1

Research Focus 5

Methodology 7

Findings 8

Organization: The "Roadmap" 10

CHAPTER TWO: The Field of Terrorism Studies - Contribution and Significance 12

The Field of Terrorism Studies 15

Contribution and Significance 22

Debates Within Terorrism Studies 27

Radicalization 34

Concluding Remarks 40

CHAPTER THREE: Defining Terrorism - Case Study Selection 41

Defining Terrorism 41 "Guerrilla War, " "Insurgency, " and Narcotics Trafficking and Terrorism 47 Further Distinctions: What this is Not 51 International Terorrism, Domestic Terrorism and Homegrown Terrorism 53 A Working Definition of "Domestic Homegrown" Terrorism 56

Methodology and Case Study Selection 57 Typology 58 Time Period 60 Geography 61

iv Case Studies Representing "Modern and Contemporary" Terrorist Groups 62 Hezbollah 62 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 62 The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) 63 Red Army Faction (RAF) 63 Jemaah Islamiya (Jl) 63 The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 64 American Identity Movements: The Silent Brotherhood 64 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 64 The Omission of al-Qaida 65

Case Studies Representing "Domestic Homegrown" Terrorism 67 Madrid 2004 69 London 2005 69 Toronto 2006 69

Concluding Remarks 70

CHAPTER FOUR: Terrorism from the Modern and Contemporary Era: Four Key Elements 71

Demon ization 72

Element 1: The Role of Leadership 77 The Literature: Understanding Leadership 79 The Importance of Leadership: Targeted Killing and Assassination 82 Leadership Analysis: Examples from the Case Studies 84 Concluding Remarks on Leadership 90

Element 2: Role of the Organization 91 Justifying Organization as a Key Focal Point 92 A Brief Word on the Changing Nature of Organization and Structure 94 Functionality: Role of the Organization and the Terrorism Literature 99 Concluding Remarks on Role of the Organization 114

Element 3: Socialization 115 Early Thoughts on Socialization 115 Socialization: Beyond Pre-Existing Conditions 119 The Link between Socialization and Group Dynamic 120 Defining Socialization 122 Concluding Remarks on Socialization 126

Element 4: Group Dynamic and Identity 127 Understanding "Group Dynamics ": Groupthink and the In-Group/Out-Group Dichotomy 128 Identity 131 Identity and the Group Dynamic 132 Understanding Identity, the Group Dynamic and Terrorism 136 Concluding Remarks on Group Dynamic and Identity 138

Terrorism According to the Literature 139

Leadership 139 Markers: Defining the Role of Leadership 140

V Role of the Organization 141 Markers: Defining the Role of the Organization 142

Socialization 143 Markers: Defining Socialization 143

Group Dynamic 144 Markers: Defining Identity and the Group Dynamic 145

Omission of Alternative Explanations for Terrorism: Mental Defect and Root Causes 145 Microlevel 146 Macrolevel 147

CHAPTER FIVE: Understanding and Defining Domestic Homegrown Terrorism 149

CASE STUDY 1: MADRID 2004- M-11 149

The Attack 151

A History of Islamists in Spain: A Link? 154

Role of the Organization 155 Analysis: Role of the Organization 159

Role of Leadership 161 Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet "The Tunisian " 161 Jamal Ahmidan 162 A liekema Lamar i 163 Analysis: Role of Leadership 163

Socialization and the Group Dynamic 164 Analysis: Socialization and the Group Dynamic 167

CASE STUDY 2: LONDON 2005 - 7/7 170

The Attack 172

Role of the Organization 178 Analysis: Role of the Organization 181

Role of Leadership 183 Mohammad Siddique Khan 183 Shehzad Tanweer 185 Germaine Lindsay 185 Hasib Hussain 186 Analysis: Role of Leadership 186

Socialization and the Group Dynamic 187 Analysis: Socialization and the Group Dynamic 192

Additional Remarks on London Attacks 193

vi CASE STUDY 3: TORONTO 2006 - THE "TORONTO 18" 195

The Plot 196

The Split 198

Role of the Organization 201 Toronto 18 201 The Ahmad Group 205 The Amara Group 205 Analysis: Role of the Organization 208

Role of Leadership 212 Toronto 18 212 Fahim Ahmad 212 Zakaria A mar a 214 Saad Khalid 216 Shareef Abdelhaleem 217 Saad Gaya 217 Analysis: Role of Leadership 218

Socialization and the Group Dynamic 221 Toronto 18 221 The Ahmad Group 226 The Amara Group 226 Analysis: Socialization and the Group Dynamic 229

Additional Remarks on the Toronto 18 231

CONCLUSION: A SNAPSHOT OF "DOMESTIC HOMEGROWN" TERRORISM 232

Analysis 232

Organization 232

Leadership 236

Socialization and the Group Dynamic 238

A Snapshot of "Domestic Homegrown" Terrorism 242

CHAPTER SIX: Conclusions 244

The Research Questions Re-Visited 246 Does Domestic Homegrown Terrorism Represent A New Type of Terrorism? 246 The Functionalist-Culturalist Debate and Domestic Homegrown Terrorism 248 Leadership and the Organization: Current Counterterrorism Policies Appear Problematic 248 Counterterrorism: The Law Enforcement Paradigm is the Best Approach 250

Possible Explanations or Causes of Domestic Homegrown Terrorism 250

vii The Terrorism Literature and Domestic Homegrown Terrorism 255 Definitional Challenges 255 Pre-Radicalzation Replacing Socialization 257 The Internet 259 Re-Assessing Ideas Tied to the Group Dynamic 262 How Terrorism Ends 264

Limits and Weaknesses of This Research 265

Concluding Remarks 271

REFERENCES 272

viii List of Figures

FIGURE 1 Ideological Categorization of Traditional Terrorist Groups 60

FIGURE 2 Operational Time Frame and Status of Traditional Terrorist Groups 61

FIGURE 3 Geographical Locations of Traditional Terrorist Groups 61

FIGURE 4 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003 81

FIGURE 5 The Madrid Group: Three Separate Social Groups 153

FIGURE 6 A Representation of Madrid Group Socialization 169

FIGURE 7 A Representation of London Group Socialization 191

FIGURE 8 The Toronto 18 Group 197

FIGURE 9 A Representation of Toronto 18 Group Socialization 225

FIGURE 10 A Representation of Amara Group Socialization 228

ix List of Abbreviations in 2005 London terrorist attack AQAP Al-Qaida in the Arabian Penisula AQIM Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb CBC Canadian Broadcast Corporation CCTV Closed Circuit Television CFB Trenton Canadian Forces Base Trenton CSA The Covenant, Sword and Arm of the Lord (US) CSIS Canadian Security and Intelligence Service EOKA Ethniki Organosis Kipriakou Aganos (Greece) ETA Euskadi Ta Askasatuna (Spain) FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia FIS Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria) FOSP Friends of Sinn Fein (US) GIA Armed Islamic Group (Algeria) GICM Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (Morocco) HMDT Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine (explosive) IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IRA Irish Republican Army JI Jemaah Islamiya (Indonesia) KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Former USSR) LC London Terrorist Group (case study) LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka) M-ll 2004 Madrid terrorist attack MC Madrid Terrorist Group (case study) MI-5 Military Intelligence Section 5 (domestic) (UK) MI-6 Secret Intelligence Service (foreign) (UK) MILF Philippine Moro Islamic Front NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIE National Intelligence Estimate (US) NSCT National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (US) PFLP People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine PIRA Provisional Irish Republican Army PLO Palestine Liberation Organization PKK Kurdistan's Worker Party (Turkey) PUPJI General Guide for the Struggle of al-Jama'ah al-Islamiya PWG People's War Group (India) RAF Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction) (West Germany) T18 Toronto 18 Terrorist Group (Canada) TNT Trinitrotoluene (explosive) UDA Ulster Defense Association (N. Ireland) UKGISC United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee ULFA United Liberation Front of Asom (India) UVF Ulster Volunteer Force (N. Ireland) ZA Zakaria Amara led Terrorist Group (Canada)

x 1

CHAPTER ONE Introduction

The events of September 11, 2001 introduced a period of tremendous change for those who study terrorism. The attack was unprecedented, both in its lethality and sophistication, as well as the fact that it occurred in a major city within the continental United States (US). For some, this launched a debate about the future of terrorism. In response to the attack, the US launched the "war on terror", with President George Bush (2001) vowing that "the war on terror begins with al-Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." The result of this announcement was an American initiative to invade Afghanistan and strip al-Qaida of its operating base and safe haven, thereby dispersing the organization throughout the Middle East and South Asia. As the US pursued terrorists around the world, retaliation was promised by the very group they were pursuing; Osama bin Laden referred to the invasion of Afghanistan as an extension of "the Crusades" (Lawrence, 2005, 135-36). What followed in the year after the invasion of Afghanistan were several statements by bin Laden directed to both the American people (October 6, 2002) and their allies (November 12, 2002), outlining plans to avenge what he perceived as hostile actions by the Western world against Muslims. "Just as you kill, so you shall be killed; just as you bomb, so you shall be bombed. And there will be more to come" (Lawrence, 2005, 173). In his statements, bin Laden named certain countries which he considered to be allied with the United States. These included Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Germany and Australia (174). Attacks against Western democratic states followed in 2004, with a high profile terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain. In 2005, a terrorist attack occurred in London, England and another was disrupted in Sydney, Australia. In 2006, a potential attack was discovered and prevented by intelligence and law officials in Toronto, Canada. While these attacks were to a certain degree forecast and thus not surprising, something about them was different. The 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by nineteen men, of various Middle Eastern ethnicities, who had come to the US with the specific intention of carrying-out a terrorist operation. In contrast, the instigators of the attacks in Madrid and London, and the 2 disrupted attack in Toronto, appeared to be citizens or long-standing residents of the very Western democratic states which were targeted. That Islamic inspired attacks were carried out against major Western cities was hardly unexpected; rather, it was the profile of the terrorists that was most surprising. Arguably, this combination of attack and attacker represents a new phenomenon which should be labelled "domestic homegrown" terrorism. On the surface, the term domestic homegrown terrorism appears redundant. However, when current ideas about domestic terrorism and homegrown terrorism are examined independently, neither one accurately captures the true nature of these attacks. Current definitions of homegrown terrorism focus predominantly on the geographical location of an individual when they became radicalized and this becomes the preeminent criteria. As such, what follows from this radicalization is of less consequence. For example a terrorist act is considered homegrown if: (1) an individual joins a terrorist group and provides logistical, financial or propaganda support to a group operating outside his own country; (2) a previously radicalized individual travels abroad to join a terrorist group and assist in planning attacks against foreign interests; (3) an individual travels abroad to join a group and participate in jihad (Bjelopera, 2011, 10). However, it is also homegrown terrorism if the individual plans to carry out an attack in the location where they live and were radicalized as in the cases studied in this dissertation. While this very broad characterization makes sense on the surface, it fails to recognize that there is a real discrepancy in how these attacks should be viewed. Without downplaying the seriousness of terrorism or the severity of the attacks which occur overseas, there is an obvious escalation or ramping-up of threat to those living in western democratic states. It is one thing for an individual born and raised in the West to support foreign groups abroad or to travel abroad to join these groups in a logistical position to assist the targeting of western interests or to travel abroad, join a group and participate in fighting against Western soldiers. It is however entirely different to target civilians and assets in the very country you were born and raised or have spent considerable time. This phenomenon needs to be studied independently and categorized differently because it is more than just homegrown terrorism in its current usage. A discussion demonstrating the shortcoming of these definitions will be provided in chapter three as well as the rationale for the proposed definition, namely adding the term "domestic" to homegrown. 3

While it is true that the attacks in Madrid, London and Toronto (disrupted) received significant attention for being large-scale, the reality is that they represented a new and alarming trend which continues today. This observation serves as the basis for this dissertation. Domestic homegrown terror attacks are being planned and orchestrated at an increasing rate. Between September 2001 and the end of 2009, there were 46 publicly reported cases of this phenomenon in the US alone (Jenkins, 2010, 1). A classified British MI5 intelligence document, acquired by the media in 2008, reported that authorities were following "several hundred individuals known to be involved in, or closely associated with, violent extremist activity," all of whom were British citizens or long-standing legal residents (Travis, 2008). Similar concerns are being raised in other countries. Although there are no specific numbers, Canada's intelligence agency CSIS has made it very clear that "countering the threat of terrorist radicalization at home" is now its "chief pre­ occupation" (Canwest, 2008). Further, CSIS has publicly stated it "is monitoring several hundred national security related subjects of interest" (RCMP, 2009). This idea is reiterated by RAND analyst Peter Chalk, who has stated that "homegrown terrorism" is now routinely emphasized by security officials in countries such as the UK, France, Germany and Australia as "the greatest threat they face" (Chalk, 2010). This growing trend has been identified and is being tracked by those in law and intelligence fields, but little effort has been made to deconstruct and understand whether it might represent a new form of terrorism and how it might differ from terrorism observed previously. Several questions therefore arise: First, does this phenomenon represent nothing more than terrorism as it has been traditionally understood in the literature? It is very important to clarify what it meant by the term traditional in this context. Much has been made about the labels that have been attached to terrorism and the field tends to use terms such as "traditional," "modern," "contemporary," and "new" interchangeably or inconsistently as they are tied to terrorism more generally. This dissertation does not dispute that different scholars interpret these terms differently. However, this dissertation seeks to investigate whether terrorist groups operating more recently behave along similar lines as modern or contemporary terrorist groups. For the purposes of this dissertation, the time frame for the analysis of modern terrorism begins in 1968. Chapter two will provide greater detail and discussion about the justification of using this terminology. 1968 will be 4 introduced as a key point in terrorism studies because it is felt to be the origins of terrorism studies as an academic field and the beginnings of a concerted and sustained effort to pursue large research efforts and establish a body of literature. In addition to the modern terrorism literature, this dissertation also engages the contemporary terrorism literature. While the period 1968 - until the late 1990s is characterized as the era of "modern" terrorism, the late 1990s up to and including today is felt to reflect the "contemporary" era of terrorism. This period is also dotted with references to the "new" terrorism which is itself a separate and unique literature found within the contemporary era. Briefly, this dissertation inquires whether or not terrorist groups perpetrating domestic homegrown terrorism "look the same" in the things they do in their pursuit of terrorism. In order to investigate this, case studies of terrorist groups from the modern and contemporary terrorism literature were selected across different ideologies, different geographical locations and time in order to create a baseline. They provide a snapshot of what modern and contemporary terrorism literature says terrorism "looks like" in this context. The time frame chosen for study, 1968 to the present was selected intentionally. It is not meant to infer that no terrorism occurred prior to this date. A second question asks how the behavior of terrorist groups might be different from that observed previously. This is purely an analysis based on the behavior of the terrorist groups and the actions, traits and characteristics they demonstrate as they seek to pursue their end goal of committing a terrorist attack. The research examines the groups after they have made the decision to pursue terrorism and does not examine how they came to this decision, whether they believe it is rational or whether they believe it will succeed. This research is merely trying to identify whether there are differences between how modern and contemporary terrorist groups have behaved and how those identified as domestic homegrown terrorist groups behave. Third, the literature has a well established idea of how modern and contemporary terrorist groups can be engaged. Based on the experiences and account of how those terrorist groups behaved, counterterrorism strategies were established and continue to be employed today. These measures are designed to interfere with the behaviors of the terrorist groups and make it more difficult for them to achieve their end goal of a terrorist attack. This includes newer counterterrorism approaches which have been articulated as a 5 response to homegrown terrorism more recently. Since 2007 the concept of radicalization models and efforts to explain how these individuals might become capable of committing terrorism has been a topic of great interest. The logical extension of this avenue of inquiry is that understanding how an individual becomes radicalized can lead to policies to disrupt the process. These models will also be examined relative to these cases of domestic homegrown terrorism. If differences do indeed present themselves, these may affect current counterterrorism policies potentially making them ineffective, inefficient or even counterproductive.

Research Focus This dissertation focuses on whether the phenomenon of domestic homegrown terrorism can be adequately explained by the modern and contemporary terrorism literature through an examination of how groups facilitate their ability to pursue terrorism. In doing so, it also inquires whether or not the recent terrorist attacks against Western democratic states by citizens or longstanding residents of those states represent a new variant, an evolution, or mutation of terrorism previously unseen and not addressed by the literature, including more recent discussions on homegrown terrorism generally. Based on observations and a preliminary examination of some of the characteristics of domestic homegrown terrorism this dissertation hypothesized that some variation would be seen. Because the attacks were orchestrated by domestic groups against the state and all members appeared to be citizens or long standing residents of that state it was felt that there would be fundamental differences in the roles of leadership and organization as key distinguishing features. If correct, this would have a direct impact on two debates currently underway among terrorism scholars: (1) the functionalist versus culturalist debate; and (2) counterterrorism policy debates including the law enforcement paradigm versus the military paradigm and also impact on recent studies of radicalization models. The essence of these debates and a discussion on the development of radicalization models will be addressed in chapter two. These debates represent some of the many very real divisions in the field of terrorism studies on how best to characterize terrorism as it is unfolding today. On one side, "functionalists" remain squarely focused on al-Qaida and al- 6

Qaida linked terror groups as the driving force behind Islamic terrorism today, and includes the notion that if there is a threat posed by homegrown terrorism, it is once again a direct correlation to the actions of al-Qaida and its constituent groups. On the other side, "culturalists" argue that the functionalist approach ignores emerging evidence of a grassroots or culturally-based driving force behind terrorism, one that is independent from the organized Islamic terrorism seen to date. This debate directly plays into the proposal that domestic homegrown terrorism is not the same as homegrown terrorism as it is currently portrayed in the literature. It will become clear that a traditional understanding of terrorism and how it unfolds does support current counterterrorism efforts and strategies such as targeting terrorist leadership and disrupting terrorist organizations. As elements prove different, these counterterrorism strategies may prove ineffective if not counterproductive. This affects another debate currently underway in the field of terrorism studies which has implications at the policy level as well. The military paradigm versus law enforcement paradigm debates centers on how best to combat terrorism. This dissertation suggests that modern and contemporary terrorism may best be dealt with by emphasizing the military paradigm but points out that domestic homegrown terrorism as it appears right now, might benefit from having the law enforcement paradigm take precedence. Further, discussions on counterterrorism must take into account new developments and approaches, specifically those which have been postulated to target homegrown terrorism. Newer approaches are focusing on radicalization models or processes as a means to understand how individuals might be pre­ empted from choosing a path which might lead them to consider pursuing terrorism against their state. These ideas must also therefore be assessed in comparison to the results of an analysis of domestic homegrown terrorism. Briefly, this dissertation will investigate whether modern and contemporary terrorism literature can explain the recent trend of terrorist attacks occurring in Western democratic states. It will determine if these more recent attacks are different and, if so, how they differ. It will also explain how terrorism is currently unfolding, and provide valuable insight as to whether current counterterrorism approaches and policies remain viable. The main research question will also allow commentary and contribution to some 7 peripheral, but no less important issues pertaining to perceived shortcomings in the field of terrorism studies itself.

Methodology In order to answer the above-raised questions, this dissertation must compare terrorism, as it is depicted in the modern and contemporary terrorism literature, with more recent terrorist attacks against Western democratic states. To begin, this research uses in-depth literature review and case studies to form a snapshot of what the modern and contemporary terrorism literature says terrorism "looks like." It emphasizes four key elements which have been the focus of terrorism studies: leadership; organization; socialization; and group dynamic and identity. It further identifies how the literature suggests these elements contribute to or facilitate terrorism, with supporting examples from a cross-section of various traditional terrorism groups across ideology, geography and time. The research then identifies three recent incidents of terrorism, which represent the phenomenon being termed Islamic inspired domestic homegrown terrorism. It constructs case studies and identifies and analyzes the same four elements, focusing on similarities and differences among the case studies. This ultimately creates a snapshot of what Islamic domestic homegrown terrorism "looks like." The research then compares terrorism constructed from the modern and contemporary literature review with domestic homegrown terrorism constructed from case studies, and addresses the main points raised by this research. If the snapshots of modern and contemporary terrorism and domestic homegrown terrorism appear similar or demonstrate veiy little differentiation, then it can be claimed that these more recent terrorist attacks against Western democratic states, where the attackers are citizens or longstanding residents of those very states, are fully explained by the modern and contemporary terrorism literature. The conclusions drawn would be that such attacks simply represent terrorism as it is currently characterized, and that both research and counterterrorism-efforts to combat or prevent it can be justified. However, if significant differences are found, it would suggest that domestic homegrown terrorism is in fact a different variant of terrorism and requires additional study in its own right. Identifying such differences would also 8 provide a good indication of where variation appears and where new research might start. By default, it would also suggest that counterterrorism policies might also need to be re­ examined or reformulated and that research investigating radicalization might need to be further developed. Additional points on methodology, including case study selection criteria, are included in chapter three.

Findings The modern and contemporary terrorism literature provided a very clear depiction of what it considers terrorism "looks like". Across all four elements, a clear understanding or definition of what the element was and how it contributed to terrorism was established. Similarly, the case studies constructed to analyze domestic homegrown terrorism also demonstrated many similarities from one to another, which allowed for a definition and snapshot of what this form of terrorism "looks like". A comparison of the two reveals significant variation across all of the elements, suggesting that the modern and contemporary terrorism literature can neither accurately explain nor capture these more recent attacks. While there is variation across all of the elements, including those associated with leadership and organization, a greater degree of difference emerged among the socialization and group dynamic and identity elements, specifically with respect to how the groups arose, socialized and established the group dynamic. This supports the contention that Islamic domestic homegrown terrorism, which is defined in chapter five should be viewed as a different phenomenon and a specific variant of Islamic terrorism. What remains unclear at this point is whether this is a temporary fad or trend, or whether it will continue to develop and evolve further. Although the differences are less clear-cut than among the socialization and group dynamic and identity elements, there is enough variation to conclude that studying terrorism from the perspective of the role of the leader and the role played by the terrorist organization itself may not be as important as suggested in the field of terrorism studies. Discussions of how terrorism ends or is ended clearly emphasize these two elements, and can be observed from past and current counterterrorism policies. This suggests that more focus must be placed on the elements related to identity, group dynamic and socialization. This finding also has real 9 implications for current radicalization models which continue to emphasize some kind of charismatic leader, intermediary, or "spiritual sanctioner" as key to setting radicalization in motion. Generally it supports the idea that a gap between postulated theories in the literature and the realities in the field has emerged, even more recently, and adds credence to claims that terrorism as a phenomenon continuously evolves, transforms and "mutates" (for a discussion on this see Ranstorp, 2007, 11-12). One important distinction which arose was that domestic homegrown terrorism occurs independent of any real connection to al-Qaida, al-Qaida linked groups or any other Islamic terrorism group. It very much appears to represent ideas found in the radicalization literature and a discussion on radicalization models will be introduced in chapter two. This lack of connection supports a culturalist interpretation of terrorism, indicating that there is a grassroots movement on the rise, especially in Western democratic states. However, this statement must be tempered by the reality that, while radicalization appears to be a part of domestic homegrown terrorism, al-Qaida and other groups remain committed to recruiting, indoctrinating and training individuals from western states. Lastly, this interpretation clearly supports a shift away from military solutions to combat terrorism and emphasizes a shift toward the law enforcement model. The manner in which Islamic domestic homegrown groups form, socialize, plan and organize will not be affected by military approaches or current counterterrorism policies targeting leadership and/or organizations. The concluding chapter offers a more detailed explanation of what this means moving forward and elaborates on a new understanding of what a law enforcement approach entails. Further, when the domestic homegrown cases are analyzed from the perspective of current ideas and models on radicalization, problems arise. In terms of more recent counterterrorism approaches based on understanding and disrupting the radicalization of potential homegrown terrorists, the three case studies analyzed for this dissertation do not support the underlying assumptions current models advocate. It is entirely possible that these three cases are outliers but it nonetheless merits further discussion. 10

Organization: The "Roadmap" The current chapter introduces the origins of the dissertation and the observations which led to the shaping of this project. It is based on the belief that a gap has emerged between terrorism in current theory and terrorism which is now unfolding in practice, and suggests that a thorough re-examination of the field's understanding of terrorism found in the modern and contemporary terrorism literature needs to be conducted in light of these attacks. Chapter two provides the groundwork for the dissertation and includes the necessary theoretical background. It situates the project in the current literature and its contribution to the discipline of terrorism studies, international relations, political science and the social sciences more generally. It provides a general account of how the field of terrorism studies has developed over the past forty years, including the most recent efforts to incorporate a critical research approach to evolve the discipline and improve the research agenda. Chapter three discusses definitional challenges facing the field and explains why "domestic homegrown" terrorism was chosen to label more recent attacks against western states. It will also highlight how the case studies chosen for analysis in chapter four and five were selected and why al-Qaida was omitted from analysis. Chapter four provides a depiction of what terrorism "looks like," according to the modern and contemporary terrorism literature. Each of the four elements deemed important to terrorism are identified and defined. Further, each element is also discussed in the context of specific examples taken from various case studies of terrorist groups from these eras. The result creates a point of comparison which will be applied to a snapshot of what domestic homegrown terrorism "looks like," which is established in chapter five. Two additional elements will also be included in this chapter. First, the idea of "demonization" will be explored and introduced. This term is important because it justifies the inclusion of socialization and the group dynamic as key elements. The literature identifies that socialization and the group dynamic leads to demonization which is an important condition allowing terrorism to occur. Second, the idea of "root causes" and their role as a condition of terrorism will be considered. The discussion of root causes is excluded from analysis because although it has "intuitive appeal," it has proven highly 11

"problematic from a methodological perspective" and has limitations in what it can tell us (Newman, 2006). This point will be expanded upon further in that section. Chapter five uses case studies of three terrorist attacks, which have been selected to represent incidents of domestic homegrown terrorism. Each case study represents an attack on a Western democratic state by citizens or long standing residents of that very state. The case studies were constructed through primary research, including reports of official inquiries, official reports, court transcripts and interviews. They were supported by secondary sources including newspaper articles, journal articles and books. Each case study is deconstructed, focusing specifically on the four elements identified and analyzed in chapter four. The resulting deconstruction and comparison between the three case studies demonstrate sufficient similarities to become the basis for a concrete definition of what domestic homegrown terrorism "looks like." This sets the stage for the final chapter, which compares terrorism from the modern and contemporary eras to domestic homegrown terrorism. Chapter six concludes the dissertation. This chapter provides a detailed account of how domestic homegrown terrorism differs from terrorism seen in previous eras and then discusses what this means to the field. It re-introduces and answers the research questions and identifies several key areas that might need to be re-visited based on the observations and conclusions made by this research. These include challenges fitting domestic homegrown terrorism into current definitions of terrorism, an investigation into alternative means of socialization including the internet and how the group dynamic may be larger than previously thought. 12

CHAPTER TWO The Field of Terrorism Studies Contribution and Significance of this Research

This chapter is designed to set the stage for the discussion and analysis to come. It addresses why this research is important and where it fits into the discipline. While this dissertation has obvious applications to the field of terrorism studies, it is important to highlight that it also has many contributions to other fields, most notably political science. Within the topics of discussion on terrorism are points that are related or overlap with similar ideas in different fields of study. This research will contribute predominantly to the field of terrorism studies, but many of the aspects apply directly to international relations and to political science more generally. Terrorist activity no longer remains local and grievances travel internationally, suggesting any discussion on terrorism needs to acknowledge international relations and subsequently address issues of international cooperation and coordination. One question addressed by this dissertation investigates whether domestic home grown terrorism attacks are best understood as a part of international terrorism which demonstrates connections and organization across the globe or if it better explained as a local grassroots problem where individuals require no outside assistance to commit terrorism. This distinction has real implications for any government decision-making on policies related to information-sharing, immigration, and migration, and whether, and to what degree, international cooperation or coordination might be required. From an international relations perspective, terrorism by its nature is a confrontation between the state and a non-state actor. Audry Cronin (2009, 116) points out the challenges this poses: "terrorism slashes at the very fabric of the modern nation-state, picking at a vulnerable seam between domestic law and foreign war, and the internal and external realms of authority." She further highlights that theoretically, terrorism cannot be analyzed using the kind of "unitary actor theories which are the foundation of twentieth century strategic thought in the West...terrorist groups [groups that use terrorism] are pre- modern and post-modern, sub-national and transnational and transcend the Westphalian state system" (2009, 142). Other international relations issues affected by terrorism include questions of sovereignty, international cooperation and international law. First, sovereignty 13 becomes problematic, especially as it pertains to isolating terror organizations and attempting to deny them territorial safe havens. Second, increased international cooperation between states to address challenges associated with transnational terrorism must be pursued, perhaps leading to new institutions, regimes or rules. Last, a coherent international legal strategy which can be applied to terrorism and some of its facets, including financing and the detention and potential trials of suspected members of terrorist organizations, is required. Academics who work within the field of terrorism often contribute in areas applicable to intra-state violence such as rebellions, revolution and state legitimacy. We consistently see terrorism employed due to dissatisfaction or disillusionment with a political status quo (Crenshaw, 1981; Marighella, 1983, or difficulty accessing the political arena (Delia Porta and Tarrow, 1986). In many cases, terrorism is perpetrated by groups who want self-determination on behalf of a segment of the population, as demonstrated by nationalist or ethnic separatist groups like the Tamil Tigers (TT), Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or many of the Palestinian groups in operation today. It may also be reflective of a group's dissatisfaction with a particular ideological stance practiced by the state, as demonstrated by left or right wing terrorist groups who wish to effect ideological changes to their government and use terrorism to accomplish their goal. This is similar to past accounts on how or why revolution or rebellion occurs as seen in works by individuals such as Charles Tilly (1978), Theda Skcopol (1979), Jack Goldstone (1991; 1994) and Mehran Kamrava (1999), and thus has potential applications for this field of study as well. For a further discussion on how terrorism studies fits into and is dependent on other fields including social sciences, political science, and historical sociology see Duyvesteyn (2004, 440-43). Many of the elements or contributing factors associated with terrorism often overlap with similar ones in political science. For example, ideas about leadership and its role in shaping outcomes, decision-making, the role of organizations and group dynamics are all studied in political science. The difference is that, while political science studies them in relation to political processes, terrorism is synonymous with violence. Academics who follow the work of political scientists such as Ted Robert Gurr (1970) and Donatella Delia Porta (1995) have studied the evolution of terrorist groups as social movements (Cronin, 14

2009, 96). Findings related to these areas in terrorism therefore have potential crossover appeal to their "cousins" in political science, and may help refine their study in this and other social science fields. This chapter begins with a discussion about the field of terrorism studies, and identifies where this research fits and the contribution it makes to the discipline as a whole. It provides a synopsis of the field of terrorism studies and how the field can be sub-divided into different eras of research. It identifies 1968 as the starting point of terrorism studies as an academic pursuit and the development of a significant amount of terrorism focused literature and research. It identifies 9/11 as a watershed moment where terrorism studies was presumed to enter a new phase and debate over "new" terrorism. Finally it introduces the most recent development in the field, a call for a more critical research approach, and the impact that this may have on the field moving forward. Because this dissertation is conducting an indepth literature review and case study analysis across multiple eras in the field of terrorism studies, it will differentiate between the following periods: 1968 until 2001 will be termed the "modern" era of terrorism research; 2001 until the present will be termed the "contemporary" era of terrorism research, which needs to be differentiated from "new" terrorism research which occurred within the late modern and early contemporary period but has since become an afterthought. The most recent development in the field emphasizes a new focus on terrorism studies termed "critical" terrorism research. Part of its criticism of the "orthodox" terrorism field is that it completely ignores terrorism which occurred prior to 1968. To acknowledge this point, this dissertation will term any terrorism prior to 1968 as occurring in the "traditional" or historical era. These terms are meant simply to differentiate the different eras from one another. This dissertation is conducting research based on the literature from the modern and contemporary eras of terrorism and how it may or may not explain a specific type of terrorist attacks occurring in western democratic states. It recognizes the value and importance of research in other eras of terrorism but does not investigate any of them here. This chapter will also introduce several debates occurring in the field of terrorism studies. The first debate highlights attempts to identify the source of the current terrorist threat. It asks whether al-Qaida, or al-Qaida inspired groups pose the greatest terrorist threat or if grassroots, unaffiliated groups represent the more pressing concern. The second 15

two debates are more oriented towards counterterrorism and how best to proceed combating and mitigating the terrorist threat. One broadly debates the appropriateness of current counterterrorism strategies. This includes whether current strategies such as targeted killings, the removal of leadership and the disruption of terrorist organizations as part of a more military focused approach are effective as opposed to a law enforcement approach. A second debate narrows the counterterrorism process even further towards homegrown terrorism and radicalization. It introduces efforts to understand how the process of radicalization might unfold in order to disrupt it or prevent individuals from starting the process. The chapter will then set the stage for the remainder of the dissertation by providing definitions and necessary background concepts. This is important for two reasons. First, this is required to support the notion that the newer case studies selected and claimed to represent "domestic homegrown" terrorism can in fact be considered terrorism. Second, in order to substantiate the claim that this may represent some new variation of terrorism these findings must be integrated with established different typologies of terrorism as well as other more recent ideas in the field. This dissertation argues that "domestic homegrown" terrorism is something entirely different from other phenomena individuals have identified in terrorism more recently. These newer ideas will be introduced to make concluding distinctions clearer.

The Field of Terrorism Studies Terrorism studies is a fairly young discipline which did not gain widespread attention until the latter part of the twentieth century. This is not to suggest that terrorism itself is a modern concept. Incidents which would meet today's definition of terrorism can be traced to groups such as the Zealots and Assassins in ancient history. Part of a larger debate that plagues terrorism studies surrounds how it labels different eras of terrorism. Terms such as "traditional," "modern," contemporary," and "new," are often used interchangeably despite meaning different things to different scholars. For example, some continue to refer to the era 1968 to the late 1980s as "old" or "traditional" in comparison to the "new" terrorism identified in the 1990s (Spencer, 2006, 6). While this is technically correct, it fails to accurately capture the fact that more recent contributions to terrorism 16 studies highlight a traditional era occurring historically prior to 1968, and that the term "new" actually came to represent a type of terrorism as opposed to an era of terrorism. This section will provide a brief assessment of terrorism studies in an effort to clarify this terminology and simultaneously identify where this research fits among these different eras. Terms such as "modernity" are disputed in the literature but setting aside the challenges posed by the numerous and sometimes contradictory uses of terms such as modern, contemporary and traditional, this dissertation chooses to employ the following timeline when discussing terrorism. It identifies the period from 1968 to 2001 as the era of "modern" terrorism, in part because this was the origins and development of the field. It identifies a point in the late 1990s where terrorism scholars began to argue a shift in terrorism was under way which was dubbed the "new" or "new wave" terrorism. Researchers suggested that the world was entering a new phase of terrorism that departed dramatically from what was seen before (Rapoport in Bergeson and Han, 2005, 135). This overlapped into, but is separate from the post 9/11 era dubbed the "contemporary" era of terrorism studies which continues today. This concept of "new" terrorism, which has fallen out of favor, is better viewed as a subfield which existed within the contemporary era. One final distinction which must be made is that in 2007, a new movement emerged within the field which sought to revolutionize terrorism studies. Known as "critical" terrorism studies, it argued that terrorism research had too many significant shortcomings and needed to be re-evaluated. Those who subscribe to this approach moved to include the idea of the term "traditional" to represent terrorism which occurred prior to 1968 which they argued was ignored. The rise of critical terrorism studies inadvertently caused a division or rift in the discipline. Terrorism studies which were not "critical" in nature were termed "orthodox" terrorism studies. The origin of terrorism studies as a field is generally thought to be 1968 due to one specific event which introduced the terrorist problem to the world like never before. On July 22nd 1968 an El A1 plane was hijacked by the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This, according to many is the origin of the modern era of transnational terrorism (Sandler, 2005, 75; Chaliand, 1989, 22; Hamilton and Hamilton, 1983; Hoffman, 2006, 63) due in part to "the full impact of modern technology" which "endowed most 17 individuals as individuals or members of small groups" with "capacities they never had before" (Duyvestyn, 2004, 442). Duyvestyn (2004, 440) further quotes Walter Laqueuer who points out despite the fact that terrorism is as old as history, academic interest in the field only seriously took off in the early 1970s. Zulaika and Douglass (2008, 27) have identified that 99% of publications on terrorism occurred post 1968 and this date can be found in the title of many of the seminal works in terrorism studies including Ted Gurr's Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960s (1979); Jenkins and Johnson's International Terrorism: A Chronology 1968-1974; and Mickolus' Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events 1968-1979 (1979). Beginning in the late 1980s the observation that terrorism predicated on religious ideology was increasing led some scholars to suggest terrorism was changing. By the late 1990s, much of the field agreed that terrorism was changing and that this "new" terrorism meant that old paradigms would need to be discarded and replaced (Crenshaw, 2009, 118). Some of the differences suggested included the fact America was now at risk; that terrorism was more violent; that it was truly global and conducted by transnational, non-state actors; that terrorist groups were well financed; well trained; more difficult to penetrate due to re­ organization away from hierarchical structure; and have access to WMD (For further discussion see Howard and Nencheck, 2012, 142 - 164; Crenshaw, 2009, 117 - 136; Spencer, 2006, 9 - 13). Part of the fascination was tied to the coming millennium and fears that attacks would become apocalyptic in nature: efforts to bring about massive death and destruction to hasten the end of the world (Morgan, 2004, 29). These predictions never came true but "new" terrorism quickly shifted to become synonymous with al-Qaida and the 9/11 attacks and the fears of greater attacks featuring WMD. Crenshaw (2009, 118-119) argues that even as early as 2000 non-American scholars were skeptical of new terrorism suggesting it was "nothing more than an American attempt to frame the threat of terrorism." Further these scholars began warning that the shift some had identified in the late 1990s was not unfolding as predicted—the data did not support the claims. These observations grew more popular and by the mid 2000s the "new" terrorism debate was mostly dead. An examination of each of the traits attributed to new terrorism demonstrated that each could be observed in previous incidents of terrorism (Spencer 2006, 5). Even if it could be argued that "new" terrorism meant that these traits appeared 18 simultaneously this would also be problematic. No group demonstrates all of these traits at any given time. Even al-Qaida has been observed transitioning away from these traits (Crenshaw, 2009, 132). Because 9/11 represents an important event in terrorism studies, it has rightly or wrongly been accepted as a point of separation between the modern era of terrorism and the contemporary era of terrorism. However the term "contemporary" is merely a term to differentiate it from terrorism which occurred prior to September 11th and it is based on a preoccupation with Islamic terrorism, al-Qaida and suicide bombings. It is not clear exactly how suicide bombing fits in with the contemporary era's focus on al-Qaida and Islamic terrorism more generally considering it has been employed mostly by non Islamic groups such as the PKK and LTTE and is argued to reflect a tactic rather than some existential statement more generally (Pedahzur, 2005; Bloom, 2005; Pape, 2005). In 2007 major criticisms leveled at perceived shortcomings in terrorism research led to the emergence of "critical" terrorism studies. While terrorism studies has periodically engaged in self examination and reflection upon the state of the field (See Silke, 2007; Ransorp, 2007; Schmid and Jongman, 2008) those who identified with the critical approach argued that the flaws and shortcomings in what they termed "orthodox" terrorism studies were significant and undermined terrorism studies as a whole. Critical theory seeks to subject the world to critique and thus to transform it. Stokes (2009) argues that orthodox terrorism studies takes a problem solving approach which takes the world as it is and proposes solutions to maintain it. This leads to the suggestion that orthodox terrorism studies maintains and perpetuates the status quo and that our knowledge on the subject may be built on a faulty framework (Heath-Kelly, 2010, 240). Jackson (2009) argues that critical terrorism studies arose due to the "poor state of terrorism related research," especially since September 11 2001. Others such as Heath- Kelly (2010, 235) and Herring (2008, 205) are more diplomatic suggesting critical terrorism studies needs to "stimulate and undertake research on topics frequently overlooked by orthodox terrorism studies." Some of the general criticisms identified by critical terrorism researchers include: it is state centric, it is based on a problem solving paradigm and that it is "counterinsurgency 19 masking as political science" (Zulaika and Douglass, 2008, 27). According to Jackson (2008) orthodox terrorism research:

the treatment of terrorism as objective, an over emphasis on non-state terrorism, inability to find a definition for terrorism, not being tied to historical accounts of political violence and social movements and the fact that it tends to reinforce and reproduce (rather than challenge) many of the dominant myths about terrorism

The argument that terrorism is treated objectively can be paired with the over emphasis on non-state terrorism and Zulaika and Douglass' criticism that the research ends up being policy driven. Critical terrorism researchers argue that orthodox terrorism studies, especially post 9/11 has centered on "a myth of exceptional grievances," whereby America must be seen as the primary victim of terrorism (Zulaika and Douglass, 2008, 27). This ensures among other things that research supports counterterrorism policies. Anthony Burke (2008, 39) singles out Hoffman's definition of terrorism as specifically "excluding states as possible perpetrators and privileging them as targets." Jackson and (2009) echoes this sentiment and claims terrorism research is not only Orientalist and masculine driven it is also biased towards the US/West and makes a commitment to state policymakers and takers, not to humanity. This leads many critical terrorism researchers to be skeptical of orthodox terrorism research which they claim is biased, performing an ideological function to support Western states in part because the research is conducted and often funded by the government itself (Heath-Kelly, 2010, 236; Jackson, 2008). Gunning (2007, 367) accuses orthodox terrorism studies of uncritically accepting the framing of the terrorism problem by the state agreeing with Herring (2008, 208) that it rarely criticizes Northern (global) state violence and when it does it is because of a counterproductive outcome and not illegitimacy or illegality. This is akin to silence on state terrorism which thereby condones it (Jackson, 2009a, 387). The idea that states are justifying violence against citizens in the name of counterterrorism is hypocrisy according to critical terrorism researchers, and people like Burke (2008, 43) advocate a shift in counterterrorism and security policies so they "abide by a rule not to harm humans." Eric Herring (2008, 201) suggests that in current terrorism research victims of terrorism are not equal and that victims in some places are seen as greater victims than in other places, neglecting their common humanity. 20

One final criticism questions the field of orthodox terrorism studies' fascination with modern and contemporary terrorism. Critical terrorism researchers argue that many scholars treat terrorism as a phenomenon which began on 9/11. Others choose to emphasize 1968. According to critical terrorist researchers this neglects a wide field of study which occurred prior to 1968. Many point to the origins of terrorism as state terrorism during the reign of terreur which took place following the French Revolution. Others argue evidence of terrorism exists as far back as groups such as the Zealots and Assassins (Jackson, 2009a). This leads to accusations that orthodox terrorism studies is omitting potentially hundreds of years of terrorism or what could be considered "historical" or "traditional" terrorism incidents that could be incorporated into terrorism studies literature and discourse. Terrorism of this sort is "mentioned" but it is often an afterthought doomed to a "superficial description" that might be found in an introductory chapter (Jackson, 2009a, 381). Those in orthodox terrorism studies have taken note of this emerging field. Some scholars have been very receptive to the criticisms and welcome the addition of a new approach designed to improve the field as a whole. They point out that some of these criticisms have been made by orthodox terrorism scholars themselves (Ranstorp, 2009; Silke, 2009; Horgan and Boyle, 2008). At the same time, some orthodox scholars are concerned at the level of criticism and fear that it might create a wedge in the field where critical terrorism researchers and orthodox terrorism researchers are more at odds with one another than working to improve the field as a whole. Horgan and Boyle (2008) examine each one of the criticisms leveled against orthodox terrorism studies and conclude that tremendous improvement has been made in terms of improving research methodology, that the field is not purely problem solving and that policy driven research should not necessarily be demonized as inherently bad. In response to the main criticism that state terrorism is ignored, the orthodox response is that it comes down to "lumping" versus "splitting." Horgan and Boyle (2008, 57):

Terrorism is best understood as a subset of political violence, used by a range of actors to attack other actors, but with the intention of spreading fear beyond its immediate target. If state action fall in that remit, it can (and should) be classified as terrorism; if not, labeling it as another type of political violence such as repression, subversion, or ethnic cleansing may be more appropriate 21

Critical terrorism studies highlights some areas of concern, but these concerns should not limit terrorism research which might fall outside its parameters. The research conducted in this dissertation would most likely be considered to fall in the orthodox terrorism research field but it actually addresses some of the criticisms identified by critical terrorism research. For example, this dissertation is examining whether the modern and contemporary terrorism literature (1968 through today) can explain more recent Islamic terror attacks against the west. It argues that these more recent attacks appear to represent something different: citizens or long standing residents of states committing terrorism against that state and its citizens which falls outside current definitions of domestic terrorism and homegrown terrorism. It compares terrorist groups from the modern and contemporary era with the groups perpetrating these more recent attacks. Based on the research conducted in this dissertation several bridges are extended towards addressing critical terrorism research complaints. First, while the research may be policy driven it is actually arguing against the status quo and suggesting that current state counterterrorism policies, especially those focused on military approaches are wrong and counterproductive. It seeks to justify a shift in state policy towards less aggressive state strategies. Second, this research does not assume terrorism started in 2001, nor is it focused purely on al-Qaida or suicide terrorism or WMD terrorism. It is comparing terrorism across forty years, two discernible eras of terrorism and is about what the literature says terrorism "looks like" generally. It is not the same old-same-old or narrow focus that the post 9/11 era has been criticized to represent (Silke, 2009, 46-7). Third it is re-visiting existing case studies in both the modern and contemporary eras of terrorism as well as conducting in-depth analysis of the more recent cases identified as incidents of domestic homegrown terrorism. This in itself is a worthwhile endeavor considering the accusations that case studies, especially more recent ones contain false information and lead to incorrect analysis. One unexpected finding of this dissertation is that factual errors were rampant in the earlier literature on the Madrid, London and Toronto case studies. Superficial and rushed analysis of these cases led to fundamental errors and mis-assumptions which were then used as the basis for analysis, and conclusions. The conclusions drawn are not supported by the real facts in these cases. 22

This section has provided a general assessment of the field of terrorism studies from its founding as a discipline in the late 1960s through to the most recent efforts to improve upon research conducted in the field. It has identified that a debate is unfolding among terrorism scholars about the best ways to conduct research in this field. The next section will provide an account of some of the challenges facing the field of terrorism studies more generally.

Contribution and Significance

The difficulties associated with terrorism studies are well known and, over the past few years, numerous compilations have been released addressing the field's shortcomings, challenges and potential avenues of future inquiry (Silke 2004; Schmidt & Jongman 2005; Ranstrop, 2007; Young and Findley, 2009; Davis and Cragin, 2009). This research falls within the parameters of these discussions and addresses some of the observations made by these scholars. Broadly, this research will provide several important contributions. First, it conducts a thorough re-examination and synthesis of the modern and contemporary terrorism literature. Second, it investigates newer and more recent case studies, selected to represent incidents of domestic homegrown terrorism. Further, because this process is being undertaken to test a hypothesis that these newer cases may not fit into the literature's account of terrorism, it is investigating whether a new variation of terrorism may be emerging. This point directly addresses one main accusation made about terrorism research, namely, that it has "a legacy of missing important trends" (Silke, 2007, 91). Audrey Kurth Cronin (2009, 2) goes further and points out that terrorism research also tends to pursue a narrow focus when an important trend does emerge:

Studies of terrorism are often event driven, spurred by attacks and the need to respond to a specific threat. As a result, the bulk of research is descriptive analysis focused on one group, detailing its organization, structure, tactics, leadership and so on. True to this pattern since the events of September 11, 2001 there has been an outpouring of research on al-Qaida, but little attention to analyzing terrorism within a wider body of knowledge. To the extent that broader cross cutting research has been done it is largely concerned with root causes and narrow questions having to do with the weapons and methods being used. 23

This research contributes to terrorism studies in general and looks to address several criticisms of the discipline, including its methodological shortcomings, lack of theoretical foundation, and that most of the existing research is not empirical or based on any data. Randy Borum (2010, 18) sums up this criticism by labeling the majority of terrorism work as "thought pieces," based on information taken from media sources, and that there is very little work providing "new knowledge based on previously unavailable data." This research works towards addressing these criticisms by first moving beyond Borum's idea of terrorism research as a thought or opinion piece. It is creating a snapshot of what the traditional terrorism literature suggests terrorism looks like, what contributes to it and how, and then uses this to compare to incidents which are unfolding today. Second, the end result of this research will hopefully create a theoretical foundation for the future study of what may be considered a new variant of terrorism, which will require additional study and analysis. Third, the analysis and research conducted by this dissertation on the three newer case studies is original research based on primary sources and interviews and discussions with experts. These were not done abstractly but rather by specific and direct enquiry into the case studies in question. While some individuals have examined these case studies, they have done so within very specific parameters, in isolation and compared to this research very superficially. This dissertation provides original research that was not done in the abstract as well as an in-depth level of analysis that is unique on this topic and in fact identifies many factual inaccuracies in previous works. This research also wades directly into two recent debates about terrorism which have pitted scholars against each other. First, the functionalist/culturalist debate asks whether the terrorist threat is being led by al-Qaida, or whether it has become a grassroots movement occurring within a portion of the Muslim population more generally. The second debate surrounds how terrorism should be addressed. Competing paradigms, one emphasizing military force and referred to as the "war paradigm," faces fierce rebuke from a competing view that terrorism should be viewed and dealt with similar to crime. This has been dubbed the "law-enforcement paradigm." Both of these will be expanded upon later in this chapter. The outcome of these debates has profound implications for the future of terrorism, counterterrorism and government policies. This research, by examining domestic 24 homegrown terrorism through the lens of the modern and contemporary terrorism literature, will help provide some answers about whether leadership and organization still play a key role in terrorist activity (functionalist approach) or if it is more grassroots driven (culturalist approach). It will also address whether traditional terrorism counterstrategies based on the "war paradigm" may be counterproductive, especially considering those perpetrating the attacks against these countries are citizens or long standing residents. Is a war paradigm even feasible in such a case The field of terrorism studies has traditionally faced significant challenges and criticisms. These continue today, especially as the field attempts to remain relevant and grow. In order for terrorism studies to evolve as a discipline, it is important to place it within the context of knowledge growth. According to Avishag Gordon (2004, 105):

The growth of scientific knowledge is sometimes analogous to the life cycle of a living organism. Scientific knowledge as it grows becomes more and more fragmented into specialism, bringing together pieces of knowledge previously isolated from the mainstream of the literature. This process rejuvenates the field with more relationships which bring about more information and solutions to the fields research. With regard to the study of terrorism, in this process the changing definition of the term plays an important role, which actually signifies a new life cycle each time a new definition arises, since this new definition brings into the field new events, new realities and new research projects and analyses.

It is this premise which allows researchers to move forward, suggest new ideas, and articulate possible new variants or typologies within the terrorism discipline. Lessons previously learned have shown us that even the most novel or subtle occurrence should not be so easily dismissed. Al-Qaida, arguably the greatest terror threat facing the world today, was not a priority in either policy or academic circles in the years leading up to 9/11. Despite several successful operations, including a failed attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, al-Qaida was never a focal point because it was not felt to represent what was considered a traditional terrorist organization (Silke, 2004). This logic indicates that the identification of new puzzles and subsequent attempts to understand them should always be a welcome contribution. A second example demonstrates that even issues which have previously been analyzed in the field need to constantly be re-visited and questioned. In 1977, Russell and Miller created a "terrorist profile" based on the comprehensive 25 examination of over 350 individual terrorists across 18 different groups. Based on their research, they identified what they felt was an accurate profile of a terrorist: "young (22- 25), unmarried male who is an urban resident, from middle upper class family, has some university education and probably held an extremist political philosophy" (in Borum, 2004, 37). The reality is that this profile, even if it was only a general assessment, is no longer applicable today. More recent research on terrorists reveals that marital status, age and status vary tremendously across the spectrum (Pedahzur, 2005; Bloom, 2005) and that in fact no profile of a terrorist can be readily identified. These two examples show the danger, especially in the field of terrorism studies, of ignoring what appear to be small anomalies and the mistake of assuming that the reality in the field does not change. In this field, re­ visiting previously held ideas is very valuable. This research has been organized as a multi-step process. The advantage of this approach is that, while the cumulative result answers a unique and specific research question, each step separately makes a contribution to the discipline as a whole, addressing several enduring and well-documented shortcomings in the field of terrorism studies. First, it addresses criticisms that recent scholarship is simply a result of "re-packaging." Information and data investigating terrorism have traditionally been gathered from two sources: (1) open sources such as media reports; and (2) academic works often based on the citations of these sources (Silke, 2004, 61). The field has thus been trapped in a circular research process, continuously making new inferences from old data. Newer case studies may help break this cycle. New data may be harvested from detailed analysis of specific events or attacks, which may introduce new avenues of inquiry for others to pursue. While part of this dissertation does rely on data which has been used for many years, two points must be made. First, the information is being used in a novel way: while it is the same case studies, this dissertation is using a different approach and focusing on different aspects of these case studies. It is using this data to ask a different question. Second, it is important to emphasize that the review of the modern and contemporary terrorism literature is not the focus of this dissertation rather it is a necessary step. It is the intuitive extrapolation of the information gleaned from the case studies towards the verification of what the terrorism literature says terrorism "looks like." In short, it is the end result which matters here and it is not simply a reiteration of previous case study analysis. This research relies on the case 26 studies to identify what the literature understands about terrorism; the purpose of this is comparative, not to make general assumptions about specific terrorist organizations. Since 9/11, terrorism studies have focused on how best to apply theoretical and statistical models as tools to understand terrorism (Rosendorff, and Sandler, 2004, 657). There has been significant movement towards computer modeling and network analysis, in an effort to tie individuals and groups together and to improve terrorism research. Despite this shift towards a more quantitative approach, qualitative and descriptive methods still serve a valuable purpose, if only to provide a basis for more quantitative approaches in the future. Some advocate that effective quantitative analysis cannot occur absent a return to qualitative analysis: "...a more detailed analysis of individual cases is required for a fuller understanding of terror...The lack of empirically oriented qualitative case studies limits meaningful quantitative research on the subject" (Schulze, 2004, 165). From this perspective, good theoretically grounded case studies themselves are a worthwhile endeavor and provide useable data. Large amounts of data, even if it is qualitative in origin, can be amassed. Further, good qualitative approaches allow us to "adopt an empathetic approach to the analysis of terrorism by acknowledging the interconnectedness and true complexity of events." This process calls for the addition, rather than the reduction, of variables in the study of terrorism (Ilardi, 2004, 215). Part of the challenge facing quantitative research in the field of terrorism studies is that terrorism is a very complex process. There is very little agreement on some of the facets and how they might fit together. People have studied different groups, different terrorist attacks and different terrorist individuals. This requires a very in-depth examination of the context and specifics which is generally not a strength of quantitative research. Perhaps the best defence for the employment of qualitative research in the field of terrorism to date is to contrast it with a famous quote by Fred Kerlinger (in Miles and Huberman, 1994, 40) "there's no such thing as qualitative data everything is either a 1 or a 0." At this point it is very difficult to assign a 1 or a 0 to any real aspect of terrorism. Further refinement may make this possible in the future. This project will also contribute to theory-building in the field of terrorism studies. While this research is not looking to identify any new variables or elements per se, a re­ examination and clarification of the modern and contemporary terrorism literature has the 27 potential to reveal new ideas. It may also fulfill "a building-block role" by filling a space between a particular type/subtype of phenomenon (George and Bennett, 2005, 75). This point speaks to the argument that if the modern and contemporary terrorism literature is unsuccessful in explaining the newer case studies, then we need to consider that domestic homegrown terrorism may be different from the traditional form of terrorism. This directly addresses the suggestion made by Young and Findley (2009, 4, 8) that we are not distinguishing between different types of terrorism, and that perhaps there may be different causal mechanisms at work. Part of the end result of this research will be some preliminary thoughts about what the differences between terrorism seen in the modern and contemporary eras and domestic homegrown terrorism might be. These differences might demonstrate a shift in the causal mechanisms suggested in the terrorism literature which no longer apply. The identification and analysis of new case studies, while invaluable to terrorism studies, also has much broader application to any number of fields which investigate aspects related to terrorism. Schmidt & Jongman (2005, 268-91) in their contribution to the Ranstrop compilation specifically identify corresponding areas which overlap with terrorism studies, including psychology, sociology, law and security, and economic planning. Gathering this data, and potentially identifying new pathways and/or new causal mechanisms will not only address and help mitigate concerns and criticisms towards the methodological shortcomings associated with terrorism studies, but will also facilitate the integration and acceptance of its research into other areas of the social sciences as well. It also serves to validate earlier research if that research is accurate, or correct errors which may have occurred. Because serious errors were found during the analysis of the Madrid, London and Toronto case studies, several assumptions have been made which are not supported by the facts. These in turn can be seen as the basis for ideas on radicalization models.

Debates Within Terrorism Studies

Situating this research within the current context of terrorism studies, it wades directly into a very divisive debate among terrorism scholars: the functionalist/culturalist debate. In response to the continuous threat from Islamic inspired terrorism, some now 28 advocate a shift away from the narrow focus on specific actors or groups, such as al-Qaida, towards a more inclusive approach focusing on ideology. This has been termed the "Global Salafist Jihad" (Cozzens, 2007, 131). This is an important debate because it highlights that Islamic terrorist attacks occurring (and being planned) against Western states are inspired from this global or international perspective. Part of the observation made about these Islamic inspired domestic homegrown attacks is that individuals are influenced or representing a greater global ideology: the terrorism is not being conducted to effect local changes or grievances. The origins of this debate begin with al-Qaida and the subsequent war on terror. Initially, it was suggested that al-Qaida could be viewed as a strategic actor and characterized as Clausewitzian in nature; its tactics were in direct relation to grievances it had articulated (Cozzens, 2007, 128). This view advocated a functionalist or structural approach, and argued that 9/11 era Islamic terrorism was really no different from traditional terrorism with an Islamic flavor. This has important implications for understanding and preventing future attacks, but in supporting this interpretation one inturn accepts several core assumptions. First, that Islamic terrorism is directly led by al-Qaida, which represents a vanguard leading the current wave of terrorism experienced in Western democratic states. Second, that al-Qaida's organizational form is important, that al-Qaida is quantifiable and can be mapped (Cozzens, 2007, 133) and that the key to defeating it lies in understanding it. Functionalists also believe that the capture of key personalities is "a sure fire method to dismantle the network." Last, they view al-Qaida's ideology as unique to its chief exponents; it has risen and will thus fall with the demise of the al-Qaida leadership, as other terrorist groups have historically done (Cozzens, 2007, 134):

The foremost concerns of the functionalist view of al-Qaida are its structure, capabilities, membership and instrumental political strategy. They conceive of al-Qaida as a web, revolving around key personalities and benefiting from globalized technology and organizational forms that afford its multi-tiered affiliates coordination and longevity.

