Anomie and His Spray Tan:

The Life, Work, and Contemporary Relevance of Émile Durkheim

Caity Rose Campana

RLG 6013: Modern Analysis of Religion

Professor Whitney Bauman

12 December 2019

1

“…Religion must be an eminently collective thing.”1

These few words, which bring an unsentimental end to the first chapter of The

Elementary Forms of Religious Life, reflect the essence of Émile Durkheim’s theory of religion.

It is this ardent focus on the social aspects of life, culture, identity construction, and being in the world that not only set Durkheim apart, but cement his position as one of the architects of modern sociology. While a comprehensive review of this theorist’s life and work is certainly beyond the 6,000-word scope of this paper, the goal of the next twenty pages is to briefly examine Durkheim’s background, highlight the most compelling and unique elements of his theories and methodology, and apply those elements to several contemporary issues. Among these topics are questions relating to the global environmental crisis, pluralism, and globalization

(with a particular focus on the recent proliferation of nationalist and isolationist policies around the world). If anything, this essay seeks to explore why it is that Durkheim’s name, regardless of whether or not one agrees with his ideas, appears to always have a place—out of respect or otherwise—in academic discussions of society, religion, and culture. In doing so, my hope is twofold: (1) to transport Durkheim’s conceptual framework into a modern arena, thereby rendering it more accessible and relevant, and (2) to ensure that Durkheim’s contributions to the field of religious studies are understood not simply in their own historical and sociological context, but also in the context of their many critiques.

Beginning with a short study of Durkheim’s upbringing, career, influences, and significant lived experiences, the paper then shifts its focus to the theoretical. This second section is primarily concerned with delineating those tenets with which Durkheim is so closely associated, such as the concepts of collective effervescence and social integration; it also

1 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995), 44.

2 introduces several notable criticisms of the thinker’s work. Finally, through the contemporary shift mentioned above, the third section aims to explain—and, in some ways, defend—

Durkheim’s importance to religious studies, and, more broadly, the humanities.

Historical Location

David Émile Durkheim was born in Épinal, France in 1858—a place and time shaped by two major revolutions—to a devout Jewish family. His father, a rabbi, ensured that he received a religious education befitting a young member of the Jewish community. As he matured,

Durkheim came to identify as an atheist, but never denied or distanced himself from the heritage that shaped his formative years. As a young adult, he attended the prestigious École normale supérieure in Paris; after graduating, he began teaching philosophy at various lycées, or secondary schools.2 Of note here is the year Durkheim devoted to studying in Paris, Berlin,

Marburg, and, finally, Leipzig, where he worked with the German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt.

Out of this period came several of the theorist’s articles on German academia and philosophy, which helped establish “his credentials as a promising social scientist.”3 The year 1887 brought about several changes for Durkheim; he became a professor at the University of Bordeaux and married—in a “religious ceremony blessed by the Chief Rabbi of Paris”4—a wealthy woman named Louise Julie Dreyfus, with whom he had two children. Durkheim published his doctoral dissertation (and first book), The Division of Labor in Society, in 1893; this was followed by the release of The Rules of Sociological Method in 1895 and Suicide in 1897. Though controversial

2 Alexandra Maryanski, Émile Durkheim and the Birth of the Gods (New York: Routledge, 2018), 42.

3 Ibid., 52.

4 Ibid., 55. 3 at first, Durkheim was preoccupied with social science and sought to establish sociology as a legitimate discipline. One of the ways he did this was through collaboration with other scholars on the popular academic journal L’Anee sociologique. Perhaps the most significant moment of

Durkheim’s life in terms of academic achievement, he was named a professor at the University of Paris (the Sorbonne) in 1902; ten years later, he published The Elementary Forms of Religious

Life. After the outbreak of World War I, which naturally had the most severe impact on France and Germany, Durkheim found himself in a politically divisive climate. He lost his son to the war late in 1915, a misfortune that spurred a sharp decline in his health and scholarly output.

