Review T He Test Track

-m —^ AIR UNIVERSITY R eview

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY...TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY FOR LIMITED WAR.. .TACTICAL AIR DOCTRINE AND EMPLOYMENT

NOVEMBERDECEMBER 1967

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

Canadian Defen c e Policy...... 2 The Honourable Paul T. Hellyer

T actics and Technology—T he Unlimited War on Lim it e d W ar...... 8 Gen. James Ferguson, usaf

BOLD SHOT—USSTRICOM No -Notice Exerc ises...... 19 Col. Benny L. Costello, usaf Lt. Col. Donald M. Wood, usa

Project RAPID STRIKE—E val ua ting a Joint Exerc ise...... 30 Col. .Arthur A. McCartan, usaf

D octrine Devel o pmen t for the Emplo ymen t of Tactical Air Forces...... 44 Lt. Col. David C. Collins, usaf

T actical Air Emplo ymen t —C urrent Status and Future Objec t ives...... 50 Lt. Col. Edward O. Stillie, usaf Air Force Review T he Test Track...... 62 Brig. Gen. Leo A. Kiley, usaf

T he British Appr o a c h to Strategy—P er spec t ives for the U.S...... 75 Lt. Col. Ray L. Bowers, usaf Military' Affairs Abroad T he Party and the Mil it a r y in the Soviet Union...... 82 Maj. John F. McMahon, Jr., usaf In My Opinion L ogistics—T he Bridce...... 93 Maj. Graham W. Rider, usaf

P lanning for Reusa bl e Launch Veh icl es—A N ew and Nec essa r y Outlook ... 98 Capt. John J. Francis, Jr., usaf Books and Ideas W hen Are Battles L ost and W on? ...... 101 Col. Alfred F. Hurley, usaf

R ise and Fall ...... 104 Dr. Robin Higham

T he C ontributors...... 109

Address manuscripts to: Editor, Air Univer- the cover sify Review, Aerospace Studies Institute, Max- well Air Force Base, Ala. 36112. Printed hy With "Canadian Defence Policy.” the Honourable Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C. Paul T. Hellyer, formerly Canada’s Minister of Subscriptions are sold hy Air University Defence, terminates a series of articles begun Book Department, Maxwell Air Force Base, in our January-Fehruary issue to recognize Canada Ala. 36112: yearly S4.50, back issues 75 during her Centennial of Confederation. Through- cents. USAF recurring pu bi ic a t io n 50-2. out 1967, the Review has considered aspects of Canada’s defense structure and international role. f This issue also presents General James Ferguson’s Vol. XIX No. 1 November-D zcember 1967 appraisal of technology's support of limited war and concludes the survey of tactical air operations, which we featured in September-October. CANADIAN NCE POLICY

T he Honourable'P aul T. Hellyer

Adherence to dogma has destroyed more armies and lost more battles and lives than any other cause in war. Major General J. F. C. Fuller ANY of the basic principles that will be the best military organization, the most govern Canada’s defence policy responsive to co-ordinated action, and that Mare constant because they are because of its simplified lines of communica- determined by factors, such as geography and tion it will be able to develop new concepts and techniques more quickly. history, which are specific. Others, such as the nature and the magnitude of the threat to This point reflects the growing complexity peace and security and the development of of defence choices, which often involve polit- weapons and weapons technology, change ical, economic, and scientific problems as well rapidly and drastically. Defence policy must as issues of military effectiveness. adapt itself to such changes, while principles The impact of shaqrly rising costs for per- remain constant. sonnel, maintenance, and operations had been The modem military force must be a observed for some time, and its consequences dynamic organization—dynamic in the sense for Canada’s defence activities were strongly that it must be constantly changing and im- emphasized in the policy discussions of 1964. proving. It must be able to adapt to the prod- It was recognized that the total funds avail- ucts of today’s advanced technology; it must able for defence were not likely to change have the best equipment available in sufficient greatly, so that money available for capital quantity to meet the requirements of national equipment would inevitably decline drasti- policy. Most important of all, it must be cally unless something was done about it. manned with responsible men highly trained In the White Paper on Defence, which in the art of modem military techniques. was tabled in the Canadian House of Com- Underlying the major revision of Canada’s mons in March 1964, and previously in the defence policy announced in 1964 is the con- Report by The Royal Commission on Govern- cept that any organization, military or Chilian, ment Organization, great stress was placed on which does not adapt to a changing environ- the importance of reducing manpower costs ment will surely decline. In the early 1960s it associated with headquarters, training, and became apparent that two aspects of this similar establishments, as well as operating problem demanded special attention. They and maintenance expenses which could be cut were the management and control structure without impairing operational efficiency. and the influence of rising costs. After considering the factors of manage- One of the issues stressed in a statement ment and control, the influence of rising costs, before a Parliamentary Committee on Defence as well as personnel considerations and the in 1964 was the number of senior officials with nature of modem warfare and the influence direct access to the Minister. I pointed out at of teclmology, it was necessary to apply gen- that time: eral conclusions reached to the specific mili- With the present prerogative of the Chiefs tary requirements of Canada. If we were to of Staff to come directly to the Minister with maintain useful forces to meet our national their problems and submissions, there are many and international commitments, we had two cases where proposals are dealt with by the choices: we had to increase defence spending Minister in isolation. This will be overcome or reorganize our forces. The decision was to in our proposed organization by the fact that reorganize. all military proposals will come through one Broadly speaking, the objectives of Cana- channel, and therefore, must in effect be co- dian defence policy fall under four major ordinated before they come to the attention headings: of the Minister. (a) Collective measures for maintenance The desirability of adopting sound man- of peace and security as embodied agement principles and a simplified chain of in the Charter of the United Na- command was reiterated in a subsequent tions, including the search for bal- statement I made before the same committee. anced and controlled disarmament; I think it [the Canadian defence organization] (b ) Collective defence as embodied in . 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the North Atlantic Treaty; incidentally was unanimous in the Defence (c) Partnership with the United States Department, are obvious. Under existing cir- in the defence of North America; cumstances an all-out thermonuclear ex- (d ) National measures to discharge re- change, even after a surprise first strike by sponsibility for the security and pro- either side, would inflict unbelievable damage tection of Canada. on the two great power blocs. Casualties on each side would number in the tens of mil- These are not in any order of priority but are lions, and there is no known way that this merely broad headings under which priorities result could be avoided. An exchange could may be established. take place as the result of miscalculation, To carry out these objectives, we have though the chance is remote. From a rational concentrated our efforts on our forces in be- standpoint, there is no conceivable national ing. The purpose of our forces in being is purpose to be achieved by an all-out thermo- to preserve peace by making a contribution nuclear exchange, and consequently the prob- to the deterrence of war in cooperation with ability of its happening is low—provided, of our allies. This principle applies throughout course, a credible deterrent is maintained. the whole spectrum of possible conflict. At Almost equally unlikely is a major con- the high end of the scale, thermonuclear war ventional war in Europe, since a war on this and major nonnuclear war are deterred by the scale would almost inevitably escalate into existence of sufficient force to make any ag- nuclear conflict, if for no other reason than gression unprofitable. Similarly, at the lower it would soon threaten the nuclear capability end of the scale in peacekeeping and other of one or both sides. activities, it is the existence of and in some At the other end of the scale, and far cases the use of forces in being which contains more likely, is a continuation of small wars, or tends to contain the conflict in a limited insurgency, riots, overthrow of civil govern- way and prevent it from escalating into some- ment, and other minor conflicts of this sort. thing more dangerous. In most situations in Not only have we been warned that there will the real world, then, it is flexible forces in be activity in these areas, but in some cases being which may be useful to keep the peace it could be a legitimate extension of an aggres- and deter war. The chance of calling on mo- sive foreign policy from the standpoint that bilization potential, though possible, is remote. the potential gain might justify the risk taken This assessment was the guide to the and, therefore, we should expect continued setting of our priorities. Forces in being, and, perhaps, accelerated activity at this level. which traditionally have been low priority, Once having decided what we believed are now at the top of our list; and reserve the possible spectrum of conflict to be, we be- forces, which were the backbone of our mobi- gan to design a force structure flexible enough lization in two World Wars, have been moved to contribute throughout the scale. This means down the scale proportionately. forces equipped to contribute to the deterrent Following careful study we concluded on the central front in Northwest Europe and that the most unlikely development at this also capable of being employed in peacekeep- time would be an all-out thermonuclear ex- ing activities, brush-fire wars, and related mis- change. The second least likely would be a sions. The range of training and equipment major conventional war in Europe lasting for required for these varied tasks is very great any extended period. At the other end of the indeed. Requirements range from the heavy spectrum, the most likely possibility of con- equipments needed on the central front for flict will be a continuation of small wars, riots, deterrence to that of light air-portable equip- insurrections, overthrow of the civil power, ments for peacekeeping, brush-fire wars, etc. etc. These are likely to continue, perhaps on Training ranges from that required to cope an increased scale. with the possibility of nuclear war to lightly The reasons for this assessment, which armed peacekeeping. To meet these varied On 19 September 1967, the Honourable Leo Cadieux, M.P., became Canada's new Minister of National Defence; he had served as associate minister since February of 1965. Governor General Roland Michener congratulates Mr. Cadieux (left) after swearing him in at Government House. Participat- ing in the ceremony are Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson and the Honourable Paul T. Helltjer, newly appointed Minister of Transport and Mr. Cadieux’s predecessor as Minister of National Defence.

contingencies, forces must be flexible and this century has produced. These include mobile. Key words in our force structure then General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Mont- are “flexibility” and "mobility.” gomery, and Air Chief Marshal Harris, to For our purposes we decided the best name a few. way to achieve flexibility and mobility was Each of these on the basis of his own through a single force. It has been suggested command experience came to the conclusion that the idea of a single force is new and that the old lines of demarcation were no should be approached with extreme caution. longer valid. The grey areas are increasing, Actually it is not a new idea. It is one which and the trend to combined operations involv- has been discussed and debated for at least ing two or more of the traditional elements a generation. The idea has won the support requires a unity of command and control to of some of the greatest military commanders ensure maximum success. 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The White Paper of 1964 would not have restoring or peacekeeping operations can de- recommended integration as a first step toward pend on the speed with which decisions are a single service if we had not been certain reached and the force and its equipment deliv- of the improved capacity of a unified force ered to the trouble zone. to meet the demands of modem warfare. I believe it is a fair conclusion that a sin- The pattern of warfare in which armies fought gle organization which works and thinks to- armies, navies fought navies, and air forces gether day-in and day-out, with direct lines fought air forces is not likely to be repeated. of communication and a single line of respon- Under the traditional three-service concept, sibility, eliminates the self-inflicted problems the individual service recruited, administered, associated with the three-service system of co- trained, equipped, and supported the com- ordinating combined operations. bat force units within that service. Joint or Concomitant with the change in our force combined headquarters were created, where structure are the changes in management tech- necessary, to coordinate and direct the opera- niques which have been introduced into the tions of the elements of two or more of Defence Department since 1964. One of the the services. This is a device necessary in a most important problems in defence manage- three-service system, but it has built-in draw- ment was the reconciliation of the programs backs arising out of the very fact that units of the three sendees, that is, the setting of the and elements belong to different services. real priorities between the programs of each. Each component depends on its parent service The integration of Navy, Army, and Air for support in a host of ways which require Force headquarters aided materially in the special channels of communication and com- solution of this problem. An Integrated De- plex methods of coordination throughout. fence Program ( id p) has been established, Commanders and staffs down to the low- which displays all approved defence activities est level of operations, and in the support and forecasts spending over the current year echelons from the scene of operations back to and the following five-year period. The pro- the home base, must act together and in gram data relate the various military functions unison as the situation demands. Under condi- and missions to resource requirements of man- tions of modem warfare, consultation between power, money, and materiel. With this infor- services having different areas of responsibil- mation available^ we can determine at once ity and different channels of communication the implications, both on*^particular mission is time-consuming. More important, it cannot and on the integrated defence program as a achieve the high degree of coordinated re- whole, of any new requirement. sponse that could be critical and would be The defence programming system in- immediately available through a single orga- cludes a program change procedure which nization. The old system can result in misun- keeps the id p current as it reflects changing derstanding and delay which, at best, a military national and international conditions and the activity can ill afford and, under some circum- adoption of advantageous technological ad- stances, cannot afford at all. vances. The development of this comprehen- Fast decision-making and quick reaction sive system has been taking place for some are synonymous with modem warfare. The months. To assist in its implementation, we introduction of jets, missiles, rockets, comput- have retained a civilian consultant group fa- ers, satellite reconnaissance vehicles, and other miliar with the process, to advise us. new military techniques demands an expedi- The operation of this system insists on the tious resolution of problems and rapid resolution of the two management problems sponse. For intercontinental warfare, the im- raised. First, since it includes all missions and pact of the contraction of time and distance the elements of all missions, it displays each is evident, but it is also valid in relation to of these in a way which facilitates the consid- military activities at the lower end of the eration of priorities and demands their solu- spectrum. Even the success or failure of peace- tion. Second, the data required for the system CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY 7

include capital costs, personnel and support be available for the capital expenditures that requirements, and operating costs, and there- are essential to effective military forces. These fore the total effect of each new program pressures will continue. The integration- change is known at the outset and available through-unification process will generate im- for review at any time. The information neces- portant new cost reductions for some years sary for management to make decisions is to come. It cannot be expected that these will readily available, and the system itself ensures match the increasing costs in current dollars that the data are presented in a manner that from year to year, but without them we would tends to realistic decisions. face much higher defence budgets to maintain Another important area which has been defence forces at approximately the level we subject to reorganization is that of develop- have today. ment. Each service had its own development The nature of modem warfare has re- funds, and in each case the administration and sulted in a compaction of time and distance screening were carried out within the service to the point that decision-making and reaction concerned without consultation with the other time must be much swifter than ever before services unless a particular field in winch it in history. I feel a unified force best meets was known that there might be more than a this demand. Unification will broaden the op- one-service interest. Since integration, the portunities available to service-motivated and three service development programs have expensively trained personnel when changes been amalgamated and coordinated to fit the in roles or systems alter requirements. In this overall defence program. way, the nation will benefit, the forces as a The facts are clear and incontrovertible. whole will benefit, and—just as important—the Either the defence budget has to be substan- serviceman himself will benefit. tially increased or substantial cost reductions have to be made, else funds would simply not Ottawa, Ontario TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY the UNLIMITED W A R on LIMITED W AR

G en er a l James Fer guso n a a ESEARCH and development is foresight has not been as perceptive as it might charged today with the responsibility have been. R of being in two places at once—at the Accordingly, those of us charged with re- frontier of future opportunities and on the search and development responsibilities must doorstep of present problems. The challenge of ask ourselves two related questions: supplying the needs of our operational forces, • Is r &d delivering the goods today, in whether those needs are ten minutes or ten terms of today’s needs and in support of the years away, is resulting in a new order of re- current emphasis on tactical capabilities? sponsiveness on the part of the .Air Force Sys- tems Command. The contributions of research • Are w'e simultaneously addressing our and development to U.S. needs in Vietnam talents and technologies to the needs of the future? represent an “unlimited war” on limited war, a concerted effort within the Air Force to influ- Recognizing that world conditions and nation- ence tactics by the use of technology. al policies can change overnight but that Historically, nations have entered into suc- weapons cannot, we must be continually aware cessive wars with the weapons and concepts of changing conditions, long-range prospects, that had been successful in the last war. If the and the possibility that unless development conflict lasts any length of time, innovations in lead times are respected w’e could again be techniques or technologies will occur, and found wanting at some point downstream. The these tend to persist until other wars bring test is to determine how’ ably we are looking about other changes. However, the circum- for new and better ways to do familiar things, stances of recent years in the course of the cold, seeking new' technologies to overcome old hot, and technological wars going on among na- problems. At the same time, are we trying to tions suggest that the time interval for innova- look ahead to the kinds of difficulties that might tion and technological inventiveness is growing plague us in any future use of military forces increasingly shorter. In fact, the day may be in the defense of freedom, ours or other near when “leftover” weapons and on-the-shelf people’s? technologies will be inadequate, insufficient, or Because Vietnam is a “different” kind of ineffective as a means of winning a war or war, there is no reason to believe it will be discouraging an aggressor from starting one. unique. Unwilling to challenge the strategic This eventuality brings into sharper focus powder of the United States, the Communists the preventive mission of defense research and have resorted to aggression at the lower con- development, which in the past decade or so flict levels, where massive power cannot be has been eminently successful in satisfying used without restraint. To overcome U.S. vul- national policy requirements for weapons and nerability to this tactic, w’e have moved to systems of a strategic nature. These same chan- strengthen our general-purpose forces, improve nels of policy, budget, and technology decision- our technology, and enrich our r &d resource- making have been somewhat less successful in fulness. In short, Air Force responsiveness to assuring U.S. tactical superiority under limited- the situation in Southeast Asia is intended to war conditions. In this respect, our collective discourage subsequent “wars of national lib- 1* clt>

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Project Underbrush At the Air Proving Ground Center, Eglin AFB, Flor- ida, “Underbrush” simulates an actual battlefield situation in South Vietnam, providing realistic testing for military engagements being fought there. Simulated effects include scarecrow-like troops in the field, Viet Cong sampan, and Vietnamese village. TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 11 eration” as well as assist in resolving the present one. To avoid exploitation at the hands of the Communists or anyone else, the U.S. show of strength clearly must span the spectrum of threat. Toward that objective, the Air Force Systems Command mission today has three prime facets: First, we are seeking ways to sene the diverse needs of the operational forces in Southeast Asia better and more quickly. Second, beyond that immediate goal, we are searching the horizons of technology for those capabilities which will deter tactical threats as effectively as our long-range missile and bomber forces have deterred strategic threats. Third, we are energizing all the technologies and resources at our command to assure the continued adequacy of our strategic forcefulness. In even- case our intention is to deter, discourage, or dissuade aggression, and in each facet of this three-part mission the meaning of A 51-foot-diameter parasail parachute, devel- deterrence is the same—assurance to the enemy oped for high-altitude cargo drops, is static- that he cannot succeed. tested by Air Force Flight Dynamics Labora- tory engineers. The parasail can be guided We have come to understand that in a automatically or manually into an impact zone limited war the aggressor has the advantage and homes on signal from a ground transmitter. of picking the time and place of confrontation. In the past, the choice of tactics and weapons from among those available to us has not always been broad enough to offset that advan- of trying to fight a war without front lines and tage. The research and development commu- in the absence of a readily distinguishable nity today has the opportunity to introduce enemy has been reported many times but is new weapons and technologies either not avail- still not fully appreciated in terms of the bur- able to the enemy or unsettling to his “style” den it places on the defender. The enemy’s of warfare. Ideally, these should be innovations ability to blend with his surroundings and to that can overcome an enemy’s advantage de- use geography to maximum advantage repre- cisively and at costs that are not prohibitive. sents the most difficult obstacle to our success Despite the superiority of Free World in Vietnam. The ability to hit small, mobile forces opposing the Communists in Vietnam, targets with pinpoint accuracy remains one of the environmental conditions favor the enemy. our most urgent needs. These conditions include “guerrilla-absorbent” The mazes of trails, roads, and waterways, terrain and the advantages of familiar ground. together with the seemingly endless resources In addition, the enemy forces are trained to of manpower for the repair and resupply mis- live off the land, to function at night and in sions, make interdiction of supply lines a diffi- adverse weather, and to pose as noncombat- cult and constant job. Roads and bridges are ants. They are exceedingly adept at hiding, quickly repaired or circumvented. So vehicles tunneling, and merging with the landscape. and supply lines must be hit directly, accu- The novelty, to say nothing of the difficulty. rately, and repeatedly. The long-range weather radar, pro- cured and installed btj Electronics Sys- tems Division, AFSC, is now in use in Southeast Asia. Three of them, spaced in a triangle, provide coverage of several hundred thousand square miles.

The real turn in the tide, not only in Viet- nam but in discouraging similar situations, may well come when U.S. technologies overcome the enemy’s natural advantages with respect to terrain, tactics, and manpower. In the Systems Command, we are committed to the earliest possible realization of this objective. Tech- nological progress already has contributed substantially to the improvement of U.S. capabilities in Vietnam. The opportunities for further advances are getting prompt and em- phatic attention in current research and development efforts. The Systems Command’s key contribution to success in Vietnam is fast technical assistance, or, as Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown has put it, “a capacity to make swift innovations tailored to the immediate circumstances.” All the resources of the Command have been made available to the Southeast Asia support requirement. An Assistant for Southeast Asia on the Headquarters staff serves as the central coordinator for the Command’s multiple limited-war activities. These activities begin with an on-the- scene assessment of combat-area problems. Our Systems Command liaison office in Saigon, located with Hq Seventh Air Force, maintains close contact with all Southeast Asia operational units. Through a Southeast Asia Operational Requirement ( sea o r ) procedure, the Seventh Air Force can address a requirement to the Systems Command. Upon receipt, the stated need generates an immediate search for a technical solution. This response first takes the form of a best preliminary estimate ( bpe), expressed concurrently with Tactical Air Command s determination of the best operational tactical solution. sea or ’s serve to bring a required operational capability to the surface for immediate ex- TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 13

The fold-auay aircraft detection radar, TPS-44, is to ke used in the forward air control ftost of the 407-L Tactical Air Control System (TACS). It can be set up in less than twenty minutes, is readily transportable, and in severe weather is folded rather than dismantled.

posure and prompt consideration. The intent of the sea o r is to elicit swift response, both technically and procedurallv. Problems de- manding broad, long-term action may “graduate” from the sea o r category once it has been determined that a quick-fix solution is not possible or attainable. The need for an airborne command post, for example, was originally identified through the sea o r procedure, which led to the procurement of the C-130E aircraft equipped for the control of airborne and ground operations in battle areas. Another sea o r stated the need for a long-range weather radar, and afsc satisfied the requirement by procuring and developing suitable equipment that was commercially available. The direct line that we have established from the origin of the need in a Southeast Asia operational situation to the source of the research and development action authority in the Pentagon can, if necessary, be traveled by telephone or radio. Along with this fast-reaction approval channel, we have set up a funding source to assure rapid evaluation of new hardware and techniques for limited-war needs. This source has provided the funds necessary to buy, test, and try readily available equipment with promising potential. Although it allows only for funding of test quantities, the combat actions are the best qualified sources availability- of this funding source shortens the of operational requirements, we insist that our time span through development and opera- people talk with forward air controllers, strike tional testing to the point where a procurement pilots, and other aircrewmen at every oppor- decision is practical. tunity. In seeking ways to continually improve Among other things, we have found from the timing and the quality of the Command's these and other experiences that “requirement" responsiveness, we have concentrated on mak- and “problem” are not necessarily the same ing our technical assistance efforts personal, thing. A requirement generally is a definite and prompt, and professional. One of the ways it definable need, while a problem may lack has become personal is through the direct con- specific identity. On occasion, the cure for a tact our Saigon liaison people have with the problem may be available but unknown, or forces in the field. Recognizing that those who the problem may exist but remain unidentified. are directing the operations or engaging in There may be technologies on the shelf which 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

could lead to new or more effective ways of people into direct contact with those battle- doing a particular job but the application of zone problems amenable to quick-fix solutions. which has not been discovered or realized. This situation represents a solution looking for a problem. T hrouchout the Systems Com- To avoid the possibility of needed solu- mand, as well as in other elements of the Air tions going begging, we have attempted to Force, other innovations in procedures and in improve and expand communications between the development of technologies and their ap- the Air Force's using commands and its tech- plications are being encouraged and empha- nology teams. We have taken a number of steps sized with a view toward improvements in to provide research and development personnel combat effectiveness today and deterrent ef- greater “visibility” in actual combat situations. fectiveness tomorrow. These steps include short-term tours and The primary problems we encounter are orientation visits of research and development the classic ones of offense and defense, but they officers and civilians to the combat zone, for are greatly complicated by the natural re- on-the-spot exposure to problems which they straints and the political and military con- may be able to solve or alleviate. straints applicable to the Vietnam situation. Another effort in this direction aims at Technology probably can never overcome all recouping as many combat-experienced r &d these limitations, but we are confident that officers as we can. following completion of their novel approaches, new ideas, and capabilities sea tours. At the moment, among the most structured on technological advances can pro- precious resources we have in the Command vide added thrust to our offense and greater are the science and engineering officers lately strength to our defense. returned from Vietnam and assigned to active The offensive power of the Free World limited-war research and technology projects. forces in Southeast Asia has been impaired by Many of them may return to the combat area, a limited ability to locate and identify the but in their r &d status. enemy, to curtail his mobility and his freedom As rapidly as possible we expose new ideas to function at night and in bad weather, and to and new technologies to the operational en- discriminate with enough precision to assure vironment, through our liaison office in Viet- accurate strikes against proven military targets. nam. We have found that it is as useful to have We are further handicapped by having to R&D-qualified officers assigned to key positions risk aircraft and other costly equipment in in the combat theater as it is to have combat attacks on relatively low-value targets, such as veterans selectively assigned to r &d programs truck convoys, bridges, river traffic, and the here in the States. like. Such interdiction actions, of course, are Mating technology to operational needs in- necessary to cut down the flow of supplies and volves considerable “imagineering” as well as to reduce the infiltration from the north. Tech- engineering. At the Air Proving Ground Center, nological advances enabling us to carry out Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, a simulated such strikes more effectually, while minimizing Southeast Asia jungle environment—complete the risk to our own people and equipment, with sampans—provides a realistic setting for would contribute substantially to the value of the testing of ideas and equipment potentially our offensive power. useful to U.S. forces. Defensively, we need better base security, Last June we established the Directorate with devices for detecting enemy intrusion, to of Technical Applications for Southeast Asia. safeguard our forces against surprise attack. This is an intentionally small, mission-minded Some of the answers to these problems are task force located at Eglin as a part of the Air already realities; others are coming. Proving Ground Center organization. Our Sensor technology is being advanced rap- purpose in forming this group is to bring oper- idly under the impetus of the Vietnam conflict. ationally oriented and technically qualified Night traditionally has favored the enemy, and TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 15

bad weather conditions long have afforded him cover and security against air attack. These advantages soon will be denied to the enemy, through systems which will make our “eye- sight” almost as good at night or in poor weather as it is under favorable daylight conditions. The sh ed l ig h t program is a comprehensive technical effort to eliminate darkness as the enemy’s asset. The program involves the ad- vancement of surveillance, detection, illumination, and attack technologies. In addition, detection devices sensitive to heat, odors, and even colors are under development. We are looking for ways to find tunnels, weapons, and concentrations of enemy troops. High on our list of priorities are better ambush detection equipment, fully effective base- intrusion detection devices, and foolproof booby-trap alarms. Communications Through the provision of better electronic Aids for and communications equipment, munitions, and lifesaving, rescue, and evacuation tech- Limited W ar niques, field elements already have witnessed the effects which up-to-date tactics and technologies can make on battlefield situations. Sixty-foot inflatable UHFI Compared to Korea, for example, there are VHF antenna, which fits into more and bigger helicopters, superior com- a twenty-pound, manpack unit, munications, faster response capabilities, and a assists combat control teams in dense jungle----Jeep-mounted much better record of personnel rescue. Most equipment links ground forces important, the death rate among battle casual- with forward air controllers. ties is significantly lower because of the improved medical and air evacuation facilities. Rescue and survival are more nearly the rule than the exception, and ground-to-air rescue devices have been developed which make it possible to pick up downed airmen from any type of terrain. A new crash-position indicator, also developed by the Systems Com- mand, has been successfully tested and is in use, simplifying search and rescue procedures and speeding responsiveness. These are examples of relatively fast answers to combat problems. To help control the air war over Vietnam, the Command has created flying command posts by converting C-130E aircraft into airborne battlefield command and control centers. They serve effectively as radio relay points, coordinating weather, intelligence, air rescue, attack, and air traffic control. 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Space systems also contribute to the effec- Agency terminals are in operation in the Philip- tiveness of U.S. combat capabilities. Thirteen pines and at Nha Trang, South Vietnam. days after the last three satellites in the Initial In the same time period, tests were begun Defense Communication Satellite Program on the early components of a tactical com- were orbited last July, that system was de- munications satellite system. Using an all- clared operational in the Pacific, handling up to transistorized ultra-high-frequency repeater 1000 messages a week over the Hawaii to satellite, the LES-5, the Army, Navy, and Air Saigon link. Other Defense Communications Force conducted test transmissions that linked

M-117 bombs on external racks designed for the B-52 greatly increase its total bomb load. TACTICS AND TECHNOLOGY 17 aircraft, ships at sea, and submarines. The high- being punctured by an incendiary projectile. power satellite, together with the small, light- New and improved types of munitions, weight, highly mobile terminal ( which can be including better air-to-air and air-to-ground jeep-mounted or back-packed, for that matter), missiles, also have been developed as part of makes the tactical system under development the research and technology approach to ideally suited to combat situations. limited-war effectiveness. Bombs designed to Other direct support items of limited-war penetrate jungle foliage before detonating, value which have flowed from Systems Com- bombs to assure low-flying attack aircraft mand research and development efforts include ample escape time, and various area denial de- expandable shelters, new adjustable litters for vices are among the special types developed air evacuation, a cold-water-cooled flying suit for use in Southeast Asia. for pilots flying low-altitude missions, and Research and development work of a more techniques for low-level parachute supply de- traditional nature is exemplified in the design liveries. Four types of steerable parachutes, and acquisition of aircraft tailored to the con- including one capable of lowering a 2500- ditions of counterinsurgency, limited war, and pound load, have been tested. Development the needs of our general-purpose forces. work and field tests have been completed on In the Concept Formulation Package stage radar sets small enough and compact enough are several aircraft systems, including the F-X to be back-pack carried into remote sites where tactical fighter for future assured air superior- they can be quickly assembled and put into ity and the A-X specialized close air support use. Portable air traffic control equipment, aircraft. The Concept Formulation Package is mobile weather stations, and rapid preparation our basic means for advocating new systems of remote landing sites have also contributed and is the foundation for justifying the re- to the flexibility of U.S. forces. sources necessary to their development. As another indication of the extent to More immediate to the needs of Southeast which Systems Command resources have been Asia are a number of aircraft being acquired marshaled in support of limited-war forces, the or modified to serve the various missions of eight Air Force Laboratories under my Direc- close air support, interdiction, forward air con- tor of Laboratories have been searching their troller, and psychological warfare. Among specialized and highly advanced inventory of these are the A-37, A-7D, 0-2A, 0-2B, and technologies for applications useful in the OV-IO. Southeast Asia conflict. Laser technologies, The Air Force’s r &d assault on limited-war among other things, have been particularly problems and obstacles ranges from armaments promising, especially for illumination and to aircraft and from laboratory ideas to field communication purposes. equipment. Since Systems Command tech- Research and development attention has nicians joined with tacticians to produce tech- also focused on flight control techniques de- nical answers to tactical problems, a variety of signed to minimize the exposure of low-flying items to meet a variety of needs have been aircraft to radar detection. Other sophisticated developed and put to use in the combat zone. equipments, like terrain-following radar and In short, we are trying very hard in the electronic countermeasures, are critically im- Systems Command not to overlook any area of portant to the penetration capability of attack opportunity that will improve our advantage in aircraft and to their survival in the hostile en- Southeast Asia. Yet there are still many prob- vironment of enemy planes, antiaircraft fire, lems to be solved, many challenges to be met. and surface-to-air missiles. Our operational forces find that their air- As a safety measure, an explosion-proofing craft can still be shot down. Overall, there is polyurethane foam material has been devel- a great need to improve our capability to de- oped and qualified for use in aircraft fuel tect the enemy, distinguish friend from foe, tanks. The foam virtually assures that an explo- and strike small targets more precisely and— sion will not occur as a result of the fuel tank’s perhaps—more economically. 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Despite all our advances in detection tech- "One should be very careful,” Secretary niques, we can still benefit a great deal from Brown has warned, “in remembering that any new-found means for obtaining real-time [Vietnam] is not the only kind of war, and if reconnaissance of ground targets that move, we proceed to organize and procure equipment radiate heat, or reflect or consume power. and train people only for this kind of war, we The Air Force’s success in the technologi- can very easily get a bad surprise if we find our- cal war is having a pronounced effect on the selves in a war where, unlike the one in South current “hot” war. Without the advances of a Vietnam, the enemy has rather advanced scientific or technical nature that have been weaponry and can operate advanced surface- developed and applied to the Vietnam situa- to-air equipment, missiles, artillery and aircraft tion, our losses there would surely be much themselves.” greater and our effectiveness much less. This possibility alone is good reason to Air Force resources for research and de- pursue the whole spectrum of research and development are pledged to the continuing sup- velopment programs designed to maintain and port of Southeast Asia needs and requirements. extend U.S. technological superiority. Our goal Those same resources of talent and technology is to be prepared for the future and to cause are pledged equally to the deterrence of sub- our capability for preparedness to impact on sequent wars and to a readiness to fight and the present. We seek to make tactics and tech- win them should they occur. This preparation nology the winning combination in a balanced goes on in full awareness that future wars may force structure geared to any degree of con- entail different sets of circumstances, may be trolled response required by national policy. waged under very different conditions, and Hq Air Force Systems Command may require wholly new technologies.