This functional assessment has more recently been challenged by a competing view which suggests that it is a mistake to focus solely on al-Qaida. Culturalists emphasize focusing on the ideology supporting it: Global Salafi Jihad. This group argues that the symptoms are broad and that al-Qaida represents but one small part of a larger imagined community 29 which is linked by ideas, not political motives (Cozzens, 2007, 136). It contends that dismantling al-Qaida and/or capturing its leaders will ultimately do very little to curb the rise in Islamic terrorism. Others argue that the gravest threat facing the West today is not a revived and re-grouped al-Qaida, but rather from loose-knit cells of Western-born Muslims or Muslim immigrants studying or working in the West (Sageman, 2008). Marc Sageman's book, Leaderless Resistance, discusses an emerging threat based on what he terms "grass­ roots" terrorism. Falling squarely into the culturalist camp, it suggests that the Islamic terror threat has evolved beyond al-Qaida and has become a "social movement" of like- minded, ideologically inspired individuals. This interpretation was not well received by another leading scholar who views the terror threat quite differently. Bruce Hoffman, who has clearly staked claim to a functionalist interpretation, has warned for years that there continues to be a threat posed by a resurgent and re-organized al-Qaida. This disagreement has unfolded very publicly in the pages of Foreign Affairs (May/June and July/August 2008) and has become increasingly personal. Hoffman, in direct reply to Sageman's response to a book review written in June 2008, suggests that the bottom-up thesis about a "bunch of guys" while once compelling is now outdated. He further suggests that many recent plots seem to suggest al-Qaida's central, top-down direction (Hoffman, 2008, 165). Further complicating the debate is that the split between functionalist scholars, such as Hoffman, and culturalist scholars, such as Sageman, is also geographical. The result has been a growing "transatlantic rift" (not my term) dividing European terror experts adhering to the culturalist view from their functionalist focused American counterparts. The functionalist-culturalist debate goes beyond academia. While terrorism scholars have been polarized by this debate, governments have been choosing sides as well. Recent government documents have indicated a growing divide between American policy­ makers on this issue. This is important because policy outcomes are dependent on how the issue is framed and interpreted. One report, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued in July 2007, adamantly claims that al-Qaida remains the preeminent threat to homeland security. A subsequent report, issued in February 2008 and presented by J. Michael McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence, confirmed this earlier assessment: "al- Qaida is, and will remain the most serious threat to the homeland as its central leadership continues to plan high impact plots" and that they "assess the group has protected or 30 regenerated key elements of its homeland attack capability, including a safe-haven in Pakistan, operational lieutenants, and its top leadership." While he acknowledged the existence of unconnected ideologically inspired individuals, he downplayed the threat compared to al-Qaida Central and its affiliates and suggested that it is not as prominent a concern as it is portrayed by some, primarily those in Europe (McConnell, 2008, 9). However, the following year, a May 2008 Staff Report from the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs pointed to increasing evidence of ideologically inspired individuals in the United States who, through the internet, are becoming sufficiently radicalized to represent a threat to the homeland (Lieberman & Collins, 2008). A war of words reflects this reality, and reports have surfaced which seek to downplay the merits of one position over the other. The NIE maintains its belief that al- Qaida remains a potent top-down organization and suggests members of al-Qaida in Iraq have been dispatched "to establish cells in other countries" (McConnell, 2008, 7). The report, which supports the functionalist interpretation of the immediate threat, goes as far as to argue that the culturalist or ideological inspired individuals may actually be waning. J. Michael McConnell (2008, 5) also suggests that al-Qaida's global image as of late has "begun to lose some of its luster," which infers that individuals inspired by their ideological message are decreasing. The outcome of this debate has real policy implications because whichever approach ultimately prevails will influence the manner in which terrorism studies and a war on terror would be carried out in the future. Recent work in counterterrorism has focused on decapitation, being the removal of leadership or the infiltration and dismantling of groups from the inside out. The debate also has implications for whether the movement should be viewed as top-down, or has shifted to a bottom-up model, that is, is there a "leadership" disseminating commands, or are groups forming and actively seeking out connections to other similar groups. An agreement that terrorism remains a top-down threat ensures a continuation of current US policy: military driven, foreign intelligence focused and an emphasis on the far front (abroad). Conversely, accepting the threat emanates from a bottom-up model; loosely affiliated small groups acting with little coordination or direction suggests law enforcement and policing needs to be emphasized. An interview conducted with Peter Bergen, senior fellow at the New America Foundation, 31 best sums up the stakes: "if it's leaderless jihad, then I can find something else to do because the threat is over...Leaderless things don't produce big outcomes" (Sciolino & Scmitt, 2008). It also has constitutional and legal implications. The difficulties in identifying, tracking and penetrating single autonomous groups within a larger community are much greater and require more intrusive methods than following an identifiable organization, its links and associates (Berlet, 2008). It is clear that the premise underlying the functionalist/culturalist debate spills over into the current counterterrorism debate, specifically, what strategies work best to counter the terrorist threat facing the West. Two paradigms are often suggested. First, the "war paradigm" suggests that the military and armed forces are the most effective means to fight terrorism. A second "law enforcement" paradigm suggests that it can be dealt with domestically as an extension of crime. The difference between the two is best summed up by Robert Sievert (2003, 308):

It is sometimes unclear whether suspected terrorists caught in the US or elsewhere should be targeted for destruction in a military operation, or captured, convicted and sentenced to a term of years; whether they should be interrogated by military intelligence, or Mirandized, advised of their rights and questioned to obtain evidence that may be admissible in a court of law against them; whether they should be tried before a military commission, or a civilian jury

According to Travalio & Altenburg (2003, 99), the military approach: "advocates the use of military force to deal with terrorism which will, (a) minimize the likelihood offenders will go unpunished, (b) provide immediate and decisive action, not held up by legal procedures or wrangling." According to Martha Crenshaw (2009, 450), the metaphor of war is designed to define the problem as a threat to national security and prescribes the solution as military engagement. Some suggest that it is the best alternative because it acknowledges that, at least in the near future, shortcomings exist in the law enforcement paradigm. This is observed in the ongoing debate over democracy and the curbing of civil rights to fight terrorism and the lack of real legal alternatives especially at the international level (Sievert, 2003,310). Conversely the "law enforcement" paradigm places the focus on existing criminal law to be addressed by civil government functions. It is to be dealt with using "the 32 domestic criminal justice system and its components—police, investigators, prosecutors, judges, juries and the corrections system... [A]ctors should be identified, prosecuted, convicted and punished with domestic crimes such as murder, hijacking and conspiracy" (Travalio & Altenburg, 2003, 98). Some suggest that the "law-enforcement" paradigm provides the best option moving forward, pointing out that military action cannot alone adequately address the problem. The use of military force may in fact be counterproductive because it fails to win hearts and minds and can create an entirely new generation of terrorists (De Wijk, 2009,410-20). Coinciding with the functionalist/culturalist rift observed between Europe and North America, it appears as if there exists a dichotomy in the preference of paradigm as well. Martha Crenshaw (2009, 450) highlights that historically, the US has employed the military approach, pointing to missile strikes on suspected bin Laden training camps prior to 9/11 and the retaliation against Libyan President Gadhafi following the Lockerbie bombing. This trend appears to be continuing following 9/11 with military incursions into Afghanistan, Iraq and more recently military activity in the North West Tribal Area of Pakistan. By comparison, it is suggested that Europe, having had more experience with terrorism in the 1970s and 80s, is comfortable using the law enforcement paradigm and has traditionally given top priority to combating terrorism that affects Europeans directly at home (Hoffman, 1999, 63). This research investigates what more recent cases of terrorism "look like." It acknowledges that the traditional picture of terrorism and its corresponding counterterrorism strategies have been focused on the role of the leader and the role played by the organization—structural elements. The problem is that the more recent cases appear to not be as heavily dependent on these two elements. If it is proven that other elements, such as those centered on ideas, identity, and socialization, are playing a bigger role in driving terrorism then the "culturalist" assumption may be supported and the "functionalist" one challenged. It also suggests that the law-enforcement paradigm may be more applicable and should merit inclusion at least beside military action. In any event, the military paradigm appears to be problematic in the context of domestic homegrown terrorism where those planning or perpetrating the attacks live within the borders of the 33 attacked state. At least on the surface the military paradigm appears not to capture such terrorists. From a policy perspective, there clearly exist several options for combating terrorism. However, the strategy seems to be dependent on how the threat is defined. Terror groups like those described in the modern and contemporary terrorism literature can be seen to emphasize leaders and organizations. They have been countered with some success using measures which attacked the organization; assassinating or capturing leaders or infiltrating and disrupting them from within. This was the standard operating procedure for British intelligence against the IRA in the 1980s as well as the FBI against White Supremacist groups in the US in the 1980s. This point must be made because it shows that the basis for this strategy had merit, and had been employed successfully in the past. However, it must also be acknowledged that this strategy may have limitations, especially against terrorism where the traditional elements are not quite the same. One cannot effectively target leadership or the organization when they may no longer exist, or where their roles may have changed or evolved: it will not succeed. This is another important contribution made by this research. It examines whether governments are employing countermeasures which are ineffective and a waste of time. Once the source of the threat is identified, what it looks like and how it might be different, only then can we re-examine how it should be combated. This is a challenge which exists and needs to be faced, because conclusions at this point are premature and ambiguous at best. In a November 2006 speech, Eliza Manningham-Buller, former Director of MI5, acknowledged that while some of the many investigated, and in some cases, thwarted terror attacks in the UK could be linked directly to al-Qaida Central, a similar number could be traced to sympathetic radicalized individuals. The research starts to provide a foundation for answering some of the questions plaguing governments and their policies. In the face of obvious and substantial disagreement in the field, it directly wades into the middle of this debate. It analyzes and categorizes newer case studies to fit them firmly into one camp or the other. It also has the ability to provide evidence which either supports or refutes whether functionalist (structure) or cultural (independently inspired individuals) claims can be made. Sageman warns us that no one is really taking the domestic homegrown terrorist threat seriously, suggesting 34 this new development "has been completely neglected in recent analyses of terrorism." He further warns us that "missing the evolution of the threat condemns us to keep fighting the last war" (Sageman, 2008, 163-64).

Radicalization Part of more recent debates regarding counterterrorism measures, especially as it pertains to home grown terrorism has been efforts to understand how individuals born and raised or who have lived for extended periods of time in the West become susceptible to radical Islam. This has led to efforts to uncover whether or not there are processes which might lead to radicalization models. Understanding how individuals undergo this process might hold the key to disrupting it, or preventing it in the first place. According to Dyer et al (2009, 8) the key to success in countering violent Islamic extremism behavior is in its early stages. Brooks (2001, 9) points out that radicalization models will help prevent mischaracterization of threats which leads to unwarranted policies, wasted spending and the potential to do more harm than good. This section will identify some of the assumptions found in the literature at both a very general level and then some of the more specific models which have been created by analyzing cases of radicalization. Varying ideas on radicalization exist in the literature although they tend to share commonalities especially that it is a process. According to Pressman (2009, 4) it radicalization refers to "the process of adopting an extremist belief system," where the radical is the one who has adopted the extremist belief. Silber and Bhatt (2007, 16) suggest it is "the progression of searching, finding, adopting, nurturing and developing this extreme belief system to the point where it acts as a catalyst for a terrorist act. Brooks (2011, 12) argues it is

the phenomenon of citizens or residents of Western countries choosing to undertake terrorist activity. It may be understood as involving a transformative process or a conjunction of behavioral and belief changes that may precede an individual's engagement in terrorist activity.

Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009, 7) define a radical as "one who carries his/her theories or convictions to their furthest applications. It implies not only strong beliefs, but 35 extreme action." Radicalization therefore refers to the process of adopting for oneself or creating in others a commitment not only to a system of beliefs, but to their imposition on the rest of society. It is important to identify that radicalization is a process and not an end point. Individuals may start a process towards radicalization but not complete it and they may become radicalized but not turn to violence. This can be contrasted to the idea of demonization, which will be discussed in chapter four. While radicalization assumes a process or progression, demonization can be viewed as an endpoint. It will be introduced as a very important point which fosters moral disengagement which helps to allow individuals to undertake terrorism and accept its potential outcomes and consequences. Efforts to understand radicalization include very general accounts by scholars such as W. Andy Knight, who examines how different levels of analysis might be used to explain the causes of radicalism and extremism. He identified several potential causes of extremism using different levels of analysis including: the individual level, the group level, the societal level, the state/society level, the state level and the transnational or global level (Knight, 2010, 308 - 20). It allows for the possibility that there are multiple possible catalysts contributing to why an individual might turn to extremism However, this dissertation will focus primarily on models which have been created based on case study analysis and efforts to identify common features which might be the key to understanding how individuals might become radicalized. These include models constructed by Silber and Bhatt for the New York Police Department (2007), Steven Emerson's model which was presented to the House Committee on Homeland Security (2006), Carol Dyer, et. al model for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2007), Tomas Precht's model on radicalization in Europe (2007) and Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman's examination and comparison of radicalization among US and UK homegrown terrorists (2009). Many of the models come to very similar conclusions on the process of radicalization. First, most dismiss the idea that radicalization is simply brainwashing. It is argued that the process does involve some de-conditioning and re-socialization, but this is no different than processes seen in the military or employed by conventional psychiatrists during therapy (Dawson, 2009, 3). Dawson further states that at no point do these individuals ever lose the capacity to think for themselves. 36

According to Jerome Bjelopera (2011, 14) the majority of radicalization models share the following ideas: the role of a charismatic leader, intermediary or "spiritual sanctioner," social networks which support and reinforce decisions made by individuals as they embrace violent jihad, the internet as providing access to information and prisons as possible incubators. The most comprehensive radicalization model developed to date is the Silber and Bhatt analysis conducted for the New York Police Department (2007). They identify four specific stages which are assisted by what they term "radicalization incubators," which can be places such as mosques, hang-outs, and book shops. The first stage is a pre- radicalization phase which they claim has no specific identifiable profile although they hypothesize that in this case it would probably be based on some combination of "environment, social status, lifestyle, education, religion or pedigree (22). The second stage is a self identification stage where an individual may begin to explore radical Islam. This is based usually on some form of catalyst; something "jump starts" this process although there is rarely any indication of what this might be. The individual becomes alienated from their former life and spends more and more time with like minded individuals (30-31). This is also where the charismatic leader, intermediary or spiritual sanctioner often appears to guide the individual towards radicalization. It is usually an extremist cleric or terrorist recruiter who serves to connect US citizens with foreign terrorist networks (Nelson and Bodurian, 2010, 3). They will be a major factor in the next phase. The third stage is an indoctrination stage where the individual intensifies their beliefs and is characterized by increased withdrawal and isolation and group dynamics begin to take effect (36-7). During the fourth and final jihadization phase individuals accept their duty to participate in jihad. This is the beginnings of the operationalization period and usually sees travel abroad for training (43-6). The Dyer et al. FBI model (2007, 4) closely matches this model arguing that there are four phases: pre-radicalization, identification, indoctrination and action (See Gartenstein-Ross and Douglass 2009, 20-6 for a comparison of all of the major radicalization models side-by-side and the conclusion that they are for the most part very similar). With the exception of some minor differences most of the models emphasize that an indoctrinator plays a critical role. Further, although it is acknowledged that it may occur in 37 chat rooms it most often occurs through face to face contact or direct email or other correspondence (Bjelopera, 2011, 15). This is not surprising considering the majority of American case studies demonstrate that a primary strategy of Islamist groups since the mid 2000s has to been to actively attempt to recruit US citizens and US legal residents. The stage was set in the early post 9/11 era when the original batch of homegrown terrorists, namely Jose Padilla, John Lindh Walker and Adam Gadahn consciously sought out groups abroad to join and fight (Post and Scheffer, 2007, 109). Foreign groups quickly learned the benefits of the US citizen who could travel internationally with little scrutiny, they were endowed with cultural and linguistic knowledge and represented "duality"- an ability to operate in environments which were very different from one another (Nelson and Bodurian, 2010, 2). Tracing back, researchers such as Emerson (2006) identified four specific imams lecturing in various cities around the US including Ali-Al Timini in Virginia; Fawaz Damrah in Cleveland; Mohammed El-Mezain in Los Angeles; and Adnan Bayazid in Kansas City. More recently other homegrown terrorist incidents have been tied to intermediaries directly in contact with individuals who became radicalized. The Fort Hood shooter was connected to al-Awalaki; the mass movement of Minnesota Somalis traveling to join al-Shabaab were recruited by Cabdulaahi Ahmed Farrax; and a Northern Virginia group was recruited and indoctrinated through a Taliban contact named "Saifullah" who used personal email correspondence with each individual (Nelson and Bodurian, 2010, 4- 6). This demonstrates that there is actual recruitment going on: experienced extremists who use their experience to spot, assess and encourage potential recruits to follow a path (Dyer et al., 2009, 7). Efforts are being made to compare the processes of radicalization in different Western states. Researchers suggest that the political culture of states may matter and highlight that European countries are at a greater risk than the United States. This argument is usually based on demographics of the populations (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009, 55-6; Brooks, 2001, 7) which argue factors in the US include higher education levels, greater wealth, more middle class Muslims who are less segregated meaning they are more likely to have similar views with the West (Schanzer at al., 2010, 16). Leiken (2005) suggests Muslims in Europe are more likely to "gather in bleak enclaves with their compatriots" (Algerians in France; Moroccans in Spain; Turks in 38

Germany; and Pakistanis in Britain) which helps create conditions where "religion, poverty and social marginalization intersect." Some effort has also gone into understanding the dynamics within the Muslim community as well as diaspora relationships. Schanzeret al. (2010) have spent considerable time studying the Muslim community in the United States in an effort to understand if there are any community factors contributing to the increase in radicalization and how they are working to deter it moving forward. He argues that US strategies in the months following 9/11 created "homeland insecurity" by increasingly detaining, arresting and questioning which led many Muslims to feel angry. However he concludes that US Muslim communities take the threat of radicalization in their communities seriously and have made a concerted effort to address grievances towards the US which may arise. Some of these strategies include: public and private denunciations of violence, self policing and encouraging the community to tum in suspects, "venting sessions" to help clear the air, and encouraging political engagement so their voices are heard (Schanzer et al, 2010, 19-39). The community continues to identify the charismatic leaders who operate within their communities as the greatest threat (12). Investigation into the relationship between US Muslim communities and their links or attachments to their countries of origins has also seen renewed interest. This approach investigates how cultural ideas might be transmitted and retained from one locale to another (For a discussion on diapora relations and extremism see Sageman, 2004; Kaldor and Muro, 2003; O'Neill, 2005; Scheffer, 2005). Other efforts tied to radicalization include attempts to identify what type of individuals may be more susceptible to the process. This approach however has faced the same challenges of profiling in terrorism more generally and the realization that there is no profile. An analysis of 139 Muslim Americans linked to terrorism since 2001 showed no profile based on age, ethnicity, geographical locale within the US (Schanzer et al, 2010, 10- 11). Tying this back to radicalization models, all of the models clearly admitted that in the pre-radicalization phases, there is no discernible patterns which emerged. Pressman (2009) has turned to the field of criminal profiling in an effort to combine the two and create an assessment tool in an effort to determine what characteristics might predict terrorism. She determined that while the criminal assessments provide a fairly accurate tool for predicting violence and crime among individuals, it did not translate well when applied to terrorism. 39

She also attempted to draw a closer comparison by specifically examining the assessment tools used by the US Secret Service to detect potential political extremism (assassination attempts on high profile figures). This approach also yielded no significant results (Pressman, 2009). The field of terrorism studies has made numerous efforts to create a profile which might help but is has thus far proven problematic. The Pressman approach however should not so easily be discarded because the development of the criminal and political extremism profiles occurred over time and with much larger sets of data. Perhaps this approach may enjoy greater success in the future, although the history of terrorism profiling suggests otherwise. Michael Jacobson (2010) has also introduced a novel approach to preventing homegrown radicalization. His efforts are based on the observation that some individuals who have become radicalized, or who have joined terrorist groups, have left them and some have actually been de-radicalized. He argues that this strategy could be applied to individuals being radicalized in the West. Other governments around the world have had success by employing some of the following strategies: undermine leadership by "naming and shaming" them; demonstrate how unglamorous the life of a terrorist really is; inform them that leaders are misrepresenting Islam; point out group's hypocrisy (ideas versus action); get family members to confront them and convince them to leave (Jacobson, 2020, 8-20). These are reasonable propositions which have worked in several Middle Eastern and North African states, however it is unclear whether they can be successful for radicalized individuals in the West. Jacobson's proposal actually plays into the research conducted in this dissertation because it is asking whether or not domestic homegrown terrorism is similar to modern and contemporary terrorism and argues that it demonstrates distinct differences. It remains to be seen if these strategies will be practical for deradicalizing potential domestic homegrown terrorists. This will be addressed in conjunction with findings in the concluding chapter. The section on radicalization has been introduced because it represents another counterterrorism approach being discussed in the literature and has become an important discourse among those in Western states towards homegrown terrorism. However, this counterterrorism strategy will also be revisited in the concluding chapter because several 40 problems appear when applied to the findings of this dissertation. The literature on radicalization models continues to emphasize certain characteristics including the importance of a leader, intermediary or spiritual sanctioner, the fact the group dynamic plays an important role and that this is assisted by increased isolation and withdrawal into a group. Evidence from the case studies conducted do not support these findings suggesting these cases are either anomalies or the literature and radicalization models on homegrown terrorism are problematic. While either of these is possible, research conducted on the Madrid, London and Toronto case studies conducted for this dissertation revealed different facts than those suggested in the radicalization literature which concluded a much more superficial analysis of multiple cases and closer to actual events when misinformation may have been spread.

Concluding Remarks This chapter has outlined the field of terrorism studies and how it has progressed through several eras. It pointed out that field has always faced scrutiny from several fronts but that more recently critical terrorist research has challenged the field and taken it to task on its methodology, its focus, as well as the general origins of knowledge in the field. While summarizing and acknowledging the contribution which might be made by a critical terrorism approach, this dissertation is conducting research on an important issue in terrorism and has suggested that it actually works to address some of the criticisms levied at the field. Although this research is working within the modern and contemporary era, based on that literature, it nonetheless has an important contribution to make towards two important debates occurring in the field today and applications to counterterrorism policy and literature particularly recent efforts to model and understand radicalization occurring in western states. 41

CHAPTER THREE

Defining Terrorism Case Study Selection

Defining Terrorism The greatest challenge facing those who study terrorism is a lack of agreement about how it should be defined. This debate has plagued not only those in academia, but a host of other fields which must deal with any aspect of the issue (Feldmann & Perala, 2004, 102), including those in the legal profession, the media, as well as government policy­ makers, officials and security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The range of views on how best to define terrorism is staggering. In 1983, two terrorism researchers, Schmid and Jongman, examined approximately 109 definitions of terrorism solicited by a survey of global terrorism researchers (Schmid and Jongman, 2007, 5). The United States government alone has over nineteen different definitions or descriptions of terrorism (Perry, 2004, 255; Schmid, 2004, 377). The differences depend on the context in which it is used and is "usually dependant on the priorities or interests of the agency defining it" (Hoffman, 1998, 38). This definitional issue has become so profound that the adage "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," is so well accepted that it no longer requires a citation. This statement is often employed to convey in a very simple manner how ideas on terrorists and terrorism are truly subjective. Terrorism is diverse and scholars have attributed terrorism to individuals, such as Carlos the Jackal; small bands operating in clandestine circumstances, such as 17 November; and large and complex organizations such as Hezbollah. It has at times also included national governments and "rogue states" (Weinberg & Richardson, 2004, 139). This brief discussion highlights the reality that there has never been, nor is there ever likely to be a universally accepted definition for terrorism. Some have gone so far as to suggest we stop trying, or that it may never be defined, though "most people have a vague idea or impression of what terrorism is" (Hoffman in Schmid, 2004, 378). This sounds akin to an "I know it when I see it" argument. However, despite the difficulties and challenges associated with the lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the field must move beyond relying on the idea that the best definition one can provide for the concept of "terrorism" is that there is no agreed upon definition. Rather, 42 researchers must be obligated to put forward some form of working definition, even if it is someone else's, for their research. The question then becomes which definition to choose. Commonalities can be found in most definitions of terrorism, including the idea about "the deliberate use of violence in order to influence some audience (or audiences)." It is however from this point that definitions begin to diverge and individuals begin adding other criteria (Goodwin, 2006, 2008). Often, the debate focuses on how these criteria should come together. For example, one simple definition of terrorism contains three simple criteria: "the creation of fear, the seemingly random use of violence and attacks on innocents" (Frey & Morris, 1991, 3). At the complete opposite of the spectrum lies the definition postulated by Alex Schmidt and Albert Jongman. The result of their survey, mentioned above, resulted in the inclusion of numerous criteria which led to an expansive and detailed definition:

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as an instrumental target of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics which form the basis for their selection for victimization. Through previous use of violence or the credible threat of violence other members of that group or class are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). This group or class, whose members' sense of security is purposefully undermined, is the target of terror. The victimization of the target of violence is considered extra-normal by most observers from the witnessing audience on the basis of its atrocity, the time (eg., peacetime) or place (not a battlefield) of victimization, or the disregard for rules of combat accepted in conventional warfare. The norm violation creates an attentive audience beyond the target of terror; sectors of this audience might in turn form the main object of manipulation. The purpose of this indirect method of combat is either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demands (eg., a government) or targets of attention (eg., public opinion) to changes of attitude or behavior favoring the short or long term interests of the users of this method of combat (Schmidt & Jongman, 1984, 2008).

It is clear that this definition, while thorough, is not useable as a working definition because it contains too many criteria. In fact very few instances considered to be terrorist attacks would be able to satisfy all of these criteria. The challenge has always been to find middle ground—a definition which is not overly general ~ potentially lumping in activities which are clearly not terrorism — but similarly not overly-inclusive — potentially having no 43 activities meet the threshold. In this sense the challenge is to cover the important aspects of terrorism while keeping the definition simple and direct. Some of the best examples of this can be found in definitions including important references to intimidating "the public," or an entire population, and as an effort to affect some kind of change. Jessica Stern (1999, 11-14) argues that terrorism is not "regular violence" because it "is purposely aimed at innocent people, including civilians and it deliberately resorts to extreme violence against defenceless targets to produce a dramatic situation." It is designed to "attract publicity and thus fulfill the objective of spreading terror among the targeted population." Michael Walzer (2002, 5) defines terrorism as "the deliberate killing of innocent people at random, in order to spread fear through a whole population and force the hands of its political leaders." He emphasizes that terrorism is "an option, a political strategy" selected among a wide variety of alternatives. According to Max Manwaring (2002, 68):

Terrorism is a very practical, calculated and cynical strategy of warfare for the weak to use against the strong. It is a generalized political-psychological asymmetric substitute for conventional war and its intent is to coerce substantive political change.

Segeller (in Feldmann & Perala, 2002, 103) argues that terrorists "kill one person to threaten a thousand, or to intimidate, expand public insecurity, or blackmail governments into reconsidering the policies they espouse." Terrorist campaigns have two main objectives: "tactically, the goal is public recognition of a problem or claim; strategically, the aim is absolute change." One of the greatest challenges facing a definition for terrorism is that while many definitions share commonalities, the inclusion or exclusion of terms such as "sub-state," or "sub-national" dramatically alters the perception of which actors commit terrorism. The terrorism literature identifies that many authors acknowledge that states can commit terrorism but prefer to set it aside as something different (Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009, 36). Richard Jackson (2009a, 380) argues that this is a common position among terrorist scholars who have chosen to instead focus on non-state forms of terrorism. He goes on to quote Walter Laqueur as accepting that "states have killed many more people and have caused far more material and social destruction than 'terrorism from below,' but 44 then argues it is simply not the type of terrorism he wishes to examine." He criticizes scholars such as Bruce Hoffman who exclude states by including in his definition that fact that terrorism is sub-national or sub-state (Jackson, 2009, 382). The United Nations, facing considerable political issues also chooses to down-play state terrorism and its definitions emphasize that terrorism is "violent acts carried out by individuals, groups and organizations" (Schmid, 2004, 388 - 90). This dissertation focuses on how terrorist groups behave as they move towards the commission of terrorism and does not attempt to wade into the debate about how definitions of terrorism may or may not include state terrorism. It similarly recognizes the debate among scholars regarding whether individuals can easily fit into definitions of terrorism. Initially, there appeared to be a very clear limitation for the inclusion of individuals as actors who can commit terrorism. Hoffman (1998, 42) made a clear effort to emphasize that terrorism required group involvement in some capacity. "While the tactics and targets of terrorists and lone assassins are often identical their purpose is not. Whereas the terrorist's goal is again ineluctably political, the 'lunatic assassin's' goal is more often intrinsic, completely egocentric and deeply personal." He further argued: "just as one person cannot credibly claim to be a political party, so a lone individual cannot be considered to constitute a terrorist group." The definition suggested "an organizational entity with some conspirational structure and identifiable chain of command beyond a single individual acting on his or her own" (Hoffman, 1998, 43). Hoffman has somewhat softened his stance more recently arguing that technological advances make some of these criteria more difficult to substantiate. In the 2006 edition of Inside Terrorism Hoffman suggests the transmission of orders and the anonymity of the internet makes tracing an identifiable leader less certain (Hoffman, 2006, 38). However, while Hoffman acknowledges the limitations of his earlier characterization that terrorism had to be a group activity other academics maintain that lone individuals cannot be so readily associated with terrorism and base the assessment on the observation that individuals cannot be "detected or deterred" (Jenkins, 2009, 2) The divisiveness within the terrorism literature on this point can be summarized as follows: there is disagreement about whether or not state terrorism is different than sub- state terrorism and whether or not individuals can commit terrorism. While it may not 45 satisfy everyone it is entirely possible that terrorism committed by different actors, whether they are states, groups or individuals might share many similarities, they may also demonstrate differences. This dissertation recognizes this debate and the challenges it poses but focuses solely on groups who commit terrorism. At no point during the literature review was any debate found questioning whether or not groups commit terrorism. Setting aside the difficulties mentioned above and the admission that no definition of terrorism will satisfy all readers, one is nonetheless obligated to attempt an adequate explanation. This dissertation will use the definition of terrorism articulated by terrorism researcher Bruce Hoffman. There are several reasons why Bruce Hoffman's definition of terrorism has been selected. First, Hoffman's definition can be considered an ongoing work in progress. He has spent the better part of the past 25 years analyzing and synthesizing this definition, which began as his dissertation project and has evolved over the years and in most books he has written. Hoffman, in his doctoral dissertation articulated that:

[tjerrorism is a powerful human political activity which is directed towards the creation of a general climate of fear, and is designed to influence, in ways desired by the protagonist, other human beings and, through them, some course of events (Hoffman, 1984).

As he continued to evolve as an academic, subtle changes in his definition emerged. The definition in his 1998 book, Inside Terrorism, suggested that:

Terrorism is the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack (Hoffman, 1998).

Finally Hoffman's 2006 definition suggests Terrorism is ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent-or equally important threatens violence; designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspirational cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated 46

or inspired by the ideological aims or examples of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and perpetrated by a subnational group or non- state entity (Hoffman, 2006, 40)

One other benefit is that Hoffman's definition has evolved and changed as terrorism has evolved and presented new challenges. In addition to the slight changes in his definition, the 2006 re-released and expanded second edition of Inside Terrorism included several additional statements designed to reflect the new terror environment. The first statement addresses the growing fuzziness in terminology used to identify categories of actors. Where once it was felt that a clear distinction could be drawn between those deemed "terrorists" and those considered "guerrillas" or "insurgents," Hoffman suggests that this may no longer be entirely accurate and argues that significant overlap now exists. He points out that many groups meet criteria assigned to guerilla movements, but are now more readily accepted and indeed designated as terrorist groups by numerous states and organizations (Hoffman, 2006, 36). His second caveat addresses what was recognized by most terrorist scholars to be a growing trend in terrorism, termed "leaderless resistance." Both of these points will briefly be addressed here. The first point, a growing murkiness or fuzziness between categorizing actors requires some expansion because several of the most well-known modern case studies used to explain terrorism have at times been categorized as guerrilla groups. These include the PIRA, FARC and the LTTE, which are being used to support claims made in the modern and contemporary terrorism literature review and it must be shown why these groups have been included as terrorist organizations. The second point, relating to the concept of leaderless resistance, will be addressed because this study argues that domestic homegrown terrorism is not an example of other terms found in the terrorism literature, more recently including leaderless resistance, lone-wolf operations, netwar or emigre terrorism. These concepts must be clearly defined in order to differentiate them from the terrorism this study identifies as domestic homegrown. One final point which must be addressed is that although the Hoffman definition provides a good account of terrorism and the most appropriate for the research conducted in this dissertation, it is not without criticism. The most obvious criticism is that Hoffman's definition (2006, 40) completely removes state terrorism from inclusion because he 47 specifically identifies terrorism as being perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity. Several other issues include the fact that the definition is "defined in highly political ways" (Burke, 2008, 39; Jackson, 2009) suggesting that it justifies the behavior of states in combating terrorism and that it is security and policy centric. It is also a very West, if not US centric interpretation which ignores other cultural understandings or contributions (Jackson, 2009; Stokes, 2009, 85; Heath-Kelly, 2010, 242). Hoffman in particular is singled out by critical terrorist researchers who argue that his definition, as well as his research more generally cannot be viewed as "neutral" because the research is conducted at. research centers such as RAND which are government funded and linked to state policy making (Herring, 2008, 203). This ties into more general criticisms of terrorism definitions that they "generally tend to reflect the interests of those who do the defining" and that definitions "set parameters for the public debate and can shape the agenda of the community" (Schmid, 2004, 385).

"Guerrilla War," "Insurgency," and Narcotics Trafficking as Terrorism Traditionally, there has been a distinction between guerrilla groups and terrorist groups. The main difference has always been that guerilla and insurgent groups intend to take and hold territory which they could then use to mount attacks against the opposing state (Feldmann & Perala, 2002, 105). However, this point must be reconciled with the idea that terrorism is a tactic, or strategy; it is "the nature of the act itself, irrespective of the individual or organization that carries out the action" (Feldmann & Perala, 2002, p. 104). While there appears to be a clear definitional distinction, this does not account for the fact that both can be used simultaneously. Guerrilla actions are felt to consist of warfare tactics used by a weaker side to inflict damage on its enemy. One definition suggests that guerrilla warfare is "a set of military tactics utilized by a minority group within a state or an indigenous population in order to oppose the government or foreign occupying forces" (Beckett, 1999, ix). Similarly, it is "a technique used by weaker parties that must confront superior forces which involves harassing the enemy, avoiding direct confrontation in pitched battles and concentrates on sapping enemy's strength and morale through ambushes, small skirmishes, raids and withdrawals, cutting communications and similar techniques" (Wickham-Crowley, 1992, 3). Conversely, terrorism consists of deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on non- 48 combatants to instill terror in the population and undermine the power of political authorities (Feldmann & Perala, 2002, 106). Walter Laqueur concurs and suggests that while guerrilla operations are directed "primarily against members of the enemy's security and armed forces as well as their infrastructure, terrorist organizations are less discriminate in their choice of targets" (Laqueuer, in Feldmann & Perala, 2002, p. 106). Based on this distinction two points about the murkiness between the two can be identified. First, the idea that organizations felt to be better defined by the guerrilla term have dabbled in terrorism is not new. The link between insurgent or revolutionary groups trying to overthrow the government using terrorism has been seen for decades. Violent acts were perpetrated by identifiable groups that "attacked government or other targets for short term goals aimed at sparking widespread discontent towards the existing government" as a means to jumpstart a revolution (Feldmann & Perala, 2002, 104). It is entirely possible to have a military strategy which combines guerrilla and terrorist activities (Ortiz, 2002, 128). There is clear evidence of guerrilla organizations resorting to terrorism as a deliberate strategy to attain certain goals at certain times. FARC, a Columbian "guerrilla group", started using terrorism in the early 1970s as part of their military strategy because they saw that it was effective in conflicts in Latin America (Feldmann & Perala, 2002, 106, 108). In 1994, Ariel Merari attempted to model the differences between guerillas and terrorists. He identified ten characteristics which he felt distinguished guerrilla warfare from terrorism (Merari, 1994, 399-401). However, more recent analysis by others has demonstrated that Merari's characteristics may no longer be concrete and that there exists significant overlap between the two categories. This has led some to try and find a definition for what is increasingly being recognized as a hybrid of guerrilla groups and terrorism. Jeff Goodwin has attempted to define what he terms "revolutionary terrorism," which combines elements of both groups (Goodwin, 2006, 2028). This builds on an argument made by Donald Black, who has argued that "those popularly known as guerrillas may sometimes engage in terrorism [when they attack civilians], and those popularly known as terrorists may sometimes engage in guerrilla warfare [when they attack military facilities or personnel]" (Black, 2004,17). A second point is merely a logical extrapolation of the relationship between the two. Once an organization has committed what can be characterized as a terrorist act, it cannot 49 go back. They may display all of the hallmarks of a guerrilla group but if they add the commission of a terrorist attack to their strategy they must also be considered a terrorist group. Deciding to use terror tactics even once, ensures that the option, even if never deployed again, remains a part of their arsenal and a possibility again at some point in the future. The bottom line is that groups that use both tactics probably represent some form of hybrid, but this does not prevent them from being called terrorist organizations as well. This murkiness between categorizations has also recently grown to include the debate about "narco-terrorists," organizations that commit terrorism and simultaneously traffic narcotics. The debate centers on the idea that crime and terrorism were traditionally seen as incompatible. It used to be an easy distinction: terrorist groups are driven by a higher cause and disinterested in profit, while crime is motivated simply by the drive for profit (Cornell, 2005b, 753). Bruce Hoffman (1998, 43): "the terrorist is fundamentally an altruist: he believes he is serving a "good" cause designed to achieve a greater good for a wider constituency whereas the criminal serves no cause at all, just his own personal aggrandizement and material satiation." So while it used to be thought that terror or ideological groups were striving for a higher cause and were therefore disinterested or opposed to the drug trade and other criminal activity, evidence suggest this has been changing as well. Yet another "grey area" has emerged, because there appears to be an increase in terror organizations using narcotic production and/or trafficking as a means of financing themselves. The connection between terrorism and crime has always existed. What has changed, however, is the type of crime being seen. Traditionally, crime meant bank robberies, kidnappings and fraud-related activities, including securing fraudulent identification papers. In the 1990s, the type of crime changed and shifted predominantly to involve drugs and weapons. Explanations for this shift are limited at best. Perhaps it was just a reflection of the changing times: drug use and drug production grew during this time period, facilitated by forces of globalization (growth and distribution). It must be acknowledged that drugs and weapons became a very profitable enterprise. As this avenue of revenue emerged, it makes sense that groups would embrace it. First, it would be lucrative. Second, it would be a sustained and steady source of resources. Long gone would be the days where terrorist groups had to potentially choose between pursuing their ideological goals or finding the resources to do so. Terror groups wandering into the drug 50 and weapons world also increases the odds that they are interacting with other, more traditional criminal elements including gangs and organized crime. The reality is that this creates some murkiness about the distinction between terrorism and crime. We can now see ideals - or the higher cause - being compromised or temporarily set aside to fund the organization; it is sometimes too good to pass up because it allows groups to pay fighters, acquire weapons and even buy legitimacy from a public (Cornell, 2005, 623-24; Cornell, 2005b, 754). The key point seems to focus on where this increasing nexus between crime and terrorism may lie. For example, the FARC's relationship with drug producers ebbs and flows and is dictated by need; sometimes they cooperate, and other times not (Steinitz, 2002, 2). If a group collaborates only as much as necessary, does it dramatically affect its ideology or motivations or does it represent a compromise, a matter of financial necessity? A complete transition to criminal behavior implies a shift away from collecting resources "as a means of pursuing political ends," towards "acquiring goods and profits that are ends in themselves" (Cronin, 2009, 146). It is important to stress that this is not about labels. Arguments can and will be made to differentiate or link ideas about terrorism and guerrilla warfare and terrorism and crime and different people will see them differently: some might view them as overlapping or as separate things. This dissertation makes the argument that if you have used terrorism, regardless of other activities, you are a terrorist organization. It is less interested in how much criminal activity might be furthering personal ends, as long as some is still being used to further the pursuit of the organization's aims and goals. The crime-terrorism nexus however remains an important one, because the newer case studies representing domestic homegrown terrorism once again appear to change this dynamic. The terrorism-crime- drugs nexus must be kept in mind as perhaps another example of a shift. An interview with one individual tied to the Toronto 18 terrorist group suggests that there was a real connection between the Toronto 18 members and ideas of gangsta credibility and criminality (Zekulin, 2011ms). Traditionally, terrorist groups and gangs have been separated and discussed at arms length from one another. Does this idea require a re­ examination, or is the Toronto 18 case an anomaly? 51

Further Distinction: What this is Not It is also important to discuss some of the newer ideas about terrorism which have been posited. They speak directly to the caveat that Bruce Hoffman identifies regarding his evolving definition of terrorism. The first addresses what is recognized by most terrorist scholars to be a growing trend in terrorism, termed "leaderless resistance" (Hoffman, 2006, 38). Leaderless resistance has its origins with an American intelligence officer in 1962 and articulated as a strategy designed to retaliate against what was perceived to be the eventual Communist take-over of the US (Beam, 1983). This strategy was then borrowed by Louis Beam, who re-configured the target as the growing threat posed by the tyrannical American government. It was also conceived to counter-act the growing infiltration and disruption of White Supremacist groups in the United States to which Beam was connected. Beam called leaderless resistance "non-organization," because it was in contrast to the traditional pyramid structure of resistance groups at the time. The strategy suggests that it is impossible to ever identify a large part of the resistance, because there is no actual contact between a leader or headquarters and the cells/group. This is because it is based on a concept where all groups operate independently of each other and never report to a central headquarters or leader for instruction. Information was to be distributed or shared via newspapers, leaflets and the computer (Beam, 1983). To be clear, leaderless resistance does not represent a type or variant of terrorism. Rather, it is a strategy: "It is a strategy in which small groups and individuals fight an entrenched power through independent acts of violence, they do not have central coordination or explicit communication with one another" (Garfinkel, 2003). It is designed to minimize communication among the cells. In a somewhat confusing manner, it is a strategy within a strategy, as terrorism is itself a specific strategy used by groups to solicit results. Today the term is often applied to describe any clandestine organization that employs cells and has a lack of bidirectional vertical command lines. There is no leader to directly issue orders or pay operatives, but an intention to "inspire" (Stern, 2003, 34). They communicate with one another through media sources in an effort to "direct cell-to-cell communication" (Garfinkel, 2003). Garfinkel has analyzed the idea of leaderless resistance by looking at several case studies including the Environmental Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). His research indicates that there is always a link where 52 all the cells can go and get "ideas" about where, when, and how they can attack or disrupt targets. He further identifies that these groups often have "press officers" who maintain the websites and send out communiques or messages (Garfinkel, 2003). While it is associated with "spontaneous, autonomous, unconnected underground cells organized by insurgents seeking to carry out acts of violence," (Garfinkel, 2003) there is still reason to associate leaderless resistance with at the very least a minimal amount of communication. Again, non-organization is how it is described, but the manner in which information is passed and direction is given has simply changed. It may no longer rely on face-to-face or personal discussions, and is more technology driven thus allowing it to occur anonymously. However, it still implies that there is some form of central command; a central site, email, or something else which instructs people who read it or log onto a site to specific actions. Although considerable debate exists surrounding exactly how widespread this strategy has become, it is simply mentioned to show that Hoffman's definition, while remaining virtually unchanged from 1998 to 2006, has more recently recognized change in the field and responded. His definition demonstrates a degree of fluidity and shows that challenges in establishing a definition for terrorism are actually becoming increasingly difficult. Past definitions of terrorism were content to rest on simpler characteristics. In order to qualify as terrorism, violence had to be perpetrated by an individual on direction from, or on behalf of, some existent organizational entity or organized movement with at least some conspiratorial structure and some form of identifiable chain of command (Hoffman, 2006, 38). Today this is no longer necessarily true, and issues related to terrorism have become much more complicated. In addition to the idea of leaderless resistance, several other more recently coined ideas should also be highlighted so that they too may be distinguished as being different from the anticipated outcome of this research. They also support the contention that terrorism and terrorism research appear to exist in a state of flux with new ideas continuously emerging. The variant of terrorism being suggested by this research must also be differentiated from ideas including:

• "Emigre terrorism" has been identified as a more recent threat and is characterized by groups or agents from third countries who carry out attacks on fellow nationals 53

on the territory of another country (Weinberg & Eubank, 2005, 101). Emigre terrorism consists of individuals who arrive in a country intent on causing harm as opposed to individuals who were either born, or have been long time residents of the very same country they then attack.

• "Lone-wolf operatives" is a term which implies some degree of autonomy. More often than not, they are attributed to a single culprit. The Una-bomber Ted Kaczynski, and Eric Rudolph's sustained bombing campaign against abortion clinics are both considered to be classic lone-wolf operations. Problems with individuals as terrorists has been identified above

• "Netwar" discusses the use of the internet as a method to improve coordination. It is "an emerging mode of conflict at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare, in which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed organizations, small groups and individuals who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without precise central command." (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, 6)

Despite the fact that many of these terms appear to share similarities, Islamic inspired domestic homegrown terrorism does not fall within any one of these characterizations. This dissertation argues that it is sufficiently different from any of these recently coined ideas and that any connection to them would be erroneous. The case studies in chapter five represent a previously unseen phenomenon, representing a new type or variant of terrorism which requires a new and separate categorization. Further, domestic homegrown terrorism is not an extension or evolution of "new" terrorism, it is not apocalyptic or millennial terrorism, tied to grandiose visions of Mark Juergensmeyer's concept of cosmic war or attempts to hasten the arrival of the end of the world. Finally, it is not suicide centric—it is not plotted or executed as suicide terrorism. The London 2005 group employed suicide terrorism in its attack but it will be clear from the case studies that neither the Madrid group nor the Toronto group seriously considered this strategy.

International Terrorism, Domestic Terrorism and Homegrown Terrorism The type of terrorism being identified in this dissertation requires some further clarification. The introductory chapter suggested that current definitions for domestic terrorism as well as homegrown terrorism cannot adequately capture the attacks being 54 investigated in chapter five. The most logical place to begin identifies that the literature clearly differentiates between international and domestic terrorism, although it uses the terms international terrorism and transnational terrorism interchangeably (Bergeson and Han, 2005, 134). Terrorism is considered to be international when: more than one country is involved in the attack, including if the nationality of the perpetrator is different from the nationality of the victims. An attack is also international if the terrorists are outside their national boundaries, or if terrorists of different nationalities act together (Sanchez-Calle and de la Calle, 2009, 36). The FBI (2006) definition of international terrorism:

involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the US or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the US. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the US, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

By way of comparison, the FBIs definition of domestic terrorism:

The unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual operating entirely within the US without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives

According to Perry (2004, 250), most US agencies typically employed similar definitions for domestic and international terrorism with the exception of two small points. Domestic incidents included a jurisdictional element "within the territorial jurisdiction of the US," and international incidents included references to assassination and kidnapping. Wilkinson (200) suggested that domestic or internal terrorism was characterized as terrorist attacks occurring within one state or province. This description was used to differentiate it from international terrorism based on the fact that it had a domestic or local agenda, not an 55 international one. Domestic homegrown terrorism implies that individuals of a country are carrying out attacks in that country with an international agenda. This aspect of the Islamic inspired domestic homegrown terrorism studied in this dissertation sets it apart from purely domestically-focused attacks such as the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing. Until 2005 the term homegrown terrorism was still reserved for domestic organizations including anti-government militias, white supremacists and eco-terrorists. This was actually done purposefully to distinguish them from jihadist terrorist networks because the jihadist cause was always perceived to be foreign (Vidino, 2009). Today, the term homegrown is used to describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the US or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents or visitors largely radicalized within the US (Bjelopera, 2011, 1). This places the focus on citizenship or the locale where the individuals were radicalized and does not distinguish anything further beyond these criteria. According to this definition, a homegrown terrorist is considered homegrown even when they leave the country where they were radicalized to join, fight with, or plan attacks anywhere in the world. Bjelopera (2011,10) maintains that the biggest threat facing the US are citizens that can move easily from US to foreign countries and are comfortable in a variety of different cultures. Vidino (2009) and Johnson (2011) echo this interpretation and label homegrown Islamic terrorists on the basis of where individuals grew up or spent the greatest amount of time. As examples they point to individuals who are radicalized in the US and travel to join foreign groups like al-Shabaab as the best example of homegrown terrorists. The cases being studied in chapter five are not transnational or international terrorism. Definitions of domestic terrorism could be applicable except for the fact that the goal of these groups is not a domestic one; the terrorist act is occurring under the auspices of a global Salafist ideology and the domestic label arguably does not go far enough. Homegrown terrorism as it is currently defined is too broad and lumps together too many different outcomes. It technically does include attacks carried out in the same state the individuals were radicalized, but places more emphasis on where they were radicalized. Based on an examination of the literature on definitions and specifically on definitions of homegrown terrorism it appears that the idea of Western individuals incubating, organizing, planning and executing a terrorist attack in the same western state has always been viewed 56 as highly implausible. Only one article by Sam Mullins (2007) outlined this scenario and it downplayed the possibility stating that it would be "theoretically possible" to have a group that is "born and/or raised in the West, radicalized, trains and achieves attack capability which does not leave their home country." He also indicated that he believes it would be the direct result of the presence of foreign recruiters and experienced jihadis. This dissertation argues that the attacks against Western states by citizens or longstanding residents requires recognition as something in its own right and that lumping it in or including it as home grown terrorism as it is currently understood oversimplifies and generalizes something which appears to be quite different and unique. Including both domestic and homegrown provisions to define these types of attacks helps differentiate it and highlight that something unique is unfolding. The logic for this approach was borrowed from efforts within the international terrorism literature to differentiate between seemingly similar attacks. Bergeson and Han (2005, 143-4) have argued that international terrorism is an oversimplification and that further separation can occur on degrees that they term "internationalness." They argue it is possible to identify several different types of international terrorism based on how the actors—perpetrators and victims and the location of attack—home-country or away, are characterized. For example, if an attacker from a country attacks a foreign target within that country that would meet their definition of international terrorism. But if an attacker travels somewhere and attacks victims, according to them this is more international. Both meet the definition of international terrorism but when compared side-by-side it is clear there is a difference. The same argument can be made for homegrown terrorism: you can have homegrown terrorism but domestic homegrown terrorism says something more about the attack.

A Working Definition of "Domestic Homegrown " Terrorism This dissertation argues that more recent terror attacks in London and Madrid, and the disrupted attack in Toronto, represent something previously unseen. The variant of terrorism, which will be studied in chapter five, moves well beyond the strategy of leaderless resistance, as it is defined above. Ideas of a "series of cells across a country or region with no chain of command and no membership roll...only a shared philosophy," 57

(Garfinkel, 2003) cannot explain the more recent terror attacks against Western democratic states. The case studies selected to represent what has been termed domestic homegrown terrorism will demonstrate that those who perpetrated or planned the studied attacks cannot be considered to meet our current understanding of the strategy of leaderless resistance. Rather, it is argued that these groups are isolated and autonomous from any other group; there will be no evidence of common intermediates, common associates, or specific and direct communication amongst these groups or any others. There will be no contact or, at the very least, much less contact than the idea of a leaderless resistance strategy would suggest. Efforts to provide a snapshot of how the terrorism literature views terrorism from the modern and contemporary eras is only possible due to widespread research already conducted by countless numbers of researchers. Conversely, there has been very little research done on the terror attacks selected for study as representing a new phenomenon of "homegrown domestic" terrorism. As such, no specific definition can be given at this point and it will remain a work in progress. Ultimately, it is the goal of this dissertation to include in the concluding chapter some closure on the definition issue. One of the goals of this research is to examine the more recent attacks and place them side-by-side with the literature's assessment of modern and contemporary terrorism. This will allow the identification of any differences between the two variants. While proposed differences between the two may initially appear to be subtle, it is the contention of this dissertation that beneath the surface the differences are substantial, allowing the claim that there are in fact two separate "types" of terrorism and ultimately two unique processes at work.

Methodology and Case Selection Chapter four identifies four elements in the modern and contemporary terrorism literature which have been the focus of terrorism researchers in their efforts to understand and explain terrorism. In addition to identifying and discussing the elements, interwoven among the discussion are concrete examples taken from a variety of case studies. In order to portray a general picture of what the literature says terrorism looks like, it must be applicable to all forms of terrorism. Examples were drawn from eight specific group case studies chosen to represent all different terrorist ideologies, different geographical locations 58 and different time periods. Each one of these is briefly expanded upon below and a very short group autobiography is also provided. In terms of selection criteria, the group had to meet Bruce Hoffman's definition of terrorism discussed in the previous section. This criterion is fulfilled as long as the organization has carried out an attack which fits within the definition.

Typology Terrorism comes in many different forms, but for purposes of analysis scholars have spent a considerable amount of time finding ways to narrow these forms into a more workable framework. What has emerged are general "typologies" of terrorism, to "subdivide the field of terrorism into categories which are more manageable for research and analysis." This can be done by "classifying them according to their underlying political motivation or ideological orientation" (Wilkinson, 2000). Briefly, ideology is "a common and broadly agreed upon set of rules to which an individual subscribes and that help to regulate and determine their behavior" (Borum, 2010, 6). Carried over to a discussion of groups, this could be defined as "the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives by which a group defines its distinctive political identity and aims" (Rosenbaum, in Drake, 1998, p. 54). These rules are also linked to (and perhaps guided by) one's beliefs, values, principles and goals. It is also a lens through which we perceive and interpret information, cues and events in our environment (Taylor, 1991; Drake, 1998; Mack in Borum, 2004, 40). Ideology, especially when it is discussed in relation to terrorism, often has negative connotations. However, it is a "functionally neutral" concept (Borum, 2010, 6) which can be applied in many other contexts including the political. The main difference is that terrorism will pursue ideological aims or goals through violence. The terrorism literature identifies several well accepted typologies (Wilkinson, 2001, 19-21) including: • Nationalist terrorists: groups which are seeking political self determination • Ideological terrorists: terrorists who seek to change the entire political, social and economic system either to an extreme left or extreme right model • Religiopolitical terrorist: militant fundamentalist factions from any major religion • Single issue terrorists: groups obsessed with the desire to change a specific policy or practice within a target society • State sponsored/state supported terrorism: terrorism used as a foreign policy tool 59

To be more specific, there are currently five types of terrorist organizations operating around the world, categorized mainly by their source of motivation: (1) "left-wing" terrorism is intertwined with the Communist movement, and enjoyed prominence in the late 1960s and 1970s; (2) "right-wing" terrorism draws its inspiration from fascism, and enjoyed prominence in the 1980s and early 1990s; (3) "ethno-nationalist/separatist" terrorism saw its peak during the era of decolonization, but has continued to exist where there are ethnic or cultural groups who feel they have been denied self-determination; and (4) "sacred" terrorism, based on religious motivations, emerged in the mid 1990s and remains the primary force of terrorism today. State sponsored terrorism, terrorism committed by a group under the direct control of a state to extend that state's self interests has decreased dramatically since the end of the Cold War. It is important to recognize that there are examples where some of these categories will overlap, creating what Drake (1998, 55) calls an "ideological hybrid." However, in these cases most of the groups will predominantly demonstrate and define themselves by reference to one of these examples (Cronin, 2003, 39). This discussion has identified several different typologies of terrorism. Any snapshot of terrorism must acknowledge these various subtypes and include a terrorist entity from as many as possible. Therefore, the groups analyzed in this dissertation will include religious, left-wing, right-wing, and nationalist/separatist. State sponsored terrorism has not really been a force in terrorism since the conclusion of the Cold War and will not be included, except indirectly due to the fact that one of the groups selected for inclusion, Hezbollah, is included as a religious group. It must also be acknowledged that Hezbollah, at least in its early years, owed much of its existence to states such as Iran and Syria, which effectively used it as an extension of their own foreign policy interests in Lebanon. Hezbollah carried out its agenda under the banner of Islam, the sponsorship of Iran and the blessing of Syria (Jaber, 1997, 21). While it is true that Hezbollah remains close to these two states, it has grown to the point where it is independently self-sufficient with its own goals and agenda. Similarly, the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) could also fall into this category as research indicates that it, despite being located in West Germany, had assistance from the East German Intelligence Agency (Stasi). Initially this assistance consisted of "looking the other way" when the RAF moved through East Germany, but it 60 evolved to substantial support including shelter, training, and new identities (Mueller, 2004, 270; Varon, 2004, 305; Montcourt, 2009, 58). Figure 1 lists the various groups selected and their ideological categorization.

FIGURE 1 Ideological Categorizations of Traditional Terrorist Groups Selected for Inclusion in Literature Review

NATIONALIST/ RELIGIO­ LEFT-WING RIGHT-WING SEPARATIST POLITICAL

Provisional Irish Red Army Faction The Order Jemaah Islamiya Republican Army Revolutionary Armed Hezbollah Liberation Tigers of Forces of Columbia Tamil Eelam Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Four "Types" of Terrorism based on Ideology (Wilkinson, 2001)

Time Period Terrorism has existed in various incarnations since its origins as "terreur" during the French Revolution. In an effort to provide a broad portrayal of terrorism, the groups chosen have all been active at some point during the time period 1968 to 2010. This time frame was selected for several reasons. First, it allows for the greatest selection of groups which fit within the other criteria and it provides a variety of activity; some of the selected groups remain active, while others are presently inactive or have disbanded or been defeated. Second, it provides a historical snapshot of the past, but not too distant past, as all the groups remain relevant today. Third, there is a great deal of information available for each group and they all fall within the eras of the modern and contemporary terrorism literature. Figure 2 highlights each of the groups and their operational timeframe and status. 61 FIGURE 2 Operational Timeframe and Status of Traditional Terror Groups Selected for Inclusion in Literature Review

RAF 11970-19981

FARC (1964 - present}

Hezbollah U985 - prtwat)

1MU11992 - present) PIRA (1969 - |99?> Jf (1993 - present) -TheOrder (1983 -1984)

LTTB<1976-2

Geography In addition to including entities from several typologies and across a wide, yet designated time frame, this research has also selected entities from numerous geographical locations. This has been done in an effort to highlight that a generalized picture can be created which can be separated from cultural or regional influences. Figure 3 shows the geographical location and operation of each group.

FIGURE 3 Geographical Locations of Traditional Terror Groups Selected for Inclusion in Literature Review

Northern _ Ireland* »G«many NW United , States* .UzbeMsian Lebanon•

Columbia • Sri Lanka • Indonesia • 62

Case Studies Representing "Modern and Contemporary" Terrorist Groups

Based on the criteria outlined above, the following groups were selected and will be used to support analytical points made in the terrorism literature.

Hezbollah Hezbollah, Arabic for "Party of God", operates primarily in Southern Lebanon. Founded in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, its goals include the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon, as well as the destruction of the state of Israel. It can be classified as a religiopolitical terrorist entity. Despite a shift into the political sphere, it continues to meet the definition of a terrorist entity. Several of its numerous terrorist attacks include a 1983 truck bombing which killed 200 American marines in Beirut, the 1985 hijacking of TWA 847, and the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina which killed 29 people. Hezbollah has been at times considered a state sponsored terrorist organization. In its early years, it received tremendous support from both Syria and Iran. Today, however, it has grown to be increasingly self-supporting and has its own goals and agenda.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Also known as the "The Tamil Tigers," this group was named after the distinct ethnic and cultural nation it claimed to represent. Founded in 1976, the Tamil Tigers were a secessionist nationalist terror entity operating in Sri Lanka. Their goal was the self- determination of the Tamil people, in the Tamil dominated regions of North and East Sri Lanka. They were responsible for numerous terror attacks, most notably the assassinations of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. They were also notoriously well known for employing suicide bombings as part of their strategy. They were defeated by the Sinhalese government in 2009. 63

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) Inspired by a left-wing Marxist ideology, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) was established in 1964. While initially a Columbian group, they have since expanded and can be found in areas of Venezuela and other parts of South America. They claim to represent the rural poor against the wealthy elite class, and more recently oppose US influence in Columbia. Once primarily thought to be a guerilla movement fighting the Columbian government, FARC has evolved into a terrorist organization as well. The late 1990s saw increases in attacks on civilians not involved in the conflict, as well as kidnappings and hostage taking. Notable attacks include the 1999 kidnapping and killing of three US missionaries and the 2003 car bombing outside a Bogota nightclub which killed 30 people.

Red Army Faction (RAF) Also commonly known as Rote Armee Faktion or the Baader-Meinhof Group after its founders, RAF was founded in West Germany in 1970. It was inspired by a left wing Marxist ideology and considered itself part of a larger anti-imperialist movement in the continuation of liberation movements in the Third World. RAF carried out several notable terrorist attacks including: a 1972 bomb attack against a US Army base in Germany; the seizure of the German Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden in 1975; the kidnapping and murder of Hans Scheyler, a prominent German industrialist; and the failed 1979 assassination attempt against NATO Commander US General Alexander Haig.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Founded in 1993, Jemaah Islamiyah, is a militant Islamic group which seeks to establish Sharia law in Indonesia, and more broadly a pan-Arabic state across the region. Arabic for "Islamic Organization," it is arguably the largest terrorist group in the region with operatives in several Southeast Asian countries. It has graduated from small local attacks on US and Western interests in Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines, to larger more sophisticated operations including the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing which killed 200 individuals. Sources indicate that Jemaah Islamiyah may have played an instrumental role in the 1995 plot to blow up US commercial airlines in Asia, termed Operation Bojinka 64

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) The Provisional Irish Republican Army split from the IRA in 1969. It is a nationalist-separatist group seeking to remove British forces from Northern Ireland and the unification of Ireland. Although removed from the US Terror Organization list in 2000, throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s PIRA was one of the most dangerous terrorist entities in the world, operating in Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Great Britain and Europe. It also enjoyed support from global financial backers in various countries around the world. During the period 1970 - 1990, it bombed numerous civilian targets and carried out several high level attacks, including an early 1990s attacks on London's Heathrow Airport and the Prime Minister's residence, and a 1993 car bombing in Canary Wharf which caused close to one billion dollars damage.

American Identity Movements: The Silent Brotherhood The Silent Brotherhood, also known as "The Order" or "Bruder Schweigen," was an American terror organization which was inspired by a right-wing nationalist ideology. Part of the Christian Identity Movement, it carried out terrorist attacks within the United States in an effort to overthrow the US government and establish a white Christian nation in its place. Founded in 1983, it committed only one major terrorist attack, the assassination of Alan Berg, an outspoken critic of the White Supremacy Movement, but were allegedly disrupted months before a major attack against an unnamed US city. The Silent Brotherhood is felt to have been a major source of inspiration for Timothy McVeigh, who bombed the Oklahoma City Federal Building some years later.