Durkheim died of a stroke in 1917, five years after the publication of Elementary Forms, which would become his most widely cited and impressive work.5

Life events are integral to understanding how a theorist’s work developed. For Durkheim, three are prominent. The former two have more to do with an overall climate or state, while the third is a proper event; regardless, they all had an outsize impact on his interests, theory, and personal outlook. First, Durkheim’s location as a European (but specifically French) thinker in the late 19th century is consequential, as his country had experienced a whirlwind of transformation, some of it quite bloody, in the form of the Industrial Revolution and the French

Revolution. These changes brought about mass migrations away from rural areas and into cities, great shifts in wealth distribution, and what could be characterized as a religious identity crisis in the wake of major scientific developments. Daniel Pals outlines four patterns Durkheim observed in and about this specific national and cultural setting:

1. In place of Europe’s traditional social system, laced together as it was by ties of family, community, and religious faith, a new “contractual” order was emerging, in which private concerns and money-related interests seemed to predominate. 2. In the realm of morals and behavior, the sacred values once sanctioned by the Church

5 Daniel L. Pals, Nine Theories of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 83-84. 4

were now challenged by newer ideals, which stressed reason over religious faith and a desire for a happiness in this life over any hope of Heaven (or fear of Hell) in the life to come. 3. In the sphere of politics, the emergence of the democratic masses at the bottom of society and a powerful central state at the top had changed the nature of social control. Individuals were finding themselves disconnected from their old moral teachers—the family, village, and Church—and were left to find what guidance they could from political parties, mass movements, and the state. 4. In the area of personal affairs, this new freedom of individuals released from their old frameworks presented great opportunity and great risk. With it came the chance of greater prosperity and self-realization but also the serious threat of loneliness and personal isolation.6

These observations are significant because they (1) unsurprisingly, illuminate Durkheim’s primary concerns as social, and (2) suggest the areas of social phenomena that he may be most closely invested in studying. For example, the fourth trend, newfound freedom of individuals potentially leading to isolation, echoes Durkheim’s interest in uncovering the role of the social in suicide, an undertaking to which he dedicated an entire book (the contents of which are examined more closely in the next section).

A second “fact” of sorts that shaped Durkheim’s lived experience and work, despite his being an avowed atheist, was his Jewishness. Although he was not an observant Jew, nor did he actively identify with many Jewish causes throughout his life, his upbringing and the rather illustrious line of rabbis from which he descended ensured that Judaism would always be a part of his identity. In her 1986 essay for Modern Judaism, Deborah Dash Moore argues for a Jewish reading of Durkheim as a means to better understand him in non-Jewish contexts, beginning with a note about his father:

An Alsatian Jew who settled in Épinal where he served as a modern French rabbi, Moses Durkheim provided his youngest son with a model of a man of learning whose scholarly ideals embraced duty, morality and a devotion to work…Durkheim’s adoption of his French middle name, Émile, underscored his new identity. As Émile Durkheim he was intellectually no longer merely his father’s son but, as the founder of French sociology,

6 Ibid., 85-86. 5

the heir of Comte and Saint-Simon, de Tocqueville and LePlay. Most writers on Durkheim accept his transformation; they locate Durkheim’s intellectual debts in European culture, ignoring his Jewish roots. Yet Durkheim’s intellectual baggage included his early Jewish upbringing and he successfully assimilated this knowledge into his sociological writings.7

But Durkheim’s Jewishness went beyond the values instilled in him by his parents. The very act of existing as a Jewish person in the world, both then and now—no matter the level of assimilation attained—carries with it an element of otherness, the unfortunate but inarguable product of antisemitism. Durkheim was no exception, as this otherness in part shaped his understanding of integration, public identity, and the place of Jews in modern European society.

Thus, viewing him not simply as a French or European scholar, but as a Jewish thinker, is necessary for understanding his approach and theory, as his “blend of politics, morality, and science intersected with a Jewish perspective on modernity.”8 A glowing example of the formative nature of Durkheim’s Jewishness is his avid Dreyfusard stance during the wildly divisive Dreyfus Affair, in which a French military officer of Alsatian-Jewish heritage—like

Durkheim—was falsely accused of treason, sentenced to life imprisonment, exiled to French

Guiana, and subsequently pardoned. In and outside of this context, Durkheim spoke out against antisemitism, but held up the re-opening of the Dreyfus case and eventual exoneration of

Dreyfus as an indication of the positive, progressive impact of the French Revolution. In sum,

Durkheim’s multiple identities coexisted within him, as our identities intersect within us, and to ignore this, plainly speaking, does injustice to his work. He was at once a French thinker, a passionate advocate for republicanism, a believer in the power of the social, and a man of Jewish origins.