Another Role of the P-38

In response to “Three Bullets on a K nife: Saga of the P-38" (Air University Revietv, XV III, 2, Janu- ary-February 1967), Brigadier General Howard T. Markey of the Illinois Air National Guard writes:

The RP-322 was a P-38 without turbos or armor plate and with both propellers rotating in the same direction. A number of these RP-322s were built for Great Britain, but for some reason they were not accepted and were parked at Tonopah, Nevada. Some of us brought them to W illiams Field, Ari- zona, and they became, I believe, the first combat- type aircraft to be employed in cadet training. We moved the radios and squeezed the cadet behind an instructor pilot before soloing him. Among the many great things about the P-38 type was its capability of functioning, at least in this lightened version, as an excellent trainer. The activation of United States Strike Command ( u sst r ic o m) in October 1961 and the establishment of its mission were part of the implementation of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which amended the National Security Act of 1947. Briefly, this law states that it is national policy— . . . to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. The functional responsibilities assigned to u sst bic o m by the Joint Chiefs of Staff include the requirement to conduct joint training exercises to assure maintenance of a high level of combat effectiveness and a rapid reaction capability. Since its inception, u sst bic o m has provided the centralized command and control necessary for the sponsoring, planning, and conducting of a wide variety of exercises for U.S. Army Strike Command ( usabstbike) forces and U.S. Air Force Strike Command ( usaf- st bike) forces. In the implementation of joint training responsibilities, the primary objective of u sst bic o m is to integrate the combat capabilities of assigned forces into effective joint combat teams that are capable of executing joint combat missions. Such training provides all participating units with meaningful experience in an adequate field combat environment and assists participating personnel in acquiring or further developing all the essential skills and knowledge that they wotdd have to apply in combat.

INCE its activation six years ago, usst r ic o m has conducted large-scale S exercises, such as swif t st r ike, desert st r ike, cold fire, and sil ver hand; augmenta- tion exercises in which usst r ic o m tests its capability to augment other unified commands with specifically tailored forces; operational exercises, which are similar to augmenta- tion exercises with the exception that the forces involved remain in the reinforced theater for an extended period of time; and “rapid reaction” exercises. Rapid reaction exercises are conducted periodically by usst r ic o m to test and enhance 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the rapid reaction capabilities and operational vides for five of these exercises each year. readiness of the Army and Air Forces assigned, Prior to a bo l d sh o t exercise, elaborate in order to assure a timely and effective re- preplanning is necessary. Consideration is sponse to the implementation of the various given to the exercise site location and climatic contingency plans for which usstricom is data, force availability, and the development of responsible. Rapid reaction exercises include a logical and realistic concept of operations. the br im fire series and the bo l d sh o t series. A decision briefing is then presented to the br im fire exercises are designed to test the Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command preparedness of the Rapid Reaction Force, a ( cin'cstrike ). Once the decision is made, a mis- brigade-size force from the armored, infantry, sion-type operations plan is transmitted to the and mechanized divisions, to deploy by air or component forces, and subsequently a mission surface means from their home stations. Since directive is issued to the Commander of the the rapid reaction exercises involve the alert- usstricom Joint Task Force (comstrikejtf). ing, marshaling, and preparation for movement The mission directive includes those key oper- of the designated force but do not involve the ational matters which clxcstrike desires that actual deployment and employment, this arti- the comstrikejtf stress during the conduct of cle will be devoted instead to the bo l d sh o t the exercise. These matters are usually based series. on areas noted during previous exercises which The bo l d sh o t exercises were developed to from a training point of view require addi- exercise the Division Ready Force ( drf), a tional attention. They may include camouflage, reinforced airborne infantry battalion of either communications, discipline, air cover for the the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North approaches to and the peripheral areas of the Carolina, or the 101st Airborne Division, Fort drop zone, proper drop zone signals, surprise, Campbell, Kentucky, in conjunction with Air tactical security, speed and vigor, mission-type Force tactical fighter, reconnaissance, and tac- orders, humane care for rescued civilian per- tical airlift units. The purpose of the exercise, sonnel, and operations involving riot control in addition to testing the rapid reaction capa- agents. The comstrikejtf and his staff develop bility, is to test the operational readiness of and disseminate a jt f operations order, which participating forces through the conduct of a outlines broad guidance to the exercise par- tactical field exercise. The forces participating ticipants. Detailed orders are not the vogue in these exercises are of limited size, tailored within usstricom, since cixcstrike permits from basic force packages for a specific tactical subordinate commanders the maximum free- mission. Upwards of 1200 to 1500 Army, Air dom possible in the development of their own Force, and Headquarters usstricom personnel tactical scheme of maneuver. are actively engaged in each bo l d sh o t exercise. During an exercise, procedures are stressed for the marshaling, deployment, and E xerc ise bo l d sh o t 3-67, conduct- tactical commitment of initial assault forces. ed in March 1967, was typical of the bo l d sh o t The employment phase is normally of short rapid reaction series of training exercises and is duration and emphasizes the requirement for selected to describe the joint planning, force accelerated joint planning and swift execu- structure, and actual execution of an exercise tion. The exercise involves the rapid deploy- of this type. ment of a joint task force ( jt f ) by air, directly The exercise setting was focused on a sit- or through an intermediate staging base, to uation in the hypothetical Republic of Mateke, an objective area, where the force is employed actually represented by North Carolina. On 25 in an airborne or airlanded assault or in a March, after an unsuccessful attempt to assas- combination of the two. sinate the Prime Minister of Mateke, a country usstricom has conducted nineteen bo l d friendly to the United States, Thomas Bowba, sh o t exercises since March 1962. The present Deputy Prime Minister and a known Commu- usst r ic o m joint training exercise program pro- nist, fled to his home province of Bangia, rep- BOLD SHOT 21

resented by the Fort Bragg-Camp Mackall The Joint Chiefs of Staff had tasked complex in southeastern North Carolina. Upon usst r ic o m to plan and conduct those opera- arrival in Bangia, Bowba ordered the immedi- tions necessary to comply with the President’s ate confinement of 64 U.S. nationals residing in decision. In response, Headquarters usstricom the province in an attempt to embarrass the activated a joint task force headquarters and Mateke Republic and gain support from Gu- banya, a Communist-led country' bordering Mateke that had openly promised to support Communist-inspired insurgency in neighbor- ing nations. Approximately 1000 Bangia guerrillas rallied to Bovvba’s efforts and began operations throughout the province in bands of 50 to 200. Jena .Airfield, the only airfield in the province, had been seized and was being held by a well-equipped company-size guerrilla force. The Prime Minister of Mateke indicated his inability to secure the release of the U.S. nationals being held by Bowba and appealed to the United States to intervene in the rescue of the hostages. The President of the United States, in an official communique, declared that he had no alternative but to take the action necessary to rescue the Americans ------Command and to effect their safe evacuation from Bangia — • — • — • Operational control Province. Bowba in turn declared that he — ------Coordination—administration and logistical support would assassinate all the hostages if Bangia was invaded. Command relationships, Exercise BOLD SHOT 3-67

Map 1. The geographical setting for USSTRICOM Joint Exercise BOLD SHOT 3-67

VIRGINIA

Gubonya KENTUCKY

O lort Campbell NORTH CAROLINA Mateke Republic BANGIA r—— ( Seymour Jgbmoa ' * O V I N C I ~STj.ooV Alt TENNESSEE SOUTH OKLAHOMA ARKANSAS CAROLINA

MISSISSIPPI GEORGIA

OOra. Alt

TEXAS

LOUISIANA FLORIDA

MotOlll A lt 22 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

selected the following forces necessary to ac- headquarters is employed on bo l d sh o t exer- complish the mission: the Division Ready Force cises. of the 101st Airborne Division—the 1st Bat- Early on the morning of 27 March. talion, 502d Airborne Infantry; a Psychological usst r ic o m forces were alerted by cincstrike Operations Element from the Special Warfare through normal command channels. From this Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the 40th point on in time, the actions taken by partici- Tactical Fighter Squadron from Eglin afb, pating units and personnel were characterized Florida; reconnaissance elements from the by speed, vigor, determination, and profession- 363d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Shaw afb, alism. The comstrikejtf and his staff moved South Carolina, and the 186th Tactical Recon- by C-130 aircraft from their home station at naissance Group of the Mississippi Air National MacDill afb, Florida, to the designated staging Guard, Meridian, Mississippi; an Airlift Task base at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. Within five Force consisting of 36 C-130 troop carrier air- hours after the initiation of the alert, the craft from Dyess, Sewart, and Pope Air Force comstrikejft assumed operational control of Bases; and two Airborne Forward Air Con- the component forces and immediately com- troller O-IE aircraft and crews from the Special menced joint planning for the conduct of the Air Warfare Center at Eglin afb, Florida. operation with the comarfor and comaffor. The Division Ready Force ( drf) com- By noon the next day the tactical fighter mander was designated as the Army forces aircraft had closed at their forward operating commander ( comarfor), and Headquarters base ( fob) at Seymour Johnson afb, North Twelfth Air Force, Waco, Texas, provided the Carolina; the tactical airlift aircraft were in Air Force forces commander ( comaffor). position at Campbell Army Air Field, Fort The command relationship for the exercise was Campbell, Kentucky; and the Tactical Recon- typical of the command structure normally naissance Element had conducted prestrike utilized when a usst r ic o m joint task force photo reconnaissance in the objective area and delivered the completed photo products to the comstrikejtf. Operational planning by the comstrikejft, component commanders, and "^lap 2. Concept ami execution of Exercise BOLD SHOT 3-67 staffs had been completed, and briefings were conducted at all levels to assure that all personnel were aware of their unit’s mission and the part they themselves would be required to play during the operation. H-hour, D-day, was established as 0600 est 29 March. The concept of operations, which was jointly developed, envisioned an airborne assault at H-hour, D-day, with the drf on Drop Zone St. Lo; the assault force would immediately seize objective Olivero and rescue the U.S. hostages interned there, move with dispatch to seize and secure Jena Airfield, and conduct a tactical withdrawal of forces from Jena Airfield and Bangia Province. All phases of the operation were to be supported by tactical air. By early afternoon on D—1, 28 March, preparations for the operation were being fi- nalized. Attention was now focused on a parachute infiltration of a joint force composed of an Air Force Combat Control Team and an

24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Army Assault Team ( cct/aat) into the objec- delay the departure of the cct/aat/lrrp. tive area, which was scheduled during the Based upon a critical analysis of available hours of darkness that night. The mission of weather data, a usst r ic o m Weather Detach- this joint team was threefold: ( 1) to parachute ment located with the jt f Headquarters fore- onto dz Holland, located some distance from casted acceptable weather conditions in the primary drop zone St. Lo: (2) move covertly objective area. A “Go” decision was then made overland to dz St. Lo, to secure the approaches by the comstrikejtf. The highly qualified to the drop zone; and (3) be prepared to pro- C-130 tactical airlift crew discharged its group vide terminal guidance for the assault airlift of infiltrators precisely on dz Holland at the aircraft during the drf parachute assault on prescribed time over target ( tot), 2000 est D-day. For the first time during a bo l d sh o t 28 March. After a rapid assembly, the cct/aat exercise, a Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol carefully and cautiously made their way to dz ( lrrp ) was to accompany the cct/aat. Its St. Lo. Although some contact with guerrilla mission was to conduct reconnaissance of the patrols did occur en route, they reached the approaches to Jena Airfield, as well as the air- primary drop zone in time to establish them- field defense established by Bowba’s guerrillas. selves for the drf parachute assault. The lrrp On the eve of D-day, thunderstorms and in the meantime commenced its reconnaissance high winds in the objective area threatened to patrol to Jena Airfield, located approximately BOLD SHOT 25

25 kilometers from dz Holland. The move, airborne station prepared, if necessary, to con- without delay or detection by the guerrillas, duct preassault strikes, suppressive fire on the and the subsequent reconnaissance of the airdrop zone periphery during the parachute as- field defenses contributed materially to the sault, and close air support for the drf during successful accomplishment of the jt f mission. their ground assembly following the paradrop. On D-day, the first of 13 personnel assault However, guerrilla resistance in the vicinity of airlift C-130 aircraft launched for the objective the drop zone did not materialize sufficiently area, followed by nine heavy-equipment drop to warrant their employment. C-130s. The parachute assault force, consisting The paratroopers were assembled with of 650 members of the 1st Battalion, 502d Air- speed and vigor. To provide the comstrikejtf borne Infantry-, and the jt f Headquarters ad- with timely intelligence, photographs of the vance echelon ( advox), hit the silk over dz St. initial objective, Olivero Village, were taken Lo at H-hour. Once again the Airlift Task just prior to the airborne assault by a single Force, with tactical fighters providing air col- RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft. They were umn escort, displayed their accuracy by plac- quickly processed by a photo processing cell ing both personnel and heavy equipment right ( ppc ) at Shaw afb, South Carolina, and de- down the middle of the drop zone. livered to the user in the objective area by a A flight of four F-4D fighter aircraft was on T-33 using the canister delivery system. Bulk aerial delivery to forces on the ground

General Theodore ]. Conway, l/SA. Commander in Chief, United States Strike Command, observes the exercise. HOLD SHOT 27

Because of Bowba's threat to assassinate been seriously wounded. The objective had the U.S. hostages if Bangia were invaded, it been secured within four hours after the com- was necessary to accomplish the first phase of mencement of the parachute assault. the ground operation swiftly before the guer- Taking advantage of the cover of dark- rillas could react. The tactical plan for the ness and using confiscated vehicles from Oli- seizure of the objective was basically simple, vero Village to supplement the limited number yet quite effective. Utilizing available cover of vehicles heavy-dropped into the objective and concealment, Company B and Company area, the jt f and rescued hostages began a C maneuvered into blocking positions while tactical shuttle movement toward Jena Air- Company A prepared to make the main attack field. Moving a company at a time and de- to seize the village and liberate the hostages. trucking at a point selected by the lrrp, all Scattered guerrilla security elements took the elements of the force were able to close at an lead elements of the drf under fire on the out- assembly area near Jena Airfield before day- skirts of the village. The forward air controller break on 30 March, D -f 1. Guerrilla opposition called for tactical air support, which effectively to the jt f s move was in the form of ambushes, stopped a guerrilla unit attempting to reinforce designed to gain time for reinforcement of the Olivero Village, thus enabling Company A to airfield defenses. overrun the objective. The hostages were Prior to the assault to seize Jena Airfield, quickly prepared for the move to Jena Airfield. an emergency ammunition resupply mission None had been assassinated, but some had for the drf was flown, comaffor, utilizing a

Paradropged men and mule get together and mote into action. \

'* P R O J E C T RA P ID STRIKE Evaluating a Joint Exercise \ i \ Colonel Arthur A. M c C artan ROJECT rapid st r ike, the third phase recent years, no similar development and im- of a United States Strike Command provement program of major magnitude has P evaluation program, included an ex- been applied to joint airborne activities. When amination of all Army and Air Force activities one realizes the contingency options offered by having a bearing on efficient and effective air- airborne and supporting Air Force units and drop deliver)’ of airborne units and their sub- the degree of national reliance placed upon this sequent assembly. The project was designed alert and ready joint tactical force, then the specifically to test procedures and techniques conclusion must be reached that procedures necessary to achieve a higher density of para- and techniques employed must keep pace with troopers and heavy equipment on the drop equipment changes, and current training must zone and their rapid assembly into cohesive be in consonance with all three. units ready for combat. Close observation and evaluation of air- With the ever pressing and increasing pos- borne forces during a continuing series of sibility that an airborne force may at any time usstricom bo l d sh o t readiness exercises over be introduced into combat, obviously the best the past two years have pointed up an urgent possible techniques and procedures must be need for substantial improvement in achieving identified and employed by Army and Air sufficient density of paratroopers and then- Force units conducting joint airborne assault equipment on the drop zone to ensure a capa- operations. Joint doctrine in the area of air- bility for rapid assembly into airborne units borne operations has not kept pace with or- ready for combat. ganizational and technological improvements. To test and evaluate those service-recom- Changes in techniques, procedures, and or- mended procedures and techniques designed ganization over the past years have taken place to improve drop density and more rapid assem- piecemeal, largely without central focus or bly, cincstrike directed that Project rapid criterion against which each change could be st r ike be conducted on a carefully documented measured to assure that each specific apparent and scientific basis. improvement did not, in itself, have a detri- the task mental effect on airborne operations in their entirety'. Significant organizational changes Analysis of the broad task of achieving and striking increases in combat equipment adequate paratrooper and equipment density have occurred in airborne units. Concurrently, on the drop zone and more rapid unit assembly the Air Force has progressed from relatively indicated the need to examine the following slow and small aircraft, such as the C-119 and primary operational matters: C-123, to the faster and larger C-130 and C-141, Aircraft formations. A search for the op- with accompanying, and sometimes forced, timum assault airlift formation to maximize changes in capabilities and technical proce- paratrooper and equipment delivery rates on dures. As a result of increases in total equip- the drop zone and at the same time retain ment and greater numbers of paratroopers per tactical flexibility while en route to the drop aircraft delivered during an airborne assault, zone, during the final approach to the drop as well as faster, larger aircraft, the parachuted zone, and throughout the recovery phase of the force is now extended over a larger drop zone mission. area, with many more items of equipment to Integration of the C-130 and C-141 in retrieve. Follow-on assembly of the force on simultaneous assault airlift operations. An in- the ground is delayed by the increased prob- vestigation into alternative methods of employ- lems of locating and derigging heavy equip- ing these two types of airlift aircraft to drop ment and assembling both personnel and paratroopers and heavy equipment on single equipment over extended surface distances. and multiple drop zones in a closely integrated Wliereas much effort and expense have operation. been concentrated on the airmobile concept Assault aircraft loading. An investigation and the development of associated units in into the comparative advantages of two meth- 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ods: either cross-loading personnel of different units in single aircraft and dropping equipments of several units on multiple impact points, so that personnel and equipment of a specific unit land in a specified area; or straight loading of personnel of one unit in a single aircraft and employing a single heavy-equipment impact point, thus placing that unit down the entire length of the drop zone. Drop sequence. A determination of the relative merits of dropping personnel first or dropping equipment first, and the effects of this determination upon serial separation. three-phase test and evaluation program Certain operational matters could economically be examined in relative isolation by USSTRJCOM C o m p o n e n t F o r c e s , usarstrike and usafstrike, prior to review by cincstrike in a larger joint test environment. Accordingly, a three-phase program was accomplished during the first half of 1966.

Phase I Phase I, conducted at Sewart Air Force Base, Tennessee, 14-25 February, under con- Figure 1. In-trail formation configuration trol of the Tac tical Air Command’s Tactical Air Warfare Center, Eglin afb, Florida, investigated the feasibility of modifying present assault airlift formation tactics to increase the onds), thus doubling the number of aircraft density of paratroopers landing on the drop over the drop zone in a given period of time; zone, thereby decreasing the total time for —employing two parallel in-trail formations force delivery and contributing to more rapid simultaneously over a single drop zone, thus assembly. doubling the delivery rate; (Figure 2) Phase I tests were conducted with up to —employing multiple routes and approaches 18 C-130 aircraft to determine whether, by to the drop zone to reduce the size of each varying formations, sizable numbers of aircraft formation and the vulnerability of the entire could be flown accurately over a drop zone in air column during the enroute portion of the less time than that presently required for sim- airborne operation; ilar numbers of aircraft employing the standard —reducing drop airspeed below 125 knots, assault airlift in-trail formation configuration. thus reducing the length of each stick of para- (Figure 1) Army paratroopers rode in the chutists on the drop zone and reducing the dis- C-130s to observe aircraft stability from a persion of equipment. jumper’s viewpoint. As a result of this brief test, employing The tests investigated the effects of minimum essential resources, cincafstrike —reducing the interval between aircraft from reached these conclusions: 2000 feet ( approximately ten seconds’ separa- a. Reduction of the interval over the drop tion) to 1000 feet (approximately five sec- zone from 2000 feet separation (ten seconds) PROJECT RAPID STRIKE 33

tion rendezvous time tolerance over the initial point is critical. d. Reducing the drop airspeed below 125 knots for C-130s in formation was not con- 2000' sidered safe by test personnel and was not attempted.

3000 Phase II

Phase II was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on 21-25 March 1966, under control of the XVIII Airborne Corps. This test 2000' phase investigated the effects of various aircraft loading and airborne unit assembly techniques. To facilitate rapid assembly, various personnel, equipment, and area assembly aids were introduced. usakstrike employed 25 C-130s to support usarstrike’s test series of three separate bat-

2000 talion-size drops of personnel and equipment. All drops were made from the standard in- trail assault airlift formation. Conclusions reached by usarstrike were that unit assem- blies adjacent to the drop zone can be accomplished more rapidly by using the following drop and assembly procedures: a. Cross-load single aircraft and/or aircraft Figure 2. Parallel in-trail formation configuration elements for the arrangement of personnel, and use multiple impact points for associated heavy equipment. ( Primary-type heavy equipments associated with the airborne battalion to 1000 feet separation (five seconds) is not were the 105-mm howitzer and prime mover, feasible. Aircraft controllability and jump plat- 106-mm recoilless rifle, 11-ton truck and trailer, form stability are detrimentally affected by field ambulance, and the Army mule.) increased turbulence in the condensed in-trail b. Drop door bundles from any aircraft in formation. Employing reduced-interval forma- the formation and from any position in the tions provided only slight improvement in stick so that these heavy, cumbersome bundles density on the drop zone. are placed close to an associated unit assembly b. Employing two parallel formations to in- area. (Door bundles contained those items of crease paratrooper density over the drop zone equipment or supplies assigned to combat units is feasible, providing a minimum lateral dis- which were too heavy or bulky to be carried tance of 3000 feet between impact points and by individual paratroopers during a jump, e.g., therefore between parallel streams is main- the 81-mm mortar and base plate, sand-filled tained. However, flexibility and maneuverabil- boxes to simulate ammunition and rations.) ity are compromised during the final run-in, c. Although heavy equipment can be dropped and an extra wide drop zone is required. over paratroopers on the drop zone with an c. Multiple routes and approaches to the acceptable degree of risk, the separation time drop zone enhance force survivability and are between the personnel and the heavy-equip- feasible either in conjunction with single ment flight serials is critical and is something formations or the parallel formation. Forma- greater than 5 minutes and less than 15 min- 9

During Exercise RAPID STRIKE, C-130s in V's-in-trail formation delivered paratroopers of an infantry battalion (reinforced) onto the drop zone at the rate of 11 men per second.... An Army mule is palletized for airdrop, with ammunition loaded directly on the pallet.

• •• • 4 _i. p

w ST JC PROJECT RAPID STRIKE 35

utes, the present standard serial separation future joint airborne operational and training time employed in training. requirements, cincstrike directed a thorough d. Remaining aircraft retain original posi- testing and evaluation of all associated aspects tions in formation whenever an aircraft is of joint airborne operations. The resultant forced to abort. This procedure permits per- Phase III, Project rapid st r ike, provided a sonnel previously dropped on the drop zone series of ten joint field experiments that per- to identify visually the aborted aircraft posi- mitted careful scientific documentation. This tion in the formation stream and make immedi- documentation formed a basis for verification ate adjustments to compensate in assembly and or disqualification of those procedures and attack actions for the personnel and/or equip- techniques developed separately by service ment that could not be dropped. Although only agencies in Phases I and II and for additional the assault in-trail formation configuration was innovations that were natural developments of employed during the three live drops of Phase the earlier phases. II, it was suggested that a more dense aircraft cincstrike assigned responsibility for this formation, such as the V of V’s, could con- phase to Brigadier General William G. Moore, tribute to more rapid assembly. Jr., usaf, who commanded Joint Task Force e. Drop personnel and equipment at one rapid st r ike in the experiments conducted in altitude. Personnel and equipment drops from the military complex of Pope AFB/Fort Bragg, 1000 feet were successful with the exception of 15 May—2 June 1966, using the following or- piggyback mule loads. This was considered a ganization: minimum practical peacetime drop altitude. a. st r ike jt f rapid st r ike Headquarters, in- f. In reference to markings, there is a definite cluding attached operations analysts, evalua- assembly advantage if all personnel assigned tors, and photographers. to a unit wear a temporary distinctive unit b. Army forces ( arfor): marking, such as a tape over or around the 1. Brigade Headquarters helmet. Heavy equipment loads can be located 2. Two airborne infantry battalions (rein- and identified more readily if distinctive unit forced ). markings are placed on the bottoms of drop c. Air Force forces ( affor): platforms as well as on the front, rear, sides, 1. affor Headquarters and top of each load. Finally, the marking of 2. Troop carrier force unit assembly areas with tethered balloons or ( a ) Forty-five C-130 aircraft smoke streamers assists rapid assembly. Unit ( usafstrike ) assembly area marking is accomplished by (b) Six C-141 aircraft ( ma c ). members of the Army assault team who have Purpose, comstrikejtf rapid st r ike was been clandestinely dropped with the Air Force directed to test and evaluate ways and means Combat Control Team in some near area and to achieve a higher density of paratroopers and infiltrated overland to the drop zone, prior to heavy equipment on the drop zone and their the main airborne assault. rapid assembly into cohesive units ready for combat. He was also required to identify areas needing further studv or evaluation beyond Phase III Phase III. Phases I and II were unilaterally con- Specific objectives. Specific objectives es- ceived tests with each service providing mutual tablished for Phase III, rapid st r ike, were as support to the other as necessary. Forces in- follows: volved were small and the duration of each a. Determine the most feasible, practicable, examination necessarily brief. Following a and efficient formation or formations to achieve thorough review of the separate and somewhat rapid and accurate placement of parachutists limited results of the first two test program and essential combat equipment on the drop phases, and with full realization of the broad zone. impact that significant findings might have on b. Determine the most efficient techniques 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and procedures for rapid assembly of parachutists and essential combat equipment into a viable fighting force after landing. T -a TLx . c. Identify and make recommendations concerning areas needing further study, test, or i innft'i evaluation within the usstricom, the services, or research and development agencies of the Department of Defense. Scope and methodology. Practical consideration of force availability and overall costs 5 sec caused the scope of Phase III, Project rapid 1000') st r ike, to be limited to the minimum number of experiments necessary' to provide an acceptable level of confidence for the data collected. 1 min Eight basic field experiments, employing two (2 miles) battalions alternately and from 22 to 45 C-130 aircraft, were determined to be the minimum essential to satisfy the specific objectives. Ii. the interest of economy, heavy drops were simulated on four events by prepositioning heavy equipment in a fully rigged configuration in 50 see (10,000) varied patterns on the drop zone. Three experiments employing a combination of C-130 and C-141 aircraft were added in order to examine other areas, such as —utilization of C-141 aircraft in combination with the C-130 in the airborne assault role —employment of a larger assault force (brigade) —a variation of the in-trail formation (augmented-in-trail) —effects upon unit assembly times of conducting an airborne assault over unfamiliar Figure 3. V’s-in-trail formation configuration terrain. A bonus return from these three additional events was the collection of additional con- firmatory data similar to those obtained from the basic series of field experiments. d. Times required to assemble company-size A Joint Evaluation Group of approximate- units at designated assembly areas adjacent to ly 80 Army and Air Force officers and non- the drop zone. commissioned officers recorded detailed data e. In-flight data such as aircraft formations, concerning the following: timing, speed and altitude during drop, degree a. Times required to drop the personnel and of turbulence en route to and over the drop equipment of an airborne Division Ready zone, adherence to the computed air release Force ( drf). point ( carp) procedures, circular error aver- b. Locations of personnel and equipment on age, visibility, and safety factors. the drop zone with reference to intended im- About twenty Army and Air Force pho- pact points. tographers recorded specific and general events c. Times required to locate and derig heavy during all airdrops, using a variety of equip- equipment. ment—16, 35, and 70-mm motion picture PROJECT RAPID STRIKE 37

cameras, hand-held and stabilized mounts, timeframe cameras, and still cameras. The Chief Scientist, usst r ic o m, the principal technical adviser to the jt f commander, directed activities of the operations analysts, reviewed data for completeness and accuracy, and assisted in the preparation of the final written and film reports.

o discussion and findings Of the number of airborne assault tech- i niques subjected to thorough scrutiny in Joint Exercise rapid st r ike, only those of principal concern to the Air Force will be discussed: assault airlift formations, integration of the C-130 and C-141 in simultaneous assault airlift operations, assault aircraft loading, and drop sequence and serial separation.