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Founded in 1993 following the independence of Uzbekistan brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the IMU is religiopolitical group which seeks to overthrow the Uzbek government and replace it with an Islamic one. Since 2002, the group has become increasingly pan-Islamic and expanded its goal to establishing an Islamic caliphate in all of Central Asia. They are responsible for numerous terror attacks in Uzbekistan but have also carried out bombings and kidnappings in the region more generally. 65

The Omission of al-Qaida The researcher has decided to omit al-Qaida in this analysis at this point. This choice was made for several reasons. First, at the time this research was designed there was disagreement in the field and a belief that al-Qaida represented an interesting, unique, yet at times contradictory case study. It has been credited as playing an important role in the origins of the "new" terrorism debate and its current status continues to create widespread disagreement among those in the discipline. Due to its high profile attack on the United States in 2001 and the subsequent US retaliation against it, there is little consensus regarding its true strength, structure or capabilities, especially as it was understood prior to 2001. The state or future of al-Qaida itself is one part of the functional/culturalist debate occurring within the discipline today. Part of the debate stems from what al-Qaida is today. Briefly, al-Qaida operated similarly to other modern or contemporary groups until the American invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. Stripped of its safe haven, the group dispersed in an effort to avoid capture and defeat. Its strategies and tactics at this time fuelled scholar beliefs that terrorism was undergoing a shift and contributed to the brief flirtation with ideas associated with "new" terrorism. By 2008 evidence suggested that al- Qaida was starting to re-establish itself in its more traditional form (Crenshaw, 2009, 123). The debate on al-Qaida centers on its strategy to ally itself with other Islamic groups and the degree these groups should be considered a part of al-Qaida proper. Rollins (2011) and Nelson and Sanderson (2011) suggest that there are different tiers or levels of association between al-Qaida "central" or "core" who remain hidden in the Northwest tribal areas of Pakistan and other groups in other locations. Others argue that groups such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) should be considered to be a part of al-Qaida central because they have clearly identified themselves as more than affiliated with the group but rather an instrumental part of al-Qaida central (Harris, 2010). AQAP, an amalgamation of groups in Yemen and Saudi Arabia formally joined al-Qaeda in 2007 transforming its operations and capabilities toward full integration with contemporary al-Qaeda (Gray and Stockman, 2008, 91). Evidence of this understanding can be found in statements released by AQAP and AQIM leadership. Correspondence from the AQAP leader includes: "to our sheikhs and amirs in the General command of Afghanistan" and refers to his organization as "your mujahideen children in 66 the Peninsula of Mohammad" (Harris, 2010, 2). The leader of AQIM also stresses who is in charge: "we are arrows in your quiver, throw us where ever you like" (Loidolt, 2011, 103). It is felt that if al-Qaida is re-establishing itself in its more traditional organization it is partially due to the safe haven it has found in places around the world. Whether AQIM and AQAP are "franchises" or branches of al-Qaida central can be debated but it is clear that they are much more attached than other groups who have adopted the al-Qaida "brand." These groups such as al-Shabab and Lashkar-e-Tabia work with al-Qaida and may even receive operational support but remain their own entities (Nelson and Sanderson, 2011). The biggest difference stems from the level of operational control. Group that associate themselves loosely with al-Qaida do receive tangible benefits including financial and logistical support on occasion. These groups however are not under al-Qaida's operational control (Rollins, 2011). Groups who have become part of al-Qaida, re- prioritize to balance not only their local grievances but they must now pursue al-Qaida's international agenda as well (Loidolt, 2011,102). The formulation of this dissertation and the main research objective occurred in the period where al-Qaida was de-centralized and was thus excluded from analysis. However, if it superficially examines how al-Qaida exists today it appears that it is making concerted efforts to return to its more traditional roots. If we examine AQIM and AQAP they operate very much like other modern and contemporary groups studies in this dissertation and can be seen to demonstrate the same behaviors. This adds further credence to the challenges facing the concept of "new" terrorism because while it is clear al-Qaida purposefully organized itself a certain way, their more recent behavior suggests this was due more to necessity than anything else. As the opportunity and safe havens re-emerge, al-Qaida appears to be shifting back to its original form. Evidence suggests that AQAP is actively recruiting to bolster its numbers and not just locally and regionally but internationally as well. They have been identifying potential Western citizens they might be able to recruit and prior to his death by US drone attack, were using American born Anwar al-Awlaki as an intermediary (Barfi, 2010, 4; Masters, 2011). The group produces a bimonthly e-magazine Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Epic Battles) (Harris, 2010, 2) and effectively use propaganda including videos and recordings 67 to grow their membership and madrassahs to indoctrinate new recruits (Barfi, 2010, 14). AQAP is highly compartmentalized, hierarchical and has a distinct division of labor. It has a political leader, a military leader and a religious leader, and a training camp run by one individual and bomb making training by another (Barfi, 2010, 2; 4; (Lindo et al., 2011, 9) AQIM has followed a similar trajectory and increased their numbers to the point that they have organized themselves into katibas or battalions which are dispersed around the region. This makes counterterrorism operations difficult (Thornberry and Levy, 2011, 3). They fundraise through donations solicited from Saudi benefactors, protection rackets, arms and human trafficking, money laundering and more recently kidnapping Western tourists (Barfli, 2010, 5; Thornberry and Levy, 2011, 4). Including al-Qaida as it appeared when this research began was problematic because at that time it was "unclear" or "fuzzy" what it actually was. Moving forward, if the superficial analysis presented here is any indication, future research may want to include al-Qaida. In response to the increased operational capacity of AQAP and AQIM the Obama administration has targeted them using traditional counterterror strategies including efforts to freeze its financial network and increased drone attacks in an effort to target leadership (Masters, 2011)

Case Studies Representing "Domestic Homegrown" Terrorism

Chapter five examines case studies which this dissertation argues represent a new variant of terrorism. Since those who perpetrated the selected attacks cannot clearly be associated with any pre-existing or current terrorist entities, this appears to be a logical point of departure for comparison. Selected case studies are constructed and analyzed, and a snapshot of the groups responsible for the attacks is created. This dissertation has characterized the cases selected for study in chapter five as representing domestic homegrown terrorism, based on the fact that those responsible for the separate attacks appear to share common traits. Following Mills' premise outlined in "most similar" research design, the case studies selected were chosen because they share the following characteristics. First, the targets of the attacks (planned attacks) in all cases were Western democratic states. Second, the attacks were staged from within the country where the attack resulted. Third, and most 68 importantly, the majority of those who perpetrated the attacks were either citizens of those countries, having been born and raised there, or had full landed immigrant status and had lived in that country for an extended period of time. The past several years have seen two such terrorist attacks carried out, and several disrupted in the final stages of preparation. These include the Madrid commuter train attacks on March 11th, 2004, the London bombings which occurred on July 7th, 2005, and a disrupted terror attack in Toronto in June 2006. These characteristics lead this study to dub these attacks domestic homegrown terrorism. One important point must be made about the selection of these case studies. These cases were selected because at the time this dissertation was planned, they represented the first incidents of this nature. While some may criticize these instances as dated, the time which passed between the events and this dissertation coupled with the in-depth analysis that was conducted was actually tremendously beneficial. For these case studies not all of the information was available until many years later. Information on the 7/7 London attack was not complete until late 2010 because key parts were withheld until other cases had worked their way through the court system and those defendants had been convicted or released. Authorities did not want to reveal how they had conducted their investigations. Similarly, information pertaining to the Toronto 18 incidents was not fully disclosed until the last defendant Shareef Abdelhaleem's trial concluded in late 2010. This is important because an examination of books, journal articles and textbooks reveals significant errors and mis-information, up to and including works published in 2010. Ranstorp (2009, 25) has raised this issue as a serious shortcoming in terrorism studies pointing out that it is common for "highly publicized claims at the time of revelation being confused with scientific fact." Information initially suggested is essentially put on the record and continuously reported despite the fact it is erroneous. Many sources use a very superficial examination of multiple cases in an effort to draw any comparisons. The lack of in-depth research and analysis also leads to factual inaccuracies. This was evident in studies on radicalization models (Precht, 2007; NYPD, 2007) where some of their conclusions are not substantiated because the basis for these conclusions is inaccurate. This poses some interesting challenges for those conducting terror research based on case studies but serves a clear warning that fewer cases studies in I 69 greater depth will help avoid this scenario. Almost like fruit from the poisoned tree, it is very difficult to entertain conclusions or claims from information that is inaccurate. More challenging is the trade-off between allowing all the information to become available while conducting research that is timely and current. This is a difficult calculation. Despite the fact that research conducted for this dissertation revealed numerous and significant inaccuracies in the literature it is impossible to determine whether this is the case for all case studies, some case studies, or a small number of case studies. It is also difficult to state with any certainty how long one needs to wait until information is adequate. This is a very real issue which will continue to challenge the field. However it does support the idea I that there is a tremendous value re-visiting previously accepted ideas and that greater focus on fewer case studies in greater detail might help alleviate inaccuracies—numerous sources in greater depth might help identify competing visions or claims which only one author, article, book are making.

Madrid 2004 On March 11, 2004, ten bombs targeted the Madrid train system, killing 191 people and wounding approximately 1800. Initial suspicions that the bombings were an attack by the Spanish terrorist group ETA were quickly dismissed. Twenty-nine individuals went on trial for their role in the attacks in 2007.

London 2005 Known as the 7/7 London attacks, on July 7, 2005, four coordinated suicide bombings attacked the London transit system during the morning commute. Fifty-two people, in addition to the four suspects, died and approximately 700 were injured.

Toronto 2006 On June 2, 2006, Toronto police arrested 18 individuals planning several simultaneous terrorist attacks in Ontario. They had planned to use truck bombs at the CBC, the head office of CSIS, and Parliament. Rumors suggest they had planned on holding the Prime Minister hostage and ultimately be-heading him. The Toronto 18 disrupted attack is labeled as such because it represents more than a plot. Research indicates that the attack 70 was less than forty five days away, all supplies had been acquired and escape plans had been finalized. This attack was going forward and was more than "talk." Based on this justification it can be included alongside the other attacks for ananlysis and comparison

Concluding Remarks The methodology selected for this research is fairly straightforward and addresses the question whether or not the modern and contemporary terrorism literature is capable of explaining the more recent terrorist attacks being seen today. The first step conducts a thorough literature review to determine what the terrorism literature has identified as the keys to explaining terrorism, that is, what the literature says terrorism "looks like." This is then compared to more recent terror attacks which this author argues have not previously been seen, characterized by citizens or long standing citizens of a country attacking that same country. This dissertation dubs this domestic homegrown terrorism. Breaking down case studies of these new attacks and then comparing them to the snapshot of terrorism created by the literature allows us to make one of two conclusions. Either:

A) There is little variation found, suggesting that these more recent attacks do not represent anything fundamentally different from what we understand to be traditional terrorism; or

B) There are significant differences between the more recent attacks and what we understand to be traditional terrorism, thus suggesting something new has emerged which may best be classified as a new variant which requires further scrutiny.

It will further allow us to comment on the specifics related to the four elements discussed in the traditional terrorism literature and identify if and how the specifics of each element might have changed. 71

CHAPTER FOUR Terrorism from the Modern and Contemporary Era: Four Key Elements

In order to demonstrate that more recent terror attacks against Western democracies can no longer be adequately explained by the modern and contemporary terrorism literature, the first step is to establish what the literature says terrorism "looks like." This dissertation argues that among the elements studied, four are most consistently identified in the terrorism literature as playing an instrumental role in allowing terrorism to occur. This section will identify these four elements, discuss why they are felt to be so important and define how they are felt to contribute to terrorism. The terrorism literature supports the notion that the role of the leader, the role played by the organization, socialization, and the group dynamic all play important roles in fostering demonization, which is a necessary pre­ condition for terrorism to occur. In addition to a discussion of each of the elements, the idea of demonization will be explained and the link between it and terrorism will be highlighted. Part of the reason the elements selected are felt to be very important to terrorism studies is because they greatly assist the process which can result in demonization. This section will also discuss two additional elements debated in the literature and explain why they were not included in this exercise. These two elements are: (1) the individual himself/herself and (2) "root causes." These are not included because there is no agreement about the role they play, the degree to which they affect terrorism, or how they can be accurately measured. These two elements also represent separate levels of analysis in terrorism studies. A micro-level approach to understanding terrorism lies in studying the individual, and this has traditionally focused on psychological or psychiatric issues. A macro-level approach to understanding terrorism studies the environment and attempts to understand how root causes such as poverty, lack of opportunity, unemployment and a lack of education may cause terrorism. Each one of these will be discussed, but this is done primarily to point out that results to date have been both debatable and often underwhelming. However, it must be acknowledged that these elements, particularly the root cause aspect are still a focal point of some research and may yet provide valuable insight in the future. 72

This section was constructed on a thorough and in-depth literature review consisting of books, journal articles, opinion pieces, conference lectures and contracted government research projects. It covers both the modern and contemporary terrorism literature from the 1970s through today from a wide variety of scholars.

Demonization For the purposes of clarity, this section will begin with a brief explanation of the concept of demonization. Demonization is being introduced first because it is an outcome, the end result which allows terrorism to occur. The four elements selected: the role of leadership the role of the organization, socialization and the group dynamic all further the potential of demonization which is why they are very important to the study of terrorism. Terrorism represents one of the most extreme forms of violence which the world has ever witnessed. This is in part due to the fact that one of terrorism's goals involves instilling fear in a wider audience than the immediate victims. This, more often than not, ensures that civilians are targeted, whether intentionally or accidentally. The act of perpetrating violence is one thing, but killing people, especially people who are average citizens requires an intense hatred and disregard for life. People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions (Bandura, 2004, 124). The process which allows people to justify these types of actions and this level of violence is termed demonization by the terrorism literature. Demonization is a necessary but insufficient condition for terrorism to occur. It creates the level of violence and requires a detachment from the ethical and moral principles most people have, namely, that one should not kill. According to Bandura (2004, 123-24) it is much easier for people to undertake "political violence," in which political figures are personally targeted. However it is much more difficult to "cold­ bloodedly slaughter innocent women and children." This will require a more powerful form of what he terms "moral disengagement." To clarify this point one can contrast this to those who kill in the criminal context, where these principles may be temporarily overwhelmed. In the case of terrorism, the act of killing is not being done for profit, does not occur as a manifestation of emotions like love, jealousy, or anger, and it is not spontaneous. Terrorism, from the definition provided 73 in chapter three specifically distances itself from these examples and specifies that terrorism is carried out for the purposes of effecting political or social change. It is ideological and it is calculated and planned. Further, it has been routinely demonstrated that most terrorists do not fit any profile of psychological deficiency, insanity or pathological/sociopathic detachment from morality. The evidence that these people are "normal," is the basis which forced researchers to examine and identify a process whereby moral disengagement becomes possible and allows for "normal" people to become capable of committing acts of extreme violence and terrorism. Further, while demonization allows for terrorism to occur, it does not ensure or guarantee that it will. This dissertation suggests that demonization must be present before terrorism can occur, not that it will. However, in all three studied in this dissertation, terrorism occurred or was planned but disrupted. This research does not address the internal debate or dynamic about how the groups arrived at the decision to employ terrorism as opposed to some other form of opposition or dissent. Demonization in this context can best be visualized as the apex of a summit, or a "tipping point." Demonization, having reached the point where others have become de-valued or de-legitimized, means that terrorism becomes a possibility. De-humanizing ensures people have been stripped of human qualities and are "no longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes and concerns, but as subhuman forms" (Bandura, 2004, 136). Demonization represents the most extreme variation of the in-group/out-group dynamic which will be further explored when discussing the group dynamic element. However, a simple explanation of the in-group/out-group dynamic suggests that people tend to identify with those they deem most similar to themselves. The similarity itself is unimportant and can be anything from locale to ethnicity, or language to culture. The closer one identifies with like individuals, the stronger the perception of a group, or an "us." This also creates a residual side-effect; highlighting that which you share with a certain group magnifies the differences from others who do not share this similarity. This leads to the emergence of an out-group, or a "them." This phenomenon is fairly common and rarely becomes a point of animosity or conflict. Demonization would represent the polar extreme of the in-group/out-group dichotomy. It moves beyond the simple recognition that there are differences, and introduces a perception of threat or sense of 74 impending danger or peril. A group dynamic often aided or manipulated by a member's guidance can continue to escalate until the level of fear or perceived threat is felt to require immediate action. As this sentiment builds, violence becomes justifiable and is seen as necessary to protect some aspect of the in-group. Often the in-group fears persecution such as the elimination of "their way of life," their culture or sometimes their very existence, at which point drastic action becomes logical. Some suggest that this premise builds from an escalation of standard political positions towards a more extreme interpretation. Simply, the perceptions of a group might make them drift towards political radicalization. McCauley and Moskalenko (in Borum, 2010, p. 4) define political radicalization as "increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup conflict." They believe it occurs through changes in one's "beliefs, feelings, and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defense of the in-group." This radicalization often begins from the platform of some grievance or unsatisfying event and is framed as an injustice. Because people do not typically regard injustices as random or of "no fault," it is not difficult to place blame on a certain target-persons, groups or state. The responsible party is then vilified—often demonized—which then sometimes derives an impetus for aggressive action to defend the aggrieved or remedy the wrong" (Borum, 2010, 5). Many scholars have studied the concept of demonization and despite some subtle differences, several common themes have emerged. First, it becomes directly tied to how one perceives "others." Spillman & Spillman (in Merskin, 2005, 374) identify how this syndrome of viewing "others" as an enemy may take hold and suggest the following characteristics:

First, negative anticipation whereby all acts of the enemy, in the past, present and future become attributable to destructive intentions towards one's own group. Second, putting the blame on the enemy, whereby the enemy is thought to be the source of any stress on a group. Third, identification with evil, whereby the values of the enemy represent the negation of one's own value system and the enemy is intent on destroying the dominant value system as well. Fourth, zero-sum thinking, whereby what is good for the enemy is bad for us and vice-versa. Fifth, stereotyping and de-individualization, whereby anyone who belongs to the enemy group is therefore our enemy. And sixth, refusal to show empathy, whereby 75

consideration for anyone in the enemy group is repressed due to perceived threat and feelings of opposition.

Miller (2006, 127; also see Borum, 2004, 28-9) provides a more general model for the evolution of demonization from the mindset of a terrorist which suggests four stages an individual/group will undertake: Stage 1—"it's not right"; Stage 2—"it's not fair"; Stage 3—"it's your fault"; Stage 4—"you're evil." Again, it is important to mention that measurement problems exist when studying models or processes of demonization. It is impossible to determine how quickly one might progress through this process, if any one phase is more important than others, or if it is possible to regress as well as progress. In certain cases it may even be difficult to find a clear indicator of what might be driving the process. According to Albert Bandura (2004, 122), the key to demonization is moral disengagement, a complex process which allows the individual to commit violent acts:

Disengagement of moral self sanctions permits different types of conduct despite the same moral standards. The disengagement may center on redefining harmful conduct as honorable by moral justification, exonerating social comparison and sanitizing language. It may focus on agency of action so that perpetrators can minimize their role in causing harm by diffusion and displacement of responsibility. It may involve minimizing or distorting the harm that flows from detrimental actions. The disengagement may include de-humanizing the victims and blaming them for bringing the suffering on themselves.

This idea argues that it is possible to de-program learned and accepted norms, and to re­ wire them. Albert Bandura identifies four techniques of "moral disengagement" which he suggests allows a terrorist group to insulate itself from the human consequences of its actions. First the members of the organization convince themselves that they are the saviors of a constituency, threatened by a great moral evil. Second, they displace responsibility onto the leader or other members of the group. Third, they learn to minimize or ignore the suffering they cause. Fourth they de-humanize their victims so that they are not people at all (Bandura, 1990). This allows for demonization to occur. In an effort to shift these ideas from a more general context specifically to terrorism, Moghaddam introduced his concept of the "staircase" to demonization where "feelings of discontent are a platform for stepping initially onto the path to terrorism." He identifies 76 several steps. During the first step, an individual's attempts to alleviate adversity and improve his or her situation have been unsuccessful, leading to feelings of frustration and aggression which are displaced onto some perceived causal agent (enemy). As anger builds, the individual becomes more sympathetic towards justification for violence. Some sympathizers eventually join an extremist group that advocates or engages in the violence. At the final step, the individual overcomes the last barrier and commits a terrorist act (Moghaddam, 2005, in Borum, 2010, 6). Moghaddam acknowledges that fewer and fewer people ascend to each successive level, which explains the limited number of terrorists. Randy Borum has spent considerable time studying the idea of demonization and simplifies the process by stressing that it boils down to one particular challenge. He suggests that demonization at its most basic level is about de-humanizing, so one may go against the moral ideas of not killing people (Borum, 2004, 51). It is worth highlighting that Bandura (1990) has identified potentially important roles for leaders and an explanation for how the group dynamic fosters moral disengagement. Sprinzak has done substantial work on a process of radicalization and outlines how an individual loses his or her individual identity while forging a "new collective identity" among those who share a certain conviction which distinguishes them (and distances them) from those who do not. This helps cast the world into a more "black and white" environment (Sprinzak, 1990). Further, it creates simplicity. One of the key aspects of demonization and de-humanizing is that it is based on overgeneralizations: "the supposed sins of the enemy may spread to encompass the entire population; it shows dichotomous thinking that a people are either totally good or totally bad" (Borum, 2004, 41). Essentially innocent people are not perceived as innocent if they are part of the out-group or "them." This phenomenon is also observed in other contexts. Erik Louw (2003, 218), talks about the "PRing of War, where "an identifiable villain was created" for the public. He offers examples including efforts to demonize Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic prior to conflicts involving them. Others point out that following the events of 9/11, the US in a sense "demonized" certain groups and regions in an effort to make certain counterterrorism options more palatable for the public (Bandura, 2004, 145). Essentially this can be found in instances where moral people will be required to come to terms with the reality that other humans may be harmed or killed. 77

In summary, the study of demonization investigates how grievances and vulnerabilities are transformed into hatred of a target group, and how hatred is transformed into a justification or willingness to commit violence. This, according to Randy Borum (2010, 5), is how we get to demonization. Having introduced the concept of demonization, the goal of this chapter is to understand how the identified elements - leadership, the organization, socialization and the group dynamic/identity - come together to facilitate this process. This dissertation argues that these elements, highlighted in the terrorism literature, can be shown as important contributing factors to demonization. It argues that, in turn, demonization allows for the possibility that terrorism will take place and is therefore an important part of what terrorism "looks like," according to the literature.

Element 1: The Role of Leadership Leadership has always been an important focal point for those who study terrorism. These discussions usually center on the characteristics or qualities of the leaders themselves, often making reference to the classical Weberian notion of charismatic leadership. Briefly, terrorist leaders were individuals who had some form of "special ability" which could influence people to do certain things. According to Weber's definition, a charismatic leader displays:

A quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These powers or qualities are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.

Further:

Charismatic leaders gain their authority through qualities uniquely their own, not through the position they might hold. They are seen as visionaries who demonstrate strong emotional expression; high levels of activity; sensitivity to the current problems of the status quo; involvement in the lives of their followers; superior rhetorical and persuasive skills; and exemplary behavior by making the same sacrifices they demand from their followers (Weber, 1964, 358 in Langdon et al, 2004, 64). 78

According to Randy Borum (2004, 61), this "charisma" gives these leaders an emotional appeal that can motivate the members to action and which "powerfully and uniquely fosters unquestioning obedience and loyalty" amongst their followers. From this perspective, the role of the leader is "crucial in drawing together alienated, frustrated individuals into a coherent organization, who in the absence of said leader remain isolated and individually aggrieved" (Club de Madrid, 2005, 8). Charismatic leaders are most often highlighted as important to religious fundamentalist terrorist groups because they "offer their constituencies clear, objective, practical and absolute directives for their lives and answers for their theological questions"(Ramakrishna, 2004, 30). However, the reality is that while charisma is often the yardstick by which most terrorist leaders are measured or categorized, it is not a necessary condition of leadership. It is logical to argue that it takes a charismatic individual to convince others to kill or commit drastic violence, but there are also examples in the literature where leaders fitting the charismatic description are not present. This has led several researchers to suggest that while charisma may help, it is not necessary (Borum, 2004, 61). This point is useful moving forward for two reasons. First, it shifts the focus from a leader to the role of leadership itself. It is clearly supported in the literature that charismatic leaders exist and that their specific qualities help drive or strengthen a group. However, this would not explain the role of leadership in cases where charisma is lacking. Second, focusing on the qualities of an individual also creates a problem when discussing terror groups which might have more than one leader. It is not uncommon for religious groups to have spiritual leaders and operational/tactical leaders. It is also not uncommon to have terror groups being led by a council. Focusing on the role of leadership avoids the pitfalls of placing too much emphasis on an individual. Instead it creates a series of tasks, roles or responsibilities that leadership must provide. In this case, charisma may make these tasks or responsibilities easier to accomplish but can occur absent it as well. In essence, leadership is what ensures things get done and is less about how it gets done. This research is interested in identifying the role that leadership plays in moving a group towards demonization, which is a necessary condition for terrorism. Although charismatic leaders are found in the literature, this research is more interested in the tasks carried out by leaders rather than the personality or traits of the leaders themselves. 79

The Literature: Understanding Leadership Leadership as a general concept has been studied in the social sciences although very little has been written about how it might be different from terrorism leadership. A very general description of a leader is offered by Randy Borum: "A leader is an agent of influence. Some leaders hold positions of legitimate rank and authority; others count themselves among the rank and file. Effective leaders must attend simultaneously to the task and mission of the group as well as to the processes and relationships within it" (2004, 60). Martha Crenshaw has also spent considerable time focusing on terrorist leaders and has outlined several key leadership roles that apply to most terrorist organizations and have served as a model through which the role of leadership can be examined. First, leaders must maintain a collective belief system. They must clearly articulate a vision and mission, defend its ideology and keep the group stable and cohesive. They must further be able to teach and persuade others on the tenets of the beliefs system and silence disbelief. Second, they need to establish and maintain organizational routines. They must teach a certain set of values and develop organizational routines that make violence easier to perform, they must "socialize and structure" to maintain cohesion and build collective identity. Third, leaders need to develop incentives that are sufficient to attract members and must monitor and modify these incentives as needed to keep cohesion and loyalty. Fourth, leaders need to be able to channel conflict and aggression, and create and transfer it to external targets. Fifth, the leader must keep momentum and action moving forward. Groups which are not acting may lose focus and de-stabilize (Crenshaw, in Borum, 2004, 61). Other authors have followed upon Crenshaw's lead and have contributed their own ideas on terrorism leadership. Gupta (2005, 14) argues that in order to formulate a collective identity, leaders or "political entrepreneurs" are required to fulfill the role of framing the issue by "borrowing selectively from history, religion and mythology" to serve their purpose. Traditionally, the terrorist group leader was considered as "the malevolent group therapist that focused the discontent of the group members on an external cause for their difficulties and righteously justifying aggression against the identified targets" (Post, 2005, 618; Robins & Post, 1997). Borum (2004, 60) suggests that "effective leaders must attend simultaneously to the task and the mission of the group, as well as to the processes and relationships within it." Taken 80 from the perspective of the oft-posited contention made by scholars that for every terrorist killed or captured, there are ten waiting to take their place, the crucial importance of the leader who will supervise these new individuals is always highlighted. Their role is to "provide a sense-making explanation for what has gone wrong in their lives, identifying the external enemy as the cause, as well as drawing them together into a collective identity" (Post, 2005, 622). Leaders play an important role in affecting individuals and focusing them on the group's goals. They are constantly enforcing the message that in order to truly be a committed member of the group, recruits must engage in increasingly extreme behaviors including violence (Maikovich, 2005, 379). Due to the reality that terrorism carries with it real personal risks for members, leadership must continuously shape and adapt its message to keep members focused. This may require "emotional, political and entrepreneurial leadership" (Oots, 1989, 142) or some combination thereof to convince the membership to undertake violence. This also suggests that members must really have faith in the leadership as well. It is this trust which allows leadership to fulfill one of its key roles: breaking down the barriers and fostering "moral disengagement" (psychologist Albert Bandura's term). Moral disengagement helps de-sensitize or "switch-off' the normal moral safeguards which prevent people from hurting others. Leaders accomplish this by projecting outwards: they project personal faults and inadequacies onto others and ascribe evil motives to those who disagree with them (Borum, 2004, 60). Leadership, that is a separation of a leader from followers, also allows for a phenomenon that diminishes personal responsibility. Individuals accept the leader's authority and transfer their own morality to that of the leader (Milgram, 1983 in Borum, 2010, 15). This is known in other literatures as the "I was only following orders" phenomenon, best demonstrated by experiments where individuals initiated electrical shocks to others because they were told to do so by persons they perceived to be in a position of authority. Leadership may come in many forms, from a charismatic or authoritarian leader at one end to a group or council decision-making body at the other. We can talk about leadership because in each one of these instances it can be clearly represented, whether as an individual or a group, which has a greater degree of influence over decision-making and goals than others (Jackson, 2009, 218-20). 81

The above discussion highlights the important role leadership plays in setting the agenda, controlling the message, and providing incentive to those within the group. Because a leader of a terrorist organization must constantly concern and preoccupy him or herself with these tasks, one can begin to see how the loss of a leader, and an absence of someone immediately filling all of these leadership roles, may bring about the disintegration of the terrorist group. This idea seems to provide the basis for the US counterterrorism strategy since 9/11. In 2003, US officials provided a model in their National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) (See figure 4) which placed the leader at the pinnacle of the terrorism model. It concluded that, "at the top of the structure, the terrorist leadership provides the overall direction and strategy...the leadership becomes the catalyst for terrorist action" (NSCT, 2003, 6). In 2006, this point was highlighted once again and the strategy advocated focusing on leaders because they "provide the vision that followers strive to realize" and also provide the "discipline, direction and motivation" (NSCT, 2006, 11). Bryan Price spent his entire PhD dissertation examining the importance of

FIGURE 4 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2003

Leadership

Organization

States

International Environment

Underlying Conditions

US 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Figure I, page 6 leadership to a terrorist organization. One of his major conclusions supports the contention made in this section. He determined the characteristics of the terrorist organization so he 82 could compare it to other types of organizations. He concluded that terrorist organizations represent "violent, clandestine and value oriented organizations," and that in these types of organizations, leaders are unique and that they "affect the organizational performance to a tremendous degree" (Price, 2009, 138). Discussing the importance of leadership as a contributing factor to demonization, and hence terrorism, can be justified by examining the literature. However further evidence supporting this claim can also be found in practice. The policy of "targeted killing" is employed by many governments around the world as a leading component of their counter- terrorism strategies. Even if it cannot be claimed that the policy of targeted killing is not evidence of the importance of leadership per se, the pursuit of this strategy at the very least suggests that governments and policymakers believe that it is important, and pursue it as a cornerstone of their counterterrorism policies.

The Importance of Leadership: Targeted Killing and Assassination Targeted killing is a somewhat more politically correct way to avoid the legal ramifications of assassination. International law has made a concerted effort to prevent states targeting leaders of other states, which is why targeted killing is sometimes argued to violate this norm. Several countries, especially the United States, have been examining the legal interpretation of this action in an effort to justify its use. The US itself has a domestic order, Executive Order 12 333, which prohibits assassinating world leaders or government officials in accordance with international law. However, legal inquiries made at the behest of US policymakers has resulted in the belief that assassinating terrorist leaders is permissible and does not contravene the order (Jackson, 1999, 694). The United States began investigating this avenue in the late 1990s for two reasons. First as a result of Israel's continued and often proactive employment of this strategy as its primary tool against terrorism, and second, the US's desire following the 1998 embassy bombings to take action against Osama bin Laden should the opportunity present itself (Jackson, 1999, 671). In fact, some tie the US cruise missile attacks on al-Qaida training camps and facilities following the Embassy attacks as efforts to commit a "targeted killing" (Kendall, 2001, 1085). 83

While the US has wrestled with the legal ramifications of targeted killings, Israel has made this strategy the cornerstone of its counterterrorism policy. Pre 9/11, the US publicly decried the policy but "understood" the Israeli predicament and supported it privately (Luft, 2003, 6). Under the counterterrorism strategy of "targeted killings," Israel actively responds to terror attacks and the threat of future attacks by targeting individuals it believes are involved in the planning and carrying out of the violence (Kendall, 2001, 1069). It suggests that "the constant elimination of leaders leaves terrorist organizations in a state of confusion and disarray, if for the very least it takes time for those in line for succession to get organized" (Luft, 2003, 4). The strategy is endorsed by Israeli military planners because it offered an effective way to "limit collateral damage while crippling militia leadership and eliminating those responsible for terror attacks." It also presents a win-win situation because the Israelis believe that the strategy has additional side benefits, including sending a message that it will be used "to punish terrorists" and deter others, and discourage citizens from helping terrorists (Gross, 2003, 354). Israel has carried out this tactic approximately 50 times since 1972 and has assassinated several prominent terrorists, including Abbas Musawi in 1992, the leader of Hezbollah, the head of Palestinian Islamic Jihad Fathi Shiqaqi and Hamas "engineer" (bomb maker) in 1995, and the leader and founder of Hamas' military wing in 2002 (Gross, 2003, 351; Luft, 2003, 6). Israel's policy has been so successful that the program has expanded over the years to target lesser leaders, people who are termed "higher level organizers" (Luft, 2003, 5). It is unclear whether this is a result of Israeli successes or a reflection that those being targeted have adapted and made themselves less available as targets, thus forcing the Israelis to look elsewhere. Israel has also become much more effective at carrying out the attacks. Israeli forces have been known to use sniper attacks, car bombings, helicopter gunships, as well as more clandestine methods such as exploding cell phones (Gross, 2003, 357). In the literature, assassinating terrorist leaders is portrayed as "a pure public good because a weakened terrorist group poses less of a threat" (Sandler, in Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004, 658). However, recent discussions have centered on whether targeted killings may have drawbacks. Aside from public opinion disapproving of the tactic, others suggest that killing the leader of a group may keep it off balance but might also force its hand as well. Retaliating against terror groups may actually be counterproductive because 84 it may bring them closer together and cohere or reinforce the group dynamic (Post, 1987, 23). Essentially it raises questions about whether this strategy may back groups into a corner, potentially hastening attacks, or push a group to respond more aggressively and violently to send a message to its constituents. Regardless of the outcome of the debate surrounding the effectiveness of this tactic, the reality is that certain governments still employ it, while others have left it on the table as an option. This fact alone suggests that at least in policy circles, the idea that targeting terrorist leadership through targeted killings or assassinations remains a viable strategy for countering terrorism. It is readily evident that the US-led war on terror is in part an effort to capture or kill top leadership of al-Qaida. "American policy makers and government officials around the globe are focusing much attention on disrupting terrorist and insurgency movements in order to prevent future attacks and incapacitate their networks" (Langdon et al, 2004, 59-60). This approach has more recently been observed by the assassination of Osama bin Laden by US forces in Pakistan on May 2, 2011. It brought this debate back to the forefront and revealed that the United States has been pursuing the option of targeted assassinations in the war on terror. An in-depth analysis by Brian Glyn Williams (2010) traces the history and evolution of the American use of predator drones, from surveillance and intelligence gathering to its evolution into the most efficient and effective way to target al-Qaida and Taliban leadership in Tribal areas of Pakistan. He aptly titled his article "the history of an Assassination Campaign" and highlights that between 2004 and 2010 it has been responsible for the death of more than 600 "high value targets" (Williams, 2010, 872).

Leadership Analysis: Examples from the Case Studies A leader is the person identified as having the greatest amount of influence over other members of the group. The literature reviewed has often focused on charismatic leaders and the idea that charisma may help create this separation of a leader from the masses. It was suggested that having charisma logically makes fulfilling the tasks of leadership easier. This point was however tempered by the fact that charisma does not appear to be a necessary characteristic of leadership and although it may assist a leader, it is not required. This is supported by an examination of case studies where differing degrees 85 of charisma were observed, yet effective leadership occurred nonetheless. At one end of the extreme is Villupillai Prabhakarian the leader of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) who would be described as the epitome of the charismatic leader:

a highly charismatic military genius, a brutal, manipulative and megalomaniac revolutionary. His uncompromising attitude, authoritarian decisions, and absolute power have never been disrupted...He has achieved a de facto God like status within the group and members are willing to sacrifice their life for him (Van de Voorde, 2005, 185-86)

Prabhakaran's dominating leadership has been used to explain the success of the group's preferred tactic of engagement which was suicide attacks. It is a well-accepted premise that suicide terrorism occurs where powerful leadership, support and command exists (Ramasubramanian, 2004, 19; Pedahzur, 2005; Bloom, 2005; Pape, 2006). Prabhakaran represented an excellent example of this prior to his death in 2009. This idea would also apply to Hambali, the military leader of Jemaah Islmaiya, who is credited as the individual who persuaded "traditionally easygoing Southeast Asians" to offer themselves up as suicide bombers during the group's 2002 Bali nightclub attack. The ability to convince members to make this sacrifice is very important because Southeast Asia's Islam is very different from Middle Eastern Islam, which makes it difficult to convey the religious merits of martyrdom to potential suicide volunteers (Dahlby, 2005, 224). At the low end of the charisma spectrum we observe Bob Mathews, the leader of the 1980s terrorist group The Order. Bob Mathews, killed in 1984, was widely considered to be a source of inspiration for many members, although he was not particularly charismatic. Members do not recall him being bellicose or aggressive, or indoctrinating or pressuring them. Rather, they describe Mathews as a man who challenged their thinking and encouraged them to stand up for their convictions (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 97). We can observe charisma in word or speech, as in the case of Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah, who has a reputation for being a riveting and charismatic speaker (Norton, 2007, 67). One of his most popular speeches occurred in 1999 following the death of his oldest son, Hadi. Nasrallah refused to make a deal with Israel to recover the body, saying "let them bury him with his companions" (Harik, 2005, 72). In the speech, he elaborated on his position: "the martyrdom of al-Sayyed Hadi is a grand title indicating that we, in the leadership of Hezbollah, do not spare our children and save them for the future. We pride 86 ourselves when our sons reach the frontlines and stand, heads high, when they fall martyrs" (Qassam, 2005, 121). Nasrallah successfully demonstrated his unquestionable principle and patriotism to Hezbollah as well as the Shi'a population at large and thus showed that he was no different from anyone else which gave him significant leadership credibility. Conversely, the literature is dotted with individuals whose charisma is best observed, not in their words or speeches, but in their actions. These are leaders who gain their position by setting an example for other members. Two such examples include FARC founder Pedro Antonio Marin, later known as Manuel Marulanda or "Tirofijo" ("Sure- shot"), and the IMU's Juma Namangami. Marulanda was the undisputed symbol of FARC and led by example, requiring his troops to emulate his lead, leading on a philosophy that "words were spare," and "speeches" were less important than actions (Dudley, 2003, 26). Namangami earned the respect of IMU members because he led by example and was considered "a daring fighter" (Weitz, 2004, 517). He was a determined and cruel commander who captured and decapitated any of his own fighters attempting to accept amnesty from the Uzbek government and return to their villages (Naumkin, 2003, 12). Other times it is difficult to pinpoint a source of the charisma. An example of this would be one of the RAF leaders Andreas Baader, who was described as having the ability to command attention based on nothing more than having a "brandoesque swagger, streetwise demeanor, and lack of inhibitions" (Varon, 2004, 63). Gerry Adams, the leader of the PIRA, also fits this description. He is credited with leading from behind the scenes and "earning a name for himself not for his physical courage or operational valor," but for his organizing abilities and tactical canniness. He had a "mystique." There is no evidence that he ever fired a shot and members claim that they never met anyone who had ever been on an operation with him. He had "never been on a robbery, never on a gun crew or a bombing" (Moloney, 2007, xx; 88; 99). Despite this fact, Adams' role in the PIRA expanded over the years until he was its leader. In essence, each of the leaders mentioned above successfully led, or continue to lead, their respective groups, despite the fact that they demonstrate differing degrees and types of charisma. Yet in each case there is no doubt that these leaders possessed a greater amount of influence and authority than other members of their groups and were the key strategists and decision makers. 87

The literature also identified the importance of leaders in communicating goals and ideological visions beyond the members of the group but to the general public at large as well. Analysis of the case studies reveals that this is a purposive and consistent aspect of many of the groups. Bob Mathews, serving as spokesperson or representative of The Order, was the one who reached out to spread the group's idea and vision. He would take the time to respond to, or write letters to, newspapers defending white supremacist ideology and calling for the "resurgence of his people" (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 155-6). The origins of the group Jemaah Islamiya is based on the vision and grievances of its two founding members, Ba'asyir and Sungkar, who took to the radio waves in an effort to spread their message and advocate the group's ultimate goal (Ramakrishna, 2004, 8; Dahlby, 2005, 225). The RAF, routinely sent communiques to the media constantly updating its narrative. One of the main leaders, Ulrike Meinhof, had been a journalist and used her writing skills to craft the communiques which spoke on behalf of the group. The other main leader, Andreas Baader, also enjoyed speaking with the media and giving interviews and even continued this practice following his arrest and imprisonment. In a 1975 interview with Spiegel, he boasted about new campaigns being prepared and led from inside the prison (Montcourt, 2009, 300) Leadership has been portrayed by the literature as the ability to harness or mould other individuals to support a group's cause. It is also explained as providing members with guidance or ideological education, and making a group's mission or vision make sense to the individual members. In addition to providing literature in the short term, it might be necessary to articulate a longer term vision for the group. For example, Bob Mathews knew that The Order was too small to effect the change it was calling for, but sold the group on continued action in the face of that reality by acknowledging it as a long term struggle:

With what we are planning, the chances of any one of us coming out alive or free from prison for the rest of our lives are pretty slim. But someone has to start it. Once others see us, more kinsmen will be inspired to follow. You and I will probably never see it come to be, but by our dedication and vision, I assure you someday it will be accomplished (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 185)

Often, membership needs to be reminded of what the group is trying to accomplish. We see this time and again, even when the vision changes. For example, the IMU's initial goal 88 to overthrow the Karimov regime and establish an Islamic Uzbekistan (Mann, 2002) changed to include the creation of a broader Islamic caliphate in Central Asia (Horsman, 2005, 207). This phenomenon can also be observed by looking at FARC, where its vision and enemy have changed several times during its existence. Initially the group's raison d'etre was to counter the seizure of rural lands by urban elites and to achieve "armed colonization" of successive areas, liberating and mobilizing the disaffected and dispossessed population into an alternative society (Manwaring, 2002, 71). By the 1990s, FARC had become heavily involved in the drug trade as a means to support its revolution. While the vision to protect the rural populations remained, the enemy changed. FARC began to carry out terrorist attacks indiscriminately, bombing and attacking civilians and the facilities of foreign companies, kidnapping hundreds of Columbians and foreign nationals, and regularly targeting civilians in an effort to "discourage collaboration with other groups and the government" against FARC and its interests (Feldmann & Perala, 2002, 113). This shifted again in the late 1990s when the United States became involved in Columbian politics with "the war on drugs." Between 1998 and 2002, the US sent more than 2 billion dollars to Columbia to help combat FARC. In response FARC went out of its way to declare the US an enemy to its interests (Marcella, 2002; Dudley, 2003, 23). Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah provides a very clear example of changing the group's vision and goals and does so almost on the fly. Considering Hezbollah is many different organizations with many different roles and responsibilities, Nasrallah by default has several different leadership hats. Those who have studied him in-depth identify four different contexts or "frames" he employs when presenting his ideas about Hezbollah's struggle against Israel. They portray a politically savvy individual who chooses his narrative to suit the particular audience he is addressing (Harik, 2005, 71). Leaders have the important job of framing the group's message, vision and goals not just to the group itself, but also to an outside audience and these examples demonstrate how leaders have managed to fulfill this role. One of the last responsibilities a leader has is to maintain the continuity of the group, to ensure it has the capability of remaining a legitimate tool for achieving the group's desired vision or goal. Often, challenges to the group emerge or the group is faced with a crisis and the leader must step up and address the divisive or destructive issue. 89

Every single group which was examined for this research displayed this trait. Although each group faced slightly different challenges or crises, the reality is that each one needed to overcome some threat to its existence. In the case of The Order, Bob Mathews did whatever was necessary to keep the group calm and focused, whether it was assuring nervous members and calming dissenting voices following the group's first terrorist act (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 217), or eliminating a potential threat to the group. One prospective member who had begun to talk extensively about the group's operations was ordered killed by Mathews to protect the group (Smith, 1994, 69). Another crisis might be the loss of a leader or significant member of the group, most often due to death or incarceration. The IMU faced the death of one of its leaders when it made a strategic blunder in the lead-up to the 2003 Afghanistan war, choosing to side with al-Qaida and the Taliban and leading to near annihilation of the group. IMU fighters were decimated by American forces and their military leader Namangani was killed (Mihalka, 2006, 137, 145; Cornell, 2005, 632). Toldir Yuldashev managed to salvage the situation and re-organized those who had survived ordering them to halt activities, returned to the Ferghana Valley to "blend in and re-group" (Rotar, 2003). A similar potential demise was also overcome by Jemaah Islamiya who following a successful terror campaign beginning with the 2002 Bali nightclub attacks suffered a crackdown by the Indonesian government. Most members including military leader Hambali were arrested and others went underground. The group however managed to survive Hambali's arrest (Conboy, 2006, 215-17). It was later determined that Hambali continued to pull the strings even managing to arrange an infusion of funds to other members for future attacks (Conboy, 2006, 219). Again, the strong leadership of Hambali even during his incarceration kept the group focused and he was responsible for returning the group to an active campaign and remaining relevant. FARC has also faced two significant challenges which leadership managed to overcome including a failed attempt at political mediation in the 1980s and the potential loss of their organizing ideology. In an effort to embrace a political solution to their goal, FARC founded a political party. However, right wing groups fearing a threat to their own interests systematically eliminated thousands of its candidates and leaders effectively 90 wiping out the political branch (Farah, 2008a, 4). This outcome threatened to split the group but Marulanda managed to contain the situation. The group also managed to survive the conclusion of the Cold War and the defeat of left-wing Marxism. States who had subscribed to this ideology provided FARC with a great deal of its resources and ideological justification. With the demise of these state supporters FARC could have easily unraveled if not for the conscious efforts of Marulanda to address them (Ortiz, 2002, 127). Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE managed to navigate through the pressures of the US led war on terror which made fundraising and the acquisition of weapons and supplies increasingly difficult (Mayilvaganan, 2009, 25). He also managed to re-establish control and dominance following the defection of one of his top commanders in 2006 when an Eastern commander "abandoned" his post and took close to 2 000 members with him (Smith, 2007, 71). The most obvious example of a leader being able to survive intense challenges to a group's position can be seen in the case of the PIRA. Gerry Adams managed to navigate the PIRA through the very contentious and complicated peace talks leading up to the Good Friday Agreement. There was a real division within the group with many in the military wing accusing Sinn Fein of selling out the PIRA and purposefully running down the group's capabilities (Moloney, 2007, 243). During these years Adams walked a fine line trying to hold the group together yet managed to frame several different messages to several different audiences at different times.

Concluding Remarks on Leadership This section discussed the idea of leaders and leadership in the contemporary terrorism literature. It introduced the concept of separating "the leader," an individual and his specific qualities or traits, from "the leadership" or tasks, responsibilities and role played by an individual or group of individuals in a position of decision-making or goal- setting for a group or organization and who are responsible for administrating the activities of the group. Leadership is an important part of what allows terrorism to occur. The literature identifies several important roles a leader plays which assists the group reach its goal of committing terrorism. Further a brief discussion of targeted killings has been provided because this shows that governments agree that leadership is important for 91 terrorism. Policies that decapitate or remove leadership thus preventing them from fulfilling important roles are pursued in an effort to prevent future terrorist acts from occurring.

Element 2: Role of the Organization As scholars have attempted to explain terrorism, one of the aspects most frequently studied is the role of the terrorist organization. This is based on the observation that the majority of terrorist acts have traditionally been perpetrated by groups of individuals. Martha Crenshaw who has spent considerable time studying terrorist organizations argues that understanding the organization is the key to understanding terrorism because "terrorism is not committed by an individual rather it is committed by groups who reach collective decisions based on commonly held beliefs" (Crenshaw, 1990, 250). This suggests that analyzing terrorism from an organizational approach would be beneficial. As with many of the elements discussed in this dissertation, other fields in the social sciences have long studied the role that organizations play in explaining outcomes. In this case, organization theory was thought to be applicable to terrorist organizations if it demonstrated that differences in design and function affected choices (Jackson, 2009, 211). Other scholars suggest that there has been too little analysis of the role of the organization and too much study of the "group," placing the focus more on the interpersonal dynamics within the organization (this dissertation has separated this dimension into an organization element and a group dynamic element to overcome this issue). Mayntz (2004, 16) complains that the contribution of organization studies towards understanding terrorism is being overlooked. Part of this may be that there is a longstanding debate about how terms like organization and group should be understood in the context of terrorism. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008, 441) suggest the problem can be found in the overlap of the terminology, specifically: when is a group an organization or vice versa. Many remain unsatisfied with previous attempts to distinguish the two by either number of members, or demonstrable levels and hierarchy. Silke (2004) further suggests that the problem is compounded by a lack of information. Terrorist groups by their very nature are violent clandestine organizations, which makes collecting data on their internal functioning very challenging under the best of circumstances. 92

This dissertation attempts to circumvent these pitfalls in two ways. First, it removes the decision-making aspect: instead of examining the role the organization plays in facilitating the decision to pursue terrorism, it uses a separate element, the group dynamic, as part of this explanation. Instead, it examines the organization from the perspective that the decision to commit terrorism has been made. Second it looks to set aside issues of organization as being defined purely by structure and instead replaces it with functionality. In this sense the organizational element is designed to focus on more basic tasks, specifically what the organization does which permits the group to survive and operate. This dissertation argues that the literature supports this interpretation of the role of the organization and recognizes that examining terrorism from a structural perspective has become increasingly difficult and that it is yielding inconclusive results.

Justifying Organization as a Key Focal Point The idea that the terrorist organization is an important factor is not new. Academically, Crenshaw and others have long advocated the terrorist group as the "unit of production" for terrorist violence (Jackson, 2009, 209), which led to suggestions that ending terrorism might lie with ending the group. Two strategies were suggested: first, terror groups could be "ended," or physically defeated, and second, terrorist groups would end by their own internal dissent, attrition or loss of members (Crenshaw in Oots, 1989, 141). This places a great deal of emphasis on organizational "breakdown" as a real possibility for ending terrorism and was based on organizational deficiencies such as a lack of funding, insufficient recruits or internal dissent (Crenshaw, 1999). The idea of creating internal dissent was widely embraced in policy circles and during the 1980s US counterterrorism strategies saw law enforcement agencies successfully infiltrate and disrupt right wing neo-Nazi and terror groups. When terrorism once again directly threatened the US following the attacks on 9/11, this strategy was resurrected. The 2003 and 2006 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism have both maintained that the key to defeating Islamic terrorism remains focusing on the leader (as discussed previously), and the organization. The 2003 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism outlines this strategy based on its model of terrorism (See figure 4) which places the organization just below the leader as the primary focus. It states: "the terrorist 93 organization's structure, membership, resources and security determine its capabilities and reach," (NCST, 2003, 6) and that the goal should be "direct continuous action against terrorist groups, the cumulative effect of which will initially disrupt, over time degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist organization" (NCST, 2003, 2). Immediately following 9/11 US strategy was an: "offensive strategy to eliminate capabilities that allow terrorists to exist and operate—attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command and control and communications; material support and finances" (NCST, 2003, 17). The US government refined this idea in the 2006 strategy. Although it remained committed to targeting terrorist groups, it narrowed the scope to focus on the organizational apparatus. The idea was that it was possible to "cut off groups from their network of support and resources," and stop the group from replenishing itself by preventing recruitment (NCST, 2006, 11). This can be seen in attempts to freeze financial assets and funds thought to belong to terrorist organizations. Whether one disrupted the resources or the recruiting, the idea was that the terrorist organization could be targeted; specifically its day-to-day operations which would make even the most basic tasks difficult to accomplish (Jackson, 2009,235). However, some question whether terrorist groups can be targeted as they were in the 1980s. Since the late 1990s there has been a shift in how "groups" and organizations might be understood. These arguments were once again centered on structural comparisons. They suggested that terrorist groups were no longer hierarchic or formally structured entities but were shifting towards less structured, more fluid networks (Jackson, 2009, 215). This had foundations in the evolution occurring among traditional everyday organizations: as corporations have evolved organizationally, so did the terrorist organizations, going from hierarchical, vertical organizational structures to more horizontal, less command driven groups (Morgan, 2004, 38). This was also supported by observations in the field, especially al-Qaida which arguably evolved its structure in response to the US invasion of Afghanistan. From this point, researchers have scrambled to identify, analyze and understand if and how its structure has changed and what this might mean for future analysis. This debate was a central point of the "new" terrorism debate which was discussed in chapter two. 94

This dissertation is not concerned with organizational debates because it is less interested in what the organization "looks like." Instead it is interested in how the group or organization carries out the day to day tasks which facilitate or allow for terrorism to occur. For this dissertation it does not matter whether the terrorists are organized formally, in a hierarchy, an individual cell, or as part of a network. The role of the organization in this context is about examining how the organization continues to exist and can viably carry out terrorist acts. Further ideas such as network, cell and/or formal organization are used interchangeably and inconsistently in the literature. The reality is that regardless of how the group is defined, some form of organization has to exist. In any group there is always at least one person who has more influence or authority over others and by default this creates at the very least a two-tiered structure which in-turn suggests some hierarchy. Jackson (2009) argues that the end goal when studying terrorist networks is to trace them back to the core group or core leaders, those with influence over the rest and target them using the traditional leadership removal or group infiltration tactic.

A Brief Word on the Changing Nature of Organization and Structure The terrorism literature has a very well developed sub set focusing on the structure of terrorist organizations as being an important feature for studying terrorism. Interestingly, the debate over structure has its origins from terrorists themselves who in the late 1800s wrestled with the best way to successfully structure themselves (McCormick, 2003. This manifested itself in a debate over whether the idea of terrorism was best carried out through "organizations" or "anarchy." Those who supported organization felt that in order to confront an oppressive regime, a certain style was required: "terrorism is a collective enterprise that required a high level of organization and careful planning to succeed." Others felt that organization went against everything terrorism was supposed to be and that instead it was spontaneous individualized activity designed to "facilitate a creative spirit of insurrection" (McCormick, 2003, 479). Individuals carrying out terrorism would eventually get the masses on their side by their example. Inevitably, having a formal structure won out and for the most part, having structure or a formal organization appeared to dominate the landscape for many years to come. This can be observed by looking at some of the examples found among the case studies. 95

While it is fair to say that groups which are larger tend to more readily display a formal organization, smaller groups have as well. The RAF was a smaller group yet when the German police forces diagrammed the RAF's organizational structure it was in a pyramidical form and by the 1980s they identified up to four levels of membership (Varon, 2004, 302). Another smaller group would be Jemaah Islamiya which organized itself hierarchically, probably due to geographical constraints of the Indonesian archipelago. The group was split into mantiqi, or regional chapters. Each mantiqi controlled up to four sub- regional branches known as wakalahs, and each branch controlled one or more compartmentalized cells known as fiah that consisted of 4 to 5 men (White Paper in Baker, 2005, 63). Each movement downwards was subordinate to the one above, with one individual serving as a leader or Amir at the apex. Larger groups however display this trait more obviously. FARC at its peak was suspected to have upwards of 18,000 members (Steinitz, 2002, 10). As it grew over time it became increasingly organized and specialized. The origins of its organizational structure can be traced to the FARC 6 th Conference in• 1978. Members agreed to a complete chain of command as well as disciplinary regulations, command guidelines and established general staffs responsible for running the different fronts that acted as tactical units of the guerillas (Ortiz, 2002, 133). Generally, FARC is structured on three hierarchical levels. The base of the pyramid is formed by the fronts (/rentes) which are the primary tactical units with 150- 200 men each. Fronts are organized into blocks (bloques) whose staff has a force at their disposal for protection and some control over special units. A block controls the operations in a specific region and can consist of up to 2000 men. The top tier comprises the general staff, protected by a security perimeter of up to 2000 men (Ortiz, 2002, 140; Dudley, 2003, 25). The group of leaders in the Secretariat of the General Staff maintains a high degree of control over the structure of the organization in part because they have been in these positions for a very long time (Ortiz, 2002, 141; Farah, 2008a, 1). As with the traditional IRA, the PIRA modeled its structure on the British Army: brigades containing battalions containing companies (English, 2003, 114). Ireland was further divided strategically: the Northern or "war zone" and the Southern "logistical zone," where weapons were stashed, bombs were constructed and training occurred (Moloney, 2007, 158). It has been dubbed "a highly advanced organization," which operated on three 96 levels. At the very bottom were the local defense committees followed by the "auxiliary IRA," part time members who could be called upon in emergencies and who served as "local eyes and ears." Finally there was the "full time IRA" which was the permanent membership known as volunteers (Moloney, 2007, 87). This can also be used to demonstrate the differing levels of involvement certain individuals may have and how the pyramid might take shape. Starting at the peak with leadership, it moves outwards and gets bigger as it transitions into the lower levels. One last example provides a very interesting revelation about hierarchy. At its peak, the LTTE boasted well over 10,000 members of which 4,000 were "experienced" fighters (Mayilvaganan, 2009, 31). The LTTE not only had a hierarchal organizational structure, but also an interesting hierarchy within the hierarchy. The LTTE, consistent with the cultural practice of Sri Lanka, incorporated the caste system into its organization. In addition to hierarchy among different levels of the organization, there was also a hierarchy within the hierarchy where some members even on the same organizational level of hierarchy were subordinate to others. This also affected the possibility of advancement within the group where lower caste members would remain "lower rung troops who do not hold any place of importance or rank" (Van de Voorde, 2005, 185). In the 1970s and 1980s, terrorist organizations were described as being organized like a pyramid, with the leadership, who decide the overall policy and plans at the top. This was followed by a larger layer of active terrorists who carry out the attacks and are often specialized in certain activities such as bomb making, assassination or surveillance. On the next level there are active supporters who supply intelligence, weapons, supplies, communications, transportation and safe houses (Fraser, in Spencer, 2006). This was mentioned above in reference to the PIRA but another example to demonstrate this practice can be seen among the RAF. At the top were the commandos, estimated at between 15-30 people, who lived under false names and engaged in "attacks on persons". Below were the "illegal militants" and then the members of the "militant RAF environment" thought to number in the hundreds who provided logistical support and sometimes engaged in lesser acts of violence such as attacks on property. At the base were the 2000 or so people in the "legal RAF environment" responsible for agitation and propaganda (Varon, 2004, 302). 97

This characterization led to a further distinction between organizations which were structured horizontally or vertically. Horizontally structured groups were often smaller, had no outside locus of authority and were complete unto themselves autonomous cells. Conversely, vertically structured groups were larger and adopted structural forms much like any large organization; there was a central command with columns or cells and the locus of control resided outside the small group (Ferracuti, 1983, Baeyer-Kaette, 1982 in Post, 1987, 32). In the 1980s, terms such as "ladder system" where the leader is on the top rung and everyone is below exemplified by Villupei Prabhakaran and the LTTE, and the "centrifugal system" where the leader is in the middle with subordinates all around him; like a solar system with the leader as sun was also popular in further differentiating terrorist infrastructure (Zawodny, 1981). An example of this would be The Order's Bob Mathews who occupied a central position among the various other members around him. Research reveals that outside of Mathews' leadership, there was no tangible differentiation among the other members once they were fully accepted by the group. In the 1990s, the terrorism studies became consumed with what was characterized as the beginnings of a shift away from formal structure to a more fluid arrangement. This shift gained momentum following the September 11 attacks when al-Qaida is alleged to have dispersed its formal structure to avoid detection and capture. This ushered in a period where terrorism researchers argued that terrorism as we had traditionally known it, formal structures and organizations, had evolved and been replaced by networks or cells. The argument was that less formal structure and ties created weaker connections designed to ensure that "leadership" could move downwards but could not be "followed upward," which created greater security (Jackson, 2006, 248). More recently the literature has moved away from the idea that the structural organization is an important aspect and two newer positions have emerged. One position advocates the relationship between leadership and organization suggesting that structure does not dictate the success or failure of a terrorist group, but rather it is the ability of the leader to control it. For Jackson (2006), this becomes an examination of "influence relationships." Jackson begins by refuting the idea that networks or cells operate independently or virtually absent any kind of control and influence. He suggests that in reality there is always someone in a network who exercises some greater degree of 98 influence than others, and that "even in networks, commanders or opinion leaders exist and have a way of communicating or reaching all members of the organization" (Jackson, 2006, 250). He further argues that the term "leaderless resistance" is being used improperly as a figure of speech which suggests no one is dictating direction or actions (Jackson, 2006, 251). For example, if we take a hypothetical group who is completely autonomous, ideas, direction and influence still exists. Even if it is coming from a faceless post on the internet, it is someone, somewhere influencing the direction the group will ultimately pursue. This position suggests that arguing about whether structure exists or not is a waste of time because there is always "structure." A second position suggests that terrorism is increasingly about the functionality of the group and focuses on the group accomplishing certain tasks. This position has been supported in the literature as researchers identify that terms like "group" and "organization" are broad and defining them in terms of structure has recently become more problematic. Evidence shows that most terrorist groups or organizations have no clear cut structure but prefer to remain dynamic or in flux thus giving them flexibility. Mayntz (2004, 12-16) suggests that the hybrid model, using attributes of both a formal structure and network makes the most sense because it ensures "the advantages of each while defeating the deficiencies of the other." He further suggests that we know this hybrid model works because regular organizations employ it, realizing that "pure hierarchies are unable to adapt to external changes," which challenges their ability to survive. His study of terrorist groups suggests that they all demonstrate features typical of centralized hierarchical organization as well as features of decentralized "networks." What differs from one group to the next is the ratio of hybrid from one to another (Mayntz, 2004, 11). He concludes that from this perspective those who employ a hybrid structure make it very difficult to label them. Can we really distinguish between "de-centralized organization" and a "well connected network," or once again does it become a matter of subjectivity? This position supports other similar arguments such as the research conducted by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (in Morgan, 2004, 39) who also discuss the advantages of structural flexibility. They conclude that groups change rapidly from one form to the other depending on which style suits their purposes at that time. They argue that that terrorist group's organizational designs can be 99 described as "sometimes acephalus (headless) and at other times polycephalous (hydra- headed)," which again makes labeling very difficult for researchers. This brief discussion has been included in an attempt to demonstrate how ideas about terrorist organizations have changed over the past fifty years. It highlights that terrorist organizations were primarily defined by formal structure and a hierarchical command and control. It then points out that studying groups that shifted to a less formal structure in the late 1990s and early 2000s became problematic. This is the reason this dissertation chose to focus on functionality instead of structure.

