The Next Hung How Labour Can Prepare

Mathew Sowemimo

Southbank House, Black Prince Road, London SE1 7SJ T: +44 (0) 20 7463 0632 | [email protected] www.compassonline.org.uk The Next Hung Parliament How Labour Can Prepare

Mathew Sowemimo

1 | www.compassonline.org.uk About the author

Matthew Sowemimo Former Director,

Dr Matthew Sowemimo co-founded The Social Liberal Forum in 2008 – a network established to promote progressive policies within the Liberal Democrat party. He is a former Trade and Industry researcher for the Liberal Democrat parliamentary party. Matthew has managed national and international campaigns on issues like global tax avoidance, employments rights and Zimbabwean reconstruction. During his time in the Social Liberal Forum he highlighted the economic and social risks of ‘fast track’ deficit reduction. He resigned from the Liberal Democrat Party due to his to the agreement between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Matthew joined The Labour Party in September 2010 and is now an activist in Uxbridge and South Ruislip constituency Labour Party.

Published by Compass − Direction for the Democratic Left Ltd Southbank House, Black Prince Road, London SE1 7SJ t: +44 (0) 207 463 0632 e: [email protected] www.compassonline.org.uk

Designed by soapbox, www.soapboxcommunications.co.uk THE NEXT HUNG will be a realignment on the centre-right of British politics that will prevent us returning to power. PARLIAMENT? In this paper I will identify the lessons we can draw from both the experience of past How Labour can Labour-Liberal Democrat engagement and the intense negotiations in May 2010 that led to the prepare formation of the current coalition. I will argue that the emergence of the -Liberal Democrat coalition was in part influenced by mistakes made by in his management of relations with the Liberal Democrats. I will The formation of the coalition between the examine the approach taken by Labour and the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats was Liberal Democrats in turn. Given the possibility a shock for many people on the centre-left. that the next election may result in another hung As someone who tried to prevent the Liberal parliament, Labour needs to learn and act upon Democrats entering into any arrangement with this experience. the Conservatives in May 2010 many of the policies of this government are contrary to my core values. Why hung parliament negotiations will Over recent months Labour members have be of continuing relevance watched the Liberal Democrats vote through a series of socially regressive policies that will Devolution: In Wales and Scotland propor- deepen poverty and potentially increase income tional representation systems mean that minority inequalities. It is therefore understandable that governments or coalitions will continue to be hostility to the Liberal Democrats has intensi- likely electoral outcomes. The approaching fied within the Labour movement. The days in elections in Scotland may well lead to the creation which people across the within of a new coalition. The first two Scottish parlia- Labour explored the possibility of an alliance with mentary terms saw Labour-Liberal Democrat the Liberal Democrats seem far away. However coalitions and the two parties may again find the wider political and electoral context makes it themselves as coalition partners in the future. is essential for Labour to build broad social and A change in the electoral system: The possi- electoral alliances in order for us to realise our bility that the Alternative Vote will be intro- objectives. Twenty-first century Britain with its duced for general elections as a result of the declining class identities, greater connectivity forthcoming referendum creates the potential for and ethnic diversity, is one where both Labour coalitions becoming more of the norm in future. and Conservative parties may struggle to secure Labour must be prepared for the possibility that governing majorities. it may need to form a coalition to govern again. Even if Labour wins an outright parliamen- As will be argued below, Labour needs to ‘get tary majority in 2015 we will need to marshal ahead’ of this scenario not find itself in a reactive a strong social coalition in order to overcome position on the day after polling. the entrenched vested interests that will seek to The prospect of a change in the electoral defend the profound income and wealth inequali- system will also encourage the Conservatives ties within Britain and the developing world. to deepen their relationships with the Liberal Labour may be able to win on its own but Democrats such as explicitly or tacitly encour- to govern it must forge ties with wider social aging tactical voting. The voting patterns of the movements. The last Labour Government’s most Oldham East by-election where Conservative progressive initiatives, such as the adoption of voters voted tactically for the Liberal Democrat the Climate Change bill and the international candidate in large numbers, could be a harbinger commitments to increase development aid for for wider electoral trends in the coming years Africa, were underpinned by huge nationwide and represent a real threat to Labour’s revival in coalitions. Labour also faces the threat that there Tory-Labour marginal constituencies.

