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The Mineral Industry of Congo (Kinshasa) in 2006

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The Mineral Industry of Congo (Kinshasa) in 2006 2006 Minerals Yearbook CONGO (KINSHASA) U.S. Department of the Interior April 2009 U.S. Geological Survey THE MINERAL INDUS T RY OF CONGO (KINSHASA ) By Thomas R. Yager The Democratic Republic of the Congo [Congo (Kinshasa)] Trade played a globally significant role in the world’s production of cobalt and diamond. In 2006, the country’s share of the world’s Exports were estimated to be about $2.32 billion in 2006, cobalt production amounted to 38%; industrial diamond, 28%; and imports, $2.74 billion. Diamond accounted for 38% of total and gem-quality diamond, 6%. Congo (Kinshasa) accounted exports; crude petroleum, 25%; cobalt, 16%; and copper, 11%. for about 49% of the world’s cobalt reserves. Copper and crude Other mineral exports included gold, niobium (columbium), petroleum production also played a significant role in the tantalum, tin, tourmaline, and tungsten. The share of diamond domestic economy. The country was not a globally significant in total exports declined from nearly 53% in 2001; the shares consumer of minerals or mineral fuels (Olson, 2007a, b; Shedd, of cobalt and copper increased from 8% and 4%, respectively. 2007). From 2001 to 2006, diamond exports nearly doubled in value, but cobalt and copper exports increased at a faster rate because Minerals in National Economy of higher prices and increased production. Petroleum products accounted for nearly 6% of total imports in 2006 (International The mining and mineral processing sector accounted for Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 68-69). 13.2% of the gross domestic product, and the manufacturing sector, 4.5%. An estimated 700,000 artisanal miners were Commodity Review involved in diamond production; employment in diamond trading amounted to about 100,000 (International Monetary Metals Fund, 2005, p. 48-49; 2007, p. 46). Cobalt and Copper.—First Quantum Minerals Ltd. of Government Policies and Programs Canada produced copper ore from the Lonshi Mine; the company shipped its ore across the border with Zambia to the The Parliament of Congo (Kinshasa) passed a new mining Bwana Mkubwa solvent extraction-electrowinning facility. code in July 2002 that replaced Ordinance No. 81-013 Reserves at the Lonshi Mine were likely to be depleted in 2008 of April 2, 1981. The new code promotes private sector (First Quantum Minerals Ltd., 2007, p. 8, 11). development of the mining industry; the principal role of the In April 2006, First Quantum started construction of a new Government with respect to mining is to promote and regulate mine at the Frontier copper deposit. The company planned to the development of the industry. Mining rights are vested with produce an average of 73,000 metric tons per year (t/yr) of the Government. Congo (Kinshasa) was a signatory to the copper during the 19-year life of the mine starting in the third Kimberley Process, which established a certification system in quarter of 2007. The capital costs of the mine were expected to November 2002 to reduce the trade in conflict diamond. be $226 million (First Quantum Minerals Ltd., 2007, p. 8). First Quantum purchased Adastra Minerals Inc. of the Production United Kingdom in May 2006; Adastra held a 65% interest in the Kolwezi Tailings project. First Quantum was considering In 2006, the production of tungsten in Congo (Kinshasa) the development of a plant with an initial production level of increased by 178%; zinc, 120%; copper, 34%; and silver, 26%. 35,000 t/yr of copper and 5,800 t/yr of cobalt; production could Cement output increased by 4% in 2006, but doubled from be expanded to 105,000 t/yr of copper and 17,400 t/yr of cobalt 2002 to 2006. Tantalum production declined by 58% in 2006; in a subsequent phase. The company planned to complete an niobium (columbium), by 57%; tin, 22%; and diamond, 19%. engineering study in 2007 (First Quantum Minerals Ltd., 2007, p. 27). Structure of the Mineral Industry Anvil Mining Ltd. of Australia operated the Dikulushi open pit copper-silver mine, which is located near Lake Mweru in La Générale des Carrièrs et des Mines (Gécamines), which Katanga Province. The company exported copper concentrates was a state-owned company, produced cobalt and copper; other from the Dikulushi Mine to Namibia for smelting. Anvil cobalt and copper mining companies were privately owned. produced 22,618 metric tons (t) of copper in 2006 compared The cement producers Interlacs and Lukala Cements Co. were with 17,816 t in 2005; silver production increased to 67,633 privately owned. The Government held an 80% share in the kilograms (kg) from 53,553 kg. Open pit