IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2011-0618
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. Fifth District Court of Appeals Case No. 2010-CA-0044 MAURICE KING, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
STATE OF OHIO'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JURISDICTION
JAMES J. MAYER, JR. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
BY: DANIEL J. BENOIT ERIC J. ALLEN Supreme Court No. 0086833 Supreme Court No. 0073384 Assistant Richland County Prosecutor 713 South Front 38 South Park Street Columbus, OH 43206 Mansfield, Ohio 44902 (614) 443-4840 (419) 774-5676 (614) 445-7873 (FAX) (419) 774-5589 (FAX)
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
99 C,(_tR`st OF COllR-i SUPREME COURT OF OHIO EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS IS NOT A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND DOES NOT INVOLVE A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL OUESTION
This is not a case of public or great general interest. This case does not involve any substantial constitutional questions. Furthermore, it absolutely does not involve any unique facts, rulings or issues. This case represents an attempt by the Appellant, Maurice King, III, to rehash the facts presented within the post-conviction relief setting and reverse his rightful conviction based upon overwhelming evidence.
In November, 2007, Tommy Thompson (hereinafter "Thompson") provided information to Det. Eric Bosko of the Mansfield Police Department that he could sell stolen property to the
Appellant, a Bellville police officer. As a result, Thompson, at the direction of Det. Bosko,
attempted to sell the Appellant stolen compound bows that he assured the Appellant were not
from the Bellville area. The Appellant agreed to view the stolen items for purchase but the
meeting was cancelled as the compound bows could not be acquired to complete the transaction.
On January 8, 2008, Thompson called the Appellant with an offer to sell him stolen
firearms. He arranged to meet the Appellant at his home on January 10, 2008 so the Appellant
could view the weapons. On January 10, 2008, Thompson and James Soles (hereinafter "Soles")
traveled to the Appellant's residence where the Appellant greeted them in the driveway and
viewed four (4) allegedly stolen firearms that were in Thompson's vehicle. The Appellant was
informed that the firearms were taken from a burglary in Cleveland, Ohio that Soles had
committed and a purchase price of $700.00 for all of the firearms was negotiated.
During the meeting, the Appellant made several phone calls on his cell phone and finally
stated that the person he was talking to would buy half of the firearms, but would not be available with the money to complete the transaction until 2:00 a.m.; a subsequent meeting was set up for 2:00 a.m. at the Appellant's residence.
At 4:31 p.m., the Appellant called his friend, Det. Keith Porch with the Metrich Drug
Enforcement Taskforce. He advised Det. Porch that Thompson and Soles were attempting to sell him stolen weapons and had left to sell them in Mansfield. He provided Det. Porch with a vehicle description, but no license plate number; he also did not advise of the 2:00 a.m. meeting.
Shortly thereafter, the Appellant called Thompson and tried to negotiate the purchase of
only the handgun. Thompson stated that he would sell all the guns for $500. Following that call,
the Appellant again called Det. Porch to advise that Thompson had reduced the asking price but
told Det. Porch that he didn't know Thompson's whereabouts, even though the Appellant had
been advised by Thompson that he was at home. Furthermore, the Appellant failed to provide
Det. Porch with Thompson's cell phone number, as well as failing to advise him of his attempt to
purchase the handgun.
At 6:09 p.m., the Appellant called Thompson to advise that his buyer would not be back
in town until January 31, 2008 and that he would call when he was available to complete the
transaction. The Appellant failed to call Det. Porch with this information. At 6:18 p.m., the
Appellant again called Thompson. In this call, he sounded irate, questioning whether Thompson
had told Soles his name or that he is a cop. The Appellant stated that he would check Soles
record on public access, but not on official access.
In the following days, Thompson did not hear back from the Appellant, nor would the
Appellant return any of Thompson's phone calls. The Appellant did not report any of these calls to
Det. Porch.