Functionality: The Role of the Organization and the Terrorism Literature A basic principal of organizational psychology is: "that the survival of the organization is the highest priority" (Post, 1987, 33). This suggests that any discussion of a group starts from the premise that maintaining its own existence is its primary goal. This applies to a terrorist group as well. If we assume that the primary goal of a group is to maintain its own survival or existence, then it becomes a question of resources. First, it requires human resources or members. Because of the dangerous nature of terrorism, a terrorist group needs to have the ability to attract, recruit and indoctrinate a steady stream of new members (Borum, 2004, 263). It must be able to replace losses which might arise due to death or capture, or it will slowly die of attrition. For terrorist groups, recruitment is survival and acquiring new members ensures continuity. Indeed, it is their most basic resource (McCormick, 2003, 496; See also Hudson, 1999, 70; Faria and Arce, 2005, 263). In order to survive, terrorist groups must also stay active. While carrying out attacks ensures that the group remains relevant and can attract new members it also serves a psychological purpose. The commission of terror attacks solidifies bonds within the group and re-affirms group cohesion (McCormick, 2003, 490). This will be discussed further in the context of the group dynamic and identity in a later section. In order to stay active, repeated attacks must be committed. Committing attacks requires resources, and the availability and amount of resources directly affects capabilities. Resources for terrorist groups can be viewed in a simple equation: groups need resources and the more resources that are accessible, the more choices or alternatives are available. No resources means no attacks, while some resources means tough choices about how they are utilized (Jackson, 100

2009, 231). Further, having more resources allows you the ability to carry out larger and more sophisticated attacks (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, 439). It is from this premise that we can begin to understand the role of the organization. How does it ensure the survival and continuity of the group? Basically, the organization allows for the accumulation of various types of resources which are important for carrying out terrorism. This section examines how groups "organize" themselves to carry out the tasks necessary to perpetuate their existence and continue to pursue their cause. It will look at recruiting, fundraising, training, communication with other groups and specialization or role definition. Despite the literature's longstanding focus on structure as the defining factor of the terrorist organization, there has always been some secondary interest in how these organizations operate. Although it often appears as an afterthought, the literature reveals some insight into the day-to-day operation of terrorist groups and how they acquire the resources necessary to operate. In this context, terrorist organizations are once again similar to other types of organizations and face the same challenges: recruiting new members and securing funds (Oots, 1989, 139). Formation of a terrorist organization, like that of any organization, requires recruiting and retaining members and must continue to replace members who are lost (leave, die, captured). Recruitment is the key to "the viability of the terrorist organization" (Oots, 1989, 143-4: Also see discussion by Borum, 2004, 57; Borum, 2010, 9). The traditional method of recruiting has two stages. First, recruiters must identify targets or potential members. After locating them, they must offer information, education or indoctrination, training, and in some instances inducements to persuade them to commit wholeheartedly (Brady et al, in Borum, 2010, p. 14). An analysis of this process suggests that it is long and also places a great deal of strain on a group's resources. In this process, spending one resource must occur to acquire another one. A more in-depth examination reveals that it may be easier for some groups to come by resources, especially new members, than others. This plays a role in recruitment. Many groups have a built-in constituency, which they can claim to represent. This means that they have a pre-existing community which might provide them with potential recruits. Others do not have this advantage and are forced to find individuals who might be considered like-minded, but do not necessarily share a powerful pre-existing connection. 101

Groups which are nationalist-separatist in origin often have ties to a large pool of potential recruits. Part of this will be addressed in the section discussing pre-existing socializing factors but the reality is that individuals will for the most part readily approach the group to join. Groups such as FARC represent a specific community or constituency which supports them and from which they draw their members. FARC grew from a small rural peasant organization into its current form and maintains its strength and numbers from Columbia's rural poor. This support continues due to the lack of perceived government response to their hardships and the economic inequalities that plague the countryside (Vargas, 1999). The same can be said for the PIRA and LTTE who advocate a separate state for an ethnic or cultural group they feel is subjugated by another state. The PIRA, however, amended its recruiting process and moved away from "open recruiting." This was partially in response to the realization that the group had been burned in the early years by having no recruit vetting process. This was partly due to the large numbers of recruits flocking in and the fact that it was still felt that everyone knew everyone. This would ultimately change and the PIRA no longer relied on its "informal clearance sieve," the reliance on recommendations from friends and/or family. Volunteers were forced to go through recruit classes and live and train among their own. Further, individuals who approached the group with "information" or "resources" were viewed with some skepticism (Bowyer-Bell, 2000, 256). Other groups need to create a commonality which affects their ability to recruit large numbers. It is probably not a coincidence that this is often reflected in the smaller size of these groups. From this perspective we can identify groups such as The Order and RAF, which needed to go to greater lengths to identify like-minded individuals. Further, these types of groups appear to be less likely to be actively recruiting or demonstrate a sustained recruiting campaign. It is usually friends or acquaintances of existing members who made an introduction. This is in contrast to bigger groups with the built-in community, which had a continuous and steady flow of interested individuals always looking to join. Jemaah Islamiya employs a somewhat hybrid model of the two different recruiting processes. The organization in its earlier days relied on word of mouth and focused on individuals who attended sermons offered by the leader Sunghar. In an effort to grow and 102 add a new generation, senior members in each mantiqi were told to become more proactive. They began to act as talent scouts, observing a potential recruit for a year and then inviting him to attend an intensive 18 month training course that covered all aspects of JI's religious code. Arguably this was also a sustained effort at recruiting because leadership established ambitious targets insisting that there would be twenty new students every six months (Conboy, 2006, 84-5). However, the terrorism literature also identifies several other resource areas as well. Terrorist groups require technical resources including knowledge and materials as well as the financial and human resources to carry out attacks and fulfill the roles of acquiring these other resources (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, 439). For terrorist organizations, a shortage of any of these resources presents serious challenges and a terrorist organization's ability to secure or acquire them may fluctuate. Terrorist groups must continuously focus on securing access to a steady influx of resources, and at times this may force a group to place the acquisition of resources as their top priority. There is often a tremendous focus on ensuring the group has an adequate amount of resources because this can be the difference between success or failure, and even survival or the group's end (Shapiro and Siegel, 2007, 408; Jackson, 2009, 240) The most fundamental resource that every group needs is financial in nature. Groups need money for financing, whether it is for materials for attacks, to pay for weapons or training, as well as any other costs that might arise. The manner in which groups meet this requirement is different, and the traditional terrorism literature identifies several different ways groups secure the funding they need. We can readily identify these techniques as: (a) securing resources from a community; (b) through legitimate business enterprises; (c) drugs or narcotics; (d) traditional crime; or (e) from an outside source. Most groups use several of these methods together. One important point that needs to be taken away from this discussion on fundraising is that in every case, with a possible example of traditional crime, the fundraising is designed to be continuous and ongoing, and to ensure a steady flow of money is available to the group. Many groups rely on receiving financial support from their community or the constituency they represent. This can itself be divided into two separate sources: the domestic or local community and the international diaspora. Domestically, a group may 103 solicit or seek donations from its local constituency or community. Depending on the relationship a group has with its constituency, this "collection" may be voluntary or involuntary where people are forced to support the group. More likely, however, are efforts to raise resources from diasporic communities. The best examples of this were the LTTE and the PIRA. The LTTE branched out and created a true transnational network to provide it with various resources. Following the 1987 civil war, many Tamils left for other countries and this set up the initial framework for the network which allowed the Tamils to raise significant foreign funds from its Diasporic communities which now exists in over 50 countries (Van de Voorde, 2005, 191). According to some, this network is highly advanced and organized:

What differentiates the LTTE from other terrorist groups is the impressive quasi-diplomatic structure it has maintained internationally since the mid 1980s. The movement claims to have political/propaganda offices and cells in 54 countries, and is charged with disseminating propaganda, fundraising, resource management and obtaining weapons (Aryasintha, 2001, 30)

This transnational apparatus allows the LTTE to raise large sums of money very quickly. Reports suggest that the LTTE could raise anywhere from one to twenty million dollars each month directly from its diaspora (Bonner, 1998; Mayilvaganan, 2009, 32). Intelligence estimates place the annual revenue of the group in the region of 100 million dollars, of which 60 million was collected overseas (Aryasintha, 2001, 31-2). In order to acquire financial resources as well as supplies, the PIRA also had a global reach. Overseas sympathizers provided valuable fundraising and weapons. In the United States there existed the Clann na Gael (Moloney, 2003, 138), which was created primarily to support the cause of increased Irish autonomy (English, 2003, 117). It had members who would funnel guns, equipment and cash to the IRA, sometimes even going to jail for the cause (Moloney, 2007, 421). One group operating out of New York known as Irish Northern Aid (NORAID) could raise anywhere from 50 - 100 thousand dollars quickly if required (Moloney, 2007, 459) [this group eventually became Friends of Sinn Fein (FOSF) in 1994 and went "legitimate"] 104

Hezbollah represents an interesting example because it has relied on many different avenues to collect funding. It is also sometimes difficult to identify how the resources are allotted because Hezbollah also has social and political wings, as well as their military (terrorist) one. Monies raised for one area may be diverted to others. Much of the funding for the social and medical infrastructure is raised domestically through legitimate enterprises. It has been suggested that it was not unusual for as much as two million dollars to be collected on a single night during Ramadan (Norton, 2007, 109). Hezbollah also receives significant subsidies from abroad, including Iran and other wealthy Shi'a in the Middle East and Europe, through alms and zakat (Muslim obligations and charities) and through investment and operating businesses (Jaber, 1997, 153). However, the Iranian contribution, estimated at US 100 million per year is felt to be diverted primarily to Hezbollah's militia wing (Norton, 2007, 110). It has recently been suggested that Hezbollah has become increasingly involved with international crime to improve their financial resources, using professional criminal elements to not only secure a new stream of funding and supplies but to also improve their operational abilities which have been improving exponentially (Azani, 2009, 204). Many groups eventually seek to transform their fundraising techniques and will try to cover their activities by making a move towards legitimate business enterprises. In addition to taxing its local community and international diaspora, the LTTE sought to diversify its income and operated several legitimate business enterprises, including a shipping company, investing in real estate, the stock market and small businesses. Further, some of it comes from illegitimate activities such as drug, weapon and human trafficking (Aryasintha, 2001, 31-2). The majority of funds are spent supplying the group with weapons. Jemmah Islamiya also used a variety of fundraising techniques, including operating front businesses allowing the group to launder money and collect and disperse funds from other Islamic groups (Conboy, 2006, 59-60). They have also diversified their sources of fundraising. Their sources for income include: funding from other groups (al-Qaida); skimming funds from Islamic charities; profit from corporate entities and contributions from sympathizers and members themselves (Golburt, 2004, 4). It runs legitimate businesses and a boarding school, but also receives donations from Islamic charities, and 105 solicits resources from its own members as well as those from the diasporic community in Australia. Each mantiqi was also given a fundraising target by the markaz to raise funds for training at the camps. Mantiqi 1 could raise up to $ 10 000 US in individual donations within two weeks (Conboy, 2006, p. 69). Other groups take advantage of drug production to acquire the majority of their resources. In the mid-1980s, FARC made a strategic and calculated decision to become involved in the drug trade in an effort to raise funds, find recruits and re-organize itself for the struggle ahead (Manwaring, 2002, 71). Its dependence on the drug trade increased as the Cold War ended and it realized the potential of drug resources as providing an alternative and almost endless supply of funding. Through the cultivation of its links with international drug traffickers, FARC has been able to develop and secure its own "pipelines" for acquiring weapons and supplies (Ortiz, 2002, 138). The first documented example of this arrangement was seen as far back as 1988, an interrogation over an intercepted arms shipment revealed that the arms came from Jamaica, and that an exchange had been brokered whereby FARC's cocaine was exchanged for the weapons (Steinitz, 2002, 4). FARC's ability to leverage drugs for weapons continued to grow. According to government estimates, by 1998 FARC's income was broken down as follows: US $550 million from drug links, $311 million from extortion, and $236 million from kidnappings (Steinitz, 2002, 10). The majority of the drug revenues came from taxing and protecting, not trafficking (11). The IMU also provides an excellent example of the growing nexus between crime and terrorism, which has more recently become a large part of terrorism studies. At varying points, the IMU appears to be either ideologically driven or criminally driven, especially as leaders were killed and replaced (Cornell, 2005, 635). Its tactics, however, are clearly terrorist in nature and contrary to traditional rules of warfare. The IMU fits the description of a smaller group trying to accomplish a goal with limited resources. For many years, the IMU focused on its training camps and weapons acquisition, but since this was so expensive, found itself having to fundraise large sums of money, getting involved in the drug trade (Mihalka, 2006, 138). It was also very creative in other fundraising tactics. Rumors also suggest that the IMU received assistance and training from Saudi and Pakistani security services (Mihalka, 2006, 138). 106

In very rare cases, groups simply turn to traditional crime in order to raise the funds they need. The Order is best known for two high profile armored car robberies designed to finance the movement's goal of starting a war with the US government, given the catchy moniker "the war in 84" (Smith, 1994, 25). The first heist netted the group approximately $43,000. Mathews immediately tithed ten percent for distribution to other right wing groups. Part of Mathews' long term vision was to strengthen the right wing movement for what he believed would be an eventual amalgamation (Flynn and Gerhardt, 1989, 143). However, Mathews quickly realized that procuring funds came directly at the expense of other activities and decided that one successful robbery could fund the group for an extended period (Smith, 1994, 92). In July 1984, several members of the Order, including Mathews himself, robbed an armored car containing approximately $3.6 million (Smith, 1994, 71). Their aim was to secure enough funding so the group would not have to worry about resources and could simply focus on its goal. In the case of The Order, evidence indicates that robbery was meant to fund the group long term. Other groups, such as the RAF, conducted crime sprees for the resources they would need for immediate purposes. They would steal a car, locate a safehouse, and acquire the materials they needed for a specific attack planned for that time (Aust, 1985). However, they also had additional sources of income from other groups as well as the East German Secret Police (Mueller, 2004, 270). The point that is important is that an examination of all the different groups and their efforts to fundraise demonstrates that the fundraising was meant to be ongoing and continuous. Even the traditional crime committed by The Order was meant to ensure adequate resources would be available for the foreseeable future. This necessity to secure different resources often manifests itself in what can be termed specialization. Terrorist groups often specialize or implement a division of labor where certain members are responsible for certain tasks. Terrorist groups often have members who are responsible for raising funds, finding and vetting recruits, training recruits, educating or indoctrinating new members, acquiring weapons and materials, building bombs, and for actually perpetrating the actual terrorist attack itself. Jackson highlights that because groups tend to implement a division of labor, it only reinforces the importance of the leadership role. Essentially leadership must be able to communicate and 107 coordinate all of these separate tasks into a focused organization (Jackson, 2006, 248). Those who have studied specialization point out that this practice is observed in most types of organization and even in networked organizations because it is efficient and effective. An examination of most terrorist groups revealed that two conditions always appeared to be present: leadership and "functional differentiation:" the fact that they have specialized units (Mayntz, 2004, 9-11; Zawodny, 1981). This appears to be one trait that all of the groups chosen for study demonstrate and it is independent of size. Even the smaller groups such as The Order and the RAF compartmentalized or specialized assigning specific task to specific members. The RAF assigned members with specific talents to specific roles. One individual, formerly a trained printer was tasked with making drivers licenses, identity cards and car registrations (Aust, 1985, 197-99). Other members were in charge of securing apartments to serve as safehouses, stealing cars for transportation and planning bank raids for funding (Aust, 1985, 126). One member, Gudrun Ensslin served as treasurer and recorded and dispersed funds to the other members (Aust, 1985, 127), specifically those tasked with acquiring weapons and explosives. The degree of specialization was so high that even German police were impressed by their sophistication and professionalism (Aust, 1985, 114). The Order appeared to follow a similar blueprint. Mathews saw specialization as the most efficient way to hasten the activities and capabilities of the group. As the group's plans developed, various members were assigned to oversee specific tasks. Mathews would continue to lead but would now travel around dispersing funds and creating new relationships. One member would be in charge of planning the group's next robbery, another would be in charge of educating recruits, a third member would plan assassinations, and another would oversee the construction and training at camps (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 248). Mathews even assigned an individual to lead recruiting in the prison system (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 279). While it was surprising to see such a high degree of specialization among smaller groups, this was expected for the larger groups. Many of the larger groups became highly specialized and compartmentalized as they grew in size and sophistication. FARC set its organizational structure very early and simply continued to grow along those lines. In, 1970 FARC had 9 fronts; by 1983, FARC had grown to 18 fronts, yet the organization 108 remained the same, they simply added more fronts and more divisions to the existing structure (Vargas, 1999). While the growth of the organization did not alter its basic structure, it did allow the group to become increasingly sophisticated and specialized, which in-turn gave it the ability to become more efficient and effective (Ortiz, 2002, 136). FARC would also create new positions as required. For example, as the drug trade began to yield significant returns, FARC created a chief financial officer position responsible for accounting and distributing resources (Steinitz, 2002, 12). In FARC, the majority of the fundraising occurred at the lower levels of the organization and were then funneled up to the general command who decided how the funding was best used (Ortiz, 2002, 140). Someone needed to keep track of this. In terms of specialization, the LTTE organized itself almost like a corporation, specializing every aspect of the groups operation. It had sea brigades, air brigades, suicide brigades and even traditional administrative specializations including fundraisers, recruiters and weapons and supply purchasers. A general snapshot of the LTTE revealed two wings: a military wing and a subordinate political wing which was governed by a central governing committee headed by Supreme chief Velupillai Prabhakaran. It was then further sub-divided into "wings" or "branches." Aside from the military and political wings, other specialized wings include: a finance wing, an intelligence wing, a women's wing and various combat wings including the Sea Tigers, Black Tigers, an elite fighting unit known only as the Charles Anthony regiment and a highly secretive intelligence group (Joshi, 1996, 28; Ramasubramanian, 2004, 8). All wings report directly to Prabhakaran. In 1987, the LTTE even created a training camp for women which created its own leadership structure (Ramasubramanian, 2004, 11). As the group continued to grow it added new positions as required. One high ranking LTTE official named Tharmalingam Shanmugham, also known as Kumaran Pathmanathan became the financial operations officer, who "makes it possible for the group to pursue war" (Aryasintha, 2001, 32). The LTTE began acquiring so many weapons that it had to create a position of "chief arms acquirer." The role, filled by Kumaran Padmanathan was to travel the globe in search of weapons, contacts and suppliers (Bonner, 1998) Jemaah Islamiya had a very unique method to "specialize" its members. Following the completion of the basic training program a follow-up assessment of the individual's 109 potential was conducted to determine the most suitable post-graduation placement within the ranks of JI. Some would become trainers in military camps or might take over administrative duties (Pavlova, 2006, 23). Designated by geography (Ml: Singapore, Malaysia and Southern Thailand; M2: Indonesia; M3: Sabah, Sulawesi and Southern Philippines; M4: Australia and Papua) (RAND, 2006, p. 151), each of the mantiqis also became somewhat specialized serving a specific role within the larger organization. Mantiqi l's primary role was recruiting and indoctrination of JI members, particularly through the Islamic boarding school operated in Johar Malaysia; Mantiqi 2 was the source of many JI operatives; Mantiqi 3 was important for training JI personnel and supporting its logistical network; Mantiqi 4 in Australia was mostly focused on recruiting and fundraising due to the large diasporic Indonesian community (Baker, 2005, 62-3; Golburt, 2004, 2). One last point which has attracted a great deal of attention is a form of external specialization. This refers to terrorist groups reaching out to other groups to acquire resources that they may be unable to secure on their own. Desouza and Hensgen (2007, 594) argue that terror groups are limited by technical resources, reciprocity and reach, that is, there are times when they lack the means to undertake operations. In these instances terrorist groups often exchange ideas with reliable like-minded contacts, which are often other terrorist groups. This is portrayed as a form of coalition formation to ensure external support. Terrorist groups may assist other groups financially and even provide operational assistance occasionally. This may include intelligence, tactics and, in some instances, actual hands-on training or joint actions (Oots, 1989, 145). Desouza and Hensgen identify three different types of exchanges which might occur between groups: (1) they can be "physical" or a "tangible resource" such as training camps, money, resources; (2) "information" such as data (geography, enemy capabilities); or (3) "knowledge," know- how and expertise (Desouza and Hensgen, 2007, 598). They consider terrorist organizations to be similar to regular businesses arguing that terrorist groups cannot operate effectively in isolation, they must focus on their "core competencies" but strategically outsource to more "expert groups" as a matter of survival (Desouza and Hensgen, 2007, 599). Another characteristic that all of the groups seemed to share was their communication, collaboration, and in some cases cooperation with other like-minded 110 groups during their existence. This included exchanging information, financial resources and weapons, technical expertise and training. The PIRA has a special place in this discussion because to this day it is regarded as a trend setter for modern terrorism. It is credited with pioneering the idea of the car bomb, as well as the precursor to "suicide bombing" (Dingley, 2009, 15). Many of their weapons, tactics and strategies have become commonplace in contemporary international terrorism and we can observe knowledge transfer from Northern Ireland to other conflicts in states such as Columbia, the Middle East and the Basque region (Forest, 2009, 287). This is because the PIRA can be linked to many terrorist groups around the world, if not directly then one degree removed, which is why we see many of their tactics globally. The PIRA had connections with other groups all around the world, especially for weapons and training. At various times, it had relationships with EOKA from Greece, al- Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Coogan, 2000, 271; 432). As recently as 2001 three known members of the IRA were arrested in Columbia confirming long held suspicion that the PIRA and FARC had links (Moloney, 2007, 487). According to Tim Pat Coogan (2000, 435), the KGB, through Czech, Cuban and Arab terrorist intermediaries armed and trained the PIRA. Part of the PIRAs 1972 operational plan was to have Cubans "train their personnel in the tactics of terrorism and guerilla war." They also had a longstanding relationship with the Libyan government. Beginning in 1972, an agreement with the "anti-British regime" of Ghadafi saw small contingents of IRA members travelling to Libya to train and smuggle back weapons. This on and off relationship with the Libyans lasted until 1986 (Moloney, 2007, 306). Similar to the PIRA, FARC created an extensive network with various groups around the globe which allowed them to access a variety of technical training and advice. The Japanese Red Army and Hezbollah have been connected with FARC. Again, these groups are specialists in urban terrorist operations and well known for their "terror techniques and strategies" (Ortiz, 2002, 139). FARC also has longstanding ties, and has shared information and techniques with other terrorist groups including Eustakadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey (Farah, 2008c, 5). However, the most well established link for FARC was with the PIRA, where members have been coming to Columbia since at least 1997. This relationship became very public in Ill

2001 with the arrest of three Irishmen in Bogota who were confirmed to be "suspected" members of the PIRA explosives department (CDI, 2002). Documents seized from a confiscated computer in 2008 revealed FARC's renewed goal of growing the organization and reaching out to other groups for funds, combat support and know-how (Farah, 2008c, 3). The LTTE had longstanding connections, and traded, trained, exchanged information and tactics with many other terrorist organizations in South East Asia and particularly in India. The connection to India stemmed from the origins of the LTTE and the Tamil movements in general. It is rumored that in its early years the Tamils were trained, armed and given refuge by India (Aryasintha, 2001, 38). According to Joshi (1996, 21), Indian intelligence trained most of the Tamil groups to use as an extension of foreign policy in the early 1980s and the LTTE proved to be the most formidable right from the start. The LTTE was known to have links with Indian groups including the People's War Group (PWG), a left wing terrorist group, and the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), a separatist group. They also developed relationships with Sikh insurgents, Kashmiri mujahideen and over twenty Tamil Nadu separatist groups located in Indian Nadu province. Since 1997, the LTTE had attempted to deepen its ties with the PKK in Turkey (Aryasintha, 2001, 30; Van de Voorde, 2005, 192) Part of the IMU's legacy was that its leadership made a concerted effort to amass as much support as it possibly could. Toldir Yuldashev is famous for his elaborate "networking odyssey" around the world's Islamic states—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, and Iran requesting funding and sanctuary from governments as well as other groups (CDI, 2002). Information suggests he was well received by several Islamist organizations including Pakistani organizations Sepa-e Sahaba (Warriors of Muhammad), Harakat-ul Ansor (Party of Allies), Sepa-e Tabibi (Warriors of the Healer) and Hizb-ut Tahrxr (Ilkhamov, 2001, 46). The IMUs most famous and infamous connection was with the Taliban and al-Qaida. Cooperation between the two was so common that the IMU fought alongside these groups during the 2003 American led war in Afghanistan. Another group with close ties to al-Qaida was Jemaah Islamiya. Research indicates that this relationship goes very far back and may even pre-date the formal organizations now known as JI and al-Qaida. In 1985, Sungkar and Ba'asyir traveled to Saudi Arabia to 112 meet potential Saudi benefactors, including Abdullah Azzam, who might be enticed into providing much needed funds (Atal, 2003, 99; Conboy, 2006, 34). In later years JI began reaching out to guerilla groups in the Philippines like Philippine Moro Islamic Front (MILF) for its paramilitary training needs (Baker, 2005, 64; Conboy, 2006, 67). While previously JI had sent its members for training in Afghanistan, they realized that in the long-run a cheaper alternative was required because it was too expensive to keep sending members to Afghanistan. In February 1997, Sungkar allegedly travelled to Afghanistan and met with Osama bin Laden. This was very informal and did not result in a formal merger but an agreement that they "might join forces to sometimes work together." However, when Osama bin Laden issued the fatwa, Sungkar and JI did not sign (Conboy, 2006, 75-6). The Order started relationships with many like-minded groups and these relationships ultimately became somewhat symbiotic. The group was the first in the White Supremacy movement to have enough resources from fundraising that it began to distribute funds to other emerging like-minded groups. In exchange, The Order acquired access to information and expertise by tapping into experts in various fields (former army or law enforcement personnel) who could be found among other ideologically like-minded groups such as the CSA, and the Aryan Nations. Hezbollah also appears to be a group that enjoyed "giving back" and often approached smaller inferior groups to assist their development. In 2001, evidence emerged suggesting that Hezbollah had discussions with various Palestinian groups including Hamas about cooperation, coordination and perhaps a limited partnership (Harik, 2005, 186). It would later emerge that since the outbreak of the 2000 intifada, Hezbollah was providing guerilla training, bomb-building expertise, propaganda and tactical tips to Palestinian groups (Bynum, 2003, 59). Perhaps most surprising in terms of international connections is the RAF. The degree of cooperation between the RAF and some groups were so intense that one group, the PFLP, demanded the release of RAF prisoners during a 1977 hijacking (Montcourt, 2009, 482). Throughout its existence, the RAF reached out to many different groups around the world and engaged in a special partnership with the most radical factions of the Palestinian movements (Koenen, 2004, 33). Members travelled to Jordan and trained in a 113

PLO training camp (Varon, 2004, 65) and purchased weapons from Fatah representatives in Germany (Aust, 1985, 118). German and Palestinian guerillas collaborated in further building their networks and eventually would engage in joint actions (Varon, 2004, 70). These relationships also served a second purpose; they ensured access to protection. The RAF would make extensive use of various Arab countries as rear base areas throughout their existence, not only to train, but also to hide when Europe got too "hot" (Montcourt, 2009, 57). They also established safe areas in Italy and France (Montcourt, 2009, 50). One confiscated letter, written in code later revealed RAF leaders writing to North Korea identifying themselves and their goals and asking for military training (Aust, 1985, 183). While this type of communication and coordination has been observed among groups in the past, it has only more recently become a focal point for terrorist researchers. One argument suggests that this communication and cooperation among groups really represents the true idea of the network and that it is a tremendous advantage to build up a long list of allies (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, 440). Networked terrorist groups can access knowledge, information, financial reserves and materials that might otherwise be unavailable, and that having more connections minimizes the chances that resources will run out and maximizes potential. If we assume that being more lethal is a desirable goal, or that it makes a group "better" than groups who are connected with other groups have the potential to learn, evolve and implement new techniques and strategies which they would previously have been unable to access. Finding other groups and making more connections helps you become "better" at terrorism, and this is why forming relations with other groups is important. Recognizing that some terrorist organizations are using each other as sources of resources has come to the attention of both researchers and governments. Part of the strategy of disrupting groups is to prevent them from acquiring the resources necessary to facilitate acts of terrorism. In 2003, the US government acknowledged it recognized that "terrorist groups work together in funding, sharing intelligence, training, logistics, planning and executing attacks and that it requires a thorough examination and identification" (NSCT, 2003, 8). Further, they recognize that modern technology has enabled terrorists to plan and operate worldwide as never before. They consider that terrorist groups establishing links with other like-minded groups around the globe is creating a "force 114 multiplier effect" for terrorists (NSCT, 2003, 10). Terrorist researcher Martha Crenshaw is currently undertaking a project to map terrorist organizations and highlights the importance of knowing what groups were connected to other groups (Crenshaw, 2010, 5) as its starting point.

Concluding Remarks on Role of the Organization The terrorism literature clearly suggests that recruiting, fundraising, and the acquisition of know-how and expertise is crucial for a terrorist group committing terrorism. In this regard, we should expect terrorist groups to actively carry out these tasks in an effort to secure the resources necessary for them to carry out terrorist attacks. Evidence found among the case studies based on these markers will indicate whether terrorist groups follow this blueprint and would demonstrate the importance of the organization as a means to secure the necessary resources. The literature clearly argues that an absence of these resources limits the capabilities of the terrorist group, making terrorism increasingly difficult if not impossible. A terrorist group that wishes to actively commit or sustain terrorism needs these resources. Discussion among the groups highlights this reality. The RAF released communiques to this effect:

Resolving logistical problems assures the ongoing security of a revolutionary organization. We place great importance in the tactical requirements necessary to secure the continuity of the RAF...Without organizational continuity, without guaranteeing the organizational permanence of the revolutionary process, the revolutionary process is left to the anarchy of the system, to chance, to historical spontaneity. RAF communique 1972 (Montcourt, 2009, 158)

The PIRA during the 1980s also felt that every evolution or re-organization was done to strengthen the group in anticipation of "the long war" many in the movement felt was coming (English, 2003, 213; Neumann in Dingley, 2009, 39). 115

Element 3: Socialization This dissertation has identified four elements which the terrorism literature has described as playing a key role in terrorism. The four elements help to foster feelings of demonization which allows for an individual to contemplate terrorism. From the earlier discussion, demonization is portrayed as a state of mind which allows individuals to accept the commission of extreme violence, or terrorism, against others. It emphasizes the tremendous degree of hatred and animosity which must be present to overcome the morality or ethics which inhibits the majority of individuals' willingness or desire to kill others. Overcoming these constraints requires some form of conditioning, and being taught to be accepting of the ideas forming the basis for demonization. In the terrorism literature, this process is often termed socialization. This section examines what the literature says about this process. It looks at theories which touch upon how pre-existing conditions were once felt to play an important role in socialization and why this has become problematic more recently. It is important at this point to make a distinction between demonization and socialization. Demonization is an end point; an individual or group has reached a point where they are now capable of demonizing, despising or de-valuing another individual or group to the point that an act of terrorism can be committed. By contrast, socialization can be thought of as a process, where the end point may or may not be demonization. Its goal may be to reach that end point but does not guarantee it will.

Early Thoughts on Socialization Socialization is generally defined as "the process through which people are prepared to participate in social systems...From the perspectives of individuals, socialization is a process through which we create a social self and a sense of attachment to social systems through our participation in them and our interaction with them" (Johnson, 1995, 267; also see Arena and Arrigo, 2005, 495). Further, there are also aspects of cognition which are part of this process: socialization is "the general processes by which individuals come to know about and make sense of the world; how and why the mind chooses to frame things how it does" (Monroe & Kreidie, 1997, 23). Efforts to understand how socialization was linked to terrorism were traditionally based on more general sociological theories explaining violence. They attempted to 116 explain why groups or individuals were driven to commit terrorism and focused on ideas such as: The Frustration-Aggression Theory - the idea that every frustration leads to some form of aggression; The Relative Deprivation Theory - the idea that people compare what they have or don't have with real or imaginary others; The Narcissistic Rage Theory - an umbrella idea that things go wrong in child-rearing which causes long term problems; and The Moral Disengagement Theory - the idea that encompasses all the ways a person neutralizes or removes inhibitions about committing acts of horrific violence. The starting point for most of these theories begins in childhood and that children require guidance and explanation to learn to live within their social system. This led to investigations of how children might be socialized or conditioned not only by what they were told, but also by what they saw immediately around them in their environment. It remains generally well accepted in psychology that early life experiences, socialization or exposure to a particular environment might shape one's general worldview (Borum, 2004, 43) This argument was made for terrorism. It was suggested that teenagers living in "hotbeds of political strife may directly witness terrorist behaviors and seek to imitate them" (Victoroff, 2005, 18). But, it was also discovered that while socialization which occurs early on in life is very powerful, socialization continues throughout one's entire life. Post (2005, 616), in his aptly titled article When Hatred is Bred in the Bone, argues that research shows that while it has clearly been demonstrated that childhood experiences are important, the idea that "what is learned in childhood influences adult social roles" is now thought to be incomplete and acknowledges that socialization may occur later in life (Rosenthal et al., 2001, 634). This explanation made more sense for those studying terrorism. Randy Borum (2004, 39) highlights several studies (Ferracuti & Bruno, 1981; della Porta, 1992; Post et al., 2003) which have focused on older individuals who became terrorists after a period of incarceration and suggest that this experience profoundly affected them. Rosenthal compares this to the process of political socialization which occurs in early adulthood as "individuals increasing their involvement and interest in events of the political world" (Steckenrider & Cutler, 1989, 65). The combination of terrorism and family links has also been demonstrated to be a powerful socializing agent. Sprinzak and Post (2003, 172) through interviews with incarcerated terrorists found that family members that were politically active socialized 117 their sons to the movement at an early age. But of further interest is the fact that even those not active themselves, while not encouraging their sons to become active, did not dissuade them. Also, several reported that once they joined, their younger brothers followed them. For example most members of the IRA and then PIRA group could highlight an "impressive IRA pedigree" which was based on family, locality and tradition (English, 2003, 111; 129). This served as the source of the republican movement in the early years when republican involvement (IRA) tended to be an inherited rather than acquired activity. It was an organization kept going by family tradition and membership was passed from father to son (Moloney, 2007, 41; 80). Data revealed that in most cases where there were already existing family members present in a group, the newly joining member would inevitably drift towards the more extreme and more militant wing. These findings are also supported by Crenshaw (1986, 389) who found similar patterns among the left-wing groups in West Germany in the 1970s: many had relatives involved in the movement. One particularly interesting revelation which emerged examining Jemaah Islamiya is that the group appears actively to attempt to create a family socialization system. Analysis revealed an intricate network of arranged marriages between subordinates and leaders designed to create a "giant extended family" that kept the organization very much isolated and closed (Golburt, 2004, 2). Evidence has been uncovered suggesting that there have been more than 100 marriages involving JI leaders and members which have integrated families in Malaysia, Indonesia and to an extent southern Philippines (Ramakrishna, 2004, 23; Baker, 2005, 61). This practice has also evolved over the years and JI has expanded it to include other Islamic groups. A RAND report highlights that the center of the JI dynamic and the links forged with other Islamic groups during the Soviet-Afghan conflict have since been bolstered by marriages across group affiliations (RAND, 2006, 154). It is believed that these types of marriages benefit the group in several ways such as ensuring the group's jihadist ideology would be passed down to a new generation (Golburt, 2004, 3). It became common to bring siblings and relatives into JI activities, so much so that the reliability of a wife was often a criterion for formal JI membership (Golburt, 2004, 3). In a less direct correlation, violence may not be the only driving force, and the environment in which they live may condition them as well. This builds on ideas from the 1970s advanced by Gurr, who suggested the theory of relative deprivation. While initially 118 this idea was not implicitly tied to terrorism, its foundation, which suggests that "rebellions come to be when people cannot bear the misery of their lot" (Gurr, 1970, in Victoroff, 2005, 19) has always drawn the interest of terrorism scholars. The logic is based on ideas that in this era of globalization, increasing inequality (between countries as well as within them) may cause anger and contempt to rise. Another idea that has become popular in explaining the rise of terrorism is that of "oppression theory," which suggests there is a direct tie between the actions of individuals in relation to how they are perceived to be treated by others. This therefore takes into account others factors such as perceived acts of injustice committed against individuals, or a group that robs them of their identity, dignity, security and freedom (Victoroff, 2005, 20; Maiese, 2005, 2). Jessica Stern suggests: "terrorists are often individuals who feel deeply humiliated and confused about their future path, or are frustrated about the political climate in which they live" (2003, 41). Many of the members of the Order meet this description. Most of Mathews' followers were characterized as law abiding citizens who "almost casually slipped into the world of extremism," inflamed by Mathews' call to arms (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 6). He provided assurances and a way forward for "those afraid of the direction America was headed," specifically the decline of white America (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 191). While these theories may have something to contribute to ideas about socialization and how it helps to create the necessary conditions for demonization to emerge, they have shortcomings. While these general theories appear to have some explanatory power, they are unable to definitively explain violence or terrorism in all cases. For example, based on discussions by Victoroff (2005, 22), not everyone who is frustrated becomes aggressive, not everyone who is deprived becomes violent and not everyone who is raised in less than ideal circumstances is socially challenged. This problem was observed time and time again in the literature. How do we explain certain members of a community becoming aggressive or violent while others do not, when they have all faced challenges similar to the ones outlined above? How do we explain individuals who turn to violence or terrorism who may have not been subject to any of these conditions? This has created a conundrum for those who study terrorism: underlying or pre-existing social factors may play a role in facilitating the demonization process for some but something further appears to also be necessary. This section acknowledges the contribution that underlying factors may play but suggests 119 that something more is often required. It will examine how socialization prior to exposure to a terrorist group may lay the groundwork for making one susceptible to accepting violence but that other factors, specifically the socialization which occurs after one joins the group, plays the key role in "focusing" or "channeling" existing anger and frustration. This allows for the emergence of demonization, which is a necessary precursor for terrorism. It is entirely possible that the socialization theories described above may make certain individuals more prone to initially seek out others or groups which are more open to violence, but this is not enough to explain why it ultimately occurs.

Socialization: Beyond Pre-Existing Conditions Horgan & Taylor (2001) suggest that individuals rarely make a conscious decision to become a terrorist, but rather most involvement in terrorism results from a gradual exposure and socialization towards its acceptance. This dissertation therefore chooses to focus on the socialization, conditioning, indoctrination and education which occurs after the individual has joined a group. This often manifests itself in someone providing this education, teaching or conditioning and ties into how leadership and the organization might foster or make this more effective and efficient. The literature acknowledges that leadership often manipulates conditions to further the ideological position of the group. According to McCormick (2003, 491), "individual feelings of deprivation are subjectively derived and need have no basis in fact. An individual's point of reference may be his own past condition, an abstract idea, or the standards articulated by a leader." Further, from this perspective socialization can be investigated where pre-existing conditions may be present or are absent and overcomes the challenges of accounting for when the environmental factors mattered or did not. The importance of the socialization process is well documented among terror groups which operate hierarchically. It may take years for someone to join and climb the ranks of the group gradually being accepted to full time status (Hudson, 1999, 24). This is further evidence that it requires a long process that must unfold before demonization and a commitment to violence can occur (McCormick, 2003, 492) 120

The Link between Socialization and Group Dynamic Examining the terrorism literature on socialization revealed a tremendous amount of overlap on ideas related to socialization, and one of the other elements of interest: group dynamic and identity. This most readily appeared in the context of identity and how one might view him/herself as part of a group or collective. Re-visiting the discussion about socialization as it pertains to one's life experiences and environment, it is possible that being a part of a community may create a specific identity which makes an individual feel closer to a group. What arises is the groundwork for in-group and out-group. As one identifies more with a group with which he/she shares commonalities, an in-group is formed. One not only identifies with the group to which he/she belongs, but also in comparison, with those who are different. Growing up in an impoverished area or where the community might be in constant conflict with another community may solidify the group dynamic. Many terrorist groups are an extension of a particular community or constituency that lives in a certain environment or under certain conditions. These communities are at odds with an outgroup as part of their day-to-day lives. In Ireland, home of the PIRA, everything is divided. Catholics are the overwhelming majority in the Republic of Ireland but a minority in Northern Ireland. Minority status in Northern Ireland has been compounded by religious and economic subordination at the hands of the Protestant community (Dingley, 2001, 453). The population of Northern Ireland is approximately 55% Protestant and 45% Catholic, and both sides see the conflict differently. Schools, housing estates and even most sports became defined as either Catholic or Protestant oriented. This polarization is most evident in the media where each side has its own newspapers (Kingston, 1995, 204). In Columbia FARC is defined by one specific segment of society. The group grew from a small rural peasant organization into its current form and maintains its strength and numbers from Columbia's rural poor. This support continues due to the lack of perceived government response to their hardships and the economic inequalities that plague the countryside (Vargas, 1999). The origins of peasant discontent traces back to the tensions in Columbia between Conservatives and Liberals since the 1930s, when Conservatives took power and used political violence to retain their hold on power and assist the country's 121 oligarchs regain lands previously re-allotted by Liberal members. This led to a period between 1948 and 1958 known as La Violencia, which saw close to 300,000 Columbians killed and led to both sides arming themselves for protection. The roots of the LTTE can be traced back to the ongoing tensions between two main ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamils which both call Sri Lanka, previously Ceylon, home. The Sinhalese, who speak Sinhal and practice Buddhism represent the majority, approximately 70% of the population, while the Tamils, who speak Tamil and are mostly Hindu and Christian represent approximately 18% of the population (Van de Voorde, 2005, 183). According to Van de Voorde (2005, 183) "religious and ethnic divergences between the two groups have endured for centuries." These tensions were however kept in check for many decades due to British control of the territory, but emerged when the British granted independence in 1948. Following independence, the majority Sinhalese perceived that the island's educational system and bureaucracy were dominated by Tamils and thus began a policy of "reverse discrimination" to correct the inequality (Joshi, 1996, 20). As a result, tensions began to increase among the two communities and two competing visions emerged: a Sinhalese majority seeking to "retrieve its ethnic heritage and reassert their position as the majority which they felt had been undermined by four centuries of foreign occupation," and the Tamils, who felt vulnerable as an ethnic minority "looking to protect their community from domination and possibly assimilation" (Kearney, 1985, 902). It has been suggested that the post-independence political rivalry between the two groups "both sharpened the sense of identity with one's own community and reduced empathy and fellow-feeling between the members of different communities" (Kearney, 1985, 903). The Sri Lankan environment is a contributing factor. According to Kearney (1985, 898) "Sri Lanka is composed of clusters of solitary ethnic communities living in close proximity but remaining clearly differentiated by language, religion and a sense of unique historical experiences." Therefore the result is that since independence in 1948, ethnic tension between the two main groups has been escalating and the Tamil and Sinhalese communities came to be seen as "monolithic wholes," collectively viewed as "that other" community (Nadarajah et al, 2005, 92). making violence much easier to commit and more difficult to stop. Many argue that despite the LTTEs defeat in 2009, Tamils still feel they are treated as second class citizens by a large majority of the Sinhalese 122 population, especially military and police officials, suggesting the catalyst for terrorism remains (Strategic Comments, 2009; Senanayake, 2009). All those who experience the same environment have something in common. It is important to highlight that this environment may be manipulated or portrayed as more severe and in some cases artificially created by those seeking to socialize, where perhaps it is not found naturally. For example, religious schools, or madrassah, often serve two purposes: first they are used to indoctrinate and recruit but second they are used to re-affirm or bring a group closer together and forge the identity of "like-minded" people (Magouirk etal,2008, 11). 13). While it is important to highlight this potential overlap, this dissertation is choosing not to view these as two facets of the same element. There is a clear separation in the literature and they will therefore be treated as such and separate markers provided for measurement.

Defining Socialization In order to examine the presence of socialization as it occurs independent of pre­ existing conditions, we need to take some of the core observations in the literature and adapt them somewhat. For example, the socialization literature has emphasized how individuals are educated or conditioned to take on certain ideas, beliefs or values. Instead of examining this from a "pre-joining" the group position, we can identify examples of conscious and concerted efforts to educate, indoctrinate or condition those who are part of the terrorist group. In certain instances this may be seen as formal education in a school setting, similar to madrassahs or "home schooling" (even for adults). In other cases it may be less subtle, including the dissemination of a manual, manifesto or required reading which espouses either a general ideological position or a more specific group agenda or goal. Essentially socialization beyond conditions an individual may have been exposed to remains an important factor which needs to be studied. This research acknowledges pre­ existing socialization may play a role and will discuss it where applicable. However, because pre-existing factors are not applicable to all groups or all individuals in a group something more is required for analysis. 123

The terrorism literature suggests that once an individual comes to a terrorist group, a concerted effort is made to educate or indoctrinate him/her. Usually there is some form of training or education, as well as manuals and/or literature outlining goals, ideology and/or strategies. This form of socialization stands apart from the circumstances or pre­ existing conditions which may have brought the individual into contact with the group to begin with, and will be the focus of socialization moving forward. From discussions in the terrorism literature, this research becomes interested in the amount of time members of a group are spending together. Socialization will be much more efficient and effective if the group spends much of its time together. Examining traditional terrorist groups, we see examples of groups spending tremendous amounts of time with each other. This might be residing together in a training camp locale, such as FARC's forces living in training camps in the Columbian jungles. The camps were so isolated from outsiders that the territory where it is situated earned the nickname FARClandia (Farah, 2008d, 7). It might be a home or compound such as The Order, where multiple members stayed on Bob Mathews' farm (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 93). Or a group may be generally isolated in another manner, such as being forced to live underground, as evidenced by the RAF. As the group went underground, members were forced to break ties with everyone but those in the group. This would be instrumental in further isolating members and forcing an ever increasing reliance on those around them. This fact was not lost on one of the original founders, Ulrike Meinhof, who was initially hesitant to cut all ties and go underground. According to Aust (1985, 78-9), Meinhof ultimately capitulated but in the end the group's development "engendered a dynamic of its own from which she neither could nor wished to withdraw." In all of these cases the group members are spending a great deal, if not all, of their time together which would affect both socialization and the group dynamic. We also observe groups making concerted efforts to educate individual members. In some cases it is ad hoc or "matter of factly," such as The Order's request that all members read Christian Identity novels such as The Turner Diaries, The Road Back, and Essays of a Klansmen, in order to propagate general ideas (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 93). Conversely, we also observe many groups where intense ideological education occurs. In the past, part of FARC's training and education involved political instruction focusing on Marxist-Leninist teachings. According to Ortiz (2002, 130-1), Marxist ideology was 124 softened in the mid-1990s. However, as new leadership emerged in 2008, the Marxist ideology is being re-introduced. Leadership feels that the traditional ideology helps hold the group together and is looking to re-introduce strict ideological indoctrination and training to FARC's members (Dudley, 2003, 26). A typical day for an IMU member consisted of military training in subversive operations techniques in the morning, and education in the afternoon. Trainees were indoctrinated by showing them movies featuring the struggles of Islamic militants against the "unfaithful" of the world (Rotar, 2003) and reading the IMU's text The Lessons of Jihad, which has been part of "the parallel Islam community" existing in Central Asia for decades. It highlights the differences and similarities between Central Asian Islam and Middle Eastern Wahabiism (Horsman, 2005, 207) making a clear attempt to differentiate its Islamic ideology from those of its Middle Eastern counterparts. Ideological education is so important to the LTTE that it has arranged promotions based on its acceptance. Acceptance of the group's indoctrination affects how high a member will rise in the organization. The highest attainable level is commeasurate with the level of sacrifice and dedication: the suicide bomber. Among the LTTE's highest rank is to become a part of the elite commando unit known as the Black Tigers, trained specifically for suicide missions (Ramasubramanian, 2004, 9). All people in the Northern and Eastern Tamil-controlled provinces under the age of 15 undergo compulsory military training, but only the select few become members of the Black Tigers. Those "selected" undergo six months of training at a place called "Red Garden", which is deep in the Mullaitivu forest. This is based entirely on an individual's willingness to accept the ideology of the group. More recently, the terrorism literature has become very interested in the role that formal education may be playing. This has been identified as a possible cause of concern in places where religious education is common place such as Pakistan, especially as it pertains to Islamic education (for further discussion see Singer, 2001; Looney, 2003, Riaz, 2005; and Puri 2009). We can observe this by examining groups such as Hezbollah and Jemaah Islamiya. Hezbollah became very heavily invested in schooling and education because it considered the schooling in Lebanon to have become Westernized and a source of corruption. Its schools are designed to introduce its students to Islam and the Koran at an early age, in a bid "to start them on the right path" (Jaber, 1997, 165). This allows 125 indoctrination to occur at a young age and children, through Islamic religious studies which are obligatory in all the curricula of Hezbollah schools, are drilled in the merits of self- sacrifice. They are taught from an early age that paradise is their reward for death in battle (Jaber, 1997, 89). Education was quickly coupled with extra-curricular activities as well. Youth recruitment and cultivation was aided through the Imam al-Mahdi Scouts Party (Qassam, 2005, 61). Jemaah Islamiya also practiced this type of socialization. In the 1970s the future leaders established a religious boarding school in Central Java known as Al Mukmin Pondok Ngruki, which focused on teaching a Salafist interpretation of Islam. Time and time again, key JI operatives apprehended by authorities following terrorist attacks have turned out to be part of the "Ngruki network" (Baker, 2005, 60; Dahlby, 2005, 223). The curriculum at Al Mukmin emphasized math, history, art appreciation and language arts, English and Arabic and strenuous amounts of Koran and jihad (Dahlby, 2005, p. 229). The clerics took advantage of the strong personal loyalty that typically develops between teachers and students in Southeast Asia (Baker, 2005, 61). As the organization developed, newer approaches were also introduced. Singapore journalists who visited Al Mukmin in 2004 noted how "anti-western and anti-American sentiment was woven into the daily teachings and routines of students," and students were taught to believe that some countries "feared Islam's progress" (Ramakrishna, 2004, 26). The majority of JI's foot soldiers can mostly be identified as young men from pesantran or Islamic high schools inspired by religious teachers (Golburt, 2004, 3), who were then provided with further reading and training designed to "indoctrinate them into obedience" (Pavlova, 2006, 13). We can observe groups creating their own curriculum or ideological education process or system outside of formal schooling as well. Groups have been known to create their own manuals and literature that all members are required to read. For example, we see The General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama 'ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI), which is essentially the JI's manual or "manifesto." It is a 44 page booklet which contains a variety of content on a broad range of topics divided into various sections and sub-sections. Written in a combination of Bahas Indonesian and Arabic, "the text is steeped in religious terminology and afloat with doctrinal precepts (Pavlova, 2006, 5; Conboy, 2006, 64)." It describes the long term organizational stages that JI must undergo in order to reach its full institutional potential (Pavlova, 2006, 2). The manual suggests "the effort to develop 126 strength is a long process that includes building potential until [the organization] reaches the stage where this potential has become real, effective, and ready to be used in a show of strength and combat operations" (Pavlova, 2006, 12). The manual is intended as a reference manual for senior JI cadres and its content is geared towards providing religious, strategic and tactical directions to the top leaders and not the "rank and file". Lesser members did not have access to PUPJI but were instead given a standard reading list designed to further their knowledge on jihad and Islam. It included books by authors such as Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam and Faraj (Ramakrishna, 2004, 19). As a recruit, members of the PIRA received a similar manual to help them learn about the group (Bowyer-Bell, 2000, 98). Known as "the green book," the manual was designed to educate recruits about the movement's aims, as well as to provide technical and strategic data (Coogan, 2000, 544). It is best described as "a cross between a political manifesto and a training manual" (Moloney, 2007, 154). All PIRA recruits would be obliged to read and digest the book before being admitted as a full-fledged "volunteer." This process helped the movement control the recruits as well. The education of recruits played a big role in "the IRA's own educative process of indoctrination and the religiopolitical nature of the country combines so that the young IRA man knows only as much about his country and Republicanism as the IRA lets him know" (Coogan, 2003, 219).

Concluding Remarks on Socialization This section discussed ideas about socialization and identified efforts to incorporate more mainstream views on socialization into the terrorism literature. This focus was placed squarely on individuals' experiences in early life as potential indicators or contributing factors to their behaviour later in life. Terrorism studies accept these premises based on studies conducted in the field which re-affirm the link between family members and close friends who join terrorist groups. It identified that underlying factors may play a role but that something more is required. This dissertation made a conscious choice to move beyond early socialization and instead focus on the socialization which occurs after an individual joins a group. The terrorism literature supports this interpretation and 127 demonstrates concerted efforts made by groups to socialize, indoctrinate or educate members who join. We should therefore expect groups to pursue this activity.

Element 4: Group Dynamic and Identity Brubaker (2002, 163) highlights the importance of the "group" as a core concept for many disciplines in the social sciences including sociology, political science, anthropology and social psychology. Levine and Moreland (1998, 415) further suggest that "an understanding of groups is essential to almost every analysis of social behavior." These statements are applicable to those trying to understand terrorism. Understanding "group" issues has become an important part of terrorism studies because the majority of terrorist incidents are perpetrated by groups. The literature clearly supports this idea and identifies that the group dynamic may play a key role in understanding the inner workings of terrorist groups. Pynchum and Borum (1999, 343- 345; Borum, 2004, 49) discuss four elements which are important when researching the effects of group dynamics. These elements are selected because an individual's actions in similar circumstances demonstrate a markedly different outcome. They advocate focusing on: (a) Group Attitudes - individual attitudes tend to become more extreme in a group setting; (b) Group Decision-Making - groups make decisions differently from individuals; (c) Group Motivation - why and how a group will take action is different than an individual's reasoning; and (d) Reduced Accountability for Violence - the members of a group can more easily convince each other that action is required and this may help spread the guilt around. There is little question that terrorism can be considered a social activity, and many believe that links between individuals and the strength of their commitment to an ideology appear to grow stronger as they are together. Crenshaw (1986, 380) suggests that terrorism studies focusing on the individual may be incomplete because terrorism usually involves group activity, thus "patterns of small-group interaction will be a significant part of the explanation of terrorism activity." Sageman (2004, 69) explains that studies have shown that those who join a specific organization tend to share a common social background, and a common psychological make-up. In the previous discussion about socialization, the idea of a shared common bond emerging from being a member of a community or constituency was suggested. While an individual must share something in common with a group to 128 become affiliated in the first place, once this affiliation has occurred, any remaining differences between the individual and the group are subject to the unifying forces of group psychology This section will examine the idea of the group dynamic focusing on issues pertaining to groupthink, the in-group/out-group dichotomy, and how these phenomena emerge and are strengthened within a group. One further point which must be discussed is the idea of identity and how it relates to the group dynamic. The literature discusses a link between identity and the group dynamic exists which manifests itself in a process whereby the individual's identity becomes replaced by the groups. This change in identity helps alleviate personal responsibility and assists in moral disengagement which allows for demonization to occur.

Understanding "Group DynamicsGroupthink and the In-Group/Out-Group Dichotomy The notion of group polarization suggests that "members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members' pre-deliberation tendencies" (Sunstein, 2002, p. 176). Sifting through this complex definition and presenting it in layman terms, it suggests that a group of individuals who share a somewhat similar opinion on an issue, will ultimately move towards the position taken by those most extreme in the group. In order to understand how this concept may play a pivotal role in influencing a group, it is important to identify the underlying mechanisms thought to be at work in this scenario. First, there is a social aspect: "people want to be perceived favorably by other group members...once they hear what others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of the dominant position." Second is the idea that a group will represent a limited argument pool: since there are numerous members (if not all) pre-disposed to an existing opinion, there are less (if any) dissenting opinions or arguments to consider, thus strengthening the resolve of the existing opinion (Sunstein, 2002, 179). This idea appears to have merit and can be used to explain why some groups which begin as politically active do not cross the line to violence. Their engagement in the political arena (debates, public protests, etc) allows their argument pool to remain somewhat open thus not allowing the group to move to the extreme of the spectrum where 129 violence becomes acceptable. Examining these two points, those who study terrorism generally agree that groups gradually move towards violent acts. They do not spring up overnight as fully developed terrorist organizations but rather adopt increasingly violent principles and tactics as the group itself develops (Long, 1990, 24). In the case of groups that eventually turn to terrorism, a shift to the most extreme position and becoming increasingly isolated and cut-off from dissenting positions takes time to unfold. One of the main underlying explanations for this phenomenon is the idea of "groupthink." Pynchum and Borum (1999, 34) suggest that in an effort to reach agreement and a strong need for group consensus, a group's ability to make the most appropriate decision is over-ridden. Thus, the idea of group polarization as it applies to terrorism can be summed as follows: "social fragmentation is likely to result when like-minded people, insulated from others, move in extreme directions simply because of limited argument pools" (Sunstein, 2002, 186). The terrorist group displays all the characteristics of groupthink. According to Janis (1972) these characteristics are: illusions of invulnerability leading to excessive optimism and excessive risk-taking; presumptions of the group's morality; one dimensional perceptions of the enemy as evil; and intolerance of challenges by a group member to shared key beliefs. Simply, terrorist groups represent a unique example of like-minded individuals who are usually drawn to an extreme interpretation of an issue. From here all of the necessary ingredients are present, allowing the group to become increasingly susceptible to groupthink and a limited decision-making process. A second phenomenon, one which may be affected by groupthink, involves a heightened sense of what is termed groupism. Groupism is defined as "the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogenous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts and fundamental units of social analysis" (Brubaker, 2002, 164). Some such as Druckman (1994, 44) subscribe to the idea that belonging to a group, in the manner described by Brubaker above, is actually felt to be a basic human need. Anthropological studies suggest it would have been a pre-requisite because it would fulfill economic, socio-cultural, a sense of belonging and security needs, thus creating a very strong sense of attachment (Guetzkow, 1957, 47). Although this seems logical and harmless in itself, research also suggests that much like individuals, esteem is an important factor for groups. Groups need to see themselves in a 130 positive light, and that "they need to believe that they are different from, and better than, other groups" (Pynchum & Borum, 1999, 345; Sunstein, 2002, 181). The problem which arises is that this inadvertently leads to a phenomenon whereby a group tends to see its attributes and actions as superior, which can only have meaning compared to other groups. In believing that your group is superior, the group to which you are comparing yourself automatically becomes inferior. In the words of Druckman (1994, 48): "not only are they part of a good group, but it is better than another group." This leads to a phenomenon known as in-groupism/out-groupism which in certain circumstances deteriorates into an "us versus them" mentality, and which consequently may lead to demonization. This is most readily evident in religious terrorism where the world as divided into "us" versus "them", and can be seen as a division between those who follow a certain religion versus those who do not (Monroe & Kreidie, 1997, 34). This is where ideas about groupthink and in-group and out-group become highly applicable to terrorism. At its most extreme, the ideas of in- group out-group continuously feed into itself and reinforces over and over again: "The world is divided into two camps—enemies and friends—you are with us or against us mentality." Groups polarize with an idealization of the in-group while simultaneously externalizing the source of all problems to the out-group. It is a type of feedback loop: the closer one feels to one group, the sense of the brotherhood and harmony serves to strengthen the in-group. But the more one identifies with one group, the further they move from recognizing the merits of other groups (Post, 1987, 29). Again, this idea fits with what we understand to be the language of terrorist ideology: absolutism. It is rhetoric of "us versus them", good versus evil, with an idealization of "us" and a projection onto "them" of all that is wrong (Baeyer-Katte, in Post, 1987, p. 28). Things are black and white with no shades of grey and no room for ambiguity. In-groupism/out-groupism and groupthink unquestionably affect a group's perception of the outside world, external events and the actions of others (Pynchum & Borum, 1999, 345). It also serves as a means of creating cohesiveness among the group and may lead to the creation of the sense of "we" which will no doubt affect the individual's identity. This suggests that an intersection of identity and group dynamics is a very important condition for terrorism. According to Crenshaw (1986, 395): "The individual's path to becoming an active terrorist is often through groups...Belonging to the 131 group can be critical to the integration of some personalities; the collective identity becomes the individual's identity." This is echoed by Post (2005, 460), who argues that a "fusion" of individual identity and group identity occurs in all groups, such that "the success of the group is seen as a success of the individual."

Identity Psychologists have long recognized the fundamental importance that identity has for individuals. According to Crenshaw (1986 in Borum, 2004, 25), "the successful development of a personal identity is essential to the integrity and continuity of the personality." Briefly, identity can be defined as: "parts of the self, composed of meanings that persons attach to the multiple roles that typically play in highly differentiated contemporary society" (Stryker & Burke, 2000, p. 284). This suggests that, in the usual course, all people have to reconcile multiple identities (for example, an individual may be male, a father, a son, a brother, their occupation, their religion, etc.). What commonly accompanies this is the ability for an individual with these multiple identities to "switch" from one identity to another as circumstances might dictate. Various works conducted by Stryker & Serpe (1982, 1994) recognize that individuals have numerous identities which comprise the self. However, they also point out that these identities are not just thrown together. Instead they are "hierarchally ordered" into a structured system that engenders aspects of salience and priority. Some individuals have trouble with this identity construct and might be at an increased risk to have one identity, such as an ideology or religion come to define all that they are (Miller, 2006, 126). The critical period of identity formation is considered to be young adulthood (Miller, 2006, 127), and this is supported by those who have long contended that at least on the surface, candidates for terrorism were often young people lacking esteem, belonging and searching for an identity (Victoroff, 2005, 22). Further, the role of parenting appears to be very critical in identity formation, especially during this period. When these children grow into adults and have identity issues, researchers have determined that this may have arisen due to two circumstances. One, the negative identity hypothesis suggests that for a variety of reasons, a person may develop a vindictive and covert rejection of the roles and statuses laid out for them by their family, friends and community (Erikson, in Crenshaw, 132

1986, 393). Conversely, a second theory suggests that the lack of identity may be a result of over-controlling parents, which stifles autonomy and leads to an identity crisis later in life (Victoroff, 2005, 23). It is entirely reasonable to assume that this may cause tension, potentially resulting in "cognitive dissonance." According to Miller (2006, 132) "in psychology, the theory of cognitive dissonance states that when confronted with information that disconfirms your beliefs or devalues your actions, the first impulse is to dig and cling even more desperately to the crumbling belief structure." This may lead an individual to attach him or herself to one identity, which in itself may further exacerbate confusion and anxiety. Monroe & Kreidie (1997, 26) stress the intense difficulty which arises with abrupt shifts in personal identity and the psychological cost it can inflict.

