Journal of International Economic Law, 2015, 18, 893–934 doi: 10.1093/jiel/jgv045 Advance Access Publication Date: 20 November 2015 Article China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment and International Investment Law
Karl P. Sauvant and Michael D. Nolan* Downloaded from ABSTRACT As China’s outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown, its approach to inter- national investment agreements (IIAs) has changed. China is now one of the world’s
most important outward investors, with Chinese FDI facing widespread criticism. The http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/ challenge for China is to adapt to this new configuration of interests stemming from these developments, both in terms of its national policies and the contents of its IIAs. In so doing, it is likely to influence, perhaps significantly, the further evolution of inter- national investment law. This article deals briefly with the salient features of China’s outward FDI and the policies that support it (Section A); the perception and reception of China’s outward FDI in key host countries (Section B); and the changing nature of the country’s approach to international investment treaties (Section C). The article concludes (Section D) with a brief review and outlook. at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico on February 18, 2016
I. SALIENT FEATURES OF CHINA’S OUTWARD FDI AND POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO THEM A. The rise of China’s outward FDI China has become a major player in the world FDI market. The country’s outward FDI flows grew from US$7 billion in 20011 to US$101 billion in
* Karl P. Sauvant ([email protected]) is Resident Senior Fellow, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law School and The Earth Institute at Columbia University, and an Adjunct Professor at Columbia Law School; he was the Founding Executive Director of the predecessor of CCSI, the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment, and Director of UNCTAD’s Investment Division. Michael D. Nolan ([email protected]) is a Partner in the Litigation and Arbitration Group of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP and an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University. The authors would like to thank Louis Brennan, Filip De Beule, Christoph Doerrenbaecher, Noha Rubins, Anthea Roberts, Stephan Schill, and Wenhua Shan for their helpful peer re- views, as well as Camilla Gambarini, Schahram Ghalebegi, Thomas Jost, Nancy Lee, Andrei Panibratov, and Adrian Torres who prepared the host country analyses on which section B of this chapter is based, and Kamel Aı¨t-El-Hadj, Victor Z. Chen, Monica R. DiFonzo, Ksenia Gal, Premila Nazareth Satyanand, Zhang Sheng, Yina Yang, and You Zhou, for their very helpful assistance in the preparation of this chapter. Special thanks go to Camilla Gambarini for helping to finalize this manuscript. A shortened version of this article appears in Benjamin Liebman and Curtis J. Milhaupt, eds., Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications of Chinese State Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all data are from UNCTAD Stat, available at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (last visited 6 March 2015).
VC The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.