2 The Appellant was indicted in May, 2008 and his first jury trial ended in a hung jury.
The Appellant was tried a second time on December 11-18, 2008. At that trial, the State offered other acts testimony from Larry Davis, Jr. (hereinafter "Davis") to establish the Appellant's motive and intent and to rebut the defense's theory that the Appellant was conducting his own sting operation. Davis testified that he knew the Appellant through his dealings with the
Appellant's father, Maurice King, II, and that he had previously sold stolen property, specifically electronics and power tools, to the Appellant. During his testimony, it was well-established that
Davis was a convicted felon who had made a deal with the State of Ohio in exchange for his testimony. The details of that deal, in which Det. (now Capt.) Bosko would call the Millersburg
Police Department where Davis had a pending case and report that he had cooperated with the
State, were brought out by both the prosecution and the defense.
At the conclusion of his second trial, the jury found the Appellant guilty of seven (7)
counts within the indictment and the trial court sentenced the Appellant to 22 months in prison.
Following his conviction, the Appellant filed a direct appeal with the Fifth District Court
of Appeals. An opinion affirming both the conviction and sentence was issued on September 21,
2010. State v. King (2010), 2010 Ohio 4844, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 4092. In addition to his
direct appeal, the Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court on October
16, 2009. The only claims which the trial court found merited a hearing were that Davis
committed perjury during the Appellant's trial and that he did so as a result of an undisclosed
deal with the State to reduce his prison time on his Holmes County case. In support of those
claims, the Appellant attached an affidavit from Zachariah Fretwell, who was incarcerated with
Davis at the Belmont Correctional Institution, and a letter allegedly written by Davis to
Zachariah Fretwell.
3 On March 8, 2010, the trial court issued a judgment entry overruling the Appellant's petition. In that entry, the trial court found that the Appellant failed to meet his burden of proof.
The court noted that there was no credible evidence that Davis' testimony at trial was false or that the State of Ohio or any of its agents knowingly procured or offered false testimony. The court fiu-ther noted Davis' limited role in the Appellant's trial and the ample amount of evidence pointing to the Appellant's guilt.
ARGUMENT OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE STATE OF OHIO
RESPONSE TO ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I:
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WAS BASED ON COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
Contrary to the Appellant's claim, the findings of fact which the trial court relied on in
overruling his petition for post-conviction relief were based on competent, credible evidence.
The trial court's judgment on the credibility of the witnesses was accurate and its ultimate denial
of the Appellant's claims was proper based on the scant evidence that the defense offered at the
hearing on the Appellant's petition. In his brief, the Appellant grossly mischaracterizes the
strength of his case. In reality, a fair reading of the record of the hearing on his petition for post-
conviction relief reveals that he offered uncorroborated testimony from unreliable witnesses,
most of which was inadmissible under the rules of evidence. The fact is that the Appellant
simply did not meet his burden of establishing a constitutional violation which would warrant a
new trial under O.R.C. 2953.21.
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the Appellant's
petition for post-conviction relief. The Appellant failed to put forth credible, competent, material
evidence that any conduct by Davis or the State of Ohio constituted "such a denial or
4 infringement of [his] rights as to render the judgment [in his case] void or voidable under the
Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States." O.R.C. § 2953.21(A)(1)(a); see, also,
State v. Hand (5a' Dist), 2006 Ohio 2028, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1855 at P22.
In the Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief, the defense put forth a general assertion that Davis lied during the Appellant's trial. However, perjury alone does not establish a claim that is actionable under post-conviction relief, which requires a denial or infringement of a constitutional right. Perjury is only a constitutional due process violation when false testimony
Cox (5`h Dist.), 2003 Ohio 5831, 2003 Ohio App. is offered knowingly by the State. State v.
LEXIS 5184 at P95. Thus, the Appellant bootstrapped that claim onto an allegation that there
was a secret deal between Capt. Bosko and Davis wherein Davis would receive a reduced prison
sentence for his Holmes County case if he testified against the Appellant. The Appellant seemed
to argue that because defense counsel was not notified of this deal, it was a violation of the
(1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194. He further alleged that it was holding in Brady v. Maryland
this secret deal which induced Davis to commit perjury.