7 Deborah Dash Moore, “David Émile Durkheim and the Jewish Response to Modernity,” Modern Judaism 6, no. 3 (October 1986): 288, accessed December 1, 2019, https://www-jstor- org.ezproxy.fiu.edu/stable/1396218.

8 Ibid., 289. 6

Finally, the horrors and reality of World War I had a marked impact on Durkheim. The propaganda associated with the French Right, a vehemently nationalistic ideology, put him in an awkward position: while he spoke out “fiercely for the cause of France against Germany,”9 he remained intensely critical of jingoism. What’s more, the far-right movement in France adhered to an antisemitic creed, further complicating Durkheim’s vision of French belonging and patriotism. In addition to these external stressors, he experienced great personal tragedy at the hands of the war, as his son, André, was killed in combat in Serbia. Reeling from this loss,

Durkheim found his health declining and for the next two years could not bring himself to research or publish further works. Ultimately, though it had no real influence on his thought or theory, World War I was significant to Durkheim’s story in both political and private ways, molding his final years and ushering in the end of his life.

Durkheim drew on the work of many prominent thinkers, but his attraction to theories with obvious social aspects is undeniable. That is, it is clear that even as a young man he sought to frame human activity, in all its iterations, as an inherently social thing. His theories reflect the positivism—or the idea that the same rational, objective scientific method that had previously been applied to the natural realm could also be applied to the social realm—promoted by

Auguste Comte. This is especially obvious in the concept of social facts (discussed at greater length in the next section), the notion that we predictably do, say, think, and feel certain things because of social influence and control. As Pals notes, “From Comte, Durkheim took an appreciation for the human need for communal ties and a deep commitment to scientific analysis of social phenomena.”10 Durkheim also drew on Immanuel Kant’s idealism. Where Kant asserts

9 Pals, Nine Theories, 84.

10 Ibid., 84. 7 that reality is essentially created via our own invented structures, Durkheim sees society—and the religion it generates—as an example of human-constructed reality. Finally, Durkheim was inspired by the French scholars Ernest Renan and Numa Denys Fustel de Coulanges, who sought to explore the social aspects of ancient Abrahamic religions (Judaism and Christianity) and the

Greco-Roman world, respectively.11

Just as a theorist’s influences are important, so too is the practice of contrasting his/her ideas with those of other thinkers. To understand who Durkheim is arguing against—for brevity’s sake, only with respect to religion—one first has to know his unique definition of religion: “A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden...which unite into one single moral community called a

Church, all those who adhere to them.”12 Neither the word “God” nor the word “supernatural” appears in Durkheim’s definition. Omitting the belief in the supernatural as an essenced and necessary part of the religious experience, instead arguing for a human-constructed sacred- profane dichotomy, was groundbreaking, and certainly challenged the conceptions of religion put forth by E. B. Tylor, J. G. Frazer, and Sigmund Freud. Next, Durkheim takes issue with the antipositivism—the belief that the social realm could not be explained using the scientific method and instead should be explored via interpretive means—championed by his contemporary, Max Weber. Weber’s principle of Verstehen (literally “understanding” in

German), which emphasizes an empathic and participatory approach to sociology, clashed with

Durkheim’s deep investment in the positivist notion that social phenomena can be explained using methods identical to those implemented in the natural sciences. Finally, Durkheim disagrees with the idea that humanity can somehow cast off or shed religion with progress,

11 Ibid., 85.

12 Durkheim, Elementary Forms, 44. 8 instead arguing that religion is inherent to society. This, of course, puts him at odds with many thinkers, including Tylor, Frazer, Freud, and Marx (also a positivist). Where the former two contend that religion (specifically “primitive” animism) is something humanity should evolve out of as a result of intellectual progress, the latter two view religion in an incredibly negative light, as a sickness, an opiate of the masses, and otherwise. Those with whom Durkheim disagrees help to shed light on the distinctive features of his theory, to which the next section is dedicated.

