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Neo-Thomistic Hylomorphism Applied to Mental Causation and Neural Neo-Thomistic Hylomorphism Applied to Mental Causation & Neural Correlates of Consciousness Matthew Keith Owen A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy College of Arts & Law University of Birmingham June 2018 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract The aim of this work is to defend substance dualism by defeating two of its paramount potential defeaters. I will argue that a substance dualist position, neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, provides a solution to the causal pairing problem and a good explanation of neural correlates of consciousness. After an introductory first chapter, I’ll explicate dualism’s dominant potential defeaters in the next three chapters. Chapter 2 will clarify what neural correlates of consciousness are and the objection to dualism based on neural correlates. The following two chapters will distinguish and elucidate dualism’s principal problem regarding mental causation, which I’ll argue is the causal pairing problem. The fifth chapter will introduce and explain neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. Chapter 6 will apply neo-Thomistic hylomorphism to the causal pairing problem, providing a solution that appeals to a fundamental tenet of neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. In Chapter 7 I’ll apply the view and an Aristotelian powers ontology to construct a model of neural correlates of consciousness that’s intended to explain such correlations. The final chapter will offer a conclusion and briefly discuss relevant future research. ©Copyright by Matthew Owen 2018 All rights reserved i To my grandparents, Keith Wallace and Sarah Kathryn Owen ii Acknowledgements Without the relentless support and encouragement from my wife and dearest friend, Aryn Danae Owen, I could not have written this work. Her belief in me and in the value of my work has sustained me. She has also carefully read several chapters of this work, identifying spelling and grammatical mistakes for me to correct. It’s an honor and joy to dedicate this volume to my grandparents, Keith Wallace and Sarah Kathryn Owen. I am forever grateful for their sacrificial loving care, guidance, unyielding support, and friendship. I also want to thank my sister Lacey Jean Owen and my parents, Jeffry Keith Owen and Linda Grace Pimley, for their consistent encouragement. My father and mother-in-law, Scott Alan and Vicky Kay McCall have also provided unwavering encouragement. My doctoral supervisors, Nikk Effingham and Jussi Suikkanen, have been immensely helpful and I want to thank them for their wise guidance, which has contributed greatly to my growth as a philosopher. They have diligently read this entire work and consistently provided very insightful feedback on content, spelling, grammar, and formatting. As a result of their feedback, this work is better written and I’ve grown as a writer. I am also greatly indebted to Christof Koch, who has met with me regularly to discuss ideas related to my research, read my dissertation, and provided very helpful feedback on content, spelling, and grammar. Our monthly meetings have proved invaluable. In addition to learning much from Christof, I’ve been encouraged by his friendship. This work focuses on philosophy of mind, a field that I was first introduced to by Duane Morris as an undergraduate student at the University of Washington. I am iii immensely appreciative of the countless hours he devoted to teaching me over the course of three years. My philosophy of mind professor in graduate school, J.P. Moreland, first introduced me to Thomistic hylomorphism. During an independent study with J.P. in the spring of 2013 and a class on human ontology the following fall, I first began thinking significantly about how a Thomistic leaning view of the mind might solve the causal pairing problem and account for neural correlates of consciousness. I am indebted to J.P. for helpful conversation during which I first began “thinking out loud” about these topics and I’ve greatly benefitted from his work, which inspired much of my own thinking. During the fall of 2016 I had the privilege of being a participant at the University of Oxford’s Neo-Aristotelian approaches to the metaphysics of the mind summer school & conference, directed by Anna Marmodoro. The congenial environment provided an excellent opportunity to deepen my understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics. During this conference I first began thinking significantly about how an Aristotelian powers ontology can be applied to an