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minute* Figure 4. Augmented-in-trail formation configuration Figure 5. Comparative rates of delivery

700V Assault airlift formations. The three C-130 aircraft formations employed during the series of experiments were the in-trail, V’s-in-trail, and augmented-in-trail, which are depicted graphically in Figures 1, 3, and 4. The average paratrooper delivery rates per second for the three C-130 formations engaged in the delivery of an infantry battalion (reinforced) are as follows: in-trail 7 paratroopers/sec V’s-in-trail 11 paratroopers/sec augmented-in-trail 10 paratroopers/sec If larger than battalion-size airborne units are employed, the number of C-130s required increases; and as this occurs, the rates of delivery change in favor of the augmented-in-trail and in-trail formations. In Figure 5, it can be seen that at a total of 27 aircraft, the rates of delivery of the augmented-in-trail and the V’s-in-trail are equal. Now the in-trail and V’s-in-trail are also equal but at a slightly later point in time. The steps in the V’s-in-trail curve are reflec- 38 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tions of the time-space separations between the in-trail and the augmented-in-trail forma- elements of 9 aircraft each and between serials tions permit lower enroute altitudes and higher of 27 aircraft each. These time-space separa- speeds than does the V’s-in-trail formation. The tions are necessary to provide flexibility in the V’s-in-trail formation, however, may have maneuver of blocks of aircraft in close forma- three aircraft in a ground-fire envelope simul- tion. In-trail and augmented-in-trail forma- taneously, thereby splitting the firepower on tions require no such time-space interruptions, any one aircraft, whereas the in-trail formation, as maneuver of the formation is accomplished consisting of a stream of single aircraft ten essentially by individual aircraft flying in a seconds apart, may permit concentrated fire stream. on one aircraft at a time, although for a rela- The formations flown and the indicated tively short time. Over the drop zone, how- rates of delivery had no measurable effect on ever, each formation flies at or near 1000 feet personnel or equipment assembly throughout altitude and 125 knots airspeed, and only the the numerous battalion and brigade airdrops. differences in length of the air columns con- This is not to say that delivery rates do not tribute to differences in vulnerability. Sup- affect unit assembly, but it does indicate that pressive and destructive fire from friendly differences in delivery rates of a reinforced aircraft would be concentrated in the vicinity battalion or brigade by any of the formations of the drop zone to reduce the vulnerability of examined are so slight that the contribution to the joint airborne force in that area. rapid assembly, if any, could not be detected. Xo factor evolved from rapid st r ike which Although high initial density of personnel and suggests that any one airlift formation offers equipment on the drop zone may have other overriding advantage over the others. The tactical significance, it alone does not contrib- augmented-in-trail formation, demonstrated ute to rapid unit assembly within the context of for the first time in this exercise, gives delivery the rapid st r ike experiments. rates comparable to the V’s-in-trail for a rein- In an actual airborne combat operation, if forced battalion-size force. At the same time it the choice of drop zones is limited and if an retains much of the flexibility of the in-trail organized defense is encountered and engaged formation and requires little or no additional from the outset and prior to unit assembly, aircrew training. The augmented-in-trail and density of personnel and equipment on the the in-trail formations are adaptable to future drop zone could take on tactical significance. all-weather delivery concepts incorporating Maximum firepower would be essential. Such station-keeping equipment. The V’s-in-trail, on a venture would likely not be undertaken the other hand, would be cumbersome under knowingly unless there was no other choice, marginal weather conditions and might be dis- and then tactical air support would be em- astrous under thick weather conditions. ployed prior to and in conjunction with the With reference to formations demon- initial and follow-on phases of the airborne strated, it was concluded that each was ade- assault. quate to assure rapid assembly of personnel Each of the formations tested has distinctive and equipment; however, none demonstrated vulnerability factors for the enroute phase of any measurable advantage over the others in the operation and for the flight over the drop terms of density of drop. Each type of forma- zone. Although only a few bits of data taken tion, employing drop altitudes of 1000 feet for during rapid st r ike contribute to an under- personnel and equipment, resulted in accurate standing of vulnerability factors, it was pos- drops. Revision of certain rigging procedures sible to apply a theoretical mathematical may permit standardizing heavy-equipment approach to the three formations employed, drop altitudes at 800 feet or lower, which their airspeeds, altitudes, and ability to maneu- would contribute to even greater accuracies ver around known or suspected ground fire and to more rapid assembly. sites, and thus to arrive at relative vulnera- Integration of the C-130 and C-141 in bility figures for the three formations. Both simultaneous assault airlift operations. As indi- A rain of heavy equipment from the sky clearly requires precise techniques, based on actual tests, to achieve maximum speed of delivery and assembly with, minimum risk to personnel. 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

A C-141 of the Military Airlift Command tests airdrop techniques in cooperation with USAFSTRIKE.... Paratroopers derig a 105-mm howitzer, ammunition, and prime mover.

An airdropped jeep is readied for action. PROJECT RAPID STRIKE 41

cated in the earlier description of Phase III, Delivery methods, as demonstrated, required Joint Exercise rapid st r ike, six C-141s of the either multiple passes over a single drop zone Military Airlift Command joined the 45 C-130s or the use of two separate drop zones. No at- of usafstrike for the final three events: two tempt was made to drop an entire C-141 load reinforced battalion airborne assault opera- of 120 paratroopers in a continuous line be- tions. and one brigade-size operation. These cause the ground pattern that would have live field experiments, although the first at- resulted was deemed tactically unsound. Re- tempts at integration of these two aircraft, did stricted to a drop zone normally associated indicate the feasibility and practicability of with the C-130, the C-141 was forced to make their simultaneous use in assault airlift opera- two passes on the same drop zone, discharging tions. 60 paratroopers on each pass. The total time Integration of the C-141 aircraft with the involved in this technique included the go- C-130 proved particularly feasible in the around time, resulting in a much slower overall vicinity of the drop zone. The two types of paratrooper delivery rate than that demon- aircraft operated at compatible airspeeds and strated by the C-130. maintained proper spacing; however, basic Although the troop compartment space in design characteristics and fuel consumption the C-141 is approximately twice that of the differentials made a lengthy joint formation C-130, the space available aft of the para- en route to the drop zone undesirable. The use trooper in each aircraft is approximately the of separate routes, speeds, and altitudes to a same. The Division Ready Force of a rein- rendezvous point for join-up and drop is neces- forced battalion normally carries with it 29 sary to obtain maximum efficient performance door bundles weighing 300 to 400 pounds each. from the two aircraft types. Equally distributed, this averages approxi- While the C-141 has approximately double mately two bundles per C-130 or four bundles the capacity for personnel and equipment of per C-141. Manhandling these bundles near the C-130, it was not possible to exploit this open jump doors requires space as well as differential to provide higher density of para- manpower. Space is extremely critical in the troopers and their equipment on the drop zone. C-141; however, overhead rails might relieve 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the space and the handling problems to some yards of varying terrain, while the company’s degree. Techniques to significantly reduce heavy equipment was dropped on an impact paratrooper stick exit time and door bundle point near the center of the long narrow drop discharge time are required to capitalize on pattern. V\ hen A, B, and C Companies were the larger capacity of this aircraft. cross-loaded, each had 20 or 22 paratroopers on On one rapid st r ike event the C-141 was a single aircraft. A Company personnel were employed in the heavy drop role. Because of dropped in the first third of the total drop pat- the length of the aircraft and the length of the tern, B Company in the next third, and C Com- tail aft of the main ramp, a 120-foot extraction pany in the last third. Successive aircraft, line is required. On five and six platform drops carrying personnel of those companies, rapidly from a single aircraft, the extended times be- dropped increments of the three companies in tween successive heavy drop platforms result- the same respective sectors. Heavy equipment ed in significantly longer and less dense heavy for each company was dropped in the appro- drop patterns on the drop zone. Certainly the priate company sector of the drop zone from state of the art must be extended to provide a straight-loaded C-130s. The cross-loading tech- positive discharge system that will contribute nique theoretically permitted three times the to greater density of heavy equipment on the concentration of company personnel and drop zone and, as a bonus, be more reliable placed more of the company personnel closer and accurate. to their equipment than the straight-loading In spite of the differing characteristics of method. In actuality, the cross-loading tech- the C-130 and C-141. their integration in the nique for personnel and the use of associated airborne assault role is feasible. Since this was multiple impact points for heavy equipment an initial attempt to employ these aircraft did significantly speed up the personnel assem- simultaneously in the airborne assault role, bly of each company and did reduce confusion there is obviously a fresh challenge to study and congestion on the drop zone. However, and develop integrated tactics of various mixes data did not substantiate a similar finding for of C-130s and C-141s in assault airlift opera- more rapid equipment assembly. tions. Of course a mandatory prerequisite for Assault aircraft loading. Two basic C-130 rapid assembly is drop accuracy, whether on arrangements for personnel and equipment one impact point or on multiple impact points. were examined: straight loading and cross- When one considers the average ground speed loading. The term “straight loading” applies to of the combat-loaded paratrooper to be about the technique of placing personnel of only one three miles per hour or approximately 100 unit (e.g., personnel of A Company) in an air- yards per minute, and the distance he must craft designated for that unit. The term “cross- travel from his impact point to his unit assem- loading” applies to the technique of mixing bly location off the drop zone, the need for units (e.g., personnel of A, B, and C Com- airdrop accuracy is apparent. The distance panies) in each aircraft so as to drop incre- reflected by one second of flight is roughly ments of each company in sequence and at equivalent to 60 seconds of surface travel and specific locations down the length of the drop exposure on the drop zone. Aircrews of ma c zone. and usafstrike had opportunities to practice In Joint Exercise rapid st r ike the average formations and run-ins to the drop zones prior exit time for a stick of 31 paratroopers, includ- to and between various live drop events. Over- ing door bundles, was 44 seconds. Sticks exited all crew training was excellent. Crew proficien- the two personnel jump doors simultaneously. cy coupled with the 1000-foot drop altitude for At the normal drop speed of 125 knots, one both personnel and equipment did reflect in second equates to 70 yards of flight. Individual excellent drop accuracies. A circular error parachutists in each stick landed about 100 average of 123 yards was recorded for the lead yards apart. When A Company was straight- paratrooper of each element lead, and a cir- loaded it had personnel distributed over 3100 cular error average of 152 yards was recorded PROJECT RAPID STRIKE 43 for the first item of each element lead dropping rapidly diminishes for the assembly of the last heavy equipment. If the ability to drop accu- 50 percent. The delay factor in equipment rately is lost through inadequate training or assembly approximated the time interval be- for any other reason, the refinements of cross- tween completion of the personnel drop and loading techniques are of little value. the beginning of the heavy-equipment drop Drop sequence and serial separation. Any in each case. airborne force commander has the choice of In a tactical situation where the com- dropping his personnel first or his equipment mander requires his heavy equipment as early first. In the case of a large airborne force there as possible, or where it is desirable for any could be a critical time in which some per- reason to shorten the total air column length, sonnel would be on the drop zone without rapid st r ike results suggest he drop equipment benefit of their heavy equipment. If equipment first, then personnel. On the other hand, where were dropped first, some of it could lie rela- assembly of at least certain of the airborne rifle tively unprotected for a critical length of time companies near the drop zone is important and until personnel were dropped, disengaged immediate recovery of heavy equipment is less themselves, and derigged and manned their critical, rapid st r ike results suggest that per- heavy equipment. sonnel be dropped first, rapid st r ike data do Those who support dropping personnel not suggest a single standard drop sequence. first cite, among other reasons, the advantage The choice of drop sequence, therefore, is one of having personnel on the drop zone to identi- that the tactical commander should make, fy and locate specific heavy equipment loads based upon his plan of action and the tactical as they descend to the ground. Personnel can situation at or near the time of the airborne begin positioning themselves so that derigging assault. may commence as soon as the heavy drop is complete. The primary disadvantage of this As a result of Joint Exercise rapid st r ike, a sequence is that a definite safety time delay is body of quantitative data on airborne assault necessary between the last aircraft of the per- operations now exists. The data contributing to sonnel serial and the first aircraft of the equip- rapid assembly are based upon several forma- ment serial, to insure that paratroopers on the tions: the in-trail, augmented-in-trail, and V’s- drop zone have time to disengage from their in-trail; and upon the two capable aircraft that parachutes and clear the drop zone. Present make up the bulk of the airlift fleet: the C-130 standards require a 15-minute interval for this and the C-141. Unfortunately, existing data are purpose; however, in rapid st r ike the interval limited to daylight operations only, to pre- was reduced to five minutes. The majority but surveyed drop zones, and to a single tactical not all paratroopers had cleared the drop zone scenario. In recent usst r ic o m bo l d sh o t readi- in this five-minute period. ness exercises, supplemental data have been Of course, the primary advantage of drop- recorded on the effects of strange and unfa- ping equipment first is the reduction of the miliar drop zones and upon a variety of tactical interval between the equipment serial and the situations. Still required are data on night air- personnel serial. This interval was reduced to borne assault operations and on the ability to two minutes in rapid st r ike. Paratroopers have perform accurate station-keeping and blind a brief interval during descent to scan for and positioning for all-weather drops. locate specifically marked heavy equipment. Future usstricom bo l d sh o t exercises will Once on the ground and disengaged from their continue to add to the data now available. This chutes, those who have identified their as- large body of valid information is of greatest signed equipments can head directly for them. value when applied to the constant and neces- Data from the multiple experiments show sary task of revising and updating joint air- that when personnel are dropped first, assem- borne operational methods, procedures, and bly times for the first 50 percent of the unit techniques for future combat use. personnel are improved; however, this effect Hq United States Strike Command DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL AIR FORCES

L ieu t en a n t Colonel David C. Collins TATEMENTS by leaders at all levels in any conflict. Consequently, the increased concerning military operations in emphasis on conventional munitions for fight- S South Vietnam are unanimous on one ing limited wars had its most stunning impact subject: air power is being applied more effec- on the Army and the Air Force. tively in joint Armv-Air Force operations than It was only natural that some divergence in any past war. Many reasons are readily of opinion between these services would result apparent for this endorsement—improved air- from such a major change in concept. Under craft capabilities, better training, improved the atomic concept, the Army had been rele- communications support, and others equally gated, in the minds of many, to a police-force well known. One that has received little recog- role following the air delivery of nuclear nition. however, concerns the intensive effort weapons, which would be the decisive phase by the Tactical Air Command during recent of the war. Air Force thinking had been cen- years to develop improved doctrine for the em- tered around its strategic retaliation capability ployment of tactical air forces. for general war and the Composite Air Strike Air Force Manual 11-1. Air Force Glossary Force (casf) concept for limited war. The of Standardized Terms and Definitions, defines change in national emphasis from nuclear to doctrine as: “Fundamental principles by conventional weapons caused both the Army which the military forces or elements thereof and Air Force to develop concepts for increas- guide their actions in support of national ob- ing the mobility and combat effectiveness of jectives. It is authoritative but requires judg- Army forces. The Army wanted to divest itself ment in application.” From this definition, we of the need to depend exclusively on the Air can isolate three basic elements of doctrine. Force for all its close air support, reconnais- First, it consists of fundamental principles; sance, and airlift support. The Air Force, on second, it guides the actions of military forces; the other hand, while indorsing the need for and third, it supports our national objectives. increased mobility for the Army, felt that such The first two of these elements are readily mobility should be provided by each service’s recognized and widely accepted. The third, contributing those capabilities that it was best however, is less well known. organized, equipped, and trained to perform. Military forces are maintained to support The reader will recognize the preceding national objectives. National policies, as ex- sentences on Army and Air Force positions as pressed by the executive and legislative being generalized statements of the results of branches of our government, determine the the .Army Tactical Mobility Requirements means by which we seek to achieve our na- Board and the usaf Tactical Air Support Re- tional objectives. Thus, a change in national quirements Board, commonly referred to as the strategy can generate a requirement for new Howze Board and Disosway Board, respec- doctrinal concepts regarding the employment tively. of our forces. A prime example of this occurred A major recommendation of the Disosway in 1960. International political trends indicated Board was that extensive joint testing and war that future armed conflicts were most likely to gaming be conducted to determine the best be limited wars that would not involve the method of providing increased Army mobility. employment of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Tactical Air Command was directed to develop U.S. military strategy changed from massive comprehensive Air Force concepts for the em- retaliation to flexible response. This reorienta- ployment of tactical air forces in anticipation tion of our strategy for future warfare created a of such tests. This involved a major study requirement for a careful examination of in- effort by tac and led to the formation of the dividual service concepts for the conduct of Tactical Air Warfare Center (tawc) at Eglin operations. It was evident that significant mili- afb, Florida, with the mission of developing tary operations in the future would involve and refining tactical air concepts and capa- forces of at least two services and that the bilities for Air Force participation in joint ground battle could again assume a major role operations. 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

These concepts were given extensive tests the Army Combat Developments Command both unilaterally and under the auspices of ( cdc ) to develop joint doctrine manuals on United States Strike Command. The tests of those subjects of primary interest to the Army Air Force concepts culminated in Joint Exer- and Air Force, cdc was not only receptive to cise Gold Fire I, conducted by cincstrike in the idea but eager and enthusiastic. Working the fall of 1964.° Although the Air Force’s basic together, tac and cdc prepared draft manuals concepts were proved valid, .Army aviation on airborne operations, tactical air support of was greatly expanded to provide vastly in- land forces, and air defense from overseas land creased numbers of helicopters and a limited areas. This effort constituted the first major number of short-range reconnaissance and air- attempt by the Army and Air Force to reach lift vehicles. agreement on joint tactical doctrine since the During this period Tactical Air Command late fifties. The joint Tactical Air Command/ undertook a major revision of the seven Air Continental Army Command ( coxarc) man- Force doctrinal manuals dealing with tactical ual, Joint Air-Ground Operations, which was air operations. The timing of this endeavor was published in September 1957, had served well very appropriate, for tac was able to include to guide Army-Air Force operations through- in these manuals the latest concepts and doc- out the world, although it did not enjoy de- trine that reflected the lessons learned in the partmental blessing. The shift in national em- tests just mentioned. Although these revised phasis from a strategy of nuclear retaliation to manuals adequately fulfilled the immediate re- one of flexible response focused new attention quirement for current unilateral Air Force doc- on the requirement for joint operations. Since trine, they did not fill the void which then ex- planning for such operations must be based on isted in doctrine jointly agreed to among the sound principles of doctrine, the requirement services. for jointly agreed, up-to-date doctrine assumed The Air Force took a positive step to fill major importance. this void in early 1963 when Air Force Regula- Inasmuch as tac is the Air Force com- tion 1-1, “Responsibilities for Doctrine Devel- mand most closely associated with the Army opment," was published. One of the primary for joint training, it was appropriate that tac purposes of this regulation was to clarify and should work with cdc on development of joint assign the responsibility for developing, coor- Army-Air Force doctrine. The initial efforts dinating, and establishing doctrine and pro- between the commands produced important cedures for joint operations. Tactical Air expressions of the two services’ views on several Command was assigned responsibility for de- controversial issues. While the first drafts of the veloping doctrine in coordination with desig- several manuals involved were of great value, nated agencies of the other services in the an important side benefit was derived from the following areas: development conferences. Participants on both sides came to recognize the facts of life con- Air defense from land areas other than cerning future warfare involving conventional continental United States weapons. Basically, this boiled down to an Tactics, techniques, and equipment of in- acceptance of the idea that no single service terest to the Air Force for amphibious opera- could by itself completely dominate or win a tions future war. W hen this premise was accepted Procedures and equipment employed by by all, the next step was obvious. the Air Force forces in airborne operations How can the capabilities of the services Close combat air support of ground forces best be utilized to accomplish the overall ob- Tactics, procedures, and equipment em- jective? From the discussions this question ployed by air forces in counterinsurgency oper- provoked, a better understanding of the other ations. service’s problems, limitations, and require- tac immediately opened negotiations with ments for support emerged. As this mutual un- °See "Exercise Gold Fire I" by Major Robert G. Sparkman, Air University Review, XVI, 3 ( March-April 1965), 22-44. derstanding developed, many of the past DOCTRINE FOR TACTICAL AIR FORCES 47

misunderstandings of the other service’s posi- perform the close air support mission. The ap- tion disappeared. At this point in the discus- proved concept provides: sions. a method of operation began to appear that would serve as a guide for future doctrinal Apportionment. The unified/joirit commander will decide, on a day-by-day basis, the development. Simply stated, this method was a proportion of the air effort he intends to apply recognition by all that progress in solving to counterair, interdiction, and close air support divergencies could only be achieved by a full tasks. His air and land component commanders and complete exchange of information by both will submit recommendations in this matter. services. Without complete knowledge and Only the joint commander can change the daily understanding of the other’s position, no dis- apportionment of air effort. cussion leading to militarily sound concepts Allocation. The air component commander could develop. With acceptance of this method will inform the land component commander of operation, true progress in the development daily of the number of close air support sorties of joint doctrine began to occur. that the component will commit in response to One of the first significant products to the apportionment by the joint commander. emerge from the efforts to agree on joint doc- The land component commander may allocate trine was a concept for improved joint air- these sorties to his subordinates. Subordinate ground coordination. In 1962 the Army—Air commanders may sub-alloeate the sorties. Land Force fire support coordination system then in commanders allocating, sub-allocating, re-allocating sorties will inform the dasc [direct air effect was based on organizational and pro- support center] through the alo [air liaison cedural arrangements set forth in the 1957 officer] at their echelon in addition to normal tac/con arc manual. Joint Air-Ground Opera- notifications through the chain of command. tions. In an effort to improve joint operations, ci-vcst rike requested that a joint effort be un- Other significant achievements in the dertaken by tac, cdc, and conarc to analyze realm of joint doctrine include jcs Publication the organization for fire support coordination 8, Doctrine for Air Defense from Overseas and determine the optimum arrangement to Land Areas; afm 2-50/FM 100-27, U.S. A rm y/ support forces of varying magnitude. As a re- U.S. Air Force Doctrine for Tactical Airlift sult of this effort, a system referred to in the Air Operations; jcs Publication 12, Standardized Force as the revised Tactical Air Control Sys- Procedures for Use in Joint Operations; and tem was developed. It corrected many of the fm 31-11 / NWP22 ( B ) / afm 2-53/ LFM01, Doc- faults of the old system and provided an in- trine for Amphibious Operations. Many other creased responsiveness of immediate close air manuals on subjects of joint concern are in support and tactical air reconnaissance for the various stages of coordination or preparation. Army. The new system underwent extensive They include such subjects as airborne opera- testing in four usstricom joint exercises—Three tions, close air support of land forces, and Pairs, Coulee Crest. Swift Strike III. and Desert ground defense of air bases. Strike. These tests proved conclusively that Another milestone in the area of joint the new system was vastly superior to the old. doctrine development was the agreement be- The concept was officially approved by the tween the Chiefs of Staff, Army and Air Force, Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force in on the control and employment of certain types early 1965 and is presently being used in Viet- of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. The nam with great success. agreement resulted in the transfer to the Air From the Army viewpoint, it seems likely Force of all Army-owned CV-2 aircraft, now that the most significant aspect of the jointly designated C-7A. From a doctrinal standpoint approved concept is the provision relating to one of the most important points in the agree- apportionment and allocation of the tactical ment was a recognition by the Air Force that in air effort. Prior to the agreement, no formalized cases of operational need the CV-2, CV-7, and arrangement existed by which tactical air C-123 types of aircraft performing supply, re- would be routinely apportioned in advance to supply, or troop-lift functions in the field area 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

may be attached to the subordinate tactical sponsible for shepherding a manual from echelons of the field army as determined by the inception to publication. It is, however, a nec- appropriate joint force commander. In effect, essary process, since doctrine, once published, what this amounts to is an Air Force commit- becomes authoritative and influences opera- ment to the Army to meet its requirement for tions and planning decisions at all levels. support from these types of aircraft. When In spite of the success being achieved in operational requirements so dictate, we have developing doctrine, one pitfall remains. It agreed to attach these units to the Army, which concerns the difference between doctrine and can then employ them as it sees fit. procedures. There is an increasing trend It becomes obvious that tremendous prog- throughout the services to incorporate within ress has been and is being made in develop- doctrinal manuals not only guidance on what ment of joint doctrine. However, much remains to do but also instructions on how to do it. to be accomplished, tac is convinced that as They are usually incorporated in a section of new weapon systems are developed a corre- the manual called “procedures for.” The dan- sponding development of operational doctrine ger in this approach is twofold. First, funda- for their employment is required, to insure that mental principles, which are intended to be they are properly integrated into the overall used as a guide to actions, are often overlooked efforts of tactical air forces. In this regard, the or ignored by the individual concerned with conflict in Vietnam has re-emphasized the old getting the job done. He becomes obsessed adage that no two wars are alike. New threats with the “how” rather than the “why” of doing and improved methods of countering them something. Second, according to the jcs defini- constantly emerge throughout the course of tion of doctrine, those fundamental principles any war. tac is deeply involved with taking are authoritative but require judgment in the lessons learned in Vietnam and developing application. Judgment is required to apply the the doctrinal concepts by which tactical air principles in accordance with the situation as forces can be more effectively employed in the it exists at a particular time and place. Thus future. the procedures for conducting air strikes Although tac initiates and develops most against the enemy might be entirely different of the new doctrinal concepts for employ ment in Vietnam from those that would be required of tactical air forces, careful attention is given if the war were being fought in Europe. The to the ideas and recommendations of all Air inclusion of detailed procedures in basic doc- Force commands with tactical forces assigned. trinal publications is neither desirable nor Almost every agency within the Air Force practical. Procedures are fine when they have either directly or indirectly concerned with a been developed to accomplish a specific task doctrinal subject is given an opportunity to under a given set of circumstances. However, comment and coordinate on proposed doctrine. warfare has not become so stereotyped that it Comments received from these sources are in- can be conducted worldwide on a check-list cluded in revised drafts, which are then recir- basis. culated for additional coordination. Thus draft W hile major progress is being made in manuals may go through several revisions and resolving some of the problems of long stand- require extended periods of time to progress ing between the Army and Air Force, the job is from the initial stage of preparation to the far from complete. Much remains to be done in point where the manual can be submitted to such areas as airspace control and reconnais- Hq usaf for Air Staff approval. In revision of sance. A major problem concerning airspace joint manuals, the process is complicated by the control is the desire on the part of the Army to fact that all the services must agree to each reserve a block of airspace over a prescribed change proposed, which further lengthens the area wherein Army aircraft would operate free- time required for approval and publication. ly without regard to Air Force control. Con- This seemingly endless process can be frus- versely, the Air Force believes the need for trating, particularly to the action officer re- proper identification is a must if we are to DOCTRINE FOR TACTICAL AIR FORCES 49

maintain an effective air defense capability. effectively. Such solutions can be reached only Safety is also a consideration. It takes little through a thorough and sympathetic under- imagination to visualize the chaos and danger standing of the problems that each service that could be created by the entry of an Air faces. Force close air support jet aircraft into a pre- tac is dedicated to the task of solving scribed area already occupied by some 400 these problems. Our knowledge of the Army’s helicopters. Nevertheless it is easy to see that capabilities, limitations, and concepts is in- flight clearance procedures presently employed creasing every day. The expansion of this bv the .Air Force would, if applied to Army knowledge will permit us to develop concepts aviation in a fluid battle situation, completely of employment of tactical air forces that will disrupt the Army’s methods of employment. not only enhance the effectiveness of our own The answers to this and similar problems forces in joint operations but also permit the lie somewhere between the extremes of the Army to operate with greater confidence in the opposing positions. Proper solutions will de- Air Force’s ability to provide the support the pend on compromise that will allow both serv- Army needs. ices to employ their respective weapon systems Hq Tactical Air Command