Theory

By now it is evident that the word “social” looms over nearly every theory and idea associated with Durkheim. Indeed, it is his commitment to the concept that humans should be understood through the social that distinguishes his work. One need only look over his four major publications to see this: The Division of Labor in Society (1893) discusses crime, morality, and the evolution of social order; The Rules of Sociological Method (1895) defines sociology as a science; Suicide (1897) seeks to explain differing suicide rates among Catholics and Protestants using the scientific method; and The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) outlines

Durkheim’s society-based theory of religion. While a full exploration of the contents of each of these is impossible given the limits of this paper, Durkheim’s most important contributions reverberate throughout his books, thus making it possible to draw out meaning and substance from a few without completing a close reading of every publication. With that said, this section focuses mostly on the ideas presented in Elementary Forms and Suicide, as these titles embody well the ideas for which Durkheim is known as well as his attentiveness to the social.

In Elementary Forms, which uses the totemism of Australian Aboriginal religion as its 9 primary example of the purest elements (hence, “elementary forms”) of religion, the following three Durkheimian concepts appear: the sacred-profane dichotomy, collective consciousness, and collective effervescence. The first of these, Durkheim explains, structures a narrower dichotomy: that of beliefs, or “states of opinion” which “consist of representations,” and rites, or “particular modes of action.”13 Together, beliefs and rites make up all religious phenomena, and beyond them one may find a clear demarcation between things imbued with religious significance and things deemed secular, or belonging to the everyday. Durkheim elaborates:

The division of the world into two domains—one containing all that is sacred and the other all that is profane—such is the distinctive trait of religious thought. Beliefs, myths, dogmas, and legends are either representations or systems of representations that express the nature of sacred things, the virtues and powers attributed to them, their history, and their relationships with one another as well as with profane things. Sacred things are not simply those personal beings that are called gods or spirits. A rock, a tree, a spring, a pebble, a piece of wood, a house, in a word anything, can be sacred.14

The final part of this excerpt is noteworthy because it reinforces the theorist’s contention that deities need not be present in a given belief system in order for that belief system to be considered a religion. But how does the concept of the social fit into the sacred-profane dichotomy? The answer is twofold. First, according to Durkheim, the primary role of the sacred is to act as a representative for a given tribe, clan, or group; it is not intended to represent good juxtaposed against evil, as the sacred-profane dichotomy is not interested in determining morality. In the case of Australian Aboriginal religion, the sacred—the “totemic principle” or god—is symbolized by the totem (in this instance, an animal or plant), which Durkheim presents as evidence that in effect each clan undergoes an apotheosis.15 Second, the role of the profane is to represent routine individual and familial matters. Where the sacred is concerned with broad

13 Ibid., 34.

14 Ibid., 34-35.

15 Ibid., 208. 10 communal issues, the profane is concerned with the everyday personal aspects of human existence. Altogether, Durkheim posits that humans elevate to a sacred level those things most closely linked to the collective, and, by extension, group identity; in three short words: society worships itself.

Collective consciousness (first delineated in The Division of Labor in Society) and collective effervescence are both closely linked to the sacred-profane dichotomy. Although its exact definition is the subject of some debate, the former generally refers to shared beliefs and social norms that create a system of communal understanding among members of a group, while the latter refers to a communal state of mind in which “every emotion expressed resonates without interference in consciousnesses that are wide open to external impressions, each one echoing the others.”16 In Elementary Forms, Durkheim uses the concept of collective consciousness as a jumping-off point for his explanation of collective effervescence, as it is through one that the other occurs. As with the sacred-profane dichotomy, Durkheim illustrates collective effervescence through interpretations of Australian Aboriginal religion. Life in

Aboriginal societies, he asserts, oscillates between two “phases”: one in which “the population is scattered in small groups that attend to their occupations independently” and one in which “the population comes together…and on that occasion either conducts a religious ceremony or…a corroboree.”17 After detailing the events of a Warramunga corroboree (including dancing, screaming, and states “of exaltation”), Durkheim argues that it is communal moments like these that comprise collective effervescence—and, furthermore, that collective effervescence affirms identity and ensures group solidarity. Such purposes, he writes, are so necessary to religious

16 Ibid., 217-218.

17 Ibid., 216-217. 11 phenomena that “it is in these effervescent social milieux, and indeed from that very effervescence, that the religious idea seems to have been born.”18 The sacred-profane dichotomy, collective consciousness, and collective effervescence all demonstrate Durkheim’s vehemently functionalist approach to religion. In other words, he is not concerned with the myths, beliefs, and meaning often ascribed to such systems, but rather what purpose they serve for their respective groups.