account of neural correlates of consciousness. I would also like to thank Mihretu Guta, Daniel De Haan, and Dawid Potgieter for their willingness to read unfinished sections of this volume and for their feedback on the ideas presented. A version of Chapter 6 was given a hearing at the Northwest Philosophy Conference at North Idaho College in October 2015 and at Gonzaga University in October 2016, as well as the Pacific Division meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers at Biola University in April 2017. I am indebted to those who attended my presentations and gave helpful feedback, especially James Kintz. The president of the Davenant Institute, Brad Littlejohn invited me to present on neuroscience and the human mind, which gave me the opportunity to present content iv from Chapter 2 and Chapter 7. And some content from Chapter 2 was published fall 2017 at the American Philosophical Association’s blog. I appreciate the helpful comments on that piece. Finally, there are few gifts greater than good friends. Aryn and I have received priceless support from our dear friends: Fred and Susan Sanders, Alan and Darcie Hultberg, Paul and Lisa Spears, Eric and Julie Knudson, Andrew and Erin Hull, Travis and Krissy Boyd, Mike and Hayley Sayenko, Jason Wells, Cheryll Cole, John Young, Graham Krahn, Sam Raju, Jacob Daniel, Russell Miller, and Daniel Byrd. v Tables of Contents Abridged 1 Introduction 1 2 Neural Correlates of Consciousness 15 3 Mental Causation & Two Other Problems 53 4 The Causal Pairing Problem 95 5 Neo-Thomistic Hylomorphism 114 6 Hylomorphism & the Causal Pairing Problem 151 7 Hylomorphism & Neural Correlates of Consciousness 187 8 Conclusion 236 Unabridged 1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….1 1.1 Recent History 2 1.2 Dualism’s Defeaters 7 1.3 Defeating Dualism’s Defeaters 9 1.4 Presuppositions 13 2 Neural Correlates of Consciousness………………………………………………….15 2.1 What is an NCC? 17 2.2 Identifying NCC 23 2.3 Implications of NCC 29 2.4 Against Dualism 32 2.4.1 Simplicity Argument 34 2.4.2 The Identity Theory’s Viability 36 2.4.3 Simplicity Argument Analysis 45 2.5 Conclusion 51 3 Mental Causation & Two Other Problems…………………………………………...53 3.1 Lack of Psychophysical Laws 55 3.1.1 Justification For Setting This Problem Aside 60 vi 3.2 Causal Exclusion Problem 63 3.2.1 Rationally Denying Closure 68 3.2.2 Analyzing the Justification For Closure 71 3.2.3 Reasons to Think Closure is False 85 3.3 Conclusion 93 4 The Causal Pairing Problem………………………………………………………….95 4.1 Summarizing The Pairing Problem 96 4.1.1 Prerequisite: Pairing Relation 97 4.1.2 Necessity of Spatiality 98 4.1.3 Formulation of Kim’s Argument 102 4.2 Analysis of Kim’s Thesis 103 4.2.1 Physically Impossible? 104 4.2.2 Logically Impossible? 105 4.2.3 Nomologically Impossible? 109 4.2.4 Metaphysically Impossible? 111 4.3 Conclusion 113 5 Neo-Thomistic Hylomorphism……………………………………………………..114 5.1 Aristotelian Terminology 116 5.1.1 Hylomorphism 116 5.1.2 Aggregate vs. Substance 117 5.1.3 Forms 122 5.1.4 Matter 126 5.1.5 Material Substance 127 5.1.6 En-forming Relation 127 5.2 Human Ontology 132 5.2.1 Human Persons 133 5.3 Incarnate Souls 142 5.3.1 The Form of the Body 143 5.3.2 The Soul Itself 145 5.4 Conclusion 149 6 Hylomorphism & the Causal Pairing Problem……………………………………...151 vii 6.1 Reconsidering the Causal Pairing Problem 152 6.1.1 Two Hylomorphic Responses 153 6.1.2 Questioning the Necessity of Spatial Relations 160 6.2 The Proposed Hylomorphic Solution 170 6.2.1 En-forming Relation & Causal Pairing 171 6.3 Objections 176 6.3.1 First Objection: Pairing Problem Reduxed 176 6.3.2 Second Objection: Presupposed Causal Pairing Relation 182 6.4 Conclusion 186 7 Hylomorphism & Neural Correlates of Consciousness…………………………….187 7.1 Some Recent Hylomorphic History 189 7.1.1 The Present Objective 191 7.2 Aristotelian Powers Ontology 193 7.2.1 Powers 194 7.3 Mind-Body Dependence 198 7.4 Mind-Body Powers 202 7.4.1 Interdependence 202 7.4.2 Ontological Extension 204 7.4.3 Requisite Physical Properties 206 7.5 From form to Biological Regularities 210 7.5.1 Regularities Without Organicism 211 7.5.2 Same Form, Same Biology 213 7.5.3 Consistency with Neuroplasticity 216 7.6 A Hylomorphic Account of NCC 220 7.6.1 Example Involving Passive Mental Power 221 7.6.2 Example Involving Active Mental Power 228 7.7 Conclusion 231 8 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..236 8.1 Future Research 237 References…………...………………………………………………………………..241 viii 1 Introduction The aim of this work is to defend dualism. I intend to defuse two paramount objections threatening to defeat dualism.
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