1. THE APPELLANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH A BRADY VIOLATION.
At the hearing on the Appellant's post-conviction petition, Capt. Bosko testified that
there was no additional agreement with Davis beyond that which was previously disclosed to the
defense. (T. 46, 48). When he initially met with Davis about the Appellant's case, he did not
promise him anything in exchange for his cooperation. (T. 44). At the time, Davis was
incarcerated in the Knox County Jail and wanted to be released on a personal recognizance bond;
however, since the Richland County Sheriff's Office was already in the process of getting Davis
out to assist in another investigation, Capt. Bosko did not take any action on that request. (T. 44-
45, 47). The defense was clearly made aware of this arrangement because Capt. Bosko was
5 cross-examined about Davis' release on a personal recognizance bond during both the
Appellant's first and second trials. (T. 49).
Capt. Bosko testified that the only other promise he made to Davis was that he would make a call to the Millersburg Police Department to let them know that Davis cooperated with the State. (T. 46, 49-50). He did make that phone call after Davis testified in the Appellant's second trial. (T. 46). However, Davis did not receive any benefit from that phone call because he had been convicted and sentenced on his Holmes County case prior to the second trial. (T. 46,
48-49).
The only other contact that Capt. Bosko had with Davis was when he transported Davis back to the Belmont Correctional Institution after the first and second trials and when he spoke to
Davis before the Appellant's second trial because Davis expressed some reluctance to testify. (T.
47). Capt. Bosko testified that he did not promise Davis anything during that conversation; thus,
Davis could not have been led to believe he would receive any additional benefit for his testimony in the second trial. (T. 48). Again, the defense was aware of all of this information since it was brought out on cross-examination during both of the Appellant's trials. (T. 50).
Terry Hitchman, one of the attorneys who represented the Appellant at trial, confirmed that the defense was provided discovery prior to the Appellant's trials regarding promises made to Davis to secure his cooperation: (T. 22). He admitted that it did not come as a surprise to the defense when this information was brought out at trial. (T. 22), Furthermore, while Mr.
Hitchman did not recall the specific details of any deals which were disclosed to the defense, he did not believe that there were any major issues or differences between what was provided in discovery and what came out at trial. (T. 22-23).
6 Circumstantial evidence received by the trial court further discounted the existence of a
"secret deal." State's Exhibit A was received into evidence. (T. 74, 80). That document, a certified copy of Davis's sentencing entry from Holmes County, was journalized on October 30,
2008, nearly a month and a half before the Appellant's second trial took place. (T. 74).
Regardless of what was promised to Davis, the fact remains that the jury heard he was serving a year as a result of a Holmes County conviction.
Further, the State offered the testimony of Sgt. Estill, the Millersburg detective that Capt.
Bosko talked to on Davis' behalf. Sgt. Estill confirmed that Capt. Bosko called and merely
relayed that Davis had cooperated with the State. (T. 75-78). He indicated that there was never
any conversation or agreement involving himself and Capt. Bosko regarding the dismissal of his
case against Davis in exchange for Davis' testimony in Richland County. (T. 77). Moreover, Sgt.
Estill testified that he did not receive any requests from other sources on Davis' behalf which
would have resulted in any benefit to Davis. (T. 78). This circumstantial evidence actually
proves that the secret agreement did not take place.
A. HEARSAY FROM THE REPUDIATED LETTER TO ZACHARIAH FRETWELL.
Zachariah Fretwell's (hereinafter "Fretwell") testimony did nothing to advance the
Appellant's theory of a secret deal between Davis and the State. Due to a hearsay objection,
Fretwell was unable to testify about anything that Davis may have told him while they were
incarcerated together. (T. 25-26). He could only testify that he corresponded with Davis after he
was released from prison. (T. 26). On this basis, Fretwell identified Defendant's Exhibit 1 as a
letter he received from Davis, however, he did not testify to the contents of that letter. (T. 27-28).
The testimony that Fretwell did not offer is more telling. Fretwell did not allege that he
was present during any discussions between Davis and Capt. Bosko. Therefore, he could not 7 verify the details of any deals that existed between Davis and the State. The only way he would have learned of that information was through statements made by Davis while they were incarcerated together, which, as the trial court ruled, is inadmissible hearsay. (T. 25-26).
On cross-examination, Fretwell's credibility and motives for testifying were proved to be suspect. He admitted that when he received the letter from Davis, he turned it over to his attorney, Terry Hitchman, the Appellant's trial counsel. (T. 31). Mr. Hitchman turned the letter over to the Appellant's other attorney, Cassandra Mayer, who, conveniently, then represented
Fretwell after he was arrested for probation violations. (T. 30-31). Mr. Hitchman confirmed this testimony (T. 23-24).