Durkheim’s third book, Suicide, introduces three additional concepts: sui generis social facts (that is, social facts that cannot be reduced to smaller parts), social integration, and anomie.

The first, which consists of “language, laws, customs, ideas, values, traditions, techniques, and products—all of which are connected to one another and exist in a manner quite ‘external’ to individual human minds,”19 is central to all of Durkheim’s work. In Suicide, however, it is especially important; not only is the book one of the first published sociological case studies, but it is also an analysis of how social facts exert control over people’s lives. One of the ways this happens, Durkheim explains, is through social integration, or the assimilation of smaller groups into larger ones. In the study, which concludes that Catholics in various European countries experience lower suicide rates than Protestants in those same countries due to the latter group’s inability to support “a sufficiently intense collective life,”20 social integration exists on a spectrum, as does the act of suicide itself. If a group exhibits a higher level of social integration, and consequently more solidarity and a sense of belonging, then their rate of suicide will be lower, and vice versa. To further demonstrate this, Durkheim breaks down what he views as

18 Ibid., 220.

19 Pals, Nine Theories, 88.

20 Émile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, trans. John A. Spaulding, ed. George Simpson (New York: Free Press, 1979), 170. 12 three distinct types of suicide: egoistic suicide, altruistic suicide, and anomic suicide. The first two are polar opposites: one occurs because of low social integration, a state in which individuals feel disconnected from the community; the other occurs because of high social integration, where individuals put their personal needs below those of the community. The third type involves the now-famous Durkheimian concept of anomie, or moral chaos, and “results from man’s activity’s lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings.”21 Ultimately, Suicide is a display of positivism—it seeks to explain the social through scientific means—as well as a groundbreaking book in that it takes something previously thought to be deeply personal, suicide, and reveals its social components.

The groundbreaking ideas proposed in Suicide and Elementary Forms established

Durkheim as a fixture in various academic fields, among them philosophy, psychology, and anthropology. However, the two areas of study on which his work has had a tremendous impact are, as one could guess, sociology and religious studies. Frequently referred to as “the father of

French sociology,” the theorist worked tirelessly—especially during his early years in the academy, when philosophy and psychology dominated—to earn sociology a proverbial seat at the table. In this emerging field, at the time centered on the study of social facts and institutions, he saw the key to explaining and understanding the human experience via scientific, logical means. Durkheim’s influence on religious studies varies only slightly from sociology in terms of theory: he proposed a sociology of religion that in and of itself was visionary, one that moved

“the idea of God from a core component to an ancillary psychological phenomena within a foremost sociological process” and shifted “attention away from the ‘idea of divinity’ or how the divine presence is used to symbolize traditional beliefs, customs, and collective needs to what the

21 Ibid., 258. 13 symbol actually ‘hides and expresses.’”22

With great impact, however, comes modification by successors as well as hefty criticism, to which Durkheim’s work has never been a stranger. Of all the thinker’s ideas, the sacred- profane dichotomy appears to be the concept that has been borrowed and altered the most by other scholars. Perhaps the best example of this is found in the work of Romanian philosopher and historian Mircea Eliade, a critic of reductionism who agrees with the notion of a distinction between sacred and profane, but diverges from Durkheim on the issue of what constitutes each.

To him, religion is not an inherently social undertaking, but rather it is about humanity’s connection to the supernatural. Thus, unlike Durkheim, Eliade holds that the sacred (“eternal” and “the sphere of the supernatural”) controls the profane (“vanishing and fragile” and comprised of “everyday business”), not the other way around.23 Like Eliade, multiple theorists have taken issue with Durkheim’s reductionist stance while not entirely excising the role of the social in religion. For example, in his study of colwic spirits, English social anthropologist E. E.

Evans-Pritchard makes a point of highlighting the social element (what he calls “social refraction”) of Nuer religion. Alongside these observations, however, he campaigns for a deeper, more Weberian approach to religion from the perspective of the practitioner.24 Taking the rejection of Durkheim’s reductionist stance a step further than Eliade and Evans-Pritchard,

American cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz calls into question the very idea of “elementary forms”: that there is a universal litany of basic elements that one may find echoed throughout the

22 Alexandra Maryanski, Émile Durkheim and the Birth of the Gods (New York: Routledge, 2018), 69-70.

23 Pals, Nine Theories, 232-233.

24 Ibid., 277.

14 world’s religions.25

More contemporary (21st century) criticisms of Durkheim’s work reflect Geertz’s concern with an attempt to frame specific ideas about the nature of religion as all encompassing.