3 A realignment of the centre-right? The power after a defeat of historic proportions. existence of the Tory – Liberal Democrat Both the Labour Party and progressives within coalition also creates a risk that the Conservatives the Liberal Democrats can also learn lessons could be helped back into power by the Liberal from the intense negotiations that led to the Democrats even in a scenario where they are formation of the current the second placed party in a . in May 2010. Ambitions to create a realignment on the centre- left of British politics, much discussed during the Blair and Ashdown era in the 1990s, never came What Labour should consider in to fruition. However the prospect of a realign- advance of a future hung parliament ment of the centre-right where Conservatives and Liberal Democrats coordinate tactical voting in Tone: ’s tone in the key Friday parliamentary constituencies must be prevented. post-election speech where he floated the The electoral landscape has shifted greatly proposal of a coalition was well judged. He since the heyday of two party politics in the sounded generous and accommodating to the 1950s. The share of the combined two-party vote Liberal Democrats, even though at this stage it has declined and the vote of both the Liberal risked antagonising his own party. He also made Democrats and smaller parties has risen over a crucial connection between the overture and time. At the 2010 the combined vote share of the wider political context. This context could the Labour and Conservative vote was 65%. The be summarised in terms of ‘the new politics’. secular trend of higher vote shares secured by Cameron could have claimed a ‘moral mandate’ smaller political parties also reflects the growing to govern given the 100 seats the had won diversity within the British population and the in a similar way that Alex Salmond did when weakening of older class identities. the SNP emerged as the largest party in the 2007 Declining number of marginal seats. John Scottish Parliamentary elections. Instead, given Curtice drew attention to the declining number the high levels of alienation and cynicism about of marginal seats in his chapter in the recent the political process, Cameron positioned his study of the 2010 general election. Curtice offer so that it responded to this mood. demonstrates that the since 1983 the number of Ed Miliband could take the moral high ground marginal seats has fallen and that it now stands at in any future hung parliament if he is able to just 85. (Curtice in Kavangah and Cowley 2010: link coalition negotiations to the wider political 414). Alongside this trend, both the Labour and mood the country at that time. Cameron’s tone Conservative parties have seen a reinforcement also impressed the Liberal Democrats. People like of their electoral strength within existing strong- who were not well-disposed to holds. The inconclusive outcome of the 2010 the Tories gave an immediate positive reaction to general election was the product of gathering the statement. electoral and social trends. The second tonal issue is how Gordon Brown All these factors indicate that the Labour lead- engaged with in the two years prior ership would be ill-advised not to plan ahead to the Five Days In May. Brown was dismissive for the possibility of another hung parliament of Clegg and made no effort to cultivate him or either in 2015 or before. There has been much build a relationship. commentary and analysis focused on whether Signalling potential movement: Gordon or not Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrat Brown made an error when he failed to signal any leadership ever seriously entertained the possi- potential policy movement on Labour’s part in bility of an alternative coalition with Labour his Friday speech. He merely reiterated Labour’s in the days that followed last year’s general offer of a referendum on the Alternative Vote. election. However setting all of this aside, the Whilst in the short term this stance meant he wider history of engagement between Labour did not antagonise the party by indicating policy and Liberal Democrat figures provide important concessions, it meant that had any deal been lessons that need to be considered as Labour done that involved policy changes the ground prepares for the gruelling task of recapturing would not have been prepared in advance.

