The Progressivist Origins of the 2003 California Gubernatorial Recall, 35 Mcgeorge L
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
McGeorge Law Review Volume 35 | Issue 4 Article 4 1-1-2004 The rP ogressivist Origins of the 2003 California Gubernatorial Recall Kira L. Klatchko University of California, Davis Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Kira L. Klatchko, The Progressivist Origins of the 2003 California Gubernatorial Recall, 35 McGeorge L. Rev. 701 (2004). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol35/iss4/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Progressivist Origins of the 2003 California Gubernatorial Recall Kira L. Klatchko* I. INTRODUCTION On November 5, 2002, more than three and a half million Californians voted to elect Gray Davis to a second term as their Governor.' Less than a year later, through the use of an arcane procedure known as the recall, just over one-third of that number set in motion a process that put an early end to his administration.2 Was this the type of recall envisioned by the Progressive reformers who designated the procedure almost a century ago? This paper argues that for the Progressives public participation and open debate were paramount, and that this recall, though circus-like in many respects, has indeed captured the public's interest and inspired their participation. However, underling this belief in the normative value of citizen involvement was the notion that such involvement would decrease the influence of moneyed interests in the political decision making process . There is no evidence that this recall has accomplished that goal. If anything it has demonstrated the electoral value of money and connection with special interests.4 Though it is impossible to know if the Progressive drafters of the recall legislation would be pleased, in the wake of the first certified recall of a California official elected to state-wide office, this paper addresses how closely this recent recall was aligned with the Progressive vision. * B.A., University of California, Berkeley 2001; J.D., University of California Davis (May 2004). The author would like to thank Professor Floyd Feeney for his support and comments on an earlier,draft of this paper. 1. California Secretary of State, Summary of All Votes Cast for Offices and Measures at the General Election, Statement of Vote 2002 General Election, at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2002-general/ sum.pdf (last visited July 17, 2004)(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 2. See Califomia-Recall.com, Quick Facts About the California Recall Election, at http://www. california-recall.com/archived-site/Califomia-recall-election-facts.html (last visited July 17, 2004) [hereinafter Quick Facts] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that the California Secretary of State certified that 1.6 million California voters signed the petition to recall Gray Davis). 3. See BENJAMIN PARKE DE Wrfr, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: A NON-PARTISAN, COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF CURRENT TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN POLMcS 213-235 (1915) (explaining that corruption and the influence of special interests create the need for "post-election control" of elected officials). 4. For example, the recall petition was reportedly financed by millionaire Congressman Darryl Issa (who spent nearly $2.3 million of his own money); Lt. Governor, and lead Democratic candidate, Cruz Bustamante was roundly criticized for his connection with various Indian gaming tribes (which contributed heavily to his campaign efforts, spending nearly $11 million); Arnold Schwarzenegger donated over $4 million to his own campaign; and Governor Davis was scrutinized for his close ties to many of the large labor unions in the state. Christian Berthelsen, $80 Million in Contributions in 75-day Recall Campaign, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 11, 2003 at Al; Mark Simon, Big War Chestsfor Recall CampaignBoth Sides Forming SubstantialGroups with Aid From Parties, S.F. CHRON. Aug. 3, 2003, at A19; see also infra part IIIB (discussing the tension between the progressive origins of the recall and the use of large amounts of money by candidates in the 2002 recall election). 