An ideal model is American professor Tomoko Masuzawa’s book The Invention of World

Religions, in which she argues that this model of comparative religion—of which the sacred- profane dichotomy is often a part—does a great injustice to and wrongly lessens the legitimacy of religions that do not possess whatever features western thought has determined constitute a world religion. She further comments on the implications of this as they relate to the modern study of religion:

To be sure, many of today’s scholars would likely contest, rather than accept, this presumption that the unity of “religious experience” should be the basis of the study of religion as an academic discipline. Yet, despite the vocal protest of some within the field, it is equally undeniable that the academy of religion scholars as a whole is publicly perceived, justly or unjustly, as firmly allied with this idea.26

On a final note, “primitive religion,” or the concept that some systems (in the case of Elementary

Forms, Australian Aboriginal religion) are less evolved, less sophisticated, and simpler than others, is today widely considered problematic, and rightly so. Moreover, Durkheim’s ideas, particularly his theory of religion, are based on rather limited ethnographic data and are focused intensely on the social. But however sweeping and provocative, they remain an important part of the fields discussed earlier. The following section explores why.

Contemporary Relevance

In short, Durkheim matters—and his work is worth studying today—because despite the

25 Ibid., 316.

26 Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 316.

15 obvious flaws many critics have identified, he brought to light the centrality of the social, and did so with unprecedented fervor. This has shaped our understanding of individual identity and the world around us in profound ways. As Pals writes, “Today, our instinctively social view of the world is an index of just how thoroughly successful Durkheim’s revolution in thought has turned out to be.”27 Indeed, the persistent interest in Durkheim among students and the willingness to teach his work among instructors of sociology, religion, anthropology, and psychology speaks to how powerfully his theories have impacted humanity. We are all “part of” the social and, to a certain degree, it is because of him that we are now able to recognize that fact in full. This keeps his theories accessible and relatable even to contemporary readers; the social is constant, and it is as much a reality now as it was in his time. Furthermore, sociology would likely not be quite as developed and well regarded as it is today if not for Durkheim’s efforts to establish it as a legitimate field of study. In a similar vein, Durkheim’s ideas influenced the work of thinkers such as Pierre Bourdieu, E. E. Evans-Pritchard (mentioned earlier), Emmanuel Levinas, Robert

Bellah, and many more. But while these impressions are undeniably important, they alone are not enough to truly demonstrate the lasting value of Durkheim’s contributions; to do that, we must situate the theorist in a contemporary context and apply his ideas to issues our planet currently faces.

In Durkheim’s time, that is, the late 1800s to early 1900s, the world experienced a great shift from local to countrywide communities. Today, we are experiencing a shift from countrywide to global communities. These changes had and are having a vastly eminent impact on every aspect of the social, from religion to the economy, and by extension it is no reach to say that Durkheim would likely see them as pushing society to its limits. But instead of looking to

27 Pals, Nine Theories, 82. 16 the sacred-profane dichotomy or collective effervescence to make sense of globalization and pluralism—and all their accompanying questions—he would probably instead turn to earlier concepts. More specifically, the theory of social solidarity outlined in The Division of Labor in

Society, in which societies are grouped “into two grand societal types with each integrated by a distinctive type of solidarity—a mechanical type based on a ‘similarity of consciousness’ and an organic type, based on a ‘differentiation of functions and the division of labor.’”28 With this framework in mind, Durkheim would likely make the observation that, first and foremost, the process of globalization cannot be stopped; it is here to stay and perhaps the most accurate indicator of this fact is the intricately intertwined nature of the modern world’s economies.

Moreover, far too many people (on a larger scale, countries), are stuck in the mechanical solidarity mindset, concerned with superficial “likenesses and the fusing of minds,”29 when in actuality organic solidarity—cohesion based on acknowledged interdependence—is the social glue necessary for a healthy international community. The place of religion—which Durkheim would maintain is not an inherently colonialist undertaking—will change as a result, but not so much as to disappear; as long as there are people, there is society, and as long as there is society, there is religion. Finally, a sobering conclusion: if humanity proves unable to recognize and appreciate global interdependence—and if we are unable to establish a global collective consciousness, then the next natural step is a descent into anomie.