Tactical Air Operations—Continued

This article, “Doctrine Development for the Employment of Tactical Air Forces” by Lieutenant Colonel David C. Collins, and the next, “Tactical Air Employment—Current Status and Future Objectives” by Lieutenant Colonel Edward O. Stillie, are follow-ons to the series of articles about tactical air operations featured in our September-October issue. The earlier group consisted of “Tactical Air Command” by General G. P. Disosway, “Tactical Airlift" by Captain Lowell W. Jones and Captain Don A. Lindbo, “ Battles Are Bloody Maneuvers: A View from the Cockpit” by M ajor John P. O’Gorman, and “The Closer the Better” by Colonel John R. Stoner. TACTICAL AIR EMPLOYMENT__ Strategic Air Command were either transferred future. Who can predict what other types of to tac or deactivated as the massive retaliation wars we may encounter? Even general war, concept continued to gain momentum. Little though improbable in our current world en- capability was retained within the Air Force to vironment, is always a possibility. If we are to fight a conventional type of war, and such a survive, it would seem that we have no choice requirement for the future was given little con- but to build and maintain in the future the sideration. military' capability to respond to any situation Our sister services also were geared for or threat throughout the complete spectrum of all-out warfare. The Navy removed guns from warfare. With this in mind, the planners in tac ships of the line and replaced them with mis- are attempting to mold, with realism, the fu- siles. Fleet air groups were converted to nu- ture of this command. clear delivery roles, and the ballistic missile submarine was introduced. The Army equipped evolution of national and military policy its forces with guns capable of nuclear delivery To refresh one's memory of the changing and developed rockets and missiles with a nature of national policy and its inherent effect nuclear capability. By 1960 the servicewide upon military doctrine and strategy, it is neces- conversion was completed, although during sary to look back a few years into our military this period there had been little interservice past. History has recorded, and we as students relationship and interface of effort, each mili- of military strategy are familiar with, the na- tary department being allowed to proceed ture of the conflict and the conditions sur- more or less on its own volition. rounding World M ars I and II and the Korean During the period of our nuclear conver- affair. Perhaps the period immediately follow- sion, however, there began to materialize some ing Korea deserves closer observation and definite and different trends in the Soviet ap- will serve to establish our point. proach to international conflict. Her classic 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW announcement of the decision to foster and exercises and tac/conarc planning efforts. The support worldwide insurgencies was made to activation of U.S. Strike Command in 1961 was the world, and her intentions to promote this a major milestone in the redesigning of our policy soon became evident. Red China’s chal- concepts and reposturing of our forces to meet lenge to Soviet primacy in the Communist contingency-type situations with a joint, rapid- World, her nuclear progress, and her revolu- reaction strike capability. tionary fervor added food for thought for the Generally speaking, however, we had geopoliticians. Our involvement in various con- again conformed to the pattern that has pre- tingency situations clearly indicated that there vailed throughout history by permitting our were serious threats to our national security far military potential to reach a state of limited short of general war. With changes being made effectiveness—this time through inflexibility rein our foreign policy to counter these situations, sulting from overemphasis on the philosophy it again became necessary to develop new con- of nuclear warfare. cepts for the employment of our military forces. tactical air forces to Vietnam TAC. capabilities at the beginning of Vietnam The air resources most likely to be em- Today it is academic whether we fault the ployed in limited wars and counterinsurgencies national policy-makers or the military planners are tactical air forces. Such forces must possess for failing to respond to these geopolitical the flexibility to react instantly and effectively trends. As we entered the war in Vietnam, to differing situations and constraints requiring however, it became obvious that our nuclear a variety of weapon systems to perform the might would be of limited value in a conflict of classic roles of air superiority, close air support, this nature. Needed was a brand of air power interdiction, air defense, reconnaissance, tac- schooled in conventional warfare, capable of tical airlift, and special air warfare, tac units rapid response, and offering a variety of de- became gradually, but deeply, involved in ployment/employment options. Confronting Southeast Asia. Our efforts to support that us were certain hard facts: (1) We had no operation are well known—the initial special tdy special air warfare ( sa w) capability. (2) air warfare operations; the expedient and Conventional air warfare expertise was out- moded as our forces had almost exclusively been trained in the techniques of nuclear warfare. (3) Conventional weapons development had virtually ceased, and those resources we had retained were of World War II vintage and in short supply. (4) Tactical fighter procurement had been meager, and equipment was basically designed or modified for high-speed penetration and nuclear delivery. (5) Despite the advent of the C-130 and the development of new assault airlift techniques, our ability to provide air resupply and battlefield mobility to the Army was in question. Tactical airlift and close air support were, perhaps, our most critical areas. Fortunately, during the period immediately preceding Vietnam a growing interest in the philosophy of joint operations had emerged, and limited but invaluable experience and training had been gained through joint field subsequent transfer of our general-purpose forces to pa c a f and their deployment to South- east Asia; our ConUS training programs; and our newly reorganized functional centers that test and evaluate our weapon systems and operational concepts and train our people in their application. In essence, we have had to relearn to live and fight in a conventional war environment and to fight jointly with the other services. Strange things have occurred, and often we have had to improvise to fit some obsolete system to a particular job. The role of the lowly exposure and sorties required. (6) We needed 6-1 forward air controller ( fa c ) aircraft has assault transports with st o l or vt ol charac- often overshadowed that of the mighty inter- teristics to enhance our forward area delivery continental bomber. The venerable C-47, re- capability. (7) Reliability, security, and ver- designated AC-47 and armed with three < .62- satility in our tactical command and control mm cannon, is being used in a ground support and communications systems needed im- role against the Viet Cong. We have become proving. experts in the not-too-glamorous art of special We are aware of these and other opera- air warfare. The Special Air Warfare Center tional problems, and many have already been was activated at Hurlburt Field, Florida, to overcome. Our r &d , testing and training pro- train our personnel in the techniques of coun- grams. and planning actions will provide other terinsurgency, psychological operations, and solutions at the earliest possible date. unconventional warfare. High-priority research and development programs have been initiated and already have shown considerable promise, Future Plans particularly in terms of equipment designed to and Objectives meet the needs of Army ground combat forces. Actual combat is the final test of the effec- problems in Southeast Asia operations tiveness of a military force. Just as our current capabilities, whether adequate or deficient, are We have had problems in Southeast Asia, tied to past decision, so will our future military and the need to revise our concepts and capa- posture become the result of the planning effort bilities for waging war in a controlled and of today. Projecting ahead, we shall examine sensitive environment has often been uncov- the thinking in tac in terms of future capability ered the hard way—through experience on the objectives, force employment, and the orga- battlefield. Numerous examples became evi- nizational structure we feel will best enable dent: (1) Our reconnaissance capability to us to do our job. Numerous analyses and stud- locate well-concealed targets in jungle or ies have also been made or are in progress to mountainous terrain, in adverse weather, and insure that we will profit from experiences in at night was poor. (2) Our ability to deliver the current conflict in designing our future conventional weapons on small targets in close forces. Considering first the hardware most proximity to friendly forces was generally lim- likely to be employed by tac in the future and ited to a daylight, visual type of operation. (3) the capability objectives we have set for these Our capability to penetrate enemy defenses forces, we look first at the tactical fighter area. needed improvement. (4) Identification of friendly and enemy aircraft was limited to vis- tactical fighter force ual sighting. (5) Weapon delivery accuracies needed improvement so as to reduce crew In the development of a tactical fighter F-4C

force, vve must consider the need to perform tracking enemy aircraft—systems designed spe- a variety of discreet tasks, and, therefore, we cifically to support the air defense mission. Our are beset by a number of competing require- air defense resources must be flexible and de- ments. If we had the resources to specialize, we ployable on a global basis. Airborne Warning could provide a specific weapon system for and Control System ( awacs) and other meth- each fighter task—counterair, interdiction, ods of enemy detection and intercept control close air support, and air defense. This is not are being studied and show considerable the case, and most of our fighter aircraft today promise. are designed for penetration and ground at- The objective of interdiction operations is tack, with the air-to-air combat capability, to destroy enemy forces and material resources until recently, receiving little interest. prior to their arrival at the time and location Air Force doctrine stresses that the crucial required to conduct effective, sustained mili- counterair battle will be won by attacking tary operations. Tactical air forces must be enemy aircraft on their home airfields. This designed to disrupt the enemy line of commu- rationale is particularly valid in general war; nications ( loc) through destruction, delay, or but, as we have seen, in a limited-war situation harassment, to neutralize the effectiveness of international considerations may preclude such enemy reserves and compromise the position strategy, and we may be required to destroy of enemy forces engaged directly in combat. enemy air power solely by air-to-air combat. Air interdiction efforts must be based on con- Whether control of the air is gained by sup- tinuing reconnaissance information and con- pressing the enemy force in the air or on the ducted in accordance with the plans and ob- ground or by a combination of the two, we jectives of the theater commander. We must must possess the means to control the air and have the capability to respond with effective to do so as quickly as possible. Our experiences weapons and sensors to locate the enemy and in Korea and Vietnam have taught us that there to conduct interdiction operations on a sus- are deficiencies in our ability to perform air-to- tained basis. air combat: obviously needed are improved Close air support provides supporting fire- aircraft maneuverability, armament, and meth- power closely integrated with ground forces’ ods of identification. fire and maneuver. It provides escort and In terms of air defense of overseas land suppressive fire for airmobile forces and sur- areas, we must be able to detect, intercept, and veillance and security for Army patrols and destroy an enemy intruder force under any type probing operations. Adequate, well-coordi- of weather situation and in any environmental nated close air support will normally be the condition. Needed are improved systems, both decisive factor in the outcome of the battle. V e stationary and airborne, for identifying and must, therefore, be able to respond quickly and TACTICAL AIR EMPLOYMENT 55

with adequate striking power to do the job. daylight hours. In permissive environments, Such a capability demands mobile, flexible the airborne visual reconnaissance pilot is of units with aircraft that offer a variety of trade- invaluable service in the recce role, and this offs among speed, range, loiter time, and pay- method of intelligence collection will continue load. to be used to great advantage in the future, Current and future tactical fighter forces particularly in light of the improved aircraft will include the F-100, F-105, and F-4, the lat- that are being programmed. High-performance ter possessing our main air superiority capa- aircraft are required for deep penetration of bility. The F-lll. soon to become operational, hostile territory, and high-speed, high-altitude will modernize and greatly enhance our fighter characteristics are needed to insure reliability force. We strongly support the F-X, a follow-on and survivability. Today the latter concept em- air superiority vehicle designed to counter the ploys tactical fighter aircraft specially con- air threat imposed by technology of the 1970- figured for the reconnaissance mission. Greatly plus time period. The prop-driven A-l of the improved sensor equipment is also needed for Special Air Warfare Force and the F-100 are detection of enemy forces and loc’s under ad- being employed in Vietnam in close air support verse weather conditions and in all types of roles. Soon the A-7 will appear in the tac inventory, and this subsonic ground attack aircraft will improve our capability to deliver weapons in adverse weather, both day and night. To cover the spectrum in our capability to provide optimum close combat air support of ground forces, the A-X has been proposed. This vehicle will be a simple, rugged, highly maneuverable aircraft, capable of being operated from austere, semiprepared airfields with a high utilization rate. The A-X will be F-lllA less sophisticated and cheaper than the A-7 and will possess a capability equal to or greater climate and terrain. The acquisition of reliable, than that of the A-l. Our future family of close jam-free sensors could, some day, revolutionize air support aircraft will be designed to fulfill concepts for employing tactical air and Army all the roles throughout the wide range of mis- ground forces in a combat situation. Our ob- sions required to support the Army’s needs. jective is to acquire a complete tactical air reconnaissance intelligence capability that in- reconnaissance cludes, as part of the tactical air reconnaissance cycle, delivery of the product to the user. During peacetime and all phases of con- As for equipment, the 0-1 has been the flict, there is a requirement for accurate, ade- workhorse of the visual reconnaissance pilot. quate, and timely intelligence information. Air- These aircraft are soon to be replaced by the borne methods of collecting intelligence data 0-2 and OV-IO, which will provide greater include visual, photographic, radar, infrared, capability in low-altitude reconnaissance and and electronic systems. Reconnaissance air- control. In the deep-penetration role, the RF- craft must be able to operate during all types 101 and RF-4 are now being employed, but the of weather conditions, both day and night, and RF-101 is soon to phase out and the RF-111 systems will vary from low-altitude, low-speed will be introduced as a reconnaissance vehicle. vehicles to supersonic, deep-penetration aircraft and missiles or drones. A systematic, tactical airlift visual surveillance program with strike aircraft on call for quick reaction is in-being today and Tactical airlift is the means by which per- is effective in visual weather conditions during sonnel and materiel are air-delivered on a sus- 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

tained, selective, or emergency basis to dis- ments for mobility on the battlefield and for- persal locations at any level of conflict, during ward area support. all weather situations and over any type of terrain. These forces must be organized, trained, special air warfare forces and equipped to provide maximum battlefield mobility and an effective air line of communi- The all-important and widely diversified cations for ground combat units. Priorities are special air warfare mission of tactical air forces established and airlift sorties apportioned by involves the three interrelated areas of counter- the joint force commander to meet the needs insurgency, psychological operations, and un- of all the services. Centralized control of tacti- conventional warfare. More important, par- cal airlift resources under the Air Force com- ticular emphasis must be placed on using sa w ponent commander provides the flexibility forces in overseas internal defense operations necessary to perform effectively and to insure prior to the occurrence of organized insurgent that aircraft are available to respond to the warfare. This includes the use of highly trained apportionment made by the joint force com- area-oriented Mobile Training Teams, which mander. will train and assist indigenous air forces in There must be a coordinated interlock be- internal defense, including civic-action and tween tactical airlift and strategic airlift. We nation-building programs, psychological opera- are similarly concerned over the interface with tions, and conventional/unconventional war- strategic sealift. With the development of the fare. Aircraft whose configurations can be Fast Deployment Logistics Ship ( fdl), a tacti- changed in the field to meet a variety of offen- cal st o l and follow-on v/st o l aircraft system sive, reconnaissance, logistics, and other tasks could mesh with strategic sealift at coastal are required. Small, rugged aircraft are needed areas, obviating our reliance upon large port or that can be operated from semiprepared sur- sophisticated air base facilities for offload- faces under primitive conditions. They should ing and transshipment. Our objective, simply be armored for crew protection, possess a high stated, is to satisfy user needs by delivering degree of survivability, and be capable of vary- what is needed, where and when and in the ing crew and payload configurations. Helicop- quantities desired. ters and fixed-wing vehicles with vtol /st o l Today the C-130 aircraft is the basic sys- characteristics are vital in this type of opera- tem being employed in the role of tactical air- tion. There should be commonality between lift. The C-123, originally assigned a special air usaf and Military Assistance Program ( ma p) warfare mission, is being used chiefly for tacti- equipment committed to the sa w mission. Em- cal airlift in Vietnam, as well as the C-7 re- phasis must be placed on low initial and sup- cently acquired from the Army. Needed in the port costs for sa w aircraft destined for use by future are replacement systems with emphasis indigenous air forces, and the equipment on s /vt ol capabilities so as to better accom- should be compatible with the varied tech- modate the ground combat forces’ require- nological capability of less-developed nations. Psychological operations, designed to influence the behavior of the enemy, require tactics and techniques which may vary widely as the level of conflict changes. Airborne and ground communications equipment and leaflet-delivery devices are employed in concert with the ground effort to influence human behavior. Improved audio and leaflet-delivery systems are needed to insure a greater degree of effectiveness, and v/st o l or helicopter aircraft are particularly suited for this type of operation. In unconventional w arfare, sa w forces are used for the infiltration and exfiltration by air operations. The key word “sustained” has a of personnel and materiel in areas under hostile direct impact on the type of organization and capabilities that must be inherent to it. control. Fixed-wing and v/st o l aircraft designed especially for this task are required. We have given careful consideration to They should possess a low-level navigation the types of conflict in which tac is likely to capability, guidance devices for night and all- become involved and the changing environ- weather landings in unimproved areas, appara- ments in which our forces must operate. Our tus for airborne pickup and delivery, and se- forces must be configured to support national cure air/ground communications. policy, and we assumed that the United States Today we are using a variety of “cats and would continue to combat aggression wherever dogs” for the sa w mission, even some modified and in whatever form it should occur. Recog- World War II aircraft. Among these are the nizing that our national policy allows the ag- 0-1, U-10, B-26, A-l, C-47, and C-123. Need- gressor the benefit of initiative and that he may less to say, these aircraft have outlived their initiate conflict anywhere at any time, we con- intended life-span, but to date no other weapon cluded that tactical air forces must be main- system specifically designed for special air war- tained in a constant state of readiness so as to fare has been made available, tac has proposed respond quickly and effectively. a family of aircraft purposely designed for the We have established that, in the future, many and varied tasks of this mission. we are most likely to encounter low-intensity, conventional, nonnuclear conflicts, probably involving the so-called Third World of less- organization and force employment developed or emerging nations. This means Perhaps the top priority program in tac that our forces must have the capability to today concerns future reconstitution of our operate from austere bases, some offering forces. Called the tac Enhancement Program, nothing more than a landing area and a water it thus far concerns only our fighter force but could involve our other forces as well following cessation of hostilities in Southeast Asia. In developing the most effective organizational structure and concepts for employing our forces, we took a long hard look at our status today and where we feel tac is going in the future. The objective was to determine the most efficient organization for a tactical fighter wing both in peace and war—one that would provide the flexibility to deploy units worldwide, ready to fight and capable of sustained 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW supply. In developing our force structure, how- of national policy should this requirement be ever, we considered possible involvement in a imposed by authority. Thus, the force must variety of conflicts, including general war, and possess the full range of tactical air capability recognized that our force requirements could and should be politically suitable to carry out never be fixed. We anticipate variable national a show of force under control at the highest and military objectives which could have a level or, as an alternative, to execute combat decisive impact upon the type and size of force operations. required. Whatever the requirement, the tac Second, tactical air forces must be capable force must be capable of meeting each specific of operating with indigenous forces, each force national objective and of operating within the possessing its own level of capability and so- political restraints imposed throughout the phistication. This requires careful considera- conflict. tion when planning for the capabilities that must be built into our units. Third, the tactical force must be ready to Philosophy of Employment assume its role as a coequal partner with the Army and to interface with the Army’s current Our philosophy for employing tactical air capabilities and those it will possess in the forces is based on three main points: future. We also have similar though lesser re- First, the United States Air Force must be sponsibilities in our relationships with the capable of operating as a unilateral instrument Navy.

OV-lOA TACTICAL AIR EMPLOYMENT 59

In developing our future force, we were ment will be provided as an integral part of the careful to bear in mind our total responsibilities force on deployment. as a major usaf command: to organize, train, It was against these considerations that and equip forces for close combat and tactical we designed and postured our future fighter airlift support of the Army; to carry out tactical force. With the success we anticipate, this con- air defense and interdiction operations; to concept may well be applied to other organizations duct the full spectrum of special air warfare requiring a flexible, mobile, quick-reaction operations; and to participate in joint amphib- capability. Also, against the employment phi- ious and airborne operations. Simultaneously, losophy outlined, we have developed some as afstrike, we must maintain a general re- broad objectives for the tac Enhancement Pro- serve of combat-ready forces for overseas de- gram: ployment and employment by the overseas • The force will have a rapid-reaction unified commanders. Our forces must, there- capability. Combat units will deploy with all fore, be able to mesh with existing command essential resources and be ready to commence structures without loss of motion or effective- operations within a matter of a few hours after ness, and they must readily adapt to existing reaching their operational base. They will be command lines and operating procedures. Fur- able to sustain operations indefinitely, pro- ther, tac forces may be required to operate vided an loc is established to give the needed where no command structure exists at all. In support. this type of environment, the command ele- • In order to respond to a wide variety

B-26B 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW of conflicts on a worldwide basis, tac units will ments to establish the optimum, we considered be able to operate from any one of an assort- a variety of options: Should we have one tacti- ment of air bases: a main operating base with cal fighter wing per base? Two wings per everything the commander needs to support base? Or should we mix fighters, reconnais- his unit, a forward operating base with reduced sance, and airlift forces on the same base? facilities, a dispersed operating base that pro- Optimum basing is required to meet the rapid- vides minimal support, or a bare base where reaction criteria and the closure time to meet any facility other than the landing strip would foreseeable contingencies. We desire that our be considered a luxury. forces be located in close proximity to the U.S. • Xot the least important of our objec- Army units that we must support, so as to facili- tives is the ability of tac units to conduct war- tate joint training. We further desire the best time operations without reorganization. This basing arrangement to permit maximum use of may appear basic until one recalls that these available weapon ranges in the ConUS. Our units may be required to move into some other forces would be balanced between tac’s two existing command structure or to conduct a geographically oriented air forces, the Ninth variety of tasks from bases that offer support Air Force in the eastern United States and the ranging from unlimited to almost none at all. Twelfth Air Force in the western.

Doctrinal Application aircrew training As specified in AFR 23-10, tac is the Air From the standpoint of our wartime air- Force agency responsible for developing doc- crew training program, our enhanced organi- trine for the worldwide deployment of tactical zation must be able to operate effectively in air forces. In this regard, we work closelv with peace and war. Here we had to consider our overseas tactical air force units in pa c a f and overall aircrew requirements, the effect of the usafe to bring the widest range of knowledge Southeast Asia operation and its short tour and experience to bear on this task. A great lengths and attrition rates, and our capability deal of emphasis has been devoted to docu- to support these requirements. Our analysis menting our basic concepts and convictions, considered both peacetime and wartime air- and these have been tested by war-gaming, crew training requirements and the organiza- validated by cixcstrike, and translated into tional structure best able to meet this aspect of usaf doctrinal manuals. Our unilateral Air our enhancement program. Force manuals have recently been updated to The training concept which evolved was provide our forces in the field with current to maintain the three centralized combat crew rules for employment, and we maintain close training schools ( ccts’s ) on a reduced basis, liaison with our Army counterparts—particu- to introduce new pilots into our weapon sys- larly the Combat Developments Command—to tems. These schools would train pilots for the insure that the same is true in the joint opera- F-4 rear seat and F-lll right seat and provide tions area. From this favorable position and A-7 pilots with training in transition and tac- applying the guidance contained in joint and tics. We would decentralize other training Air Force publications, we evaluated our en- which has been accomplished by the ccrss to hancement program from the standpoint of the tactical wings and give them additional air- established doctrine and have postulated a craft and people to do the job. future force capable of moving faster and This concept is important for two reasons. fighting harder and more effectively than ever First, and most important, the additional air- before. craft and people in the tactical wings will increase the resource base from which to deploy a full combat-ready wing, this being our goal. basing requirements In addition, this configuration allows us to In analyzing our ConUS basing require- transition easily to the greater wartime aircrew TACTICAL AIR EMPLOYMENT 61 training program because we will have not operations while an loc is being established. only the three centralized training schools, Other resources required by the squadron which can be expanded, but also a training may also deploy with the basic unit. This will capability existing in each wing. In other vary according to the support capability of the words, with our present force structure, we deployment base. In other words, the squadron would have 15 potential Replacement Training may be deployed to a main operating base that Units ( rtv’s ) to support wartime training re- already supports the type of aircraft involved quirements. The rtu’s would support the war- and may operate indefinitely with little or no time training requirements for both aircrews additional help from the parent wing, or it and maintenance personnel. The ccrs’s and could deploy to a bare base that requires addi- rtu’s would both provide the same aircrew tional people and resources from the wing to training course in wartime. support its operation. equipment internal icing organization We recognize the need for additional This planned decentralization of functions equipment for our units to meet the mobility will have a definite impact upon the internal requirements we have established. Each tacti- organization of the tactical fighter wing. The cal fighter wing will have as an objective its wing w ill be geared to deployment/employ- own bare base equipment, and certain items ment requirements, and the added training of heavy equipment can be prepositioned or responsibilities. The objectives are (1) to pro- pooled. Equipment-wise, however, the wing vide a more effective organizational structure will be capable of deploying one. two. or three for our fighter wings; (2) to establish a training squadrons to operate from a bare base or from concept that will take us from peace to war and two forward operating locations, one of which back to peacetime operations without reorgani- may be a bare base. zation; (3) to establish mobility requirements and long-lead-time items to meet these requirements; (4) to determine the additional per- squadron functions sonnel and materiel assets needed to configure We believe that numerous functions must the force; and (5) to recommend a ConUS be organic to the squadron and that the basing structure. squadron commander should have something to command. We propose to give him people to handle his administrative needs and monitor T he effo r t s we have expended in the current his personnel program, and a small dispensary conflict and the opportunities we have for fur- with a flight surgeon and some Medical Corps- ther enhancing the effectiveness of our tactical men; he will retain norma] flight operations air forces are part of a continuing search for and training of aircrews; and he will have in- means to discourage aggression. The plan dis- telligence people to provide target folders and cussed here will permit the Tactical Air Com- handle his escape and evasion program. Also mand to perform its mission better and provide organic to the squadron will be security and the air support needed by the Army in its law enforcement personnel to guard its assets, peacetime and wartime operations. Our goal, some people to operate motor vehicle dispatch in simple terms, is to realize a tactical force and vehicular maintenance sections, and a unit with the strength and effectiveness to deter supply to maintain its mobility kits and records. limited aggression as effectively as our stra- It will have a maintenance capability to remove tegic retaliatory forces have deterred general and replace parts, including aircraft engines, war, and, should this fail, to provide the United and to calibrate, test, and accomplish phased States with an effective military instrument of inspections on its aircraft. Mobility kits will national policy. contain spare parts and equipment to support Hq Tactical Air Command Air Force Review

THE TEST TRACK

Brigadier Gener a l Leo A. K il ey

HE goal of the Test Track Directorate at similar case can be made for ejection system T the Air Force Missile Development Cen- testing. Xo doubt many lives have been saved ter is perfection in meeting project objectives. because track testing proved the reliability of Success in meeting the goal results in savings of an escape system, but there is no way to com- personnel, time, and money. These savings are pute that kind of savings. possible at the test track because of the track’s unique testing capability. A guidance system, evolution of the track for example, despite rigorous quality control at the factory and thorough engineering and test- Construction of the track facilities had a ing in the laboratory, still needs a shakedown to rather inauspicious start. The Air Force needed prove its worth. Track testing subjects the a special launch facility to conduct tests on system to the dynamic loads of actual opera- two missile projects; Holloman had available tion, then allows its repeated recovery for land and a well-instrumented range. Conceived further evaluation and analysis. If such testing about 1948, the initially accepted specifica- finds but one flaw that could cost the country tions for the track called for a precision test an r &d or operational missile, millions of dollars facility. An era of economy justified a track of will have been saved. Several such flaws have only 3550 feet. Accepted on 15 June 1950. the been found in the numerous systems tested. A track saw its first sled test eight days later and AIR FORCE REVIEW 63

Table 1 aerodynamic work, controlled acceleration/ deceleration experiments, instrumented im- Tests on Original 3550-foot Track pacts of warheads and fuzes, and. if the track 23 June 1950-29 March 1956 were extended to 90,000 feet or more (the ultimate concept), for testing complete major Project Number Dates Objective of Tests structures (e.g.. Atlas). Snark missile launch 33 23 June 1950-28 March The resultant new 35,000-foot track saw 1952 its historic first run on 23 August 1957. Warhead accelera- 39 March 1952—10 February While various efforts have been made to tion/deceleration 1954 impact realize the desired 90.000-foot track, there has Q-2 drone acceleration 6 Sept 1952-21 Oct 1952 been but one other addition to the length. In OQ-19 drone launch 6 (5) 25 Nov 1952-9 Jan July 1966 a 500-foot section, designed spe- 1953 cifically for blast testing, was completed. This (1) 16 February 1955 Jet vane control 6 Feb 1953-20 Sept 1954 addition brought the track to its present length, tests missile slightly over 35.588 feet. Parachute recovery 6 3 Jul 1953-14 Dec 1953 Since the first test in August 1950, which system for 3 24 Feb 1956-20 Mar 1956 was the launching of a Snark missile at the Matador missile speed of 149 feet per second, the track has Aeromedical research 58 21 Jan 1954-21 March 1956 on deceleration/ accommodated over 3000 test runs in a variety windblast/ aircraft of projects, some vehicles reaching about 7000 crash feet per second! (Table 3) On 5 May 1967 a Aerodynamic testing 16 8 July 1954-15 March 1955 slim, aerodynamically shaped monorail vehicle for the B-58 To detect what 10 11 Jan 1955-16 March 1955 set a new land speed record for a recoverable linear acceleration vehicle by reaching a velocity of 6750 feet per could be imposed on second (4600 miles per hour) during a 30.000- flight control foot run down the track. gyroscopes Development and 40 4 Feb 1954-29 March 1956 testing of track the facility equipment Threshold of Space, 7 27 Sept 1955-13 Oct 1955 The track is made of crane rail weighing motion picture for Twentieth Century Fox ___ Table 2 Total 230 Runs on 5000-foot Track 19 May 1 9 56-2 August 1957 operated for six years and 230 tests. (Table 1) Project Number Dates Periodically—from around 1953 on—there Objective of Runs Development and 48 19 May 1956—2 August were requests to lengthen the track. It simply testing of track 1957 was not long enough to accommodate all the equipment work proposed. Construction of a 1521-foot Guidance 7 19 Nov 1956-28 March addition was completed in 1956, and the 5071- 1957 Rocket ballistics 42 2 June 1956-4 May 1957 foot track remained in operation for a little over investigations two years and 117 tests. (Table 2) Aeromedical/ 15 20 Oct 1956-16 Mar 1957 Just as 3550 feet became inadequate, so Biodynamics did -5000 feet as further uses of the track be- Tests of Lockheed 3 14 March 1957-25 April came evident. Then the potential value of track downward ejection 1957 seat testing of inertial guidance systems for inter- Tests o f Fairchild 2 16 Feb 1957-6 April 1957 continental ballistic missiles looked promising. decoy missile For that matter, there was a test potential for Total 117 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

171 pounds per yard, spaced seven feet apart. ference with daytime sled activity. (A some- The mill workers cut the track in 39-foot what unusual difficulty encountered as a con- lengths and marked the segments to indicate sequence of night operation in the Tularosa the sequence. At the site the segments were Basin is posed by the rattlesnakes, which seek butt-welded together, first to form 10,000-foot the warmth of the rails. The track crews have lengths and finally into a continuous rail almost learned to cope with these unwanted guests seven miles long. and have suffered no casualties—seldom even a The rails are tied down under tension and bite anymore. But the trophy room is full of normally remain so. This tends to straighten rattles from the fallen foe.) the rails and maintain alignment. Compressive For braking purposes, a water trough 60 stresses are possible only when the rail tem- by 14 inches lies between the rails, with a hold- perature exceeds 120°F. Adjustable tie-downs ing fixture every 10 feet 10 inches for the entire are spaced at 52-inch intervals to hold the rail track length. The fixtures hold frangible dams, in precise alignment and to prevent buckling so that level and still pools of water can be kept at temperatures above 120° F. The adjustable at any height desired for water braking. The mounts make it possible to align the west or scoop or brake on the sled picks up the water master rail to a tolerance of ±.005 inch and ejects it, transferring kinetic energy from throughout its entire length, referred to a first the sled to the water and bringing the sled to a order reference line. The east rail is aligned to stop. the master rail to within ±.010 inch. The cri- The track runs north-south, and there are terion for alignment is that the minimum radius four blockhouses on the west side—a large one of curvature must be at least one million feet. at each end of the track, one at the center, and Rail alignment operations are performed an auxiliary at track station 2970. A complex of at night with special optical tooling and align- administrative, shop, laboratory, and mainte- ment equipment. Xight operations are neces- nance buildings lies near the south breech. sary to avoid heat turbulence and shimmer, The data collection center for track opera- which affect the use of precision optical equip- tions is in a large concrete building called ment. Also, working at night precludes inter- “Midway.” It is equipped to handle sled in-

Table 3 Types of Tests

1964 1966 Total Type 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1965 47 385 Guidance 12 51 63 47 57 70 38 57 26 39 30 73 326 Dispensing* 2 16 15 4 40 12 12 9 14 40 32 55 152 Rain erosion 2 8 21 64 39 136 Escape 3 1 12 6 28 114 Feasibility: 2 29 8 4 13 12 Sleds—Boosters 5 3 2 88 Impact 12 9 16 9 22 10 6 14 10 17 93 Aerodynamic 14 2 27 1 11 4 16 51238 Blast-Vulnerability 1 11 60 Recovery: 6 3 772 24 Parachute and T-358 102 111 84 1299 Development* * 16 13 16 40 131 209 158 107 174 138 3 103 Aeromedicol 11 30 24 15 965 14 50 Detecting* * * 24 12 14 51 Component 6 29 2 16 Braking 16 3 3 Gemini observation NASA 351 2914 Total 2 16 17 43 43 70 47 105 162 247 232 212 368 340 332 327