The defense came away with nothing after Davis took the stand. Davis was clearly reluctant to testify at the hearing. He largely refused to answer questions and the trial court acknowledged his right to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. (T. 34-40). The Ohio Supreme
Court has held that a fact-finder cannot consider an invocation of Fifth Amendment rights for any purpose. Columbus v. Cooper (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 42, 47, 550 N.E.2d 337; State v.
Martinez, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5027, (Nov. 2, 1994), Lorain App. No. 93 CA 005689, unreported. In other words, it does not prove or disprove anything.
To the extent that Davis did testify, he admitted that he sent the letter to Fretwell
(Defendant's Exhibit 1, hereinafter the "Repudiated Letter"), which enabled the defense to
authenticate its origin. (T. 39). Davis went on to say that what he wrote was not the truth, but
was "just two guys bullshitting." (T. 39). He further asserted that the letter does not imply that
he perjured himself at the Appellant's trial. (T. 40). The only point on which Davis did not
refuse to testify was when he decided to repudiate the contents of the defense's so-called
exculpatory evidence.
8 An authenticated letter is not necessarily admissible evidence. The contents of the letter must fall within some hearsay exception. The situation is similar to a police report. The report itself is admissible to show its existence but its contents are hearsay unless properly admitted into evidence. Here, the actual contents of the letter were never attested to by a witness with knowledge of such that the hearsay exception could be asserted. No one asked Fretwell what it said, nor was Davis asked what he wrote.
With respect to the Repudiated Letter, Davis was not "unavailable" under the hearsay
rule. He did not assert any privilege. Instead, he stated that it was not true. Because he was
"available" on that matter, the contents of the letter are not admissible. Only his in-court
responses to questioning about the Repudiated Letter are admissible.
B. HEARSAY FROM CINDY WOLFE.
The only testimony that the Appellant presented to support his allegation that Davis
committed perjury came from Cindy Wolfe (hereinafter "Wolfe"), an ex-girlfriend of Davis with
a lengthy criminal record including felony and misdemeanor convictions and a history of drug
abuse. (T. 6, 71). During her first attempt at testifying, Wolfe claimed that she always went with
Davis when he stole from retail stores and fenced the stolen items to Maurice King, II, the
Appellant's father. She claimed that she never saw the Appellant at those exchanges, but she did
see his brother. (T. 8-9). Thereafter, the defense attempted to elicit testimony from Wolfe
regarding statements that Davis made in jail concerning his testimony in the Appellant's trial;
however, it was properly excluded by the trial court because it did not fall within any exceptions
to the hearsay rule. (T. 10-19). Wolfe then left the witness stand to be recalled later.
Wolfe returned to the witness stand after Davis became unavailable due to his invocation
of his Fifth Amendment rights. The defense proffered testimony about what Davis told her under
9 a continuing objection to hearsay. (T. 63-56, 57). The trial court heard the proffer with the understanding that its admissibility would be resolved later. (T. 56, 57-58). Once Davis refused to testify, he was "unavailable" under Ohio Evidence Rule 804 and, therefore, his prior statement was admissible as a statement against his interests pursuant to Rule 804(B)(3), but in keeping with its constraints as to trustworthiness.
The burden placed upon a proponent of hearsay by Rule 804(B)(3) is "formidable."
United States v. MacDonald (4th Cir. 1982), 688 F.2d 224, 233, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 16562.
"The against-interest exception was drafted with [Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284,
93 S.Ct. 1038] in mind and requires `corroborating circumstances' for statements offered to exonerate defendants, the justification being that they can be fabricated by friendly defense witnesses (and attributed to unavailable speakers) and are hard to rebut even if false." State v.
Swann (2008), 119 Ohio St.3d 552, 559, 895 N.E.2d 821, quoting Mueller & Kirkpatrick,
Evidence (1995) 1118, Section 8.82. In other words, it is extremely convenient for the Appellant to claim that he is innocent and Davis committed perjury. Unless the "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement," such a self-serving proposal is not worthy of the Court's consideration. The State submits that Wolfe's proffered testimony lacked sufficient corroborating circumstances or indicia of trustworthiness. Therefore, it was properly discounted by the trial court.