Durkheim would likely view nationalism (or the mechanical solidarity that lies at its heart) as the primary cause of the aforementioned. That being said, because of his experiences during World War I, in which he found himself wrestling with the patriotism he held dear and what he knew was a toxic wave of French nationalism, Durkheim would almost definitely offer a

28 Maryanski, Émile Durkheim, 58-59.

29 Ibid., 59. 17 nuanced take on the global rise in nationalism we’re currently witnessing. First, the turn toward nationalism as a response to globalization is a natural, even understandable one. It is also not confined to just a few countries, religions, or ways of life, but rather seems to be a far-reaching wave. Examples include the rise of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist group linked to the 2002 Gujarat riots as well as the 1992 destruction of the Babri mosque (and of which India’s current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is a member);30 the political gains of nationalist parties in Europe, specifically the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which has a history of minimizing Nazi atrocities;31 and the unique flavor of white nationalism espoused by Stephen Miller, senior policy advisor to U.S. president Donald Trump.32

According to Durkheim, people tend to retreat to what is familiar in moments of uncertainty and liminality, but the solidarity that inspires this action is not sustainable because it is based on surface-level similitude as opposed to reciprocity. The present global situation is a double-edged sword: we are more connected to one another than ever before because of the communication tools at our disposal, and this has led to the demarginalization of voices previously unheard or suppressed. However, those same tools are vehicles for the swift, boundless spread of hate and misinformation that seems to characterize the current era.

In Durkheim’s eyes, this deficit of meaningful exchange is linked to nationalist leaders and polarizing figures like Donald Trump, who—for lack of better terminology—he would likely

30 Lauren Frayer, “The Powerful Group Shaping The Rise Of Hindu Nationalism In India,” NPR, last modified May 3, 2019, accessed December 1, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/05/03/706808616/the-powerful- group-shaping-the-rise-of-hindu-nationalism-in-india.

31 Joanna Kakissis, “Threat Of Nationalist Wins In EU Vote Tests Germany, A Country Built On Alliances,” NPR, last modified May 24, 2019, accessed December 1, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/05/24/725819109/as-allies-see-nationalism-rise-germany-sees-threats-to-alliances-it- champions.

32 Jean Guerrero, “Stephen Miller And White Nationalism,” NPR, last modified November 14, 2019, accessed December 1, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/11/14/779208233/stephen-miller-and-white-nationalism. 18 find equal parts mesmerizing and nauseating. The theorist would probably point to Trump’s ascent to the presidency as evidence of the power of collective effervescence (a phenomenon most observable at his campaign rallies, where crowds are often stirred into frenzies, chanting

“Lock her up!” in reference to former secretary of state Hillary Clinton33 or, more recently,

“Send her back!” in reference to Minnesota congresswoman Ilhan Omar).34 Trump’s rallies also have a history of breeding spontaneous violence, mostly against protesters and members of the media.35 Larger than that, however, is what Durkheim would truly be concerned with, which is what Trump symbolizes for the rest of the world: the anomic disintegration of the United States.

He would argue that this has been achieved through a difference in solidarity among those

Americans on “the left” and those on “the right.” While Trump has successfully convinced the latter to unite around him (to the point that many of his supporters defend behavior and statements they previously would have condemned), the former not only virulently disagrees with “the right,” but is also characterized by aggressive intragroup conflict. Such infighting,

Durkheim would assert, is fed by a call-out culture in which viable leaders and public figures are silenced, ignored, shamed, or fall into public disfavor under the guise of being held accountable; one recent example is the viral November 2019 article by journalist Michael Harriot in The Root, provocatively entitled “Pete Buttigieg Is a Lying MF.”36 All of this together would be proof enough to the theorist that the United States lacks a strong national identity, without which it

33 “RNC 2016 Chant: ‘Lock Her Up’ Goes Mainstream,” video file, 3:22, YouTube, posted by Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2016, accessed December 1, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VtaxcKvRCpY.

34 “Trump rally crowd chants ‘send her back’ while he continues attack on Ilhan Omar,” video file, 6:38, YouTube, posted by CBS News, July 17, 2019, accessed December 1, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4tkanu-72Y.