Identity and the Group Dynamic Early studies on terrorist groups showed there were different reasons why people were inclined to join a terrorist group. Although somewhat discredited now, it was initially felt that many individuals joined for tangible reasons such as needing food, shelter, a job or a structured environment (Galanter and Forest, 2005; McCauley & Segal, in Pynchum & Borum, 1999, 349). During the 1960s and 1970s there was a period where it was felt individuals joined for more idealistic reasons and specifically for "a cause" and in an effort to make a difference. Another prominent theory revolved around the idea of the "breaking point." People joined organizations in search of support after they had suffered some sort of personal trauma which caused a "de-stabilization of current life-style" and "some sort of distress" (Driscoll, in Downs, 2006, 2-25). Simply, some sought out a group to fill the "family" role which may be absent for any variety of reasons (Crenshaw, 1986, 395). The attempts to study terrorism from the micro level: focusing on the individual and their reasons for doing what they did was a popular analytical method at this time. It will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter but has more recently been discarded due to measurement problems. Some features of terrorist groups such as the pressures of conformity and consensus are characteristic of all small groups, it provides a sense of belonging which becomes a very powerful motivator (Hudson, 1999,. 34) 133

Early research on terrorism focusing on identity looked into why individuals might join terrorist groups. It was hypothesized that individuals who suffered from a lack of identity or crisis of identity sought out the comfort of a group. This would help foster a sense of belonging or family, in some cases where an individual may have never felt this (Borum, 2004, 26). This makes it possible for the individual to define his or her identity simply through group membership. The individual identity merges with a group identity and takes away a sense of individuality. "Membership in a terrorist group provides a sense of identity or belonging for those personalities whose underlying sense of identity is flawed." For these individuals "belonging to the terrorist organization becomes the most important component of their psychological identity (Post, in Borum, 2004, 25). Those who feel overwhelmed by the complexity of the world may choose to avoid "the struggle to define oneself or discern personal meaning and choose to define themselves simply through group membership or identification with a cause" (Taylor and Louis, in Borum 2010, 4). The gained identity as a group member may substitute for an individual's personal identity, which may improve their self-esteem (Pynchum & Borum, 1999, 349; Druckman, 1994, 49). Victoroff (2005, 30) describes a process where "the collective subsumes the individual." Acceptance and affiliation may be the most important reasons an individual seeks to join the group. Individuals may join for various reasons which remain difficult to document, yet some believe that individuals will join after they have tried other forms of political involvement (Victoroff, 2005). Linking the issue of identity to the group environment reveals some interesting findings. Druckman (1994, 49-50) stresses the importance of "group" to an individual's identity. "Membership in a clan, religious group or ethnic group becomes part of the individual's self identity and critical to a sense of self worth." He however stresses that this association may also become unhealthy: "the self may become threatened by information that calls into question the groups to which one belongs." Both Gupta (2004, 6) and Post et al (2003, 176) highlight how this might occur by focusing on the importance of the link between the identity of an individual and that of the group. "As an individual succumbs to the organization, there is no room for individual ideas, individual identity and individual decision-making." Ultimately there is a fusion or melding of an individual's self image to that of the organizations (Post, 2005, 629). Monroe & Kreidie (1997, 34) have specifically 134 identified fundamentalism and extremism as meeting this description. They found "fundamentalism provides a powerful sense of group membership and identity. This identity is one in which individuals have strong collective awareness of themselves as part of a distinct social entity and perceive themselves as group members—not individuals— who share a common identity. In this instance, identity supersedes choice. According to Sprinzak (in Hudson, 1999, 35), as radicalization deepens, the collective group identity takes over much of the individual identity of the members. This has led some to argue that terrorist groups act with a collective rationality. A terrorist group is not considered to be a collection of different views but rather a unitary actor, able to act as a single mind (McCormick, 2003, 482). It appears that while an individual must share something in common with a group to become affiliated in the first place, once this affiliation has occurred, any remaining differences between the individual and the group are subject to the unifying forces of group psychology. What occurs is that individuals tend to submerge their own identities into the group resulting in a kind of group mind or group moral code that requires unquestioned obedience to the group (Post, in Hudson, 1999, p. 36). Applying these ideas more specifically to terrorism shows how identity and group dynamic intersect and how this paves the way for terrorism to occur because it facilitates demonization. This process may also be "helped along" by the terrorist group itself. The literature highlights how groups consciously make efforts to portray the sacrifice a group member makes for the group as a means of forwarding a "group identity." The celebration of martyrs is a common means of accomplishing this goal. The RAF moved to dismiss notions of individuality as attacks by the group were carried out by "commandos" representing fallen members and comrades (Varon, 2004, 210). The "May Offensive," a series of bombing attacks were carried out by the Petra Schelm Commando, the Thomas Weissbecker Commando, the Manfred Grashof Commando and the July 15th Commando (Montcourt, 2009, 163-65). This practice continued even in subsequent generations. In April 25th 1975 RAF's "Holger Meins Commando" seized the West German embassy in Stockholm Sweden and demanded the release of RAF prisoners as well as others (Montcourt, 2009, 332). In fact this dynamic became so entrenched, that the RAF eventually lost sight of individuality. All actions claimed by the various RAF commandos 135 were seen as the work of one single, unified organization for which all members bore collective responsibility (Montcourt, 2009, 336). This was the position taken by the group even at trial (Montcourt, 2009, 351) The PIRA also ensured a culture of struggle was taught, so that martyrdom and sacrifice became a large part of what was expected of members. This idea was based upon the 1916 Easter uprising. An IRA member named Patrick Pearse created an ideology of martyrdom in the Republican movement justifying violence as an act of patriotism and self immolation: "Life springs from death and from the graves of patriot men and women spring living nations" (Alonso, 2001, 132). This idea was somewhat re-invented with prison hunger strikes and the martyrdom of Bobby Sands who died protesting British treatment of PIRA prisoners. LTTE individuals were indoctrinated to make sure they would meet the needs and satisfy the interests of the LTTE. This was done to ensure that decisions would not be challenged, it encouraged self-discipline and precluded critical and independent thinking (Van de Voorde, 2005, 189). They also went to great lengths to legitimize the idea of martyrs and martyrdom for the Tamil cause. Part of their success in creating this group identity stems from the fact that many higher-ups or "leaders" have demonstrated a willingness to die for the cause themselves and have created a culture in which they practice what they preach (Roberts, 2005, 498). In essence the idea that a group member is a group member is a group member regardless of station. An example of this can be found in the first suicide bomber Charles Anthony who carried out an attack in 1983. In his memory, a Charles Anthony Brigade was created and tasked with important attacks. He was also a very close friend of Prabhakaran who named his son after his friend (Roberts, 2005, 495). It resulted in the founding of an annual celebration of the martyrs. Established in 1989, the LTTE declared every July 5th would be the day of the Black Tigers which serves to emphasize the role of the martyrs and this prestigious unit. It also pays homage to those who have fallen and their families. The identities of the Black Tigers are only revealed after their death and LTTE radio broadcasts the operational deeds of the suicide bombers. Parents and family are also honored (Ramasubramanian, 2004, 11; Roberts, 2005, 497). In 1995 the LTTE further entrenched these ideas by establishing the "Office of Great Heroes" which is responsible for upkeep at the Tamil cemeteries and memorial sites 136 designed to show the respect and importance of the dead. LTTE burials are also very ceremonial and symbolic. According to Peter Chalk, who has observed the LTTE "the LTTE plants their dead and does not bury them. An LTTE martyr never dies; rather his body is planted as seed to be re-born. Elaborate celebrations honoring the dead are meant to draw energy from the seeds as a regenerative act so they can carry on the struggle" (Chalk in Roberts, 2005, 500) Although it did not use the tool of martyrdom to foster a group identity, The Order employed another common tool to accomplish the de-individualization of its members: symbolism and ritual. Bob Mathews preceded meetings with rituals and symbols and initiation ceremonies for joining members. These rituals involved pledging loyalty to the group and swearing allegiance and loyalty on the life of an available white child in the middle of a circle of members (Flynn and Gerhardt, 1989, 97-8). The oath included a commitment: "I, as an Aryan warrior, swear myself to complete secrecy to the Order and total loyalty to my comrades...We hereby invoke the blood covenant and declare that we are in a full state of war and will not lay down our weapons." The group also ordered a form of medallions or "dog-tags" for all their members which included the group's shield and scroll logo and motto (Glynn & Gerhardt, 1989, 309). This was to serve as a symbol that they were part of a group.

Understanding "Identity," the Group Dynamic and Terrorism This early research uncovered the link between the intersection of an individual's identity and the groups identity. Now, "research on the social psychology of terrorism suggests that once individuals join a terrorist group individual differences disappear in the face of the powerful unifying forces of group and organizational psychology" (Post, 1987, 25). Part of this is based on the nature of terrorism itself. Identity becomes more rigid once a line is crossed and action occurs: "Joining a terrorist group makes members dependent upon the group for emotional support. The move from outside to inside the terrorist group means a profound alteration in lifestyle. The member, especially when he has committed a crime is more dependent than ever as the group literally becomes a protection against danger. When the group's existence is threatened, it increases group cohesion (Post, 1987, 28). This fact leads some to argue that retaliating against terrorists 137 may actually be counterproductive because it reaffirms the threat therefore strengthening the in-group, and heightens tensions which may lead to an increase in terrorism (Post, 1987, 33). Terrorists share a strong group dependency and the bond is further solidified over time by the hazards and liabilities of a clandestine existence. As the group distances itself from the mainstream the importance of group solidarity grows (See Crenshaw, 1985, 1992 and 2000 for further discussion). As terrorists go underground, group decision making really becomes an increasingly closed, rigid and inward looking process (McCormick, 2003, 486). Researchers have spent considerable time investigating the role of imprisonment or incarceration on groups. There is a general agreement that "periods of incarceration often facilitate experiences of injustice, abuse and humiliation." The PIRA exemplifies this point very well. The PIRAs group dynamic was strengthened when members were incarcerated or interned over the years (English, 2003,.113), because it helped identify a commonality—the fact that they had all suffered at the hands of the British. Joining the group at a young age and subsequently experiencing imprisonment which involved co-existing in extreme conditions is complemented by an increasing dependence on the group...very few "new ideas" and less opportunity for independent decision-making (Alonso, 2009, 75). Former members recall the group even in prison controlled the debate and one said they were like a "totalitarian organization trying to actively repress debate (Alonso, 2007, 75; 89). Those in charge in jail read and monitored letters going in and out (Alonso, 2007, 134). In this case incarceration plays an interesting dual role on influencing identity and the group dynamic. First, it can reinforce or creates cohesion among the group, strengthening the in-group, and simultaneously it can heighten perceptions of humiliation and helplessness helping to solidify the enemy or outgroup as well (Ferracuti and Bruno, 1981; Delia Porta, 1992; Post et al, in Borum, 2004, 39). This can be directly tied to a consolidation of identity in the group or organized membership that provided the most valued element of personal identity. Research determined that one of the main fears of individuals from groups who were interviewed was a fear that they would be asked to leave the group or would be "abandoned by the group" (Post, 1987, 27). Again the terrorism literature provides many examples of how the threat of being banished or disavowed was employed by various groups. In some case it 138 was a very purposeful and obvious threat such as the in the case of the RAF. Andreas Baader is known to have taken full advantage of others' desire to belong. He ensured compliance by threatening expulsion from the group. For him questioning was defined as disloyalty and a risk of losing one's spot in the group and being "forced to return to the isolation and alienation out there" (Strum, in Post, 1987, 27). In other cases the threat was more subtle. For members of the PIRA it was a well accepted fact that loyalty to the group was paramount. It made leaving the group impossible and disagreeing with the group potentially dangerous. Stories revealed by dissenters suggest that those who spoke out or failed to follow orders "often faced extreme marginalization and even potential threats to their life" (Alonso, 2009, 90). "People who spoke their mind would have been ostracized and things would just start going bad for them" (Alonso, 2009, 126). One final motivation for remaining a loyal member of a group might be a danger from others if one leaves the group. It becomes very difficult to leave or risk expulsion from a group when there are potential ramifications not only from the group itself but from outsiders as well. If we examine community or constituency groups, the initial motivation for joining may be based on protection from an outgroup. In many cases groups face hostilities from members of other groups. Examples include the PIRA versus several protestant groups such as the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Tamils and the Sinhalese population and FARC and paramilitary forces loyal to elite land owners. In these cases leaving the group or being forced to leave the group may place an individual at great personal risk. One of the reasons the LTTE could not de- escalate their terrorist campaign was that the leader Prabhakaran had made too many enemies and if he had tried to enter normal life would probably have be killed (Ganguly, 2004,915).

Concluding Remarks on Group Dynamic and Identity This section discussed ideas about the group dynamic and also linked it to identity. The literature clearly discusses several key aspects of the group dynamic including ideas related to groupism. Groupism highlights the narrowing of opinions and belief among a group which spends considerable amounts of time together and how isolation from others facilitates this process. Other ideas were also introduced including ideas of the diffusion of 139 responsibility, the replacement of an individuals' identity with one centered on the group and the in-group/out-group dichotomy. One of the important points on this dichotomy was the realization that the identification one might feel with a certain group creates a powerful side-effect—it reinforces differences with other groups. We would expect to observe the emergence of a group identity as terrorist groups spend increasing amounts of time together and become isolated from others outside the group.

Terrorism According to the Literature

The preceding pages in this chapter have spent considerable time reviewing and analyzing the traditional and contemporary terrorism literature in order to identify what the literature suggests are the important contributing factors to terrorism. This section will summarize the findings and create a snapshot of terrorism during the modern and contemporary eras which will provide the basis for comparison with the newer cases of terrorism representing "domestic homegrown" terrorism. First, it will discuss all of the individual elements together and assemble an overall portrait of terrorism. Second it will identify several markers that will be the focal point for comparison. In the newer cases each element as described in the current terrorism literature will be examined to see if the markers identified are present or absent. For example: the terrorism literature clearly suggests that terrorist groups have a readily identifiable leader who wields more influence over the group than any other member. Each new case study will be measured by this criterion: either they will or they will not. The markers may also be examined by assessing their similarity or differences. For example the terrorism literature identifies certain organizational functions that need to be met including securing financial resources. Each new case study will be measured by this criterion: yes they secure funding and either yes it is similar to what has been suggested in the terrorism literature or it is different.

Leadership

The literature agrees upon a fairly standard interpretation of what the roles of the leader are and how a leader's fulfillment of these roles can contribute to the success of the terrorist group. Moving beyond the literature review and the theoretical conversation, an 140 investigation of case studies indicates the presence of most of the characteristics and in this case confirmed that the more abstract and theoretical discussions in the literature can indeed be observed in leadership. To reiterate, the traditional terrorism literature identifies the following leadership characteristics which are a part of the leadership role in facilitating terrorism. Leadership was determined to exist when an individual demonstrated more authority or influence over other members of the group and a uni-directional delegation of tasks and/or responsibilities could be observed. This was often portrayed as a reflection of charisma and predominantly manifests itself in the articulation of goals, perhaps setting the parameters of an ideology and more general decision-making. This individual is also most often the public face or spokesperson of the group who might have externalized or communicated goals and the group's vision. This might be political statements, manifestos or communiques airing grievances or attacking a specific out-group. This individual also plays a prominent role in teaching, indoctrinating, guiding or educating other members of the group. Most importantly the role of leadership is to keep the group together and focused on the task at hand. They are often responsible for ensuring the group remains active and survives any potential crises or challenges which might threaten the group.

Markers: Defining the Role of Leadership The contemporary terrorism literature identifies several important leadership roles, tasks and responsibilities. These will serve as the basis for markers which will be searched for in the case studies which represent "traditional homegrown" terrorism. First, I examine whether the presence of a leader (or leaders) can reasonably be demonstrated: Is there an individual (individuals) who clearly has more influence or authority than other members? Does delegation of responsibilities or tasks diffuse uni- directionally from one centerpoint? Can they be observed articulating goals, making decisions and setting the parameters of an ideology, vision or purpose? Second, I examine whether a spokesman can be demonstrated to exist. Does an individual (individuals) represent the group, have they externalized or communicated the goals or vision of the group? Have they produced some form of manifesto or communique airing their grievances, or directly attacking others? 141

Third, 1 examine whether an individual (individuals) plays a central role in teaching, indoctrinating, educating or training other members? Do we observe someone providing guidance, socializing or other tools necessary to commit terrorism? Fourth, is there an individual (individuals) observed who plays a role in keeping the group or membership together and focused? Have there been any crises or challenges which threatened the organization or group which were solved by this individual? These four markers provide the basis for measurement on the leadership element and will be used to assess whether or not leadership exists in a similar fashion in these newer case studies.

Role of the Organization More recently the terrorism literature has taken an about face on the importance of structure as the defining factor of terrorist organizations, instead examining the functionality of groups. This dissertation embraces this more recent understanding of terrorist organizations and is less interested in how they are structured but chooses to focus on how they organize themselves to accomplish the tasks required to ensure they can be successful in their objectives. Generally, it has been suggested that in order for a terrorist organization to be successful, it must successfully "organize itself' (Oberschall, 2004, 28). This not only requires activities such as communication among its members and the ability to make decisions but also requires more basic elements such as recruitment, fundraising and training to support its activities. These functions present a picture of the terrorist organization as no different from any other organization: its main goal is to survive and continue to pursue its goals. Its success in accomplishing these tasks means the group has the ability to conduct terrorism. The literature focuses on the acquisition of resources as ensuring continuity and the group's survival. Without people it cannot continue, without financial or material resources it cannot carry out attacks, without know-how and expertise the group cannot adapt, evolve or become sophisticated. According to the terrorism literature a significant shortcoming in any of these areas results in the death of the group. Examples from terrorist groups in the literature demonstrate that every group actively 142 sought to accomplish these tasks and described their terrorist actions as campaigns, long wars, or ongoing with the group needing the resources to ensure they could keep going. Based on the terrorism literature, we would expect to see terrorist groups which continuously and purposefully recruit new members, have established a method to raise funds to support themselves and their cause, and have established connections and mutual cooperation with several other groups. Further, we would expect that these tasks are compartmentalized, that is, specific members or bureaucracy exists to meet these demands.

Markers: Defining the Role of the Organization It becomes clear that discussing the organization or group from a structural perspective has recently become problematic and subjective. Instead, this dissertation will key on markers associated with how the organization, from a functional perspective, contributes to allowing terrorism to occur. Further, the literature highlighted that in order for terrorist groups to survive and carry out attacks resources are required. It identified several different types of resources which a terrorist group needs in order to be successful including human resources—people, financial resources—money, and what are termed technical resources—know-how and expertise. Therefore, in order to set markers for how the organization contributes to terrorism, this dissertation will focus on the tasks which are performed to acquire these resources. First, I inquire about how the group acquires its human resources focusing specifically on recruiting. Does the group recruit continuously, consistently seeking to add or replenish its membership? Can a sustained a purposeful recruiting strategy be observed? Second, I inquire where the groups acquire financial resources, in an effort to identify how the group fundraises. Does the group raise funds from individuals, a local community or internationally through a diaspora? Does it receive funding from other terrorist groups? What role does crime play in this equation? Third, I inquire about where it acquires know-how and expertise. How many cooperative contacts does the group have with other groups? What is the extent of these collaborations? Is it ad hoc or continuous, is it purely tactical information or are material goods involved as well? 143

Fourth, I inquire about the efficiency of the group in carrying out these activities. Can we observe a degree of specialization where certain members carry out specific roles?

Socialization The terrorism literature has undergone an evolution in regards to this element as well. Initially socialization was thought to be a process through which an individual progressed and which then set the stage for their movement into a terrorist group. It focused on pre-existing factors as the key to understanding how an individual might become susceptible to violence, rage or aggression against others. The literature has however attempted to move away from this characterization because it is difficult if not impossible to argue that certain pre-existing factors affected one individual but similar factors did not affect another. The literature still focuses on socialization: the means by which an individual might be educated, indoctrinated or convinced to pursue certain actions but has to move beyond pre-existing factors into more tangible observations. Socialization from this perspective, requires that we search for evidence of a socialization which is designed to change an individual's moral constraints, which allows for what Bandura (1990) describes as "a process which allows for mechanisms which regulate individual behavior to be selectively disengaged and reconstructed." This permits individuals to set aside the restraints they may have had towards killing others and allows for demonization to set in. Regardless of how an individual comes to join a group and despite their previous personal experiences some form of socialization is required to begin a conditioning or teaching about the group, its objectives and aims. The portrait which emerges from the terrorism literature is one where groups make a conscious effort to continue the socialization of their members in some shape or form. In some cases it is casual reading emphasizing general ideas and in other cases it is full blown ideological indoctrination. The literature also acknowledges that groups are socialized by spending tremendous amounts of time together, in essence feeding off of one another.

Markers: Defining Socialization Although it has shortcomings we do need to accept the role that being a member of a specific community group or constituency plays. Individuals who become members 144 might do so because they have been subject to a certain socializing factor. However due to the problems with macro and micro approaches to terrorism we need to account for other methods of socialization. This dissertation has chosen to focus on socialization activities which might occur following an individual's joining of the group which helps continue a socialization process towards a certain outcome. First, I am particularly interested in how much time individuals are spending together and in what capacity. Second, I am examining what, if any, efforts are made to educate or ideologically indoctrinate individuals. I am also interested in the commitment to planning and execution of education or ideological socialization as well.

Group Dynamic The terrorism literature clearly identifies the importance of the group dynamic specifically as it relates to the creation of a group identity because it facilitates demonization which paves the way for terrorism to occur. First, a group identity allows for a diffusion of responsibility where people will feel less guilt in the presence of a group. There can also be efforts made to displace the responsibility, whereby people can behave in ways they might not normally if they feel a "legitimate authority accepts responsibility for the effects of their conduct" (Bandura, 2004, 130). Second a group "deindividualizes" the individual which affects inhibitions and restraints (somewhat like peer pressure). Third, the creation of a group identity increases the in-group/out-group dichotomy because it promotes the "positive" attributes of one's group while emphasizing the "negative" attributes of other groups (Borum, 2004, 49-50). The terrorism literature suggests that when an individual joins a group a concerted effort must be made to amalgamate them into the ingroup. It is designed to bring together all of these separate individuals into one focused group, a transformation of many separate pieces from potentially multiple sources with multiple motivations into one group. In terms of the group dynamic, it should be viewed as the relationships and interactions between individuals in a specific group setting. In order to satisfy the presence of a group dynamic and identity shift, there must be an active attempt to foster this 145 dynamic. It must move beyond the minimum criterion of simply being consistently surrounded by the same group of people.

Markers: Defining Identity and the Group Dynamic Acknowledging that the group dynamic "deindividualizes" individuals, and in replacing the individual's identity with that of the group facilitates demonization we must find examples within groups which assist this process. These include issues surrounding how and where the group came together as well as the specific activities designed to foster camaraderie. This would bring insiders closer together while limiting exposure to outsiders. The literature emphasizes that the group dynamic is affected by the shared excitement and clandestine nature of terrorist related activities. For the purposes of this dissertation this contribution is accepted as a given influence and I will instead focus on more tangible markers First, I investigate the circumstances which led to individuals becoming members of the group. Do these individuals have anything in common? Do they all come from one place? Is there a common meeting place where the majority of members came from? Do they share a common bond, likes/dislikes, or interests prior to becoming involved with the group? How much time might they have spent together prior to joining? Second, I will investigate efforts to create a group identity. Do they have a name? Was it given to them or did they create it?

Omission of Alternative Explanations for Terrorism: Mental Defect and Root Causes This dissertation examines the elements which contribute to terrorism from a mid- level approach. This level of analysis was chosen because micro level analysis, focusing on the individual, and macro level analysis, focusing on environmental factors are problematic. The following section will briefly highlight the real problems with analyzing terrorism from the micro and macro level. Micro level analysis focusing on individual personality traits, psychology and psychiatry was thoroughly examined beginning in the 1970s and discredited in the late 1980s. New research focused on individual terrorists in the 2000s has confirmed that this approach yields no significant trends. Conversely, macro 146 level analysis is a relatively new field, but to date has returned contradictory evidence and remains speculative at this point.

Microlevel Studying terrorism from the micro level focused on the individual terrorist. In the 1970s and 1980s this focused on gauging the mental stability of those who committed terrorism. Due to the nature of terrorism it was hypothesized that those involved would demonstrate some evidence of mental defect or psychopathy. Following years and years of study based on numerous terrorist profiles, it was demonstrated that aside from a very small proportion, most of the terrorists were "normal." There was no red flag, nothing identifiably different about them from the majority of the population. This led to a consensus in the field that it was not possible to explain terrorism as a product of an individual sickness or mental deficiency. According to Crenshaw, "the idea of terrorism as the product of mental disorder or psychopathy has been discredited (Crenshaw, 1992 in Borum, 2004, 30). When trying to explain terrorism as a product of individual mental disorder failed, researchers expanded their investigations to examine other traits, essentially searching for a terrorist personality. This led to efforts to uncover a profile of the terrorist which might be . used to predict who might be a risk to become one. Once again however this approach demonstrated that individual terrorists had no consistent profile and there were no over­ arching similarities between them. Russell and Miller created a terrorist profile in 1977 based on interviews with over 350 terrorists (in Borum, 2004, 37). Only a few short years later, the profile had changed and was inaccurate. More recently, researchers have resurrected this approach to study suicide bombers hoping to uncover a profile to identify and pre-empt this type of terrorism. Three volumes (Bloom, 2005; Pedahzur, 2005; Pape, 2006) examining the phenomenon of suicide bombing all concluded that no discernable profile exists. The absence of a terrorist profile, which was accepted as proven in the late 1990s (McCormick, 2003, 491), has been re-confirmed more recently. At this point avenues of inquiry focusing on the level of the individual have not provided an explanation for 147 terrorism. Terrorists for the most part appear to be normal and do not appear to share any common trait or experience from one to another.

Macrolevel In more recent years, there has been an increased effort to broaden explanations for terrorism to the macro level of analysis. What emerged was a set of explanations which are lumped together as "root causes." The basic concept of the root causes of terrorism argument is that certain conditions provide a social environment and widespread grievances that when combined with certain precipitant factors result in the emergence of terrorist organizations and terrorist acts. It suggests that there is some form of causal relationship between underlying social, economic, political and demographic conditions and terrorist activity. These conditions and grievances try to explain how, where and why terrorism occurs (Newman, 2006, 749). Root causes might include issues pertaining to poverty, social inequality, exclusion, dispossession and political grievances. While these issues can be assessed at the level of the individual they have most often been applied at the societal level in an effort to make broad generalizations. This would then expand to include issues such as political openness, opportunity and freedoms. Rohan Gunaratna (2002, 34) advocates this link and suggests that "in conditions of poor governance, rampant corruption and human rights abuses, terrorism flourishes." These types of explanation fit squarely into the developing field of globalization studies which emerged in the mid 1990s. Tied to terrorism, some hypothesize that these issues are directly related to globalization, especially inequalities and impossible expectations. Terrorism is suggested to be a result of anger and frustration which occurs when people's expectations are not or cannot be met thereby creating a perception of injustice (Nasser, 2004). This is an easy explanation for terrorism however it can only be substantiated on a very superficial level. For example, looking at the increasing levels of terrorism which have been occurring in the Middle East over the past twenty years, it is easy to suggest that high levels of unemployment, the lack of access to higher education and an increasingly young population has left terrorism as the only source of employment or that increased idle time leaves individuals more time to get in trouble. Further, this is then linked to the fact that the majority of the countries in the region are un-democratic: 148 individuals have no political mechanism by which they can express their grievances. This sets the stage for groups and leaders to manipulate the sense of exclusion, humiliation and repression to attract individuals. According to O'Neill (2002, 11; See also Newman, 2006, 769) "terrorist leaders seek support from people who feel humiliated, threatened, aggrieved and without help," and certain countries have an endless supply of individuals who meet this profile. Although this appears to be a plausible claim, there are several shortcomings with the root causes argument which cannot be overlooked. First, claiming that social disadvantages cause terrorism cannot be supported. For example, extensive research on Palestinian terrorists has revealed that they are usually highly educated and have a high standard of living. Both of these points run contrary to root causes arguments (Newman, 2006, 752). Goodwin (2006, 2034) argues that while initial evidence seemed to support the plausibility of root causes explanation, as more data was collected it became more difficult to substantiate the initial findings. A second problem with root cause arguments is that there is no direct cause and effect. The vast majority of people who suffer from root cause grievances do not become terrorists, root causes never give the whole picture (Newman, 2006, 756). If there were direct links between poverty, literacy, unemployment or the lack of opportunity for education, than terrorism would arguably be more widespread. For example, if poverty was an explanatory factor contributing to terrorism then there would be a greater number of terrorists since it is not a small sample of people within certain countries who are poor, it is often entire nations. Further while the countries often associated with terrorism are often poorer, have high rates of unemployment and lack basic services, especially compared to Western standards, there are countries which are often far worse in these categories which are not characterized as hotbeds of terrorism. 149

CHAPTER FIVE Understanding and Defining Domestic Homegrown Terrorism

CASE STUDY 1: MADRID 2004 - M-ll The March 11th 2004 Madrid terrorist attack (M-l 1) represents the first high profile terrorist attack to occur following September 11th, and I argue it is also the first significant incident of domestic homegrown terrorism. It is important to recognize that some officials in Spain remain convinced that the attack had links to al-Qaida or the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM). However after analyzing the information, it appears that evidence of a link is exaggerated or circumstantial and can be dismissed as such. Part of the reason some of these doubts linger is that Spanish authorities continue to maintain that they cannot piece together the entire picture because seven of the main contributors blew themselves up to avoid capture when surrounded by police (BBC News, 2005; Hinds and Evans, 2006; Spiegel, 2007; Williams, 2008). Because of the allegations that the M-ll attack was linked to al-Qaida in addition to providing the details of the attack, this introductory section will provide a very brief discussion of the history of Islamist sympathizers in Spain and their link to terrorist attacks committed outside of Spain. This will demonstrate why some remain convinced that M-ll was an al-Qaida plot but more importantly it will provide the basis for why this dissertation disagrees with this claim. The goal is to highlight the fact that in a round-about way there is a link to Islamist sympathizers which were at one point associated with al-Qaida and the GICM but that claims of collusion, cooperation or coordination between these groups and those responsible for M-l 1 cannot be substantiated. This case study was constructed through researching open sources in the media and on the internet as well as accessing several primary sources. Government reports and inquiries into the events of M-l 1, were translated from Spanish to English by University of Calgary Masters student Juliette Gonzalez. These reports were supplemented by watching several hours of the government inquiries on Spanish television recorded and translated by CSPAN. One point that became very clear early on in the research process was the politicized nature of the inquiries into the attacks. Part of the legacy of M-ll was its apparent influence on the Spanish electorate since in a national election four days after the attacks, the ruling party was defeated and replaced. There have been accusations made that 150 the incumbent party purposely manipulated information about the attacks to seem as if they were conducted by the Basque nationalist separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). Government, according to the opposition groups attempted to sensationalize and scare voters claiming first ETA was responsible for the attack, then it was al-Qaida, and finally it was ETA perhaps working with al-Qaida (Aviles, 2004; Segell, 2005, 223). Hinds and Evans (2006) suggest that ETA was an obvious scapegoat because it was always considered the main domestic threat and officials had already heightened security measures in the lead- up to the elections due to fears ETA would try to disrupt them. Because al-Qaida had operational cells in Spain at one point, many felt that this was reason enough to suspect the group. Further, the release of two documents in December 2003 on the Islamist message board Global Islamic Media also made al-Qaida a suspect. The two documents were titled Jihadi Iraq—Hopes and Risks, and another shorter brief simply called Message to the Spanish People. The first was addressed to militant Islamists around the world and recommended "painful strikes" against Spanish forces. The second called for the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Iraq and threatened to attack Spanish interests outside Iraq (Lia and Heghammer, 2004, 355; 357). On the surface this appears to make a compelling case that the Madrid attacks could have been ordered or endorsed by foreign jihadis but the reality is that neither of these messages called for direct attacks in Spain. The first message specified that the Spanish forces in Iraq should be militant's primary targets and the second suggested attacks against Spanish interests abroad. There was never a specific warning about an attack in Spain nor any appeal for such an attack to be attempted. Following the attack an unidentified individual claiming he was an al-Qaida in Europe spokesman also appeared on a video. Authorities were not convinced of the tapes authenticity (Segell, 2005, 226). Because a majority of the bombers would later be identified as having Moroccan descent, it became widely assumed that it must have been a group attached to the GICM. The GICM had conducted the Casablanca bombings in 2003 and was felt to have connections to Islamists in Spain (Haahr-Escolano, 2005). While this link does exist, the theory that M-ll was a GICM operation can be dismissed for two reasons. First, one of Madrid bombers did approach the GICM for human resources to conduct an attack but was flat out refused due to internal difficulties and turmoil within the Moroccan group 151

(GlobalSecurity, 2005; Segell, 2005, 26; Williams, 2008). Second, the GICM was in no position to offer assistance. Following the Casablanca attack the group's membership was targeted by Moroccan officials who executed four leaders and gave thirty-nine others long term sentences (CDI, 2004).

The Attack On March 11th 2004, four days before the Spanish general election ten backpack bombs left in train cars simultaneously detonated killing 192 people and injuring another 1500. The attack targeted Spain's busiest commuter rail line, southeast of downtown Madrid which carries 250, 000 of the one million commuters each day. The explosions occurred along a five mile stretch of track just outside of Atocha Station, Madrid's oldest and largest station which was an intermediate stop for all the bombed trains (Lia and Hegghammer, 2004, 355; Segell, 2005, 222; Rodriguez, 2005; Hinds and Evans, 2006; Rose and Murphy, 2007, 186). In total four trains were attacked using a total of 13 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed in backpacks and detonated using the internal alarms of mobile phones. Each backpack contained approximately 22 lbs of explosives which the terrorists had placed on the trains. The terrorists then disembarked before the trains departed the stations (Lieberman and Bucht, 2009, 191). Three of the bombs failed to detonate which provided the police with evidence to track down members of the group (Jordan and Manas, 2008, 32). Because the bomb assembly used cell phone alarms to trigger the detonators investigators could trace the SIM cards in the phones back to one of the plotters (Kenney, 2008, 112; Kenney, 2010, 220). In addition to the three unexploded IEDs, authorities also located an abandoned van parked in Atocha station containing three additional bombs designed to go off after rescue workers arrived. These were successfully deactivated and provided additional forensic evidence also used to identify the attackers (Segell, 2005, 222; Hinds and Evans, 2006). Within two days authorities had detained the first suspects and by three weeks knew the identity of most of the group (Lieberman and Bucht, 2009, 190). This led them to an apartment in Leganes, a suburb of Madrid where they surrounded seven members hiding in an apartment. Instead of giving up, the group blew themselves up killing a policeman in the process (Rodriguez, 2005; Hinds and Evans, 2006). Killed in the blast were what would 152 later be determined to be many of the core members of the group including Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet (The Tunisian) suspected of being leader of the group; Jamal Ahmidan, a Moroccan also suspected of being a leader; Allekema Lamari, an Algerian described as "the emir"; Mohammed Oulad Akcha and Rachid Oulad Akcha, and Abdennabi Kounjaa (Lieberman and Bucht, 2009, 192). Authorities located the apartment one day after an unsuccessful attempt to bomb the Madrid-Seville high speed train (WWICS, 2009) suggesting the M-l 1 attacks were supposed to be the start of a bombing campaign and not an isolated incident (Kenney, 2008, 121; Kenney, 2010, 924). Investigation into the M-ll attacks later revealed that the attacks had actually not gone according to plan and were also an evolution of several earlier versions planned by the bombers. Authorities believe that the ten backpack bombs located on four commuter trains were to detonate simultaneously in the Altocha train station to maximize damage and casualties but the trains were late that day. An explosion inside Altocha would have brought down the station killing and injuring many more people (Segell, 2005, 222; Lieberman and Bucht, 2009, 190). Second, it is believed that the initial plan was to blow up the rail tracks to cause massive derailment, but that the group was afraid they would be noticed tampering with the tracks (Hinds and Evans, 2006). Another version of the attack had the bombers targeting the Madrid metro but this was abandoned when the group realized it would have had to be a suicide attack due to security measures in place (Hinds and Evans, 2006). When the investigation into the bombing was completed, Spanish police estimated the M-ll attacks cost approximately 50-70000 Euros, although others estimate a longer campaign would have been more in the range of 100 000 Euros (Alonso, 2007, 209); Jordan and Manas, 2008, 30). It was determined that most of the members of the group were legal residents of Spain and had lived there for many years although none had been born there. Several Spanish citizens were however implicated for supplying the explosives stolen from a mineral mine in Northern Spain (Rodriguez, 2005; Jordan and Manas, 2008, 30). In total, authorities arrested 70 people linked directly to the attack and an additional 42 individuals linked to Islamic terrorism more generally (C-Span, 2004a). This dissertation will focus on what is felt to be the core members of the group: this group constituted of Jamal Ahmidan, Jamal Zougam, Serhane ben Abdelmajid, Rabei Osman 153

Ahmed, Amer Azizi Allekama Lamari and to a lesser degree Mohammed and Rachid Oulad Akcha and Mohamed Chaoui. The investigation into the M-l 1 attacks revealed some very interesting observations. It appears that the group was actually several smaller groups which came together (See figure 5). FIGURE 5 The Madrid Group: Three Separate Social Groups

Amer Azizi Group Dabas Brothers Group Yousef Belhadj Group

(A Q. Amer Azizi Serhane Fakhet 3 Jamal Zougam u© Jamal Ahmidan o loose contact to; | Mohamad Chaoui Abdenabi Koujma *3 Allekema Lamari | Said Berrak o cn Mohamad Oulad Akcha Rabei Osman Ahmad Rachid Oulad Akcha Arish Rifaat

In this sense if you examine all of the people arrested, some are non Muslim Spaniards and others were common delinquents and petty criminals. Many of the individuals connected to the plot were not even jihadists (Jordan and Manas, 2008, 18). A more troubling revelation is that the M-ll attack unfolded very quickly from discussion to planning to action. The catalyst for the attack appears to be the December 10th 2003 posting of the document Jihadi Iraq about how to defeat the US occupation in Iraq (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 46). A very brief snapshot of the timeline suggests that once the decision was made to commit the attack in December 2003 information on how to make bombs and cell phone detonators was downloaded, drugs were exchanged for explosives, mobile phones were purchased and a house was rented to start making bombs leading to the attack approximately three months later (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 46; Kenney, 2008, 122). Atran (2005) describes the Madrid attack as the template for rapid terrorism. He describes rapid terrorism is: "a self organized group of friends, like the would be Madrid bomber plotters who read an internet text like "Iraqi Jihad" that suggests bombing Spanish trains to force that country's withdrawal from the US led coalition in Iraq. Chatting with like minded jihadists on the web the group of friends metamorphoses into a jihadist cell- and in a few weeks an amateur plot is hatched and executed." 154

Much like the events following 9/11, Spanish authorities revealed that were aware of, and even monitored some of the members of the group. This allowed them to identify and locate the group so quickly after the attack (Alonso, 2007, 209). This is not surprising because evidence emerged during the Commission investigation which concluded that since the late 1990s, foreign radical Islamists had been using Spain for jihadist activities in support of al-Qaeda's terrorist operations, predominantly to recruit suicide bombers for operations in Iraq, Bosnia and elsewhere (Haahr-Escolano, 2005).

A History of Islamists in Spain: A Link? Prior to the M-l 1 attacks, Spanish authorities were aware of the presence of Islamist groups operating in Spain. As for why this was not a concern for intelligence agencies and authorities, an analysis of the history of Islamists in Spain demonstrates a slow and gradual escalation of activity. To the credit of Spanish authorities, these groups were disrupted and dismantled following 9/11. The starting point for Islamist terrorist activity in Spain is 1995 when a bomb exploded in a restaurant just outside Madrid killing 18 and injuring over 100 (Jordan, 2003). Origins of an Islamist presence in Spain however occurs much earlier and is attributed to the 1986 arrival of Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas aka Abu Dahdah, a member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. While little is known about his activities between 1986 and 1995, it is alleged that he set up an al-Qaida cell in Spain in 1995 known as the Abu Dahdah cell. Since the late 1990s the al-Qaida network in Spain had been involved in different terrorist activities which were mainly oriented towards other countries and was regarded as a "valuable base for logistical and infrastructure support." The cell engaged in the indoctrination and radicalization of other individuals as well as the financing of other terrorist cells in countries around the world and the recruiting of mujahideen in order to send them to conflict spots such as Bosnia and Afghanistan (Jordan, 2003; Alonso, 2007, 203; Reinares, 2007). Alongside al-Qaida, many other Islamist groups also arrived in Spain in the late 1990s. Across the water in Algeria, members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) transferred parts of their infrastructure. Like al-Qaida these groups used Spain as a jumping-off point: activity occurred in Spain but the 155 activities were designed to impact or affect other countries—like Algeria and not Spain (Jordan, 2003). Following 9/11 the Abu Dahdah network was disrupted by Spanish police. Prior to the dismantling of the group an individual named Amer Azizi is thought to have joined the cell (Jordan, 2006). Amer Azizi was part of the M-l 1 group and this led some to speculate that the 2004 Madrid group was actually a new incarnation of the former Abu Dahdah cell with Jamal Ahmidan, Jamal Zougam and Serhane ben Abdelmajid joining the former Abu Dahdah members Amer Azizi and another individual linked to the Abu Dahdah cell named Rabei Osman Ahmed (CBC, 2004). However, it remains unproven whether Azizi and Ahmed were legitimate members of the Abu Dahdah cell. In addition authorities investigated and dismissed any role for Ahmed in the M-l 1 attacks. In Spain between 2001 and 2006, people who were arrested and suspected of being involved in Jihadist terrorism activities were from North Africa. Many were from Algeria and Morocco and had immigrated to Spain (Reinares, 2007). Around 2003 authorities began hearing discussions about the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM). Very little is known about the GICM primarily because it was dismantled immediately following their only terrorist attack: the Casablanca bombing in 2003. However, Reinares (2007) suggested that it was affiliated with al-Qaida and that some members of GICM were members of al-Qaida and vice-versa. This is part of the leap some have made trying to tie M-ll to al-Qaida: some of the M-l 1 bombers may have had ties to GICM which may have had ties to al-Qaida. Others however refute this idea and maintain that the individuals who helped plan, fund and carry out the M-l 1 attack constituted an ad hoc jihadist group and not a particular terrorist organization. Many were homegrown radicals acting on their own rather than being directed by al-Qaida, the Moroccan group or any other (Rose and Murphy, 2007, 186)

Role of the Organization There have been many questions surrounding the group which carried out the M-l 1 attacks. First, seven members thought to be crucial to the planning and execution of the bombing killed themselves to avoid being captured by authorities. Second the number of people tied to the group is very big although analysis reveals it was a much smaller core 156 which conducted the attacks. Rodriguez (2005) set out to identify and differentiate the core members from those who had loose ties or peripheral association. He conducted a network analysis, tying together links that each member had to other members identified by authorities. He concluded that if one examined all of the individuals mentioned in police and intelligence reports a large network of approximately 70 people who may have played some minor role emerges. However it also demonstrates a much smaller core of 13 people who actually played a role in the attack. Further, the circumstances in which the group came together are very interesting. It appears that the M-ll group was an ad hoc group composed of several sub groups of individuals all with a similar goal of carrying out a terrorist attack. Some were religious extremists but others were criminals and drug dealers (Johnson, 2005; Jordan and Manas, 2008, 29). One man, an individual named Seeman Gaby Eid connected the core group with a cluster of Spanish citizens who provided the explosives, thus bringing even more people into the group who were not necessarily religiously motivated (Rodriguez, 2005). The network analysis reveals that the M-ll group was formed when three separate social groups converged. It reveals that one group was associated with two brothers Mohannad and Moutaz Almallah Dabas, the second was a group tied to Amer Azizi and a third was a group tied to an individual named Yousef Belhadj (Jordan and Manas, 2008, 25). Each one of these social groups consisted of friends and relatives. The sum total of all of the people linked through these social groups totaled seventy-five people. Even more interesting is the fact that none of these individuals were main leaders, plotters or organizers of the attack which ultimately took place. Instead it appears that following the convergence of the three social groups, newer players emerged to lead the actual attack. These individuals: Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, Jamal Ahmidan, and Allekema Lamari will be discussed in further detail in the section on leadership. There are also problems suggesting these three individuals were leaders because the core group itself did not appear to have any observable hierarchy or compartmentalization. There was no specialization or designation of tasks to certain members. Rather each person contributed what they could when it needed to be done. For example Ahmidan knew how to smuggle and exchange drugs so it made sense for him to do it on behalf of the group. Another member owned a 157 cell phone store and therefore had access to some of the devices the group would need and provided the phones and SIM cards. The group also did not expand and there is no evidence to suggest the group was actively recruiting new members at any time. Serhane was known to enjoy playing soccer with youths in the community and is alleged to have invited some of them back to his house for tea and to discuss the suffering of Arab Muslims in places like Palestine and occasionally show videos or play sermons (Kenney, 2008, 61). There is, however, no indication that any of the members, especially those in the core group, were introduced later in the timeline or through an alternative entry point other than the friendship and social ties of the three initial subgroups. The attack was funded internally by the group which did not seek or receive any donations or fundraising from external groups. In order to raise the necessary resources, the group relied on petty crime and drug trafficking and to a lesser degree on the personal donations of its own members (Williams, 2008; Jordan and Manas, 2008, 22; 30). Most of the money for the day-to-day operations of the group was generated through narcotics trafficking. Jamal Ahmidan was a petty criminal and drug smuggler with ties to criminal elements in both Spain and Morocco which allowed him to raise large amounts of financial resources very quickly. It is alleged that Ahmidan also traded hashish and ecstasy for the explosives and detonators used in the attack (Jordan, 2006; Alonso, 2007, 209; Kenney, 2010,919). The group was also very inexperienced and lacked sophistication. Officials suggest that the M-ll group gathered information from news reports and government websites, and that some members of the group tracked the investigation by consulting online news agencies (Kenney, 2008, 38). Computers seized by authorities after the attack found manuals and tactical documents taken from the internet (Jordan and Manas, 2008, 29) and the group reportedly downloaded an instructional manual from the Global Islamic Media website that authorities believe they used to plan and carry out their attacks. The manual "Preparations Chain for the Struggle" (Cadena de preparativos para la lucha) contains suggestions for placing bombs inside hand bags or something similar and how to communicate by cell phones without attracting law enforcement surveillance (Kenney, 2008, 39). The fact that the group used "ready-made explosives" also suggests a lack of 158 knowledge and experience. The group acquired more than 100 kilograms of Goma-2 Eco dynamite from a mine in Northwest Spain meaning all they would have to do was attach detonators (Kenney, 2008, 48). The reality is that none of the group had any real operational training or experience. The most experienced would have been Lamari who had been a previous member of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) but his tasks during this time were mostly logistical and not operational or "hands on" (Jordan and Manas, 2008, 32). Lamari had enough knowledge to know never to use cell phones because he knew from experience that they were easily traced BUT never shared this information with other members of the group. In fact Spanish authorities did not identify Lamari as being involved in the plot until nearly four months after the attack (Kenney, 2008, 90). Authorities speculate that only three individuals might have had any credible skills to construct the bombs. Lamari, another member of the group named Sayed Ahmed who was a former Egyptian army officer or Emilio Suarez Trashorras, the former miner who supplied the explosives to the group (Kenney, 2008, 86). None of the members of the group had ever attended any terrorist training camps (Jordan, 2006). It is also unclear whether the group actually conducted a trial run. Several of the bombers were observed riding around on the metro before the attacks but it was unclear if they were training or just riding the metro (Kenney, 2008, 57). Because the plot unfolded very quickly, the group did not need to evolve or adapt. However, officials are convinced that M-ll was not supposed to have been a "one-off' attack. The bombings that day constituted the beginning of a campaign that was going to continue weeks afterward and only ended because authorities managed to track down the seven main players which ended in their suicide (Alonso, 2007, 204). Police found information in the apartment about future attacks planned by the group and identified other "soft targets" including two Jewish recreational centers and a British school. On April 2nd 2004 an explosive device was found at the railway line in the province of Toledo near Madrid that was aimed at derailing the Seville-Madrid high speed train (Alonso, 2007, 205- 6). 159

Analysis: Role of the Organization This research indicates that the M-ll attacks were conducted by a group of approximately thirteen individuals although network analysis reveals that there was a wider web of acquaintances from various different social networks that could be connected to the group. Examining the thirteen member group in isolation there is no evidence of any recruitment. This applies to the group after it was formed: at no time did they actively seek out new members or set in motion any form of recruitment strategy or process. This includes the fact that once the core group was set, no additional individuals joined even from the pre-existing social groups that the thirteen had initially come from. The lack of additional recruitment is interesting in this case because reports indicate the group had plans for at least one additional attack in the weeks following the M-l 1 attack. Perhaps the group assumed they would avoid capture and be able to conduct an additional attack. It is also plausible that if the group was seeking continuity to conduct additional attacks, they might have used the M-ll as capital or credibility to attract and recruit new members at a later date. This however does not explain why they did not actively recruit from the pre­ existing social groups which would have likely had at least some individuals which might have been recruiting targets. Essentially it is clear they were not actively recruiting at any time, but unclear why this might be the case if they were seeking to conduct a campaign. Financially, the group secured the necessary funding through traditional crime. While the crime was exchanging narcotics for supplies, in this instance this is crime because the exchanges were all carried out through criminal channels previously established by a member prior to his involvement in the terrorist plot. Jamal Ahmidan prior to his ideological and religious conversion was a criminal and drug trafficker and his use of the drug trafficking to secure money for the terrorist attacks was simply an extension of pre-existing criminal enterprises. In this case the distinction is made from terrorist groups which begin to use narcotics as a means of securing financial resources and the criminal who becomes a terrorist yet continues to use his criminal connections to further the group. The fact that the group used narcotics as the primary source of revenue allowed them to very quickly raise the money they would need. In some cases the narcotics were sold for money and in other cases bartered for materials. The explosive materials were acquired in exchange for hashish, ecstasy and the vehicle in which they were delivered. One advantage 160 with the drug trade is that large amounts of money can be raised very quickly and it is fair to argue that because the group had existing access to drugs and the connections to traffic them quickly it was capable of arranging another cash infusion for future attacks if necessary. Despite one member acquiring the financial resources and explosive materials for the attack, the M-l 1 attack does not appear to have compartmentalized or demonstrated any observable specialization. As tasks needed to be accomplished, members simply contributed what they could when they needed to. One member owned a cellular phone store and therefore it made sense for him to supply phones and SIM cards. One member had connections to drugs therefore it made sense for him to traffic them. Because the group only conducted one attack there is no additional information available suggesting that these roles would change or responsibilities would be formally delegated if and when the group moved forward with additional attacks The dissection of the M-l 1 case study has raised serious doubts about the attack as an operation conducted by al-Qaida or the GICM as some have claimed. Evidence previously discussed indicates that although the group did attempt to contact the GICM, requests for assistance whether tangible or advice was rebuffed. There is no other evidence which shows the group made attempts to contact any additional groups. This can be supported by revelations that the group executed an attack which was outlined in an internet manual, they were self sufficient financially and did not need to manufacture their explosives. It is unclear once again whether or not efforts might have been made to contact groups although no efforts were made in the three weeks in between M-l 1 and the group's suicide. Summarizing the M-ll group's organization it appears that they were self sufficient, self financed and self contained. Reports indicate that the group had contemplated additional attacks but there appears to be no evidence to support a concerted effort for continuity or the establishment of a permanent group. The fact that the group ended prevents any further evidence from inclusion but it is entirely possible that the group may have sought permanence and continuity but nevertheless made no efforts to carry out the tasks the terrorism literature, discussed in chapter four, suggests are important to set the foundations for a sustained group or campaign. 161

Role of Leadership An analysis of the Madrid bombers fails to identify one leader who had a disproportionate amount of influence over other members of the group. However, most of the reports identify the important roles played by three of the bombers: Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, known as "the Tunisian," Allekema Lamari, felt to be among other things the spiritual/ideological leader and Jamal Ahmidan (BBCNews, 2005). Authorities believe that it was the relationship between Serhane and Ahmidan that was the driving force behind turning talk and rhetoric provided by Lamari into action (Williams, 2008). Williams goes on to say the coming together of Ahmidan and Serhane was what allowed it to happen because "Serhane brought to the relationship an infectious zealotry and a commitment to violence but needed Ahmidans organization and resources. Similarly Ahmidan without being egged on by Serhane would have remained focused on drug business." This section will look at these three individuals more closely.

Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet i(the Tunisian" After several false starts authorities finally settled on the opinion that Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet was the leader and coordinator of the M-l 1 attacks. Fakhet had arrived in Spain in 1994 and found work as a real estate agent. In 1996 Fakhet returned to University and pursued a PhD in Economics (Rodriguez, 2005; Williams, 2008). According to former classmates when Fakhet initiated his studies in 1996 he was "gracious and engaging" and not particularly religious. Many however acknowledge that over the next few years he became increasingly "withdrawn and incommunicative," but can offer no detailed explanation of why this happened except rumors that Fakhet had been subjected to some kind of personal tragedy (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 31-2). At this point he began to spend more time at mosques and engaged in discussions about Islam and the misery of the world. According to Court documents Fakhet became increasingly radical as the Iraq war started and would spend considerable amounts of time on Islamic websites looking for ideas on terrorist attacks. His web searches included an interest in the Bali and Casablanca terrorist attacks (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 39) In addition to his academic pursuits, Fakhet had also worked for several years as a translator and assistant accountant at one of Spain's largest mosques. Individuals have 162 indicated that as Fakhet became increasingly radical he also became disillusioned with the environment at the mosque and started to question the Imams. This coincided with Fakhet's growing closeness with others involved with the group including Amer Azizi (Kenney, 2008, 73). Eventually Fakhet left the mosque and began meeting with other members of the group in a more private setting where they were free to discuss their views away from the public eye. Fakhet had previously written several letters to the Spanish newspaper ABC but his correspondence was not on behalf of the group (Alonso, 2007, 206). Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet was one of the seven members that died in the apartment explosion.

Jamal Ahmidan Prior to his involvement with the M-l 1 group, Jamal Ahmidan was a petty criminal and drug trafficker. Growing up in Morocco, he was not particularly religious and was more interested in his criminal business than political or religious extremism (Williams, 2008). When he arrived in Spain in 1990 he set up a small store and launched his drug smuggling operation importing drugs from Morocco into Spain with the assistance of the Oulad brothers who were friends from his childhood (Rodriguez, 2005). Both Mohamed and Rachid Oulad would be implicated in the Madrid bombings as well. This also spoke to the charisma and leadership qualities that Ahmidan possessed because he was able to bring along many of the members of his criminal enterprise to the Madrid group (Williams, 2008). Sometime in the late 1990s Ahmidan was incarcerated in Morocco for non- terrorism related offenses when he killed a man during a bad drug deal (Kenney, 2008, 82; 119) and many suggest this is where he was introduced to radical Islam. Friends suggest that when he was freed after two and a half years he was somewhat different but never suspected he had become radicalized because he continued to sell drugs (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 39) which is not an activity usually associated with strict religious adherence. Ahmidan played a critical role in the M-ll attacks because he was able to raise large sums of money quickly through his criminal activities. He also used his prison and criminal connections to locate and secure the explosives used in the bombs (Williams, 163

2008; Kenney, 2008, 56). Ahmidan was killed alongside the other two suspected leaders during the police siege three weeks after the Madrid bombings.

Allekema Lamari Allekema Lamari was the only member of the Madrid group who had any previous exposure to Islamist extremism (Jordan and Manas, 2008, 29). Lamari was initially a member of the Algerian political group Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) which was banned by the Algerian government in 1992. In response to the detention of most of the FIS leadership a militant organization named the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) splintered from FIS and began conducting localized terrorist attacks. Reports suggest that Lamari was detained on two separate occasions first in Algeria as a member of FIS in the early 1990s and then again in Spain in 1997 as a member of the GIA. Reports indicate that he became radicalized during his incarceration in Spanish prison (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 39; Kenney, 2008, 86). Lamari's key role in the attacks was twofold: first it has been suggested by his nickname "the emir," that he was held in high regard as an ideological leader who would share his personal experiences from prison as well as his time in FIS and GIA (Kenney, 2008, 76). Second, it is clear that he had some operational experience although it was probably limited. For example, Lamari knew enough about avoiding surveillance and detection that he was not identified as part of the plot until four months after the attacks had occurred. His contribution also remains unclear because he died in the apartment explosion as well. The M-ll leadership picture suggests that these three individuals in combination were the key to the plotting, organization and execution of the attack while the other 10 core members played minor roles or served as bomb couriers on the day of the attack. However due to the fashion in which the group ended, it is difficult to assign any one of the three the title of leader responsible for overseeing the entire plot.

Analysis: Role of Leadership The short time frame in which the group operated poses considerable challenges ascertaining the markers associated with leadership. Research indicates that three individuals had a disproportionate amount of influence over the other ten members of the 164 group but there is no evidence of a hierarchy among the three leaders themselves. It is unknown who decided on the type of attack, the timeline of attack, or any plans beyond that attack. Speculation has assigned the role of ideological leadership to Lamari but the short time frame once again supports the argument that the members of the group came predisposed to radical Islam making Lamari's role setting ideological parameters or ideological justifications unclear. Reports also did not identify any evidence of education, guidance or indoctrination occurring. There was no evidence that a spokesperson was ever chosen to represent the group although it is possible this might have changed if the group had continued to launch further attacks. Further there is no evidence of in-fighting, disagreement or any other crisis which might have required attention from a leader. But again this is probably a reflection of the short period between formation, planning, execution and the group's demise.