Wolfe proffered that Davis told her at the jail that he lied at the Appellant's trial to get a better deal on his own prison time. (T. 58). Although Wolfe did not state what Davis supposedly
lied about, it was implied based on her previous testimony that that he lied about the Appellant's
purchase of stolen property from him. (T. 59). However, this claim was discredited on cross-
examination. While Wolfe claimed that she was with Davis every time he stole electronics,
10 fenced the stolen goods, and bought drugs with the money between 2006 and 2008, she admitted on cross-examination that she was locked up for a substantial period of time, seven (7) or eight
(8) months total, during their two (2) year relationship. (T. 66-67). She further admitted that it was likely Davis continued selling stolen property during that time to fund his drug habit and she would have no idea who he sold that property to. (T. 67-68).
Wolfe's claim that Davis told her he was going to lie at the Appellant's trial also lacked corroboration or any indicia of trustworthiness. In her proffer, she initially stated that her conversation with Davis occurred during visitation at the jail before he testified and that it concerned his plans to lie. (T. 57-58, 60, 61-62). However, on cross-examination, she stated that he did not tell her that he lied in the Appellant's trial during that visit. Instead, she claimed that that statement occurred in one of approximately 30-40 phone calls after that visit. (T. 63-64).
Most importantly, Wolfe claimed that she was in fear of Davis for the entire time she knew him and she only stayed with him to obtain drugs. (T. 70-71). Despite this overwhelming
fear of Davis, she visited him in jail and spoke to him over the phone, thereby learning of Davis'
alleged admission to perjury, because she was concerned he was going to testify and wanted to
know what he was going to do. (T. 57-58, 62-63). This does not support truthful circumstances.
Wolfe would have known that Davis already testified in the Appellant's earlier trial. There
would be no need to find out his intentions. Further, her stated fear of Davis is inconsistent with
demanding he relate his intentions to her in any setting, much less one where he is confined. She
testified her fear was not lessened by his confinement. (T. 70-71). We are left to believe that
Wolfe demanded to know what he was doing despite her great fear of this individual. Further,
Wolfe admitted that, despite her claimed knowledge that Davis had committed, or was planning
to commit, perjury in the Appellant's trial, she did not tell anyone in a position of authority. (T.
11 60-61). Nothing about the circumstances surrounding this alleged disclosure by Davis indicates trustworthiness, especially given the high burden placed upon the proponent of the statement.
The defense did not offer any corroboration of their self-serving hearsay. The only other item of any evidentiary value is the letter from Davis to Fretwell, the contents of which Davis repudiated on the witness stand. In the Repudiated Letter, should the Court consider its contents,
Davis does not even hint that he committed perjury. Thus, Wolfe's vague claim that Davis told her that he lied at trial is utterly without corroboration.
Wolfe also changed her testimony as to the circumstances under which she received this
"admission" from Davis. She did not testify as to what it is he lied about. The defense merely implied that it involved criminal conduct committed by the Appellant. The only relevant testimony from Wolfe is that Davis told her the prison time on his Holmes County case would be reduced if he testified against the Appellant and he lied to get that benefit. (T. 57-58, 60, 61-62,
63-64). Again, the first part of the statement does not differentiate what Davis was told by the
State versus what he thought the result might be (indeed, there is no jurisdiction for Richland
County representatives to reduce Holmes County prison time). Sgt. Estill testified no such deal
is, or ever was, in place. (T. 77-78). The second part of Wolfe's statement does not even hint at
what the "lie" was about. Whatever the "lie" was must be something violative of the Appellant's
constitutional rights, and, thus, actionable in post-conviction relief. Since the Appellant had the
burden to show a violation cognizable under post-conviction relief, the trial court properly found
that the Appellant had not met his burden.
C. THE APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVE EVEN THE THRESHOLD QUESTION OF WHETHER PERJURY OCCURRED.
Based on the testimony set forth above, the Appellant failed to prove, first of all, that the
perjury actually occurred. Right or wrong, the defense advanced two (2) different perjury 12 theories at the hearing: first, that there was a secret deal to give Davis a reduction in prison time; second, that Davis lied generally about his interactions with the Appellant. There was no competent, credible evidence of either theory.