’ Dispensing tests include oil frock tests in which lest item s ore ejected from n m oving sled. 'Developm ent tests include all frock test* condu ced to im prove the track testing capability. •Detecting tests include tests on miss distance indicators ond Jorgrf defector devices, AIR FORCE REVIEW (O

formation on Frequency Modulated ( fm/ fm ), a run, it is an ideal development facility for use Pulse Code Modulated ( pc m ), and Pulse Du- between laboratory and free-Hight tests. Fur- ration Modulated ( pd m ) telemetry channels. ther, the track permits nondestructive testing. Presently the track has a capability to transmit Thus the engineer can “debug” new equipment and receive, in real time, 84 channels of fm/ fm, while testing and calibrating it, as, for example, 90 channels of pd m . pc m can be transmitted at in guidance systems. He finds out what hap- any rate from 200 to 1,000,000 bits per second. pens to the parts under acceleration/decelera- Reception and recording means go beyond this. tion, what happens during wind loading, how Some information ( e.g., sled velocity) is trans- much flutter an airfoil can stand, and whether mitted by land lines. the product will stand up under rain. There is Initially data on sled velocity came from a specially designed 6000-foot section of track metric optical instrumentation and by wires built just to answer this last question. The tied across the rails. The cutting of the wires track achieved a measure of fame in past years started and stopped time/interval counters. with its capability for research intoaeromedical Finally, the Track Directorate developed the problems. How much vibration, windblast. measurement methods now in use. Today, at g-loading, etc., could a man survive? And 13-foot intervals along the track are small light- where else would you find chimpanzees bang- beam interrupters. A small sled-bome sensing ing at a psychomotor panel as they moved head, containing a light source and a photo- downtrack? This type of work is rarely done sensitive pickup, passes over the interrupters on the long track anymore, but it stands ready and interrupts the light beam, producing a for further testing of this sort when the need voltage pulse. The pulse is sent from the sled develops. The performance cf guidance sys- to the ground receiving station and recorded tems can be repeatedly tested and calibrated, on magnetic tape. The old method of cutting with full recovery of undamaged hardware and wires to trigger time intervals is still in use but instrumentation. Such tests are performed un- only where great accuracy is not needed. der realistic and varying combinations of con- The track still makes use of photographic ditions of programmed acceleration, shock, coverage too. The permanent metric photo- vibration, and temperatures. graphic system consists of 72 data cameras The track offers an ideal test environment spaced at 500-foot intervals on a line parallel for ejection systems, and it has served this to and 1040 feet east of the track, so as to purpose for the T-33, F-102, F-104, F-106. and provide photographic space-time coverage F-lll, to mention a few. Our Canadian neigh- over the entire track. Cameras for trackside bors brought their rcaf escape systems to the data purposes vary from 16-mm through 512- Holloman track for test, too. In these tests the inch film. Slow-motion studies and other engineer can evaluate such aspects as man/ methods of data recording are used, among seat separation and parachute deployment. them image motion cameras and shadowgraph Test requirements levied on the track recording systems. Complete trackside photo- through the years have varied from a simple graphic instrumentation gives close-up magni- determination of the structural integrity of a fied observations of programmed events, such missile or aircraft component to the complex as ignition, flame pattern, engine shutdown, test objectives of evaluating inertial guidance operation of internal units, impact studies, etc. systems destined for the nation’s missile arsenal. Between the two extremes are any number of track versatility additional uses, such as the evaluation of new or improved aircraft escape systems, materials, A sled run is the closet simulation of a mis- warhead fuzes. Using the specially equipped sile flight that can be achieved on the ground. rain section, track people can determine the Because the Holloman track can closely simu- effects of rain on almost any material. .Also, we late missile free-flight environment and allow are finding a valuable use of the track in blast- close observation of test items during and after vulnerability testing. The track tests the blast The Track The 35,588-foot Hollornan high-speed test track points north into the Tularosa Basin on the eastern edge of White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. It is long enough to enable extended acceleration and still leave sufficient track for low-g recovery of current test systems. The track can be lengthened if needed in the future. . . . The Data Collection Center is a completely shielded structure built on a counter- poise. air-conditioned and dust-free throughout. AIR FORCE REVIEW 67

effects on missile forward sections by passing often must work in time intervals measured in them through a high-pressure wave generated nanoseconds before it is destroyed by impact. by detonating large quantities of txt at a The primary aim of impact tests is to trackside station. determine the operating sequence of components in the fuzing circuit and warhead. The missile is strapped to the sled and “launched” testing on the track off the end of the track into prepared barriers, The major test categories that have com- or else prepared barriers are run into the nose prised the workload on the track since testing cone while it hangs suspended off the end of began in 1950 are shown in Table 3. Dispens- the track. Some kind of data-collection system ing tests, for the purpose of this illustration, is required, depending upon the individual test include all track tests in which test items are item. System operation may be monitored in ejected from a moving sled. Firing of spin several ways: by telemetry carried on the im- rockets from a sled, at a predetermined sled pact vehicle; by using colored strobe lights on velocity, is an example. Development tests in- the test item, with high-speed trackside optical clude all track tests conducted to improve the instrumentation to observe operating sequence; track testing capability; for instance, checkout by direct recording of signals from the test of new test vehicles and certain propulsion item while it is being hit by a target sled; or by techniques, testing of instrumentation under combinations of these or other methods. development, testing of new braking devices. Ineitial guidance system testing. Sled test- Many tests conducted on the track do not ing complements laboratory testing of guidance individually represent a large enough workload components and systems. Generally, guidance to be designated under a major test category. components—principal lv accelerometers with Such testing varies from structural and aero- their associated electronics—are sled-tested dynamic tests of airfoils to contractor propul- after preliminary laboratory tests have been sion systems. Frequently these tests are one of completed. These laboratory tests show the a kind. One typical question answered at the accuracy limits of performance of the acceler- track was. “What happens to the internal struc- ometer as well as its error trends in the simu- ture of a 155-mm shell as the result of firing lated ballistic missile environment. In addition, it?” Normally, once a shell is fired, it simply is a main aim is to determine if the component destroyed at impact. But the track engineers hardware validly represents the manufac- set up a mattress-equipped sled, programmed turer’s claimed theoretical performance model. it to match the projectile’s speed, and made a After component tests, sled tests are run to soft recovery just as the missile trajectory and evaluate the entire inertial measurement unit, sled path coincided. Results of the test were with associated electronics and other system sent to the U.S. Army’s Picatinny Arsenal for equipment, including computers. These tests analysis and evaluation. How much flutter can are performed to determine the functional in- an airfoil stand? This question too was an- tegrity of the system and to evaluate it while swered at the track and was instrumental in operating in a dynamic sled environment. the successful development of the B-58 bomber. The environment to which a system is It may be of interest to describe in more subjected during a sled run can be tailored for detail some of the major testing categories: acceleration and deceleration as dictated by Impact testing. During impact, a missile the system design specifications. One large- warhead must operate within an environment scale system, weighing approximately 1200 of severe stresses. This environment consists of pounds, was subjected to an acceleration of 8 g’s hundreds of g’s and causes rapid deformation for three seconds and deceleration of 10 g’s for of the missile’s warhead and nose cone. The two seconds. Future sled tests of guidance sys- warhead must be designed so that this de- tems are expected to involve decelerations at formation does not prevent detonation at ex- levels of 100 to 150 g’s. pected impact velocities. The warhead fuze Escape system testing. A variety of per- 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

formance requirements and payloads is encom- provides velocity, acceleration, temperature, passed in the testing of escape systems, and pressure, while the telemetry units on including static tests as well as a large range in anthropomorphic dummies provide data that dynamic performance, with test velocities up can be related to human subjects. to around 1100 miles per hour. Single- and Rain erosion testing. In 1961 the track double-seat systems have been tested, as well acquired a 6000-foot section of rainmaking as modules weighing up to 3000 pounds. equipment. Addition of this equipment gave Typical instrumentation in escape system the track one of the longest facilities of this testing includes both telemetry and optical type and an entirely new potential. The rain coverage. Optical coverage is available for erosion area starts 8867 feet from the north systems having trajectory envelopes of up to end of the track and has adjustable spray heads 8000 feet longitudinally, 1200 feet laterally, at four-foot intervals. The distance allows and about 2000 feet altitude. Specific data enough track for vehicle acceleration before gained in a typical program are module trajec- entering the rain area and also provides about tory, dynamic pressure, attitude, position, com- 20,700 feet of track for free run and braking ponent velocity, total velocity, angle of attack, after leaving the rain area. flight path angle, and acceleration (of both The rain system can produce raindrops of component and total system). In dual-seat about 1.5 millimeters in mean diameter, which ejection systems, a frequent requirement is to is, statistically, the drop size often found in a evaluate blast, burning, and acoustic effects, natural rain condition of one-half inch per and debris damage on the remaining occupant hour; or it can produce any selected concentra- after one seat ejects. Other tests demonstrate tion up to ten times that. In the latter case a test canopy ejection capability, seat ejections item that travels 1000 feet in the rain erosion through canopies, and the effects of birds strik- environment has been subjected to the equiv- ing aircraft windshields. Sled-borne telemetry alent of 10.000 feet through natural rain. Stud-

9 * 1 AIR FORCE REVIEW 69

ies of the test methods by Sandia Corporation erated by detonating large quantities of tnt indicate that the raindrops, even in a concen- at a trackside station. Also planned are free- tration ten times that of natural rain, are far Hight impacts at velocities between mach 3 enough apart that the drops do not bunch at and mach 6. The test vehicle will leave the impact. Each impact is complete before the north end of the track and subsequently pass next drop hits the test item on the same spot. through a blast field. The rain spray from the nozzle system is Special facilities have been constructed for concentrated to fall on the west side of the the testing of blast effects: (1) A captive site, track. Rain erosion tests customarily use mono- 13,000 feet from the south end, provides pro- rail vehicles, with the missile nose cone, tection for the test track and gives a clean blast radome, or other test item mounted on a stinger wave over the recoverable re-entry vehicle. or gooseneck in front of the vehicle. Most rain (2) The north breech area has been hardened erosion tests, to date, have been performed at to withstand four to six pounds per square velocities of mach 2 to mach 4; future tests are inch ( psi) overpressures. (3) A 500-foot exten- programmed up to mach 5. Rain erosion tests sion at the north end allows for free-flight and are conducted generally under early morning impact of the test items. “no wind” conditions between March and mid- Blast tests require special efforts because December when the ambient temperatures do the sled/blast encounter must be precisely not fall below freezing. timed to occur at a specified track station. In Blast-vulnerability testing. A recent test one of these tests, it is planned to accelerate a effort is aimed at determining the vulnerability two-ton sled to mach 3 and have it meet the of re-entry vehicles. Re-entry environments blast wave at the captive blast site. have been simulated by passing the test vehicle A more detailed view of the vehicles using through shock tubes filled with heavy gas, such the track will better explain how the tests are as Freon, or through a high-pressure wave gen- performed.

A Lance missile nosecone is mounted for an impact test. The monorail sled carries it to the impact area just beyond the track. Fuzing switches actuate strobe light systems or telemetry links, to indicate the sequence and time intervals between fuzing events. High-speed photography records the actions. . . . The early GAM-67 sled, originally expendable in testing the Crossbow missile nosecone's fuzing system, as modified is still used today.

The effects of rain on a radome of fuzed silica can be seen after a high-speed run through the rain erosion test environment. The sled’s aerodynamic drag brakes appear as fins on either side of the radome, and shredded remnants of several water-braking polyethylene bags hang beside the track. AIR FORCE REVIEW 71

track vehicles strange things do result. Hitting a bird can leave a jagged hole in the test vehicle. Half- Holloman keeps over 100 sled test vehicles inch steel sheathing is torn almost like paper, in its inventory of both dual-rail and single or prows are dented, and slippers have been monorail design. They range in size from a knocked loose. The track lures birds because vehicle of 15 pounds to a 15-ton giant. It is the braking water makes an ideal birdbath and quite a change from the day when the sleds a good place to satisfy their thirst in the arid in use were little more than a missile cradle desert area. The rails make a good perch, but with a booster rack for solid-propellant motors. they also serve as death traps: the sleds travel Today the track boasts vehicles for vir- faster than sound so that the population of tually any use. And if the sled needed is not in “avian heaven” is increased before the birds stock, it can be designed. Dual-rail vehicles are can fly away. Numerous devices have been used where the need is for large payload capac- tried to correct the situation. Track engineers ity. space for extensive instrumentation, and finally decided upon sending a small monorail precise acceleration, deceleration, and velocity sled ahead of the primary test vehicle to dis- profiles. In comparison to the dual-rail sled, a perse the squatters. And currently Primacord monorail vehicle has a smaller payload capac- is set off just prior to a run. which quite effec- ity: but its advantages of high velocity potential, tively scatters the birds. light weight, minimum propulsion requirements. and ease of handling make it an excellent vehicle for various applications, such as current test efforts the impact testing of missile nose cones and A visit to the track reveals one obvious warheads. On the other hand, most testing of fact: there is no set hour for test programs. guidance systems currently requires use of Testing mav begin in the earlv hours of the dual-rail vehicles. morning or late at night. Both solid and liquid propellants are used, One of the current early morning tests is and just as in the choice of sleds, each offers advantages as well as disadvantages. Solid- that conducted for the Army’s Frankfort Ar- propellant motors are readily available in senal on 20-mm point-detonating fuzes. The assembled form, relatively easy to store and weapon, a Mann gun. is mounted on one rail handle, and require only simple hardware to of the track and fired into a rain curtain. At a adapt them for track testing. On the other predetermined distance, the fired ammunition hand, there is a relatively high cost per unit is caught in a sand-filled hopper. The test an- for some of the high-performance motors, and swers a very simple but important question: they lack precise thrust control for individual “Are the fuzes sensitive to rain?” units during burning. For pushing very large The normal rain erosion test, however, payloads to moderate test velocities, liquid makes use of a sled. For example, we recently propellants are more economical, and their completed a series sponsored jointly by the Air controllable thrust over a long thrust period is Force Materials Laboratory at Wright-Patter- a definite advantage required in some tests. son afb, Ohio, and the Naval Air Development The low rate of acceleration onset and the Center at Johnsville. Pennsylvania. The project ability to vary thrust profiles accurately make aimed to determine the effects of rain on vari- liquids particularly well suited for use in test- ous materials while traveling at supersonic ing guidance systems and guidance system velocities. Stainless steel wedges capable of components. holding 80 samples were furnished by the U.S. An interesting problem that might not Navy. The fixture, mounted on a gooseneck in occur to all is that caused by the local bird pop- front of a sled, presented the materials to the ulation. Birds can be sled wreckers. This might rain field at five different impact angles: 15, 30 seem highly improbable: a few ounces of bird 45, 60. and 90 degrees. The series was quite versus a 200-pound sled. But at supersonic successful and provided useful data. speeds the laws of physics still prevail, and A continuing effort at the track has been concerned with the testing of various dispens- chute. The module has been tested more than ers. These projects generally had as their aim 50 times since September 1964. the development of better methods for deliv- The F-lll escape system is by no means ering bomblets or agents such as that used for the only one under test. The track completed a defoliation. Somewhat in the same category is test series for Lockheed Aircraft Corporation the series of track tests designed to fire the to evaluate an improved seat ejection system 2.75-inch folding fin aerial rocket ( ffar ) from for the F-104. Similarly a program is under an SUU-20/A dispenser. The aim, as in most way to test an all-purpose system designed by launch projects, is to determine the actual the Douglas Aircraft Company. The rcaf’s rocket trajectory and compare it with the Central Experimental and Proving Establish- theoretical. The ultimate goal, of course, is to ment located at Ottawa, Ontario, is using the determine whether or not the rocket and track to evaluate the escape mechanisms of launcher can be used on an aircraft. the Tutor and T-33 trainers and CF-5 tactical As noted earlier, a portion of the track’s aircraft. effort is devoted to blast testing. As part of a The work on guidance systems is progress- program sponsored by the Defense Atomic ing, with sled tests being conducted to provide Support Agency, tnt charges are being deto- data on the suitability of a strapped-down iner- nated close to the track to measure structural tial measurement unit for both boost and space loading and dynamic response of supersonic guidance applications. One test unit is a modi- sleds during blast wave intercept. fied lunar excursion module ( lem) abort A continuing series at the track involves sensor assembly ( asa). Another program aims the F-lll crew escape module. This two-man to evaluate an improved accelerometer; it was cockpit section separates from the parent air- no accident that the instrument returned to the craft by explosive charges, is propelled away track, the scene of earlier evaluations in the from the sled by a rocket motor, and finally is Minuteman guidance programs. recovered by a 70-foot-diameter main para- No less important in a day’s activity are Typical Test Situations Liquid engine ignition, with red fuming nitric acid as oxidizer and JPX as fuel. The combination produces over 125,000 pounds of thrust for 7 seconds and achieves a sled speed of over 1000 mph. Developments in liquid propulsion have increased thrust to 150.000 pounds. . . . The F-lll cockpit is mounted on a dual-rail rocket sled for track testing of the ejection system of the crew escape module.... Bird damage—a problem being solved.

the tests to determine the effects of impact on a project officers. This facility at Holloman afb test specimen. For example, Ballistic Systems is the major test track in the Air Force today. Division of Air Force Systems Command is Backed by over fifteen years’ experience, track- sponsoring a series to determine the perform- personnel are constantly exploring new ave- ance of a contact fuze system and the structural nues for sled testing and ways to extend the response of the payload to impact. range of test environments that can be offered With the advent of operations in South- to users. east Asia, the track has played its part in quali- The tendency in track testing—for many fying weaponry for that area. Tests have been programs—is tow-ard even higher sled veloci- conducted to qualify 20-mm ammunition, to ties. One goal is a hypersonic mission capabil- check out various dispensing systems, and to ity, at velocities up to 8500 feet per second, evaluate the rain erosion characteristics of with recovery of the sled and its payload. An- numerous materials. other goal is to achieve velocities of 10,000 While this survey of the track activity feet per second for impact work. To meet these gives only a sample of the 31 separate projects demands, track engineers and scientists are now in progress, it does indicate the broad constantly evaluating numerous means. For spectrum of test capability. As one former example, the conventional solid-propellant track commander said of the track: “Its uses . . . rocket motors used on monorail sleds reach a are limited only by the engineer’s imagination.” practical limit when the air drag approaches the thrust level of the motor. To achieve high- future goals sustain velocities, track people are looking at the application of air-augmented rocket sys- The Track Directorate is a complete oper- tems. These ducted rockets promise an increase ating entity, providing the facility itself, the in propulsion efficiency by providing a higher test vehicles, propulsion, electronic and optical specific impulse (e.g., existing motors, 200 instrumentation, engineering services, and pound-seconds per pound; ducted motors, 600 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

pound-seconds per pound). Further, there is ther on improved data-retrieval techniques. the possibility of reuse of the hardware with Currently, sleds moving at 6000-7000 feet per the ducted system. second are operating on the threshold of radio As to dual-rail vehicles, efforts are under frequency ( rf) blackout due to ionization way to develop a sled whose performance will similar to that experienced in re-entry. Fre- significantly surpass the mach number range quencies fitting atmospheric transmission win- currently available. Tentative performance dows or delayed data transmission may solve goals call for a mach number range to five and this problem. Yet another demand caused by above, carrying payloads weighing from 1000 the increased velocities for such tests as impact to 3000 pounds, with a capability of recovery and free-flight blast is better motion picture using the existing track length. coverage. Track operators are now working Another future goal of the track is to toward rates of 100.000 frames per second and attain the capability to operate sleds for a part beyond. of their trajectory in both lower- and higher- As to other goals, there are many. Im- density atmospheres using polyethylene bags provement of the velocity measuring system is fixed to the rails and filled with various gases, one. One aim is to obtain a passive system such as Freon. The aim of the operation in a (e.g., a laser) with an accuracy goal of .01 low-density atmosphere is to reduce drag, foot per second. Yet another is improvement of impact pressures, and stagnation temperatures the rain simulation facility. Rain erosion ex- at hypersonic speeds. Through high-density periments on the track are the only known gases the sleds will experience aerodynamic means for realistic ground testing of the de- environments nearly equivalent to those of a structive effects of rain on warheads, radomes, higher mach number in ambient air. etc., during supersonic or hypersonic flight. We To conduct tests at velocities in the realm hope to improve the rain facility so that it can of mach 6 and above, we shall have to develop simulate real rain intensities ranging from a instrumentation equipment capable of with- light mist to a thunderstorm cell. Dust and sand standing the more severe environments. Higher testing are also currently being considered. velocities dictate, for example, reductions in Continuing research and development in sled volume and wetted area, thus reducing all areas of track performance capability, con- the space available in the vehicle for instru- current with actual testing, have resulted in an mentation. Thus increased use of miniaturiza- outstanding track facility. I believe that the tion of instruments will become a necessity, facility will continue to improve and expand its besides improved tolerance of the instruments already diverse and proven worth to the na- to stronger vibrations. The successful use of tion’s aerospace test programs. high-speed sleds as research tools depends fur- Air Force Missile Development Center THE BRITISH APPROACH TO STRATEGY:

Perspectives for the U.S. L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Ray L. Bowers

The military posture of Britain succeeded in making her strength felt the United States today in conflicts with Continental foes. Her methods rests primarily upon this constituted the classic weapons of a nation of nation’s strength in sea sea power; in retrospect they serve to suggest and air pow er. It is the possibilities and the pitfalls of similar strat- through command of the egies for the future. sea and air that America The current global military involvements of extends military power the United States are relatively new in Ameri- to far-flung comers of can policy, and thus our strategic thought can- the globe, containing not draw on a historical continuity rooted in and balancing the power of her cold war our own experience. The American public as enemies—enemies whose natural strength lies well as our strategy-makers — soldiers and in land forces. Our sea power and air power statesmen—are thereby at a disadvantage in reach into the Congo, the Middle East, the attaining the deeper view and historical per- Dominican Republic, Korea, and Southeast spective required of them. It is useful, then, to Asia. Behind these global activities stands the condition our view to the essential continuity ultimate deterrent, our strategic nuclear forces, of America’s current strategic problems from which are themselves expressions of America’s the past by examining the classic and tradi- power in sea, air, and space. tional British approach to war. Our current world position holds striking resemblance to that of Britain—the nation of the continuum of air warfare from naval sea power—during the past several centuries. Britain represented a technically advanced and During and after the Second World War, relatively wealthy society, confronted with the United States became the heir to Britain’s Continental enemies who possessed superior historic command of the sea. American military strength in manpower and in land warfare policy reflected as well a strong preoccupation capabilities. Again and again over the decades, with the air weapon, a recent intruder as an 76 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW instrument of global power. During the eight the contiguity of dangerous enemies, have years beginning in 1950 (a period which in- been obliged to give close attention to doc- cluded the ground fighting in Korea), 68 per- trines and readiness for land, as opposed to sea, cent of the nation’s military spending went to warfare. Poland failed to organize herself ef- the Navy and Air Force.1 Thus, although the fectively for war despite strong neighbors, and mass citizen army vanished along with the no- as a result Poland vanished from the map tion of universal peacetime conscription, the throughout the nineteenth century and again nation’s ability to deploy strength globally has in 1939. Poland’s example underlined for Prus- remained strong. How, then, does the intrusion sia and modem Germany the significance of of air power validate the picture of American strength for land warfare. Regular involvement strategy as analogous to Britain’s historic ap- in Continental wars caused France and the proach to war? Austrian Empire to give first attention to prob- Both sea power and air power have been lems of land rather than sea warfare. Modern the natural tools of the more technically ad- Russia and China became almost exclusively vanced nations; both take strength from a powers in land warfare because of their interior society tuned to technical things. Both are con- situations, vast populations, dependence on cerned with bases and lines of communication. land communications, and technical backward- In both arenas, conflict lacks fixed fronts and is ness handicapping development of sea power. concerned with achieving command of the The Japanese crushed emerging Russian sea medium. It is no coincidence that Mahan’s power at Port Arthur and Tsushima Strait in doctrine of the command of the sea found re- the war of 1904-5, as they had crushed that of flection in the English title of Douhet’s book, China ten years earlier. The Command of the Air. Both air power and Nations outside the Eurasian mass—Brit- sea power yield access to distant regions; both ain, Japan, and the United States—in their possess the mobility and striking power to exert security from land invasion, have historically force over great distances. Both can make a developed naval strength as the first instrument show of force, unmistakably supporting the of national power. In Britain and the U.S., this nation’s diplomacy. The expanding possibilities has been accompanied by strong distrust of of strategic and tactical air transport suggest militaristic tendencies and aversion to large past strategies of sea power. The ability of air standing armies, conditions which have forces to strike directly against enemy land strengthened democratic political develop- communications constitutes a new and rein- ment; but in Japan, antimilitarism and democ- forcing capability. Thus, the far-reaching sea racy are recent conditions of uncertain en- power and air power of the United States today durance. In wars, these sea power nations have and the strategic considerations underlying generally been successful against enemies that their employment may be viewed as similar to stress continental land forces. Of the three, the Britain’s past global use of naval power. British experience has been by far the most prolonged and consistent. The English preoccupation with naval Britain’s historical sea power strategy strength, begun in the reign of Elizabeth I, be- A nation’s historical approach to war is a came established as a conscious and permanent product of three broad circumstances: the na- approach to strategy during the wars of the tion’s geographical and strategic situation, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, matur- prevailing attitudes and characteristics of its ing in the Seven Years’ War (1756-63) against society, and the ideas of its military theorists France. Shaken by early defeats in the Medi- and leaders. Generally speaking, the first of terranean and in North America (Braddocks these factors—particularly the happenstance of defeat), the British cabinet turned to William location—has been the most fundamental in in- Pitt, the Elder, who soon emerged as supreme fluence, itself coloring the other two. The states director of the nation’s war energies. of Continental Europe, for example, because of Allied to Frederick the Great of Prussia BRITISH APPROACH TO STRATEGY 77

and holding important territorial possessions moth of the land each remained supreme in its in Germany. Britain might have elected to dis- own realm, neither able to bring the other to patch large land armies to the Continent. Many ultimate defeat. Britishers, including the King, supported such Upon the outbreak of conflict in the 1790s, a course of action. Aware of Britain's limited Britain promptly put into effect her traditional capability in manpower to decisively influence naval-oriented strategy, opening a series of land campaigns on the Continent, Pitt turned overseas campaigns, notably in the Caribbean, toward less direct strategies. He would aid his entirely peripheral to the campaigns on the Prussian ally with financial subsidies and token Continent. Britain’s colonial and commercial fighting forces, but England’s principal ener- activities prospered increasingly with the gies would be directed elsewhere—toward de- elimination of French sea competition. Having veloping and exploiting Britain’s naval might, learned the futility of warring without Con- to win world empire in North America, India, tinental allies during the war of the American and the Caribbean. Revolution, Britain now engineered a series of Under Pitt, the tide of war turned to favor coalitions against France, financing Prussian, the British. The French New World bastion of Austrian, and even Russian armies with the Louisbourg at the mouth of the Saint Lawrence fruits of British commercial prosperity. Mean- fell before determined British action in 1758. while French schemes for direct invasion of Wolfe’s subsequent amphibious campaign the British Isles floundered at the coastline against Quebec, a thousand miles up the Saint before the reality of English sea power. Na- Lawrence, assured the conquest of North poleon’s Continental System, an economic- America for the British. Meanwhile in the West boycott against English trade embracing most Indies, British expeditions seized valuable of Europe after 1806, hurt him more than French possessions—Guadeloupe, Martinique, Britain, straining the economics of the Con- and Dominica. On the opposite side of the tinental states and turning their peoples to- globe, French forces in India witnessed the ward nationalistic anti-French restlessness. blocking of their support from home, while Weaknesses in the Continental System helped English supplies and reinforcements increased. bring Napoleon to his enervating involvement Pitt’s global strategy also included successful in the Peninsular War and to his disastrous attacks against French stations in Africa, con- campaign in Russia.-1 quest of prized Spanish Manila, and several Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and Portugal, hit-and-run assaults on the French coast itself. and his subsequent difficulties in stamping out Command of the seas was absolutely vital to the people’s resistance there, provided an op- all these campaigns; it had been achieved in portunity for British intervention. Wellington’s 1759 by two decisive victories over French small Anglo-Portuguese army on the penin- fleets, at Lagos Bay off Portugal and at Qui- sula, deployed and comfortably sustained for beron Bay on the French coast. To the last, six years by British sea power, fought one of the English remained aloof from the grand the classic campaigns of military history. The campaigns on the Continent; and Pitt’s strat- large French armies found their overland com- egy won world empire for Britain.2 munications ruined by extensive partisan The French Revolution at the end of the activity, and they were unable to live off the century served to revitalize French arms. Un- countryside because of the poverty of the der the brilliant Napoleon, France defeated region—attempts to do so only further enflamed her Continental opponents, uniting all of Eu- the fierce Spanish resistance. Scattered over rope by 1807 against British economic strength. wide areas in order to police the insurgent French sea power, however, had been crushed countryside, the French armies never could through a succession of British naval victories, concentrate sufficiently to crush Wellington. culminating in the triumph of the incompara- The Peninsular War, conducted in a peripheral ble Nelson at Trafalgar in 1805. For a decade theater where Britain’s sea communications thereafter the giant of the seas and the behe- were easier than the enemy’s by land, epito- 78 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

mized the British approach to war. The years of The feeling that no forces should be spared involvement in Spain drained France’s strength from the decisive western theater contributed and helped lead toward her final defeat. By to the tragedy of missed opportunities sur- the close of hostilities in 1814, Wellington’s rounding the Dardanelles undertaking of 1915, army had pressed across the Pyrenees and into and the momentous consequences sought by southern France.1 this classic peripheral venture of sea power The final convulsion—the campaign at Wa- went for naught.'' Admiral Fisher, who himself terloo-found sizable British ground forces at urged amphibious operations in the North Sea last committed in the central theater. Welling- and the Baltic, expressed the frustrated tradi- ton’s 94,000 absorbed Napoleon’s heaviest and tionalist view: most desperate blows on the final day. Sig- 25 January 1915 nificantly, however, only a third of Welling- It has been said that the first function of ton s men were British; the rest were Dutch the British Army is to assist the fleet in obtain- and German allies. ing command of the sea. This might be ac- During the century after Waterloo, Brit- complished by military cooperation with the ain’s naval and commercial strength yielded Navy in such operations as the attack of Zee- vast prosperity and power. Her control of the brugge or the forcing of the Dardanelles. . . . seas permitted deployment to the Crimea in Apparently, however, this is not to be. The 1854—56, to fight a peripheral war along the English Army is apparently to continue to pro- fringes of Russian strength. Otherwise, Britain vide a small sector of the allied front in France, remained aloof from the Continental wars of where it no more helps the Navy than if it were Germany, Austria, and France, although she at Timbuctoo.6 willingly used her warships to block Russian During the thirties the brilliant young control of the Straits at Constantinople in 1878. writer B. H. Liddell Hart led the reassessment In both the Crimea and the Straits, Britain was of the war in Britain. In the first chapter of his practicing a policy of containment toward im- book. The British Way in Warfare ( 1932), Lid- perial Russia, using naval strength to check dell Hart pointed out the historical inconsis- the land power most dangerous to the Conti- tency of Britain’s wartime policy. Was the nental balance. Kaiser’s Germany any more dangerous to Brit- ain than Napoleonic France had been? If not, the twentieth century why had Britain poured out her strength in “wholehearted abandon,’’ sacrificing a genera- The First World War constituted for tion of her youth and her global economic lead- Britain a drastic departure from her traditional ership? At first British military leaders reacted strategy. Following prewar understandings coolly to these painful questions, but gradually between Sir Henry Wilson and the French they began to divide toward partial acceptance military planners, Britain’s army moved into of Liddell Hart’s view." The approach of Brit- France at the outbreak. Repeated Allied offen- ain’s military leadership to the strategy of the sive efforts in the west led to the deployment Second World War was to be unmistakably on the Continent of the bulk of Britain’s newly- colored by the reacceptance of the traditional trained manpower. Planners became obsessed British view. with the front in France, following the writings In 1942 and 1943 the question of an early of Clausewitz that stressed destruction of cross-Channel assault brought the British enemy strength in a single, direct, grand en- strategic approach into focus. American lead- gagement. Proposals for peripheral ventures ers pressed for firm agreements on specific of the historic type were emotionally resisted planning dates for the Continental invasion, by the field commanders on the Continent, while British strategists responded unenthusi- British as well as French. Yet until the war’s astically and sought enlarged activity in the final year, every attempt at smashing the dead- Mediterranean. The Mediterranean constituted lock in France only intensified the bloodbath. a peripheral theater, one which many Ameri- BRITISH APPROACH TO STRATEGY 79