Socialization and the Group Dynamic The origins of the M-ll group dynamic centers around the friendship and social ties of several groups which came together and ultimately produced a smaller core group which carried out the bombing. What really stands out about the Madrid group was the manner in which the group's members got to know each other. The group found its membership through recruitment but it was based on selecting individuals from existing social networks such as friendship, parentage, or friends from Islamic centers and movements including Jama'a At Tabligh Al-Da'wa an apolitical and non-violent group for Islamic thinking (Jordan and Manas, 2008, 30). The group was built upon prior relationships which provided acquaintance and trust and a much smaller attack network (Rodriguez, 2005) which probably also helped solidify the group dynamic much quicker: the group knew each other and would have felt some level of comfort right from the beginning. Some of the more prominent examples of the social bonds include the revelation that Jamal Ahmidan and the Oulad Akcha brothers were childhood friends, the Oulad Akcha brothers and the Almallah Dabas brothers were family friends and Jamal Zougan and Mohamed Chaoui were related by marriage and also ran a business together. Serhane Abdelmajid Fakhet was married to the sister of another member (Jordan and Manas, 2008, 34). 165

Aside from the fact that the group was established through the social ties of several sub-groups (Jordan and Manas, 2008, 23), there is little that stands out as socializing the group or cementing a group dynamic among the M-ll bombers. Most of the group was composed of first generation North African men predominantly in their thirties (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 24). While ten of the thirteen core group were Moroccan—probably why it was initially linked to the GICM—a more detailed analysis of the others linked to plot reveals the membership was actually quite diverse and had an international character. Those arrested included 6 Spaniards, 32 Moroccans, 10 Syrians, and several Algerians, Lebanese, Palestinian and Egyptian individuals (Rodriguez, 2005). Almost all were legal residents of Spain and had lived in the same or in adjacent neighborhoods within the city limits of Madrid for many years (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 24). They came from modest socio-economic status and worked in a variety of professions including petty criminals and drug dealers, part time workers and students. Many were married with children (Jordan, 2006). None of the group members had been to a training camp or had fought jihad abroad and there were no veterans with a long and committed militancy to the cause (Jordan and Matas, 2008,21). This supports the observation made by Nesser (2006, 17) who suggested that the majority of the larger Madrid group were better described as "drifters and misfits" who had social ties to jihadists, and were not necessarily part of the cause themselves. Even an examination of some of the members of the core group reveals that there was very little to suggest that they harbored Islamist sympathies until closer to the attacks. Jamal Ahmidan was very well integrated into Spanish society and ran a hashish and ecstasy smuggling ring with friends and family members. Jamal Zougam, was also once fully integrated into Spanish society and enjoyed the company of women, drank alcohol and partied at discos. Others such as Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, and Anghar Fouad el Morabit were promising students focused on higher education (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 24). Most of the Madrid bombers began attending Centro Cultural Islamico, also known as the M 30 Mosque, which has a history of being the "mosque of choice for radical thinking Muslims" and as "an extremist incubator." This is where the younger Madrid bombers met up with others such as Amer Azizi who had more of a history with extremism as part of the Abu Dahdah network (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 32). Due to his connection 166 with the Abu Dahdah network Azizi gained credibility and coupled with his natural charisma became a motivational figure for many of the younger members. Similarly, Allekema Lamari who had spent time in prison as a member of the GIA was admired and was always sharing stories about his experiences (Kenney, 2008, 76; 86). The third alleged inspirational figure head was an Islamist sympathizer named Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed who led a Salafist/Wahhabi circle and started attending Friday prayers at the M 30 mosque in late 2001 (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 32). While there is an agreement that these three men provided the Islamist ideological motivation behind the group, their roles beyond this remain unclear. Authorities initially identified Rabei Osman Ahmed as the leader. This was based on a recorded phone conversation where he bragged about the Madrid bombings. However authorities could find no real concrete link between him and any of the Madrid bombers and charges against him were dismissed as nothing more than bravado (Haahr- Escolano, 2005; Spiegel, 2007; Lieberman and Bucht, 2009, 193). Azizi, posited by some to be the proof of a link between al-Qaida and M-ll, escaped capture and had an international warrant issued for his arrest. Fernando Reinares a terrorism expert in Spain has remained convinced that M-11 was an al-Qaida attack and uses Azizi as the lynchpin in his argument (Maclean 2010). He argues that Azizi could have been considered to be leader of the GICM and had previously met with numerous al-Qaida members as a courier for the Abu Dahdah network. These allegations remain unclear because Azizi was killed in a US missile attack in 2006 (Maclean, 2010). Similar charges against Lemari also remain unverifiable because he was among the seven members who blew themselves up in an apartment three weeks after the attack. After several months at the Mosque, members of the Madrid group began to separate themselves from secular society. They left the Mosque because it was not radical enough and by mid 2003 they were holding closed private meetings and discussions at someone's home where they began to discuss jihad (Silber and Bhatt, 2007, 39). As the group closed ranks and moved out of the public sphere social ties became the ticket to entrance. In order to attend one of these meetings, an individual had to not only express an affinity for jihadist ideology but also needed to be invited by one of its members. The group would meet once per week but this increased to once per day during the holy month of Ramadan. The meetings usually lasted anywhere from three to eight hours but during 167

Ramadan often lasted all night and centered on religious topics especially jihad (Kenney, 2008, 59-60). The group also spent time together on the weekends doing physical activity such as playing soccer or swimming followed by a meal and prayers (Kenney, 2008, 60). They also spent time watching videos showing jihadists fighting, listening to sermons by militant preachers and memorizing and singing rhythmic songs glorifying jihadist campaigns in Afghanistan and Chechnya (Kenney, 2008, 60). While authorities believe this is where the group dynamic became cemented they also believe that the core group grew together through their socialization at a telephone Calling Shop owned by brothers Jamal Zougam and Mohamed Chaoui and at the apartment they rented to construct the bombs. Due to the fact that most of the core members killed themselves to avoid capture, authorities cannot say with certainty what type of group building activities might have taken place in the apartment but concede several members spent a lot of time there together (Rodriguez, 2005). The closeness of the group was in a sense demonstrated by the group killing themselves together. Evidence recovered after the fact also suggested the group contemplated using suicide attacks but opted to target the trains and not the train station directly (Alonso, 2007, 205). A representation of the group's socialization can be observed in figure 6, specifically how the group became more and more intimate.

Analysis: Socialization and the Group Dynamic One of the interesting points revealed from the case study analysis is that the group of core members actually formed from three separate social groups. It is interesting because the cohesiveness which existed among the three separate social groups could have been an explanatory factor in discussions pertaining to group identity, cohesiveness and trust. However the fact that some members came from one group, some another group and so on suggests that some effort would have been needed to create a new dynamic identity or trust among these individuals coming together. There is no evidence that there was a conscious effort to educate or socialize the group after they had come together. There is also no indication that there were assigned readings or literature that each member was required to read. However, it is clear that the group did spend increasing amounts of time together where they watched videos, listened to sermons and had their own discussions. Reports suggest that at its peak the group would 168 spend hours every day, especially during religious holidays engaging one another in religious discussion. In this case there is a clear indication of how the group, locked in a discussion which was isolated from outside influence would begin to drift towards the most extreme position and solidify a group identity similar to the process outlined in the traditional terrorism literature. Most of the research however focused on the core group after they had come together and there is no information about how like minded individuals may have come together to form the initial three social groups or solidified those group dynamics which ultimately contributed the members of the M-11 group. The group began socializing in traditional settings such as Islamic centers and the M 30 mosque. At some point the group departed the mosques and began to meet privately. Two locations became frequent meeting spots: first, the telephone calling shop owned by Jamal Zougam and Mohammad Chaoui and then eventually an apartment which had been rented to serve as the launching point for the attacks but this would have been after the attack plans had been set. There is no indication about what kind of group building activities may have taken place in these locations. 169

FIGURE 6 A Representation of Madrid Group Socialization

M30 MOSQUE Various members ol the 3 social groups

TELEPHONE SHOP

APARTMENT

Lamari Fakhrt Ahmidan M Akcha R Akcha Koujma Rifaat

Seeman Gaby Eid

\ 1 Emilio Suarez Trashorras - Explosives 170

CASE STUDY 2: LONDON 2005 - 7/7 The July 7 th 2005 terrorist, attacks in London, also known as the 7/7 bombings, provides another interesting case study and was selected for inclusion because it represents an Islamic motivated terror attack against a Western democratic state and it was perpetrated by three British born citizens and a fourth who had lived in Britain for approximately twenty years. Despite the shock the attacks created, it would be wrong to suggest this attack was unexpected. Threats made by groups such as al-Qaida have always included the United Kingdom as a desirable target but in more recent years this had been compounded by the UK's involvement in wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The British Intelligence and Security Committee warned the Blair government that British foreign policy, specifically the war in Iraq created a "realistic risk" that the country would be targeted (Rai, 2006, 15). What was unanticipated however was that it would not be Islamists from a foreign country, but rather British citizens attacking their own countrymen and women. Intelligence assessments conducted in the year prior to 7/7 outlined the terrorist threat to the UK and in February 2005 Security Services suggested they knew that both British and foreign nationals belonging to A1 Qaida cells and associated networks were "currently present in the UK" (UKGISC, 2006a, 9). However the assessment also remarked that the individuals were supporting the activities of terrorist groups or might be engaged in planning or attempting to carry out terrorist attacks abroad. This was not unusual. British intelligence agencies had been monitoring Islamists who had been successful in targeting UK interests and citizens abroad for many years including a November 2003 car bombing on the British Consulate and the HSBC building in Istanbul. British citizens had also been victims in other high profile attacks on Western interests including the World Trade Center attack in 2001, the Bali nightclub attack in 2002 and the Madrid bombing in 2004. The bombings which occurred on July 7th 2005 were the first successful Islamist terrorist attack in the UK and it took authorities somewhat by surprise (UKGISC, 2006a, 8). An interesting parallel which immediately arises is that the Madrid attack was similarly unexpected for similar reasons. Both London and Spain had previously identified Islamist elements known to be residing in their country, but both were felt to predominantly serve as planners to stage or support attacks elsewhere and not as a real threat to attack the state in which they were operating. It was well known that Islamists were active in the UK, but 171 they were only monitored as support cells for other groups conducting attacks elsewhere. The report mentions that terrorist attacks were almost exclusively conducted by outsiders— either immigrants residing in a target country or terrorists who arrived specifically to conduct an attack (HSI, 2007, 32). This does not apply to the 7/7 attackers: three of four bombers were born and raised in Britain and the fourth had moved to Britain when he was one year old. In addition, much like the Madrid attack, questions surrounding the bombers have generated enormous speculation and debate. One of the most compelling aspects of domestic homegrown terrorism is coming to accept that individuals raised in a society or community are capable of turning against that which they once previously embraced or accepted. This leads to efforts to explain how this might arise and predominantly takes the form of attempts to rationalize or justify the attack as being spearheaded by outsiders, and/or speculation that the attackers were either "tricked" or "brainwashed". This inevitably leads to suggestions that a foreign group whether it is al-Qaida or another extremist group must be involved. There have been considerable efforts to draw links between the 7/7 bombers and an outside Islamist extremist group. However, several investigations conducted on the 7/7 attacks have dismissed most of this speculation and there is no credible evidence to support these contentions. For example, two days after the attack, British media began reporting that a known extremist figure and possible mastermind had left the UK shortly before the bombings. Officials maintain no such person ever existed (UK H of C, 2006, 9). Five days after the attack rumors swirled regarding a potential 5th bomber. Investigators identified a regular transit commuter who appeared on closed circuit television cameras as "being at the wrong place at the wrong time." Officials maintain that there is no intelligence to support the idea of a fifth or further bombers (UK H of C, 2006, 10). Twenty months following the attack British authorities arrested three men who were believed to be connected to the 7/7 attacks (HSI, 2007, 33). However at trial Mohammed Shakil, aged 36, Sadeer Saleem, aged 26 and Waheed Ali, aged 25 were cleared of any role in the attacks (Gardham, 2009; Clutterbuck, 2011, 12). Again, officials dismiss any notion of a support cell or individuals at large representing the same group. 172

This section begins by discussing the facts of the 7/7 attacks. These facts were ascertained by analyzing primary sources including official government and intelligence reports investigating the incident as well as discussions with Dr. Lindsay Clutterbuck, a terrorism specialist at RAND based in London who was previously a member of Scotland Yard and has intimate knowledge of the events. Dr. Clutterbuck provided an advanced copy of his soon to be released RAND report which represents the latest efforts to dissect and analyze the 7/7 bombings and any connections it might have had to other Islamists plots in Britain. It discusses some of the circumstantial evidence which to this day still leads some to suggest that al-Qaida was actively involved and argues why these points do not adequately make a case that this attack should be viewed as anything other than an incident of domestic homegrown terrorism. It concludes that much like the Madrid case, people's claims of circumstantial evidence and coincidences provide no conclusive evidence to support an unknown or as yet unfounded further plot.

The Attack On July 7th 2005, London was in the midst of celebrating the fact that the city had been awarded the 2012 Summer Olympic Games when the morning commute was disrupted by four explosions. Three explosions occurred at approximately 0850 on the London underground system: the first on the Circle line between Aldgate and Liverpool Street, the next at Edgware Road station and the third on the Picadilly line between Russell Square and King's Cross. At 0947 a fourth explosion occurred on the upper deck of a London bus in Tavistock Place (UKGISC, 2006a, 2). Initially, there was mass confusion as the first three bombs detonated and authorities are unsure whether it had been a suicide attack or had been detonated remotely similar to the Madrid attack one year earlier. When the fourth bomb detonated one hour later authorities were unsure whether the new explosion was the beginning of a second wave of attacks or the result of a fallback option due to some unforeseen technical difficulty (Rai, 2006, 22; HSI, 2007, 36). In total, the explosions killed 56 people, including the bombers and injured more than 700 others (CBCNews, 2005). The bombers would later be identified as 30 year old Mohammad Siddique Khan, 22 year old Shehzad Tanweer, 20 year old Germaine Lindsay (aka Abdullah Shaheed Jamal), and 18 year old Hasib Hussain. 173

As the days passed more detailed information was pieced together by officials and investigators who revealed that on the day of the attacks, all four bombers met at 0650 at Luton train station. Witnesses told investigators that the group of men spent a considerable amount of time removing objects from the trunk of their car and each of the men had put on a large rucksack (UK H of C, 2006, 3). The group boarded the train and travelled together to King's Cross where they went their separate ways. These reports confirmed to investigators that the devices had been detonated manually by the bombers thus making them suicide attacks (UKGISC, 2006a, 11). At 0850 three of the bombers, Siddique Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay detonated their explosives simultaneously. Investigators determined that the bombs exploded on trains underground and were detonated purposefully as two trains crossed each other on the tracks so that double the damage could be done (Lieberman and Cheloukine, 2009, 241). CCTV footage placed the fourth bomber Hasib Hussain standing in the crowd appearing to make phone calls to the other bombers ten minutes after the first three bombs detonated (UK H of C, 2006, 4; HSI, 2007, 37). He is also recorded entering a corner store where he purchased a nine volt battery. Officials speculated that his bomb malfunctioned and he needed to make technical adjustments before he could detonate his bomb (UK H of C, 2006, 4). At 0947, Hussain detonated his bomb on a double-decker bus which at this point were being used to shuttle London commuters around following the closure of the underground transit system. Later, it would be determined that the overall cost of the attack was estimated to be 8000 pounds, including overseas trips, rent for the safehouse, bomb making equipment, and rental cars and was entirely self financed (UK H of C, 2006, 23). It also appears that the bombs were homemade and the ingredients were all readily commercially available and not particularly expensive. Each bomb consisted of approximately 2-5 kg of homemade explosive (UK H of C, 2006, 23). Police, working backwards tracked the path of the bombers and located an apartment in Leeds where they found remnants of the explosives in a bathtub (Rai, 2006, 23). It took officials two days to positively identify Siddique Khan and Tanweer and realize that they had seen them previously on the periphery of another investigation (UK H of C, 2006, 9; UK Government, 2006, 1). On July 9th, checks on intelligence databases 174 revealed the name Mohammed Siddique Khan had appeared during a previous high profile investigation known as Operation Crevice (UKGISC, 2009, 15). Further, re-visiting previous investigations and surveillance of other Islamists also revealed that in two specific incidents, Siddique Khan was "an unidentified male" in the company of Islamists of interest at different times. This revelation provided fuel for the fires that the 7/7 attacks were part of a larger plot, were directed by al-Qaida or some other foreign group and that a mastermind was involved in recruiting and training several British cells to conduct a series of attacks around the United Kingdom. Intelligence officials and police had been aware of the activities of several Islamists operating in Britain for several years. This dates as far back as January 2001 when agents acting on Operation Warlock were tasked to conduct surveillance on a group of 40 individuals who were on an outward bound expedition organized by two well known extremist sympathizers. After the fact, Siddique Khan is identified as one of these forty men (UKGISC, 2009, 57-59). He appears once again starting in spring 2003 in a separate investigation which would become Operation Crevice. Operation Crevice was an investigation into a foiled plot by five British citizens with the assistance of Momin Khawaja, a Canadian, to carry out a series of bombings in downtown London. It was only after the fact, when intelligence and police agents reviewed their notes and surveillance footage of the activities monitored during Operation Crevice that they identified Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer as previously "unidentified males" on several occasions (UKGISC, 2006a, 14; UKGISC, 2009, 3). It showed the two meeting with a central figure in the plot named Omar Kyham. On April 14th 2003, Kyham is observed getting into a car registered to Siddique Khan although they only met for three minutes. A review of Kyham's cell phone records also revealed that a phone number associated with Siddique Khan appeared on July 13th, 19th, 24th 2003, and again on August 17th 2003. During the period between April 2003 and the arrest of the Crevice plotters in early 2004, police suspect Siddique Khan and Kyham may have met up to three separate times (UKGISC, 2009, 23). However, following the arrest of the Crevice plotters, intelligence agents moved on to another perceived threat dubbed Operation Rhyme and made no efforts to further investigate the identities of the then unknown Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer (UKGISC, 2009, 57-65). 175

These issues raised some interesting questions about a potential link between those implicated in the foiled Operation Crevice plot and the 7/7 attacks. However, intelligence agents to this day continue to defend their position that despite the appearance of these two men in previous investigations, there was no credible evidence, especially at the time, to suggest these two men were anything more than acquaintances, and certainly no evidence suggesting that either man was involved in or aware of the Operation Crevice plot. They point out that surveillance does not place the two at a meeting with the Canadian bomb expert when he visited London, but concede they may have attended a farewell dinner with many others before Khawaja returned to Canada (UKGISC, 2009, 32). They concede that Siddique Khan was seen with Omar Kyham and they talked by phone, but are adamant there is no evidence to suggest a direct link between groups. Their only recording of Kyham with Tanweer had the two discussing the Madrid attacks and its apparent success at influencing a power transition in Spain (UKGISC, 2009, 28). The only information of concern they identified was that two unidentified males at the time were talking about getting some training and schemes to defraud financial institutions (UKGISC, 2006a, 14). This is the intelligence agency's rationale for not pursuing them further following Operation Crevice. Defending themselves at a government inquiry, intelligence agents argued that the cell phone number registered to an individual named Siddique Khan was only one of some four thousand contacts he had with other people during the course of their surveillance (UKGISC, 2009, 23). This is the account echoed by both the Intelligence Committee and police agencies. Intelligence agencies concluded that there was not enough evidence to realistically say there was any connection between the attempted the group identified during the Crevice investigation and 7/7 bombings. They agree that some among the two groups "may have known one another," and perhaps even "talked to each other," but no evidence suggests either one knew what the others were thinking or planning (UKGISC, 2009, 40; Clutterbuck, 2011, 21). The official police assessment of the attacks suggested no evidence to link the bombers to al-Qaida or any other known terrorist organization. The Police called them "unaffiliated terrorists" who were "inspired rather than directed by al-Qaida and that there was "no control over the men from any known terrorist commander" (Rai, 2006, 156). British authorities concluded that their investigation revealed no evidence of 176 others, "either no such network existed or it has successfully managed to avoid detection" (HSI, 2007, 38). During the trial of those investigated by Operation Crevice more details emerged about the activities of some of the 7/7 bombers prior to their bombing attack. Some of the testimony was once again used to suggest that 7/7 was linked to al-Qaida or one part of a larger plot. These arguments must also be viewed with some skepticism. First there was the testimony of a jihadi detained by American intelligence who alleges that Siddique Khan had been training in Pakistan on at least two occasions and also another time possibly in Afghanistan during the late 1990s. He says the 2003 training camp was where Siddique Khan first met with members identified during the Crevice investigation (UKGISC, 2009, 37). Authorities agree that Siddique Khan and Tanweer went to Pakistan but dismiss the argument that because they went to Pakistan they must have been contacted by al-Qaida members and the attack must have been planned and executed from there (UKGISC, 2006a, 27). They claim no evidence exists suggesting who they met with, what they learned or what, if any, operational training they received (Kirby, 2007, 421; Clutterbuck, 2011, 32). Second there was the further discussion of the man deemed to be "the mastermind" of 7/7. Phone records released at the trial indicate that Siddique Khan was in contact with a man named Haroon Rashid Aswat even in the hours before the bombing. Haroon Rashid Aswat is a well known Islamist sympathizer but his contact with Khan led many to believe he had recruited, groomed and trained the group. This idea slowly faded away as evidence of his connection appeared to be lacking (Kirby, 2007, 419). Investigations revealed no intelligence to suggest communication close to the attack occurred and dismissed contact between Aswat and Khan as "casual," the result of Aswat having lived in Beeston and probably knowing Khan as a friend (UKGISC, 2009, 74). In May 2007 a second possible mastermind who was a senior al-Qaida "planner" named Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi was discussed re-igniting accusations that both plots may have been directed by al-Iraqi at the behest of al-Qaida. Again, there is no evidence to support an individual having ties to members of both the groups (HSI, 2007, 32). The last problem with the mastermind scenario is that authorities know Hussain tried to call other bombers after his bomb failed to detonate, presumably to see if theirs had failed as well. Since he did not call anyone else, officials are convinced this is evidence there was no mastermind (BBC August 24th, 2005). 177

The last piece of evidence people use in an effort to tie the 7/7 attacks to al-Qaida are the videotapes claiming responsibility for the attack. It is important to note that authorities have dismissed these al-Qaida claims. The first of many claims for responsibility started appearing on the internet within hours of the attack. The most prominent was posted by "The Secret Organization Group of Al-Qaida in Europe." Intelligence and security agencies quickly deemed this claim uncredible suggesting there was no evidence to support the claim (UK H of C, 2006, 8; UKGISC, 2006a, 12). On September 19th Ayman al Zawahiri mentions that al-Qaida was involved in the London attacks but no firm evidence exists to support this claim or determine what if any support al-Qaida might have provided (UK H of C, 2006, 21). According to the media, counter terrorism experts never treated the message from Ayman al Zawahiri on the London attacks as conclusive proof that al Qaida was behind the attack (BBC, 2005a). Lindsay Clutterbuck (2011, 37) points out that "al-Qaida were at least involved in exploiting the attacks." In a video statement released later Khan discusses why he did it. He says: "until we feel security, you will be our targets and until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight." Authorities suggest this shows a personal mission by Khan in response to what he perceived to be an illegitimate foreign policy by his former country (Rai, 2006, 131). This would be supported again on the one year anniversary of the attacks when a videotape of Shazad Tanweer was aired where he talked about US and UK operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as his motivations (HSI, 2007, 35) Analyzing all of the available information suggests that it is very difficult to neatly connect the 7/7 attacks to a continuation of previous foiled plots or an al-Qaida planned and directed operation. In 2006 a confidential memo leaked to the press. In the note from Security Services MI6, British Prime Minister Tony Blair is told that they have "run out of leads" and that chasing ideas about training in Pakistan and links to other groups were going nowhere. By comparison media outlets were maintaining these leads were very much alive (Kirby, 2007,421) 178

Role of the Organization Part of the concern which arises regarding domestic homegrown terrorists is the ease with which these individuals seem to organize themselves and acquire the means necessary to conduct attacks. This dissertation argues that one of the main distinguishing characteristics between the traditional terrorist group and the domestic homegrown groups will be found within this element and that the role of the organization in facilitating terrorist attacks will be different. One of the things which immediately stands out in the 7/7 case study is that the group consisted of relatively few members. In terms of how this impacted the organization, two points are relevant. First: the evidence presented above indicates that this was a "one and done" group with all four members conducting a suicide bombing. By default the organization died with them and there was no opportunity or effort to evolve the group or adapt to circumstances they faced during the attack. Second the attack moved from discussion to action very quickly which again would have limited practice, preparation and fine-tuning. Reports from the government inquiry stress how surprised officials were after all the pieces were laid out. A very simple timeline reveals a fifteen month operation beginning with the conversation overheard during Operation Crevice when two unidentified males, now known to be Siddique Khan and Tanweer talking about financial fraud and jihad in Pakistan in February 2004 (UKGISC, 2009, 48). While officials have no concrete information indicating a specific genesis of the attack: who conceived it and when, the first evidence something operational was in the works occurred on March 31st 2005 when the group rented an apartment to make bombs (UK H of C, 2006, 22). From there it progressed even quicker and the group conducted a dry run or reconnaissance trip on June 28th 2005 (HSI, 2007, 35). Best guesses suggest that the plan began to take shape in February 2005 with the return of Siddique Khan and Tanweer from Pakistan. At this point Khan can be said to be leader, Tanweer his right hand man and Hussian and Lindsay playing important subsidiary roles (UK H of C, 2006, 22). This suggests some degree of hierarchy within the group, with Siddique Khan and Tanweer having more authority than Hussain and Lindsay. One of the most interesting facts about this case revolves around the capabilities of the group. Authorities marvelled at the sophistication and discipline that the group 179 exhibited yet dismissed any connection or substantial assistance from outside sources. A report investigating the attack characterized it as "simple and inexpensive yet somewhat sophisticated" and remarks how the group managed to completely avoid any detection from outsiders (UK H of C, 2006, 27). Another report echoes this sentiment describing the plan as "very simplistic yet sophisticated," highlighting how the materials were easily obtained, the small group helped maintain secrecy and the vulnerability of the target chosen for attack (HSI, 2007, 40). Evidence of sophistication manifests itself in the behavior of group members. After the attacks, authorities identified a car at Luton train station which belonged to one of the bombers. When they searched the vehicle they found several small improvised IEDs and a loaded handgun. Police speculate these tools were designed to cause confusion if the group was confronted before they could carry out their attack (UK H of C, 2006, 3). In order to minimize this likelihood, authorities also determined that the group conducted at least one dry-run before the attack. At the apartment the group used to mix their explosives, police found tickets and receipts indicating that Siddique Khan, Tanweer and Lindsay carried out a trial run on June 28th 2005 (BBC, 2005b; UK H of C, 2006, 24). The group was also careful about their cell phone uses and used rental cars to avoid detection during the attack planning stage (UK H of C, 2006, 24). Kenney (2008, 118) argues that the London bombers, having been born and raised in Britain used this advantage which helped them avoid suspicion. Compared to traditionally understood terrorists arriving in a country to attack and who would probably stand out, Khan and rest of London bombers had local knowledge and a good command of English which helped them avoid detection. The composition and construction of the bombs initially caused debate about the capabilities of the group. The bombs were homemade explosives composed of peroxide found in hair bleach, citric acid and heat tablets which are easily acquired and inexpensive household products which combined to form a highly volatile compound known as HMDT (hexamethylene triperoxide diamine). The 7/7 bombers could easily have found instructions to make these explosives from open sources including the internet. However, this mixture is highly volatile and instable without proper precautions. Again, the group was knowledgeable enough to keep the mixture cold through the use of an industrial fridge found in the rented apartment and portable coolers (HSI, 2007, 36; Kirby, 2007, 425). Cell 180 phones were used to detonate the devices. One potential point of disagreement among bomb experts was that despite the fact that the bombs were simple enough to be built without help, expertise would have made it much easier. Another point of contention is that the group appeared to get the mixture right the first time. While this is possible, authorities were puzzled that there was no evidence to suggest test explosions ever occurred (UK H of C, 2006, 23) In terms of paying for the attack, Siddique Khan is believed to have provided most of the funding through his student loans and a 10 000 pound bank loan (BBC, 2006). Germaine Lindsay apparently contributed to fundraising by cashing bad checks. He used the cheques to purchase perfume which he then exchanged over the internet for other materials the group needed to make the bombs (UK H of C, 2006, 25). Bank investigators showed up at Lindsay's house the day after the attacks to question him, unaware that he had been one of the bombers (UK H of C, 2006, 23). The idea to exchange perfume for materials might have arisen from a meeting attended by Khan and Tanweer and other Islamist sympathizers where the group was taught how to raise money fraudulently by skimming credit cards, lying on applications and defaulting on bank loans by a fraud artist (UKGISC, 2009, 28, 42). Authorities concede that Siddique Khan and Tanweer traveled to Pakistan from November 19th 2004 to February 8th 2005 and Tanweer told friends that he was investigating Islamic schools he might attend later on. Both men may have attended a training camp but there is no concrete evidence to say for sure (UK H of C, 2006, 20). Another report based on the testimony of an American source suggested Siddique Khan had received training at an al-Qaida camp in Afghanistan at some point (HSI, 2007, 33) Media mistakenly reported that Khan had traveled to US and met with extremists there, but intelligence officials maintain this never happened (UKGISC, 2009, 69). Part of the problem with assigning any significance to the trips to Pakistan is that most of the members of the 7/7 group traveled to Pakistan to see family and friends. The Tanweer and Hussain families both readily volunteered to authorities that they had often taken or at times sent their children on family trips to the region (UK H of C, 2006, 21). Investigation into the contacts made by the group clearly shows that certain members were in contact with others people who would be linked to Islamic extremism in 181 the UK. Further it is conceivable that two members did receive some training in Pakistan. However every investigation has concluded that these points in no way amount to evidence that the 7/7 attack was linked to other plots or one part of a larger plot, or that the group operated on direction from someone in Pakistan or an al-Qaida affiliated operative (UKGISC, 2006a, 12; Clutterbuck, 2011). From analysis, we know that the group was self funded and developed their own bombs instead of attempts to secure ready-made explosives. The question of whether the group sought outside information or training is subject to debate depending on what the two individuals may have learned in Pakistan and whether their relationship with Omar Kyham and those investigated during Operation Crevice went beyond social interaction. Evidence in both of these scenarios is not enough to claim that the group had ties to any other extremist groups. We also know the group did not actively recruit new members as no new members joined the core group of four at any time and that there was no specialization or compartmentalization: group members did not specifically carry out specific tasks at the exclusion of other ones.

Analysis: Role of the Organization

The group was sufficiently small that specialization or compartmentalization apparently did not occur. Analysis indicates that Siddique Khan had a hand in everything but no special assignments were given to any of the other members. Organization could be hierarchical if we accept Siddique Khan as leader, Tanweer as his right hand man and Hussain and Lindsay on the lowest rung but it appears each member contributed to planning and execution aspects of the attack fairly equally. Examining the markers set out for the role of the organization it is clear that the group did not recruit at all. Reports indicate that Siddique Khan recruited all three additional members and based on Tanweer's appearance during surveillance of earlier incidents it is fair to say he was the first to be recruited. Authorities are still unclear how, when and where Hussain and Lindsay were added to the group although they speculate that the bookstore and gym seem logical environments and that they may have come into contact with Siddique Khan as a community mentor. This is indicated by the information offered by Lindsay's wife about 182 the approximate time his demeanor changed which she attributed to his having met new people. The fact that the theories about additional members or support cells have been dismissed supports the contention that once the group was established it did not recruit or grow. This coupled with the fact that the group committed a suicide attack killing all its members provides conclusive evidence that this was a "one and done" group and not a group planning on a sustained or prolonged campaign of attacks. The limited nature of their fiindraising also supports this idea. The group acquired only the financial resources necessary and had no long term plan to amass more. They did not solicit funds from members of their community, they did not solicit funds from another like minded group whether this was a domestic like-minded Islamic group or foreign based. It is an acceptable premise to suggest that if the 7/7 attacks had been designed and ordered by a foreign group and tasked to Siddique Khan for execution as some have suggested, that some form of financial support would have been forthcoming. Access to outside funds would have most likely further sped up the time frame for attack as no money would have needed to be raised and ensured further security of the group as no illegal, illicit or suspicious transactions would have potentially jeopardized the bigger plan. If the attacks had been planned for even one day later, bank officials would have had suspicions about the activities of Jermaine Lindsay and this might have brought down the entire plot. Without outside financial support the group self financed the attacks. Siddique Khan provided the majority of the funds while Lindsay passed bad cheques and traded stolen goods for materials via the internet. Despite evidence that Siddique Khan and Tanweer were present at a meeting which discussed methods of sustained financial fraud, it appears that the group did what was needed for that operation suggesting no war chest for future attacks was amassed. The technical know-how or expertise to carry out the attack is not as straightforward as the human or financial resources components. Reports indicate that Siddique Khan was an acquaintance of Omar Kyham, a member investigated during Operation Crevice. They also reveal that Siddique Khan and Tanweer were in Pakistan where it is reasonable to believe they received some form of training. How this translates into an analysis of how extensive the groups contact with other groups was and how much they learned from other 183 groups remains uncertain. First, even if it can be conceded that there was contact between Kyham and Siddique Khan, there is no indication it was anything beyond like minded individuals meeting and having discussions and not representatives of two separate groups. Evidence clearly indicates that neither group knew that the other had something in the works so this would minimize the contact measure significantly. The traditional terrorism literature has highlighted contact and cooperation between groups as important and even in instances where representatives have met it has always been clearly as representatives of a specific group. Second even if Siddique Khan and Tanweer did receive some form of training from an unsubstantiated group in Pakistan, it was limited and a onetime event. In this case we can acquiesce to the idea that there was contact with another group but it was limited to information only: no resources exchanged hands, and no tactical guidance was provided beyond anything learned at the camp itself. The organizational criteria for the 7/7 bombers can be readily observed but do show a tremendous variation from what was observed in the traditional literature review. Taking into account the size of the group the real determining factor here appears to be the fact that the group was "one and done." This influenced the outcome of their acquisition of both human and financial resources and to a lesser degree the terrorist knowledge as well. The group did not need to learn, evolve or adapt and therefore did not need to acquire any further information to serve this purpose

Role of Leadership Due to the small size of the group, it is possible to briefly examine each one of the members. In this case it is a very useful exercise because it demonstrates how ordinary and unassuming these individuals were prior to the attacks. While the role of leadership has been squarely assigned to Mohammad Siddique Khan, the exact role, relationship and degree of authority over the other members has never clearly been developed.

Mohammad Siddique Khan Thirty year old Mohammad Siddique Khan has been described as the leader of the 7/7 group but himself remains an enigma for authorities. One of the biggest mysteries yet to be answered definitively is when, where and how Khan became radicalized. He never 184 voiced extreme views, and had publicly spoken out against 9/11 (UK H of C, 2006, 14). He had previously told associates that he had turned to religion after a "far from blameless youth that had seen him involved in fights as well as bouts of drinking and drug-taking" (BBC, 2007) At the time of the attacks he was a father with a young child and a wife who was four months pregnant (Rai, 2006, 28). Born in Britain, friends and acquaintances remember a very Westernized immigrant. During his youth he preferred to be called "Sid" and liked to wear a leather jacket and cowboy boots. He praised the virtues of American life after he visited the US as a teenager (HSI, 2007, 33; Kirby, 2007, 417). As a young adult he held several prominent positions working for the Benefits Agency and then for the Department of Trade and Industry as an administrative assistant. In 1996 he went to Leeds University and when he graduated he went to work as a teaching assistant working with special needs and the children of immigrant parents having difficulty assimilating. Following the attacks newspaper reporters could not find one person who portrayed him in a negative light (Rai, 2006, 25) and colleagues said there was no suggestion of extremism (BBC, 2007). In his spare time, Siddique Khan also worked a second job as a social worker committed to ridding the streets of drugs and for the local government agency helping troubled children (Rai, 2006, 26; UK H of C, 2006, 13-4). This role might have been where he came into contact with the rest of the 7/7 bombers. Khan is described as leader and many attribute the role of recruiting to him despite the absence of any evidence suggesting overt recruitment. This was based on the observation that he was older, "recognized" in the community and did have charisma (HSI, 2007, 34; Kirby, 2007, 418). Former friends said Khan had a huge influence on many young men in the area; one said it appeared that his relationship with Tanweer and Hasib, who Khan mentored at a local gym, had a definite father-figure element (Rai, 2006, 28, 83). He also fits the leadership model as being the most experienced in the group which would have allowed him to share his knowledge and experience with less experienced individuals (Kenney, 2008, 55). In an effort to identify when Khan may have been radicalized, authorities concede Khan is known to have attended a training camp in Pakistan during a two week visit in July 2003. They however do not like the term "training camp" because often times these camps 185 were very informal (needed to avoid detection) and it remains unclear who he might have met or what he might have learned (UK H of C, 2006, 20). Other sources suggest that it was at this camp Khan met another group of British Islamist sympathizers who would later be attached to the Crevice plot and maintained those links when he returned to Britain (BBC, 2007). A detained American extremist claims that Khan's radicalization occurred earlier and he had traveled to Afghanistan in the late 1990s with another man (UKGISC, 2006a, 16) although authorities are skeptical of this information. What authorities believe is that Khan had a relationship with the three other bombers and that a plan to carry out the attack was created sometime after Khan and Tanweer returned from a second trip to Pakistan in February 2005.

Shehzad Tanweer Shehzad Tanweer was the twenty-two year old son of Pakistani immigrants. Friends and family paint a picture of the completely assimilated immigrant who loved playing cricket and was an excellent student (UK H of C, 2006, 14). Tanweer and his family were not overly religious but in 2000 at the age of eighteen, he began going more frequently to the mosque (Rai, 2006, 32). Relatives in Pakistan remember two separate visits, one prior to the Iraq war where the relatives characterized him as not religious and a second visit in 2004 where he had become very different. He claimed to have become devout and praised the actions of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida. Some of his relatives argue that Tanweer actually underwent a "reversion," that he had some religious instruction as a youth, very little during his teenage years and then fell victim to extremists due to his superficial knowledge of religion (Kirby, 2007, 417).

Germaine Lindsay Germaine Lindsay aka Abdullah Shaheed Jamal was born in Jamaica but immigrated to Britain with his mother in 1986. Along with his mother, he converted to Islam in 2000 and sources say he was a very astute student who learned Arabic and memorized the Koran in a very short period of time (HSI, 2007, 33). Friends offer competing views of Lindsay following his conversion. Some suggest that very little changed and that he remained a normal guy, others say he became completely different and 186 distanced himself from old acquaintances (Rai, 2006, 37). Authorities know that he was disciplined for handing out leaflets at school in support of al Qaida (BBC, 2006) but believe he was predominantly self radicalized listening to lecture tapes and attending a lecture by extremist preacher Abdallah al Faisal (Clutterbuck, 2011, 18). To this day they are not entirely clear where and how he met Khan and the others bombers (UK H of C, 2006, 18). Lindsay's wife however suggests that in 2004 he had met a group of men at a prayer meeting and from that point on his demeanor and behavior changed (Rai, 2006, 39).

Hasib Hussain 18 year old Hasib Hussain was the youngest bomber and by all accounts was the definition of an average student. He was never particularly religious growing up but neighbors said that he had a dramatic and visible conversion experience two years prior to the bombings when he accompanied his family to Saudi Arabia for hajj in 2002 (UK H of C, 2006, 14-15). They said that he began to dress traditionally and prayed often (Rai, 2006, 46)

Analysis: Role of Leadership

By all accounts Siddique Khan has been portrayed as the leader of the 7/7 group. Reports suggest that he was the first of the group to become radicalized. He can be observed being active in the Islamist sympathizer movement quite early on and reports indicate that he was considered to be a mentor or father figure to those around him in every station of his life including those in the 7/7 group. Part of the problem in tracing an exact line of influence or authority stems from the fact that the group operated undetected until it was too late. Aside from some friends and family members who reported some changes in behavior, no one with in-depth information is available to discuss the specifics of the group's operation. Information present in all the reports suggest that it is easy to assign the role of leadership to Khan because he was older, had more experience and was known in the community to serve a leadership role. It is fair to assume that this would have remained the case in his relationship with the other group members. Siddique Khan could also be considered to be the spokesperson for the group since it was his video which was released following the bombing. Tanweer also recorded a video 187 but it was not released until one year later on the anniversary of the attack. The motivation for the attack appears to have been British involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. Because both Siddique Khan and Tanweer mentioned this in their recordings, it would be a fair assessment to say that this was probably the raison d'etre upon which the group was based. Arguably this would have been the message preached by Siddique Khan to the other members of the group with the group's goal being to either draw attention to or affect some form of change in British foreign policy. The limited time frame and smaller size of the group probably played a role in ensuring that the group never faced any significant challenge or crisis. There are no reports of observed tension between any members and no indications that the group disagreed about any facet of the attack. This may have been different behind the scenes but even if this was the case Siddique Khan managed to either avoid any challenge to his ideological teachings or operational goals or managed to put down a challenge or solve a crisis. In either scenario Siddique Khan's leadership would appear to have been successful in steering his group towards and completing a successful attack

Socialization and the Group Dynamic One of the most interesting aspects of the 7/7 bombers is that they were all very different people. Despite the fact that three of the four bombers were of Pakistani descent, they all came from very different backgrounds and they were all in very different places in their lives. Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain were all second generation British citizens. All grew up in Beeston but none grew up poor despite the fact that Beeston is a notoriously poor area. Tanweer actually came from a very well-off family (UK H of C, 2006, 13). At the other extreme Lindsay grew up much poorer. Khan and Lindsay were married and had families, Tanweer and Hussain did not. Khan had a university education and Tanweer was entering University, Hussain and Lindsay barely had high school education. It has also been established that none of the four had grown up in a particularly religious household. This once again highlights the difficulties in identifying a common profile of what an extremist may look like. If we set aside the family backgrounds of the individuals we are left with the fact that three of the four were raised in Beeston a predominantly Muslim immigrant 188 neighborhood in London. However, of the four bombers, only Hussain is documented to have had issues with integration or a troubled background, the other three were unquestionably well integrated and had been highly westernized. Khan in particular grew up rejecting his Pakistani Muslim identity wanting to be called "Sid" and always had more white friends than Asian ones (Rai, 2006, 81). The biggest question which remains for authorities is identifying how Khan became radicalized. They accept Khan had a role in radicalizing the other three but do not know where Khan got his information (Rai, 2006, 157). Analysis reveals that all of the bombers became more religious a few years before the attacks. In 1999 an Islamic fundamentalist preacher visited Beeston and some suggest this is when Khan started to become sympathetic to armed jihad which would be solidified several years later by the Iraq war (Rai, 2006, 82). Tanweer and Lindsay became interested in extremism at some time during early 2001 and were encouraged by 9/11. Hussain changed following the Iraq war. One friend suggested that the bombers turned to religion about four years prior to the attacks when they began to spend a lot of time at a back street bookshop which had opened in the neighborhood. The Iqra Islamic bookshop was known in the community for selling "under- the-counter-stuff including videos taken in Iraq, Bosnia and Chechnya which were very graphic and designed to incite rage (Kirby, 2007, 418). It was here they began to observe how "their Muslim brothers and sisters were being treated around the world" (Rai, 2006, 52) Two reporters investigating the 7/7 bombers discovered that the Iqra Islamic served as a meeting place for a group of young Muslims who ultimately came to be known in the neighborhood as the Mullah Crew. It is alleged that Khan had worked with Tanweer in creating a fifteen person "vigilante group" which carried out strong arm social work with a measure of community approval. The group met in the Iqra Islamic bookshop which sold videos, and at a gym beneath Beestons Hardy Street mosque. The gym according to some in the community became known as the "al-Qaida gym" (Rai, 2006, 101; UK H of C, 2006, 16). It is suggested that the community initially overlooked the crew's tactics and the extremist views because it was felt they made a difference. While it was known they would take drug addicts and forcibly confine them to break the habit, any other efforts at moral policing have never surfaced. 189

There are three mosques in the immediate area and the group attended all three at different times. They were never associated with one over any other and also attended other mosques outside their immediate area (UK H of C, 2006, 16). Rumors suggest Khan and Tanweer left the local mosque and began meeting at the Iqra Learning Center in Beeston where they freely engaged in group radicalization away from the moderating influence of mosque imams (Kenney, 2008, 72). The information we have suggests that Khan, Tanweer and Hussain shared a social life around mosques, youth clubs, gyms and the Islamic bookshop in Beeston which was used for lectures and discussion groups on Islam and to access extremist websites. It is suggested that Khan used these places to at least identify candidates for indoctrination even if the indoctrination took place more privately, though government reports say there is no real evidence that this type of formal indoctrination took place or other individuals were ever approached (UK H of C, 2006, 26). The group dynamic of the 7/7 bombers was probably solidified by the fact that the group was so small. There are however some puzzling aspects about the group because it appears that the core four was a portion of a much larger group. If we are placing an emphasis on the socialization of the members as well as examining the types of activities they did together, we observe that there was a much larger group of people involved, yet only four ended up involved in the attacks. Investigators discussed the social dimension that the Mullah Crew may have contributed to shaping the identity of members of the group, perhaps as a stepping stone towards more radical or extreme behaviors. The Mullah Crew organized a regime of outdoor activities such as paintballing, canoeing and mountain climbing and only took "select" people with them (Rai, 2006, 101). This appears to be the key bonding experience for the group but the Report into the attack highlights the well established link between extremist groups, bonding and outdoor physical activity (UK H of C, 2006, 17). In 2001 a group of forty men were observed by West Yorkshire police attending a training camp organized by two known extremists, After the 7/7 attack, photo identification revealed that one of the men unidentified to that point, was Khan (UKGISC, 2009, 17). Investigators also know that there was some overlap of outdoor activities between those investigated during Operation Crevice and some of the 7/7 bombers 190 although no evidence exists suggesting either knew what the other was doing or planning (Kenney, 2008, 73). The reports however also acknowledges that in the case of the 7/7 bombers, these trips were often "sporadic and informal," not necessarily limited solely to the group members and were often nothing more than a group of guys camping—no training of any kind occurred (UK H of C, 2006, 17). From this perspective the outdoor bonding as a key part of the solidifying of the 7/7 group dynamic appears somewhat lacking. What is clear is that these outdoor activities provided further opportunities for bonding and indoctrination away from the public eye (HSI, 2007, 34). The group dynamic may have also been fostered in other locations where the individuals spent time together such as the Iqra Islamic bookstore and the gym beneath the Beeston Hardy Street Mosque. Part of the difficulties in sorting out how the group dynamic was cemented lies in the reality that all four members died in the attack. This means that there was no one with intimate knowledge left to fill in missing pieces. Perhaps the apartment rented to construct the bombs served as a clubhouse or headquarters where the core four partook in activities or routines that no one else did. A representation of the London group's socialization can be seen in figure 7. 191

FIGURE 7 A Representation London Group Socialization

MOSQUE / ISLAMIC CENTRE/GYM

Al-IQRA BOOKSTORE

APARTMENT Hasib Hussain

MEMBERS OF MULLAH CREW

Siddique Khan: - Pakistan training camp 2003 - meets Omar Khyam (Crevice Plot) - Pakistan training camp 2004-5

Shehzad Tanweer: - Pakistan training camp 2004-5

Germaine Lindsay: • Self Radicalized

- Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer: Friends first (both members of Mullah Crew Community Group) - Siddique Khan meets Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain through mentoring program ( Shehzad Tanweer first, Hasib Hussain later) - It is unclear how Germaine Lindsay is introduced to group 192

Analysis: Socialization and the Group Dynamic The analysis of the organization has already suggested that the small size of the group may have played a role in solidifying a close group dynamic. In terms of how the group members became interested in Islamic extremism, authorities are uncertain. With the exception of Jermaine Lindsay who apparently self radicalized by listening to audio cassettes of a radical imam, the other members were not devoutly religious until very close to the attacks. Further, at least three of the individuals were considered to be highly integrated into Western and British society for most of their lives. Although this dissertation has mentioned it is difficult to attach any significance to previous life experiences, none of the members with maybe the exception of Jermaine Lindsay had any noteworthy issues in their life which may have affected them later in life. Reports indicate that Siddique Khan and Tanweer were part of a larger social group which formed a neighborhood group known as the Mullah Crew. It is unclear whether they made efforts to recruit other members of this group or tried and were unsuccessful although if they had, this information would probably have come out. This is important because the socialization of this group needs to explain why only two members "graduated" to more radical pursuits. The case study analysis also revealed that many youth in the area frequented an Islamic bookstore as well as an Islamic youth center and gym. It was revealed that under the counter materials were available for viewing and purchase at the bookstore but there is no evidence to suggest that the 7/7 bombers read specific texts or that Siddique Khan needed to indoctrinate or radicalize any of the members. The 7/7 bombers did spent time together especially as they made preparations for the attack. However there is very little indication that they spent all their time together or were isolated in any way from other parts of their life such as family, employment or other forms of day-to-day social activity. This is highlighted because it suggests that they would have still had other influences, ideas and values influencing them right up until the day of the attacks. It is also unclear how much of this time would have been spent with only the immediate members of the group. If they were spending a large proportion of their time at a bookstore or gym they would have been surrounded by other people which would have tempered their discussions and actions. Even if we assume that the people in these places may have had strong opinions about Islam, because they were not members of the actual 193

7/7 group we can differentiate a level of ideological belief between them. This point is made to argue that there is a difference between spending time together and "spending time together," in an almost quality versus quantity argument. We can begin to ask questions about which might be important for socialization towards a certain end or fomenting a strong group identity. The closing of the group identity and strengthening of the group dynamic may have occurred out of sight at the apartment they rented to prepare their explosive devices. Once again however it must be pointed out that this occurred quite close to the attack and reports indicate the purpose for renting the apartment was to construct the bombs. This would suggest that the group dynamic was already well established. Another interesting question which needs to be addressed is the strength of the group dynamic in the 7/7 group in relation to the fact that it was a suicide bombing. Do we differentiate between the trust and cohesiveness necessary to plan and carry out a terrorist attack and the trust and cohesiveness to get all members to sacrifice their lives? Is this a reflection of the size of the group? Can it be argued that the size of the group may impact the group dynamic in terms of amount of time they need to spent together or the "quality" of time they need to spend together? Analysis also highlighted how quickly the 7/7 bombers moved from decision to idea to attack.

Additional Remarks on the London Attacks From the information available, the 7/7 bombings represent an excellent example of domestic homegrown terrorism. Kirby (2007, 416) describes the group as "essentially an autonomous clique whose motivations, cohesiveness and ideological grooming occurred in the absence of any organized network or formal entry into the jihad (Kirby, 2007, 416). We also know that the group consisted of for the most part unremarkable ordinaiy young men who at some point became motivated by a fierce antagonism to perceived injustices by the West against Muslims and a desire for martyrdom (BBC, 2006). For authorities the biggest concern is how ordinary and unassuming British Muslims became radicalized so quickly (UKGISC, 2006a, 29), although other reports indicate that the government was aware of the growing threat. In a report issued one year prior to the attacks and most likely commissioned in response to what had unfolded in Madrid, authorities reviewed strategies 194 to engage young Muslims who may feel alienated, frustrated or angry at Britain. However, the report misses the mark in identifying where the threat will come from. It incorrectly argued young Muslims were going to be recruited by existing groups targeting college and University campuses as well as the prison system (UK Home Office, 2004, 7, 10, 15, 20-1). In comparing the 7/7 terrorist attack to traditional terrorism some fundamental differences can be observed. First, the 7/7 bombers committed a suicide attack meaning that the group ended with the attacks. This did not appear in the literature review nor among analysis of groups which were analyzed in chapter four—they were all campaign oriented. The size of the group is also fairly atypical from what we would expect. Although there is no established rule suggesting a minimum numbers requirement to be considered a terrorist group, four members is on the low side of what the literature has shown. Aside from these obvious differences, many of the markers established in the concluding section of chapter four can be observed although there does appear to be some variation. While this dissertation expected some variation among the leadership and organizational elements, some surprising revelations occurred with the socialization and group dynamics elements. In both of these elements there are substantial differences from what was established in the traditional literature suggesting that this more than leadership and organizational elements may be the major difference between traditional terrorism and domestic homegrown terrorism. It has been suggested in the analysis section above that one of the obstacles impeding a completely accurate deconstruction of the 7/7 attacks is the fact that all of the individuals involved died during the attack. This same challenge exists in trying to identify specifics about the group's practices and dynamics. The following analysis is based on information which was available and does not vary from official accounts or conclusions drawn by investigators and other analysts. 195

CASE STUDY 3: TORONTO 2006 - "The TORONTO 18"

In June 2006, Toronto police announced the disruption and arrest of eighteen individuals who were accused of plotting a massive terrorist attack at various locations in Southwestern Ontario. Four years later, following the trial and sentencing of the final members of the group details emerged about the both the plot and the group of individuals behind it when a publication ban was lifted. The release of all of the information revealed several surprising revelations which portrayed a very different threat than the one initially reported by media and law enforcement. The Toronto 18 plot turned out to be a far more interesting incident and speculation that a group of 18 individuals had been working towards the execution of a spectacular terrorist attack proved to be unfounded. The reality which has emerged from an analysis of this case study is a very complex series of events which actually points to the Toronto eighteens origins as a cohesive group which then splintered into two separate plots with two different leaders. This provides the opportunity for further insight into domestic homegrown terrorism because in this case there are actually two separate groups which can be analyzed, not just in comparison to the Madrid and London case studies but to each other as well. The Toronto 18 case study was constructed through an analysis of primary sources including original research. When the publication ban was lifted all of the court proceedings for all of the group members became available. In total, some forty court transcripts and appeals were researched. In addition to these sources one of the police agents who infiltrated the group was also interviewed. On June 13th and 16th 2011 Mubin Shaikh was interviewed and provided additional insight from his own experiences. His information proved invaluable as he was able to not only share his own information but information he had acquired from attending meetings with intelligence agencies, law enforcement and attorneys which assisted in providing a very clear picture of the group and the plot. It is important to mention that Mr. Shaikh was extremely straightforward and forthcoming but was also conscious of some details he could not reveal. Most of these however revolve around the identities and actions of the four youth offenders accused although he could reveal that they only played very minimal roles in the plot. Because the Toronto 18 ended up splintering into two groups, each one is analyzed in relation to the core elements identified in this dissertation. As such this case study will 196 be organized slightly differently than the Madrid and London studies. Following a brief introduction and discussion of the plot, the groups' split and how the attack was going to unfold, each one of the elements will be discussed first, as they manifested themselves when the group was cohesive and intact, and second how they appeared after the group separated into two autonomous groups. Although all of the members representing both groups were arrested at the same time, one of the groups was much further along in the preparations for their attack. It will also be evident that each of the groups demonstrates some variations among the elements.

The Plot On June 2nd 2006 police arrested eighteen individuals for plotting terrorist attacks against Canadians. Intelligence agents first became concerned with an individual named Fahim Ahmad in February 2005 and launched an investigation dubbed Project Osage following his activities. The investigation expanded to include a larger group of individuals in contact with Ahmad on November 17th 2005 (R. v Ahmad, 2009, 1; 50). However, in the time between the initiation of the investigation and the time when charges were laid and the group arrested the plot had evolved and the group had splintered. What began as an investigation into the activities of one group developed into two concurrent investigations about two separate plots. Two points are immediately important about this realization. The first is that the public never knew the real circumstances behind the plotted attacks, and second despite the lifting of the publication bans, the full details have still never been fully disclosed, leading to an incomplete and inaccurate portrayal of what would have been the biggest terrorist attack in Canadian history. Originally the media and various other sources reported a large group of individuals plotting sensational attacks consisting of several simultaneous massive bombings in addition to the storming of Parliament and a beheading of politicians. In fact, these were actually two separate plots: one group was planning to detonate three bombs while the other wanted to storm Parliament in an effort to have Canadian troops withdrawn from Afghanistan. The plots were not connected. It was also determined that one of the groups was much better organized than the other and that arrests had to be made as the group was imminently prepared to acquire the necessary ingredients to build their bombs. 197

The Toronto 18 plot initially revolved around an individual named Fahim Ahmed who was the common link between two different groups of men. One of the social groups was centered in Meadowvale (Mississauga) where Ahmad had grown up and the other from Scarborough where Ahmad had moved after his marriage. Figure 8 provides a detailed account of all of the members indicted in the Toronto 18 case as well as their ultimate affiliation.

FIGURE 8 The Toronto 18 Group

SCARBOROUGH MISSISSAUGA

Fahim Ahmad Zakaria Amara

Amin Durrani Saad Khalid

CM a Jahmaal James Asad Ansari o a «s Steven Chand Qayyum Abdul Jamal '3 e CD Mohammed Ali Dirie Ahmad Ghany N

Yasin Abdi Mohamed Ibrahim Aboud

4 youths (cannot be names)

The table reveals two separate groups and ultimately the group fractured along these geographical lines. The fracture saw another individual named Zakaria Amara emerge to lead the Mississauga group in a separate terrorist plot. Mubin Shaikh revealed that there was a clear series of events which led Amara openly to question whether Ahmad was serious about taking action. The split reflected Amara's growing frustrations that Ahmad's plans were "unrealistic" and that "his reach exceeded his grasp" (Zekulin, 2011ms) which led him to take control and develop his own group. A very simple representation depicts Fahim Ahmad and several of his friends including Zakaria Amara having known each other growing up in Mississauga. Ahmad's marriage after highschool saw him re-locate to Scarborough where he found a new circle of friends. Ahmad served as the immediate link between the two circles of individuals and 198 travelled back and forth between the two groups, eventually bringing them together to form the initial Toronto 18 (See figure 9). From here the group became increasingly radicalized through literature dispersed to the group by Fahim Ahmad who had started to spend an increasing amount of time on Jihadist websites. In March 2005 members of the initial group met in Toronto and were joined by three additional individuals Ahmad had met online. One was a British citizen named Aabid Khan who was also known as "Mr. Fix-it" and two were unnamed US citizens from Atlanta (Teotonio, 2010) (See figure 9). Mubin Shaikh identified this as the point where the group begins to discuss taking some form of action. Aabid Khan is said to have arranged passage for one Toronto 18 member, Jaahmal James and the two US citizens to attend a training camp in Pakistan (Zekulin, 2011ms). It turns out that the American individuals were planning on carrying out their own attack in US and had commenced surveillance of potential targets (R. v Durrani, 2008, 10). From December 18th to December 30th 2005 the group held a training camp North of Toronto. The camp was organized by Fahim Ahmad with the purposes of providing training for recruits and assessing whether they would be suitable candidates for the group (R. V. Amara, 2010, 9). In early February 2006, Ahmad and Zakaria investigated a property they wanted to purchase for use as a safehouse and training facility (R. v Amara, 2010, 15). By mid March 2006 the growing animosity between Fahim Ahmad and Zakaria Ahmad started to affect the cohesion of the group and by the end of March 2006 Amara began to pull away from the group setting his own plot in motion.

The Split Several points are important regarding the split of the original group. First, there was clearly growing concern about the direction of the group and the leadership of Fahim Ahamad. In addition to Zakaria Amara's discontent, other members including Steven Chand and Jahmaal James were becoming increasingly concerned about the relaxed attitude and recklessness they felt Ahmad was displaying. Specifically, Jahmaal James upon his return from a training camp in Pakistan felt that Ahmad was bringing down too much "heat" on the group (Teotonio, 2010). Following the split these two individuals who had remained with Ahmad despite their growing concerns, began to distance themselves from the group and this is reflected in their prison sentences. 199

Zakaria Amara went beyond voicing his concerns and ultimately chose to sever himself from the group. In one interview Mubin Shaikh described a series of events and specific grievances which increasingly frustrated Amara, leading him to leave. Shaikh revealed that Amara had become increasingly disillusioned over time and identified three specific issues. The first concern occurred following the original training camp which Ahmad videotaped. Ahmad later revealed that he had sent a copy of the tape abroad to show other jihadis what they were doing. Amara was furious that his face was visible on tape and actually became preoccupied with trying to re-possess any copies Ahmad had. Second Amara always felt that the original plan of storming Parliament was ridiculous and outlandish and only highlighted how amateur Ahmad really was. Third, Amara began to think that Ahmad was all talk. Since their call to action in March 2005, Amara was frustrated that the plan had not moved forward: they had failed to acquire any weapons cache, they had failed to secure the safehouse/training facilities and Amara's suggestions of alternative plots were ignored (Zekulin, 2011ms). One individual Saad Khalid left with Amara who then added several new members to his own groups. All bridges were burned th between the two groups when on March 24 2006 Amara paid Ahmad the ultimate insult calling him "Islamically wrong" (R. v Amara, 2010, 18). Following the groups splintering a new Amara led group moves forward to implement its own terrorist attack. Simultaneously Ahmad downplayed Amara's defection and also continued to move forward with his attack plans. He spun Amara's departure by informing the remainder of the Scarborough group that it was Amara who was the weak link who was "acting independently of his instruction" (R. v Durrani, 2008, 55; R. v Amara, 2010, 155; Zekulin, 2011ms). The schism resulted in two separate and independent groups (detailed in figure 9) with the Ahmad group committed to a Parliament attack and conducting a second training camp and the Amara group expanding its membership and pursuing a truck bomb plot. The two groups did not overlap again. The Amara group would be responsible for what would become the imminent terrorist threat. Amara quickly planned his attack, recruited several other acquaintances and arranged for the acquisition of the materials. Dubbed "The Battle of Toronto", Amara's plot was to simultaneously detonate three u-haul trucks filled with fertilizer explosives and containing metal chips targeting the Toronto Stock Exchange, CSIS 200 headquarters and CFB Trenton (Teotonio, 2010). The u-hauls would be driven by three members of Amara's group and then remotely detonated by cell phone (R. v Amara, 2010, 20). The explosives were ammonium nitrate fertilizer based and were to be mixed with mercury fulminate which is made by treating mercury with strong nitric acid. A test detonation conducted by experts using one ton of ammonium nitrate and gasoline created a bomb with the equivalent of 768 kilograms of TNT and would have caused "catastrophic damage" to the targets and massive casualties (R. v Amara, 2010, 39). The motive behind the attack appears to have been focused on changing Canadian foreign policy, specifically trying to influence the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan (R. v Amara, 2010, 1). The group also selected the Toronto Stock Exchange in an effort to affect the economy. It is believed that an attack on the exchange would have closed it and cost Canada approximately 500 billion dollars (R. v Amara, 2010, 29). Mubin Shaikh revealed that one member of the Amara group Shareef Abdelhaleem was preparing to make money off the event by playing the stock market in advance of the attack (Zekulin, 2011ms). Conversely, the Ahmad group continued pursuing the original plot to attack Parliament and take hostages to force the withdrawal of Canadian troops from Afghanistan and the release of Muslim inmates from Canadian prisons (R. v Ansari, 2006, 4; R. v Ahmad, 2009b, 64). Ahmad termed this "Operation Badr." However, the group was moving very slowly. A second training camp occurred in May 2006 but firm plans once again remained undecided (Zekulin, 2011ms) The evolution of Amara's group included the addition of three new members. Saad Khalid who departed with Amara reached out to his friend Saad Gaya who was studying at McMaster University. Also entering the picture was a confidant of Amara named Shareef Abdelhaleem. Abdelhaleem was older, and by all accounts a successful computer engineer who knew Amara from the Mississauga Islamic Center A1—Arqam which Abdelhaleem's father ran (Teotonio, 2010). It was Abdelhaleem who would introduce Zakaria Amara to the last member of the group a former friend of his named Shahar Elsohemy who was actually a police informant. In April 2006 the final plan was laid out at a meeting between Amara, Abdelhaleem and Elsohemy and a tentative date set for either September or November 2006 depending on how quickly Elsohemy could acquire the fertilizer (Teotonio, 2010). Plans were also discussed about purchasing plane tickets to leave the 201 country after the attacks and hiding out in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Sudan (R. v Amara, 2010, 19). The Mississauga group was arrested June 2nd 2006 in the process of accepting and unloading the chemicals and fertilizer set up by Elsohemy which was a controlled delivery by law enforcement officials (R. v Abdelhaleem, 2010). The Scarborough group was detained shortly thereafter. What emerged in the aftermath of the split are two very different groups. One group appeared much more sophisticated and moved very quickly to implement its plan while the other continues to stumble along slowly. Mubin Shaikh suggests that he always believed that Ahmad would eventually try some form of attack but never believed that it would be very sophisticated or large scale. His greatest fear was that Ahmad was a very charismatic guy who despite not being very technically proficient might have ended up finding another Amara who was very capable (Zekulin, 2011ms). From this point forward each one of the elements will be investigated by their application to the original Toronto 18 group and then more specifically in the context of the two groups post split. In most cases the focus is on the Amara group who were actively moving forward while the Ahmad group in most cases appears to be inactive. The analysis is quite detailed because the case against the Amara group and the Ahmad group were very well developed compared to other disrupted plots. The Crown's case was based almost entirely on wiretaps, seized videos and computer based communications, surveillance, and the testimony of the respective police agents (R. v Ahmad, 2007, 56).