4 | www.compassonline.org.uk Don’t destroy trust: Gordon Brown’s leaked the post continues to be in place tactical voting offer to Ming Campbell to join his government behaviour is potentially affected by how Ed in 2007 appeared more as a ruse to destabilise the Milband interacts with the Liberal Democrats at Liberal Democrats than a serious offer. Given the this juncture. previous history of the Liberal Democrats feeling Consulting Labour MPs: The most significant that they were being ‘strung along’ by Labour, mistake made by Brown was that he did not Brown’s tactics exacted a long term price in terms consult the Parliamentary Labour Party about of loss of trust. the negotiations with the Liberal Democrats. Understanding the other side’s perspec- Cameron had a crucial meeting with his MPs tive: Any successful negotiation must involve on the Monday after the general election where an appreciation of the other side and the factors he sounded them out about the offer of an AV that inform their negotiating position. David referendum to the Liberal Democrats. The Chief Cameron and George Osbourne recognised in Whip also circulated a round robin in advance advance that the Liberal Democrats could not of that meeting seeking views on a referendum. go along with a deal that did not include serious The PLP was never convened during this time movement on . and this allowed people like John Reid and Do your homework: The Conservatives David Blunkett to argue that Labour MPs were intensively researched Liberal Democrat policy being ‘steamrollered’ when in fact they were positions and identified where there were inter- opposed in principle to any coalition. Gordon faces or conflicts with Tory positions. Oliver Brown’s approach was fundamentally wrong- Letwin and his researcher Peter Campbell had headed as viability of the proposed ‘rainbow prepared in depth position papers for his party’s alliance’ depended on containing any backbench negotiating them (Wilson 2010: 147). Labour, rebellions. by contrast, were almost totally unprepared and Prior engagement: The Ashdown diaries were therefore disadvantaged in terms of any document in great detail the engagement of Tony negotiation with the Liberal Democrats. Blair and over a two year period Don McIntyre’s biography of Peter Mandelson prior to the 1997 general election. This meant refers to the extensive work that that both Labour and the Liberal Democrat lead- Office did not just on Sinn Fein negotiating ership were: positions but also on the personalities and styles of individual negotiators like Gerry Adams and „„Able to understand the underpinning of each Martin McGuiness. In the Rhodesian settlement other’s positions, for example, Blair made negotiations in 1980 the Foreign Office staff clear the constraints he faced on electoral used a character analysis of General Peter Walls reform. to help them peel him away from the rest of his „„Able to make some agreements in advance of negotiating team. the general election, for example, the intro- Communicating with the electorate: It is duction of proportional representation for notable that the Tories’ ‘final offer’ to the Liberal the European elections. Democrats was made publicly by „„Trust was built up and personal relationships on the Monday after the election. The Tories were established. hoped this would encourage voters to believe that „„Divisions within the leaderships of either they had been accommodating and so avoid the party about negotiating objectives are far blame for a second election. Labour could draw more difficult to overcome in the frenzied on this approach in order to overcome inevitable aftermath of an inconclusive election. criticisms of ‘deals in smoke filled rooms.’ „„Both sides were able to coordinate the The issue of communicating with the wider language that they used in public about electorate would become even more relevant relations with each other and equally impor- if the alternative vote is in place during the tantly about policy questions of relevance election. The movement of second preference to their relationships. For example, Paddy votes and influencing that movement will be Ashdown formally abandoned the position of continuing relevance to Labour. If first past that the Liberal Democrats were equidis-