2004 / The ProgressivistOrigins of the 2003 California GubernatorialRecall Part II of this article provides a brief overview of the Progressive quest for public reform in the guise of recall legislation. Part III addresses the genesis of the 2003 gubernatorial recall and examines how closely it aligned with the foundational principles espoused by the Progressives. Part IV concludes that the 2003 recall resulted in an increased interest in the electoral politics of the moment as well as an increase in the importance of interest group influence, and for those reasons the Progressive framers both triumphed and simultaneously failed to achieve all of their goals. II. THE PROGRESSIVE ORIGINS OF THE RECALL The politics of the early 20th century were not so different from those of today. Debates raged over the issues of governmental responsibility, voting rights, the role of the courts, and social justice Some politicians believed, as some do now, that they had a duty to be faithful to the wishes of their constituencies, some saw themselves more as stewards of the public interest, and a small group of "Progressive" politicians believed that the people themselves should control their collective political destiny.6 These Progressive reformers launched a movement predicated on their belief in the value of direct democracy and the economic independence of individuals. 7 Underlying that belief was a general distrust of representative, or corporate, power structures, which were viewed as being prone to corruption.! The Progressive Era, which began in the last years of the 19th century and lasted for nearly twenty years, was marked by a national movement to return power directly to the people, who had long since lost the political voice they once had in the town hall meetings of colonial times. 9 Led by the likes of Theodore Roosevelt, Robert LaFollette, Woodrow Wilson, and California Governor Hiram Johnson,, the Progressives generally set out to put an end to corrupt government and business practices, though various actors within the movement maintained their own, often disjointed, positions on specific issues.' Most Progressive 5. See DEWITr, supra note 3, at 143-243; The ProgressiveParty Platform of 1912, in THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 1900-1915 at 128-132 (Richard Hofstadter ed., Prentice-Hall 1963) [hereinafter Progressive Party Platform]. 6. ProgressiveParty Platform,supra note 5. 7. Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 11, 16-18 (1997); see William Deverell, The Neglected Twin: California Democrats and the ProgressiveBandwagon, in CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVISM REVISITED 79-93 (William Deverell & Tom Sitton eds., 1994) (illustrating one individual's experience and belief in the progressive movement). 8. Deverell, supra note 7; Persily, supra note 7, at 18. 9. Deverell, supranote 7; DEWrrr, supra note 3, at 14243; Persily, supra note 7, at 18. 10. See Persily, supra note 7, at 22-30; The Progressive Party Platform of 1912, supra note 3, at 128. Richard Hofstadter, one of the leading writers on the topic, characterized the movement itself as being both vague and lacking in cohesion or uniformity, RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYANT TO F.D.R. 5-8 (1955). McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 35 politicians, however, agreed that, in order to return political power to their constituents, systemic changes would be necessary." The initiative, referendum, recall, direct primaries, and non-partisan elections were all suggested methods to accomplish that goal. 2 The recall was contemplated as a mechanism to remove officials who were "manifestly unfit to serve their constituencies" or who were abusing their official power. 3 One of the major tenets of the Progressive platform was the reallocation of political power away from small vested interests and into the hands of the majority of people. 4 Thus by granting the electorate the right to remove officers, the recall was the populist version of impeachment, which allowed only elected representatives to remove an officer. From the Progressivist vantage this shift in the balance of power would have been particularly significant given their view that political parties were tools of the special interests run by self-interested party bosses. 5 These fears were encapsulated in the inaugural address of 1911, wherein Governor Hiram Johnson spoke of giving Californians the means to "protect themselves hereafter" from both "big business," like "the former political master of this State, the Southern Pacific Company," and other private interests.' 6 The initiative, referendum and recall were the means offered to achieve that goal. Of the recall he said: "[it is] the precautionary measure by which a recalcitrant official can be removed," and he went on to speak of his trust in the voters and in their ability to govern." Johnson founded his vision on his trust in the electorate to not use the recall for petty or personal reasons, as his opponents suggested they would.' 9 The Progressives knew that Johnson's faith alone would not sufficiently countermand criticisms of the procedure; to that end they fine-tuned the recall theory. 11. See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 10; Gerald Woods, A Penchantfor Probity, in CALIFORNIA PROGRESSiVISM REVISITED 99-111 (William Deverell & Tom Sitton eds., 1994). 12. See DEWITT,supra note 3, at 213-15. 13. Id. at 215, 241. The recall ballot itself contains two sections: the first posing the question, shall the officer be recalled from the office which she holds, the second, listing the names of replacement candidates. See CAL.