Role of the Organization Toronto 18 The initial Toronto 18 group was quite large and therefore did have some clear form of organization. The Toronto 18 grew under the direction of Fahim Ahmad who through his links to the individuals in Scarborough as well as Mississauga brought them together and made efforts to have them coalesce. During the group's inception and through the first training camp Fahim Ahmed was the accepted leader and motivator of both groups and was consciously attempting to amalgamate them (R. v Amara, 2010, 9). He also preferred to be involved in every aspect of the group's activities. It might appear that he delegated tasks to others but a more in-depth investigation reveals that he was always "hands on." 202

Ahmad began by surrounding himself with like-minded individuals but ensured that they were given some form of direction. Hard drives as well as memory sticks seized from members after they were arrested revealed shared common literature. Mubin Shaikh revealed that each member was given literature that they needed to read. He shared that when he first met with Ahmad and Amara on November 27th 2005 he was given conservative Wahhabist literature to read (Teotonio, 2010; Zekulin, 2011ms). Ahmad was fond of creating propaganda and indoctrination videos which he had members watch. He dubbed these videos the "Realty Series". He also used them as recruiting tools on at least one occasion. On March 28, 2006 Ahmad and Shaikh were intercepted on a car probe having a conversation with unknown young men. Ahmad told the men to take CDs he described as the "Reality Series" and distribute them (R. v Ahmad, 2009b, 107) In December 2005, at the peak of the group's activities a training camp was held. From December 18th - December 30th 2005 the group gathered in Washago Ontario located approximately 150 km north of Toronto and underwent training, indoctrination and group building exercises (Teotonio, 2010). Mubin Shaikh reveals that part of what allowed him to so quickly become accepted by Ahmad was his background, especially his military training. Once Ahmad learned this he insisted that Shaikh plan two training camps for a number of individuals, the first to serve as an introductory course and a second one later in "a more advanced" phase (R. v Durrani, 2008, 12; Zekulin, 2011ms). Shaikh and another member Steven Chand who also had some military background ran the recruits through a series of drills. The participants engaged in general physical training including marches, paint ball games and obstacle courses (R. v Amara, 2010, 11). Shaikh suggests that this was where the group's hierarchy could best be observed: Ahmad was in charge and had informed Shaikh and Chand how the camp was to be organized and what he wanted it to accomplish. This made Shaikh and Chand lieutenants while Amara was quietly the right hand man (Zekulin, 2011ms). These four individuals were "evaluating" the participants both as to their abilities, physical fitness and dedication. The purpose was to differentiate the attendees from one another and also gauge their enthusiasm and "how receptive they were to some of the ideological banter that developed." Essentially which candidates could be "moved up to the next stage of training" (R. v Ahmad, 2008, 18; R. v Durrani, 2008, 17; Zekulin, 2011ms) 203

The camp was also designed to educate or indoctrinate and foster group camaraderie. During the day everyone had to participate in single-file marching led by a participant carrying a flag of the declaration of faith (R. v Durrani, 2008, 24) and at night the group would have discussions or listen to halaquas (religious sermons). Two primary halaquas were given during the camp. The first was a recording of Unra Awalki's lectures on the "Constant of Jihad". Ahmad encouraged everyone to sit, listen and take note of what was said as he added his own commentary. According to Shaikh, the lectures stressed the priority of going to fight the jihad over securing knowledge and learning (R. v Durrani, 2008, 25; Zekulin, 2011ms). The second halaqua was a sermon by Ahmad who stated that "they were like Al-Qaeda, though not officially Al-Qaeda, but had the same aims, objectives and methods" (R. v Durrani, 2008, 26). Ahmad also wanted to use the training camp as a way to showcase what he was trying to do in Canada. The group was instructed to pretend they were mujahideen in Chechnya and videotaped in the same way jihadi videos were produced. Shaikh has testified that Ahmad maintained that two minutes of video were shown to Afghan leaders overseas who found the footage "impressive". Amara however was very concerned that Ahmad had shared the footage because his face was visible in some of the footage (R. v Durrani, 2008, 29). According to Shaikh, this contributed to his growing disillusionment with Ahmad and the group. Shaikh also revealed that Ahmad shared his disappointment with the group's capabilities (Zekulin, 2011ms) In January 2006 the group began looking for a safehouse where they could continue to train and make preparations for future attacks (Teotonio, 2010). On February 4th 2006 Ahmad, Durrani, Chand and Shaikh drove twelve hours to northern Ontario to inspect a rural property to purchase for this purpose and to use as a weapons storage facility (R. v Ahmad, 2008, 6). Shaikh implied that the plan went beyond using the property for training and a safehouse. He revealed that the group discussed using Mr. Fix-its connections to bring over experienced jihadis to stay at the house and use for potential attacks (Zekulin, 2011ms). The group could not agree on the suitability of the property and it was never purchased. In an effort to secure the funds to purchase a property as well as weapons, Steven Chand introduced an individual to Ahmad on March 3rd 2006 known only as Mr. Talib. In 204 a wiretap he can be heard describing various types of bank fraud and related financial crimes in which he was involved. While the purpose was to learn if they could use some of these techniques to raise funds for their own attacks, Ahmad attempted to recruit Talib which made Chand angry and uneasy because he felt Ahmad was revealing too much information to a stranger. This was the beginnings of the tension between himself and Ahmad (R. v Ahmad, 2008, 12; R. v Durrani, 2008, 53). Shaikh revealed that the possibility of bank robberies was brought up at one point but were never seriously considered (Zekulin, 2011ms). At this point the group had no weapons. Previous attempts made earlier by Ali Dirie and Yasin Mohamed to smuggle in weapons from the US were unsuccessful leading to their apprehension and re-affirmed police interest in Ahmad who had used his credit card to rent the car (R. v Ahmad, 2009, 51). At this point the group had no property. They did however continue their efforts to gather knowledge and get supplies. Documents seized after the fact were mostly about bomb making including titles such as "10 Great High Explosive Mixtures", "Ammonium Nitrate", "Basic Explosive Theory", "Blowing Up a Car" and "Bombs for Beginners"(R. v Ahmad, 2007b, 6; R. v Ahmad, 2009b, 2; 69). The group did re-organize itself but this was based primarily on the fact that the group split. However, in this case the re-organization appears to have been completely internal and was not in response to any outside stimuli ~ it was not adaptive nor an evolution to a perceived threat or inefficiency. It is also unclear what the long term plans for a cohesive Toronto 18 group might have been and whether they had planned a sustained terrorist campaign or a one and done style attack. The fact that the plan to storm Parliament was not well developed prevents us from saying how it would have unfolded or where it might have gone after that. This is also the case for the post split Ahmad group who according to Shaikh never really developed any coherent attack plans of their own (Zekulin, 2011ms). However, evidence suggests that the Amara group had a very well developed strategy and that they planned a massive simultaneous bombing after which they were going to flee the country. It appears that on the surface they could have been considered to be a "one and done group." 205

The Ahmad Group Following the group's splintering in March 2006, it is fairly unclear what direction the Ahmad led group was going to pursue. Mubin Shaikh suggested that the plot to storm Parliament and behead politicians remained a focal point of discussion but it continued to be a very vague set of statements instead of a plan (Zekulin, 2001ms). Ahmad did organize a second training camp in May 2006 partly to identify new individuals which might be interested in joining the group and fill the void which was created when Amara left and took several existing members with him (R. v Durrani, 2008, 64). A second videotape was also made during this training camp which was going to be used for propaganda purposes (Teotonio, 2010; Zekulin, 2011ms). Shaikh maintains that there were still no specific efforts to raise funds or purchase or acquire weapons or other materials. In complete contrast the Amara group continued and even accelerated its efforts to conduct an attack while the Ahmad group seemed to be at the very least patiently waiting or had no intention of actually moving into an operational phase. Shaikh revealed that he was never one hundred percent sure Ahmad or his group were going to follow through and Amara's assessment that Ahmad was "all talk" may have had some validity (Zekulin, 2011ms).

The Amara Group The Amara group was the polar opposite of the Ahmad group. The disruption and arrest of all members of the Toronto 18 occurred because the Amara group had progressed well into an operational phase. The arrests were made as materials for the bombs were being delivered to the group. Following the split Amara had sought out new individuals to ensure the success of the attack, researched the best way to carry out the attacks, secured the necessary funding and materials and even planned his departure after the attacks. At the time of the split, Amara had already begun working towards his objective. Police surveillance on March 22nd 2006 observed him conducting research at the Meadowvale Public Library in Mississauga. A police computer technician's search of the computer revealed he had searched topics including "ammonium nitrate in agriculture", "nitric acid", "rocket fuel", "fuel tablet", and "buy nitric acid". Later that same day he went with Saad Khalid to visit an old friend of theirs named Saad Gaya (R. v Gaya, 2008, 21) who would be recruited to assist in the plot. The group was completed when Shareef Abdelhaleem 206 joined and brought with him Shahar Elsohemy who by this time was already working with police. Amara meticulously researched and planned the attack. Prior to his arrest authorities entered his home and found a safe which they inspected through a small hole. Inside the safe they observed electronic devices and envelopes of money. On a separate occasion they also managed to investigate his computer. They found information and videos on bomb making, a list of chemical suppliers and manufacturers, packaging for an MK 160 remote control via cellular phone and 200 student farmer business cards (R. v Amara, 2010, 25). A 135 page bomb manual had portions underlined, hand written notations and hand written pages dealing with ingredients. Propaganda articles including one titled "Clarification About the Issue of Jihad Today" were also observed (R. v Amara, 2010, 26). Amara funded the operation himself using his student loans and maxing out credit cards. He amassed approximately $ 30 000 for expenses which included funding for the attacks as well as leaving Canada and living abroad following the attack (R. v Amara, 2010, 23). Amara and Abdelhaleem were also heard on wiretaps discussing a meeting with an accountant about the best way to open accounts, without drawing attention, which were going to be used to move the money made from the stock market crash (R. v Abdelhaleem, 41). The $30 000 was used to set up the ammonium nitrate fertilizer purchases which kept increasing in size. In a series of meetings Elsohemy was asked to get increasing amounts of chemicals for three bombs: two tons then three tons then four tons of ammonium nitrate and in each case he was given cash in an envelope (R. v Abdelhaleem, 51). During May and June of 2006, Amara made efforts to secure large quantities of ammonium nitrate as well as nitric acid and other materials essential to the bomb-making process. This was the role that Elsohemy was supposed to fill because it was thought he had contacts to secure large quantities without arousing suspicion (R. v Gaya, 2008, 8). The money was also used to rent a storage unit where the materials were to be stored and mixed. The group had tried unsuccessfully to rent a house. On May 22nd, 2006, Saad Gaya and Saad Khalid actually completed and signed a rental agreement for a house at 23 Findlay Blvd. in Toronto. The agreement was for tenancy commencing June 1st at a monthly rental fee of $1,450.00. The owner of the property balked when he met 207

Khalid and Gaya and felt they were too young to be reliable despite Amara instructing them to offer several months advance in cash (R. v Gaya, 2008, 33; 43). Ultimately the group settled for a storage unit rented by Khalid. On May 31st Khalid rented an industrial unit at 1228 Gorham Street, Unit #6, Newmarket (R. v Khalid, 2009,46). Finally, a sum of money was set aside to purchase airplane tickets which the group would use to leave Canada after the attacks. This apparently created a great deal of confusion. Initially it was agreed that Elsohemy would purchase tickets for all members of the group. The attacks were initially planned for September 11th so "world would always remember that date." Amara told Elsohemy to purchase round trip tickets to Pakistan for November 15th but subsequently told Abdelhaleem he was getting tickets for October 15 (R. v Khalid, 2009, 23). Shaikh revealed that Amara planned to leave much earlier than that and had not told anyone he would be leaving right after the attacks (Zekulin, 2011ms). This seems to be supported by later admissions that Amara told people not to bother buying him a ticket because he would buy his own to avoid connecting everyone together (R. v Khalid, 2009, 32). Shaikh suggested that Amara was planning to leave immediately following the attacks and that he was fairly certain the other members would be caught (Zekulin, 2011ms). The Amara group apparently entertained the idea of a short abbreviated bombing campaign. Abdelhaleem wanted to have bombs go off on three consecutive days to "scare Canadians and have them afraid to leave their houses" (R. v Khalid, 2009, 30). Amara however decided against this and evidence supports this because Abdelhaleem, Khalid and Gaya all acknowledged that they were to drive vans to the target locations and Amara had made plans to leave the country immediately following the attack The picture that emerges is that the group still adhered to some form of hierarchy. Amara liked to have control over everything but it is fairly well established by some actions and intercepted conversations that Abdelhaleem was essentially the right hand man. He brought in Elsohemy and had Elsohemy execute tasks on behalf of Amara. On May 8 2006, Abdelhaleem told Elsohemy to place the first order for chemicals without telling Amara, explaining as he pointed to himself "not every link in the chain needs to know what the others are doing" as long as there is a co-coordinator (R. v Khalid, 2010, 26). It is felt that the group may have been isolated from itself. Court documents reveal that Amara is known to have subscribed to the teachings of El Ariri who advocated in planning an attack, 208 that only the centre person should know the entire plan. It is alleged that Abdelhaleem did not know the identity of Khalid and Gaya and they did not know of Abdelhaleem's involvement. It appears that Amara was the only one to deal with Gaya and Khalid. There was evidence however that Saad Khalid and Gaya were not the patsies they made themselves out to be at trial and that they may not have known all the details or all the members but they knew about the attack. They are overheard having input into moving the date for the bombings forward (R. v Gaya, 2010, 10). When Khalid and Gaya were arrested they had memory sticks they had received from Amara containing instructions they needed to follow about: renting the house, doing surveillance in downtown Toronto and obtaining chemicals. Amara also had provided them with a pinhole camera (R. v Amara, 2010,36). Several of these points also point to a fairly sophisticated group. The manner in which they used memory sticks to communicate and pass instructions and store documents was meant to avoid detection left on hardrives. Amara developed the identity of the "student farmers" printing business cards and t-shirts to make it appear as if the chemicals had a legitimate purpose. In terms of the attack, Amara ensured that at the very least he had an escape plan and he had also built two detonators for each bomb so each one would have a back-up if the first failed (R. v Abdelhaleem, 46). He also devised a system to know if someone had entered the storage area and "investigated" its contents. Instructions seized on the day Khalid and Gaya were arrested unloading the fertilizer reveal a conscious effort to monitor the materials. Amara instructed them to secretly "mark" the bags with little red dots so they would know if authorities had been in and switched the fertilizer like they had in London. He also instructed them to seal the door with wax from candles so they would know if the door had been opened (R. v Amara, 2010, 35). Instructions also reveal that Amara was going to pass by to pick up two bags of fertilizer which he was going to take up north and conduct a trial explosion although the group was arrested and he never had the opportunity (R. v Khalid, 2009, 35)

Analysis: Role of the Organization The organizational aspects of the Toronto 18 groups exhibited the markers set from the analysis of traditional terrorism yet closer examination reveals that there are some 209 subtle differences. Beginning with the Amara group, we can observe three of the criteria identified to be associated with the organization element and an absence of two. Further, two of the three show a variation from those seen in the traditional context. The Amara group met the minimum threshold from the perspective that it sought out (and acquired) the primary resources we would assume necessary for an attack: First, it recruited new members. When Zakaria Amara split from the Ahmad group he essentially left behind all of the human resources the group had amassed to that point. One member, Saad Khalid chose to leave with Amara but other members were also recruited. Very quickly following the split, two further individuals were recruited both of whom had a past social relationship with Amara, Khalid or both. Saad Gaya was recruited as a former friend and Shareef Abdelhaleem was a family friend of Amara. It appears that these new individuals were recruited purposefully to shore up the group's numbers so Amara's multiple bomb plot could be conducted. Further, the recruitment of Elsohemy by Abdelhaleem appears to have once again been done with a specific purpose: the fact that they were convinced Elsohemy could acquire large amounts of fertilizer and chemicals without arousing suspicion. Beyond the recruitment of these three individuals it does not appear that there was any focused or sustained effort or strategies to recruit new members. This adds further weight to the evidence that this was designed to be a one and done attack. The group also made efforts to acquire technical know-how to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their attack. However, the source of the information came from within the group itself and there is no evidence to suggest they made efforts to contact any others despite the obvious connection they had with another like-minded group. Amara acquired all of the technical information about chemical and fertilizer mixtures from the internet and his knowledge to construct the detonators from his schooling (Zekulin, 2011ms). Surveillance of potential targets was conducted by the group themselves with Gaya and Khalid using a pinhole video recorder supplied by Amara to select from a variety of high profile targets in downtown Toronto. Third, the group secured the necessary financial funding to conduct the attack. It is also alleged that they had set aside enough money for the group to depart Canada for a safer environment overseas. The Amara group's source of funding was Amara himself who used his student loans and maxed out several credit cards in order to secure the money. He did not raise any funds through 210 soliciting others in the group or from the community. While technically the money he acquired would have amounted to fraud (diverting student loans for non-scholarly purposes), money was not raised through any specific criminal activity. Amara, independently acquiring the knowledge to construct the bombs and singlehandedly securing the funding for the attack coupled with no efforts to continuously recruit played the prominent role in the plans. He did delegate specific tasks such as renting the storage unit and ordering the chemicals but it would be difficult to consider this specialization or compartmentalization. The analysis of traditional terrorist organization highlighted that certain tasks were often the responsibility of certain people in most cases becoming their primary responsibility. Taken as a whole, one of the arguments made about the importance of an organization's functionality is the fact that it provides the group options. More importantly without options, without the ability to conduct attacks, recruit members, the information to adapt and evolve, it becomes more difficult for the group to exist: it becomes irrelevant or dies from slow attrition. This however presumes that the group wishes to continue operating. In the analysis conducted on traditional terrorism groups, it was clear that considerable efforts were made to ensure that a long campaign could continue if necessary and this meant continuous fundraising, continuous recruitment to replenish killed or captured members and continuous learning and evolution. This cannot be said for the Amara group as the evidence suggests that it was designed to be a "one and done" attack. None of the efforts described to ensure continuity can be observed and the leader had made plans to flee the country. We do however see some differences if we examine the original Toronto 18 group. These differences also apply to the splintered Ahmad group since he remained in charge and continued to pursue the plan initially developed by the larger cohesive group. There appears to have been an effort to continue recruiting: the group grew when the two groups came together but Ahmad continued to look for recruits creating propaganda tapes to hand out to individuals he felt might be interested. Part of the tension which emerged between Ahmad and Chand grew over Chand's perception that Ahmad was not cautious when he met new people and would talk openly about his activities as well as the groups. Shaikh also revealed that he was actively recruited despite being an outsider and that Ahmad while 211 not open about his specific intentions, was very open about his extremist ideology (Zekulin, 2011ms). To a certain degree, both training camps were also meant to try and convince individuals to join the group. This is especially true of the second training camp in May 2006 which Ahmad wanted to use to identify suitable candidates to help fill the void left by the recent split (Zekulin, 2011ms). The group investigated several ways to raise funds to acquire weapons and a safehouse and these included meeting with an individual named Talib to discuss more illicit money making activities. There is no evidence to suggest these schemes were ever put into practice or that there was ever a specific dollar amount suggested by Ahmad. Ahmad claimed to have been in contact with mujahideen overseas and had also suggested on one occasion that he was in contact with at least one other group operating in Canada. Neither of these claims was ever substantiated. Ahmad did spend a lot of time on the internet and particularly in chat forums having to do with Islam. He also made at least tentative connections with the two Americans as well as Aabid Khan who had links to other terrorist groups especially some in Pakistan. This can also be used to show that the initial group under Ahmad did try to enhance their expertise and gain knowledge. This was done through the internet but also tangibly by having Aabid Khan arrange for Jahmaal James to attend a two week training camp. Shaikh revealed that there had been discussions about sending multiple members but it was quickly decided that sending more members might raise suspicions. It was ultimately decided that James would attend and then "fill everyone in" (Zekulin, 2011ms) There is also some evidence to suggest that there was the making for some very basic specialization in the group. Shaikh and Chand with their military background served a very specific role as trainers at the camps, James was sent to acquire more technical knowledge which he would share, Ahmad was in charge of indoctrinating newer members and Shaikh revealed that another member Arnin Durrani had taken it upon himself to become the recruiter (Zekulin, 2011ms). Part of the problem in verifying this can also be applied to the question of whether or not this group would have had continuity—multiple attacks or a longer campaign—or whether they were going to be one and done. The group's split prevents us from ever really knowing how this group might have grown and evolved. We can speculate that the recruiting and the reaching out to other groups could be 212 viewed as evidence that this group might have been interested in something bigger. Although Shaikh's assessment of the reality of an attack and the reason Amara split just as easily support the idea that nothing of concern would have ever materialized from that incarnation of the group. This is the same judgment applied to the post split Ahmad group: there was never really any way of knowing if an attack was going to occur and what this would have meant moving forward.

Role of Leadership Toronto 18 In its initial stages the group was composed of two separate groups: one from Meadowvale and the other from Scarborough with Ahmad being the common bond between the two. At this point the group was cohesive with Ahmad as the leader and Amara serving as "the right hand man." Mubin Shaikh revealed that Ahmad was a confident and charismatic individual but that he was much more amenable when others "stroked his ego" and made him feel important. Shaikh referred to him as Ameer sahib loosely translated as "my leader" (Zekulin, 2011ms). Despite the group's split, this section discusses Fahim Ahmad although there was no imminent attack from his group. He is still an important figure because first, he played the key role in religious indoctrination and was the one who provided the other members of the group with literature. Second, he arguably continued to at the very least plot some kind of attack which was to occur at some point. The role of the leadership for the actual potential attack which was disrupted fell on Zakaria Amara after the split. It is clear that he moved squarely into the leadership role and proceeded on his own path. Due to the actual small size of Amara's group it is possible to briefly introduce the other main characters in the plot. This exercise was not undertaken for anyone in the Ahmad group as their roles were less advanced and less developed.

Fahim Ahmad It is difficult to identify where and when Fahim Ahmad may himself have become radicalized. He was born in Afghanistan and lived through the Afghan civil war coming to Canada in 1994. Shaikh discussed that Ahmad was heavily influenced by his "conflict ridden background" (Zekulin, 2011ms). Reports indicate that he was visiting jihadist 213 websites as early as 2002 and was actively communicating with other like-minded individuals by 2004. Ahmad was a frequent visitor to chat forums on sites such as ClearGuidance.com, IslamicNetwork.com and at Tibyan Publications (Teotonio, 2010). His internet adventures led him to the foreign connections to the group because he came into contact with both Aabid Khan, a UK citizen known as Mr. Fix-it who knew individuals involved with Pakistani terrorist groups Lashkar-e-tabbiya and Jaish-e- Mohammad as well as two US citizens (Teotonio, 2010). Mubin Shaikh revealed that Ahmad would trawl the sites and that he had a password protected account on a site called PalTalk where he would advertise he was "looking for soccer players" which was code for like minded individuals. Shaikh highlighted that many "Muslim activist types" were familiar with this type of advertisement (Zekulin, 2011ms). Ahmad had become a very charismatic ideologue and grew his beard and dressed traditionally. He was so confident in his assertions about Islamic doctrine, international politics and the plight of Muslims that very few people ever questioned him. He began to develop a group of followers and convinced them that the West was at war with Islam (Teotonio, 2010). Fahim Ahmad recruited individuals by indoctrinating them with emotional arguments about the oppression of Muslims and argued that while the enemy was the Americans, because of their closeness Canada was also an enemy (R. v Amara, 2010, 6). Shaikh disclosed that Ahmad had told people he had been to Iraq and knew people there but it was a lie designed to make people think he was more important or more qualified than he really was (Zekulin, 2011ms). In addition to claims he was in contact with mujahideen overseas, Ahmad also said that he was in contact with other groups in Canada although Shaikh reveals there was never any evidence to support this. He does however acknowledge that the group thought it would be beneficial to try and reach out to other groups (Zekulin, 2011ms) Shaikh conceded that Ahmad was charismatic and that he played the role very well but disclosed that despite most of his followers unwavering support, Zakaria Amara and Steven Chand were on occasion sceptical of Ahmad's leadership. He recalled one specific incident where Chand called Ahmad out in front of other members of the group which angered Ahmad (Zekulin, 2011ms) The leadership of Fahim Ahmad has to be viewed with some caution. He was a dedicated individual who on the surface made every effort to carry out his vision of jihad 214 against Canada. He was a charismatic individual who capably manipulated religious ideas and won followers. He was seen on the video made at the December 2006 training camp instructing the others that they must do whatever it takes to work towards their objectives, no matter the cost, the consequences, or how long it takes. He pushed them to remain dedicated to the cause, and told them they had been "purchased by Allah" in return for heaven. He also urged them to go back to their jobs, families and communities and to pretend to fit in, while pursuing the terrorist cause (R. v Ahmad, 2009, 64). To his credit as leader, he managed to assemble a group of like minded individuals and for at least a time appeared to have control over the group's direction. He did research, concocted the Parliament plan and made some effort to acquire the resources to support his plan. However, the fact that his leadership ended up questioned and he failed to maintain control presents evidence that his leadership had shortcomings. Further the fact that no Ahmad group attack was ever close to occurring suggests that Ahmad did not fulfill the role of leadership very well.

Zakaria Amara In comparison to Fahim Ahmad, there are several interesting events in Zakaria Amara's life which it has been suggested made him susceptible to the religious and ideological positions he ultimately came to accept. His motivations to conduct a terrorist attack stem directly from some of these experiences. Amara was born in Jordan and baptized Orthodox Christian. He converted to Islam when he was ten and moved to Canada in 1997 at age thirteen (R. v Amara, 2010, 43). According to Shaikh, Amara had a very strained relationship with his father and his parents had a history of marital issues. He believes that Amara's father divorcing his mother and leaving the family for good in March 2005 may have been the final straw that pushed Amara over the edge (Zekulin, 2011ms). Two other points are also important: first, Amara married at a very young age and a psychiatrist testified at his trial that the challenges of raising a family, which forced him to drop out of University, and the collapse of his parents marriage stressed him and made him very upset (Teotonio, 2010). This all occurred around the time that the United States was attacking Afghanistan and Iraq which made Amara, like many in his peer group very angry (R. v Amara, 2010, 62). Another important contributing factor which impacted Amara's 215 ideological philosophy was his desire to become an Islamic scholar and subsequent rejection of his application by the University of Medina. In the summer of 2003 Amara went to Saudi Arabia to apply to become a full time student in Islamic Studies at the University of Medina. He had secured references from moderate Muslims in the Toronto area and had a well documented history of giving sermons and leading prayer services at his high school. It is important to mention that none of these sermons involved political statements or discussions about jihad. His application was however summarily rejected leaving Amara confused and angry (R. v Amara, 2010, 48, 49). Shaikh says that this experience did impact Amara and contributed to the attacks. Amara wanted to be taken seriously and wanted to show everyone how serious he was about Islam. He believed that his moderate approach to Islam had hurt his efforts to be accepted at the University of Medina and that by some warped logic a terrorist attack would give him some credibility to get accepted (Zekulin, 2011ms). When he was arrested Amara was working as an attendant at a gas station to support his wife and young daughter while taking electronics courses part time at Humber Collage (R. v Amara, 2010, 41). The group would meet to discuss their plans at the gas station when Amara was working early mornings. Shaikh also revealed that police set up a camera and have video of Amara working on his detonator at his gas bar job nonchalantly setting it aside when people came in to pay and then pulling it out again. Amara learned to build the detonators at school and did not need outside information or help for this part of his device (Zekulin, 2011ms). What is not disputed is Amara's role as the leader of the Mississauga group following the split. He made it very clear on several occasions to the other members of the group (including Elsohemy the police agent) that he was the leader and that the attack would be implemented on his terms (R. v Amara, 2010, 33). In addition to being the operational leader Amara also recruited two additional members Shareef Abdelhaleem and Saad Gaya to play a role in the attack. There is however no real evidence to suggest he needed to indoctrinate them in any way and although literature was found in their possession it is unclear if it was supplied by Amara (R. v Amara, 2010, 110). Aside from singlehandedly building the detonators, Amara provided detailed instructions about the materials he would require as well as how they were to be obtained and stored as well as 216 the funding to purchase them. The judge at his trial summed up his role as follows: "voice messages plus bomb manual reveal a plan that was thoroughly researched and meticulously planned to the point that detailed instructions were given to those who did not know all the plans—including his own plans to flee" (R. v Amara, 2010, 107). Zakaria Amara oversaw every single aspect of the attack he was planning and delegated tasks and responsibilities to other members of the group. It is felt that some members of the group had very little information about the specifics of the attack and that no one in the group was privy to all of Amara's plans and he only shared that which was absolutely necessary.

Saad Khalid Saad Khalid was a friend of both Zakaria Amara and Fahim Ahmad but chose to leave with Amara following the split. He admitted that he participated in the plot to detonate bombs led by Amara. However he claimed he did not know the precise locations targeted or his precise role and admitted only that he knew the bombing would result in serious property damage. A judge agreed that Amara had not shared all the details but found him "wilfully blind as to whether the plot was likely to cause death and injury to innocent people further suggesting that Khalid's role in the plot was pivotal and went on "for several months" (R. v Khalid). Being wilfully blind is the same as "knowledge" in the eyes of criminal law. Khalid, whose family had arrived in Canada in 1995 was highly intelligent and working towards a commerce degree at the University of Toronto and the judge did not believe he was just a "gofer" as he claimed. There is clear evidence that he: bought electrical components which were found at this house after the arrests, tried to rent one house and rented the two industrial storage units, and prepared to do reconnaissance in downtown Toronto. He was also arrested unloading the purported ammonium nitrate. There are also wiretaps where he can be heard wanting to have weekly meetings, wanting to move up the attack date and offering to relay instructions from Amara to Saad Gaya (R. v Khalid, 2009, 14). 217

Shareef Abdelhaleem Shareef Abdelhaleem joined the Amara group following the split and apparently became Amara's right-hand man. It was also Abdelhaleem who introduced Shahar Elsohemy to the group. Abdelhaleem's motives for carrying out the attack are open to interpretation. He was a successful computer programmer who was known to enjoy women, alcohol and drugs (Teotonio, 2010) and did not demonstrate any significant ideological predispositions prior to his involvement with the group. During the planning phase Abdelhaleem seemed to be against the idea of a large scale attack but became intrigued by the financial windfall which could be made knowing the stock market would be attacked (Teotonio, 2010). Shaikh revealed that he also felt that Abdelhaleem was probably more in it for the money then the ideological aspects but still had extremist views towards the West (Zekulin, 2011ms).

Saad Gaya Saad Gaya was born in Canada and was religious but had no history of extremism (R. v Gaya, 2008, 124). Prior to his arrest, he had worked at an Islamic School including teaching Sunday school (R. v Gaya, 2010, 30). Gaya was recruited by Amara and Khalid following the March 2006 split while he attended McMaster University. He admitted that he was involved in a planned attack but like Khalid claimed that he was not aware of the size or scope of the attacks Amara had planned. He admitted that his motivation was to get the Canadian forces out of Afghanistan and was overheard reacting angrily to events he watched on CNN where entire villages were being bombed for what he perceived to be "no reason." He told authorities that he knew what he was doing was wrong but the prevention of death and suffering in Afghanistan was much more important than the destruction of property (R. v Gaya, 2010, 39). The Court also found that Gaya was willfully blind suggesting that he may not have known all the details but that he should have known what was coming especially considering his role in conducting surveillance in downtown Toronto and that he took delivery of such a large amount of fertilizer. 218

Analysis: Role of Leadership The role of leadership in the case of the Toronto 18 is unusual because it demonstrates both a significant failure of leadership on the one hand and very effective leadership on the other hand. On the surface some fairly clear observations can be made. First, because the group splintered and split it is clear that the leadership of Fahim Ahmed suffered from significant shortcomings. Once the undisputed leader, he was unable to maintain full control over the group. Conversely, the leadership demonstrated by Zakaria Amara following his secession from the Scarborough group is impressive in part due to the speed at which his plot was planned, additional members were assembled and materials were constructed or acquired. In addition we must contrast this with Ahmad's leadership after the split which again must be said to have had mixed results at best. Arguably he managed to continue leading his group. Shaikh indicated that the skepticism and ultimate distancing of Chand and James was well underway prior to Amara's departure (Zekulin, 2011ms). Arguably he managed to organize another training camp and at least began to identify potential recruits. However, it is also clear that Ahmad was unable to actually put a plot into any operational motion: his plans remained static and there was little movement towards advancing them. However a more in-depth examination of leadership in the groups is also possible by examining them in the context of criteria set out earlier in the conclusion of chapter four. Beginning with Fahim Ahmad and the initial cohesive Toronto 18 group it has been established that Ahmad was unquestionably the leader of this incarnation of the group. It was Ahmad who provided the religious guidance and ideological motivation and a clear example of this was his pronounced role in disseminating literature to the other members as well as leading halaquas during the training camps. Others, including Shaikh portrayed a very charismatic individual who could pass off superficial knowledge of Islam and topics such as jihad and martyrdom without being challenged. Ahmad was also responsible for delegating tasks to those around him yet managed to maintain a firm guiding hand on all aspects of his plans. He sent two members to the US to secure weapons, he organized the training camp and dictated to Shaikh how it was to be run and he travelled with other members to inspect a potential safehouse property. He also demonstrated initiative when 219 he videotaped the training camp and halaquas to share with others on the internet and abroad. Painting a picture of Ahmad's influence over the original group suggests that it was initially very strong but began to erode as numerous challenges arose within the group. From this perspective the group was not necessarily challenged or in any form of crisis until dynamics within the group started on a downwards trajectory. Ahmad was unable to hold sway over Amara, who departed taking Khalid with him, or reassure Chand or James. Shaikh pointed out that selecting a spokesperson or issuing communiques from the group were not discussed but it was accepted that someone would ultimately have to negotiate with authorities and talk with the media during the Parliament attack (Zekulin, 2011ms). Shaikh inferred that his experiences with Ahmad led him to believe that Ahmad would not have passed up this opportunity to be in the spotlight. He also indicated that no one else ever showed any interest in serving this role. Ahmad remained in charge of his own group following the split and his position at this point was even stronger. He maintained that the split had been the result of Amara's unwillingness to take orders and direction and continued to push his initial attack plot. He organized another training camp and sought to recruit new individuals. At this point influence and authority appear to have been re-established and Ahmad once again is the focal point delegating ideology and tactical directions. Due to the very short time frame between the split, Ahmad's leadership resurgence and the group's disruption and detention it is however difficult to speculate if Ahmad's leadership would have remained unchallenged. Shaikh revealed that Ahmad began to once again demonstrate his charisma but also suggested that all plans were vague and lacked refinement. If we re-examine some of the reasons Amara opted to distance himself from Ahmad it is clear Ahmad's lack of commitment or ability to deliver beyond the planning and talking stage played a large role. It is therefore possible to suggest that it could have repeated itself in the future From an analysis of the role of leadership, any circumstance where Ahmad appears to have any claim to this position whether it is with the initial group or his own group after Amara's departure can be argued to have affected the group's ability to conduct an attack. Ahmad's leadership or lack thereof dramatically impacted the group's ability. However, it 220 appears that in this case all of the criteria associated with the role of leadership in traditional terrorism appear to be present. They appear however to have been ineffective. Turning to the Amara group we once again observe a very clearcut unidirectional flow of influence and authority. We are aware that Amara sought out two additional members Saad Gaya and Shareef Abdelhaleem to assist him with his plans. There is however no indication that any concertive effort was made by Amara to educate or indoctrinate these newer members. Court transcripts reveal that meetings did take place at the gas station where Amara worked but there appear to be no formal efforts made such as were observed when Ahmad was leading the group. The attack was completely at the discretion of Amara who planned it, researched it, funded it and delegated tasks to other members in the group. Evidence was introduced showing that Amara communicated his instructions down to the littlest detail through the passing of memory sticks. Amara also maintained control of the group by ensuring that no other member was privy to all the details. This goes as far as to the allegations that Amara had planned his own escape without informing the other members. It appears that Amara may have attempted to downplay his role as leader. Wiretaps indicate that other members made suggestions about the targets (Abdelhaleem) and the timing (Khalid) but it is unclear if and when Amara ever compromised on his attack plan and schedule. There were no challenges or crises which emerged within the Amara group: analysis indicates that the plans ran quickly and smoothly. The only indication that any statement would be made by the group was a conversation between Amara and Abdelhaleem via memory stick that a claim of responsibility would be made following the attack so Canadians would know why they had been targeted. Several conclusions can be drawn about the role of leadership for all the groups attached to the Toronto 18 plot. First, the criteria associated with the role of leadership in traditional terrorism do appear to be present, especially in the case of Ahmad led groups. We observe a clear leader articulating goals, making decisions about how to pursue them and providing the necessary motivation, religious and ideological support. We observe that the influence and authority as well as delegated tasks moved uni-directionally from the leader downwards. We do not observe a clear indication of communiques or indications of a spokesperson or public face of the group. 221

These characteristics also hold in the case of the Amara led group. However, Amara does not appear to provide ideological or religious guidance nor does he provide a motivation. In fact, a closer examination of each of the members of the Amara group appears to reveal many different motivations depending on the member. Abdelhaleem appeared to have been motivated by the opportunity to make money on the stock exchange attack, Gaya appeared to believe that attacks on Afghanis needed to be drawn to the attention of the public and Amara was arguably driven by personal motivations of wanting to be someone and gain entrance into Islamic Studies abroad. Amara seemed to have skillfully manipulated all of these varying motivations into a collective attack.

Socialization and the Group Dynamic Toronto 18 Socialization and the group dynamic among the original Ahmad/Amara group was already well established prior to real discussions about the possibility of conducting a terrorist attack. Many of the members of the group were long time friends who had grown up together and did things together. This would have helped create a more singular group identity because it was a tight social group. Those who were newer to the social group were provided with literature and ideological guidance. Finally, a training camp was organized which included both religious education as well as group building exercises in an effort to tighten the dynamic. The origins of the core members of the Ahmad/Amara group can be traced back to highschool in Mississauga. Zakaria Amara and Fahim Ahmad met in Meadowvale while attending Meadowvale Secondary School where they joined the Muslim Student Association. This group was created to assist Muslim youth who were either troubled or disaffected. It is also where they met Saad Khalid (Teotonio, 2010). Over time observers say the three individuals began to express more religious views. They began having meetings at lunch where sermons about jihad and martyrdom led by Saad Khalid were discussed. According to friends at this time Amara began "burying his head" in religious texts and speaking at Friday prayers and he became respected among other youths at the school (Teotonio, 2010). They formed the Brothers of Meadowvale which was a group mixing Islam preaching and ideology with rap music taking verses from the Koran and 222 making it into gangsta rap and posting them online (Teotonio, 2010). One of the interesting points made by Shaikh was that there was a tremendous overlap between criminal gangs, criminal ideas and religion. Individuals in the group, especially Amara, knew the power of the respect certain criminal elements had and that youth looked up to them. Shaikh pointed out that the two members who were caught with guns at the border were bringing the guns back for notoriety as much as anything else and that Amara had been carrying a weapon since he first encountered him (Zekulin, 2011ms). This is another very interesting point which needs to be further examined because as mentioned in chapter three definitions of terrorism have gone to great lengths to try and separate it from crime. Shaikh highlighted that there was a common bond which initially brought the three individuals together: all three had very specific life experiences which contributed to their seeking something "bigger then themselves." Saad Khalid's mother had committed suicide and left him with a void he needed to fill; Amara was estranged from his father during his formative years whom was also at odds with his religious curiosity and Ahmad had experienced several traumatic episodes growing up in Afghanistan (Zekulin, 2011ms). These pre-existing factors coupled with their high school experiences and intertwining of gangsta rap and Islam helped to set a foundation where a small tight knit group would emerge which would become subject to the forces of ingroupism. At eighteen Ahmad got married but was forced to move to Scarborough to live with his wife because his family disapproved. This is where we get the origins of the second group, the Scarborough group, when Ahmad meets other key players like Amin Durrani, Jaahmal James and Steven Chand (Teotonio, 2010). Shaikh discusses these individuals as having identity issues prior to their meeting Ahmad as well. Ahmad befriends Amin Durrani who has already exhibited extremist tendencies at Stephen Leacock High and been disciplined by school authorities for giving speeches and handing out flyers on how to be a good Muslim. He also met Jahmaal James, an extremely poor individual and another convert to Islam named Steven Chand. These two individuals were said to be looking for any kind of religious guidance and Ahmad filled this void very well befriending the two, often buying them lunches they could not afford (Teotonio, 2010). Despite Ahmad's new life in Scarborough, he would still travel back to Mississauga to visit his friends. By this time Amara and Khalid had begun spending more time at the 223

Ar-Rahman Islamic Learning Center in Mississauga. This is where they met Qayyam Abdul Jamal who was actually the center's janitor. Much older than the other members Jamal held very conservative if not extreme views and ends up spending lots of time with Amara, Khalid and Ahmad, sometimes having them come to his house for barbeques after prayers. Jamal was initially portrayed as the "father-figure" leader of the Toronto 18 but all charges against him were dropped (Teotonio, 2010). Amara would also travel to Scarborough to visit Ahmad. In these instances they would often go to the Salaheddin Islamic Center which had a reputation as being a very theologically conservative mosque led by a controversial imam named Aly Hindy (Teotonio, 2010). The socialization they were receiving at the mosques was supplemented by the increased amount of time the individuals, especially Ahmad, were spending on the internet. The internet also provided Ahmad with the extremist literature he would need to indoctrinate individuals who started to join the established social group. Mubin Shaikh first met Ahmad and Amara in November 2005 and after some initial "tests" to feel out Shaikh's religious beliefs he was accepted by the group. He was immediately provided with literature to read including a jihadist text titled Blood, Wealth and Honour of Disbelievers (Zekulin, 2011ms). He was told that all members had an obligation to read Islamic literature and that they served as the basis of discussions. Over the next few weeks Shaikh received other readings as part of what he described as a "recruiting-like process." Some of the titles were "Fundamental Concepts Regarding Al- Jihad" ("Fundamental Concepts"), "Milat Ibrahim" ("The Religion of Ibrahim") and the "Essay Regarding the Basic Rule of the Blood, Wealth and Honour of the Disbelievers" ("Essay") (R. v Ahmad, 2009b, 61; Zekulin, 2011ms). In addition, all members of the group were given the video shuhada al-Muwajahat (Martyrs of the Confrontation) featuring bin Laden glorifying the September 11th attacks. Ahmad distributed these outside the Salaheddin Islamic Center to potential new members and called them "The Reality Series" (Zekulin, 2011ms). Following the arrest of the group other videos were also seized from various members including "Top Ten One," a countdown of highlight style attacks conducted by mujahideen abroad and "The Return of the Crusaders " which showed bombings and the execution of unarmed men (R. v Ahmad, 2009b, 59). 224

In December 2005 the group conducted a training camp which was designed to train and assess the individual members of the group but also to bring the group closer together. At night meetings were held which included discussions about jihad and martyrdom. In addition three formal halaquat sessions were held where Ahmad imparted his ideologies to those in attendance while in the background an audiotape played "The Constants of Jihad" (R. v Amara, 2010, 11). A videotape filmed at the group's training camp shows Fahim Ahmad addressing a group of camouflage clad men discussing jihadist principles, their mission and the selection of possible targets (R. v Ansari, 2006, 5). Mubin Shaikh said that these meetings were often taped by the group with the intention that they would be sent to higher up mujahideen people who would be "impressed by them" and to be used as propaganda, educational or recruiting tools by the group in the future (Zekulin, 2011ms). A representation of the Toronto 18 group socialization can be seen in figure 9. 225

FIGURE 9 A Representation of Toronto 18 Group Socialization

in o o SCARBOROUGH Fahim MISSISSAUGA r-i a GROUP Ahmad GROUP u OS <

Aabid Khan - British 2 US Citizens Citizen

TRAINING CAMP

«r> o oc* U SCARBOROUGH Fahim MISSISSAUGA W A GROUP Ahmad GROUP 226

The Ahmad Group Following the split, the Ahmad group continued to discuss their plot to storm Parliament. And in May 2006, Ahmad organized a second training camp at Rockwood Conservation area in an effort to re-energize his followers. Shaikh shared his observations that the second camp was even more outlandish than the first including preparations for amphibious attacks (Zekulin, 2011ms). It would be reasonable to believe that Ahmad continued some of the other practices established above following the split. This would include sharing literature and videos among the group's membership, surfing jihadi websites and having discussions when group members met. Shaikh revealed that Ahmad was still attempting to recruit new members from within their social circle and that it was always people they knew (Zekulin, 2011ms)

The Amara Group The socialization and group dynamic of the Amara group remains somewhat difficult to understand. Prior to the Ahmad/Amara split there are many examples of how the group socialized and fostered a sense of camaraderie. Evidence has also been introduced showing that literature was distributed in an effort to educate the individuals, a training camp was conducted in an effort to prepare them for an attack, and religious discussions and sermons were held. We are also aware that the Ahmad/Amara group already had a group identity from their days together attending high school and playing soccer. The problem which arises is that immediately following the split the Amara group consisted of two members Amara and Saad Khalid. For these two individuals all of the socialization or efforts to facilitate the group dynamic can be explained from their experiences with the larger first group: we know that they were longtime friends and had always enjoyed playing basketball together (R. v Khalid, 2009, 70). The same cannot be said for Saad Gaya and Shareef Abdelhaleem who joined afterwards. Further the short time frame between their joining Amara's group and the planned attacks would not have allowed for much indoctrination, education or cohesion building exercises. Despite this reality both Gaya and Abdelhaleem jumped head first into plotting a terrorist attack with a group of individuals they sort of knew. This particular observation is alarming because it implies that individuals are capable of reaching the point where they can contemplate an attack with 227 a group of individuals they may not wholly know, and this is contradictory to our traditional understanding that it takes time and persuasion for people to reach that point. The group did meet at the gas station where Amara worked and were overheard by police wiretaps having religious conversations and discussing jihad (R. v Abdelhaleem, 2010, 19). In addition searches following the group's arrest revealed a video in Amara's car entitled "top ten" which depicted roadside bombings and the execution of Western soldiers (Teotonio, 2010). Memory sticks in the possession of Gaya and Khalid as well as laptops were confiscated and included texts with titles such as The Book of a Mujahideen, Fundamental Concepts Regarding Al-Jihad, The Book of Jihad, The Exposition Regarding the Disbelief of the one that assists the Americans, and The Virtues of Jihad. It was determined that they had been saved onto the computer on May 16, 2006 and last accessed on that same date (R. v Khalid, 2009, 53). A representation of how the Amara group socialized can be seen in figure 10. 228

FIGURE 10 A Representation of Amara Group Socialization

GAS STATION MOSQUE

Zakaria Amara Saad Gaya - Previous T18 Saad Khalid Shareef Abdelhaleem - Previous T18

Note: - Zakaria Amara and Saad Khalid: friends from Mississauga, Ontario (Both members of original T18 Group) - Saad Khalid and Saad Gaya: childhood friends - Saad Khalid introduces Zakaria Amara to Saad Gaya - Zakaria Amara and Shareef Abdelhaleem: Initially met at mosque; family are friends - Zakaria Amara brings in Shareef Abdelhaleem - Meeting held between Zakaria Amara, Shareef Abdelhaleem, Zakaria Amara, Saad Gaya and Saad Khalid at gas station where Zakaria Amara works - No clear indication that Shareef Abdelhaleem, Saad Gaya, Saad Khalid and Zakaria Amara were ever all together at once - Shareef Abdelhaleem brings in police informant Shahar Elsohemy 229

Analysis: Socialization and the Group Dynamic Similar to the analysis of terrorist groups from the modern and contemporary eras it is difficult to fully develop the element of socialization without at the very least acknowledging that many of the individuals which ultimately choose to become members of such groups arrive with some form of social baggage. Analysis has revealed that in the case of the Toronto 18, many of the key players such as Fahim Ahmad, Zakaria Amara, Saad Khalid, Jahmaal James and Steven Chand may have been shaped by personal events which may have affected decisions they would make later on. This dissertation recognizes that this is an important aspect but has also identified that research that focuses on an individual's life experiences as a measurement tool faces significant challenges. Unless a particular life experience can be shown to be a factor in a significant number of individuals, it is difficult to assess its significance in a single individual. This dissertation therefore takes the position that analysis revealed several of the members of the group had potentially life altering experiences or events which may have contributed to their ultimately joining this group. It however also takes the position that these individual experiences cannot be given a significant weight in the socialization analysis. This point has been reiterated in relation to each individual case study but will be expanded upon in chapter five which compares traditional terrorism to a more generalized account of all the case studies chosen to represent domestic homegrown terrorism. I will argue that while it is difficult impossible to look at the contribution of individual life experiences in individual case studies, it is entirely possible that generalizations may be made in terms of the types of experiences that are being observed in cases of traditional terrorism versus those being observed in domestic homegrown cases. The origin of the initial Toronto 18 group was two individuals Fahim Ahmad and Zakaria Amara who were childhood friends. As time passed the two continued to add newer friends such as Saad Khalid. The fact that Ahmad continued to visit his friends in Mississauga following his relocation to Scarborough demonstrates how close the friendship was. Examining the socialization of the group it is clear that it was created primarily through the interaction of a close knit social network. With the exception of Mubin Shaikh all of the members of the group, whether pre or post split knew each other in some 230 capacity. Many met at highschool and formed a Muslim student association, others were family acquaintances and interacted at mosques. The parameters of interaction changed when Ahmad brought together the two separate social circles and joined them into one group. From this point forward a new dynamic needed to be created since the two social groups did not have the social history that each one had had independently. Analysis revealed that each group prior to their amalgamation was moving towards radicalization: Ahmad had been visiting websites for some time and accounts highlighted above suggest the groups were having discussions about jihad and Islam more generally during the early formative period. As the group came together several efforts to socialize members of the group, especially newer less experienced members began. Shaikh revealed that all newer members were provided with the same literature (Zekulin, 2011ms). We are aware that Fahim Ahmad took it upon himself to provide this religious and ideological direction for the group. He provided the extremist literature to all members of the group to serve as the basis for discussions that group members would have with each other. One interesting revelation was that with the exception of the initial meeting of the entire group (plus the UK and two American individuals) in March 2005, and the December 2005 training camp, the full group never met all together. This would have made the December 2005 training camp the best opportunity for Ahmad to socialize, indoctrinate and educate the group and solidify a group dynamic The training camp by all accounts was a series of repetitive drills, marching and nightly sermons and halaquas. Fahim Ahmad also attempted to create a group identity and constantly referred to those who attended the camp as Ussud el Tawheed (The Lions of Tawheed). There was discussion that this should be the group's name moving forward but it never gained common acceptance (Zekulin, 2011ms). One of the differences that can be observed immediately is that the Toronto 18's ability to come together was very limited and the approximately two week period of the training camp was crucial for the group. From this perspective, the actual training that group members underwent would have to be considered hurried and sporadic: a brief but intensive session. Statements by Ahmad appear to recognize the fact that the group could not meet or train together very often. He can be heard on tape directing them to return to 231 their normal lives in an effort to avoid suspicion from family, friends or co-workers (R. v Ahmad, 2009, 64). Many of the members led full lives, they had jobs, families and went to school which would not have allowed them to spend a majority of their time meeting, training or even researching or reading. This would have made routine and rigidity, some of the trademarks observed with traditional socialization difficult if not impossible. It would also have limited the amount of time the group could spent together which the traditional terrorism literature appears to suggest greatly aids in creating trust and groupism. The traditional terrorism literature suggests the more time the group spends together the closer they became. This appears to be counter to what is being observed with the Toronto 18 group as well as the Amara group post split. The day-to-day lives of these individuals impeded the amount of socializing, group building and bonding opportunities. Pair this with the very short time period between discussion and the group becoming operationally active and it becomes difficult to observe where the group dynamic could have been solidified in a process similar to the one discussed in the traditional terrorism literature. This suggests the key to the socialization of the group as well as whatever group dynamic or closeness emerged was a result of efforts or activities which occurred prior to the actual formation of a group. This appears to make sense considering the fact that these individuals all had some ties to one another. The focal point would have had to be Fahim Ahmad who was the center of each social group. The friendship and trust that Ahmad had with each of the social groups must have been the common factor which allowed the two groups to come together and trust each other and be accepting of each other so quickly.

Additional Remarks on the Toronto 18

The Toronto 18 group reveals some very interesting characteristics and demonstrates some significant differences from the analysis carried out in chapter four regarding groups from previous eras. Initially this dissertation suggested that the literature would have difficulties explaining this type of terrorism, dubbed "domestic homegrown" terrorism unfolding in Western democratic states. It also posited that the main differences would be observed among the leadership and organizational elements. The Toronto 18 case study confirms this hypothesis: differences do exist among the leadership and 232 organization elements. But the Toronto 18 analysis also reveals some variation among the socialization and the group dynamic elements as well.

CONCLUSION: A SNAPSHOT OF "DOMESTIC HOMEGROWN" TERRORISM Analysis This chapter has examined three case studies chosen to represent episodes of "domestic homegrown" terrorism. Each case study was analyzed indepth and the markers identified from the traditional terrorism literature were highlighted. In this concluding section the three case studies are examined together in an effort to create a snapshot of what this type of terrorism looks like. It is important to identify that the analysis will actually include four examples: the Madrid case (MC), the London case (LC), and two separate Toronto cases. Research revealed that the Toronto 18 plot splintered into two separate groups. For this section both the Toronto 18 group (T18) and the Zakaria Amara (ZA) group will be discussed. Each of the markers identified in the traditional terrorism literature will be discussed from the context of the case studies together. This serves two purposes. First it helps clearly identify what is occurring in these cases of terrorism and second it will reveal how similar or different these cases are one from another. The final chapter then compares this concluding section with the concluding section from chapter four and sets the stage for conclusions regarding the questions posed by this dissertation. First, it will become clear that the traditional terrorism literature does not accurately reflect these more recent attacks and that there are in fact several differences. Second, the differences are not necessarily found in the leadership and organization elements as this dissertation initially posited. Third there are sufficient differences to begin discussion that "domestic homegrown" terrorism may in fact represent a new variant of terrorism.

Organization Investigating the results from the organizational perspective several discrepancies arise. The first difference that emerged was the life span of these groups. The terrorism literature places a tremendous amount of emphasis on continuity: a group sustaining a terrorist campaign and the tasks necessary to ensure that this can occur. The LC group 233 committed suicide attacks and the group ended at this point. The ZA group had made arrangements to depart Canada following their attack indicating it was to be an isolated attack as well. The T18 group did not ever reach operational capacity but their initial plan, though outlandish implied they would exchange hostages for safe passage to some undisclosed location. The only group where there was planning for another attack occurred with the MC group. They had plans for one additional attack but there was no evidence about attacks beyond this one. LC and ZA are obviously one and done and T18 seems to be as well. Arguments could be made that MC may have wanted to conduct a sustained campaign but must be tempered by the fact that only one additional attack was planned. It is as likely they would have ceased operation following this second attack as they would plot additional attacks. This is an important distinction between these new cases and the traditional terrorism literature because the literature appears to take for granted the group's desire for survival and continuity. Audrey Keith Cronin has done considerable work on how terrorism ends and does not account for the idea that a group may simply form, conduct one attack, and dissipate by choice. None of the groups studied can readily be identified as hierarchical. While in each case a clear leader can be identified it appears that all of these groups can best be described by the satellite model postulated by the literature review. It suggests that there may be a simple hierarchy—one level between leader and additional members but very little if any separation of further levels of authority beyond this. While the LC, T18, and ZA cases identify a "right hand man," it is unclear beyond this moniker if it translated into any additional authority or responsibilities. Research did not uncover any tangible evidence showing these "right hand men" acting in a comparable leadership role over other members. Passing on orders given by the leader to other members does not meet threshold because no independent action is being taken. The fact that this occurred may be easily explained by issues such as time constraints or the leader's availability at any given time. One distinction that will present itself in the socialization and group dynamic section is that many of these groups did not spend a lot of time together, so this avenue of transmission can easily be explained. There is also no indication that the groups were compartmentalized or engaged in any form of specialization. Specific members did not carry out specific tasks in any 234 observable way. For example the groups did not have one person responsible for fundraising, one member responsible for recruiting, one member responsible for material acquisition. In each of the cases it appears that members did what they could to contribute to the group where they could and when they could. In two cases, ZA and LC, the leader appears to have been responsible for executing most of the tasks himself: planning, acquisition of funds, and acquisition of materials. While there is no observable specialization it is possible that it might have evolved in two of the groups if the groups had not been disrupted. While LC and Z A are clearly examples of "one and done" groups so no evolution or permanence of roles would emerge for obvious reasons, it is possible that permanent roles might have evolved for MC and T18 under specific circumstances. Evidence indicates that MC had planned at least one additional attack and T18 never clearly articulated its future plans. If these groups did intend on pursuing multiple attacks it is entirely possible that specialization might have occurred over time. It is impossible to speculate how many attacks this might require or how specialized, if at all they may have become. The observation that these groups were not engaged in a campaign or planning ongoing attacks is supported by the manner in which they pursued tasks identified as imperative for group survival in the literature. The literature emphasized that groups needed human resources, financial resources, and technical know-how in order to sustain themselves. This meant that groups needed to continuously add new members and fundraise. The literature also identified that groups made connections with other groups to acquire expertise and know-how. T18 appears to have been the only group which was actively recruiting. There is evidence showing that the leader Fahim Ahmad would engage outsiders in an effort to gauge their suitability and that one of the goals of the training camp was to identify candidates which might fit with the group. Mubin Shaikh identified that following Zakaria Amara's departure from the group, T18 was looking to find individuals to replace him and the other individual who left. ZA was also forced to recruit to acquire the manpower to conduct his attack, but this was specific and limited: he only filled his needs and then stopped. There is no evidence showing that LC or MC was recruiting. Once the group was 235 formed, no additional individuals joined and there was no effort or strategy to locate any new members. The same appears to apply to the ZA group. In terms of how the groups acquired the financial resources to conduct their attacks, evidence demonstrates that each group was self-funded. They received no financial assistance from any outside source such as other like minded groups or from a constituent community. The LC and ZA groups funded themselves by taking advantage of personal (student) loans and existing lines of credit (credit card loans). The MC group relied on traditional crime, specifically selling narcotics for money or bartering for materials. The T18 never became sufficiently operational to fully develop a method to secure funding, but research indicates that they had been investigating ways to get lines of credit and loans (some were fraudulent schemes). It is also clear that the fundraising for all of the groups was ad hoc: they only raised the financial capital necessary for their immediate needs. None of the groups sought a continuous influx of resources. None of the groups appeared to have any links to outside groups. Evidence from the case study analysis regarding such connections have been examined and dismissed. There have been suggestions that the MC and LC groups were in contact with al-Qaida or the Moroccan GICM but this evidence is very much circumstantial and unverifiable. The leader of the T18 made claims that he was in contact with foreign mujahideen groups in Afghanistan and Iraq but these claims were never substantiated either. One point which must be made is that each of the groups may have had limited contact with like minded individuals at certain times. Siddique Khan, the leader of LC was an acquaintance of Omar Kyham and they met on several occasions. The MC group formed from the parts of three separate social groups. The T18 group talked with and ultimately met with Aabid Khan, a British citizen and two Americans whom Fahim Ahmad met on line. It is however very important to highlight that these were individuals and not specific groups or representatives of any established group. Two additional points must be identified in this section. First there is very little detail on what any of the groups did to provide any type of education or indoctrination. In each case individual members had literature on topics such as jihad or extremist ideology but no formal education or ideological teaching process can be observed. This will be further discussed when referring to the socialization process of the groups but needs to be 236 mentioned here because the traditional terrorism literature clearly shows examples of groups taking an active role teaching and educating members. Second, in each case it appears that the internet played a prominent role in providing this material. In each case study it is clear that leaders as well as individual members spent considerable time on the internet and had access to a very large pool of literature. One further point on the availability of this information is that it could be obtained in English. Mubin Shaikh shared the importance of this fact and explained that only one member of the T18 could read Arabic. The role of the internet will be further discussed in the concluding chapter

Leadership Leadership can readily be identified in all of the case studies examined. The T18, LC and ZA groups have one leader while evidence indicates that the MC group may have had up to three individuals in a leadership capacity. Because all of the major players in the MC case committed suicide it is unclear exactly what the dynamic might have been and whether it was a true leadership by committee scenario or simply the matter never came to a head. The absence of any evidence suggesting dissent or disagreement within the group, especially among these three individuals allows us to draw one of two conclusions. Either the group did have leadership by committee, or one of the leaders did have a greater leadership role. For the purposes of this research this point is actually irrelevant. Research suggests leadership did exist which means an examination of whether the leadership roles, which are the focus of this element can take place. In each case it appears that the leadership did make efforts to least provide ideological guidance but it appears they fulfilled this task to varying degrees. Fahim Ahmad, the leader of the T18 thought very highly of his knowledge and took any opportunity to impart it to the other members of the group. He suggested literature and led discussions on occasions when the group did meet together. Zakaria Amara, leader of the ZA group also appeared to have provided some ideological guidance but it was very limited. As he was recruiting his newer members there is evidence that the topic of religious duty and/or individual obligations may have been broached but once the group was complete there is little indication that ZA continued this practice. For both the LC and MC group it is unclear what, if any, form of ideological guidance may have occurred. In 237 the case of the MC group one of the members, Amer Azizi, has been sometimes referred to as "the emir" suggesting this might have been a role he filled. There are however no details or specific examples where this type of overt guidance might have taken place. The terrorism literature also identified that leaders often served as the public spokesperson for their respective group. This was designed to articulate the group's goals, grievances or as a basis of communication. There is an observable discrepancy which emerges when this is examined from the perspective of the newer groups. In the case of the LC and MC attacks, videotapes were released following the attack. The LC videotape was a recording of the leader Siddique Khan explaining and validating the groups attack. The MC videotape was slightly different in that the speaker on the tape is a matter of dispute (some still question the authenticity of the tape as being from the MC group) and is much more veiled or cryptic. In the case of the T18 and ZA groups evidence indicates that tapes would have been released but in the case of the T18 it was never determined who would be the spokesperson or what the message might be and for the ZA group the discussion ended on the note that "someone would explain the attack," but again nothing more. Previous discussion has suggested that in the case of the T18, the spokesperson would have most likely been the leader Fahim Ahmad. The same however cannot be said for the ZA group. In the analysis of the cohesive T18 group pre-split it was clear that the group dynamic was portrayed in competing personalities: Fahim Ahmad was outgoing and charismatic while Zakaria Amara was quiet and did not appreciate any limelight or attention. Carrying this observation forward to the ZA group it is quite possible that Amara, the leader would not want to be spokesperson and might have delegated it to another member. One factor that all of the groups however did share was that the communication with the public, media and government officials was (would have been) after the fact. No efforts were made to identify themselves, warn government, conduct propaganda or gain the support of like minded people prior to the attack. In the case of the groups which were clearly going to be one and done such as LC and ZA this raises interesting questions which will need to be examined further in the concluding chapter. With the exception of the T18 group split, it appears that all of the leaders managed to maintain control of their respective groups and focused enough so an attack could unfold. The T18 case study identifies the failings of leadership as an explanation for the 238 split and subsequent forming of the ZA group. It did however also indicate that the T18 group under the same leadership did attempt to continue moving forward. It is unknown if Fahim Ahmad learned from the split and could have avoided a similar episode in the future or if his chronic inability to lead would have ultimately led to the group's demise at some point if the group had not been disrupted. The MC, LC and ZA groups did not appear to face any significant challenges which the leader would have needed to overcome, nor were any crises ever identified. This plus the fact that the groups remained focused on their goal and succeeded in implementing it (LC and MC had successful attacks and ZA was extremely close) also appears to point to success of leadership. There may however be another explanation for this. In each of the case studies the time frame between group formation, planning and attack (or operational readiness in the case of the ZA group) was extremely short averaging several months. Perhaps the groups managed to avoid major crises or faced no challenges based on this fact alone. There is no way to question, test or prove this observation because there are too many unknowns. It is possible that if groups' windows of operation were longer, issues challenges or crises may have arisen affecting them.

