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Presidential Eligibility Tutorial http://people.mags.net/tonchen/birthers.htm Presidential Eligibility Tutorial Copyright (©) 2009-2014 Stephen Tonchen Revision date: February 28, 2014 This document is subject to ongoing updating as relevant new information becomes available. The most current version is found at http://people.mags.net/tonchen/birthers.htm Presidential Eligibility Tutorial originally appeared in June 2009 under the title Obama Presidential Eligibility - An Introductory Primer. It explains, in plain English, why some historical and legal researchers believe Barack Hussein Obama II does not meet the presidential "natural born citizen" eligibility requirement specified in the U.S. Constitution. This Tutorial should not be confused with the WorldNetDaily Obama Eligibility Primer, an entirely separate and unrelated document published in 2010. Abstract Throughout U.S. history, popular opinion has generally supported the viewpoint that mere birth on U.S. soil is, in most cases, sufficient to confer U.S. citizenship at birth (see, for example, Quotations from the 39th Congress). However, prior to 1898, the actual rulings by federal courts (including the U.S. Supreme Court), and the original meaning and intent of the 14th Amendment citizenship clause, paint a somewhat different picture. According to the preponderance of pre-1898 federal case law, the citizenship of a child, at the time of its birth, is that of its father, not its birthplace. If children born on U.S. soil, of foreign-citizen fathers, were not federal (United States) citizens at birth, such children could not have been natural born citizens. The President's autobiography and long-form Certificate of Live Birth [01] provide the following information: · Barack Obama Jr. was born in Hawaii on August 4, 1961; · His mother, Stanley Ann Dunham (1942-1995), was a U.S. citizen; and · His father, Barack Obama Sr. (1936-1982), was a native of British East Africa (Kenya) who never became a U.S. citizen. If this information is correct, President Obama was born with both American and British nationalities. By modern-day policy and practice, he is a U.S. citizen by virtue of birth in the United States. He was also, at birth, a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies by descent from his father (FactCheck.org: Obama's Kenyan Citizenship). This Tutorial examines whether a person, such as Barack Obama Jr., who is a foreign citizen (in addition to a U.S. citizen) at birth, is a natural born citizen Constitutionally eligible to serve as President. Contents Introduction 1. What is a "birther"? 2. What are the eligibility requirements for president? 3. Why do birthers think Barack Obama might not be eligible to serve as president? 4. Where should we begin looking for the original Constitutional meaning of "natural born citizen"? 4.1 Modern-day word usage 4.2 U.S. Constitution 4.3 Foreign-language translations of the U.S. Constitution 4.4 Current Federal Statutes 4.5 English-Language Literature 4.6 18th century meaning of "native" 5. In a nutshell, what is the Obama eligibility controversy? 6. How should we decide between the two sides of the Obama eligibility debate? 7. What was the original purpose of the presidential "natural born citizen" requirement? 8. What was the 18th-century meaning of the word "foreigner"? 9. Prior to the 14th Amendment, what was the difference between a citizen of a State and a citizen of the United States? 10. Who were State citizens prior to the 14th Amendment? 11. What is a 14th Amendment natural born citizen? 12. What was the originally intended meaning of "jurisdiction" in the 14th Amendment? 13. Doesn't the Wong Kim Ark decision make Obama a "natural born citizen"? 14. Doesn't the Julia Lynch case show that Obama is a "natural born citizen"? 15. What was an 18th-century English "subject"? 16. How did someone become an English "subject"? 17. What was Calvin's Case? 18. What is ligeance, and why was it so important to Calvin's Case? 19. Didn't Calvin's Case affirm the jus soli principle? 20. Who were "alien enemies"? 21. What was a "natural-born subject"? 22. Were English-born children of alien parents "natural-born subjects"? 23. What did "actual obedience" mean? 24. What was an English "citizen" before the American Revolution? 25. Wasn't jus soli the "rule of Europe" when the Constitution was being written? 26. What was Vattel's "Law of Nations"? 27. What is the root of the "natural born citizen" debate? 28. What is the difference between "Constitutional" and "statutory" natural born citizens? 29. Wouldn't the most recent modern-day statutory meaning of "natural born citizen" take precedence over the original Constitutional meaning? 30. If Obama is not a "Constitutional natural born citizen", so what? Why should anyone care? 31. Why has every birther lawsuit been denied or dismissed? 34. Do birthers actually believe that President Obama was born in a foreign country? 