can planners denounced as a strategic dead the United Kingdom suffered only a third as end but which suggested to the British an im- many military deaths in the Second World portance like that of Spain in the Napoleonic War as in the First, attaining an equally com- wars. Germany was to be progressively weak- plete victory despite the early collapse of her ened by strategic bombing, blockade, and con- closest ally.9 striction of the ring about her, prior to the final assault. Grim memories of the First World the British uatj War strengthened British caution; Churchill feared a Channel “red with the blood of Brit- In summary, the British have historically ish and American youth.” The Americans, used a variety of techniques in seeking to em- who needed early and firm commitments in ploy their supremacy in sea power to defeat order to organize their mass-production econ- Continental land powers. Taken together, these omy toward the vast logistics requirements of techniques constitute a “British way in war” the buildup, seemed unnecessarily rigid to that has been consistently followed save dur- the British, who preferred a more flexible ing the war of 1914-18. Generally the British and opportunistic approach to future plans. have sought indirect measures of strategy and Churchill denounced the unsophisticated have avoided deployment of mass armies in American view as a “logical, large-scale, mass- Continental campaigns. Four principal tech- production style of thought.” As late as the niques appear salient, all of which have rested Teheran Conference in November 1943, upon the fundamental command of the sea Churchill was talking about delaying the assured by the Royal Navy: cross-Channel assault in order to stage new ( 1 ) Use of naval superiority to blockade amphibious ventures in the eastern Mediter- enemy commerce and to maintain or expand ranean; Stalin’s firm opposition finally served one’s own commerce. to close the matter.8 (2) Use of wealth from commercial activi- In retrospect, the British reluctance about ties to subsidize allies, sustaining their strength overlord, the cross-Channel invasion, now for land warfare. seems less definite than it did to American (3) Peripheral land-sea ventures in theaters strategists at the time; many of the British more easily accessible by sea than by the en- reservations were based on sound appraisal of emy’s land communications. factors not always fully assessed by the Ameri- (4) Limited participation in large Con- cans. Sometimes British military officials viewed tinental campaigns, contributing physical and the Prime Minister’s far-ranging strategic psychological stiffening, especially when the imagination with as much irritation as did the enemy has been weakened by the attritional Americans. When in early 1944 Churchill effects of the first three. pressed for an “Asiatic-style North Africa This formula served Britain well and brought operation," the heads of the three British fight- her power disproportionate to her numbers. ing services threatened resignation in opposing Her victories have usually been won at rela- this “Bay of Bengal” strategy. One critic of tively small cost in manpower. Churchill attacked the “traditional” approach, The principal twentieth century intruder writing that before 1939 “the British public was into Britain’s hegemony of the seas, the United trained to put faith in every conceivable means States, has practiced each of the four tech- of winning wars save by fighting battles and niques at various times. This nation’s strategies beating the enemy.” Meanwhile Britain’s tra- during the nineteenth century wars with ditional practice of subsidizing Continental Mexico and Spain and during the Civil War allies was suggested in World War II by her rested heavily upon naval superiority. During eagerness to aid the Soviet Union with mate- the Second World War this country generated rial and financial aid. a willingness shared by enormous power for land warfare, so that our the .Americans. After the war Churchill’s de- leaders approached the strategy of the Euro- fenders could show, perhaps speciously, that pean war mainly from this viewpoint. The 80 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW needs of the Western Front during our involve- lines of communication and other air pressure ment there in 1917—18 had even more thor- targets, inflicting attrition and preventing en- oughly obscured any strategy oriented to sea emy buildup for major offensive operations power.lu despite his numerical preponderance. The sim- ilarity to Wellington’s essentially defensive lessons for the United States methods in Spain was notable. Another Chi- nese intervention against American power Actually, the Americans have since 1950 along the fringes of the Asian continent in followed clearly, if perhaps unconsciously, the Southeast Asia might be met by even more British example. Our presence on the peninsula successful strategies, following the British pat- of Southeast Asia suggests the British posture tern. Our methods could include: (1) sustain- in Spain and Portugal at the time of Napoleon. ing a defensible perimeter on the ground In each case, the British and the American, through sea and air transportation, (2) intense access by the nation controlling the global sea air attack against selected targets, including (and/or air) routes was easier than the labori- enemy land communications made vulnerable ous land communications of the enemy. Mean- by their length, by the needs of the enemy’s while, each of these peripheral strategies rest- enlarged ground forces, and by the absence of ed upon a bedrock of ultimate power: in the sanctuary, (3) subsidy of Asian allies to help one case Britain’s battle fleet of ships-of-the- in the ground fighting, and (4) the threat of line, and in the other, the strategic nuclear offensive amphibious sea and air operations to forces of the U.S. Navy and Air Force. unbalance the foe and weaken his concentra- There are difficulties in correctly applying tions. the historical British experience to the Amer- This would be no panacea formula promis- ican strategic situation of today. The American ing quick success without the agony of bitter problem of maintaining an almost nonexistent ground fighting. Only the scope and not the balance of power in continental Asia has been intensity of land warfare would be limited. staggering, whereas the British could usually The notion of invading and occupying a large find in Europe several competitive states of part of the Chinese homeland would be beyond roughly equal dimensions of strength. Thus consideration. the British technique of subsidizing Conti- All that would be needed, perhaps, is an nental allies has been less successful for the astute national leadership strong enough to Americans, and this country has felt obliged overcome the inevitable impatience of the pub- to intervene with significant land forces on lic for quick results regardless of costs or haz- the Asian periphery twice since 1945. ards and calling for either withdrawal or major It may be that study of the war against “escalation” as alternatives. The idea of con- Japan holds particular significance for containing and balancing enemy power, not elim- temporary strategists. The victory in the Pacific inating it, must, in my opinion, be viewed as represented the successful application of over- an acceptable objective. The British in history whelming preponderance in sea and air power, have usually been patient for success. It was although Japan scarcely represented the kind the Americans who wished to stage a cross- of continental land power posed by China now. Channel assault in 1942 and 1943; it was the In Europe, Allied sea and air strategies were Americans who planned invasion of Japan for blurred by the decisive role of land fighting 1945-46 despite the clearly accelerating effects on the Russian front and in the west after of Allied sea and air power. Unless the United D-Day. Perhaps the situation during the later States accepts not merely the outward patterns stages of the Korean fighting presents the most of the British approach to strategy but also the meaningful example for the future. American state of mind required for consistent applica- sea power sustained deployment in Korea of tion of that strategy, our vigorous world policy land forces to maintain a defensive stalemate might end either in retreat or in total war. on the ground, while U.S. air forces punished The British have shown that a technolog- BRITISH APPROACH TO STRATECY 81

ically advanced society, favored by geographic historic British way in war. The reward is a location, may by sound strategy contain and perspective toward problems of global strat- balance the awesome strength of Continental egy, a perspective which may point to a perma- enemies. Britain did this generally without nent approach to world power, along with the fighting major Continental land wars. Ameri- necessary resolve to apply such an approach ca’s global strategy parallels the British model, with consistency. but it remains for Americans consciously to recognize and accept our inheritance from the United States Air Force Academy

Notes 1. A. Goldberg (ed .), A History of the United States Air G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), Vol. 1, pp. 284-85; Liddell Hart, Force. 1907-1937 (Princeton: Van Nostrand. 1957), p. 117. The Real War, 1914-1918 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1930), pp. 2. G. B. Potter and C. W. Nimitz, Sea Power (Englewood 41-43. Cliffs. X.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), pp. 51-65; A. T. Mahan, The 8. L. J. Meyer, “The Decision to Invade North Africa, Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (12th ed.; (TORCH) 1942,” R. M. Leighton, "OVERLORD versus the Boston: Little, Brown, 1890), pp. 291-329; B. H. Liddell Hart. Mediterranean at the Cairo-Tehran Conferences, 1943," and The British Way in W arfare (London: Faber and Faber, 1932), Maurice Matloff, “The Anvil Decision: Crossroads of Strategy, pp. 2 5 -3 8 . 1944," all in K. R. Greenfield (ed.). Command Decisions (New 3. Potter and Nimitz, Sea Power, pp. 108-86; A. T. Mahan, York: Harcourt Brace, 1959); Arthur Bryant. Triumph in the The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and West (Carden City. N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 25-124; Empire, 1793-1812 (Boston: Little, Brown, 18941, Vol. 2, pp R. M. Leighton, "OVERLORD Revisited” in American Histori- 372-411. cal Review, Vol. 68, No. 4 (July 1963), pp. 919-37; W. S. 4. D. J. Goodspeed, The British Campaigns in the Penin- Churchill, The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate (Boston: sula, 1808-1814 (Ottawa: Army Headquarters, 1958); N. D Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 346, 432-51, and Closing the Ring Eaton, "Spanish Military Contributions in the Peninsular War” (1951), pp. 572-75; D. D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe I unpublished M.S. thesis. University of Wisconsin, 1956). (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 193, 198-200; K. R. 5. Cyril Falls, The Great War (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Greenfield, American Strategy in World War 11 (Baltimore: Sons, 1959); John Terraine, Douglas Haig, The Educated Johns Hopkins, 1963), pp. 24-48; Trumbull Higgins, Winston Soldier (London: Hutchinson, 1963), pp. 71—78, 123-39, 146- Churchill and the Second Front (New York: Oxford University 47; Potter and Nimitz, Sea Power, pp. 412-31; W. S. Churchill, Press, 1957). The World Crists. 1911-1918 (London: Odhams, 1938), Vol. 9. Higgins, Churchill and the Second Front, pp. 188, 199; 1. pp. 461-689. Bryant, Triumph in the West, pp. 25-124. 6. Quoted in Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. 1. pp. 583- 10. Note Theodore Ropp, “Three Views of American 84. Policy" in Duke Alumni Register, August 1966; Ropp, "Ana- 7. B. H. Liddell Hart, The British Way in Warfare, pp. condas Anyone?” in Military Affairs, XXVII, 2 (Summer 1963). 13—17, 38—41; Liddell Hart, Memoirs, 1895—1938 (New York: Military Affairs Abroad

THE PARTY AND THE MILITARY IN TH E SOVIET UNION

M ajor John F. M c M ahon, J r .

HE reasons for the ouster of the Soviet consideration that tended to draw the military T “collective leadership" in June 1957 and into the issue was the threat to Soviet military Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964 are both might and prestige through reduced defense complex and simple. Much of what really hap- expenditures. The military supported the anti- pened must remain in the realm of educated incumbent faction on the premise that the lat- speculation. In both instances, however, sev- ter would continue to make Soviet defense eral preliminaries occurred which have a well- policy its chief concern. It was considered es- documented parallel in the history of recent sential that Soviet military power retain its Sov iet politics. Some of them are germane to posture vis-a-vis the United States nuclear our discussion of the evolution of the military force. as a political force in the Soviet Union: First, It is of little significance whether the real there was a threat to downgrade and weaken cause of the beginning of the end of the Soviet military power through the reduction of Khrushchevian era was the Cuban missile crisis defense expenditures. Second, covert activity, and its disastrous aftermath, or the agricultural directed against the incumbent leadership and failures, or the Sino-Soviet rift. What is of in- supported by some deterrent power-oriented terest to students of Soviet military history is Party members, took place at the highest levels the emergence of the military hierarchy for a of the Party hierarchy. Third, but not last, the second time in seven years to act as the balance military leadership was prevailed upon to of persuasion in toppling one dictatorship and wield a balance of power in favor of the anti- supporting the installation of a successor. Al- incumbent faction. This political-military coali- though no single military leader emerged as tion succeeded both times in overthrowing the a “hero of the day” as did Marshal Georgi incumbent political leadership, so that a new Zhukov in 1957. the rise in influence of the leadership rose to power with its very existence military in the new Soviet government in 1964 indebted, temporarily at least, to the military. was noteworthy and quite significant. In many respects the 1964 pattern closely One Soviet affairs analyst in attempting to resembled that of 1955-57 when Khrushchev interpret the 1964 Soviet leadership crisis saw used the military to depose Malenkov and his Khrushchev’s ouster as the loss of an uphill associates. In both instances the one major battle by those who opposed the military ele- MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 83

ments. Yuri V. Marin of the Institute for the ment and further expansion of this abm de- Study of the U.S.S.R. believed that the move fense net, to preclude an increase in the tempo was planned and carried out by a caucus of the of the arms race. Although the Party leadership orthodox top Party members under pressure has agreed to exploratory talks with the United from the armed forces supported by state States, Soviet military leaders contend that the security organs. Other Kremlinologists felt that defense net is needed to nullify or seriously political motives were absent from this par- degrade United States offensive capabilities, ticular military power play. However, the vast thereby lending a greater degree of credibility potential of the Soviet military machine as a to the Soviet nuclear deterrent. practical political force had been awakened by It seems quite certain that if United States Khrushchev in his drive to power in 1957, and pressure does cause the Soviet political leader- now. seven years later, the same force that ship to agree to a moratorium or a scaling down guaranteed his rise to Parts- leadership was of the abm effort, then the entire issue of Soviet instrumental in the demise of his political strategic deterrence would be open to debate power. once again. The neo-Khrushchevian approach It is of great import that at the present to deterrent strategy would be considered a time another potentially significant episode is direct affront to Soviet military expertise and taking place in the Soviet Union. The facts thus prestige. Then all the ingredients would be far made public suggest that traditional Soviet available for another political-military show- defense-mindedness and pressure by military down. leaders have induced Khrushchev’s successors If a showdown were to occur ox er the issue to accept the concept of an antiballistic-missile of abm defenses, a new element would most ( asm) defense net around Moscow and other likely be added to the preliminaries. It is be- Soviet cities. Some six years have passed since liex ed that two deputy premiers of the Soviet a rather intense debate began- between Khrush- Union. Ustinov and Smirnov, are considered chev and the military over the merits and de- strong supporters of the military and the arma- merits of such an abm system. From 1961 until ments industry. With the increased military mid-1963 Soviet military leaders attempted to posture of the United States confronting the correct what they considered to be an errone- Soxiet Union throughout the world, it is not ous appraisal by the political leadership of the farfetched at this time to envision a military - value of an abm system. Initially, Khrushchev pclitical-industrial alliance arguing for the con- was against a further buildup of defensive tinued development of the abm defense net capability, as he assessed the Soviet limited and precipitating such a state of affairs in the offensive missile inventory to be an effective Sox iet Union that the military could be cata- deterrent. However, in the face of an expand- pulted once again onto the political stage. The ing United States offensive missile force the argument xvould most certainly rest on the military leaders were able to persuade Khrush- proposition that military response and pre- chev to retreat from his original position. It was paredness were being sacrificed and de-empha- agreed that an abm defense net would make si/ed in the face of an ever modernizing United the Soviet deterrent more credible. Thus, since States nuclear threat. Then. too. Kosygin and 1963, a great deal of effort has been applied to Brezhnex- would be accused of going “soft” and perfecting an abm defense system. Some five of reneging on a once-settled debate. billion dollars has been spent on the develop- A conceivable military-political-industrial ment and initial deployment of this system. alliance in the Soviet Union xvould certainly Present Soviet policy seems to have set- haxe far-reaching effects on the Soviet scene. tled for an abm capability to enhance the image For example, the control of the military has of Soviet military power as a deterrent force recently become highly centralized in the Min- vis-a-vis present Lnited States and future Red istry of Defense. The Supreme Military Coun- Chinese capabilities. Current United States cil. xvhich is responsible for top-level control of policy is to seek a moratorium on the develop- military operations, noxx considers all military reaching effects upon Communist doctrine. Soviet military power as an insular tool of the Party has given way to a newer interpretation that the military shares the leadership in the patriotic movement to counter the awesome power of the United States. Soviet international affairs have forced the military to accept a role foreign to Marxist theory. The Party has had little recourse but to allow the Soviet military to be portrayed as a most awesome and feared force in order to carry out foreign policy goals in a nuclear environment. The military has welcomed this transformation, for it has released them from a past fraught with frustration, fear, and repression. It is, therefore, logical that we consider the past in order to understand present-day events as well as the theoretical foundations and historical precedents underlying the Party and the military relationship. With some knowledge of what has gone before, a more meaningful appraisal of the military’s future role in Soviet political maneuvering can be Zhukov more adequately determined. In this manner it is possible to arrive at some feasible conclusions while avoiding the penchant for compar- matters of the highest order. These two facts ing Soviet military tradition with the evolution alone suggest that the military is controlled by of the military profession in the LTnited States. the military at the highest political level, save for the top Party leadership. Much of this has Evolution and Revolution come about due to the pressures of the nuclear age. It is therefore significant to note that if the One of the chief continuing concerns of deterrent-power-oriented Party leaders were Soviet leadership has been to maintain and to weld together this more independent mili- maximize the loyalty of its armed forces. The tary structure with the industrial leadership of totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union makes the Soviet Union over the question of abm its leaders extremely apprehensive lest any hos- defenses or other defense matters, a major tile elements penetrate its military establish- functional change would most likely occur in ment or subversive thoughts develop within it. Soviet political-military relations. Long-held Such a development would be very dangerous theories about the role of the Soviet military in to the fabric of Soviet society, and for this rea- Soviet society would fall, and Soviet political son elaborate safeguards have been formulated and military doctrines would have to be re- to prevent it. evaluated in the light of this new-found politi- The position of the Soviet armed forces is cal wherewithal. crucial. The Kremlin is vitally concerned with Not since the days of World War II have its absolute strength and spares no effort in Soviet military leaders wielded such domestic building up its military might. On the other political influence as they seemingly do at the hand the very existence of a professional corps present time. Indications are that the pressures of military men, wielding considerable power and patterns of the nuclear age have had far- and gradually tending to develop their own MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 85

esprit de corps, has been a constant threat to ty’s wishes, and so the military was forced to the totalitarian character of the system. The accept second-best within its own profession. Kremlin, therefore, has had to absorb within The expression of these views marked the itself the military machine and make absolutely beginning of conflict within the Party military certain that a second force capable of turning organization as to policy and tactics. These against it would never exist. The officers and conflicts became an integral part of the military men of the Soviet armed forces have been life of a regime under which the military was trained to conceive of themselves as being, first deposed from its position of political aloofness of all, willing supporters of the political system and made politically conscious—at times acute- and the philosophical assumptions on which it ly conscious—of the political disputes within is supposedly founded and only secondarily the Party. To this day the professional military military men, professionally trained in the art officers have waged an unending battle against of war. As we shall soon discover, the Soviet political controls in the armed forces. The ever regime is today plagued to a greater degree by present fear of military influence has caused this last proposition, since the advent of nuclear the Party to use direct methods of control of weapons has thrust the military into a new the Soviet armed forces to a greater extent than and important role in Soviet power politics. in any other mass organization. The long-range The Marxists have always closely related success of the Soviet leaders in holding the the military to domestic politics, considering loyalty of the armed forces is related directly the military more as an instrument for a ruling to the general emotional acceptance of the class to maintain its power at home than as a Soviet system by the great majority of the high tool of international combat. To the Marxists, command. Sufficient military discipline exists the soldiers in any country are the second line of defense when the police have been over- whelmed. Lenin said often that a revolution Malinovsky could not be successful under modern conditions of warfare if it did not win to its side enough of the military to neutralize the effectiveness of this strongest weapon of the rulers. The military is thus recognized as one of the most important instruments in politics. According to the official Soviet view, the Red Guard was the principal and decisive armed force in the November rebellion. The Red Guard was par excellence the military organization of the proletariat which was fos- tered and developed by the Bolsheviks in 1917, in preparation for the armed rebellion they were planning. However, at the first conference on military affairs after the revolution, there arose differing opinions as to the place of the Red Guard in the new society. The members of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( cpsu), wanted to arm the workers and form them into separate armed units under political control. The professional military wanted to maintain the military as a fixed unit for national defense, using the Red Guard as the foundation of a new army. These latter views could not prevail against the Par- 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW within the armed forces to enable the high situation the Commissariat for Military Affairs command to maintain its authority over the was established in May 1918. It consisted of rank and file. three commissariats, one military (which dealt One of the chief concerns of the Soviet with enlisted personnel) and two political leaders has been to maintain and maximize the (which dealt with officers and commanders). loyalty of the armed forces. The masses in a The political commissars shared command totalitarian state are deprived of even the with the military specialist (the commander), smallest vestiges of political power, and so a and all orders had to be countersigned by both crisis finds them unable to produce from the political commissars. This system originated ranks any organizations ready and able to do because the Party was fearful of counterrevolu- battle on their behalf . They can only apply for tionary activity, especially from the ex-czarist assistance to groups already formed and per- officers who had been pressed into service with sons possessing some sort of authority. In such the Communists. Even the Commander-in- a crisis, history points to the military as the Chief of the Army, in the Revolutionary War governing factor. By means of the proceedings Council, had to have his orders cosigned. taken against the leaders of the Bolsheviks’ Old The military commissars were the imme Guard and the Red Army in 1937. Stalin was diate political organ of the Soviet government insuring his totalitarian power against any such in the ranks of the armed forces. They were ap- crisis into which the country might be thrown. pointed from “irreproachable revolutionaries, The fear that the military was becoming an able to remain the embodiment of the revolu- influential force automatically resulted in the tion under the most difficult circumstances.” destruction of the visible representatives of The persons of the commissars (both political this group. Since de-Stalinization, the Party’s and military) were declared inviolate, and an tasks have become much more difficult because insult offered to a commissar while on duty was of the present age of “enlightened existence” proclaimed equal to the most heinous crime in the Soviet Union, the “elite ’ economic and against the Soviet government. The military social status of the military high command, and commissars were tasked to see to it that the the apparent rise of the military into the higher military did not become a thing apart from the levels of political activity (e.g., the Zhukov entire Soviet system and that the various mili- affair and Marshal Malinovsky’s role in the U-2 tary establishments did not become the focus incident, the Cuban missile crisis, and Khrush- of conspiracies or instruments against the chev’s downfall). Party. The Soviet government has attached ex- The institution of political commissars had ceptional importance to the political training its origin in the political necessity of watching of the Soviet Army, Navy, and Air Force, hold- over the politically suspect ex-czarist officers ing that in the hands of men who are ignorant and the guerrilla leaders who rose to command of the object for which they are fighting mili- positions in the military. From these early tary technique loses a great deal of effective- shoots grew a mighty tree with roots penetrat- ness. In the hands of men who are fighting for ing deeply into the military. As time passed, definite ideals, however, military technique the later aim of the political organs was not to acquires added power. The shibboleth of the watch over the ex-czarist officers but to super- Party during the formative years of the Red vise, from the political viewpoint, the entire Army was “political expediency ”; military and military and its political indoctrination. other needs took a back seat to political needs. The military was a crucial problem for the Even if the military took in illiterate and ig- Party. The latter needed a strong force for na- norant men. as long as they were “class-trust- tional defense, yet was exceedingly reluctant to worthy,” they were accepted. The ex-czarist allow any other group to develop a power officers were not to be trusted but had to be situation that might present itself as a possible utilized in the military for lack of other ex- rival. There was a fear that certain groups perienced military leaders. Because of this might agitate, causing a counterrevolutionary element within the military. The Main Political Administration of the Red Army had been set up in May 1919 to serve under the Central Committee of the Party as its Military Depart- ment. In essence this gave the Party direct control over the activities of the military. To those even remotely familiar with the auto- cratic institutionalization of military systems, a curious conflict suggested itself: conflict between this new institution, breaking down the sacrosanct principle of unity of military leadership. and the general posture of military life. For example, as soon as the Red .Army had become a regularly organized armed force, commanded by men welded into it by the fire and stench of battle, the commissar had no place in it. However, the Party could not lose contact and control; consequently, political and Party- life continued to pulsate and to circulate within the body of the Red Army. Thus was born the principle of dual command. Rokossovsky An unsuccessful attempt was made (by the military) to have the institution of commissars abolished in the early 1920s. In 1924, how- were transferred at least theoretically to the ever, the age-old military principle of unity of commander. command was to a degree established in the A reaction to this state of affairs by the spheres of combat, supply, and administration, Party leaders was fairly certain because the while the political commissars were relegated military was developing into a competing to political and Party work. The Party leader- power-oriented organization. Marshal Tukha- ship could not abdicate its control of the mili- chevsky had put military loyalty above strict tary without running a risk that the officer Party discipline. He had carried on a campaign corps would develop into an independent against the Party’s interference in military mat- power center. The military had entrenched it- ters and against the intolerable dualism. He self in its principle of single command, and a had waged an intense campaign to cause Stalin definite power struggle ensued between the to rid the military not only of the political con- hopeful political commissars and the deter- trols with which it was bound but also of the mined military commanders. Under the power- shackles imposed by Stalin’s secret police. The ful influence of Marshal Tukhachevsky, the antagonism between the military and the secret Commissariats of Army and Navy were re- police ( cpu) was of long standing and grew placed by the Commissariat for Defense in continuously sharper until 1936. March 1934. At the same time the Revolu- So it was that Tukhachevsky complained tionary Military Council was abolished, its bitterly against this dualism, and suddenly in powers being transferred to the Commissar for 1936 Stalin acceded to the High Command’s Defense. Thus, at the top echelon, the collegial demand and ordered the cpu liquidated. Tuk- method of military command and administra- hachevskv had wanted to end the dualistic mili- tion gave way to the principle of single com- tary system in order to suppress the cpu’s mand. In like manner, the collegial system was high-handed terroristic regime in the interests discontinued throughout the military at every of Soviet democracy; Stalin eliminated the cpu echelon of command in 1934, and in keeping in the interests of his own totalitarian terroristic with the single command principle its powers despotism. Stalin used the support of the mili- leaders (Stalin) than the reintroduction, as a concomitant to the purge, of the collegial system (dual command) and the political commissars in full vigor. Thus, the purge and con- sequent closer supervision of the military resulted in the re-established equality of the political commissars with the commanding personnel in both the military and political phases of Soviet military life. The commissars —“the eyes and the ears of the Party and government in the military”—launched a vigorous campaign for increased political activity. The process of creating a professional officer corps had suffered severely in the purge. A very great proportion of the higher officers had been removed and many of them executed. This im- pressed all military officers with the political nature of any authority in the Soviet Union and weakened their professional devotion as well as their sense of initiative and personal security. The Party had succeeded, in this crisis, in making the officer corps first supporters of the political system and secondarily mili- Timoshenko tarv men. tary to destroy the cpu as a state within a state; impact of World War II then he turned around and crushed the so- called “Soviet-democratic internationalistic op- The shortcomings of dual command position" within the military. The trend toward showed up, however, in the Finnish campaign further unity of command was rudely halted and brought back unity of command to the with the Great Purge of the Red Army less than military units. Marshal Timoshenko, having a year later. assumed the office of Minister of Defense on In mid-1937 the armed forces were struck 8 May 1940, called for the abolition of the polit- by the purge. With the development of their ical commissars, and this move was carried prestige and professionalism, they had report- out on 12 August 1940. The political commissar edly formed a plot to get rid of Stalin. The mili- now became an assistant commander for polit- tary had now regained much of its power, and ical affairs, subordinate to the unit military certain elements in the Party wanted its sup- commander. A few years later, in order to en- port. The purge was devastating. A dozen of hance officer prestige, the military salute was the top military leaders were executed, includ- reintroduced, new uniforms were adopted for ing, naturally, Tukhachevsky. Thousands of the officers, and stricter standards of discipline other commanding personnel were executed, were established. imprisoned, or dismissed, or they simply disap- Just as suddenly as the commissars had peared. A conflict of major importance had lost their position of influence, they recovered arisen between a large section of the military it after Hitler’s attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941. leaders and Stalin’s group, and the purge This may be attributed to the mass defections reached out to the military to mitigate the that were taking place in the Soviet Army. Res- Party’s fears of a rising political force. No toration of the political commissar was a clearer illustration exists for the mistrust and desperate attempt to restore the loyalty of the fear in which the military was held by the Party crumbling political machine. The Army was MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 89 disintegrating, the Party was in a state of panic, death and again at Beria’s crisis was played by and to rescue his machine Stalin hoped for the the military. At Stalin’s deathbed six top mili- same zealous leadership that had been shown tary men were present. Marshal Zhukov was bv his first political commissars in the Civil War. called back from obscurity to accept the posi- This setting up of Communist to watch Com- tion of Deputy Minister of Defense. The for- munist in command positions (at this time al- tunes of the armed forces rose and fell in direct most 90 percent of the higher-ranking officers proportion to the intensity of the factionalism were Party members) was one of the anomalies within the “collective leadership.” The military brought about by the struggle within the Party appeared in many public and diplomatic dis- and by the purge. It was not sufficient to be a plays, and once they even tempered the polit- Communist; it became necessary to be a ical situation by having Zhukov ( now top mili- staunch follower of Stalin. tary representative in the political power struc- On 9 October 1942, with the military situa- ture of the Soviet Union) publicly call, in so tion improved, an effort to increase military many words, for Beria’s removal. efficiency was commenced by abolishing once again the political commissars and re-estab- post-Stalin era lishing the assistant commander for political affairs. This last pattern is essentially in effect Behind the Party scenes, a hard-fighting today, with the main political directorate of the political professional struggled for power. In Soviet armed forces established as an entity his climb to the top, Khrushchev made clever within the Ministry of Defense. use of the military. Fearing unrest at home and By the conclusion of the Second World desiring to capitalize on war hero Zhukov’s War the military had once again regained pres- popularity, Khrushchev had induced the “col- tige and prominence in Soviet society. The lective leadership” to appoint him First Deputy propaganda organs hounded the people with Minister of Defense under Bulganin. Khrush- praise for Stalin and his “military genius,” yet chev had also succeeded in having Zhukov greater tribute was paid to men like Marshal appointed a member of the Central Committee Zhukov by the Russian people. Once again the following Beria’s fall in June 1953. Although Party acted to undermine the military, only military power and prestige became greater this time the measures were not so drastic, pos- through the mid-1950s, Khrushchev did not sibly because of the adverse effect on rebuild- allow the military to become too powerful or ing war-tom Russia. too important. Certain demands were acceded Men like Marshal Zhukov were relegated to in keeping the favor of the military at his to minor posts because they were too highly side; but Zhukov’s poor political judgment and respected in the military. Some military officers the developing factionalism within the military who sensed Stalin’s desires were quick to de- high command allowed Khrushchev to force nounce their fellow officers in the hope that Malenkov’s resignation and to replace him with they might replace those dismissed. Whatever Bulganin without much fear of a military coup Stalin’s reasons were in “exiling” his top gen- d’etat. erals and marshals, the fact remains that the Under the existing unstable conditions military had become a powerful internal force Zhukov, who was named Minister of Defense to contend with. In early 1953 the favor of the at the time Malenkov was ousted, felt able to military was solicited while a purge was begun demand stricter enforcement of the principle of all other elements in the Soviet ruling circle. of unity of command. The military press cam- This occurred in conjunction with the so-called paigned vigorously for the abolition of political “doctor’s plot.” which also saw the Chief of assistants, for a policy requiring subordinates’ Staff. General Sergei M. Shtemenko, removed unquestioning obedience to officers’ orders, twelve days prior to Stalin’s fatal illness. This and for the termination of interference in mili- had all the earmarks of a new Stalin purge. tary decisions by the Party organization. The dominant role at the time of Stalin’s Zhukov was able to reduce further the power found himself isolated in a Presidium packed with Khrushchev supporters. It was obvious that Khrushchev and the Party machine would not tolerate such conditions. Increasing autonomy of the armed forces, regardless of Zhukov’s possible personal ambitions, would in the end have created what has been noted many times before: a power center rivaling the Party. On the other hand, the Party- leadership could not neglect the military support and loyalty that were necessary to guaran- tee its power position as well as to insure that its international aspirations remained feasible and viable. Thus, a dichotomous situation existed wherein the armed forces had to be kept in close check while the military high command was wooed and catered to by the Party leadership. Khrushchev, however, could not permit Zhukov to remain in his top post any longer because he was reaching heights of power unknown to the military of this Com- munist state. So Zhukov was dismissed, and the Sokolovsky Party made it clear that an officer was first of all a Party member whose primary loyalty must be to the Party and to his professional military of the Main Political Administration by making duties, rather than to his professional hierarchy the company commanders responsible for both or personal ambitions. military and political training, by reducing the number of hours devoted to political indoc- The Continuing trination of enlisted men, and by making officer Bid for Power indoctrination voluntary rather than mandatory. History has unfolded an unending strug- When it came to reducing the Party’s di- gle which has existed in the Soviet military rect control over the military, Khrushchev and since the early day's of the Soviet state and Zhukov clashed. In a series of speeches and which, as far as I am able to discern, exists at articles, Zhukov criticized the Party groups for the present moment. This, of course, is the oft- failing to back the officers in strengthening mentioned struggle for unity of command. Ac- military discipline. Notwithstanding the dis- tually the Soviet military has been much more pute, Zhukov was elevated to full membership interested in establishing itself on the pattern in the Presidium of the Central Committee fol- of Western powers, i.e., a military hierarchy lowing the June 1957 leadership crisis. Zhukov internally free from political controls. The had backed Khrushchev in the purge of Malen- thought of becoming a rival political force has kov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov, and not focused into the Soviet military picture. Khrushchev had utilized his support. Having However, one of the most difficult issues to solidified his power position, Khrushchev was judge has been the extent to which the Soviet now ready to deal with Zhukov. Immediately officer corps and particularly its high-ranking following the purge, the press opened a cam- members have constituted a closely bound paign for increasing the role of Party organiza- group with strong group Walties that could tions in the armed forces. Efforts were intensi- have overridden loyalty to the Communist fied to strengthen Party control, and Zhukov Party in time of crisis. Stalin thought there was MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD 91