Socialization and the Group Dynamic This research set out to distinguish between socialization which occurred following an individual's introduction into a group and the socialization or socializing factors which an individual may have been exposed to at some point in their life. Focusing on the former emphasizes what the group is taught whether this is training or education and directly begins to tie in with the solidifying of the group dynamic and identity. Focusing on the latter emphasizes individual life experiences and pre-existing environmental factors. Research revealed that there was very little formal training or educating occurring once the group was established. The exception to this was the T18 group which did conduct one training camp for its members prior to the split and a second one following the split. There is no indication that the LC, MC and ZA ever had training camps attended by all or even a majority of the membership. Research revealed that some members of the LC group and the MC group had participated in outdoor orientation activities at some point but in most cases it was with much larger groups and described by authorities as camping and 239 hiking exercises with no formal organization or agenda. The T18 (one) and LC group (two) did have members who attended a foreign training camp while no one in the ZA or MC group had any operational training. In the case of the T18 member who attended a training camp in Pakistan, he quickly distanced himself from the group prior to sharing the knowledge he had acquired. It is unclear what type of training the two members of the LC group received during their time in Pakistan. A second avenue of investigation examined the amount of time a group spent together. While this of course has implications for the group dynamic component it can also be important for assessing the amount of time the group had to socialize together. In all cases it appears that none of the groups completely isolated themselves or went underground but carried on with their day-to-day lives while simultaneously pursuing activities with the group. The MC group is said to have started spending increased amounts of time together closer to the attacks frequently meeting for lengthy discussions. In the other cases however time together appears to have been sporadic. The ZA group occasionally had lunch or met at the gas station where Amara worked at night. However research indicates the entire group may never have met all at the same time. The T18 group initially consisted of two separate social groups divided by geography (Mississauga and Scarborough) which made getting together very difficult. Two members of the LC group were married with young children and fulfilled familial responsibilities as well as group obligations. The fact that none of the groups spend a lot of time together is very important. All of the discussions in the literature about socialization, group dynamic and the creation or cementing of a group identity has always emphasized increasing isolation and that it is a lengthy process. This does not appear to be the case with any of these groups. This will also be a focus for elaboration in the concluding chapter. The terrorism literature was shown to have made considerable efforts to identify the role individual experiences may have had on certain individuals and their decision to join a terrorist group but could not do so due to absent significant measurement challenges. It also mentions the role that the environment may play on socializing an individual especially as it pertained to the socializing or conditioning of an ingroup and outgroup. This dissertation emphasized that it would acknowledge the presence of these two factors but would also move beyond them and identify efforts to socialize, educate or condition 240 which occurred after individuals had joined a group. Analysis of several of the key players in the case studies, especially those pertaining to the T18 and ZA cases did reveal events in their lives which may have impacted them and affected their decision-making moving forward. In the LC and MC cases friends and acquaintances also suggested some key members faced some form of life crisis but could not elaborate on what these might have been. However discussion about environmental factors poses a challenge which was unforeseen until an analysis of the newer case studies was complete. The traditional terrorism literature discussed the importance of the environment in creating different groups in a given society. Discussion about groups such as the PIRA, LTTE, FARC, JI, Hezbollah and the IMU highlighted the presence of natural ingroups and outgroups where animosity and persecution was readily observed. The idea that individuals belonging to a minority or threatened group might naturally gravitate towards the terrorist group representing that constituency was introduced. The challenge which arises is that examples from the traditional terrorism literature seem very straightforward: animosity is created by the relationship which exists between two groups which are and have been deemed different from one another. In the case of these newer case studies it is important to understand whether or not this same dynamic exists as well. On the surface the environmental conditions should be very different. Western democratic states preach openness, acceptance and in the case of Canada and Britain multiculturalism— emphasizing, embracing and accepting of differences. They do not have the history of animosity, hostility and conflict that cases from the traditional terrorism have shown. If the terrorism literature suggests that the pre-existing environmental conditions are felt to contribute to an individual's decision to join a group which then targets an outgroup or seeks political change for a community how might this unfold in the newer cases which do not display this level of division or hostility. In many cases individual group members are well acclimatized and assimilated into their respective societies. This is another issue which requires further elaboration in the concluding section. An analysis of the group dynamic of these groups also provides some very interesting results. The group dynamic attempts to account for how groups become sufficiently close such that a group identity emerges and the trust necessary to operate in a 241 clandestine and illegal environment develops. Research indicates that there was no individual profile applicable to any of the individuals which compromised the group. In the case of the T18, ZA, LC and MC the membership of each was diverse in terms of age, education level, marital and economic status. Further none of the groups can be said to have shared a common ethnicity or "nationality." In each case members had diverse ethnic and/or cultural backgrounds. This is an interesting development which will also be elaborated upon in the concluding chapter because it is a clear difference from what is observed in the traditional terrorism literature. Other avenues of investigation revealed some interesting points. First in the case of the T18 group, the ZA group and the MC group, members were often longtime friends pre­ existing the group's formation. The only outlier appears to be the LC case where none of the members were friends prior to any involvement in extremism or ideological evolution. In the case of the T18 there was a tremendous amount of interaction among members prior to group formation, many went to school together. This spills over into the ZA group, where two members interacted prior to group formation while three were added later. In contrast, both the LC and MC did not demonstrate very much interaction prior to group formation. The MC group resulted in the amalgamation of individuals from three separate social groups who did not know each other in any other capacity prior to their initial meeting. Second, two of the groups appear to have arisen from individuals who were all centered in one proximate geographical location. The MC group saw a majority of individuals from one neighbourhood, the LC group had three of four members from a shared neighbourhood and the ZA group did as well. The outlier in this example is the T18 group which had two groups from two separate neighbourhoods Mississauga and Scarborough. The T18 group split occurred on these lines when Mississauga group members decided to go out on their own which created the ZA group. Another important factor which assists the development of the group dynamic is how the group interacts with each other. In three cases, T18, LC and MC the groups met and spend some time in Mosques. The ZA group did not make use of the Mosque as a primary meeting place. The groups also each spent time in a common but public place whether this was a gym a bookstore, a gas station or something similar. In two cases research indicated that a private dwelling was used to meet and ultimately prepare the 242 attacks. The LC and MC groups both had such a place, the ZA attempted to secure one but was turned down and the T18 investigated purchasing a property. The context of where the groups met is very important because it then becomes possible to investigate how the dynamic of the group may have evolved. In each case, it appears that the groups started mixing in large and public places such as a Mosque. It also appears that the groups then shifted their activities and met in somewhat smaller places, but where like minded people would be found such as an Islamic bookstore or business where those coming and going could be more readily observed. Finally it appears that the groups isolate even further and choose a place or attempt to secure a place for members only. From this account the group becomes smaller and smaller until it separates the core membership from potentially like minded but not as committed individuals and isolates the group from more moderate or competing ideas. In this case both of the avenues suggested in the literature for group dynamic formation and identity cohesion are present. However this must be reconciled with the fact that previous discussion has already highlighted that the majority of the groups remained connected to the outside world. Therefore despite the fact that a process appeared to be in place which would have allowed the group identity to take hold and trust to emerge this must be explained from the perspective that despite the means and opportunity to isolate themselves these groups still were not entirely isolated.

A Snapshot of "Domestic Homegrown" Terrorism Moving beyond the case study analysis and deconstruction, a portrait of these cases can now be constructed. From the information gathered, domestic homegrown terrorism, that is, "a terrorist attack by a group on a Western democratic country by individuals who were born and raised or who have resided in that country for an extended period of time" has the following characteristics. First, the group does not seek continuity or prolonged survival; it is one and done or plans a very brief and limited campaign. The short life span is a conscious choice Second, the group is very small in size and autonomous. It has no contact with any existing or established terror group but may have contacts with individuals who share its views. Communication is facilitated by modern technology with the majority of correspondence occurring over the internet and in chat rooms, cell phones and email. 243

Leadership is present but not beyond one level of hierarchy and there is no specialization or compartmentalization of tasks within the group. Third, the group is self sufficient: it is self funded often through personal funds and acquires a great deal of its technical knowledge and expertise outside of a training camp setting; the group is capable but not technically or tactically sophisticated. The internet again plays a large role in acquiring expertise and provides the basis for ideological and educational materials as well. The group demonstrates some ideological learning but it appears to manifest itself as more of an individual endeavor than a set curriculum. There is no evidence of an active or sustained recruiting strategy or process, recruitment appears to end when the group is formed but may open up temporarily but only to replace members who have departed the group. Fourth, the group is well connected to the country it is targeting. The majority, if not all of the members have lived there for an extended period of time if not born and raised there; its members for the most part were acclimatized and integrated into the society at some point. They also appear to have become devoutly religious later in their lives often showing no evidence of religious tendencies prior to this change. The group members do not share any profile nor are they culturally or ethnically homogenous. The group does not represent a community or ideological constituency or local grievance but rather a global movement or a larger political motivation. Five, it is very likely group members knew each other in some capacity prior to the formation of the group. The group does not isolate itself, continuing their day-to-day life; they do not spend a lot of time together, meeting sporadically and intermittently. The group escalates its activity rapidly; group formation to planning to attack occurs very quickly. This suggests that members come to the group with some pre-existing degree of ideological predisposition which helps speed-up the establishment of a group dynamic, identity and trust. 244

CHAPTER SIX Conclusion

The introductory chapter highlighted that the origins of this dissertation was the observation that more recent Islamic terrorist attacks appeared to represent something previously unseen. This was based on the fact that the attacks were being planned or perpetrated against Western democratic states by individuals who were born and raised or had been long term residents of the very state they were attacking. These attacks were dubbed "domestic homegrown" terrorism. From this starting point the research questioned what this might mean for terrorism more broadly. Two general questions were posed. First, this dissertation questioned whether or not the modern and contemporary terrorism literature could explain these newer attacks. It suggested that the roles traditionally played by leadership and the organization found in the literature would be different when applied to terrorism unfolding in three newer cases. Second it questioned whether the elements observed in modern and contemporary terrorist groups would be seen in domestic homegrown terrorist groups. In addition, chapter two identified several debates in the field of terrorism studies. First it introduced the fiinctionalist-culturalist debate. This debate centers on disagreements about the current terrorist threat today and whether it is posed by al-Qaida and other global Islamic movement groups, or if terrorism has become a grassroots phenomenon where individuals are becoming involved in terrorism absent any form of direction or indoctrination from a traceable source. The second debate examines terrorism studies from the perspective of counterterrorism and how to combat terrorism. This debate investigates whether a military approach or law enforcement approach best mitigates the terrorist threat. It directly questions whether current counterterrorism approaches targeting leadership and the organizational structure of the groups, discussed in chapter two, remains the best policy. More recent efforts to understand and combat homegrown terrorism were also introduced. Researchers are attempting to model radicalization in an effort to prevent citizens from potentially becoming terrorists. This research investigates whether current radicalization models in the literature fit with the observations from the domestic homegrown case studies. 245

This chapter begins by re-visiting the research questions and offers some conclusions based on the analysis conducted in chapters four and five. In addition it will also offer some commentary on what this research means to the field of terrorism studies. It is clear from the discussion in chapter five that there are fundamental differences that exist between the three domestic homegrown terrorist groups analyzed and the literature. However, some of these observations merit further attention because they have much broader ramifications for the field as a whole. Each one of these observations will be addressed in greater detail First, the observation that the three cases studies demonstrate enough uniqueness to be considered something new has real implications for definitions about terrorism. One specific challenge has already been outlined: this is not domestic terrorism and it is not homegrown terrorism. Accepting this meant another term: domestic homegrown terrorism was suggested. The literature review in chapter three outlined the definitional challenges plaguing the field and this may muddy the waters further. However an even more crucial result of this research has been to idenitfy that these groups do not pursue terrorist campaigns and are best described as "one and done." This trait may actually make it difficult to include these attacks as terrorism as it is currently defined. Second, the observations that the groups had no real outside contact with other groups, the fact that there was no evidence of ideological or tactical training and the abbreviated time frame from discussion to attack are huge aberrations from the modern and contemporary terrorism literature. These points deemed critical by the literature need to be accounted for and it will be argued that technological advances, specifically the internet may substitute for some of the roles traditionally played by leaders and organizations observed previously. This would represent a huge shift which would require a complete re­ examination of many parts of the field. Conversely we need to be cautious that this is not another "new" terrorism which never seemed to fully change the field as many predicted it would. Third, the observation that these groups do not isolate and withdraw from their previous lives forces us to re-examine ideas tied to the group dynamic. Part of this discussion does overlap with the socialization aspect discussed above and how these individuals might be arriving with some established predispositions. In terms of domestic 246 homegrown terrorism, we need to ask what we might mean by the idea of "group." The modern and contemporary literature clearly reserves this term and the subsequent processes for the immediate terror group—all those directly involved. For domestic homegrown terrorism the question that needs to be addressed is how the group dynamic is occurring when there is no isolation or withdrawal and if there is a role for other "groups" which have previously been ignored. The modern and contemporary terrorism literature has acknowledged a role for other groups such as family or the community but has always assumed it was a socialization role. Perhaps these groups need to be included as part of the group dynamic. If this is the case, it would open up a potentially new avenue of inquiry to be applied to terrorist groups from the modern and contemporary eras as well. Fourth one final observation about domestic homegrown terrorism is that it does not reconcile with what we know about how terrorism ends as described in the literature. This chapter will also provide a very superficial and speculative discussion about what might be causing the increase in domestic homegrown terrorism in Western states. Based on the work of W. Andy Knight it examines some possible explanations identifying why certain segments of western populations might become increasingly susceptible to radicalization.

The Research Questions Re-Visited Does Domestic Homegrown Terrorism Represent A New Type of Terrorism?

There is enough evidence to argue that the modern and contemporary terrorism literature does not accurately explain these attacks. More specifically, the manner in which groups from those eras "behaved" or "pursued" terrorism is not evident. Because the literature cannot account for these attacks it suggests that these three case studies represent something new or unique and require additional study. The analysis also clearly shows where the differences exist and narrows the focus for follow-up research. Although it is clear this is a new development, claims that this represents a permanent shift cannot be made. At this point it is too early to identify whether it represents something which will continue to move forward and adapt and evolve as its own type of terrorism or whether it is a fad or trend that exists in the present. Surveying terrorism more generally it is clear that domestic homegrown terrorism is not the only type of terrorism occurring presently. Al- 247

Qaida and al-Qaida inspired groups continue to operate around the world. Other Islamic groups such as al-Shabab continue to make efforts to recruit individuals from various Western states to travel to Africa and the Middle East to participate in jihad (Globe & Mail, 2011). While these types of terrorism should not be ignored, domestic homegrown terrorism is not receiving the attention it deserves. The literature, if it mentions it all, treats it as an afterthought. Most papers discussing radicalization mention the idea of homegrown terrorism but continue to emphasize it from the perspective that these "would be jihadists" are mostly the results of targeting for recruitment by outside forces (NIE, 2007; Jenkins, 2010) Moving forward additional case studies need to be constructed and more groups examined. From this methodology more similarities can be gleaned among these cases and differences can be further distinguished between them and other types of terrorism. Ideas about the specific elements can be further refined and studied. Discussion on radicalization in chapter two identified differences among the populations of Europe and the United States leading some to claim that Europe faces a greater threat from this type of terrorism. This point suggests that comparisons about the characteristics of various domestic homegrown groups might also be pursued in an effort to determine if differences do exist between groups in Europe and groups in North America. The Madrid case study seems to occupy a very important place in the analysis of domestic homegrown terrorism. Evidence indicates that the Madrid case could be viewed as either the ground zero or case study zero of domestic homegrown terrorism or as perhaps some form of bridge or hybrid of the two. There are clear similarities to the domestic homegrown terrorism cases and it does fit within the definition offered. The group quickly moved from planning to operation to execution, the group did not demonstrate any ideological education or indoctrination or formal training. Group members had lived in Spain for a long period of time and many of the members were at some point well integrated or connected into Spanish society. However the Madrid group also shares some similarities with groups from the modern and contemporary eras which should not be overlooked. It was a larger group, evidence indicates the group may have attempted to reach out to another group and they funded themselves through crime (drug-smuggling). It also appeared that they entertained an abbreviated campaign (one additional attack was 248 planned) which is not a sustained campaign as depicted in the literature or a one and done as observed from the analysis of the other domestic homegrown cases. Further research might help us reconcile this observation and help to clearly categorize the Madrid attack.

The Functionalist-Culturalist Debate and Domestic Homegrown Terrorism This research clearly supports certain positions in the aforementioned debates occurring in the field of terrorism studies today. Analysis of the three case studies clearly points to the grassroots movement culturalist interpretation and a lack of connection to al- Qaida, al-Qaida affiliate or any other group. It further demonstrates that the name "domestic homegrown" terrorism is very appropriate in that the driving force behind these groups is local individuals who have developed and progressed isolated from instruction, training or education. By its very definition domestic homegrown terrorism is about self starting grassroots individuals who come together and form a self started autonomous group. The analysis of domestic homegrown terrorism should begin here with efforts to understand how this process unfolds. The work on radicalization which was summarized in chapter two indicates this examination is underway. However, it is important to re-iterate that some of the conclusions made by these reports did not fit with the three cases studies analyzed in this dissertation. It is also therefore imperative that these reports be re-visited and refined because there were many inaccuracies in the case study analysis conducted by these reports. These reports superficially examined multiple cases which might have allowed mistakes or oversights to go un-noticed. This further emphasizes the importance of good in-depth qualitative case study analysis as a first step which might minimize problems such as misinformation and incorrect facts

Leadership & the Organization: Current Counterterrorism Policies Appear Problematic The results of this research clearly demonstrate the absence of well defined leadership, leadership roles and real organization. This indicates that current counterterror strategies employed by governments centered on these characteristics will be unsuccessful against groups like those studied in this dissertation. One additional point is that the three cases studied in this dissertation also contradict much current thinking in the radicalization 249 literature. The radicalization literature maintains an important component of the process involves the charismatic leader, sanctioner or intermediary who guides individuals, or the group towards extremism. Similarly these models talk about the formation of the group dynamic and socialization as the group spends more and more time together and becomes increasingly isolated from their previous lives. These ideas do not appear in the three case studies analyzed here but seem to appear sporadically in other examples cited in the reports on radicalization models. This directly carries over from points mentioned above about how this might be a result of superficial analysis attempting to be timely which inadvertently resulted in significant mistakes. As such the conclusions may also suffer from these shortcomings. It is however also possible that the three cases selected for inclusion in this dissertation might be anomalies and that the patterns detected by the radicalization literature are accurate except for the Madrid, London and Toronto cases. In chapter two, the US counterterrorism plan was introduced showing that targeting and removing leadership and/or disrupting the resources terrorist groups rely on was the key to combat terrorism. There is even fresh evidence to suggest that the US remains committed to this strategy including the targeted killing of Osama bin Laden and Yemeni cleric Anwar al-Alawki. While an in-depth analysis of the leadership and organizational elements did not reveal as dramatic a difference as originally suggested, this does not negate the argument that current traditional counterterror policies will be completely ineffective against instances of domestic homegrown terrorism. Evidence revealed that these groups do not seek out resources traditionally felt necessary for the group's success or survival which suggests efforts to freeze Islamic terrorist organizations' assets or track/prevent financial resources from being moved from one group to another will have no impact on domestic homegrown terror groups. The same applies for targeting leadership. First identifying these groups has been very difficult to begin with and their short life span means government would have to move much more quickly than they traditionally do. Second, the act would be occurring on domestic soil and possibly against a citizen of that country. Targeted killing is a highly questionable practice from a legal perspective and employing this strategy in one's country against one's own citizens would be highly unlikely to happen. The conclusions drawn by the analysis of the three cases indicates that current counterterrorism policies would not be effective against domestic homegrown 250 terrorist groups. However, these policies may be effective against other types of terrorism and continue to be pursued by western governments against groups like al-Qaida.

Counterterrorism: The Law Enforcement Paradigm is the Best Approach Just as this research clearly finds evidence to support the culturalist side of the threat debate, evidence also appears to suggest that the best approach to combat domestic homegrown terrorism lies within the law enforcement paradigm. By default the military approach seems counterproductive if not impossible considering these groups reside in the Western democratic states they are going to attack. Ideas that targeting foreign training camps might minimize domestic homegrown terrorism seem logical but the evidence indicates that very few actually sought out or attended one of these camps. However, suggesting the military paradigm might be counterproductive does not negate the fact that the law enforcement paradigm itself may need to be re-examined and re-configured. Law enforcement places a tremendous amount of emphasis on the after the fact aspect of crime: how individuals are arrested, tried and detained. This is not enough to prevent future terrorist threats. A more appropriate paradigm would instead be a legislative-intelligence one which provides the tools necessary to identify and monitor these groups as early as possible. This requires an examination of intelligence procedures and capabilities as well as more robust legislation which is capable of dealing with this type of terrorist threat. It also supports continued efforts to understand the radicalization process which might supersede the disruption efforts by preventing them in the first place.

Possible Explanations or Causes of Domestic Homegrown Terrorism One of the challenges facing the terrorism studies discipline is that there is hardly any consensus on most issues in the field. This can be observed in efforts to define terrorism, efforts to create profiles and efforts to isolate and explain what causes terrorism more generally. Accepting this reality serves to further highlight the contribution this research really makes. While it would be very satisfying to identify exactly what is causing or driving this type of terrorism, no firm conclusions or answers can be provided. However it is possible to examine some factors which might contribute to domestic homegrown terrorism and speculate how they might do so. The most obvious place to start 251 would be examining what might lead to an increased radicalization of certain segments of Western populations. Centering on work by individuals such as W. Andy Knight, we attempt to explain how this might unfold at different levels of analysis. Terrorism studies suggests that motivations for terrorism vary but can be divided into several different overarching categories: religious, nationalist-separatist and ideological (left-wing or right-wing) (Wilkinson, 2001). This dissertation has argued that domestic homegrown terrorism appears to be unique. One of the biggest differences is that although it is clearly a religiously inspired motivation, the fact that these are individuals are both born and raised or have lived in the same western states they attack needs to be taken into account. What might explain the shift in the attitudes and beliefs of these individuals which allows them to target their own country and fellow citizens? W. Andy Knight (2010, 301-24) investigates causes of extremism at different levels of analysis: the level of the individual, the group level, the societal level, the state-societal level, the state level and the global level. From this framework it is possible to begin analysis of which of these levels might best explain the radicalization of certain individuals in Western states. It might be the key to understanding how these groups of individuals are able to move to terrorism or demonization so quickly: they might be coming to a group with some pre-conditioning. The internet might play a prominent role in facilitating this pre-radicalization and will be examined in depth in a later section. Radicalization often starts with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society or the domestic and foreign policy of their government (Precht, 2007, 32). So the individual level would be the ideal explanation and as the literature suggests would most likely reveal some sort of tipping point: an event or catalyst which might have nudged them towards embracing radical or extreme ideas. Research collected on an individual's perceptions, state of mind or sense of self could indicate why they made the choices they did. However efforts to analyze individuals themselves as the key to understanding why they might be susceptible to radicalization have been and continue to be problematic for two reasons. First, each individual is unique and no two will react identically in similar situations and second the abundance of counterfactuais: individuals who have been subjected to similar pressures, challenges or crises that do not choose the radicalization or extremism route. Terrorism research accepts that the personal experiences and choices of 252 the individual are a factor. However it is too difficult to measure and to identify how this might contribute to any meaningful or generalizeable conclusions. This assessment also applies to domestic homegrown terrorism. Those who ultimately choose to pursue domestic homegrown terrorism will be subject to their own experiences. It is entirely possible that something has happened which steered them toward extremism and terrorism. It is also highly likely that it will be difficult to accurately identify what this might have been or if it serves as an indication of a more generalized phenomenon which can be observed in other individuals as well The group level of analysis has been a real focal point for explaining terrorism. Discussions in chapter four outlined the role that the group plays in fostering trust, a group identity, moral disengagement and the extreme polarization which emerges as a group becomes closed and isolated from outside perspectives. Observations from the case studies indicated that there were "groups" in each case. However, it also showed that these groups did not completely isolate themselves from their previous lives and did not abandon old friendships or relationships. In the case of the ZA group they actually spent very little time together. In an effort to explain how processes such as the trust building, the establishment of the group identity, moral disengagement and the extreme polarization occur we can look at the contribution that may be occurring at two other levels of analysis. It has been suggested that individuals are coming to the group with some pre-socialization or radicalization. This may very well be the case and the internet may serve to facilitate this process. Individuals may spend considerable amounts of time disengaging or radicalizing alone prior to joining a group. At the societal or community level the literature argues that radicalization is occurring because there are "bad" idea entrepreneurs actively attempting to convince members of these communities that the Western lifestyle is bad. Radicalization models discussed in chapter two highlight this reality and have identified several radical community members who were actively recruiting and spreading extremist propaganda in Western communities. Analysis at the level of the community infers that radicalization and therefore instances of domestic homegrown terrorism might be increasing because extremist ideas are being purposefully spread in an effort to indoctrinate or radicalize certain individuals. One interesting observation which emerged was that domestic 253 homegrown groups, despite meeting many of the characteristics of a constituency group, had no obvious link to the community or community support. It is unclear what this says about levels of community support. Analysis at the state-societal level would need to investigate the relationships and perceptions members of various communities have with each other as well as with the state. The potential cause for radicalization at this level would argue that communities where extremism and radicalization is increasing are disillusioned with some facet of their place in that state. These would likely be social, economic or political grievances at the domestic level. The most important part of the equation is identity. How are individuals living in a state able to turn so quickly against it? The most obvious response is that for some reason they do not feel the loyalty, belonging or sense of membership in that state. This is easier to explain for those who have arrived in a country but were not born and raised there. It centers on their perception of their place in those societies. Individuals arriving in a western democratic state with every intention of improving their life might be encountering obstacles which prevent them from succeeding. Over time this increases their frustration and anger, maybe to a point of despair. This scenario might also unfold should an individual who is born in the country observe a similar situation affecting their parents, friends or relatives. The identity question becomes much more troubling for those who were born and raised and may even be second or third generation citizens of those countries. It requires an investigation of how governments attempt to assimilate or integrate different groups and how these countries work to create pride, loyalty and to a certain degree "oneness." States that encourage cultural diversity might be subject to unintended side-effects. Remaining too tied to one's culture at the expense of the state's culture may encourage the establishment of cultural or ethnic enclaves which create the framework for an in-group. This situation if antagonized may result in the "us versus them" mentality which makes it far more likely that anger, suspicion and resentment emerge. These feelings may in turn be manipulated by those whose intentions are to generate terrorist actions. Radicalization of certain members of these communities would unfold more easily in this environment. Explanations at the state level of analysis might focus on state foreign policy choices and how they are perceived by members of certain parts of their population. The 254 literature indicates a real correlation between western actions in Middle East and how it creates anger and resentment among younger Muslims in the West (Neumann, 2006, 76). From this perspective, grievances or conditions at other levels may combine and the behavior of the state may provide the catalyst finally pushing the individual over the edge. There is very little states can do about this fact except to be mindful or sensitive to how they explain their actions. This might be the most concerning level of analysis because it cannot be avoided: states make choices about their role and place in the international system. From a foreign policy perspective, issues and events in the Middle East remain in flux. Long term effects of the Arab Spring, tensions in places such as Syria and Iran as well as whether states subjected to intervention such as Iraq and Afghanistan improve or deteriorate are all potential pitfalls for states. The continuing problems plaguing Israeli- Palestinian relations also exacerbate tensions. Any one of these issues creates a potential pitfall and may antagonize individuals. The global level of analysis typically focuses on forces occurring in the international system and how this might contribute to radicalization or extremism. One possible explanation ties the effects of globalization to increased tensions, anger and resentment. It is based on ideas that particular regions or cultures feel threatened by the expansion or encroachment of predominantly western ideas or values (Cronin, 2002, 57-59; 66-71). While this is a very plausible explanation for terrorism generally it might not be as impactful on domestic homegrown terrorism because living in Western states should minimize negative effects of globalization. Additionally, research indicates that the majorities of domestic homegrown terrorists were well integrated and accepted Western culture and values. Another focal point of study at this level might be the intersection of ideas and how they travel from one place to another. The field of memetics, loosely defined as how ideas transmit from one person to another (Dawkins, 1976) and the intersection between memetics and radicalization (Pech, 2003) may be worth investigating. The primary focus would be on how cultural ideas, imitation and replication of certain ideas transmit to others. It might provide a global level explanation for how extremist or radical ideas may become embedded in certain communities in Western states. It might tie to studies about the role of diaspora communities and the influence they have on like members in other states. 255

According to Post and Scheffer (2007, 104; Also see Precht, 2007, 35) the link between immigrants and diaspora communities is very powerful. "Although most Muslim immigrants are not 'stateless' many suffer from an existential sense of loss, deprivation and alienation from the countries where they live." They argue this sense of disconnectedness may leave some vulnerable to elements or ideas imported or retained from their country of origin. Explanations for why certain individuals in western societies may become radicalized span all levels of analysis. However none of them alone adequately explains how individuals who are born and raised and well integrated into these societies can become capable of turning against it so quickly

The Terrorism Literature and Domestic Homegrown Terrorism Definitional Challenges Identifying domestic homegrown terrorism as a new variant of terrorism acknowledges that there is potentially something unique occurring with these attacks. Some in the field may not welcome the observation and labeling of domestic homegrown terrorism because it further complicates the already contentious issues the field has with definitions of terrorism. Chapter three spent considerable time discussing issues related to defining terrorism. Identifying and lobbying for the inclusion of what some may view as another variant of terrorism might be unwelcomed because it is further broadening the definition as the field is attempting to narrow it. Debates about whether state terrorism and sub-state terrorism should be viewed as similar or different are joined by debates asking if individuals should be considered capable of conducting terrorism. Debates about citizenship and geographical locations of attacks are used as the basis for determining if terrorism is international or domestic. In order to find a niche where domestic homegrown terrorism might fit, some of these categories might require further sub-division. Chapter three also included a section outlining the rationale for why the term domestic homegrown terrorism needs to be applied stressing that current definitions of each of these terms individually fails to accurately depict the attacks. While this is theoretically appropriate and in the opinion of this research justified, it is quite possible that it complicates definitional issues. 256

This dissertation has argued that it is possible to remove ideology or motivation and argue that the modern and contemporary terrorism literature clearly indicates similarities based on how terrorist groups "behave;" the things that are required to facilitate terrorism. It also recognized but removed goals and motivations based on Wilkinson's (2001) variants of terrorism. If the goals or motivation of these groups is further examined they might not fit neatly into Wilkinson's categories. It is clear that the three groups studied were religiously inspired but it could be argued that further analysis targeting motivations (which was not done in this dissertation) might reveal others. While the literature accounts for groups with several motivations as hybrid groups, this category might also be inadequate if it can be shown that they have multiple motivations and that some of them are not found among the literature's distinctions. Focusing on the observation that these groups had a very limited life span by choice and could be termed "one and done," also creates a definitional problem. Terrorism definitions discuss several criteria necessary for an act to be considered terrorism. One of these requirements is that the act is intended to "affect some kind of political change." While it is very clear that a terrorist campaign demonstrates an effort to fulfill this criteria: acts of terrorism continue or are threatened to continue until the group has achieved its desired change, this does not apply so clearly to one and done attacks. The lone terrorist attack seems to negate the idea of efforts to affect political change because there is no evidence of continued presence. Perhaps a more accurate term would be that these represent political statements—a group that is unhappy about some facet of its society and wants to draw attention to it. Although it is a very fine line, if one chooses to accept domestic homegrown terrorism as political statements as opposed to efforts to affect political change, than they could be disqualified as terrorism. If these attacks are terrorism by every other criterion except this one, is it still terrorism? Does this not suggest a slippery slope if the field begins to make exceptions on some criteria but not others? Does this mean this observation needs to be applied to the definition problem more broadly and ask it to investigate how these acts, which clearly represent terrorism in spirit are allowed to fall between the cracks? A further definitional complication might arise based on how difficult domestic homegrown terrorist groups might be to detect. This research observed that these groups 257 operate in such a manner that identifying them can be challenging. While several groups have been detected and disrupted, it is unclear whether this trend will continue. The literature clearly identifies terrorists learn from their mistakes and the mistakes of others. Groups such the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) demonstrated the lengths to which groups go in this respect. They would apply for information from the Government, including intelligence reports and post arrest interview transcripts and also attend the trials of their comrades. This provided them with invaluable details about how they were identified, how they were monitored and how evidence was gathered against them (Aust, 1985, 137; Jackson, 2009). This remains a concern for many and is at the center of the debates about trying terrorists in civilian courts (Savage, 2009). The openness of the legal system in Western democratic states places a tremendous emphasis on the disclosure of evidence. Revealing strategies, tactics, and resources allows groups to evolve and adapt to counter them. This will improve their odds of success in subsequent attempts. For example, reports indicating groups are monitored through their internet discussions will undoubtedly make other groups more cautious in the future. Some researchers have been hesitant to include terrorist attacks committed by individuals in the same category as terrorism broadly in part because of the difficulties they pose for "detection or deterrence" (Jenkins, 2009, 2). If we assume that terrorist groups learn and adapt then domestic homegrown groups, already difficult to detect, may soon become nearly impossible to identify. Again, those who suggest that individuals are "different" based on this observation may choose to lump domestic homegrown terrorist groups in this category further muddying the waters about what type of terrorism this is and how it should be categorized.

Pre-Radicalization Replacing Socialization This research identified no clear evidence suggesting any formal attempts by a leader or the group as a whole to socialize, educate, or indoctrinate individuals joining the group. The terrorism literature highlights that these efforts ensure members are ideologically prepared to commit terrorism and that this is a purposeful and lengthy process. Coupled with the absence of rigorous indoctrination, research also demonstrated members of the three groups were willing to act very quickly once the group was formed. 258

Because of these observations an analysis of domestic homegrown terrorism must provide some explanation for how traditional efforts to socialize do not occur but the end result is the same. The most logical hypothesis is that individuals are joining groups predisposed to some ideological assumptions. This has been termed "pre-radicalization" in most radicalization models. It argues that certain individuals in western states are now able to access material that they once could not and is tied directly to advances in technology and the internet. The modern and contemporary terrorism literature has only recently started to investigate the link between terrorism and the internet and it has produced mixed results. Many have hypothesized that the internet would facilitate existing terrorist groups and how they organized and conducted themselves. It was assumed that they would use the internet to reach out and communicate with other groups more effectively and exchange information and strategies. They would be able to raise funds and disperse funds around the world and gather information to plan or authorize attacks. Very little thought has been put into how it might serve as a catalyst towards creating new terrorists. Faced with the results from this research it is clear that this link needs to be analyzed further. The internet debate can actually be divided into two separate topics: whether the internet facilitates terrorism as a whole, and whether the internet might contribute to radicalization. Current terrorism research investigating the link does not make this distinction. Research on the link between terrorism and the internet is very recent and despite all of the attention paid to terrorist use of the internet for recruitment, training and communications, no consensus exists that terrorists will find the internet to be a uniformly permissive environment (Bjelopera, 2011, 3). The three groups studied for this dissertation did not appear to use the internet in any meaningful or extensive way to further or sustain themselves. The one commonality the groups all shared was that they were known to have accessed both ideological and tactical information from the internet. This could be a major factor that replaces a leader or group responsibility to socialize and indoctrinate followers.

The Internet 259

From an organizational perspective, the internet should help enhance some of the tasks necessary to sustain the group. It may help attract recruits by spreading propaganda and hate, it may help fiindraising or the transfer of funds from one group to another. It may help them communicate with other groups to share tactical or logistical information and it may make gathering intelligence on potential targets easier (Hummel, 2008). However, these advantages appear to be tied to the more traditional or existing international terrorist groups. None of the domestic homegrown groups used the internet to recruit—there was no real evidence of efforts to actively recruit. There were no efforts to fundraise or distribute funds, and no efforts to really reach out to others in any meaningful way. Transferring or raising funds electronically might also provide more danger than advantage especially since government efforts to disrupt terror groups involves tracking funding in an effort to freeze and starve them of resources While it is possible certain tasks may be facilitated by the internet, one fundamental question asks whether the internet replaces hands-on tactical training that terrorists have traditionally been given at training camps. Weimann (2007) suggests that the internet can be seen as an "online training camp" because it provides practical instructions on how to carry out assassinations, conduct surveillance, use bombs, guns and explosives. Former FBI director Robert Mueller was quoted in 2007 as saying: "the information age means you do not need training camps to become a terrorist: all you need is an internet connection" (Kohlman, 2008, 99). Others disagree and point out that recent evidence questions these concerns and this has real implications for domestic homegrown terrorism specifically. Nesser (2008) and Stenersen, (2008) argue that despite the availability of information and know-how the internet may not substitute for training camps. They point to cases such Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab the underwear bomber who attempted to blow up an airplane on December 25th 2009; and Faisal Shahzad, who left a car bomb in Times Square on May 2nd 2010. In both cases, the suspects did everything right, evaded detection and positioned themselves to successfully carry out attacks. In both cases these individuals were incapable of getting the incendiary device or bomb to work. There are several reasons why internet as training camp may be problematic especially in the case of domestic homegrown terrorism. Even with the knowledge gained from the internet, there are further challenges facing the potential terrorist. They must 260 acquire the necessary parts to construct bombs and other devices and assemble them into an efficient and effective instrument of destruction. This requires a trial and error approach which only increases the odds of detection. The terrorist needs to venture into the public sphere to purchase the necessary elements and then test them and buying large quantities of any product, let alone electronics and explosive materials, is going to attract unwanted attention. Given the option it is likely that attending training camps where hands-on guidance and task repetition remains the more logical choice. In terms of replacing certain roles traditionally performed by leaders and the organizations, research indicates that the internet might assist terrorists in several specific ways including spreading propaganda or ideological information to others. In the case of homegrown terrorists it may simply mean that information they might not otherwise be able to secure becomes available. In 2006, the FBI estimated there were over 6000 extremist web pages on the internet (Mueller, 2006). The most tangible link to the internet as maybe facilitating the process of radicalization might be that curious individuals might investigate extremism as information is now available in English (Jenkins, 2009, 4). Conway and Mclnernay (2008) argue that the internet allows individuals to access videos and messages and that this may lead to discussions in chat rooms where like minded individual can gather and talk. This might serve as the basis for pre-radicalization or a first step towards learning more. Others argue that while the framework exists for this process, there are other issues which might prevent effective pre-radicalization. Brooks (2011, 30) argues that research has indicated that despite the availability of ideological and tactical materials online, they are often poorly organized, incomplete and flat out wrong. Anonymity may embolden individuals to search out extremist material but it often lacks proper support and interpretation. The information is often incomplete and difficult to comprehend absent the proper guidance from an experienced individual. Further, anonymity as opposed to face-to- face contact removes a commitment element. Individuals who cannot be identified may be more likely to search for information but the same anonymity allows them to retreat or dismiss the material because peer pressure does not force them to conform or try to belong. It is entirely possible that the internet might serve the curiosity of individuals, but it lacks the "human" touch: the guidance, manipulation and interpretation that convinces 261 individuals who are unsure or wavering in their commitment. Bjelopera (2011, 21) acknowledges the possibility that accessing and engaging online jihadist rhetoric may possibly prod an individual towards violence. However, "instances of solely virtual radicalization without face-to-face interactions seem rare." A study of 242 European jihadists from 2001-2006 demonstrated that most radicalized individuals had viewed some form of propaganda on the internet (Bakker, 2007), but most radicalization models continue to emphasize real world people and social networks (Silber and Bhatt, 2007; Dyer et al, 2007; Bjelopera, 2011). According to Precht, (2007, 6) while some homegrown terrorist groups might form and grow autonomously up to a certain level, overseas travel and international contacts have been the contributing factors in most recent European radicalization cases. Issues associated with the formation of the group dynamic appear to be the most problematic to replace through electronic medium. The literature identifies the powerful force which emerges as a group of individuals spends more time together and become increasingly isolated from their everyday lives. The degree with which this can occur absent the actual human interaction appears to be limited. Discussions about moral disengagement and drifting towards extreme positions and more importantly building trust would be much more difficult without the face-to-face interaction. Three general perspectives on terrorism and the internet are found in the literature. First there are those who argue that research on the relationship between terrorism and the internet has not yielded anything noteworthy. This perspective suggests that the internet and terrorism craze is likely to end up on the heap of other promising developments that never developed such as the "new" terrorism debate. Others argue that the internet may not as yet be playing the role it was thought to play but it should not so easily be dismissed. Some such as Brooks (2011, 30) suggest that the internet-terrorism relationship is in "an infancy stage," and will soon begin to "pay dividends." Finally there are those in the literature that suggest the internet has already changed terrorism. They argue it can replace ideological or spiritual education, indoctrination and even be a "virtual training camp." According to Talbot (2007, 130) "today most experts agree that the internet is not just a tool of terrorist organizations, but it is central to their organization." This may apply to other terrorist groups but does not appear to be the case for domestic homegrown terrorism. 262

However the internet-terrorism link may be more subtle for domestic homegrown terrorism: the internet may be able to replace the roles traditionally played by people, especially foreign connections in the socialization process.

Re-Assessing Ideas Tied to the Group Dynamic One interesting revelation was that aspects of the group dynamic are different. First, the time frame from group formation, planning, preparation to attack is significantly shorter than the current terrorism literature suggests. Second, the groups never completely isolate themselves or withdraw from their previous lives. In the case of the ZA group, the group met infrequently and never for extended periods of time. The literature suggests that as the group withdraws and isolates it is inevitable they drift towards the more extreme position because there are no alternative perspectives or arguments permeating through the group. In order to explain how this process unfolds and at a much quicker rate, we need to account for an alternative which allows the same transformation to take place. Two possible avenues to explain this include the individual's level of commitment prior to group formation and a re-assessment of what we understand to be "group" behind the group dynamic. The shortened time frame might be explained if members of a group have already undertaken a significant part of this process. As discussed above, the internet allows individuals to start radicalizing which means they may have already reached the extreme polarization position. Time would not be required for all members of the group to drift to this end point. Arguably this would also hasten the development of the other dynamics. This might explain how a group arrives at the end point much quicker but it needs to be reconciled with the fact that these ideas are not challenged as they are progressing. The literature clearly identifies that the amount of time spent together and away from others or outsiders allows the extremist narrative to develop and sustain because no alternative arguments or perspectives are being introduced to counter the emerging ideas. The three case studies examined for this dissertation revealed that the groups never completely withdrew from society and never isolated themselves. They continued to exist in their previous lives working jobs and spending time with family. This would suggest that they remained attached to, or engaged in mainstream society. The question therefore 263 becomes how did the narrow and extreme ideas continue to develop uninterrupted as if there was no counter narrative? One possible explanation might be that the closed argument pool or narrow and extreme ideas were not challenged despite the lack of isolation and withdrawal. The individuals may be engaging with other extended groups such as family and other members of the community but the message is not being challenged or perhaps even being reinforced subconsciously. It is important to stress that this is not meant to imply family members or members of some communities are actively advocating extremism or violence. Instead the growing negative perception radicalized individuals have developed is not meeting resistance from any positive messages emanating from these other groups. Family members or members of a community may inadvertently and unknowingly be fuelling the perpetuation of negative ideas. According to Mubin Shaikh (Zekulin, 2011ms) community members are not speaking negatively about Canada, the West, democracy, foreign policy or any other values or beliefs, rather they are not saying anything. Could it be possible that negative, radical or extreme ideas introduced and accepted by the immediate group could live on in this type of environment? If this is the case then complete isolation from outsiders might not be necessary. Extreme positions taking hold in the limited group interaction continue to exist because when members are outside the group and spending time with their families or in the community, no one challenges the assumptions they are gradually accepting when they do meet with their group. It is possible that the group dynamic remains in place but that the group is simply bigger than initially thought. In a roundabout way this implies it might not be negativity which is the problem but rather a lack of positivity or acceptance of Canada, the West, democracy, foreign policies and values and beliefs. This would be an interesting avenue of research to pursue which has not been examined in the terrorism literature. The literature has always assigned a role for family and community to socialize negatively: instill in family members or members of a community the wrongs they have been subjected to. It is another matter entirely if they may be playing a role in fostering aspects of the group dynamic because they are indifferent and not providing a counter narrative to challenge radical or extremist views. How Terrorism Ends 264

The main differences between domestic homegrown terrorist groups and terrorist groups from the modern and contemporary eras appear predominantly in the origins and workings of the groups. However it was also observed that these groups appear to be shortlived or "one and done" and the fact that these groups do not pursue or organize to pursue some kind of campaign is a major difference from groups in other eras. The current terrorism literature makes no allowance for this end to terrorism. In her book How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (2009), Audrey Kurth Cronin examines the various ways in which terrorism has ended. She identifies six patterns in the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns throughout history (2009, 8):

(1) capture or killing the group's leader; (2) entry of the group into a legitimate political process; (3) achievement of the group's aims; (4) implosion or loss of the group's public support; (5) defeat and elimination by brute force; and (6) transition from terrorism into other forms of violence

The literature suggests two avenues for de-escalation: one where the decision is made by the group, as described by numbers (2), (3), and (6), and one where it is "forced" upon the group, as described by numbers (1), (4), and (5). It is important to observe that in the case of the groups studied for this dissertation, none of these apply. In this case, the literature on how terrorism ends or de-escalates does not account for how the three groups studied here ended. The Madrid and the ZA group were ended but looking beyond this fact it was clear that they were unilaterally ceasing operations voluntarily but outside any of the possibilities suggested by Cronin. It should also be mentioned that according to Cronin, two of the main ways terrorism ends are directly related to leadership and the group itself. These become problematic if leadership and organization have changed, which has direct applications for numbers (1) and (4). Part of the problem is that because this is a newer development, there is no real explanation why this might be the case. It is unclear whether this lone attack strategy is chosen purposefully or if it simply developed that way. Perhaps it is being done for security reasons and the recognition that today it is very difficult to mount a sustained campaign without being caught. Law enforcement were very successful in tracking down the Madrid group after one attack and the T18 and ZA groups prior to their attack taking 265 place. Perhaps the lone attack is intended to be a statement rather than an effort to affect change. For whatever reason these individuals wanted to convey a message about a specific grievance or dissatisfaction but were not inclined to pursue it to its conclusion.

Limits or Weaknesses of this Research There are several possible limitations or criticisms that might be made about this research. However, each one of these current weaknesses can be addressed with further research which will strengthen and support the findings of this dissertation. The most obvious limitation would be tied to the case studies selected to represent domestic homegrown terrorism. The first point would be that this research chose to limit its analysis to three cases and a second point that the case studies are dated because they occurred in the mid 2000s. Both of these criticisms were briefly addressed in earlier sections of this dissertation but will be re-examined. The cases were selected because they represented the biggest terrorist attacks (and disrupted attack) when this research was designed. The notoriety of the attacks also guaranteed that there would be adequate information available for analysis. This dissertation highlighted that in many instances there appeared to be factual inaccuracies in the literature, especially in instances where researchers chose to study many cases at once. It further observed that large portions of information on these cases were purposefully withheld from public release for many years if it was tied to other legal proceedings. In this case limiting the number of cases and allowing time for all the information to become available was a trade-off. More cases or more recent cases have a higher risk of potentially inaccurate or incomplete information. A second possible criticism might be that these three cases could be anomalies and that the findings here may not represent anything beyond the specific time frame or cases. In an effort to investigate this criticism it is worth briefly examining some additional cases which have unfolded more recently in an effort to determine if this is the case. Six reports on homegrown terrorism in the West were consulted. These include: Paul Cruickshank's The Militant Pipeline (2010); Lorenzo Vidino's works Danger of Homegrown Terrorism in Scandinavia (2006) and Radicalization, Linkage and Diversity: Current Trends in Terrorism Europe (2010); Crone and Harrow's Homegrown Terrorism in the West: 1989- 2008 (2010), and Europol Reports including the 2007 EU Terrorism Situation and Report. 266

These reports examine major Islamic terrorist attacks and plots occurring in Western states. They reveal that there is an overlap of some characteristics observed in the three cases analyzed for this dissertation. Vidino (2006) argues that the evolution of Islamic terrorist groups seen in the Madrid and London cases can be observed in more recent Scandinavian cases as well. He points out the similar trajectory of Islamic activity in Scandinavia during the 1990s where the more traditional organized terrorist groups such as the Algerian GSPC or the Egyptian Gama'a al-Islamiyya operated as logistics hubs in countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway. He however idenitifes that the overwhelming majority of terrorist activities taking place in Scandinavia more recently are carried out by homegrown networks (Vidino, 2010, 1-4). Further analysis on the Scandinavian cases revealed that there was in fact a clear pattern and that the majority of Islamic terrorist activities were coming from independent, homegrown networks composed mostly of extremely young, second and third-generation Muslim immigrants in the West. Further that they were "spontaneous networks" which had limited if any ideological affiliation with al-Qaeda (Vidino, 2006). An examination of several Danish cases including the Hofstad group, the 2005 Glostrop group, and the 2006 Vollsmose group showed members of these groups were either Danish citizens or individuals that had been there for many years. They were highly integrated into Danish society and had no contacts to foreign terrorist groups (Crone and Harrow, 2010, 18; 2011, 526; Cruickshank, 2010, 5-7). Like the Madrid, London and Toronto groups, the Vollsmose group was mostly young second-generation Muslim immigrants of various ethnic origins and one was a young Danish convert to Islam (Vidino, 2006; Europol, 2007, 19). The 2007 London nightclub and Glasgow airport terrorist attacks fit this pattern as well. These attacks were committed by longstanding residents who planned and conducted attacks against targets in the United Kingdom. Although it was initially suggested that one of the attackers was linked to al-Qaida, no evidence emerged supporting that foreign training had occurred or that he had been ordered to carry out an attack (Vidino, 2010, 14 Cruickshank, 2011, 6). Efforts in the literature to examine and classify Islamic terrorist attacks and plots against the West are now being measured and compared based on degrees of "autonomy" 267 and "linkages." Crone and Harrow (2011) argue that there appears to be differences among these two variables. Some of these groups are completely autonomous and have absolutely no ties to established foreign groups, while others are directly tied to others and might even be acting on specific orders. Vidino (2010) suggests that it is possible to observe links to foreign groups based on whether members have any form of training or none. Analyzing case studies from this perspective revealed that groups existed along a continuum or spectrum: in some cases groups had obvious links and connections and in other cases it is clear that groups were completely autonomous. Some of the groups could not be accurately categorized as one or the other. Vidino's (2010) analysis of twenty-one major terrorist plots against the West found that nine could reasonably be traced back to Pakistan or the Middle East but that the other twelve could not. Briefly, these reports indicate that the characteristics of Islamic domestic homegrown terrorism identified in this dissertation can be found in additional case studies. These include the smaller size of the groups, the fact that they are completely autonomous from any foreign terrorist group (training, finances), membership consists of citizens or longstanding residents of the country targeted and there is no real indication of isolation or withdrawal. Some information however is less clear including how many of the groups might have been recruiting and how many can accurately be portrayed as fitting the one and done criteria. This might support contentions made earlier in this paper that a certain amount of time does need to pass because there was very little detail on these more recent cases. The lack of information might also be a result of a misguided perception that these cases are not worth studying in detail because they did not result in successful attacks. This brief discussion indicates that the findings of this dissertation are not anomalies and that the characteristics observed in the Madrid, London and Toronto cases can be seen in other cases which have occurred. It also indicates that additional case studies should be studied to overcome this potential limitation and minimize this criticism. A second limitation or criticism about the research conducted in this dissertation is a new twist on an old problem in terrorism studies: the definition of terrorism. Here the definitional issue is not only a lack of agreement on terms such as "domestic" terrorism and "homegrown" terrorism, but the fact that currently no one is attempting to address the two and remedy the present overlap. One challenge posed by this problem was that there was no 268 point of departure on this type of terrorism and one needed to be created. This point was addressed in chapter three but can be expanded upon further. The problem that arises is that without further efforts to identify similarities and differences it is easy to simply declare them one and the same which does not do justice to either term. Current definitions of homegrown terrorism remain focused on where an individual was radicalized and neglect to investigate any aspect beyond this point. It is entirely possible to have Islamic homegrown terrorism which is domestic, including the London, Madrid and Toronto cases but there are examples of other variations which exist that should not be lumped into the same category. Some cases which muddy the definitional waters further include the 2010 Danish plot to bomb the JyHands-Poster newspaper in Copenhagen and the August 2010 Canadian case investigated by Project Samosa. In December 2010, three men were arrested planning to attack the Jyllands-Poster newspaper in Copenhagen. While this case shares the same characteristics as the Madrid, London and Toronto cases there is one small but important difference: the group travelled a very short distance to conduct its attack but crossed state borders. The group consists of two Swedish citizens and a third who had lived in Sweden since 2010 who had planned what authorities called a "Mumbai style attack" (Anderson and Goodman, 2010). Despite demonstrating the same characteristics as domestic homegrown terrorist groups, the fact that they travelled from Sweden into Denmark to conduct the attack excludes them from this label. In August 2010, Misbahuddin Ahmed, 26, Hiva Alizadeh, 30, and Khurram Sher, 28 were arrested and accused of planning a domestic terrorist attack. During a search of an Ottawa residence, police seized more than 50 electronic circuit boards which were to be used to develop remote detonators as well as terrorist literature, videos and manuals and plans, materials and a list of potential targets (CBCNews, August 30 2010). The target list is alleged to have included the Parliament buildings and Montreal subway system. Of the three individuals charged, Sher was born and raised in Montreal, Ahmed is a Canadian citizen raised Canada but born in Pakistan and Alizadeh was born in Iraq but immigrated to Canada in 2000 (CBCNews, September 15, 2010). Authorities were fairly certain that Alizadeh was in contact with someone in Afghanistan but could not confirm if he was tied directly to a specific terrorist group. This revelation included suspicions that the group was 269 also attempting to provide support to Afghani groups and facilitate attacks on targets and troops overseas as well (OttawaCitizen, August 30, 2010). Based on this information the group was homegrown but appears to have simultaneously had domestic intentions and international aspirations as well. This dissertation, attempting to identify the characteristics of domestic homegrown terrorism and compare them to those found among modern and contemporary terrorist groups began from a disadvantageous position. It essentially had to create a basis for the definition and then re-frame it based on findings from the research. This needed to be done because there was no clear understanding or definition about what these types of attacks might look like or how they should be categorized found in the literature. They were simply "lumped" in with many other cases as long as they shared one criterion: that the individuals were radicalized in the West. The 2010 Copenhagen and Toronto cases show that this type of categorization is too general. They share all the same characteristics as the Madrid, London and Toronto cases except for very small differences. However, based on the current understanding of homegrown terrorism, the literature would not consider them to be different from one another. Having a clear understanding of how a framework for homegrown terrorism might be broadened would help make analysis of these cases clearer. This requires looking beyond simply the location where an individual was radicalized and should also include additional factors. Currently it is very easy to suggest all these cases are the same: they represent cases of Western citizens who become Islamic home grown terrorists, but the reality is that beyond this point, the statement is very general and factually inaccurate. A third limit of this dissertation is that it provides very little explanation for why Islamic inspired domestic homegrown terrorism might be occurring. The analysis revealed that there were substantial differences among the elements but at this point it can only speculate why these differences exist. There are no obvious explanations although several areas seem promising. The role of technology, specifically the internet seems to be a logical point of departure for future research. This explanation however fails to acknowledge the difficulties and complexities surrounding these types of attacks. This dissertation has "lumped together" different cases which occurred in different Western states. This makes the faulty assumption that these states are identical and negates the 270 potential contribution made by environmental, societal and political culture variables. Each of these states has unique challenges and demographics which undoubtedly affect the prevalence of this phenomenon. Building on discussions found in the radicalization literature, others have posited that radicalization appears more likely in Europe than in the United States and point to several specific demographic factors. We may be able to generalize about why this type of terrorism has increased but state specific analysis and a comparative perspective is required to unravel why this is occurring and variation will probably be observed across each state and case. This leads back to the notion of tipping points as a main catalyst for certain individuals but this approach remains problematic because different individuals in different states will be subjected to different pressures and perceptions. A fourth potential limitation of this dissertation is that it accepts the literature review as the basis for its four key elements. It is important to state that this observation does not presuppose that the literature review is inaccurate. Instead it is meant to draw attention to the reality that our understanding of these elements has been constructed on ideas which were borrowed or transplanted from other fields of study. For example aspects related to group dynamics migrated from psychology, aspects related to leadership and organizational attributes and effectiveness were imported from studies on politics and even the corporate world. When terrorism studies borrows or transplants ideas from other disciplines and applies them they move onto a separate path which deviates, evolves and grows independently of findings in its field of origin. The problem is that these ideas come to be accepted on their own merit and neglect to acknowledge they remain connected and intertwined to similar ideas in other fields. We very rarely see efforts to re-visit these other fields to observe whether and how the concepts have evolved and what this might mean for similar ideas in terrorism studies. Accepting that much of the basis for terrorism studies originated in other fields it is entirely possible that new discoveries or theories in those fields have not yet been applied in a similar fashion which might be limiting research in terrorism studies. We need to remember how the field developed and continue to re-visit other fields and not rest on the laurels of what has been developed to date. 271

The reality is that each one of these limitations or weaknesses can be addressed moving forward. The addition of more cases will help refine the research and create a better understanding of this phenomenon.

Concluding Remarks This dissertation argues that Islamic inspired domestic homegrown terrorism in Western states remains a very real threat and that it demonstrates these groups behave differently than those we have studied traditionally. It also suggests that current counterterrorism approaches may not be effective and may in fact be counterproductive against this type of terrorism. Efforts to understand why some individuals who are either born and raised, or long standing residents of Western states attack those states remain challenging but needs to remain a priority. If we subscribe to the idea of tipping points: specific events or occurrences which ultimately push an individual towards anger and potential violence, as a potential catalyst for this phenomenon, many can be seen on the horizon. Individuals living in Western states may be tipped by continued tensions in the Middle East and the policies pursued by their Western state including the tension with Iran over its nuclear program, outcomes of the Arab Spring and Libyan internvention, the future of the Syrian state, the ever present Israel-Palestine issue and how states such as Iraq and Afghanstan respond following Western withdrawal. Further compounding these issues might be events occurring within Western states themselves such as tensions between society and minority groups, as well as economic opportunity and economic well-being. Islamic inspired domestic homegrown terrorism will not be the only terrorist threat facing Western states but it does remain a real possibility moving forward and efforts to understand it need to continue. 272

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