35. If President Obama's birth certificate shows conclusively that he was born in Hawaii, would it end the eligibility controversy? 36. Aren't Obama eligibility challenges merely partisan attacks by Republicans against a Democratic president? 37. What is "Quo Warranto"? 38. What is the "de facto officer" doctrine? 39. What can we do? Appendix 1: Excerpts from Jus Gentium (1749) Appendix 2: Methods of English Subjecthood Acquisition Appendix 3: Comparison between English and European Political Theories Appendix 4: Federal Quo Warranto Statute Appendix 5: Wong Kim Ark reasoning Appendix 6: Roman Citizenship Appendix 7: Alexander McLeod's Sermon (1815) Appendix 8: Senator Howard's Asyndeton Appendix 9: Presidents whose Parents were Foreign-Born Footnotes References Acknowledgments About the Author Disclaimer Revisions Copyright Introduction The Philadelphia Convention adopted the U.S. Constitution on September 17, 1787 [02]. Anyone born after that date must be a natural born citizen in order to be eligible to serve as President of the United States [03]. What is a natural born citizen? Even if President Barack Obama is a U.S. citizen, is he a natural born citizen? According to an article which appeared in the Michigan Law Review in 2008, two points regarding natural born citizenship are universally accepted and are not in dispute: · Anyone who is born in the United States, of parents who are U.S. citizens, is definitely, without doubt, a natural born citizen. · Anyone who acquires U.S. citizenship through naturalization, after his or her birth, is definitely not a natural born citizen [04]. But what about other categories of persons? What about children born overseas to American parents? And what about children born in the United States, of an alien parent? Today, such children are U.S. citizens. But are they natural born citizens? So far, Federal law, the Constitution and the courts have not settled these questions. ... the definition of what it means to be a natural-born citizen has never been decided in the courts and the Constitution doesn't explain exactly what it means by "natural born," according to Peter Spiro, a Temple University law professor and citizenship-law expert. (National Journal, Is Canadian- Born Ted Cruz Eligible to Run for President?, May 1, 2013) In 2004, Senator Don Nickles predicted that, if the meaning of natural born citizenship remains unresolved, it will someday become "a real issue": The definition of this term ["natural born citizen"] is an issue that has been debated in legal circles for years and has never been ruled on by the courts. Clarification is needed before this becomes a real issue. (Nickles) Senator Nickles' prediction has come true. President Obama's father, Barack Obama Sr. (1936-1982), was a native of British East Africa (Kenya). He never became a U.S. citizen. Consequently, President Obama -- regardless of where he was born -- acquired British nationality, at birth, by descent from his father. The President publicly admits that his citizenship status, at birth, was "governed" by the British Nationality Act of 1948 (see Barack Obama's "fight the smears" website). FactCheck.org has confirmed President Obama's foreign citizenship at birth: ...at the time of his birth, Barack Obama Jr. was both a U.S. citizen (by virtue of being born in Hawaii) and a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (or the UKC) by virtue of being born to a father who was a citizen of the UKC. (FactCheck.org: Obama's Kenyan Citizenship) If a person inherits foreign nationality at birth, he might also acquire U.S. citizenship at birth; but even if he is a U.S. citizen, is such a person a natural born citizen? Foreign influence: On September 4, 1787, the framers of the Constitution changed the presidential eligibility requirement from "citizen" to "natural born citizen". According to multiple historical sources, the primary purpose of this wording change was to exclude "foreigners" from the presidency and thereby reduce the risk of "foreign influence" [05]. Apparently, a person who is merely a U.S. "citizen" can also be a "foreigner" in some sense, but a "natural born citizen" is one who is not a "foreigner", at least not in the same sense [06]. Since natural born citizenship pertains only to one's status at the time of one's birth [07], the only "foreigners" that the "natural born citizen" provision can possibly exclude from the presidency are persons who are "foreigners" at birth. When the U.S. Constitution was being written, meaning of the word "foreigner" was not limited to persons born overseas; it also included anyone who was a citizen or subject of a foreign country (see Question 8: Meaning of "foreigner"). When President Obama was born, he was a "foreigner" according to the 18th century meaning of the term: he acquired foreign nationality (in addition to a U.S.
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