mining ceased large-scale diamond producer Société Minière de Bakwanga in November 2006; the company planned to mill ore from (MIBA). Artisanal and small-scale miners accounted for most stockpiles until the planned completion of a new underground of the diamond, gold, niobium (columbium), tantalum, tin, and mine in the fourth quarter of 2007. Anvil expected production tungsten production in Congo (Kinshasa). Artisanal and small- to be 20,000 t of copper and 56,000 kg of silver in 2007. The scale miners also played a significant role in the country’s cobalt life of the underground mine was expected to be 6 years (Anvil mine production. Mining Ltd., 2007a, p. 3, 7). Congo (Kinshasa)—2006 11.1 Anvil was engaged in a joint-venture agreement with Central African Mining and Exploration Company plc Gécamines and DeMoura Enterprises to mine the Kulu deposit. (CAMEC) of the United Kingdom started heap leaching In 2006, production at Kulu increased to 19,956 t of copper operations at its Luita solvent extraction-electrowinning plant from 1,361 t. In 2007, copper output was expected to be about near Lubumbashi in 2006. The company planned to produce 16,000 t. Anvil planned to complete an electric arc furnace at at a rate of 40,000 t/yr of refined copper, 3,000 t/yr of refined Kulu for the production of black copper ingots with a grade of cobalt, and 3,000 t/yr of cobalt concentrate by the end of March between 90% and 94% copper in the fourth quarter of 2007. The 2008. CAMEC planned to increase production to 100,000 t/yr plant was expected to have a capacity of 15,500 t/yr of contained of refined copper and 12,000 t/yr of refined cobalt by the end of copper and to be fully operational in the first quarter of 2008 2008 (Central African Mining and Exploration Company plc, (Anvil Mining Ltd., 2007a, p. 8-9). 2006). Anvil held a 95% interest in the mining rights for the The Tenke Fungurume project was a joint venture between Kinsevere and the Nambulwa deposits in Katanga. In the second Phelps Dodge Corp. of the United States (57.75%), Tenke quarter of 2006, Anvil announced plans to complete the first Mining Corp. of Canada (24.75%), and Gécamines (17.5%). stage of development at Kinsevere, which included an open In December 2006, Phelps Dodge gave conditional approval pit mine and two electric arc furnaces, in the second half of for construction of the first phase of the project. Final approval 2007. The Kinsevere project was expected to produce between depended upon getting Government signatures for a previously 23,000 and 25,000 t/yr of black copper ingots. Anvil planned to negotiated power supply agreement. If Tenke Fungurume complete a feasibility study of the second stage of the project were to proceed, production was expected to begin at a rate in the second quarter of 2007. Depending on the results of the of 113,000 t/yr of copper and 8,200 t/yr of cobalt in late 2008 study, Anvil could build a solvent extraction-electrowinning or early 2009. The life of the first phase of the project was plant with a capacity of 60,000 t/yr. The combined production estimated to be about 40 years. Capital costs of the project were from the Dikulushi, the Kinsevere, and the Kulu Mines was estimated to be about $650 million (Tenke Mining Corp., 2006). expected to be 60,000 t in 2008 and nearly 100,000 t in 2010 In April 2006, Katanga Mining Ltd. (Kinross Forest Ltd., (Anvil Mining Ltd., 2007a, p. 10; 2007b, p. 8). 75%, and Gécamines, 25%) announced the completion of a Gécamines and its joint-venture partners produced 36,000 t feasibility study on restarting production at the Kamoto Mine of copper in 2006 compared with 26,000 t in 2005 and 38,000 t near Kolwezi. Katanga planned to produce nearly 24,000 t/yr in 2001. The company’s production was inhibited by aging of copper and 900 t/yr of cobalt in the first phase of the project; equipment; a lack of investment, fuel, and spare parts; and poor production was expected to increase to 67,000 t/yr of copper infrastructure (International Monetary Fund, 2007, p. 51). and 2,800 t/yr of cobalt in the second phase. Katanga planned to In the second half of 2006, Ruashi Mining SPRL (Metorex start production in October 2007 (Katanga Mining Ltd., 2006; Ltd. of South Africa, 67%) started production of cobalt and Arenson, 2007). copper from tailings near the Ruashi Mine. The company reached Copper Resources Corp. of South Africa planned to restart the full capacity of 10,000 t/yr of copper and 1,000 t/yr of cobalt production at the Kinsenda copper mine by October 2007. by the end of 2006. Resources in the tailings stockpile amounted The company planned to produce 40,000 t/yr of copper in to 3.2 million metric tons (Mt) at grades of 1.86% copper and concentrate.
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