4 | www.compassonline.org.uk The Next Hung Parliament | 5 tant in their attitude to Labour and the What the Liberal Democrats should Conservatives. consider in advance of a future hung „„The Ashdown diaries also show that the parliament relationship building of this period allowed tensions to be managed. For example, misun- Democratise negotiation strategy: derstandings about public statements from MP has subsequently acknowledged that the either side could be overcome as result of the coalition agreement left open the question trust that gradually built up at senior level. of tuition fees despite the pledge that Liberal Democrat MPs had made. in his Publicly agreeing a shared policy agenda: book concedes that the negotiation strategy was The pre-1997 engagement delivered the Cook/ drawn up in secret without reference to the Maclennan agreement on constitutional reform. Liberal Democrat Shadow Cabinet (Laws 2010: The Cook/Maclennan agreement was the 19-20). The Liberal Democrat parliamentary precursor to major advances in the constitu- party could insist on democratising their party’s tional reform agenda. This shared platform negotiation stance in the months prior to the next meant that had Labour needed to negotiate general election. A key issue will be what is the a coalition in 1997 it could have draw on the shape of post-cuts Britain. momentum generated by the Cook/Maclennan Prevent leadership ceding ground: Nick agreement. There is a case for a comparable Clegg did flag up negotiating bottom lines early exercise that lays out shared policy commit- in 2010 and the whole structure of the manifesto ments between Labour and other political elevated the pledges on tax allowances, political parties in this parliament. reform and the pupil premium above others. Managing the mood: Cameron ensured that All these commitments were ones that Liberal he had ‘outriders’ – people who were encouraged Democrat negotiators treated as red lines. The to speak publicly to prepare his party for entry Liberal Democrat Left expended immense energy into coalition. called for a coalition in influencing the party’s manifesto (with some on the afternoon of Friday 7th May and talked success) but took their eye off the ball when it about how it would serve the wider national came to which pledges should be treated as red interest. There were no equivalent people within lines. In some cases the leadership conceded Labour who were publicly making the case for policy issues in the context of manifesto in the a coalition. Equally, people who had credibility knowledge that they were going to discard them with key constituencies like the trade unions and when it came to coalition negotiations. younger Labour MPs, were not ‘put up’ to speak Second election: David Cameron ‘hustled’ the in a coordinated way. Liberal Democrats in part based on the calcula- ‘Coalition of the losers?’ Labour’s slump to tion that they would be too fearful to be seen to be 29% understandably led some party figures to say the instigators of a second general election. As it publicly that they feared a ‘rainbow alliance’ would has transpired in Rob Wilson MP’s account of the be perceived as a coalition of the losers. However post-election negotiations, the Prime forming such a coalition as a defeated former was far from certain that the Conservative Party government is materially different from trying could win a second election outright particularly to form it having spent a spell in Opposition. In having failed in very favourable circumstances. any future hung parliament Labour might well Liberal Democrats need to consider if they have increased its vote share at the expenses of weaken their own negotiating hand by the wide- other parties even if we are still in second placed spread assumption that they will never ‘hardball’ in terms of the national vote. Labour should and indicate a clear willingness to fight a further be careful not to reinforce a media narrative election if a satisfactory deal cannot be reached. where second place parties are delegitimized Clarity of objectives: People within the wider as candidates for government. Many coalition Liberal Democrat party and indeed individual governments in Europe have been headed by MPs need to make a strategic choice about where political parties that were narrowly second in the to try and exert influence coalition negotiations. popular vote. Liberal Democrat MPs focused on widening the