such group loyalty, so it seems, for he had most standing concession concerning unity of com- of the Soviet High Command executed in 1937. mand. It is worth noting that in recent years The present generation of top Soviet officers the regime has tried a compromise cross-train- may be solidified to some extent by fear that ing program, one in which political officers are their careers would suffer a similar fate,(fig- trained to be commanders and given command uratively) at the hands of the political leaders. of troops while military commanders are given Another solidifying influence, presumably, is “special military [political] training.” resentment at the manner in which Stalin and In examining the past and current political the Communist Party leadership tried to avoid role of the military, as well as speculating on giving credit to the marshals and generals for the future, I see several points that seem their roles in World War II. worthy of emphasis. First, the military has be- Divisive forces probably exist among top come a political force of sorts. The death of Soviet military leaders, too. Intense rivalry, Stalin in 1953 created a power vacuum that jealousy, and competition for favored positions caused the unstable political forces to look to certainly have been evident. It would not be the military for support. The arrest of Beria surprising if Marshal Zhukov’s meteoric rise in and the sharp reduction of the role of the secret 1953-57 stirred up jealousy among some of his police and political commissars keynoted the associates. Beyond that there has been much newly achieved prestige and influence of the speculation as well as factual evidence that Soviet military leadership. The very issues some high Soviet military commanders—Mar- which arose between the rival political leaders shal Konev, for one—worked very closely with Khrushchev, presumably hoping that his influence would help them attain their personal goals. The precedent of great military condem- T ukhachevskij nation of Zhukov by Marshals Konev, Rokos- sovsky, Yeremenko, Sokolovsky, Timoshenko, and Birvuzov makes it doubtful that the top Soviet military leaders would all work together against the Communist Party if the goal were conditioned by personal or political ambitions. The Soviet military has managed to reduce the rigid controls of the secret police as well as limit to an extent the realm of responsibility of the political assistants. An article appearing in the 13 June 1959 issue of Sovetskaya Aviatsiya (Soviet Aviation) states that in October of 1958 the Central Committee of the cpsu confirmed the status of the “Statute of Political Organs (1957)’’ in the Soviet military. (This was a Khrushchev concession to Zhukov before the latter’s fall from power.) The article states that the political organs of the Party were directed to strengthen the one-man command in the military; protect the authority of commanders; help them to eliminate shortcomings which obstruct the increasing of combat readiness of the commands, units, and ships; and teach all personnel a high level of discipline. If nothing else, this is an indication of the increased power of the military to extract a 92 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

drew the military into important, even if pas- ness of establishing a new leadership ame- sive, political action. Between 1953 and 1957 nable to the Soviet military. the military played the role of “balancer” in the The current status of the Soviet military power battle among the members of the “col- leaders was bom of certain issues seemingly lective leadership.” It was Khrushchev who influenced by a history of repression, the ad- eventually achieved personal power with the vent of the nuclear age, and the reliance placed overt support of the military. For their efforts, upon them by Khrushchev. Basic changes the military gained a new status, which sur- made during Khrushchev’s rule continue to vived the Zhukov affair, as top Party leaders exist. The basic unity of the armed forces is vied for the support of the military as a hedge evident in the single High Command organi- against the day Khrushchev would fall. Having zation, the General Staff of the Soviet Armed been thrust onto the political scene, the mili- Forces. The Soviet military organization has tary were less than eager to revert to the status been “Westernized” to the extent that military of the Stalin era. leaders now participate in discussions and de- A second point worth mentioning deals cisions on major issues of military policy at the more with the circumstances of time and tech- highest level. Soviet military leaders have also nology. The advent of the military as a key been thrust into important Party and govern- factor in Soviet nuclear-age policy strength- ment positions because of their knowledge and ened their new-found political role and de- expertise in nuclear matters. It is obvious that stroyed the original idea that the military was the Party looks to the military to make credible more an instrument for helping a ruling class the deterrent vis-a-vis the United States and to maintain its power at home than a tool of Red China. international combat. The threat of thermo- While the future political role of the mil- nuclear war forced the Soviet armed forces to itary is somewhat speculative, it will no doubt be the tool of international persuasion that is hold true that any future conflict among the so necessary for the U.S.S.R. in countering the political leaders, or between the political lead- U.S. nuclear posture. Since 1957 many a gen- ers and the military, which directly affects the eral and marshal has put military loyalty and military may force the latter to become active military interests above strict Party dictates. among the contestants for power. If faced with Many able and patriotic military leaders de- a serious compromise of Russia’s military pos- bated quite openly with Khrushchev on the ture, the Soviet military leadership would be- issues of strategic and tactical nuclear warfare. come a most powerful and determined force Soviet military leaders maintained a lively de- within the Party hierarchy. With the aid and bate throughout the early 1960s, and many of support of certain Party leaders and industrial their positions ran counter to public statements directors, the military could control the acces- made by Khrushchev. The eventual ouster of sion to power of whatever political group it Khrushchev signified the independent power desired. Although the military would not be position that the Soviet military had achieved desirous of assuming the political leadership in just a few short years. It was obvious that in its own right, its support of a particular Khrushchev’s intent to downgrade defense ef- group would be the sine qua non to Party lead- forts and focus his concern elsewhere turned ership. In any event, the Soviet military has his military support against him. The pressures found itself thrust into a new role on the of the nuclear age and the complexities of in- political scene, and undoubtedly it will not ternational strategies guaranteed that the mil- relinquish this new-found power and prestige. itary as a body would remain undisturbed Hq United States Air Force while the political element went about its busi- In My Opinion

LOGISTICS-THE BRIDGE

M ajor G raham W. R id e r

HE time for agreement within the De- establish the existence of similar errors, which T partment of Defense about the meaning might then be resolved. Finally, an analysis of of the word “logistics” is long past due. It is current Defense organization can reveal pos- axiomatic that if our military efforts are to suc- sible errors in the logistics structure, thus clear- ceed at all, they will succeed because of, not in ing away much of the confusion. With this spite of, logistics. Yet logistics is all too often knowledge and understanding, the military ignored, misunderstood, abused, or barely profession will be able to satisfy the need for alluded to in military planning. Under these good logistics in military operations. conditions, disaster in some form is imminent for the planned military operation. Thus, not logistics defined only must we reach agreement within the De- partment of Defense about the meaning of What is meant by the word “logistics”? A logistics but we also have to reach an agree- few centuries ago it was everything military ment concerning the application of logistics to other than fighting. A highly regarded military our Defense organization. historian, Mark M. Boatner III, relates that in But good logistics and bad logistics, per- sixteenth century France an officer known as haps more of the latter, will coexist in military le Major General des Logis was charged with operations until the aforementioned agree- just about all the duties now performed by the ments are reached. In fact, we really cannot entire general staff of modern armies. Further- know the difference between good and bad more, as recently as 1870 Dcr General Quartier logistics until the agreements are achieved. Meister was the second officer to Von Moltke Accordingly, this article has a dual purpose: to on the Prussian General Staff.1 Thus, until at achieve an understanding of what “logistics” least a century ago logistics was consolidated really means and to establish an insight regard- under one officer and included all military ing the reason for the current confusion about efforts except actual combat. As recently as logistics. Professional military men need this World War II the U.S. Army was organized understanding if they are to recognize the mis- into forces. Significantly, the Army service takes of the past and their causes. Comparison force was responsible for full support of air and of present actions with the past will then ground combat forces. Over time, the name had 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

been changed, but the function remained in the Air Force Institute of Technology School essentially the same. of Systems and Logistics analyzed and de- Bringing the definition of logistics up to scribed the logistics process in their master’s date has been an appropriate task for the thesis. Their conclusion was that the process academicians within this nation’s armed serv- consists of three major areas of activity: ices. That responsibility has not been shirked. Military logistics is the process at the strategic In determining what is and what is not logis- level of determining the force structure; at the tics, logisticians owe a debt of gratitude to the support level of translating the broad statement U.S. Navy for its efforts toward analysis and of requirements into usable military assets; and definition of logistics as it applies to military at the operational level of distributing and ap- operations. Foremost in the Navy effort stands plying the assets as well as providing the broad Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, who dedicated range of services and facilities necessary for the his career to a study of logistics and who in- movement and sustained support of the com- spired many other Naval officers to similar bat force.3 study and research. One of these officers is In this view, logistics encompasses a broad Captain R. B. Hunt, who published Definitions spectrum of military effort and consists of a of Logistics in 1956 under the sponsorship of myriad of detailed activities that are so inter- the George Washington University Logistics related as to create a process directed toward Research Project. His definitions include: the support of military operations. This con- Logistics is the process of planning for and pro- ceptual description firmly indicates the span viding goods and services . . . of logistics. Military logistics is the process of planning for Successful military operations are directly and providing goods and services for the sup- dependent upon successful logistics. Logistics port of the military forces. has a direct interface with operations at both Subsequent research on the subject by Admiral ends of the military spectrum. Strategy can- Eccles himself contributed some refinement to not be devised without logistics planning for these definitions. In particular, a theme of his its support. And the reverse of this relationship book Logistics in the National Defense (1959) is also true. While at our highest government- is that logistics is a bridge between our national military levels operations and logistics staffs economy and the actual combat operations of must work together, at the business end of the our forces in the field. The Admiral’s efforts military spectrum, the firing line, the other resulted in this definition: interface occurs. In a tactical environment the supply of “beans and bullets” to the fighting Logistics is the provision of the physical means man becomes critically important to success in by which power is exercised by organized combat. forces. In military terms it is the creation and Admiral Eccles’ concept of the logistics sustained support of combat forces and weap- bridge is considered confirmed. The bridge can ons. [Italics mine.] Its objective is maximum be visualized as having one end planted firmly sustained combat effectiveness.2 in the nation’s economic base (support logis- Thus, logistics is the creation and sustained tics ); the other in actual combat organizations support of combat forces and weapons. Once (operational logistics); and the structure itself this definition had been established, only one as a representation of national policy (strategic more academic effort remained: to explain how logistics). This concept is taught in the Grad- logistics is accomplished. The how of logistics uate Logistics Course, afit School of Systems was hinted at by Captain Hunt’s use of the and Logistics. The definition of logistics which word “process” and by Admiral Eccles’ char- has been established—the creation and sus- acterization of logistics as a bridge. tained support of combat forces and weapons With this background information and —is accepted and taught by the school’s faculty; more obtained through additional research, so too is the conceptual definition of the logis- two students of the Graduate Logistics Course tics process. IN MY OPINION 95

the real problem success because logistic support was adequate —in fact, more than adequate for military oper- The challenging task of defining logistics ations. Good planning for and management of has been successfully completed by military logistics assured that success. There are too academicians. The real problem, then, is not many examples of military logistics—good, bad, that we do not know what logistics is. We do and indifferent—to be cited here. The point is know. The real problem is that we have not that we must learn from our past, for experi- used the knowledge properly in practical ap- ence appropriately and selectively applied is plications within the Department of Defense. the best teacher. What needs to be accomplished is a sometimes Thorough analyses of logistics in past mili- harsh, but necessary, analysis of logistics as tary operations have yet to be completed. This applied to our military organizations and op- task can be done, now that we understand the erations. Analysis is one way of determining meaning of logistics. But until it is done, suc- whether or not the mistakes of the past are cess in the practical application of our the- being repeated. It is also a way of finding and oretical knowledge will be frustrated. And applying what was obviously good logistics in frustration can cause confusion. Because these the past to our current and future organization analyses have not been made, we find it dif- and operations. ficult to identify what, in practice, is and what Some examples from recent military his- is not logistics. tory are readily available for analysis. For instance, after World War II, the German logistics organization General Friedrich von Paulus is said to have remarked that two hundred additional tons of This difficulty is reflected in a somewhat supplies daily could have turned his defeat at confused organizational structure for logistics Stalingrad into a victory. By today’s standards in the Department of Defense. A brief but that is a relatively small tonnage even for air- critical look at the structure hopefully will lift. But for the German Army in Russia its create an insight as to how our misunderstand- nonavailability was a disaster, a disaster caused ing of logistics has created confusion in our by inadequate logistics. We Americans were organization for logistics. It should also show not immune to inadequate logistics either. No why the organization itself confuses the minds military historian will ever forget how General of military men regarding what logistics is, Patton’s slashing attack with the Third Army thus compounding an already difficult situa- toward the German heartland in 1944 ground tion. to a halt: the cause—lack of gasoline. Not that Let us start at the top of the Department there was exactly a lack of it; plenty' of gasoline of Defense and work down through the orga- was available on the docks back on the coast. nization. The current U.S. Government Orga- But the gasoline simply could not be gotten up nization Manual is a most appropriate reference to the front lines in sufficient quantities to sup- for this task.4 It contains charts of the major port General Patton’s advance. Disaster? Well, organizations in the department. We first notice certainly not the disaster which Von Paulus in the Office of the Secretary of Defense an met, but nevertheless a disaster in that mili- Assistant Secretary for Installations and Lo- tary operations were effectively halted, the gistics. His title implies that installations are not enemy was afforded respite, and the conclu- a part of logistics. But installations are normally sion of the war was delayed. Again—inade- a part of support for forces and weapons. Con- quate logistics. fusing? Yes, but still an improvement over past Of course, our history is not all so bleak. structure. In the mid-fifties there was an As- On another front, and later in the same war, sistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics and logistics was a shining success. Okinawa was another Assistant Secretary for Properties and the locale, some six thousand miles from the Installations. The implication then was that economic, industrial, and military base of the supply, property, and installations were not United States. The invasion of Okinawa was a part of logistics. So the organization under the 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW present Secretary is improved, though not per- there is confusion; that a misunderstanding of fect, from a logistics point of view. Next we logistics exists; that logistics efforts in the Air notice the separate existence of a Director of Force face difficulty, perhaps partial failure, in Defense Research and Engineering, who is accomplishing the mission? responsible for the research, development, test, Our sister services are in some respects and evaluation of new weapon systems. One better organized for logistics. A recent reor- would logically assume that since this effort is ganization of the U.S. Army created the Army involved in the creation of military weapons, Materiel Command, responsible for procuring it is logistics. Yet the organization structure and distributing combat weapons and materiel. plainly says it is not. Are the reasons for con- But even that word “materiel” adds to the fusion about logistics becoming apparent? confusion. Both the Air Force and the Army Let us turn next to the Department of the continue to use it. Such titles as Deputy for Air Force chart. The structure of the Air Staff Materiel and Materiel Management make one reveals some very interesting interpretations wonder where materiel fits in logistics. An at- of logistics. Starting with the Deputy Chief of tempt to answer that question is beyond the Staff for Systems and Logistics, we find by scope of this article. Perhaps the services would implication that systems are not part of lo- be better off if use of the word “materiel” were gistics. In the Air Force a system is known as discontinued. For most applications, “logistics” consisting of a weapon and the related per- should be used instead of “materiel.” sonnel, equipment, and facilities required for Interestingly enough, the U.S. Navy does operating it. Furthermore, implied by the word not use the word, having chosen to use instead “Systems” in the title is the process of conceiv- the anglicized version “material” and thus add- ing, defining, acquiring, and delivering to ing to the confusion. However, by establishing operational units the weapon and its associated the Office of the Chief of Naval Material the facilities and material. That process appears to Navy has achieved what is possibly the best be the creation of combat forces and weapons, military organization for logistics to be found yet Air Staff structure implies it is not part of in the Department of Defense. Only three mili- logistics. This impression is confirmed when tary functions are to be found outside the juris- the next-lower level of Air Force organization diction of that office; operations, personnel, is viewed: at the major air command level we and medicine. All other functions—procure- find an Air Force Systems Command and an ment. supply, distribution, facilities, finance, Air Force Logistics Command—the first to etc.—are under the Chief of Naval Material. create forces and the second to support them. Naturally there are similar functions organic Are there other functions which might ra- to the operating fleets, but the creation and tionally be assumed to be part of logistics but sustained support of combat forces and which the Air Force has separated for inde- weapons are the responsibility of the Office of pendent operation? Let us look again at the Air the Chief of Naval Material. Staff structure. There is a Deputy Chief of Why, then, is the office not designated as Staff for Research and Development. Again, “Naval Logistics”? Perhaps the reason is that this function seems to be part of the process the personnel and medicine functions are not of creating forces, yet it is not under logistics. included in the office. One can reasonably as- Its existence, however, does align Air Staff sume that both functions are properly part of structure more closely to that of the Office of the creation and sustained support of combat the Secretary of Defense. Then we discover forces. Nevertheless, none of the armed services the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and place personnel or medicine under logistics. Resources, who is “responsible for developing Air Force programs pertaining to the attain- the task ahead ment of operating and supporting forces.” That The purpose of this article is not arbitrarily stilted phraseology sounds suspiciously like to decide what is and what is not logistics in our definition of logistics. Is it any wonder that Defense organization. Its first purpose is to IN MY OPINION 97

achieve an understanding of the meaning of and effective logistics, then we must analyze logistics. Therefore, it has been shown that and refine our structure. within a military organization there appear to We simply must decide which military be only two functions. The first is to create and functions are operational and which are logis- sustain combat forces and weapons. The sec- tical. It can be done because we know wbat ond is to conduct combat operations. logistics is. A thorough analysis of logistics The other purpose of this article, it will be in past military operations will either confirm recalled, is to establish an insight regarding the or disprove our decisions regarding an orga- confusion surrounding logistics. It has been nization for logistics. It appears that some deci- established that the confusion does not result sions will be nothing more than amending titles from a lack of knowledge of what logistics is. and office designations. Other decisions may Apparently the confusion results from what require consolidation of staff functions or per- might be termed a misapplication of theory to haps a complete reorganization. These deci- practical military organization. It seems that sions must be made. All that remains is to get our knowledge of logistics has been ignored in on with the job. Until the job is done, confusion the structuring of the Department of Defense. and potential disaster will continue to surround Therein lies the problem. If we are ever to logistics. avert future disasters in military operations, if School of Systems and Logistics, AF1T we are ever to assure success through efficient

Notes thesis, School of Systems and Logistics, Air Force Institute of 1. Mark M. Boatner III, Military Customs and Traditions Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 1965). (New York: David McKay Company. Inc., 1956), pp. 16-17. 4. All organizational references were taken from the U.S. 2. Henry C. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense Government Organization Manual 1966-67, published by the (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1959), p. 22. Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records 3. Richard C. Williams and Robert L. Breeding, “A Con- Service, General Services Administration, Washington, D.C., ceptual Description of Military Logistics” ( unpublished master's I June 1966. PLANNING FOR REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES A new and necessary outlook

C aptain J ohn J. F rancis, J r .

N A RECENT meeting of the American then, the paradox that industry’s latest de- I Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics velopments are reinforcing the trend of ex- held in Boston, the proponents of reusable pendable systems, which in turn are causing space boosters made the latest of many unsuc- specific costs to be so high as to preclude in- cessful attempts to stimulate the nation toward dustry’s own capital investment. Let me outline development of such a system. All these at- these developments and point out their con- tempts have been very similar, and their failure tribution to a type of inertia to which the U.S. not surprising. I believe it is possible to explain seems bound. their failure as a lack of understanding that we are no longer dealing with transportation on inertial law earth from point to point but from earth to a totally new environment. This misunderstand- The inertial character of the space pro- ing is evident in proposals that suggest airline- gram reflects the tendency of an object to re- like operations to and from orbit. I suggest main in motion once placed in motion. That is, that the space environment requires new con- the trend of high-cost operations, low traffic cepts in thought regarding transportation and rates, and expendable systems will continue so that we who advocate reusable boosters must long as no positive action is taken to change it.1 reorient our thought to correspond to new Furthermore, the longer these conditions con- operations. tinue, the harder it will be to obtain the condi- The notion that we must choose a system tions required to justify reusable boosters, i.e., and begin immediate development if we are high traffic, low-cost operations. The low traffic ever to achieve our goal will only result in fur- and high costs tend to reinforce one another. ther rebuttals from decision-making levels. Let Because of the high launch costs, space me present the reorientation of thought which system designers are forced to use sophisti- I feel will release us from that notion. cated methods to reduce the number of Our space program has been determined launches required. More sophisticated design and developed through its kinship to the ballis- generally tends to raise the cost of the payload. tic missile program. Expensive, expendable This then requires that the booster reliability boosters are used to boost very expensive, ex- be improved, which raises the cost of the pendable payloads into orbit. In ten years booster. And so it goes. Several specific pat- American industry has provided developments terns of this nature are developing which tend which enable the government to carry out its to perpetuate these conditions. operations within the constraints of this fixed Because the larger boosters generally are situation. However, this same industry has not more cost-effective than smaller boosters, sys- been able to participate in ways other than tem designers tend to gravitate to their use. By supporting governmental activities. Mass con- substitution of a large booster to handle the sumer exploitation of a new medium, which load of several smaller boosters, the number has characterized American industry’s partici- of launches required for a given weight in orbit pation in other fields, has not occurred in the is reduced. This trend is supported by the de- use of space. Costs for space operations are still velopment of multipurpose and multilaunched too high for profitable investment. We have. satellites. Under the multipurpose concept, a IN MY OPINION 99

single satellite carries out several missions: in- It is not enough to plead for more ad- stead of requiring several boosters to support vanced technology. Technology is being pur- several systems, what is needed is only one sued vigorously, but in areas other than booster that can support the single more- reusable boosters; it is providing economic and sophisticated system—which is more expensive. operational rewards in support of current The more cost-effective, larger boosters can be trends. so used, since these multipurpose systems also What is required is that reusable vehicles tend to be larger. A single booster may also show a saving not only over existing systems launch many satellites and thus deploy a com- but also over tomorrow’s systems—systems that plete system, a prime example being the com- will operate adequately within the constraints munications system of seven satellites deployed of a moderately growing budget.2 by the Titan IIIC. New technology, redundancy, and sim- new outlook plicity contribute to the extended operational life of satellites. Extended operational life There is a very real prospect that the cur- means, of course, fewer launches of replenish- rent trends in the space program will continue ment satellites. for the next fifteen years. Yet, at present there Synchronous orbit operations tend to rein- seems to be little likelihood of real mass ex- force these patterns to an even greater degree. ploitation of the space environment by the na- As operations at higher altitudes improve, it tion’s industrial complex. The primary reason will be possible to combine several types of remains the high specific costs. Apparently missions in several multipurpose satellites de- these costs can be reduced enough only by re- ployed by a single launch. Because earth sur- usable systems. How, then, can the character face coverage is greater from orbital altitude, of the space program be changed so as to pro- fewer satellites will be needed originally, and vide for mass exploitation of space, by which as their operational life is extended, fewer re- the people of the U.S. can ultimately realize plenishment launches will be required. the benefits of their investment? With microminiaturization of electronic The change can be made in either of two components, circuits are smaller, simpler, and ways. The first and most unlikely way appears more reliable, thus contributing to the concept to be a high-level revolutionary decision to ex- of more satellites per launch and extended op- pend the R&D funds necessary to develop the erational life of the satellites. entire reusable system in a single program. Although these trends bear more directly (The decision to develop the intercontinental upon unmanned systems, similar trends can be ballistic missile is similar.) Such a decision identified for manned systems. Generally, tech- would have to be predicated upon anticipated nical development will provide methods for savings in the launch rates and payload costs. extending the life of space stations, improving This way would be high risk and very expen- man’s toleration of the environment, and de- sive, and the decision to follow it is highly un- veloping large and efficient ferry-logistic vehi- likely to be made. This decision is what the cles. These, in turn, will serve as a depressing reusable booster proponents have been seek- influence on launch rates supporting manned ing. activities. The alternative is more evolutionary but This, then, is the inertial law that must be by its nature also requires a top-level decision. circumvented if the concept of reusable boost- A long-range planning approach that will make ers is to materialize. use of evolutionary development to finance fur- It is not enough to await the development ther change appears to offer the best chance of of the right conditions. The right conditions success. There are several ways in which R&D will never materialize without a positive expenditures could be used to generate savings, change in the character of the entire space and these savings could be used to provide for philosophy. further R&D, in a self-perpetuating operation. 100 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

I am suggesting two possible approaches, developing a reusable launch vehicle with very to stimulate the type of thinking which I feel low cost. will eventually produce the rewarding result of Too often the planner who wants to bring reusable space systems. Both approaches are about a change in the space program is too general and need development considerably much occupied with the ultimate realization beyond the scope of this article. of his dream, a particular pet design. He has The first approach is to make use of sav- given no consideration to the real world, other ings accrued by reusing our unmanned satellites than to express his dissatisfaction with it. He that require recovery. If these savings are used has given no consideration to how such a for technology to make manned spacecraft re- change could take place, only that it should. usable, further economy can be achieved. I have tried to suggest potential means of Finally, these savings could be appropriated bringing about change in the basic character of against the R&D cost of a reusable first stage. our space program. A planner must realistically Another approach for carrying out this assess the world and its trends. He must fore- sort of evolutionary change would make use of cast how developments will proceed if he takes gradually increasing degrees of booster reusa- no positive action. He should then determine bility. Such a program could begin by simple what action is appropriate to bring about recovery of current boosters by means of a needed change. I feel that the alternatives sug- recovery package attached to the first stage. gested here represent the kind of positive ac- The savings from this operation could be di- tion that is necessary and should be taken to rected toward developing a first stage designed bring about desired change in the space pro- for reuse with near-term technology. The sav- gram. ings from this program might ultimately aid in Space Systems Division, AFSC

Notes fore, any reusable booster must be developed within the estab- I. Adequate funding could provide for development of a lished economic bounds. reusable booster. However, without a major political or military 2. Expendable launch vehicles are projected to produce perturbation, it is unwise to expect more than a moderate re- launch costs of approximately $100 per pound in orbit—almost sumption of budgetary growth in the next fifteen years. There- an order of magnitude below today’s costs. WHEN ARE BATTLES LOST AND WON?