D. THE SECOND ELEMENT OF BRADY: STATE ACTION.
As for the second element of a Brady claim, the Appellant failed to prove that the State was aware of any perjury. As previously stated, perjury is only a constitutional due process violation when false testimony is offered knowingly by the State. Cox, 2003 Ohio 5831 at P95.
Capt. Bosko adamantly denied any deals with Davis outside of what was disclosed to the defense
and related to the jury in the Appellant's first and second trials. (T. 46, 48, 49-50). Further, the
unrebutted testimony of Sgt. Estill of the Millersburg Police Department established that Capt.
Bosko called him and advised him that Davis had cooperated with the State, just as Capt. Bosko
and Davis testified at trial. (T. 75-78), (Trial at T. 439-442, 462-463, 578-578, 591).
E. THE FINAL ELEMENT OF BRADY: MATERIALITY.
Finally, the Appellant failed to demonstrate "materiality," that the outcome of his trial
would have been different if any other deals between Davis and the State had been disclosed.
The jury heard that Davis was in prison for a list of crimes, including a 12 months sentence from
Holmes County. (Trial at T. 439-442). He received essentially nothing for his testimony.
Moreover, Davis' entire criminal past was put before them. It simply can't be known what
credibility or weight the jurors assigned to his testimony. Thus, the Appellant has failed to show
that, even if the little relevant testimony presented at the hearing was true, the jurors' verdicts
should be called into question.
In overruling the Appellant's motion for post-conviction relief, one of the factors the trial
court relied on was Davis' limited role in the Appellant's trial. (Order on Post-Conviction Relief
13 at p.1). The court noted that Davis was not a witness to the crimes for which the Appellant was convicted, the attempted purchase of stolen guns on January 10, 2008. Id. Rather, Davis offered testimony that he had previously sold stolen electronics and power tools to the Appellant through the Appellant's father, Maurice King, II. (Trial at T. 442-444, 446, 447-448). This testimony was only admitted to help establish the Appellant's intent on January 10, 2008. It is worth noting that the State had two (2) other witnesses, Joshua Conley and Rebekah Leicy, who would have corroborated Davis' testimony that the Appellant was present at his father's home and purchased stolen property; however, the State was prevented from presenting that evidence as a result of the defense's motion in limine. (Hearing on Motion in Limine at 26-27, 38-39), (Trial at T. 464-
468).
The jury did hear a great deal of other testimony and evidence concerning the Appellant's actions surrounding his attempt to purchase stolen guns on January 10, 2008. Specifically, the
State presented evidence from two (2) police informants, including the audio and video
recordings of the transaction. (Trial at T. 222-247, 303-313). On top of all of the State's
evidence, the defense helped convict the Appellant by calling Det. Keith Porch as a supposed
exculpatory witness. Det. Porch testified that the Appellant did not appraise him of vital
information, that the Appellant should have called other officers if he was really trying to have
the felons with stolen guns apprehended, and, finally, that the Appellant perjured himself in his
first trial when he testified about what he told Det. Porch. (Trial at T. 626-643, 660-668). Based
on this evidence, there is no reasonable probability that, if the jury had known of any additional
deals between the State and Davis, it would have resulted in a different verdict. The defense
specifically asked Davis whether anyone promised that his prison time would be reduced in
exchange for his testimony and Davis testified that no one had. (Trial at T. 463).
14 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Ohio respectfully requests that the Court deny the
Appellant's jurisdiction to pursue his appeal.
Respectfully Submitted,
DANIEL Y. BENOIT Assistant Prosecuting Attomey Supreme Court No. 0086833 Richland County Prosecutor's Office 38 S. Park Street, 2"d Floor Mansfield, OH 44902 (419) 774-5676 (419) 774-5589 (FAX)
Attorney for Appellee, State of Ohio
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Appellee, State of Ohio's Response the Appellant's Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction was sent to Attorney Eric Allen, 713 South Front, Columbus, OH 43206, by regular U.S. mail, this I1-0"- day of May, 2011.
NIEL'J. BENOIT Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
15