6 | www.compassonline.org.uk negotiations to include Labour in their early negotiations are going well in order to generate meetings with Nick Clegg. However what many public and market confidence. of them did not realise was that Nick Clegg wished to do this anyway because it gave him more leverage with the Conservatives. Liberal Conclusion Democrat MPs and campaigners could have utilised their political capital on insisting on Labour was badly served by Gordon Brown in his specific policy commitments in the coalition insensitive dealings and lack of preparation for agreement.Liberal Democrat MPs will have to the hung parliament that opinion polls indicated decide if there is to be ‘a next time’ whether they was a real prospect from at least January 2010 can assert themselves more vis-a-vis their own onwards. David Cameron, in contrast, was party leadership. skilful in his post-election engagement with Nick Do an assessment: According to David Laws, Clegg and was supported by advance policy Peter Mandelson shared with the Lib Dem nego- preparation. The 1997 election result was in tiators a version of his analysis of the risks and part influenced by the engagement between opportunities of the competing coalition options and Paddy Ashdown as it created a in front of them. The Liberal Democrats correctly climate that encouraged tactical voting against judged that David Cameron would favour a the Conservatives. Had there been equivalent coalition but did not do a serious enough assess- engagement and informal coordination between ment of what the risks and rewards might be for Labour and Liberal Democrat leaderships in 2010 their party as a junior coalition partner across the it could have generated levels of tactical voting range of available options. One crucial piece of that might have resulted in Labour being the experience that has emerged since the Con-Lib largest single party in the House of Commons. Dem coalition experience of the last few months The Liberal Democrat leadership was well is that the Liberal Democrats have absorbed a prepared for the Five Days in May period. Nick disproportionate amount of opprobrium for the Clegg and his allies had prepared a clear negoti- most difficult decisions of the coalition. ating strategy and managed their parliamentary Don’t box yourselves in: Nick Clegg may have party well in this period. In the process they intended that his public declaration to commence obscured the fact that the party’s negotiating lines talks with the with the largest had been devised without the input of Liberal vote would be a precursor to ultimate coalition. Democrat MPs. However for the wider party it had the effect of At the next general election the two ends of limiting options and giving one party, in this case the current coalition will have a shared record the Conservatives, the ability to set the agenda in and one forged in tremendous adversity. From the media. The benefit that this formula had in the early period of the coalition both Nick Clegg closing down probing by journalists was exacted and David Cameron did not only defend them- at a higher long term price. selves against Labour attacks but also proac- Dont’ try to negotiate a coalition agreement tively sought to entrench a version of history over five days: The sovereign debt crisis in May where they inherited a devastated economy 2010 meant that the political parties were under from the third term Labour Government. The pressure from Gus O’Donnell to quickly put longer the two governing parties position them- in place a new government. However in any selves against Labour, the more they will share a future coalition scenario these pressures will common identity and not simply a policy record. hopefully not be so pressing. The imprecision of These are powerful factors that Labour has much the coalition agreement in key areas like capital to overcome if it wishes to prepare the ground for gains tax provided room for decisions to be potential future collaboration. re-opened. The five day time limit completely Labour should begin constructive engagement disempowered Liberal Democrat MPs from with the Liberal Democrats and the Greens in being able to properly scrutinise the text of the advance of the next general election. The policy coalition document. There is nothing to prevent terrain that could be explored during informal parties publishing initial outline agreements if discussions between the two parties is the scope

6 | www.compassonline.org.uk The Next Hung Parliament | 7 for rebuilding public services and relaunching References the drive to eliminate child poverty in a post- spending cuts environment. Progressives within Laws, D. (2010) Twenty Two Days In May. the Liberal Democrats need to be aware that London, Biteback Publishing. the Tory Right will be agitating for renewed commitment to cuts in personal and corporate Wilson, R. (2010) Five Days To Power. London, taxation once the deficit has been eliminated. Biteback Publishing. The Liberal Democrats will also be watching to see how Labour approaches the referendum on Curtice, J et al in Kavanagh, D and Cowley, P. the Alternative Vote. The extent to which Ed (2010) The British General Election of 2010. Miliband actively campaigns for a ‘Yes’ vote will London, Palgrave Macmillan. be one indicator of this. My own decision to resign from the Liberal Democrats reflected my fundamental opposition to major elements of the coalition agreement, particularly the acceleration of deficit reduction. So it is easy for me to understand the visceral feelings of fellow Labour members against any notion of engaging with the Liberal Democrats. However whilst I hope that Labour will win a good majority at the next election, we need to prepare for the eventuality that there is another hung parliament. The party must set emotion aside and be hard-headed in its attitude to the Liberal Democrats. Our ability to regain power and begin to repair the growing tears to the social fabric of Britain may depend on it.

8 | www.compassonline.org.uk The Next Hung Parliament How Labour Can Prepare

Mathew Sowemimo

Southbank House, Black Prince Road, London SE1 7SJ T: +44 (0) 20 7463 0632 | [email protected] www.compassonline.org.uk