35 “Protester attacked while leaving Trump rally,” video file, 2:09, YouTube, posted by CBS Evening News, March 10, 2016, accessed December 1, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZPUW3B6h6g.

36 Michael Harriot, “Pete Buttigieg Is a Lying MF,” The Root, November 25, 2019, accessed December 1, 2019, https://www.theroot.com/pete-buttigieg-is-a-lying-mf-1840038708. 19 cannot possibly hope to participate in, or even fancy itself a part of, the global community. A symptom of the country’s communal bonds breaking, this points to an almost inevitable anomic condition.

Like the major shifts discussed above, the global environmental crisis is forcing society to transform. Through a Durkheimian lens, there are two ways this could pan out. In the first model, society reverts to mechanical solidarity and eventually descends into anomie; in the second model, society is brought together by adversity, in turn fostering organic solidarity in a global effort to clean up a human-engineered mess. The latter option is of course favorable and not entirely out of reach or unrealistic, as any kind of pressures or outstanding scenarios do tend to possess a uniting power. This is especially true in the context of climate change, which will continue to have a very tangible impact on humanity; the resulting organic solidarity would likely reflect this in its physicality, as humans will need to live closer together and share food, skills, resources, and responsibilities with one another. At the same time that crises bring about unity, however, they also have the potential to generate fear and tumult. This fact, coupled with the unnerving rise in nationalism mentioned earlier, is why the first model is also very much a possibility. If people do not see themselves as belonging to a global community, then there is little chance they will appreciate the interconnectedness revealed by climate change. A product of this attitude is outright denial, even in the wake of reports like the November 2019 “World

Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency,” in which over 11,000 scientist signatories from

153 countries “declare[d]…clearly and unequivocally that planet Earth is facing a climate emergency.”37 Capitalizing on the mechanical solidarity cultivated among supporters, who will believe him over experts, Trump consistently pushes the privileged, dangerous narrative that

37 William J. Ripple et al., “World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency,” BioScience, November 5, 2019, 1, accessed December 1, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biz088. 20 there can be “different views” on climate change and that he alone is in control. In his words, “I want everybody to report whatever they want, but ultimately I’m the one that makes that final decision.”38 Durkheim, who dedicated his life to the scientific method, would find the rejection of empirical facts about climate change disheartening. But most of all, he would likely see disturbing whispers of the anomic model in the notion that disease, rising sea levels, natural disasters, and species extinction somehow recognize income, national borders, or titles when in fact they do not.

Conclusion

When thought of as a monolith, theory tends to devolve into an intimidating, obscure subject of study populated by dense writings and (mostly) white men of yore tucked away in ivory towers. And while there may be some truth to this image, another side of theory exists: the functional one that seeks to explain how ideas translate into lived experiences. It is with this side that Émile Durkheim is concerned, and it is because of his sincere devotion to the social that the honorifics frequently bestowed upon him are well deserved. But just as well deserved are the many valid criticisms of his work; testament to the fact that a genuinely faultless theorist does not exist. In all, Durkheim is of import because he urged people to consider the social in ways they hadn’t before, inspired countless scholars, and managed to produce works that are still relevant today. Moreover, there is incredible value in studying him, not because he belongs to an arbitrary school of “classics,” but because his ideas live on in the discourse(s) of today. The sacred-profane dichotomy, collective consciousness, collective effervescence, social solidarity,

38 “President Trump on Climate Change | AXIOS on HBO,” video file, 2:02, YouTube, posted by HBO, November 4, 2018, accessed December 1, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=96&v=UZq2L_49PBQ&feature=emb_logo.

21 anomie, and other concepts all appear in modern contexts, and they may even equip us with new ways of understanding and addressing the issues that define our time and determine our future.

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“Protester attacked while leaving Trump rally.” Video file, 2:09. YouTube. Posted by CBS Evening News, March 10, 2016. Accessed December 1, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZPUW3B6h6g.

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Ripple, William J., Christopher Wolf, Thomas M. Newsome, Phoebe Barnard, and William R. Moomaw. “World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency.” BioScience, November 5, 2019. Accessed December 1, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biz088.

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“Trump rally crowd chants ‘send her back’ while he continues attack on Ilhan Omar.” Video file, 6:38. YouTube. Posted by CBS News, July 17, 2019. Accessed December 1, 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u4tkanu-72Y.