C olonel Alfred F. H urley

anson Baldwin describes his latest gigantic battles (actually, campaigns) scat- book, Battles Lost and Won,f as a tered throughout so vast a war, he will have “militaryH panorama of World War II.” Of problems. To be at all successful, he must be course, when a writer is ambitious and brave both selective in his coverage and heavily de- enough to try a one-volume treatment of eleven pendent for his information upon the work of

t Hanson W. Baldwin, Battles Lost and Won: Great Campaigns of World War ll (New York: Harper & Row, 1966, $10.00), 532 pp. 102 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW others. Baldwin, the distinguished military Its mistakes get the biggest emphasis. Not editor and analyst of the New York Times, has without justice, Baldwin points out that Gen- chosen to focus on land and sea warfare and erals Marshall and Arnold were too optimistic to use primarily the publications and criticisms in their expectations as to the combat potential of the historical staffs of the U.S. Army, Navy, of the B-17 forces in the Philippines when the and Marine Corps. The only air fighting he war began; and it is true that troop carrier treats at chapter length is the RAF-Luftwaffe navigation in the paratroop operations in Sicily encounter during the Battle of Britain and the and Normandy was frightful. Yet only a few Japanese suicide strikes against our naval sentences cover the crucial role of American forces off Okinawa. and Allied airmen in almost completely wiping Considered on Baldwin’s terms, the book out German air opposition before the Nor- has many merits. He notes that military history mandy invasion. No other Army Air Forces’ is “often written and read simply as chronology activities rate Baldwin’s consideration, except or tactical narrative with little accent on the as discussed below. human drama,” whereas in his view military Baldwin neatly applies Professor William history without drama is “incomplete.” His R. Emerson’s most critical insights® about U.S. emphasis on the individual fighting man, Army Air Forces’ strategic operations in Eu- where his sources permit, adds a dramatic ele- rope before D-Day to British and German ment too often found only in novels about airmen as well. In Baldwin’s view, there was a World War II. His passion for authenticity is “general lack of prescience” among those air- attested to by the more than one hundred men, too, about both the effectiveness of strate- pages of footnotes and bibliography at the end gic bombing and the size of the effort required. of a five-hundred-page book. In that position, However, in using Emerson’s critique, Baldwin they will probably be overlooked by the gen- leaves out an important point. He quotes eral reader, which is regrettable, for many of Emerson on American airmen: “In particular, the footnotes are rich in data and argumenta- they failed completely to grasp the essential tion that would have added considerably to the meaning of air superiority ... if American air- text. men made mistakes, certainly they made fewer There can be few quarrels with Baldwin’s than did the airmen of any other nation . . .” coverage of specific battles, documented as Baldwin leaves out Emerson’s statement fol- they are. But his work is open to criticism in lowing the words “air superiority”: “This is not one key respect: his approach does not take surprising; the second World War, after all, is into account the point that the battles he dis- the first, and so far the only, experience we cusses were not always lost or won within the have had of large-scale air war. During the time frame marked by the beginning and end- 1920’s and the 1930’s, all that they had to go on ing of the fighting. Rather, as in the case of his was hunches and guesses. In such a pioneering discussion of the battle for Corregidor, our venture, error is unavoidable.” struggle for that piece of real estate probably Baldwin’s omission of Emerson’s point be- was lost in the niggardly budgets demanded by comes important only when one reads his ac- an isolationist nation in the 1920s and ’30s. count of the gallant but mistake-ridden Marine Another aspect of this same deficiency in Bald- effort at Tarawa. Quite sensibly, Baldwin puts win’s approach is his treatment of key person- the battle in focus by describing it as an indis- alities. For instance, General MacArthur’s most pensable wartime test of the amphibious doc- vulnerable period to criticism is overstressed trine that Marine planners had worked out by choosing the Corregidor battle as the sub- before the war. He quotes the Marine Corps ject of a chapter and ignoring his later manifold historians on this score: “There had to be a contributions. Tarawa. This was the inevitable point at which This deficiency in perspective on Baldwin’s part is clearest in his minimal, one-sided treat- °Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History. Number Four, "Operation Pointblank—A Tale of Bombers and Fighters. ment of the work of the U.S. Army Air Forces. United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1962. BOOKS AND IDEAS 103

untried doctrine was at length tried in the unpublished collection of data on the achieve- crucible of battle.” The same fundamental ment of the Air Service, American Expedi- consideration should have been applied by tionary Forces, during World War I. Much Baldwin in evaluating U.S. Army Air Forces’ more accessible is Robert F. Futrell’s published strategic operations in Europe. work, The United States Air Force in Korea, Baldw in’s limited treatment of the work of 1950-1953. Far shorter but also important the U.S. Army .Air Forces may be no more than reading is available in the works by Irving B. a matter of restricted perspective or lack of Holley on our World War I doctrine and air- sufficient space. How'ever, it also may be symp- craft development, Ideas and Weapons, and by tomatic of a problem affecting the full history Thomas Greer on air doctrine in The Develop- of our service. Certainly one major theme in ment of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, our history is the propaganda efforts of some 1917-1941. Other scholarship has been done, of our early leaders, notably General William but I believe the foregoing w'orks are the most ( “Billy”) Mitchell. As Professor Emerson important. In any event, the scattered nature pointed out in his Harmon lecture, the airmen of what is available proves the point I wanted of earlier years were right in their appreciation to make. of the importance of aviation in future warfare The theme of a full history might be the and in their conviction that only airmen could maturing of our service from the Wright broth- direct aerial combat operations. Beyond these ers era until its strategic element became the basic considerations, the airmen at that time cornerstone of our foreign policy in President could only be hypothesizing about air strategy Eisenhower’s administration or the lever by ( especially in its details) until they had tested w'hich President Kennedy forced Russian mis- these ideas in combat. When one considers siles out of Cuba. As Baldwin says, military that Mitchell alone hypothesized about air history is more than “chronology or tactical strategy in some 150 articles and three books, narrative”; drama is essential to its telling. claiming as much as he could in the context of The inclusion of the recollections of the shrink- an interservice struggle over a tiny budget, ing number of early aviation’s veterans should critics such as Baldw in should find it easy to add drama to the projected history. The oral isolate claims unrealizable in World War II. recollections of those w'ho knew General Ar- Hopefully, we airmen of this generation nold. as gathered by the staff of the Columbia will do more than closely scrutinize the work of LTniversity Oral History Project, offer an ex- critics like Baldwin. Rather, we should be fully cellent starting point. aware that our own published record is only Our service, then, is at the place in its piecemeal. We have yet to get dowm to the job development where its record is more than a of taking our own hard look at the record of collection of yesterday’s headlines. The strug- our service in the decades since the Wright gle for recognition has ended. We can, if we brothers’ first powered flight in 1903. We can w'ish, look long and hard at what we have done learn an important part of the story by plowing and produce a full record of our development. through W'esley Frank Craven and James Lea This will give critics such as Baldwin a far Cate’s seven volumes on our role in World War better basis than they now have for evaluating II. A few' hours of reflection on the reports of aviation’s role in past and present military the Strategic Bombing Survey might gain us an policy. Far more importantly, the airmen of appreciation of the contributions of the B-17, this generation might learn lessons from the B-24, and B-29 in the war. Only the true spe- full record which will equip them to win bat- cialist in our history' has gone to the National tles in any future wars. .Archives to study Colonel Edgar Gorrell’s United States Air Force Academy RISE AND FALL

D r . R obin H ic h a m

Y CHANCE, recent months have seen of that history, Per Ardua.- The most detailed B the publication of a number of books history of the rnas will probably be contained dealing with the rise and decline of British air in Arthur Marder’s fourth volume, due out in power.! They trace some of the basic changes 1968.! A serious history of the rfc is yet to come. that have taken place in the status of air power and British power in the twentieth century. They vary in style and content from the ro- W hat Geoffrey Norris has writ- mantic through the disillusioned to the didac- ten is a nostalgic adventure story that fills in tic. Viewed chronologically in terms of their from standard sources some of the details while contents, they move from the mundane and concentrating upon the individual heroism romantic to the profound. which was the dominant theme of the 1914-18 British air power had its diverse origins air war. As the story of the wild kind of things in the years before the First World War when that happened to pilots flying unreliable air- army officers at the Balloon Factory at Farn- craft they barely understood, it is a romantic borough, naval officers under the leadership of book. Occasionally Norris mentions the lack of Admiral Sir John Fisher, the Prime Minister training and the losses, but never does he really under Fisher’s guidance, and wealthy amateurs see the tragedy of this sort of operation. Given all developed aeronautical equipment and machines that were all too often unstable, with ideas. Official recognition of aviation started engines that might run three hours without early, with the founding in 1909 of the Aero- breaking down, it was suicidal to send aircrew nautical Research Committee (later Council). on operations with as little as 17 hours’ total In 1912 the Royal Flying Corps ( rfc) was es- flying experience. Moreover, the British dis- tablished, with military and naval wings. But dained parachutes, though successful ones had owing both to internal service situations and to been tested at Farnborough and were available practical political considerations, the two before the war. Thus, one of the sad things wings went their separate ways, and before about the war was the abuse of gallantry and war broke out in 1914 the naval wing had be- the building of a tradition based upon physical come by Royal Warrant the Royal Naval Air courage rather than upon carefully planned Service ( rnas). Neither air wing has had a operations designed to make maximum use of proper official historical treatment; the nearest the limited force available. The skilled sur- thing to that is the official six-volume The War vived, it is true, until bad luck or overcon- in the Air1 and the semiofficial condensation fidence killed them. But myths die hard, and

fGeoffrey Norris, The Royal Flying Corps: A History (London: Frederick Muller, 1965, 30s), 256 pp. David Divine, The Broken Wing: A Study in the British Exercise of Air Power (London: Hutchinson, 1966, 45s), 400 pp. Richard Worcester, Roots of British Air Policy (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1966; distributed in the United States by Lawrence Verry Inc., Mystic, Connecticut, $6.50), 224 pp. Sir Solly Zuckerman, Scientists and War: The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1967, $4.95), 177 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 105

the fact that the same man (Sir Hugh [later because they were the work of human beings, Lord] Trenchard) was virtually in command must be recalled when we consider our own of the rfc and later the raf ( Royal Air Force) programs. from 1915 to the end of 1929 was to continue Divine looks at the First World War ana- the Army traditions of the nineteenth century lytically and comes to the sound conclusion in the air force of the twentieth, with tragic that far too much mythology has grown up consequences. What was needed was some about the fighter pilots and the so-called inde- serious analysis of the whole war effort. This pendent air force and the effects of strategic need might have been filled by The War in the bombing. He argues that the cost of the inde- Air had it not been written largely by a civil pendent air force was far more than the dam- servant awed by the former field commander age it did and that it had no effect on the out- of the rfc. come of the war. Divine’s approach must not The romantic glow about air operations be taken lightly, for he has long been defence was not really shattered until Sir Charles Web- correspondent of The Sunday Times. Yet his ster, a stubborn and noted European historian, account of Lord Trenchard’s conversion to the and Xoble Frankland. a former Bomber Com- bombing mystique in the early twenties differs mand navigator, produced in 1961 the four considerably from my own reading of the same volumes entitled The Strategic Air Offensive materials. The second third of the book is de- against Germany,+ Anyone who wishes to voted to “The Bomber Years,” when the write the aerial history of the First World War counterstrike theory was predominant. Logic might well adopt the Webster-Frankland tech- is again on the side of his analysis, especially nique, which was to consider each period from when he emphasizes the failure to provide an three aspects: plans, operations, and analysis. “army-cooperation” ( tactical) air force despite If this were done for the 1914 air war, a very the brilliant work of then Wing Commander different picture would emerge of this ancil- John Slessor, Air Power and ArmiesT Thus the lary operation. Second World War found the British, despite efforts by such people as Captain B. H. Liddell Hart and General Sir Frederick (‘Tim ”) Pile, seriously lacking in air defences, both fighter I n pa r t , this is David Divine’s and gun, and largely without a tactical air approach in The Broken Wing. Having already force. The latter in particular had largely to be rapidly surveyed the army’s procurement of built in the Middle East desert campaign of weapons in The Blunted Sivord,5 he has next 1941-42 along German lines. The latter part tackled the air force. His general thesis is jour- of The Broken Wing is much more the author’s nalistic; despite rave notices on the dust jacket, metier, a slashing account of the muddle over it is not good history-. It is provocative and the development of a V-bomber force as a little well worth reading, but the sources are unclear deterrent and the subsequent dabbling with and there are a number of errors of fact and missiles. more arguable interpretations. His thesis is Underlying all the problems with which that for decades the British public has not been The Broken Wing deals is the fact that Britain getting its money’s worth in defence because has been steadily losing her pre-eminent place the British system is incapable of producing as a world power. The air force arose late in weapons on time or in sufficient quantities. The the history of the British Empire. It was to old story of too little too late is examined in prove in the years after the 1914 war that it detail. As in The Blunted Sword, the author’s could provide a useful service as a policeman bias and didacticism detract somewhat from in areas where tribes were primitive and dis- balance, while his historical research is often tances great. In Iraq it showed that a significant shallow or skimpy. Nevertheless, his indict- savings could be effected by employing the ment is one which cannot be lightly shrugged air arm to quash troubles as soon as word was off, for the lessons he draws are ones which, flashed to it that action needed to be taken. 106 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

On the North-West Frontier of India it could Ironically, the Japanese attack on Singapore also aid in patrolling and containing the tribes- had in it many of the lessons that might have men along that difficult and constantly trou- been learned from Gallipoli. All this could be bled border. But effective use of the air force drawn together in the person of Churchill, who depended upon several factors: intelligent had conceived the Dardanelles operation in political appreciation and direction, adequate 1914 and who in 1919 had as a mandate the equipment, and suitable training. Its effective- disbandment of the raf. It was his Chief of the ness was compromised by the failure to appre- Air Staff, Trenchard, who not only saved the ciate that it could not with the then-available raf as an independent service but also advo- equipment handle night infiltration and terror- cated taking over anti-invasion defence by ist activities in a populous area such as Pales- means of torpedo-bombers; however, he did tine, where the correct solution remained firm little about it and became involved in the political control reinforced by police and in- bomber deterrent defence. A further irony is fantry supported by a reliable intelligence that though Trenchard did not provide the service. Its effectiveness depended, too, upon equipment to undertake such an operation, proper foreknowledge of trouble which its neither did he foster the colonial strike forces limited forces could nip in the bud. In much which might have kept the peace abroad. The of the period between the wars it was limited raf was hamstrung in part by the same prob- by lack of equipment and by the failure to lems that plagued the army, which never had develop a continuously flexible and advancing its role decided until the spring of 1939. Divine doctrine. can argue correctly that the raf did know that To this then had to be coupled some other it was to be the Home Defence Air Force and very real difficulties. These included a natural that it was supposed to achieve a 52-squadron extension of the struggle for an adequate share goal by 1928, though in fact this had not been of the defence budget in promises that the raf reached even when rearmament began in 1934. could take on more responsibilities. Outside of And the events which followed showed that it Europe the most notable of these was the con- was not capable of fulfilling the primary role cept that the Air Force in India could be used of armed forces—keeping the peace. as a mobile reserve to defend Singapore if a Military terminology unfortunately often war with Japan developed. This strategy might obscures this central fact. And because many have been sound if two conditions had existed: politicians, especially in the interwar years and first, if the squadrons in India had been ade- since in Britain, have not been trained in quate in number and equipped with up-to-date strategic thinking, they have failed to under- machines and weapons; and, second, if the stand that armed forces are a part of diplomacy support route to Malaya had been invulnerable in peacetime. They are the sheathed sword. to attack. But neither of these conditions was However, it is equally important to assure in fulfilled, in part because of parsimoniousness peacetime that the sword is not rusted into its at home and in part because no one until very scabbard and that it is not only sharp but of late in the game envisaged Britain’s being insufficient strength to do the job in wartime. volved in wars both in Europe and in the Far This also assumes, though, that the Higher East at the same time. Added to this was the Direction understands how to use it and knows arrogance that viewed the Japanese as inferior its limitations. It may be trite to say so, but, fighters—an arrogance from which even Wavell like insurance premiums, the budgets for the is said to have suffered. services must ensure that the protection pur- There is a lot of irony to the final situation chased is sufficient. Faced with a parsimonious as it developed in late 1941. The raf had government, the military leadership must pre- weeded out most of the rxas personnel after sent the best case possible, naturally; but it the 1918 merger and the establishment of must also ensure that what it obtains with peacetime levels. The ex-RNAS personnel thus limited funds is capable of expansion into a left unemployed trained the Japanese navy. viable modern force as rapidly as possible. BOOKS AND IDEAS 107

One of Divine’s complaints is that the British veloped. N’evil Shute told the tale of the Tudor deterrent has never been viable. It takes study in his No Highway (1948), but the official to be correct, and it takes courage to say when report as to the losses of that type remains im- your role is no longer necessary. The latter is pounded under the Official Secrets Act. On the perhaps the most difficult of all; empire build- other hand, the Comet well illustrates the ers do not like to wither away. longevity even today of some technological This is a problem which the British and developments, for it was conceived in 1943 and others have faced in recent years as their place modifications are still being built. in the world shifts. The forces and costs have But the force of Worcester’s arguments, become too great for any one service or even which range over the whole structure of the any one nation in competition with the United industry from the ministries to space, can well States, the Soviet Union, and probably Red be seen in the case of the British Aircraft Cor- China, xat o was a step in the direction of a poration and its two jet aircraft. The VC-10 military alliance; but nationalism has been too has turned out to have great passenger appeal strong, especially in Britain and France, for but for sound economic reasons to be unsalable the necessary combinations to be achieved— to most airlines. It was conceived as part of a and there has always been the problem of Brit- package deal in which bo a c could buy fifteen ain’s special relationship with the United States Boeing 707s if it also bought twenty equivalent and France’s special relationship with itself. British aircraft. So a jet Vanguard, which the then Vickers company had been trying to sell to bea , was made first into an Empire-routes M any of the same problems and then into a trans-Atlantic design. While which Divine assaults are tackled in Richard the result was an aircraft technically ahead of Worcester’s controversial study of the roots of the Boeing and Douglas designs, it was actually British air policy since 1945. Unfortunately the six years behind and somewhat more costly. author has been so wrapped up in his own At the same time the break-even point was role as a demi-Liddell Hart in the aeronautical unrealistically figured at 20 aircraft versus the business that he fails to write clearly. Even the American giants’ reckoning of 300. Like Vick- informed have trouble figuring out some of his ers’ successful Viscount, the BAC-111 also references. Yet despite this, the main theme is cracked the American domestic market—in clear—that Britain has never developed a prac- itself no mean feat. But by dividing its effort tical aeronautical policy which has taken into between the VC-10 and the BAC-111, the com- account the needs of the raf. the airlines, and pany lost its margin over Douglas’s DC-9. The the aircraft industry. Whether or not the re- handwriting was on the hangar wall by the cently announced Board of Trade inquiry will mid-fifties—the Americans were going to get do this remains to be seen. The story is, in the big jet market. parts, much the same as Divine’s and overlaps But the Americans were not then able to with it in treating the mismanagement of the aim at the small jet, and this is the market upon V-bomber and the missile. which the British should have concentrated More important, Worcester shows that their forces. They should have focused also there is a definite need to apply the principles upon underdeveloped countries, so many of of war to national industries. This is evident in which would emerge from the old Empire. As the tales of the Handley Page Herald versus proof of what could have been done, one has the Fokker F-27 and the BAC-111 versus the but to look at the Canadian industry, where DC-9. In 1942 the Brabazon Committee met de Havilland of Canada in particular, taking a and came up with a postwar plan for the in- leaf from its parent’s prewar record, has pro- dustry. Through misassignment, prevarication, duced the Beaver and the Caribou, even sell- lack of responsibility, and cold-shouldering of ing some to the United States military. If genius, among other causes, not all of the com- further proof were needed, there is the revival mittee s proposed types were successfully de- of the Ford Trimotor. All these aircraft are 108 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW being sold in a market which Britain could over the last half-dozen years on both sides of have had but in which it has not gotten a cor- the Atlantic. Certainly those who want to un- ner, primarily for failure to concentrate on a derstand the problems of the present age can few really competitive designs and to get them hardly find a better starting place than this into the marketplace come hell or high water. short book, in which the author ranges from A lecture by Worcester to the Royal Aero- nuclear weapons through the problems of nautical Society and his subsequent book have scientific secrecy to those of liberty in a scien- stirred up a rash of hostility in Britain. Part of tific age and to the social function of science this has been because the Labour Government itself. At a time when the best minds in the has been willing to listen to him, but a good United States are grappling with the stupen- deal of it has been fear. Worcester is only one dous cost of the antjballistic missile system as of a number of critics who have in recent years a counter to the intercontinental ballistic mis- been pointing to the lack of policy-making sile, Zuckerman points to the “inexorable law” finesse while at the same time urging that that the cost of defence mav well outweigh the Britain take a realistic view of the future. Re- benefits and that it may be much more sensible ports on the latest Paris Air Show indicate that to find ways of cooperating w ith other powers some of the hard facts of modern life are be- to obtain the spin-off benefits of this kind of ginning to sink in and that Europeans in gen- science in a more economical way. eral are recognizing that for both their own While this thought may not be very pleas- and the world’s economic, diplomatic, and ing to many Americans, yet its author speaks military health they had better pull together. from experience in Britain. There the country’s For the British, who have traditionally regard- ability to expand its war production peaked in ed the Continent as something to which they 1944. From then on, the accumulated physical do not belong, this means abandoning some and financial toll of two World Wars, coupled national pride and the pursuit of mere prestige with rapidly rising costs in a highly technologi- projects. cal age, not to mention certain other realities, forced the country out of the defence business. Zuckerman is not arguing an abstract point; he is facing the problem which on a smaller level J ust as Worcester deals with both can trouble all of us—How much insurance is the past and the future, so does Sir Solly Zuck- enough? What risks are we prepared to take? erman in Scientists and War, but from a much Turned another way, the question is one different point of view. Sir Solly is currently asked me some years ago by one of the di- Chief Scientific Adviser to the British govern- rectors at the Navy’s China Lake establishment. As such, he is familiar with the problems ment: What is an adequate level of armament of making policy. As a scientist—he is a profes- for any nation? The answ-er will never be easy. sor of anatomy—he has warned that there It depends upon a calculation of warning time, must not be a tendency on the part of leaders assets, friends, risks, and contingencies; and it to have scientists make their decisions for them. depends upon a fine judgment based upon Few people bring to military problems such a scientific, economic, political, social, ideologi- wide background and so much expertise. He cal, and historical understanding. The answer has had an acknowledged influence on the also depends upon who is supplying the data work of Air Vice-Marshal E. J. Kingston- and upon how much of it is really only a McCloughry, a talented air thinker. “guesstimate.” It is important, therefore, that Perhaps Zuckerman’s major contribution the w'hole be studied objectively and that all is the sensible rationale which he brings to the factors be weighted on a plus-or-minus basis. whole subject of military policy. The book it- One of the joys of Sir Solly’s work is that self is certainly very much worth reading, for, he puts the ideas not in abstruse mathematical unlike the other three volumes alreadv dis- formulas but in language that everyone can cussed, it is not a piece of special pleading but understand. Thus he enables people to start rather is a series of essays and lectures given thinking again with a clear head. BOOKS AMD IDEAS 109

T hese four bo o k s span British aeronautical even though we may not always agree with history from the romantic to the rational. There him. is something to be learned from each author, Manhattan, Kansas

Notes 1. Sir Walter Raleigh and H. A. Jones. The War in the 4. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Stra- Air (London: Oxford University Press. 1922-37), 6 vols. tegic Air Offensive against Germany (London: Her Majesty’s 2. Hilary St. Ceorge Saunders, Per Ardua The Rise of Stationery Office, 1961), 4 vols. British Air Power, 1911-1939 (London: Oxford University 5. David Divine, The Blunted Sword (London: Hutchin- Press, 1944 ), 356 pp. son, 1964). 3. Arthur Marder, Fear Cod and Dread Sought (New 6. [Marshal of the RAF] Sir John Slessor, Air Potter and York: Oxford University Press, 1961- ). 4 vols. Armies (London: Oxford University Press, 1936).

The Contributors

T he Honourable Paul Theodore Hel l yer , P.C., M.P., (B.A., Univer- sity of Toronto) was Canada’s Minister of National Defence until Septem- ber, when he became Minister of Transport. He was graduated in aeronautical engineering from the Curtiss-Wright Technical Institute of Aeronautics at Glendale, California, in 1941. Subsequently he was employed by Fleet Aircraft Limited at Fort Erie, Ontario, starting as junior- draughtsman and working up to group leader in engineering on the Cornell aircraft elementary- trainer. Mr. Hellyer obtained a pilot’s license in Califor- nia and was working toward his pilot’s wings in the Royal Canadian Air Force when he transferred to the Royal Canadian Artillery. After demobili- zation, he went into business in Toronto and at the same time worked his way through the University of Toronto. When elected to Parliament in 1949, he became, at the age of 25, the youngest member of the House of Commons. In 1953, he was re-elected and in February 1956 was appointed Parliamen- tary Assistant to the Minister of National Defence. Fourteen months later, Mr. Hellyer was sworn into the Privy Council as Associate Minister of Na- tional Defence. He was re-elected to the House of Commons as Member of Parliament for Toronto-Trinitv in a December 1958 by-election. He acted as Chairman of the 1961 National Liberal Rally in Ottawa, and he served as a Parliamentary representative to NATO under both Liberal and Conserva- tive administrations. He was president of a Toronto construction company when he resigned to devote Full time to public life in 1962. Re-elected in the general election of April 8, 1963, Mr. Hellyer was named Minister of National Defence when the Cabinet was formed. G en er a l James Fer guson is Commander, Air Force Systems Command, and Director, Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) program. Commissioned from flying cadet in 1937, he served in fighter units until 1943, when he organized the 40.5th Fighter- Bomber Group and took it to the European Theater. He was Operations Officer. XIX Tactical Air Command, during the planning of the Xormandv invasion and was its Director of Operations on V-E Day. He then served with the 5th Fighter Command in the Philippines and Okinawa until September 1945. Postwar assignments have been as instructor in tactical air operations. Air Command and Staff School, to 1947; with the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, finally as its Chief of Staff, to 1950; as Assistant to the Vice Commander, later Assistant Deputy for Operations, Far East Air Forces, to 1951. and as Vice Commander. Fifth Air Force, to 1953; as Deputy Commander, Ninth Air Force, TAC, to 1955; as Deputy Director—later Director—of Requirements, DCS D. until 1959: as Vice Commander. Air Research and Development Command (later AFSC), until 1961; and DCS/R&D, Hq USAF, until assuming his present assignment in 1966.

C olonel Arthur A. M c C artan i USMA) is Chief. Joint Operations Analysis and Test Group. Hq U.S. Strike Command. At Strike Command since August 1963, he served as Chief. Field Test Division. Joint Test and Evaluation Task Force (JT E T F ), until its deactivation upon completion of mission 30 June 1965. He was Chief Evaluator, Joint Exercise RAPID STRIKE, 1966. Colonel McCartan served in the armed forces during World War II and the Korean War and is a 1948 graduate of the N'aval War College.

L ieu t en a n t Colonel David C. Collins C olonel Benny L. C ostello (M.S., L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Donald M. is Chief, Supporting Systems Branch, George Washington University) is Chief, W ood. USA (B.S.. University of Ver- Doctrine Division, Hq Tactical Air Com- Training Branch, J-3, Hq U.S. Strike mont) is assigned to the Joint Training mand. During World War II he served as Command. He entered the service in 1942 Branch, J-3, Hq U.S. Strike Command. navigator on B-29s. completing 25 com- and during World War II flew 30 missions During World War II he served with the bat missions against Japan. After the war in B-24s in the European Theater. Colonel U.S. Navy in the Pacific Theater. Since he attended Air Tactical School and Costello has held his present assignment entering the U.S. Army in 1951 he has served on its faculty until he entered pilot since graduating from the Air War Col- served in the 11th Airborne Division, the training. Since his graduation in 1950, he lege in 1965. 25th Infantry Division, the 101st Air- has served in Goose Bay, Labrador, and in borne Division, and the 5th and 6th Spe- Air Defense Command at Kinross AFB, cial Forces Groups (Airborne). In 1961- Michigan; as a student, instructor, and 62 he served as a Senior Regimental Ad- group chief, Squadron Officer School; as viser in the Republic of Vietnam. During student. Air Command and Staff School; his second tour of duty in the R5 N in with a C-119 squadron, later C-130, at 1965-66, he commanded an Operational Dreux and Es’reux, France; and in TAC "C " Detachment while assigned to the as squadron operations officer, squadron 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). commander, and assistant division opera- Colonel Wood is a graduate of the Army tions officer until his present assignment Command and General Staff College. in 1965. L ieu t en a n t Colonel Edward O. S tillie ( B.S., University of Maryland) is Chief, Long Range Objectives Branch. DCS/Plans, Hq Tacticul Air Command. After completing flying training in 1943, he served as a transport pilot in the China-Burma-lndia Theater during World War II. Postwar assignments have been as a special air missions pilot at Bolling AFB, D.C.; in operations staff positions. Headquarters Command and Hq USAF; and in Alaska and Bangkok, Thailand. Colonel Stillie is a graduate of the Air Tactical School and Air Command and Staff School.

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Ray L. Bowers (USNA; M.A., University of Wisconsin) was Associate Professor of His- tory, U.S. Air Force Academy, from 1958 until his assignment to the 345 Troop Currier Squadron, Far East Air Forces, in 1967. He Hew as navigator-bombardier, 47th Bombardment Wing (B -45), United Kingdom, 1952-55. He participated in the testing of the B-66 aircraft at Edwards AFB in 1955-56 and served with the 17th Bombardment Wing (B -66) during 1956-58, suc- cessively as aircrew member, air targets officer, and wing special weapons officer. Colonel Bowers’ articles have been published in Military Review, Aerospace Historian, and Naval Institute Proceedings, as well as Air Univer- sity Review ( May-June 1966).

B ricadieh Gen er a l Leo A. K il ey (Ph.D., Ohio State University) is Director of Science and Technology, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development, Hq USAF. Commissioned in the Air Corps Reserve in 1941, he served in various weather assignments until accepting a regular commission in 1946. Subsequent assignments have been as Commander, 15th Weather Squadron, Philippine Islands and Okinawa; Com- mander, Hickam Weather Central, Hawaii; student. Air Command and Staff School; Chief, Plans and Operations Division, 2059th Air Weather Wing, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma; USAFIT student, Ohio State University; Chief, Programs Branch, later Deputy Director, Atomic Warfare Directorate, Air Force Cambridge Research Center; Deputy Chief, then Chief, Biophysics Division, Air Force Special Weapons Center; Assistant DCS, later DCS, Weapons Effects Tests, Field Command, Defense Atomic Support Agency, also Military Deputy Test Manager, Nevada Test Site, and Commander, Joint Task Unit 8.1.3 of Joint Task Force Eight, Pacific Proving Ground; Vice Commander, later Commander, Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories; and Commander, Air Force Missile Development Cen- ter, Holloman AFB, New Mexico, until his present assignment on 1 July 1967.

Ma )Or John F. M c M ahon, J r . (M.A., University of North Carolina) is assigned to the Appli- cations Branch, Special Warfare Division, Deputy Directorate of Plans for Policy, Hq USAF. After completion of flying training in 1956. he served as a jet instructor pilot at Greenville AFB, Mississippi, and Craig AFB. Alabama. He was on the faculty. Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy, from 1961 to 1963, when he joined the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing. He served in Vietnam as an F-4C aircraft commander. Major McMahon is a 1967 graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College.

M ajor Graham W. R id er ( USMA; M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology) is a doctoral student. College of Business Administration, Arizona State University. After graduation from West Point in 1952, he attended the Airborne Communications Officer Course, Keesler AFB, Mississippi. He has served as Armament and Electronics Maintenance Officer, 64th Fighter- Interceptor Squadron, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska; staff officer. Armament and Electronics, Hq 25 Air Division, McChord AFB, Washington; Adviser to the Imperial Iranian Air Force, Teheran, Iran; Weapon Systems Officer, Hq Air Defense Command; student. School of Systems and Logistics, AFIT; and faculty member, Graduate Logistics Management Studies Department, AFIT, where he will resume duty upon completion of his present studies. Cor.o.NEL A lfred F. H urley ( Ph.D., Princeton University) is Professor and Head of the Department of History, U.S. Air Force Academy. He enlisted in the Air Force in 1950, was commissioned from Officer Candidate School in 1952, and rated as navigator in 1954. His assignments have been as instructor, Air Force Observer Instructor School, James Connally AFB, Texas, to 1956; student, Princeton, to 1958; instructor in history. USAFA, to 1963; navigator and executive officer, 7499th Support Group, Wiesbaden, Germany; staff officer. War Plans Division, Hq USAFE; and temporary member. Chair- man’s Special Study Group, J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until his assignment to the Academy. Colonel Hurley is author of Billy Mitchell—Crusader for Air Power (1964).

C aptain John J. F rancis, J r . (USAFA; M.S.E., University of Michigan) served as a project officer in Advanced Planning, Hq Space Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, Los Angeles, California, from 1964 until his present assignment at Webb Air Force Base, Texas, for pilot training.

D r . R obin Hic h a m (Ph.D., Harvard University) is Professor of History, Kansas State University. After obtaining his pilot’s wings in the Royal Air Force in 1944, he was assigned to 48 Squadron, South-East Asia Command, operating out of Chit- tagong. Upon his return to the United States in 1947 he resumed his education. 1950-57. He assisted in oceanic history at Har- vard and taught at the Universities of Massachusetts and North Carolina before moving to Kansas State in 1963. Dr. Higham is active in several professional societies, has written numerous articles and book reviews, and is the author of Britain’s Imperial Air Routes, 1918-1939; The British Rigid Airship, 1908—1931 A Study in Weapons Policy; Armed Forces in Peacetime: Britain 1918-1939; and The Military Intellectuals in Britain 1918- 1939; and is coauthor (with Major David H. Zook. Jr., USAF) of A Short History of Warfare.

The Air University Review Awards Committee has chosen “The Closer the Better" by Colonel John R. Stoner, USAF, as the outstanding article in the Septem- ber-October 1967 issue of the Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF L ieu t en a n t Colonel Eldon W. Downs, USAF, Editor J ack H. Mooney, Managing Editor Major Robert G. Spa r k ma n , USAF, Chief, Acquisition Branch E dmund O. B arker. Financial and Administrative Manager J ohn A. YVest c o t t , J r .. Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston, Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L . Mid o si May Patterson, Assistant Editor, Portuguese Language Edition W illiam J. D e Paola, Art Editor and Illustrator F ir st Lieu t en a n t Jer r y R. Stringer, USAF, Editorial Project Officer

ADVISERS

C olonel Mer r itt G. Garner, Hq Military Airlift Command

C olonel Alfred J. L yn n . Hq Strategic Air Command

C olonel Marvin M. Stanley, Hq Tactical Air Command

C olonel Rea ue F. T il l e y , IIq Air Defense Command

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Cec il G. F urbish, Hq Air Force Logistics Command

L ie u t e n a n t Colonel James F. S underman. //

D r . H arold Hel fma n . Hq Air Force Systems Command

L a Veh n e E. Woods. Hq Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories

ATTENTION

Air University Review is published to stimulote professional thought concerning aerospace doctrines, strategy, tactics, and related techniques. Its contents reflect the opinions of its authors or the investigations and conclusions of its edi- tors and are not to be construed as carrying any official sanction of the Deport- ment of the Air Force or of Air University. Informed contributions are welcomed. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW