CHAPTER V

RELIGION IN THE IRANIAN SOCIETY; A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW

The aim of this chapter is to analyse religion in the Iranian society from two different perspectives. First, religion in Iran as a system of socio-cultural values. And secondly, the changes which this social institution has gone through particularly during the period chosen for this research. When we speak of religion in the Iranian society, we mean Islam and a particular branch of it, i.e. Shi'ism, as manifested in the lives of Iranians. Iranian society can be regarded as a predominantly religious society all through its long and great history upto the present times. Iranian society, right from ancient times was the centre of great religions such as Zoroastrianism and Mithraism. The former is looked upon as the first mono­ theistic religion of the world. This religion is named Zoroastrianism which is a derivation from the name of the Prophet Zoroaster (Zarthustra). Zoroaster is the Greek form of the word Zarthustra (Zarthusht in Persian litera­ ture). It emerged in Iran around one thousand years B.C. In this connection Dr. Sayyed Hossein Nasr says: "There is still no agreement about the dates of'Zoroaster's life;

322 323 some think that he lived about a thousand B.C. whereas many other noted scholars believe that he lived from 660 to 5^3 .2 B.C." The latter religion, i.e. Mithraism, came into existence in the third century B.C. Though this religion was effective for some time, particularly after the conquest of Alexander, it was gradually replaced by old Zoroastrianisra and it vanished during the later periods of history. There also emerged some other religions such as Manichaeism during the third century A.D. and for many centuries it was a rival of Christianity; but as Dr. Nasr says, it was mainly a religious movement in opposition to Zoroastrianisra. Mani, founder of Manichaeism, was put to death soon after his return to Iran from exile in the year 274 7 A.D. Since then Zoroastrianisra continued to be the dominant religion of Iran till it was invaded by Arabs who introduced Islam in the 7th century. Soon after the defeat of Sassanids dynasty, at the hands of Arabs in 7th century A.D., Islam was established in this society as the dominant religion. After its inception, Islam soon became the religion of majority. Zoroastrianisra was confined to a small minority which exists in Iran even today, B. Spuler believes that a nation may convert to a new religion through: (1) conversion of the leading group, 324 or (2) spreading mission organizations built up by religious personalities and groups. According to B. Spuler, neither of these two were the reasons for the conversion of Iranians to Islam. He says, the people of Iran were converted to Islam because of "the financial pressure". This appears to be a harsh judgement. The economic factor could not be the decisive factor in the conversion of the Iranians to Islam. It is true that economic pressures are exerted upon the people of a defeated nation but other important factors also seem to have contributed to the process of Iranians' conversion to Islam, These factors were as follows: (1) Islam came with new values of equality and justice among the people the majority of whom were groan­ ing under an oppressive hierarchical system. This was particularly so towards the end of the Sassanids' period. In this respect T. Arnold says that people felt the new faith, i.e. Islam, could sweep away all those dark mists, could open the soul to new, alluring and tangible hopes, and could bring immediate release from a miserable state of servitude. T. Arnold further continues: "Sassanids dynasty had been marked by terrible anarchy, and the sympathy of the people had been further alienated from their rulers on account of the support they gave to the persecuting policy of the State religion of Zoroastrianism. In all of these, persecutions had stirred up bitter hatred against 325 the established religion and the dynasty that supported its oppressions, and so caused the Arab conquest to appear in the light of a deliverance. The followers of all these varied forros of faith could breathe again under a rule that granted them religious freedom and exemption from military service, on payment of a light tribute." (in return for protection).

"Muslim Law granted toleration and right of paying Jizyah (tribute) not only to the Christians and Jews but to Zoroastrians and Sabaeans, to worshippers of idols, of fire and stone." 12

It should also be noted that "the Prophet himself had distinctly given directions that Zoroastrians were to be treated exactly like the people of the Book, i.e. the Jews and Christians."1 3-^

We may, therefore, conclude in the words of T.W. surely Arnold that "It is/impossible to attribute the decay of Zoroastrianism entirely to violent conversions made by the Muslim conquerors."

Dr. Ali Shariati comments in the same vein as T.W. Arnold and says: The main reason behind the failure of Sassanids was that Iranians welcomed Islam spontaneously. They were fed up with their social existence which was

Brackets mine. 326 marked by social injustice and social inequality of an extreme type. That is why Iranians did not put up a serious fight against the Arabs. They accepted and hailed the victory of Islam willingly.

(2) The new religion brought with itself higher concepts of God symbolized by monotheism.

(3) The new religion brought by foreigners came along with military superiority.

It should, therefore, be noted that in the earlier phase of the Arab invasion it was not the military might and its fright that led to the victory of Arabs and the acceptance of Islam by people. But later on, it must be conceded that the military power was employed to subjugate Iranians under the Ummayads' and Abbassids' dynasties. The same was used for forcible conversion (contrary to the true or authentic teachings of Islam) of many people.

By and large, Islam, particularly Shi'ism, was accepted and ofi'icially declared as the national religion (i.e. religion of State as well as religion of the common man), only when the first national Iranian Government, i.e. Safavids dynasty, came into power about the l6th century. The first king of this dynasty. Shah Ismail, a descendant of a thirteenth century saint, united Iranians and conso­ lidated his power. In 1500 A.D. he was crowned as the King 17 of Persia in Tabriz. He immediately made Shi'ism the State religion, Safavids originally belonged to a Sufi 327 order. Under this dynasty Iran once again became a very powerful nation. IS

It should be noted that right from the beginning of the great division of Islam into two different sects, i.e. Shi'ism and Sunnism, Iranians were largely supporters of Shi'ism, in that they formed the majority of the Shi'iahs. Iranians have always been deeply influenced by Shi'ism 19 which has played a unique political role in the life of this nation.

Division of Islam into two sects took place right after the death of the Prophet Mohammad in 632 A.D, Some Muslims, who were numerically a minority group, believed that the leadership of the Islamic community (Ummah • Ummat in Persian language) is only by Divine appointment (tayin). This leader to them is the vice-gerent (Khalipah) of Ck3d on the earth. Later on this group formed Shi'ism,

Shi'iahs believed that the first Imam who must have been leader of Ummah was Ali, cousin of the Prophet, and who, one year before the death of the Prophet, was nominated by the Prophet himself for this leadership.

The Sunnis.constituted the majority group, rejected Imam Ali as the first leader of the Ummah after the Prophet, They considered Abu Bakr as the first Khalifah, This is the main source of the religious split in Islam,

Shi'iahs believe in the event known as 'Ghadir-e- 32S

i^ Imam Khumm' when/Ali was introduced to the people, by the Prophet, as the 'general Guardian' (Waly-i-Uramah). This Imam was a very clear sign of/Ali's legitimacy as successor to 20 the Prophet.

On the other hand the majority (Sunnis) held that the Prophet had left no instruction on the matter of his successorshipu. .2 1

Dr. Nasr sees another important difference between Shi'ism and Sunnism. He says: "Sunni Islam considered the Khalifah to be the guardian of the Shariat in the community, while Shi'isra saw in the successor a spiritual function connected with the esoteric interpretation of the revelation and the inheritance of the Prophet's esoteric 22 teachings." Shi'ism and Sunnism form the major split in Islam. There are, however, different divisions in each of these two branches. From different branches of Shi'ism, three prominent groups have emerged. These are: (1) Twelve Imam Shi'ism, the great majority of Shi'iahs. It is Iranians' religion. It is also the religion of half of the popula­ tion of Iraq. (2) Seven Imam Shi'ism or Ismailism which flourished in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and South Africa. (3) Zadism or Five Imam Shi'ism which can be found in Yemen.2 3'^

Ghadir-e-Khumm » Name of a place in Saudi Arabia. 329

Sunnism is divided into four major schools known as: (1) Maleki School, (2) Shafaai School, (3) Hanafee

School, and (4) Hanbalee School.

We must now explore some fundamental meanings of

Islamic notions. The holy Quran informs us that the first person who called this religion as Islam was the Prophet Abraham (Ebrahim). The word Islam etyraologically means 2L sur-render and obedience. H.A.R, Gibb says: Islam means 25 "submitting" oneself or one's person to God. ^ The word is also defined as both 'submission' and Peace - or being one with the Divine Will. A Muslim is sometimes, called as Mohammadan, a term which Muslims do not prefer. For example, in Iran people are usually not familiar with this word. Muslims do not want to be called Mohamraadans because 27 unlike Christians who worship Christ, a Muslim worships 2g only God and not Mohammad the Prophet. Islam is based on Allah as the one and only God. It is not based on the personality of his messenger - Mohammad. To a Muslim the only eternal being who must be worshipped is the Almighty God and not any other being. Hence it is to be noted that a Muslim is one who has surrendered himself to God. That is why he is a Muslim and not a Mohammadan. A Muslim thinks of Christ as God's Prophet. He should not be worshipped. He should be respected and his precepts should be followed. Here we are emphasizing the significance of the prophetic 330 tradition of all Semitic religions. It has also important implications for the principles of charisma whatever be its source. Such a charismatic leadership given a fair trial and a correct direction may generate a favourable climate for mobilization of the resources, both material and spiritual. As we have repeatedly emphasized the process of mobilization is the essence of development and modernization.

The word Shi'iah was used for the first time when Shi'ism started as a movement in accordance with the Imam po support of the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law,/Ali. Supporters of this movement were called Shi'iahs and the word Shi'iah literally means 'Partisan or Follower'. Imam Therefore, Shi'iah refers to those who support/Ali's move­ ment and consider him as the only righteous successor of the Prophet to lead the Ummah in the Divine path and according to Divine Will. Imam Caliphate of/Ali started in 656 A.D. It lasted for about four years and nine months while three other Khalifahs had taken the leadership of community before him. Imam Ali was assassinated by his opponents in the year 663 A.D. but his movement, i.e. Shi'ism survived and spread widely through centuries upto the present times.

Theological Principles of Islam - Shi'ism - (Usui ad-Din) The theological principles of Islam (Shi'ism) are five. These are: 331

1) Tawhld (belief in the Divine Unity), 2) Nubuwwah (Prophecy • Nabuwwat in Persian Language), 3) Adl (Divine Justice), 4) Imamah (Belief in the Imams as successors of the Prophet, Imamat in Persian Language, Imamate in English literature), and 5) Maad (Resurrection « The final day of judgement).

In the book 'An Illustrated History of the World's Religions', it is recorded that the five pillars of Islam are: 1) Shahadah (Confession of the faith, as the first basic pillar), 2) Sala"t (Ritual prayer), 3) Zakat (alms paid to the needy), 4) Sawm (fast), and 5) Hajj (Pilgrimage to the Kaaba).^-"-

This researcher would like to point out that of the five Pillars of Islam recorded in 'An Illustrated History of the World's Religions', excepting the first one, the other items, i.e. the 2nd to the 5th, are related to Islamic rituals. They are not theological principles of Islam. Briefly, according to Shi'ism, Tawhid, Nubuwwah, Adl, Immaraah, and Maad, are the five principles of Islam.

* Since this researcher deals with religion in Iran, i.e. Shi'isra, he discusses here mainly Shi'ism point of view. 332

Of course, there are differences in the interpretation of these five principles among different Islamic sects. Some of the Islamic sects which appeared during the long history of Islam might have accepted or rejected this or that principle. The most important point, however, is that they have not added any other element to these five principles. In order to have a more clear picture of the five cardinal theological principles of Islam we shall discuss them briefly.

1) Tawhid (Belief in the Divine Unity); is the first and basic principle in Islam accepted by all Islamic sects. Islam calls upon everyone to believe in God and oneness of Allah.^^

The minimum requirement for a Muslim is to accept 33 that God is one and Muhammad is His messenger, ^ When one accepts the oneness of God, one should manifest one's belief through confession (or Shahadah). That is why while discussing the five pillars of Islam written in 'An Illustrated History of the World's Religions' we excluded the first pillar, i.e. Shahadah. Shahadah is the expression of La ilaha ill' Allah, which is a basic doctrine in Islamic theology. La ilaha ill' Allah literally means there is no God except Allah. Allah is the absolute

f 7 «" ? * The Arabic word Allah is a shortened form of Al-illah, the God. (H.A.R. Gibb, Islam: A Historical Survey, p. 36.) 333 reality and is Almighty. Allah (God) who symbolizes eternity and is the only one. Everything exists by His creed and according to His will. Nothing is able to go beyond His will since He is the Almighty Power. The Holy Quran says: "Say, He is Allah, the one I Allah, the eternally Besought of alll He begotteth not nor was begotten ... And there is none comparable unto Him."-^^ (GUI: 1 to 4)

A sign of absolute Almighty power and ability of God is clear in this verse of Quran "But His command, when Ha intendeth a thing, is only that He saith unto it: Bel and it is." (XIXVI, Sl).^^

When a person testifies that there is only one God and no other God exists except Him, he who is confessor enters the Ummah (Islamic Community) as a Muslim. Whether he is in one place along with other I^usliras or is alone far away from them, whether it is a man or woman, young or old, white or black, rich or poor, he enters to the Ummah as equal to others and unites with them as a member. Hence the spirit of Tawhid unites all Muslims in the world wherever and whoever they are. Tawhid is the first basis of Islamic principles because it integrates all Muslims in the world regardless of their nation, race, kinship, language, colour, etc. One may very well say that the concept of one God is found not only in Islam but in other monotheistic 334 religions also. But it needs to be pointed out that the view of God in Islam is quite unique and different from the view of God in other monotheistic relitions, like, for instance, Christianity. In Christianity while there is belief in one God, there is equally the belief in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (Trinity). In Islam there is no belief in such a trinity. God in Islam, has no son, and he is also no father. There is at the same time no Holy Spirit. There exists one and only one God who is Almighty, Creator, Supreme Power, Supreme Judge and Avenger, Bounteous, Loving- Kindness, the Compassionate one, the Merciful, the Protector, the Provider, the Pardoner, Clement, ever to turn to the repentant sinner,-^ the only Absolute reality, the Absolute truth, and exists from all eternity to all eternity. And as the Quran says, people are exhorted to call to such an ^ absolute existence; "Call not on other God but Allah, there is no God but He ..." (XXVII, V.88].^'^

In the famous 'the Cow' Verses (Sura II, V.255)God is introduced in the following verses: "God ... there is no God but He, the Living, the Self-subsistent. Slumber seizeth Him not, neither sleep. To Him belongeth whatso­ ever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth. Who

* 1) It should not be misunderstood that this researcher is comparing these two religions, i.e. Islam and Christianity. 2) Whatever this researcher writes about Christianity refers to the common belief among today's Christians. However, he does not enter into a discussion whether or not these common beliefs are in accordance with the true teachings of Christianity. 335 is there that shall intercede with Him save by His Will/ He knowth what is present with men and what shall befall them, and nought of His knowledge do they comprehend, save what He willeth. His Throne is wide as the heavens and the earth, and the keeping of them wearieth Him not. And Ha is the High, the Mighty one."-^^

Some other characteristics of God are reflected in the different names by which He is called, e.g. Hearer, Seer, Bestower, Reckoner, Pardoner, Keeper, Guide, Al-haqq (the truth), al-alim (ha who knows), etc.

The uniqueness of God in Islam is the Islamic belief that the Prophets of other monotheistic religions, like Christianity and Judaism are sent by Allah and are only messengers of Allah's words. Allah is the only God that man must try to know, obey, and worship.

2) Nubuwwah (Prophecy • Nabuwwat in Persian Litera­ ture) ; In the preceding discussion of Tawhid we said that a Muslim must first of all believe in the oneness of Allah and secondly accept Mohammad as the Prophet of Allah. Of course acceptance of Mohammad as the Prophet of Allah does not mean rejection of other Prophets. There are different beliefs about the total number of Prophets. 'An Illustrated History of the World's Religions' reports as many as 2ifO,000 Prophets.'^^ On the other hand, scholars like G.E. Von Grunebaum^ and Tabatabai^ consider the number of Prophets upto 124,000. 336

The Holy Quran says: "There is no distinction between Prophets, ... Every one of the Prophets believed in God, His angels and His scriptures and His apostles. We make no distinction at all between His apostles. ... Say, we believe in God and that which hath been sent down unto us, and that which was sent down unto Abraham and Ismail and Isaac and Jacob and other tribes, and that which was delivered to Moses and Jesus and the Prophets from their Lord; we make no distinction between any of them. ... They who believed in God and His apostles and make no distinction between any of them, unto those will we give I 2 their reward, and God is gracious and merciful." [sic]

While the Quran declares that all the Prophets are God's messengers and makes no distinction between them there is a point which distinguishes Mohammad from other Prophets. It is that Mohammad is considered as 'Seal of Prophecy* (Khatam al-anbiya). It means Mohammad is the last Prophet after whom there will be no Prophet for ever. The call of Islam is the mission for belief in the message of Prophet Mohammad,^-^

The important point here is this: Islam emphasizes the Prophecy of Mohammad as the second principle of the religion. It subjects the matter of being a Muslim to an absolute condition, i.e. the acceptance of the Prophecy of Muhammad. It, however, emphasizes that Muhammad is a human being pure and simple and as a man equal to others. He is 337 a man, but a messenger of Allah. Physically a man but esoterically a Prophet. He is chosen by CJod from among ordinary people to illustrate a 'perfect man'.

As God says in the Quran about Mohammad: "He is it who hath sent among unlettered ones a messenger of their own, to recite unto them his revelations and to make them grow, and to teach them the scripture and Wisdom." (LJCII,2). And, "Verily in the messenger of Allah ye have a good example". (XXXIII, 21).^^

M. Abduh sees no relation between T^hammad and God except that ^'tohammad is a human messenger, that God's revelations are inspired in his being, hence he presented God's messages to the people all over the world. Not only this but he too would live according to the Divine Will.

A Muslim believes, according to the declaration of Quran, that: "Mohammad is not the father of any man among you but he is the messenger of Allah, and the seal of Prophets." (XXXIII, 40). And "We reveal the scripture unto thee as an exposition of all things." (XVI, 39).

The Prophet's mission also has been for every single human being and for all the times. He was not in chosen by God for a particular group but for everyone and not for a particular span of time but for ever. He is God's Apostle to all mankind. 338

As a human being Mohammad was born on 29th August, 570 A.D. in Mecca. He insistetecd upon saying about himself that he is only a man.'4 9

He lived among his own people like any other simple person involved in social, economic, and political acti­ vities before and after his Prophecy.

Before his prophecy also he was known by people because of his deeds, and was named Al-Arain (trustworthy). 50 According to Muslim belief, it was at the age of forty that he received the call from Allah and was chosen as the Prophet to guide all mankind. And he left his physical body behind in the year A.D. 633.

3) Imamah (Belief in the Imams as successors of the Prophet • Iraaraat in Persian Language • Imamate in English Literature)

The third principle of Islam, to Shi'ism, is Imamah. While discussing the reasons for the emergence of Shi'iah and Sunni branches of Islam, we considered the Imamah as one of the reasons. Imamah, since then, has become one of the principles of Islam to Shi'ism, so that whosoever has accepted Imamah as a principle to Islamic faith is a Shi'iah Muslim.

On the basis of this faith Shi'iahs always followed household of the Prophet. After Imam All's assassination 339

Imam in A.D. 663 Shi'iahs followed his elder son/Hassan,and Imam after Imam Hassan the younger son of Imam Ali,/Hussain, as the leader and Imam.

Imam Hussain was martyred 51 by his opponents in if the battle of Karbala on 10 October of the year A.D.68O, corresponding to the tenth of Muharam in the sixty-first year of Hegira, Imams are always regarded, by Shi'iahs, as inter­ mediary between Allah and human beings, while to a true Shi'iah, Imams are also human beings. Though Imams are human beings, Allah has chosen them as Imams and each Imam has a certain inner quality. This inner quality of Imam is given to him by the Will of God. By and large, Shi'iahs, whether followers of Five, Seven,or Twelve Imam Shi'ism, believe that Imamah is a principle of Islam and Imams are chosen by Divine Will from the Household of the Prophet among whom Irasim Ali is the first Imam chosen by God. Arid whosoever does not accept this cannot be a Shi'iah. Dr. Hussain Nasr gives the statistics that one-fifth 52 of the total population of Muslims are Shi'iahs and H.A.R. Gibb believes the total number of Muslims to be about one-seventh of the total population of the world. 53'^ A much earlier study conducted by Thomas W. Arnold and published in IB96 gave the total

Karbala « Name of a place in Iraq. 340

number of Muslims as large as 200 million. (Majority of Iranians believe in Twelve Iraam Shi'ism.)

4. Adl (Divine Justice) Every Muslim believes in Divine Justice. Allah is the Almighty power and above everything, Allah is absolutely just. His Will and want is entirely just. His justice is a positive one, that is equity. Allah as Adel (he who adl is with him) never ignores good or bad deeds of any person; also deeds o£ persons are measured absolutely justly by God and are responded to by Him in the most absolutely proper and equitable way. Allah is just and His justice is absolute. Thus justness is one of the innate characteristics of the Divine Nature, There is not even a trace of injustice in God. There is also no question of whether Allah can be unjust or not. Because unjustness is far from being Allah's Nature.

5, Maid (Resurrection « Final Day of Judgement) Like the other two principles, Tawhid and Nubuwwah, Maid is the third principle which both Shi'ism and Sunnism believe in.

Theologically Maid means 'belief in the final day of judgement'. Every Muslim believes that there will be a final day when all human beings would come alive and would have to stand before the Divine Judge. On this day God will reward or punish each person in an absolutely just manner on the basis of his/her good or bad deeds. 341

The Quranic verse says: "0 Ye who believe, believe in CJod and His Apostle and the Book which Ha hath sent down to His Apostle and the Scripture which He hath sent down formerly. Whosoever denieth Ciod and His Angels and His Book and His Apostles and the last Day hath strayed far from the Truth.""

To sum up in the context of the final day man's life gets a new meaning of individual responsibilities. The belief in Maad also strengthened the belief that man's life is not only limited to this-worldly life but is extended to a life beyond it after death.

Islam; The Potentialities of Change (Values. Ideals, and Ideologies) These five principles of Islam constitute its true essence. Along with these there are some ideological principles. Since this researcher has dealt with a tradi­ tional religious society, i.e. Iran, in the ongoing context of modernization, he would now concentrate on those ideals and ideologies of Islam which are relevant to the general process of modernization.

The real questions in this analysis are: 1) How far the ideals and ideology of Islam posi­ tively contribute to the process of modernization, i.e. what are the potential elements of change in Islam? To put it differently, what is the transformative capacity of Islam as a system of values and as an ideology? 342

2) Do the Islamic values, Ideals, and ideology promote or obstruct the process of modernization, and if so to what extent?

Our answer to these questions will determine the relevance or irrelevance of the Islamic values to the continuing process of dynamic changes in the society. We would discuss this question in the light of Islamic concepts, values, and tradition. It should be noted that our discussion would be on the theological level.

It is necessary, here, to mention that theology is not sociology. It differs in nature and methods. Theo­ logical principles are fixed. Yet theology is not entirely irrelevant to sociology. Theology reflects a direction, a trend of values, and an ideological trend. It, there­ fore, influences human behaviour or it is an important orientation of human conduct. This is the connecting link between sociology and theology. Therefore sociology can­ not be completely theology-free.

In connection with the question of potentials of change in Islam, we would like to quote at the outset, a long but meaningful paragraph of Asghar Ali Engineer's discussion on this theme.

He writes: "I cannot venture an opinion about other religions here but I can certainly say that Islam imbibes the spirit of change as it itself was the product of the process of change and social transformation of far-reaching 343

consequences which was occurring in Mecca during its early period.

Religion, in its true spirit, it must be remembered, deeply concerns itself with the spiritual development of its followers. Such a development cannot take place in a socially stagnant situation. The very logic of development involves change. Dynamics of an individual's spiritual development is deeply related with that of social development around him/her. This inter­ active relationship becomes much mora significant in case of a community. The spiritual development of a community cannot be thought of in a social vacuum. Only those who stand to lose fear change and proceed to rationalise it with the help of religion as they understand it. Unfortu­ nately the limitation of their understanding becomes the limitation of religion itself. Thus the Divine which is supposed to be infinite in its potentialities is severely reduced to the finite and purged of all its potentialities by finite minds of fearful of change.

Such a limited view of religion reduces it to a non-changing function of a changing society and more of a past relic than a vital force in the present. It also opposes human freedom in its endeavours to bring about purposeful change in keeping with the changing society in the name of immutability of Divine Law."''

A.A. Engineer further says: "The Quran, however, 344 required the believers to devote themselves to the creation of a better society both materially and spiritually ,..". 57 On the same lines, Balraj Purl in his article "Personal Law and Muslim Identity" discusses the potential capacity of Islam to change by quoting Dr. Iqbal's state­ ment: "Change is, according to Quran, one of the greatest signs of God. He [Dr. Iqbal] therefore regrets the immobility of Islam for the last 500 years largely due to the decline in the spirit of Ijtihad."'^ Our perspective, therefore, would be that, Islam is not, (at least theologically) against bringing about changes in the society; on the contrary, it encourages progress and change towards betterment oT the social life of man. Here one has to come to grips with a social question: If Islam is not against change then why do the attitudes contemporary Islamic societies reflect conservative/? We shall try to consider this question in the section on 'Islam in Practice* (pages 339-393). a) Islam. Unity and Integration First about unity and integration in Islam, it may please be noted that our points are on a pure theological plane. That is to say we shall quote from the Quran regarding the values of unity and integration in Islamic community.

Brackets mine. 345

The history of development of nationalism both in the West and in the East shows that at least in some societies religion has played a big role in the building up of a nation. Unity is the essence of nationalism.

From this point of view, the spirit of unity in Islam is highly significant. It conceives unity in two ways: (1)

Unity of Allah, and (2) Unity of Ummah (Islamic community).

The interesting point here is that, the Islamic community has its orientation towards unity of Allah. Everything, stems from Allah and finally will return to Him only. CO "Unto God we all return." In this connection Jami writes: "Though art absolute being; all else is but a phantasm. For in thy universe all beings are one. Thy world captivating beauty, in order to display its perfec­ tions, appears in thousands of mirrors, but it is one.

Although thy beauty accompanies all the beautiful, in truth the unique and incomparable Hearth-enslaver is one."Tt6 0

Unity of the Islamic community exists in the sense that an Islamic community forms a nation no matter how grouped or scattered its members are. The basic question is that whoever accepts Islam automatically enters the Islamic community and unites with others firmly. This community may consist of blacks or whites,men or women, rich or poor. To whichever country he/she belongs, his/her unity with the Islamic community is regarded as fundamental. 346

Unity has also another symbolic significance. When everyone and everything is created by and is from CJod and its final return is to God, all the members of the Uraraah are bound together to reach their final religious destinies.

M. Abduh says: "the Quran is the unifier of Muslims, Not only it is one unique and definite source of legisla­ tion but it also speaks to all Muslims and specifically urges them to unite and to vigorously oppose oppression,"

Every Muslim surrenders himself to God; consequently Islamic community rallies round one unique centre. This naturally leads to the integration of the Islamic community socially as well as politically. This integration of the Islamic community can be: (1) the integration of a Muslim country, (2) a Muslim community in a country, or (3) the collective integration of Muslim communities in different countries.

Islam, therefore, has all the theoretical poten­ tials of building an international unity among the Muslims of the world. It is not for a particular group of people but for each and every person. No one can deny the need and necessity of socio-political integration in the process of modernization of a society. Of course, whether this unity has been actually achieved by Islam or not is an important but a different matter. (We shall discuss this question at a later stage.) 347

In this connection, the following statement of the first Shi'iah Imam, Ali, is eloquent: "Muslims and non- Muslims are all equal under law, their blod is like our blood."^^

Imam Ali not only wanted to unite Muslims and non- Muslims, but also he aimed at abolishing the intense clannish relationships which had splintered the Arab society into different tribal pieces. b) Islam and Democracy This brings us to another aspect of the problem: The inter-relation between Islam and Democracy.

Some scholars like A.B. Shah and G.E. Von Grunebaum believe that Islam has not a democratic structure. It is an absolute and authoritarian creed. G.E. Von Grunebaum says: "Islamic thought is authoritarian. Political absolutism parallels the theological absolutism of God's relations to His Creatures." ^

A.B. Shah puts the same point in this way: Islam is "Inhospitable to the growth of a secular democratic polity. For instance, it does not recognize the sovereignty of man, neither of the individual nor of the people as a whole, ...".

Such interpretations have possibly their bases in the Quranic verses that describe sovereignty of God as absolute and beyond any power. Take, for instance, the 348

Quranic verse which says: "Unto whom belongeth the soverei­ gnty of the heavens and the earth and all that is between them."^^

In this connection we may submit the following points: (1) Theological absolutism and political authori­ tarianism are not logically linked with one another in an irrevocable manner. Sovereignty and Absolutism of God are entirely different from the authoritarian government and political sovereignty. Allah's sovereignty is absolute, but it is absolute only in relation to Divine Justice. In other words, from the Islamic point of view, God's sove­ reignty is absolute in its absolute justness.

One can, therefore, take a legitimate position that the notion of Allah's sovereignty and absolutism is totally opposed to dictatorial absolutism of a political government.

(2) We must also bear in mind that the political structure of a society is not necessarily a mere reflection of its theology. Social reality and socio-cultural struc­ ture are not perfect logical categories. Contradictions and inconsistencies exist in the total structure of a society. As a matter of fact, Christian theology is equally absolute. And yet the leading Christian societies are democratic. How could this happen?

The real research, therefore, should be to identify the democratic elements in the theological^socio-cultural, and economic structure of Islam. This researcher feels 349 that such democratic elements are potentially present in the overall structure of Islam. Some critics say that democratic institutional characteristics are absent in Islamic societies. However, this is a challenging subject for another research work, it may be related to the peculiar historical, economic and political dimensions of those societies.

Along with the idea that government is Allah's sovereignty there is also the belief among Muslims parti­ cularly Shi'iahs that Ummah is under the leadership of Imam or Khalifah who is Vice-gerent of Allah.

Consequently it is obvious that though Allah is the absolute commanding power over being, He has granted the leadership of the Islamic community to one of the members of the community, i.e. Imam, who is learned, wise, pious, and just one among all.

There is another important point. Grant of the leadership of the Ummah to one of the members of the community by God cannot necessarily lead to a type of dictatorship; we must ponder over the profoundly signi­ ficant fact that, there is no religious hierarchy in Islam. This fact has tremendous secular and political implications.

When ideally, there is no religious hierarchy in Islam and when the State and religion are regarded as 350 inseparable from each other, power cannot be concentrated in the hands of one person since it passes from the whole Islamic community to the leader of the community who is after all one of the members of that society and is chosen by Divine Will as the best qualified person, in Shi'ism.

(3) Another feature of Islamic government is that it seeks to prevent decision-making by one single individual (which is the characteristic of any authoritarian govern­ ment). The religious canon insists on group-consultation prior to taking a decision on the government level.

Such emphasis on consultation for decision-making comes very close to the ideals of a democratic government.

If history tells us about many Khalifahs who ruled over the community in a very harsh dictorial manner it should not be taken to be of conclusive significance. It should not be misinterpreted to mean that dictatorial monarchies are sanctioned in Islam. Islamic ideals never accept superiority of one person, whosoever he is, over another person. It also does not accept obedience of any man to any other man. Superiority goes to Allah alone and obedience is to Him only. One scholar points out characteristic of an Islamic Government when he speaks of economic system of Islam in relation to the attributes of capitalism and socialism. He considered "economic exploitation to be the worst form 351 of injustice, ... The principles of Islam did not justify a government with absolute power, ... the absolute power of capital is just as reprehensible, if not more so, as dictatorship. While the individuals who are ruled by their desires for capital lose sight of a wide range of religious values, those whom capital exploits suffer economic and social injustice. Islam favored cooperation in society not ruthless competition. Because the government that is to mediate ought only rule with the consent of and through consultation with the people, ...".

Islam and Modernization We shall now examine the inter-relations between Islam and modernization. First, we shall state a few basic factors of Islam and its character as a religion and how, by and large, they may positively contribute to the process of modernization. Secondly, after having done this we shall mention a few original theological precepts which throw light on various customary aspects of social institutions. a) Islam and This-worldly Life No other religion is as strongly this-worldly than Islam. Islam in its ideals pays attention not only to spiritual life and moral values but also to the material aspects of social life.

Emphasis mine. 352

Particularly Shi'ism, unlike some other religions, e.g. the Roman Catholic, does not concentrate only on the soul of man. It keeps a balance between physical mainte­ nance and development as well as purification and piety of one's soul. b) Islam. Social Glasses, and Achievement The social structure of Islam is relatively more congenial to an open society which puts a premium on achieving.status.

Men in all modern societies consider social classes as a very natural phenomenon. It is the normal manifesta­ tion of social stratification which is a universal fact. Hence, many social thinkers say that social classes are unavoidable. On the other hand, it is manifested that though classes are clearly a reality, the modern societies are open systems based on the orientation of achieving status system which is one sure sign of modernization.

There is also the Marxist point of view which is ideologically committed to the realization of a classless society.

Muhammad Qutb in his book 'Islam: The Misunderstood Religion' discusses that the idea of classes is absent in Islam.6 9 He writes: "The class system is based on the wrong assumption that property means power and that the class which owns property has the power as well. Such a class will exercise an influence over the legislative power, 353

Consequently such a class will, by direct or indirect means, make the legislations which protect itself and subject the common people to its own authority, thus depriving them of their legal rights. In the light of the above-mentioned definition of classes it may be truly said that there has never been a class system in Islam. This can be clearly seen from the following facts: There are no laws in Islam which aim at keeping the property in hands of particular persons. The Holy Quran plainly says: "In order that it may not merely make a circuit between the wealthy among you" (59:7). Therefore, Islam made laws that ensured continual fragmentation and redistribution of wealth. According to the Islamic law of inheritance the inherited property should be distributed among a large number of persons. ... The Holy Quran prescribed that "if at the time of division (of inheritance) other relatives or orphans or poor are present, feed them out of the (property) and speak to them words of kindness and justice" (4:S),7 0 B. Sheik Ali also argues in the same vein when he studies the religious aspects of Islam. He says: the new community (i.e. Islamic community at the time of its forma- tion) was to have no hierarchy, no distinction of caste, colour or class.7 1

Brackets mine. 354

The other characteristic of any modern society is the achieving character which tends to make the society an open one. It is said by some of the scholars that achieve- 72 meat is a value according to Islamic principles. Islam is a religion which stands for an achieving status-system. Even salvation is not granted. It must be achieved by the person. "Striving towards various forms of worship actively seeking to improve one's relationships, and conscientiously working towards the common good, and upholding justice are all a necessary part of the righteous path leading to salvation. "'^•^ c) Islam, Brotherhood, and Equality Brotherhood is a basic humanitarian concept in all religions. All religions have emphasized the values and sentiments of brotherhood among members of a society or a community. Islam specially exhorts for it.

But the concept of religious brotherhood has a deeper meaning in Islam. In a mosque all can pray. There is no distinction of sex, race, language, sect, and so on.

This researcher is aware that the concept of religious brotherhood is different from the concept of equality as a modern value. Nevertheless the deeper meaning of brotherhood « in Islam comes close to the modern concept of equality.

* The term equality means to us no superiority of anyone over anyone else in social, economic, and political spheres of social life. (researcher). 355

There are many thinkers who mention that Islam stands for equal rights, e.g. 3.H. Nasr (Ideals andrtealities o f Islam), N.M. Siddiqi (Women in Islam), M. Qutb (Islam: The Misunderstood Religion). Here are some quotations from the Quran and Hadith.

The Quranic verse says: "0 mankind, we have first created you from one male and one female, and then have made you into many branches and different sects that ye may know one another. Lol the noblest of you in the sight of Allah, is the most pious among you. Lol Allah is knower and Aware.®"'^^ (XLIX:13).

What is meaningful in this expression is "the noblest among you". He who is the most pious is the noblest one. Thus nobility comes on the basis of piety. It is not based on any other quality or criterion such as wealth, prestige, knowledge, family status, power, and so on. Hence this kind of nobility cannot generate feelings of superiority or inferiority of other persons. Since nobility of man is judged by Allah alone and not by any human being, it should not bring greater advantage to one person than another. This finally means that in this worldly life every indivi­ dual is regarded as equal to the others.

* Hadith • Sayings of the Prophet and Imams. (Researcher)

@ Translated by this researcher from Arabic language. 356

It has been said in the Hadith that "All people are equal, as equal as the teeth of a comb. There is no claim of merit of an Arab over a non-Arab, or of a white over a black person, or of a male over a female. Only God-fearing people merit a preference with God."'^ (Hadith). Here again a person's merit is judged only by God, all people are equal in the eyes of God.

Another verse from the Quran says: "0 people! be careful of (your duty to) your Lord, Who created you from a single being and created its mate of the same (kind) and spread from these two many men and women."1 ft (IV:1),

In this respect, one verse of the Quran cuts across the limits of a nation and even those of the Islamic commu­ nity. It says: "And whoever does good deeds, whether male or female, and he or she is a believer, these shall enter the garden and they shall not be dealth with a jot unjustly"7 '7 (IV:124). This Quranic verse does not make any distinction between Muslims or non-Muslims. It clearly says whoever does good deeds is a believer. This verse does not take into account only worshippers of God, but looks upon all those who do good deeds as believers, whoever the benefactor is. In support of this researcher's point of view, Prof. 3.T. Lokhandwalla in his article "The Position of Women Under Islam" says: "But now the consolidation is the miracle, not the continuation and working for the principles 357

laid down in the Quran of achieving human equality and human brotherhood. To take one example, the Prophet on migration to Medina, instituted the principle of brother­ hood and equality between warring people, Muslims and non- Muslims; Arabs and non-Arabs. But when the Arab empire came, the only entry for the non-Arab Muslims was either through clientage to an Arab tribal or adoption by it. The Arab practice dominated the new religion and the Prophet's ideas were circumscribed within local customs and conven­ tions and the spirit behind the Prophet's dispensation was encompassed within the social and political requirements of the first two centuries of Islam."

At another stage, Prof. Lokhandwalla discusses the influence exerted by the norms and traditions of the Imperial Arab society; "Most of these traditions seem to be spurious but have found a place in the authoritative collections with a view to authenticate the norms and traditions of the Imperial Arab society of the second and third centuries of Islam."^

In the political context, equality manifests itself when man is free. This right of freedom is considered to be of central importance in the modern world.

Islamic ideals of the political rights envisage freedom of the individual as the basic right of any indi­ vidual. As M. Abduh (Egyptian reformist) observed: "For 358 many years, Muslim rulers had been anything but just. Setting themselves as examples of cruelty and deceit, these rulers enslaved the free when Islam exhorted them to free the enslaved."

The right of freedom is inextricably combined with freedom of thought, A person who is permitted to think as well as to express his thought freely and without any sort of fear can be considered as a free citizen.

Absence of the right of free thinking is virtually an absence of democratic rights. But our contention is that this absence is not an indivisible part of the original or basic religious structure of Islam.

In the context of freedom of thought and action, A.A. Engineer looks at the matter from another angle and writes: "Islam, one may point out here, means submission and hence by implication negates freedom of thought and action. I am afraid though literally true, it is not the spirit of the Quranic teachings. Submission is demanded not to any unreasonable and tyrannical authority and not in any absolute sense. The Quran, it must be noted, demands submission to hududallah which means certain limits set by Allah. Absolute individual freedom may be an attractive philosophical concept but is not necessarily a socially

Emphasis mine. 359

beneficial and meaningful proposition. Freedom must be exercised within certain socially acceptable limits and that is what is precisely implied by hududallah. The notion of social acceptability itself is subject to change in a changing society. The limits may accordingly expand or contract. How the limits, one may then ask, could be set. What would then, if I may so put it, be the limits of these limits? The limit of these limits would be deter­ mined by fundamental values which are transcendental and eternal. Equality and justice are two of such values which cannot be compromised.S i

Another Islamic scholar writes: "Prison tenns were given out of political considerations, not because of edicts of the Quran. People in position of authority were afraid that one free thinker would alert another and light would be shed on political, as well as religious issues until all positions of authority would be threatened. It is politics then that persecutes thought and religion."8 2

Again in the context of equality of sexes the Quranic versus run: "Lol men who surrender unto Allah and women who surrender, and men who believe and women who believe, and men who obey, and women who obey, and men who speak the truth, and women who speak the truth, and men who persevere (in righteousness) and women who persevere, and men who are humble and women who are humble, and men who give alms and women who give alms, and men who fast 360 and women who fast, and men who guard their modesty and women who guard (their modesty), and men who remember Allah and women who remember, Allah hath prepared for them forgiveness and a vast reward." -^ (33:36).

Referring to the above Quranic verses, A.A.Engineer concludes that the Quran "in spiritual and metaphysical sense accords complete equality to both the sexes and thus paves way, in times to come, for equality in concrete and material terms too when society develops potential for appropriate institutions."

On the same point of equality between men and women Engineer's comments are interesting. He writes: "Such an attitude towards women (that puts so many restrictions on women) had nothing to do with the Quranic position. It was purely a feudal attitude which, through corresponding interpretation of the Quran during the medieval ages came to be thought to have religious sanction. Thus the received tradition became the religious tradition. One must distinguish between the two traditions. The religious tradition as expounded by the holy Quran is much more conducive to according equal status to both the sexes in the present socio-economic condition which has the nece­ ssary institutional framework for the true liberation of women. The time has come when the Quranic ideology and the institutional framework coincide with each other for the liberation of women." -^ 361

Some people however may object to this formulation. They take the position that equality is a modern secular concept. It could not just exist in ancient religions including Islam. In this respect, we would like to mak© one point clear. We do not suggest that equality with all its implications is manifested in contemporary Islamic societies. Our only contention is that the spirit of equality which is an ideological component of moderni­ zation, exists in the true teachings of Islam.

A considerable number of Muslim scholars who are quoted above, take this view. More significantly, some critics of Islam support this contention, e.g. Muller.

Our argument, therefore, is just this: secular values like equality are not suddenly born in vacuum. After all, they too have a historical background. (Even Marx and Engels have held that Christianity in its early phases was a religion of the oppressed. Later on it changed.) The roots of secular values can, therefore, be traced back to religious teachings. The Quran makes a positive plea for equality. It also reflects a protest against social injustice. d) Islam and Economic Equality There is also the question of economic equality among all members of a society.

Though Islamic law does not reject private ownership, it is against accumulation of wealth. In case of private 362 ownership one has to pay different kinds of taxes. Further, one's inheritance should be distributed among members of the family.

As regards the question of equal legal rights in the economic sphere one scholar says:

"In economic terms, natural resources in the Universe, such as land and capital, general circumstances such as shortages for reasons of war or disasters, as well as laws of nature - all these belong to the whole of society, and all its members have equal shares and rights of access to them. No man has the right to claim a bigger share since he does not create or generate power indepen­ dently. ...

He should know that he is not the creator. Ha should give the weaker members of the society the extra income which is due to the productivity of these natural resources that are used by him beyond his equal share. ...

Differences in income (in Islamic society) could not be very big and they are limited by differences in human capacity for work and not by individual claims on natural resources. Income related to these resources is a collective claim and its fruits should be divided equally."

In the Quran, Ctod says: "0 Ye who believe I spend of the good things which Ye have earned, and of that which 363

We bring forth from the earth for you, and seek not the bad (with intent) to spend thereof (in charity) when Ye would not take it for yourselves save with disdain; and know that Allah is absolute, owner of praise." (11:267.)

'UVhatever alms Ye spend or vow Ye vow, Lot Allah knoweth it. Wrong-doers have no helpers." (11:270).

"Those who spend their wealth by night and day, by stealth and openly, verily their reward is with their lord, and there shall no fear come upon them neither shall they grieve." (11:274).^^ e) Islam and Education Education is considered as one of the main prerequi­ sites for modernization of any society. This is a point on which all social scientists agree. Until and unless a society achieves an advanced level of education, it cannot march towards progress and development.

One of the very disturbing deficiencies in the Third World countries is in the sphere of education. In the Third World societies there is (1) non-availability of educational facilities and institutions, and (2) the standard of educational programmes is very low and poor.

In general, the Muslim countries, among the Third World countries, are not exceptions to this. They too suffer from an educational deficiency and educational backwardness. 364

If one searches through history of Islam one can find that Islam has encouraged education in the sense of grasp and diffusion of knowledge. This is the theme of a book written by Dr. S.H. Nassr entitled 'Science and Civil­ ization in Islam'. In this book he introduces some of the internationally famous Muslim scientists and scholars who were top masters in their fields of specialization. For instance, Avicenna in Medicine, Al-Biruni in astrology, Khaje Nasir-e-Toosi in Astrology, Khayyam in Mathematics, Al-Farabi in Chemistry, etc. Avicenna's book on the simpler drug, pathology and therapeutics, general diseases, and pharmacopoeia, entitled 'Canon' ('al-ghanun') has been translated into different languages of the world. It was the most important textbook in European medical schools until the mid-17th century. In certain oriental countries it is influential even today.'^

The remarkable thing is that this Islamic culture, could produce such eminent scholars and could create a continuous tradition of enlightened learning,

Annie Besant in her survey of education in Islamic countries writes: "Universities arose, and students flocked to them from all parts of Europe, for in Christendom science was unknown, astronomy and mathematics had vanished, chemistry had not risen from its Egyptian tomb.'* 91

Damascus was regarded as one of the great centres of steel industry for some centuries in the world. Muslims 365 had invented flour mills and water irrigation system by the application of both wind and water powers for the first Q2 time in the world.' The question is: How did science and technology subsequently decline in Muslim countries?

Ahmad Y, Al-Hassan in his article "Science and Technology in Islam" tries to analyse this phenomenon. Some of the reasons, according to him, are: (1) colonization of Muslim societies by Western countries, (2) the process of accumulation of capital in the West which contributed to the rise of mercantilistic capitalism, (3) disruption or diversion of international trade routes.

It is to be noted that none of the factors behind the decline of science and technology in Islamic countries, as given by Al-Hassan, has any connection with the Islamic thought. The Islamic thought according to him puts a premium on the acquisition of knowledge and education in science and technology. "'^

We now cite to substantiate this: 1) Education is regarded by Islam as a duty and is compulsory for every person in the society. G.E. Von Grunebaum writes: "According to a repeated Prophetic tradi­ tion, search for knowledge is incumbent on every believer, male or female." 94

2) Knowledge, in the Islamic view is sacred, Al-alim 366

(He who knows), one of the names of God, comes from the word Ilm (Scientia).^^

3) The importance of knowledge in ideals of Islam is obvious in the first revelation to the Prophet. This Quranic verse says:

if, a) "Read (recite) : In the name of thy Lord who Createth, b) Createth man from a clot. c) Read (recite) : And thy Lord is the most Bounteous, d) Who teacheth by the pen, 96 e) Teacheth man that which he knew not.*' The Prophet Mohammad says; "Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave."9 7 "Who speaks of knowledge, praises God, who seeks it adores God; who dispenses instruction in it bestows alms; and who imparts it to its fitting objects performs an act of devotion to God. Know­ ledge enables its possessor to distinguish what is forbidden from what is not; it lights the way to heaven; it is our friend in the desert, our society in solitude, our companion when bereft of friends, it guides us to happiness; it sustains us in misery; it is our ornament in the company of friends; ...".'^

Here is another profound saying of the Prophet: "The ink of the scholar is more valuable than the blood of the martyr." 99

'^ Brackets mine. 367

Imam Ali, the first Imam of Shi'iahs, defines science in a very characteristic way: "The essence of science is the enlightenment of the heart; truth is its principal object; inspiration its guide; reason its acceptor; God its inspirer; the words of man its utterer."

In the same vein, the Prophet urges: "One hour's meditation on the work of the Creator is better than seventy years of Prayer. To listen to the instructions of science and learning for an hour is more meritorious than attending the funeral of a thousand martyrs, and more meritorious than standing up in prayer for a thousand nights. "^"^^

An endless pursuit of knowledge, consistent culti­ vation of skills and an attitude of innovative adventure are essential things in any programme of modernization in the educational sphere. Islam has potentially a rich heritage for this. f) Islam and Secularization This is a much debated topic. Some people believe that all religions including Islam are concerned with only spiritual and moral aspects of life with a total disregard for the this-worldly and material part of it.

Here we shall leave all other religions and talk only about Islam to find out (apart from whatever we said about education and Islam) whether or not what some scholars 36a

like G.E. Von Grunebaum say that: "On the whole, Quranic

and 'secular' science never coalesced"^^^ is true.

First of all we should determine what we mean by secularization. Secularism has a variety of meanings:

1) Separation of State from religion.

2) Decline of institution of religion in the society. 3) Lesser and lesser relevance of religious values, and some other definitions.

If one defines secularization in the way as Niyazi Berkes does it: "Secularism simply means the autonomy of the various sectors of social life from the domination of 103 religious ideas as ultimate normative values." Then it is clear that this kind of secularization is far away from Islam; because, Islam is interwoven with the different activities such as economic, political, educational, etc. Islamic religious ideas have penetrated in each and every

aspect of man's life in the Islamic societies to such an extent that it cannot be separated at all.

Dr. Nasr says: "Islam does not distinguish between

the religious and secular. Rather it takes the whole of man's life into account and tries to give meaning to all

of his actions."-"-^^

There is no room for doubt that Islam deals with each and every aspect of man's life from its own outlook and according to its ideals and values. In other words, 369

Islam is not concerned only with spiritual aspects of life but has also developed ideals, models, and values for the entire society and social life.

One important aspect of secularization deals with material aspect of life. In other words, one should find out whether or not Islam is, as many believe about all religions, concerned only with spiritual and moral aspects of life and has forgotten the worldly, material part of that.

H. Askari's understanding of the material aspects in Islam is expressed in the following words: "Quran clearly invites man to ponder over the mysteries of nature and declares that the world has been subjugated to man for which he should be grateful. Quran thus liberates man from his ancient slavery to the physical environment and paves the way for the development of science,"

In brief, one can say that secularization in the sense of separation of religion from social life of man, or decline of religion in the society does not exist in ideals of Islam. But the non-separation of religion and social life in Islam does not go against development of material aspects of life, Islam pays a great deal of attention to development of material aspects of life and encourages it. Hence from an Islamic point of view there never arises any question of secularization, in the sense of separation of religion from different aspects of social life. 370

Modernization of Social Relations We shall discuss this inter-relationship with refer­ ence to (a) Purdah, (b) Polygamy. a) Islam and Purdah Purdah (Chadoor in Persian language • Veil in English) for women is a well known custom in the Islamic societies. In many of the Islamic societies it is compulsory for women to wear Purdah, Now the real question is: Is Purdah a religious norm?

The social reformists, and intellectual Muslims reject the wearing of Purdah by Muslim women mainly on grounds of the violation of women's fundamental right of freedom. They believe that there is no compulsion for wearing purdah under religious command. For these people compulsion of purdah is a restriction on the minds of women. In this context M.M. Saddiqi writes: "There is no doubt that the purdah system as it exists among middle- class Muslims has nothing Islamic about it. It is purely a non-religious social custom." M. Abduh, Egyptian thinker, takes the same position: "If there were statements in Islamic shariat that dictated the use of the veil as is common amongst some Muslims of today, I should not be discussing this issue, God's order should definitely be obeyed. We do not, however, find any such statement. It is merely a custom that arose out of mixing with other nations. This custom was adopted. 371 exaggerated and given a religious cloak when religion is 107 innocent of dictating such habits."

Maryam Jaraeela in her book •Islam in Theory and Practice', accepts wearing of veil as a necessary article of women's clothing. It should be noted that the same author in another book of hers 'Islam versus the West' writes: "Such customs like veil were all imported customs and had nothing to do with the Quran."

Many Muslims say that wearing of veil is necessary as it has its sanction in the Quranic verse: "And let them (women) not display their beauty and ornaments except what (must ordinarily) appear thereof. And let them draw their garment over their bosoms and not display their beauty except in the presence of their husband, or their own father, or their husband's fathers, or their own sons, or their husband's sons, or their own brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons. ..."^^^ (.UIV:31). What is important to be considered is this that the injunctions "not to display their beauty and ornaments" and "to draw their garment over their bosoms" do not mean wearing purdah in such a fashion as it is in the Islamic countries.

Moin Shakir's view is well worth quoting: "The practice of seclusion or veil exists in the pre-Islamic times. In the same way a number of customs which are now treated as Islamic have nothing to do with Islam." 372

He traces the tradition of veiling back as far as 1500-2000 B.C. among the Assyrians. Ha writes: "The custom of veiling existed before the advent of Islam. Its origin goes far back as Assyrian codes {1500-2000 B.C.). It was also prevalent in the Byzantine empire. The Prophet did not abolish it. It is argued that upto the time of the four Caliphs, the women kept the face, hands and the feet unveiled." S. Numani also contends that the slave girls did not observe veiling while it was common 112 among nobility.

M.H. Hauf who does not uphold compulsion in the matter of the veil, believes that the meaning of the Quranic verses 'not display her body' is that a woman should not expose her flesh by wearing, e.g. miniskirts, hot pants, or going topless since it degrades her dignity and leads to many social problems for both the sexes. A woman must keep her modesty, and the style of her clothing depends on her job but she must always cover the parts of the body which provoke passion, and behave decently and with dignity. ^•'•^

In 1900, Qasim Amin, an Egyptian advocate strongly urged the removal of the veil which he considered as offensive and degrading for women.

This researcher, looking at the Quranic injunctions and their different interpretations, desires to express his views in the matter of veil (purdah) in the following way: 373

What is important in Islamic thought are the norms of modesty and chastity for both the sexes. If Islam tells women to cover their bodies and not to expose their flesh to the opposite sex, the main purpose of this injunction is to foster these norms.

History shows that women in pre-Islamic era in Arab society, were looked upon as merely means of sexual grati­ fication for men. This had pushed women to the lowest level. Hence, to uplift women's social status, Islam, as the first step exhorts them to keep themselves away from immoralities which destroy her individuality and personality.

In this context, finally, it may be noted that some advocates of women's liberation movement have protested against the commercial exploitation of the women's body.

The attempts of Islam to improve women's social condition have not yielded enough because of the inability (deliberate or accidental) of many people to understand the true meaning of Islamic teachings besides their inability to adopt, to apply, and to harmonize these injunctions in the context of the fast-changing world.

According to Islamic teachings women should cover their bodies as men should do so, equally. The aim is that both the sexes should keep their chastity and should not expose their bodies. Non-exposure of different parts of the body does not mean merely wearing a long piece of black 374 cloth, i.e. veil. Chastity and modesty are moral concepts of social life and should be created in the mind (according to the Quran in the heart) of any person, man as well as woman.

Moral values are inner-understanding of any person, and come from self-realization and consciousness. Chastity and modesty are matters of giving many years of continuous training to both sexes to bring them up to a high standard of self-consciousness.

If one accepts that Islam (of course, true Islamic teachings) looks at both sexes as equal and gives them equal chances to enjoy social rights, therefore, when men can wear modern fashion of coat, trousers, and tie, and when this is not considered to be something against Islam, women can also wear suitable articles of clothing with entire modesty without exposing their bodies. If a woman keeps her modesty and chastity while adopting proper and modest articles of clothing in accordance with norms and customs of the society in which she is living, this is never against Islam. b) Islam and Ideals of ferriage (Polygamy and Monogamy) Marriage is highly respected in the social ideals of Islam. Every Muslim must get married at the proper age unless he/she has a serious reason for not getting married. It is not also obligatory since no one is pennitted to compel a person to get married. He/she must marry a person 375 whom he/she accepts as a partner for the whole of his/her life. It is regarded not only as a personal, social, and religious duty but also a factor of bringing grace (Baraka, in Arabic language - Barakat, in Persian literature) to the couple and the family.

In this context, something needs to be said about polygamy, I4any people think of Islam as a religion that permits polygamy which degrades the individuality of the Muslim woman.

It is true that Islam has permitted the man a second marriage, but this is certainly not for the purpose of sexual gratification which is actually manifested in the lives of some people.

There are rules and restrictions upon getting married to more women than one. Take, for instance, the case of a woman who cannot bear a child and is infertile. In such a case her husband can get permission from the court to get married to another women but along with it the first wife is allowed to ask for divorce from the court.

If polygamy was practised in the early days of Islam it was only for the purpose of supporting the widows and the children of those who died in different wars at that time. This is a point which A. B. Shah concedes in his article "Islam and Humanism".

There are further restrictions on getting married to 376

more wives than one. In case of an acceptable reason for the second marriage, men are advised to select the wife first from among the widows who have children and are poor, then from among widows who do not have children, preference then should be given to women who have no father or brother to support them and they themselves also do not earn enough to support their life. Polygamy for the purpose of sex-pleasure is not permitted by Islam. It is a big mistake of many Muslims as well as non-Muslims to think that Islam has permitted its followers, as an advan­ tage to men, to practise polygamy to enjoy more sex pleasure. Polygamy is not an ideal of the Islamic doctrine.

As a matter of fact, polygamy is not encouraged by the doctrine of Islam. The Quranic verse that some people refer to as a permission for practising polygamy is not quoted fully or properly and has been misinter­ preted. It is this: "Give unto orphans their wealth, do not return evil for good, cease not their wealth and attach it not to thy own. Lo! that is a great sin. And if Ye fear that Ye may not do justice to orphans, then, marry of the women, who seem good to you, two or three or four; and if Ye feared that Ye cannot do justice, then one or else keep Ye to your rightful possession. This is nearer to your not doing tyranny." (4:2 and 3). This is not a passport for polygamy, because the very same vevsQ immediately adds what is also ignored: "But if you

* Translated from Arabic to English by this researcher. 377

should fear that you will not do justice, then confine yourself to one wife."•'••'•''' (IV:3).

Prof. Lokhandwalla also argues in this vein. In support of his argument, he quotes Zamakhshari (Third Century H.J. Islamic Philosopher) to the effect that verse 3 from Chapter Four in the Quran indicates marriage with one woman only, 118

Lokhandwalla closely investigates this matter and says that the same Quranic verse aimed at ameliorating the condition of orphan girls. He says: "It was customary for tribal leaders or the elders of the families to take under their protection the orphan girls. This protection gave them also an interest in the property of the orphans and to avoid creation of any conflicting interests, if they gave the orphans in marriage to others, the guardians themselves used to marry their wards to maintain a complete control over their property. It is to correct this social evil that the Quran permits limited polygamy, but if that social evil does not exist, and if that social evil is not the cause of polygamous marriages, the verse becomes irrelevant and the polygamy also ceases to have a direct Quranic sanction. till9

There are also other Quranic verses in support of what we said, e.g.: "And indeed you cannot do justice between women, even when you are eager to be (completely 37S just)." (IV:129)12 0

Many of the thinkers like Jalal Abdoh say: "The Quran clearly laid down that one cannot have more than one wife if one were not able to treat them equally. As it is obvious that it is beyond the capacity of an ordinary man to observe such a condition; what the Quran 121 was really prescribing was tantamount to monogamy."

Balraj Puri opines in the following way: "Polygamy is permitted but not commended. If the conditions prescribed by the Quran for permitting a second wife were to be enforced, polygamy would simply become impossible. "-^^^

A.A. Engineer in his review of 'Women and Poli­ tical Participation in India and Pakistan' edited by Gail iMinault, makes an interesting observation: "The Anjuman- e-Khawatin-e-Islam founded by Sheik Abdullah held at Faridkot, Punjab, in March 1918 and attended by 500 delegates passed a resolution disapproving of the practice of polygamy. The resolution said: "... The kind of polygamy which is practised by certain sections of the Muslims is against the true spirit of the Quran and of Islam and that it is the duty of educated women to exercise their influence among their relations to put an 123 end to this practice." "^ 379

This researcher desires to maintain that the only prescribed and privileged form of marriage in normal conditions in Islam is monogamy and that is all.

3) Islam and Divorce

One may deal with the question of divorce in Islam which is known to be a right arbitrarily preserved for man to exercise it at any moment and at his own sweet will. (In reality, Muslim men in all countries had freely enjoyed it. Kven today they continue to do so in many Muslim countries.) Apart from the movements and reforms which have taken place in different Islamic coun­ tries, this researcher would like to invite attention to the original teachings of Islam in this respect.

Although Islam has permitted divorce it has also been subjected to certain conditions. One cannot divorce one's wife simply because one just desires to do so. The husband is bound to observe certain conditions before getting his wife divorced.

Contrary to what some Muslim men have practised, divorce is a very complex and long process in Islam. If divorce is permitted it is for the purpose of forestalling 3B0 problems in a family in which couples cannot live together any more, ^t the same time it is denounced because it naturally leads to a breakdown of the family.

Islam has dealt with this problem and has given per- mission for divorce. But this right has been considerably misused.

S.T. Lokhandwalla believes that: "The Quran deals with the law of divorce (talaq) with great elaboration which indicates that it was trying to overhaul the pre- Islamic usages and contain the control of the wali over 124 the ward, and the husband over the wife."

The Quran also "recommends to take recourse to two arbiters in case of disputes between the parties before resorting to final separation. It lays stress on the 125 proper maintenance of the wife."

"The Prophet provided for divorce as a right to be exercised by both parties to marriage. ... It should, however, be pointed out that the Prophet declared, 'of all things permissible the most displeasing to Allah is divorce'."

4) Islam and Conversion We shall now take up another vital aspect of Islam which has important implications for modernization and secularization. This is conversion.

Some scholars believe that Islam is a religion of 381 the sword in which conversion is a matter of compulsion. They also say that history of Islamic conquest provides evidences of forced conversion. If this view is accepted then naturally Islam stands far from democratic values of freedom.

One may ask: if Islam does not approve, but even rejects, compulsory conversion, then how is it that history, many times, has shown leaders who made conversion to Islam a matter of force? There have been seen some rulers who had massacred many people who were not ready to convert to Islam.

We can consider this highly controversial issue by making a distinction between (1) the true and original teachings of Islam on the one hand, and (2) the history of Islamic countries on the other.

The spirit of Islam is against compulsion in reli­ gion. The Quranic verse very clearly says: "There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from errors. And he who rejecteth false deities and believeth in Allah hath grasped a firm handhold which 127 never break. Allah is hearer, knower." (Surah 11:256).

In the very next verse from the same Surah (Al- Baghara = the Cow), punishment of the disbelievers is left to the other world and by Allah's own judgement, hence the

Emphasis mine. 382

Quranic verse runs: "Allah is the Protecting friend of those who believe. He bringeth them out of darkness into light. As for those who disbelieve, their patrons are false deities. They bring them out of light into darkness. Such are rightful owners of the fire. They will abide there in."'^^ (Surah II:2$7).

Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad in his book, the Tarjuman al-Quran, refers to these two verses and writes: "There is no compulsion in religion (that is not the way to correct faith which is but an inward force). Without doubt the right way is clearly distinguishable from the wrong way. (It is for everyone to choose one of them.) If anyone discards the way of Taghut of violence and disorder, and takes to the way of God (and Peace) he has surely taken hold on a strong handle that shall not break (he cannot then have a fall). Remember that God is He who heareth and knoweth. (Surah 11:256).

God is the guardian of those who believe. He bringeth out into light those who sincerely believe in Him. As to those who believe not, viz. the Taghut variety, their false deities and their mischievous agents are their guardians, who bring them out from light into darkness. These are the companions of fire; therein will they dwell. "-^^^ (Surah 11:257).

Taghut (in Arabic Literature) - void. 383

The Quran has never commended compulsion in the matter of conversion. A true Muslim is one who knowingly, consciously, willingly, and in a spirit of freedom converts to and embraces Islam. God speaks to the Prophet: "Summon them to the way of the Lord with wisdom and with kindly warning." (The Quran XVI: 126) ."'•^^

The story of Tufayl b.'Amr is interesting. He came to Mecca and converted to Islam; on his return to his tribe, Banu Daws, his first attempt to bring his tribe- folk to Islam failed. Disheartened at the failure of his mission, he appealed to the Prophet to call down the curse of Allah on the Banu Daws Tribe. The Prophet Mohammad told him, "Return to the people and summon them to the faith, but deal gently with them." 131

The voluntary basis of conversion to Islam has also been pointed out by T.W. Arnold when he describes the situation in Bukhara and Samarqand, In these two regions opposition to the new Faith was very strong and violent. The conquerors made different efforts to gain proselytes. For example, they gave monetary rewards to those who attended Friday prayers, and even recited the Quran in Persian language (since the common language was Persian) instead of Arabic, so that it would be intelligible to all.»2

In this connection. Prof. S.T. Lokhandwalla, quoting 334 from Imam Qazali'3 fatwa, writes: Let me mention here that there are fatwas which prohibit conversion by force. One of such fatwas is attributed to Imam Wazali. There were fatwas issued in the middle ages when Jews and Christians in Basra were invited to Islam with economic benefits which show that conversion with gifts and presents were not to be allowed. 133

We may also refer to Thomas Arnold who looks upon Islam as a missionary religion and not a religion of the sword. According to him, it was the missionary nature of Islam that mainly contributed to its spread all over the world.

T.W. Arnold does not deny that there are historical instances in which both Islam and Christianity, resorted to force and violence to convert people. In the history of Christianity, for example, Charlemagne forced people to convert at the point of the sword, -^ King; CnuOn t also 135 forcibly uprooted paganism from his dominions.

In the history of Islam, Marvan, the last of the Umayyed Caliphs had said: "whosoever among the people of Egypt does not enter my religion and pray as I pray and follow my tenets, I will slay and crucify him." ^

He continues: Some rulers like al-Mutawakil, al- Hakim, and Tipu Sultan were not the missionaries of Islam 13-^'7

'^ Fatwa • Legal decision, Answer of a Mufti to a question of law. 3^5

(as they have used force and terror to convert people to Islam). But true missionaries are those "who won converts to the Muslim faith by peaceful means alone."

T.V.'. Arnold distinguishes between two types of followers of Islam and Christianity. Missionaries who are political, economics, and social instruments. They are basically different from the missionaries who have a thirst for pure souls which animates their true creed.13 -^ 9

To prove his point that Islam is a missionary religion, Arnold refers to the Quran and quotes, as follows, some of the Quranic verses which also support our contention that Islam does not accept forcible conversion:

"Summon thou to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and with kindly warning: dispute with them in the kindest manner."-^^^ {XVI:126).

"Say to those who have been given the Book and to the ignorant. Do you accept Islam? Then if they accept Islam, are they guided right: if they turn away, then thy duty is only preaching; and God's eye is on His servants."-'•^•'- (111:19).

"If one of those who joins gods with God ask an asylum of thee., grant him an asylum in order that he may

* It should be noted that Islam should not be con­ sidered a missionary religion as Christianity is. There is no missionary group in Islam as there is in Christianity. 386 hear the word of God; then let him reach his place of safety."^^^ (IX;6).

He also questions the image of a Muslim warrior with sword in one hand and the Quran in the other and regards it as a misinterpretation. He writes: "This mis­ interpretation of the Muslim wars of conquest has arisen from the assumption that wars waged for the extension of Muslim domination over the lands of unbelievers implied that the aim in view was their conversion." ^

"They who had joined other gods with God say,'Had He pleased, neither we nor our forefathers had worshipped aught but him; nor had we, apart from him, declared any­ thing unlawful.' Thus acted they who were before them. Yet is the duty of the apostle other than plain spoken preaching?"-^^''' {XVI: 37].

This researcher just desires to say that Islam being a religion of peace is basically not aggressive. The some of aggressive behaviour of/the Muslim rulers and persecutions in the name of Islam have nothing to do with the true teachings and spirit of Islam. These fanatical acts are mainly based on misunderstanding and misinterpretations of those who have interpreted Islamic injunctions according to their own political, economic, and social vested interests. In the context of conversion to Islam in India, Yogendra Singh writes: "The use of force in conversion 337

was more of an exception than rule and the most popular sources of conversion were the sufi saints who talked in an idiom very close to that of the popular Hindu saints and were less rigid and orthodox in their approach to religion." Yogendra Singh also quotes Aziz Ahmad*s point of view: "In the conversion of large masses of Indians to Islam the use of force was an exception rather than a rule."

Jagat S. Bright in his book 'Muslim Miracle Makers' expresses the same opinion: "The truth is that Islam has long been misunderstood not only by the non-Muslims but by the Muslims themselves. ... For one thing, most commonly misunderstood, Islam does not believe in the propagation of religion by the sword or by force. "^

"When Moses Maimondis who, under the fanatical rule of the Almohads, has feigned conversion to Islam, fled to Egypt and there openly declared himself to be a Jew, a jurisconsult from Spain denounced him for his apostasy and demanded that the extreme penalty of the law should be inflicted on him for this offence; but the case was quashed by al-Qadi al-Fadil, 'Add al-Rahim b.'Ali, one of the most famous of Muslim judges, and the prime minister of the great Saladin, who authoritatively declared that a man who had been converted to Islam by force could not be rightly considered to be a Muslim. In the same spirit. 388 when Ghazan (1295-1304) discovered that the Buddhist monks who had become Muhammadans at the beginning of his reign (when their temple had been destroyed) only made a pretence of being converted, he granted permission to all those who so wished to return to Tibet, where among their Buddhist fellow-countrymen they would be free once more to follow their own faith. Taverneir tells us a similar story of some Jews of Ispahan who were so grievously persecuted by the governor 'that either by force or cunning he caused them to turn i^hometans. But the King (Shah Abbas II) (I642-I667), understanding that only power and fear had constrained them to turn, suffer'd them to resume their own religion and to live in quiet."

"In IO4I-IO42, a number of Turks who were still heathen and living in Tibetan territory sought permission from Arslan Khan b. Qadr Khan to settle in his dominions, having heard of the justice and mildness of his rule; when they arrived in the neighbourhood of Balasaghun he sent a message to them urging them to accept Islam; but they refused, and as he found them to be peaceable and obedient subjects, he left them alone."

Particularly, it would be pertinent to note what J.S. Bright says: "India was conquered not by the SWORD of Muslim kings but by the WORDs of the Muslim saints.'^^

T.W. Arnold while discussing the nature of tolerance in Islamic faith towards other religions concludes that 3^9

Islam is against compulsion in conversion and records of force and persecution are based on local attitudes and circumstances. Arnold writes: "... The theory of the Muslim faith enjoins toleration and freedom of religious life for all those followers of other faiths who pay tribute in return for protection, ... The very existence of so many Christian sects and commu­ nities in countries that have been for centuries under Mohammadan rule is an abiding testimony to the tolera­ tion they have enjoyed, and shows that the persecutions they have from time to time been called upon to endure at the hands of bigots and fanatics, have been excited by some special and local circumstances rather than inspired by a settled principle of Intolerance. At such times of persecution, the pressure of circum­ stances has driven many unbelievers to become — out­ wardly at least — Mohammadan and many instances might be given of individuals who, on particular occasions, have been harassed into submission to the religion of the Quran. But such oppression is wholly without the sanction of Mohammadan Law, either religious or civil." 151

[sic]

Islam in Practice

So far our presentation was, to a significant extent, 390 on the theoretical and theological plane. We quoted some verses from the Quran in support of our contentions. At the same time this researcher is aware that there are scholars whose understanding of Islam and Islamic ideals, the Wuran and Quranic injunctions are different - even con­ trary to - his understanding of Islam and the Quran. This difference is there, probably because:

1) This researcher's understanding of Islamic ideals and values is mainly based on his studies of the Quran. Of course this should not be misunderstood to mean that he has ignored the work of others, as he has quoted, here and there, from writings of Muslim as well as non-Muslim scholars. On the other hand, opposite ideas mostly come from those scholars whose studies are, upto a certain extent, based on the Europeans' studies of Islam.

2) This researcher, however, is aware of contradictions

* For example, there have been some rulers and religious leaders (as we explained) who, in the name of Islam, made conversion a matter of compulsion. At the same time, in the true teachings of Islam and in the practice of many other Muslim rulers and religious leaders, conversion was fully a matter of conviction, and compulsion was condemned. This is a kind of contradiction. Or matter of wearing veil, which is declared compulsory in some societies and left arbitrary in some others. Another example of contradiction can be seen in what Y. Singh writes about the practice of some Muslims in India. He quotes from Ghaus Ansari that: "Even the pollution-purity norms were practised: Muslim Bhangis (untouchables) were not allowed to enter mosques for reasons of uncleanliness" (Modernization of Indian Tradition, p. 74). However, we accept that in the Mosque everyone is equal and can say his prayers, regardless of race, social status, kinship, language, sex, nationality, and so on. Y.Singh also quotes from Aziz Ahmad that some Hindus converted to Islam (the Meos of Punjab) deny the rif:ht of inheritance to their daughters (Modernization of Indian Tradition, notes, p. 230), while Islam gives daughters the right to have a certain share of inheritance. 391 in the Muslims' tradition in different societies which are sometimes disturbing; he has not, however concentrated on these. He believes that main source of these contra­ dictions and inconsistencies is the misinterpretations and misunderstandings of Islam by some. 3) This researcher has discussed this question from a positive and constructive point of view. Muslims' tradition involves many non-Islamic factors which originate from different sources, personal, local, historical, economics, political, and so on. Our judgement should not be guided by fixed or conventional criteria. They should be guided by the profoundly wise words of the Prophet: The difference of opinion in my community is a divine mercy." Further, this researcher is not oblivious of certain contemporary realities in the Muslim world. These are mainly:

'^ It is necessary to elaborate what this researcher means by the term "Muslims' tradition", a) The term tradi­ tion is defined as "A social custom passed down from one generation to another through the process of socialization. Tradition represents the beliefs, values, and ways of thinking of a social group." (A Modern Dictionary of Sociology, p. ^.41.) b) By "Muslim's tradition", this researcher does not mean the wuran and Hadith. Muslims' tradition, to this researcher, means norms, customs, and so on, which are practised by those who called themselves adherents of Islam in different societies throughout the history. c) The Quran (Muslims' holy book) is not a tradition. According to Muslims' faith the Quran is words of God. 392

1) No Islamic State has stood for the separation of religion from the political and executive authority.

2) The present Islamic countries have a long way to go in the sphere of science and technology.

We quote in this regard:

1) "The Muslim world, for various reasons is largely

a part of the underdeveloped, non-industrial world. Muslims are essentially a rural people living on land that returns

little to them, I^ny have not advanced beyond ad hoc agri­ culture, and the rest, except in a few areas, rely on animal power. The result is a common poverty stretching

from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans.

Urban Muslims, probably no more than 2B per cent of the total, share the frustrations of all non-industrial city-dwellers, low income, high unemployment and crowded living conditions, but high unfulfilled expectations. Most of them have inherited a past of colonial subjugation and today remain largely dependent upon the economic, social, and political initiatives from the industrial, Western world, albeit for some who have access to petroleum, this balance is shifting."^^-^

2) "Fewer women are educated in the I4islim world than in other cultural areas and although the absolute number of women educated is growing, so is the gap between women and men." 393

3) "In the urban areas where the rate of literacy employment opportunities are more, the percentage of Middle Eastern women in such variety of urban jobs, as has been shown by Nadia Youssif are among the lowest in the world. "•'•^^

Hence, when we talk about Islam in practice we should not forget the wrong things which have been done in the name of Islam, are imposed upon people to preserve and fulfil the vested political or economic interests of a particular group of groups.

Our only plea is that what has happened in history should not be turned into inexorable historical laws. History does not repeat itself is as true as history repeats itself. The entire thrust of this investigator is that Islam as a religious system has potential creative elements which are conducive to modernization in the social, political, cultural, and economic spheres. One cannot and should not brand a religion in toto. The transformative possibilities of Islam should be explored objectively.

Institution of Religion in Iran So far we had primarily dealt with the value system of Islam. V/e now propose to analyse the institution of religion in Iran,

Iran has always been a religious society. Right 394

from the introduction of Islam to Iranians, it received a large and strong support among the people. Particularly Shi'ism was what attracted the attention of Iranians right from the beginning of its emergence. Kurt Frischtler in his book 'Imam Hussain va Iran' {Imam Hussain and Iran) says: Iranians were supporters of Shi'ism and Shi'iah T 156 Imams. Shi'ism has always played a great role in uniting Iranians against whoever threatened them as an aggressive enemy. Shi'ism was the very force that united Iranians against Arabs who had introduced Islam to them. The first Government that brought Iran under control (after the Arabs' attack) was a Muslim Government, i.e. Safavids. Later on one could trace a very close relationship between politics and religion.

In recent history one may cite such examples as (Wagheeh-e-Rezhy) 'Event of Tobacco', and Constitutional Revolution of 1906, which reflected the same connection.

The impact of institution of religion on the poli­ tical institutions and the monarch's court was so much that Abbas Mirza, eldest son of Naser el-Din Shah, Prince and Governor of Tabriz, had to turn to the religious leaders for their support when he started to introduce some reforms

* Tabriz • Name of a city in the north-east of Iran and central city of Azarbyjan province. 395 particularly in army. In order to avoid people's opposi­ tion and protest ha asked one of the religious leaders, Shaikh al-Islam, to declare that reforms in the army were in full accord with Islam. 157

This shows that no power in the country could match the belief of the people in religion. It is also indica­ tive of the power of the religious leaders.

Mention has already been made of the Tobacco crisis. This, however, needs some elaboration. In 1891 Naser al- Din Shah gave a monopoly for dealing in tobacco to an Englishman, Major Talbot. In return, he received a personal gift of £25,000 plus an annual rent of £15,000 to the State and a 25 per cent share of the profit for Iran. In contrast. Major Talbot acquired a fifty years' monopoly right over the purchase, sale, and distribution of tobacco all over Iran and as well as its export from Iran.

This provoked Bazaar tobacco merchants and others against the concession, and the Shah. It was followed by the shut-down of the main Bazaars of Iran like Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Esfahan, i^azvin, and Kermanshah, This general strike was encouraged in the name of religion. A religious leader gave a 'fatwa' (religious order] that people should boycott tobacco in any form. This 'fatwa' was supported by other religious leaders from other coun­ tries like Iraq, Turkey (Jamal al-Din Afghani), etc. Even 396

Naser al-Din Shah's wives in his Haram followed the religious fatwa and boycotted the use of tobacco. Conse- quently, the Shah was forced to cancel the concession.15 3

We can give innumerable instances which show the influence of religion on different aspects of Iranian life.

One example from the economic field: The first state-wide stock company founded by a group of merchants in Esfahan was named Shirkat-i Islami which means 'The 159 Islamic Company'. The Bazaar merchants gave financial support to the religious schools, and religious organiza­ tions. The financial help and support came mainly in the name of the 'Zakat' and 'Khoms' (two kinds of religious taxes), 'alms', 'Gifts' and so on. The influence of the institution of religion was clearly reflected in some powerful movements in Iran such as 1906-1909 Constitutional Revolution and the 1952-53 rebellion of the people against the last Shah of Iran. In the first event, though the leading groups of the movement were not only Ulamas but also intelligentsia, Bazaar merchants, and students, the entire movement, right from the beginning of 1906 to the end of the 1909 bore a strong complexion of Keligion. Two of the three revolts

* Haram " The house in which Naser al-Din Shah acco­ mmodated all his wives. No man was allowed to enter this house, except Naser al-Din Shah himself, very small boys of the Royal family, and eunuchs. 397 of the people - the first and the third one - started in the month of Muharram which is a month of religious cere­ monies and mournings.

During Heza Shah's reign (1925-1941) there were some social movements too; two of the first main movements were: (1) 1926-1927 movement, and (2) 1935-1936 one. Both move­ ments were supported by Ulama and won the religious support of the common man. Particularly, during the upheavals of the people against compulsory introduction of hat, this command was declared as anti-Islamic.

In Mashhad this creed was denounced as 'heretical' and it was followed by a mass meeting held in Bazaar and other places. In the holy shrine of the Imam Reza (the Eighth Imam of Shi'iahs) the crowd shouted: "Imam Hussain protect us from the devil - the Shah".^ Though both movements failed and were finally smashed by the army, they clearly showed the strong religious sentiments of the people.

Usually, leaders of these opposition movements immediately mixed up religion for two reasons: (1) to strengthen the tempo of the movement and (2) to mobilize the masses. Reza Shah stood harshly against such movements and suppressed them with gunpower. This compelled the unarmed people to surrender.

'^ Imam Hussain • The third Imam of the Shi'iahs and the younger son of the Imam Ali. 398

Two important points need to be referred to here: the first is that Shi'ism has some revolutionary aspects, e.g. it was a bulwark against any kind of corruption, be it economic, social, or political.

The history of Islam shows that Shi'ism stood up as a protest movement. It revolted against the socio­ political condition in early Islamic era. Shi'ism denounces passivism of Muslims and condemns submission to tyranny and corruption of any kind. In short, religious feelings have always been one of the main forces of mobilization of the people. If one carefully reads the history of Iran in the 19th and 20th centuries one cannot find any movement by masses that was separated from the religious system of values.

The second point is that the representatives of the institution of religion were not only Ulama, but also some of the members of the intelligentsia. These Muslim inte­ llectuals were academically trained in European and American Universities. They preached Islamic thoughts, defended Islamic principles and looked upon Islam as the only possible means for uniting and mobilizing the Iranian masses,

There is another point, that is, though every mass movement in Iran had a religious complexion it does not mean that it was decisively organized only by the Ulama. There are also instances that protests and movements were launched by members of the intelligentsia who had 399 religious moorings.

Perhaps it was Naser al-Din Shah, who, for the first time, tried to keep the religious leaders out of politics. He tried to confine them to the realm of praying, teaching, 1 A? and the observance of the Shari'a, In his own way, Heza Shah, like Maser al-Din Shah, started a campaign against the influence of religion. He found that the religious groups were a threat to his king­ ship, he tried to limit the scope of religion. This trend can be seen particularly after the defeat of Amanullah Khan 1 fi'\ of Afghanistan at the hands of religious leaders in 1929.

The same campaign against Muslim and other opposi­ tion groups was followed up by the Shah after his father, tteza Shah. He too did his best to limit the influence of religion to only mosques, holy shrines, religious schools, and a few theological faculties in the country. Neverthe­ less, he tried to present himself as a very religious personality. He used to pay annual visits to holy shrine of Imam Heza in Mashhad as well as some other religious places, with a view of winning the support of the religious masses. It is evident that the Shah played a double and dramatic role, because of the strength which has roots in the inherent sense of religion in the minds of the people. Leaving aside the 1979 revolution, one of the big movements of the people in response to the call of Ulama

* Ulama » Top clergymen, {Literally it means Learned People, Scholars, and Scientists.) 400 was launched in early 1960s. The Ularaa, like many of the intellectuals, opposed the Shah's Land Reforms programme. Ultimately these protests led to the I963 rebellion of the people against the Shah. People particularly in Tehran and Qum came marching and fighting on the streets, when Ayatullah Khomeini gave them a call against the Shah's Land Reforms programme. These demonstrations ended in bloodshed; hundreds of people were killed and some thousands were forced to go to jail.

Ayatullah Khomeini as one of the most known leaders of the movement was imprisoned; but he was very shortly released and was sent into exile in Iraq.

The Shah could not eliminate the influence of the religion on Bazaar and Bazaar people totally. This was a great boost to the 1979 revolution, because when in the beginning of the second half of the 1970 decade the Shah started his campaign against Bazaar people, the group of Bazaar merchants inclined gradually more and more towards the opposition camp. The Bazaar people too, supported the movement in 1978 and 1979.

With this alignment, however, traditional religion emerged as the strongest social force in uniting, organizing and mobilizing the Iranian masses. All the commentators and political analysts began to believe that religion was the only alternative revolutionary force to unite the 401

people. People considered Islam as their saviour and felt that participation in the movement was a religious duty.

After the 1979 revolution, the religion dominated other social institutions too, viz. politics, education, economics, etc.

People who looked on religion as the saviour turned towards it with great fervour, so that, religious values, in the early times of revolution, spread over the society dominantly. Their faith in religion was so strong that they wanted to do everything through religious means. Religion became the controlling impulse.

One important consideration is that religion is not the only governing factor of the social structure. Evidently there are other forces like new ideas, secular values, pressure of objective conditions, unexpected and unpredictable events, and emergence of revolutionary religious and non-religious personalities. There is no reason to believe that such forces will never emerge in Islamic societies. The Iranian revolution was an event which held out a big promise. We now turn our attention to it.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution: A Brief Outline After a close study of some aspects of Islam and its relation to Modernization, wa can now refer to the momentous event of 1979 - the Iranian revolution, and pose a fundamental question: why was this a religious, i.e. 402

Islamic revolution, and not a non-religious revolution? In other words we shall attempt to explain why the Iranians in their opposition to the Shah were rallied under the banner of Islam.

Background of the Revolution

The history of Iran records several revolutions and rebellions. Take, for instance, the constitutional revo­ lution in 1906, and the National movement in 1953*

The roots of 1979 Iranian revolution can, actually, be traced back to:

1) the first quarter of the 20th century when after the constitutional revolution in 1906, intellectuals began to realize its failure;

2) the rebellion of 1953 of the people against the Shah under the leadership of Dr. M. Mossadegh.

The fact that 1906 revolution had been a flop became apparent when Reza Khan (Reza Shah) proclaimed himself the King of Iran in 1925 after a coup engineered by Britain and the Soviet Union in 1921, which put Reza

Khan into power.

Reza Khan demolished the 1906 constitution and established an authoritarian regime in which his position was above that of the Majlis. He ruled the country in an arbitrary manner. His dictatorship generated opposition and protest movements, in the forms of individual and public resistance of different political groups. He tried his 403 best to smash all opposition till he was sent into exile in 1941.^^^

Reza Khan had to abdicate under the pressure of Britain and Kussia because he was leaning towards Germany in the Second World War. He was not ready to permit the allied troops and armaments to pass through Iran, as this was considered to be a clear sign of support for Germany. '

After Reza Khan, his son Mohammad Reza, i.e. the last Shah of Iran, seized power in the country and con­ tinued his father's authoritarianism. During the Shah's dictatorial role, i.e. from 1941 till 1979, we find that different individuals and groups opposed his regime. These groups and individuals (some of whom have been mentioned in Chapter III entitled "Socio-Political Changes") were adherents of different ideologies. Of these, some were committed to religious ideology, some championed nationa­ listic ideologies, and some accepted the communist ideology. But none of them except Dr. M. I-tossadegh (at the end of 1940s and in the beginning of 19503) and Ayatullah Khomeini (in 1978 and 1979) had a nationwide support of the people. This was partly due to the internal political situation of the country that had forced the opposition to go under­ ground and pursue their activities from there. Since, a ban was put on all these groups and individuals, many of the Iranians were not even familiar with the names of many of the opposition personalities. 404

The 1953, an uprising of the people under the leadership of Dr. M. Mossadegh drove the Shah from the country, but the revolt ended very soon due to the ruth­ less suppression of the rebelling masses. The nationalist government of Dr. I-tossadegh collapsed, and a significant nationalist movement was a sad failure. All these events led to two indirect consequences: (1) the blatantly dictatorial nature of the Shah's regime was fully exposed, and (2) they gave a valuable political experience to the intellectuals and revolutionaries which stood them in good stead for their future political adventure.

In the later years of the 1950s suddenly, once again, opposition groups, particularly university students went on strike. This movement showed that a new phase of the struggle had started. Though this strike had led to some blood-path, it was followed by a radical wave of strikes in the early years of the I96O3.

Meanwhile, the formation of revolutionary groups of the educated middle class and intellectuals, and the accelerated activities of the opposition, were indicative of a deep urge of an ultimate revolution. Further suppression of the opposition by the regime generated this revolutionary class. This gradual awakening reached such a level that in the early months of the year 1978, the first signs of the people's rebellion were becoming apparent. 405

A revolt movement started in different cities throughout the country, and was reflected in the means of propaganda and action viz. pamphlets, sabotages, strikes, demonstrations, etc. To have a clear idea of the general conditions we shall note some features of the final years of pre-revolu- tion period, i.e. 1975 to 1979.

Final Years of Pre-reyolution Period and Kevolution. i.e. 197 5 to 1979 By 1975, it became clear to almost everyone that not only had the so-called white revolution, with its major thrust of the land reforms, failed, but also the oil money which flowed in large amounts into the country had, by and large, aggravated the economic problems of the people. As a result, the rapid economic growth of the country in the first half of the 1970 decade, had to be slowed down. This slowing down of the economic growth was, indeed, the first signal of the coming crisis. At precisely the same time the country was being paraded to Iranians as well as to foreigners, as one of the richest countries in the world. The deepening economic crisis was quite visible in the 1977 and 1978. Inflation reached a high level, but instead of finding a proper solution to it, the Shah tried to use the bazaar as the main scapegoat. He claimed corruption in the bazaar as the main cause of the monetary inflation. Hence, he ordered an anti-corruption drive in which ^,000 bazaar merchants 169 were imprisoned. This anti-corruption drive 406 could not solve the problems of inflation and exploita­ tion of the masses. Evidently, corruption in the bazaar was not the only cause. As a result the bazaar merchants turned against the 3hah. The main roots of corruption were 170 with the Shah, his family, and his group of friends. One report states: "\Vhat rendered the situation clearly unacceptable was the ostentatious presence of a favoured elite, whose members continued to reap immense profits while the common people sank into abject poverty."17 1 There were lots of other socio-economic problems of the people, such as, the acute shortage of housing, frequent power-cuts, inefficient communication facilities, gaps between pockets of urban affluence and vast poverty of the masses. For example, the rate of agricultural output was between 2 and 3 per cent per year while the rising demand was 14 per cent17 2 per year. This gap between production and demand led to an alarming increase in the prices of foodstuffs. Another report gives almost the same statistics; it states that while the population rose to about 2 to 2.5 per cent a year, the consumption of agricultural products 17"? was about 12 per cent.

Political and social repression also intensified the gravity of the economic problems of the masses in general.

SAVAK was known as the notorious instrument of the worst kind of social and political suppression. Naturally, this organization was feared and hated immensely.

The Shah's regime was neither able to control the 407 situation more nor could it initiate any new refonns to change the conditions, in the economic, social, and political spheres. The Shah, as in other times, started to introduce changes at the top. Therefore, he replaced his long term prime minister, Amir Abbas Hovyda, by his previous oil •JO I minister Jamshid Amuzegar, in 1977. The new prime minister made lots of promises to the people for betterment of their life conditions. This replacement also did nothing for the people. Amuzegar's economic policies increased unemployment and other economic problems.1 7 5 Almost everyone was sure that the regime lacked the ability to change the basic socio­ economic structure. The general condition of status quo is nicely reflected in an open letter from the National Front to the Shah on 12 June 1977.*^ By the end of 1977, social tensions were surfacing. The first sign of the rebellion came in the beginning of 197S. Initial protests of some of the people who had so far been conservative took a violent form in 197S. One event at the end of the Amuzegar's cabinet, sparked off the protest movements. This was the 'Cinema Rex' event. In Abadan city, 'Cinema Rex' was set on fire while people inside the auditorium were watching a movie. As a result, almost four hundred people were either burnt in the fire or suffered very serious injuries. The regime immediately claimed that this incident was organized by the Muslim

Please see Appendix No. 5. 4oa

1 7 A protestors while people wjre sure it was done by the SAVAK. To the people, the reasons for the hatching of such a brutal plan by the regime were clear. Since the protestors were mainly Muslims, the regime wanted to demonstrate and convince the people that they were very reactionary. What­ ever reason was behind the Cinema Hex event it led to people's hatred for the regime. This event had a catalytic effect in transforming the hitherto gentle protest move­ ments into violent action. Consequently martial law was proclaimed in 12 cities. Every protest and movement slowly but definitely reinforced the forces of Islamic thoughts. Hence, as indicated above, to divert the minds of the people and to show the reverence the ^hah had for Islam, he replaced Prime Minister Amuzegar by Ja'far Sharif Emami in August 197^. Sharif Emami was the leader of the senate, and came 177 from a well known religious family. Sharif Emami, with the object of winning the support of the people, initiated, immediately, some superficial actions, first to prove his own religiosity and that of his cabinet, and secondly to at least temporarily improve the economic conditions of the people, He, therefore, closed down night clubs, gambling casinos, banned public drinking and all forms of pornography. He changed the Iranian calendar from Imperial to Islamic, abolished the post of women's affairs minister in the cabinet, and increased /.09

the wages and salaries. In many cases, they were enhanced 179 to more than double.

Sharif Eraami's decisions and superficial changes were also not sufficiently effective because people had no trust in him and thought that all these changes were only for a short period and that later on the Shah's regime after getting rid of some immediate problems, would again start the old policy and injustice would re-emerge.

The protests and the movements in mid-1978 had a distinct anti-Shah flavour. Slogans like "down with the

Shah and down with his suppressive rule", also "long live freedom", "Independence, Freedom and Islam", went up in the air. They were intensified by increasing violence.

On 8 September 1978, a military government headed by General CJolamreza Azhari replaced Sharif fimami's cabinet, and very soon martial law was declared in more cities.

The military government of Azhari even by imposing martial law in many of the cities could not stop or reduce the protests and violence. To the people, the new Military government was the surest ultimate weapon of Shah's dictatorship. It further fired the people's wrath and they became more resolute in their opposition to the regime.

Simultaneously, both Ayatullah Khomeini and Dr. Sanjabi rejected the military government, called it illegal, and

* Dr. Sanjabi • one of the leaders of the National Front Party. 410 asked people to strengthen their political activities, their strikes, and their movements.

V/ith the appointment of the military government, strikes spread all over the country among the employees and workers, government offices, post, telephone, and tele­ graph departments, mining industries, dockyards, textile mills, assembly plants, social service organization, indus­ trial units, banks, oil industries, etc., which brought the economy of the country to a total halt. The oil workers' strike dealt a powerful blow to the regime. It was planned when Engineer Bazargan met Ayatullah Khomeini in the Neauphle-Le-Chateau. During this meeting, Engineer Bazargan agreed to organize oil workers* strike in oil refineries, mainly in the south of Iran, and he did so when he came back to Iran.

All these moves on the economic front were naturally considered as the dangerous signals to the regime which foresaw its toppling down. Hence, the regime was trying to put an end to the general strikes by any means and at all costs. Military troops were sent to the streets to stop demonstrators and strikers.

Military troops could not stop the people. Though Martial Law had been declared, demonstrators rushed into the streets in lar>?;er numbers all over the country. They appealed to the military troops and soldiers to join them as their brothers. The soldiers of the army were offered 411

bunches of flowers, were embraced warmly, and were persuaded to join the strikes and demonstrations. As a result many soldiers left their troops and joined the demonstrating masses. 180

The Shah realized the futility of the support of the army. On December 30, 1978 (according to some observers it was December 29) a new government headed by the prime minister Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar, one of the leaders of National Front Party was formed.

Dr. Bakhtiar'3 government was, actually, designed to control everything for quietening down the people's move­ ment in the absence of the Shah who had to leave the country. This government was also rejected both by Ayatullah Khomeini and by Dr. Sanjabi as an illegal government.

After the appointment of Dr. Bakhtiar Cabinet, strikes and violence escaladed. One report states that on 11 December 1978 in Tehran city 2 million people, out of an estimated 4.5 million population of the city, demonstrated 182 against the Shah. The number of demonstrators began to increase day by day. Some believed the estimated number of demonstrators was as much as 3 millions by the end of January 1979 and at 183 the beginning of February in the same year. ^

* Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar was one of the leaders of the National Front Party. He was thrown out from the party immediately after his acceptance of the position of the Shah's prime minister. 412

While the government was confronting the rebellious masses here and there, especially in Tehran, the only hope for the Shah was the royal guards which remained loyal to him.

The Bakhtiar cabinet had the support of high rank­ ing army officers while lower rank officers and army personnel were among those who opposed the Shah and the cabinet. Since it did not enjoy the support of the people, Dr. Bakhtiar's government could not survive for more than a month and a half and shortly after the Shah's departure on 16 January 1979, collapsed on February 11, 1979.

Ayatullah Khomeini returned to Iran after 14 years of exile when the clashes reached their climax. He landed at Tehran International Airport on January 31, 1979. The last days of the clashes between the people and the royal guard were, the 8th, 9th and 10th of February 1979. It was reported that during these three days, in Tehra^i, "645 persons lost their lives and 2,804 suffered serious 184 injuries". On the last day the royal guard left their guns and stopped fighting with the people. On the morning of 11 February 1979, General Garabaqi telephoned Engineer Bazargan and asked him to send someone to take over the army from him. This, in fact, was the end of the 2500 years of monarchic rule over the country, and also the victory of the people over the Shah's regime.

On February 11, 1979, the Provisional Revolutionary 413 government headed by Engineer Medhi Bazargan, who was chosen as the prime minister by Ayatullah Khomeini, replaced Dr.

Bakhtiar's government. All clashes stopped. People were jubilant over their great victory over the Shah's regime.

Effective Factors in Awakening Mnds of the People

We can now sura up. No revolution takes place unless people take part in it, and people do not take part in any revolution unless they feel that their participation is a must. People realize this necessity in the process of any

revolution when they are able to grasp the required socio­ political consciousness of the purpose and understand their socio-political condition. There were several factors

responsible for awakening of socio-political consciousness among people, in the Iranian society. These factors as we have indicated many times above can be classified as follows:

1) Intense activities of political groups

2) The role of intellectuals as the spokesman of the revolution

3) The development of education on the Western lines 4) The wrong misdirected policies of the regime in land reform programme 5) Effects of oil boom 6) Economic problems, political pressure, and social suffocation. We shall discuss the effect of each of these factors separately. i.14

The role of the first two factors, i.e. political groups and intellectuals, has already been discussed in the socio-political chapter (Chapter III); one of their main efforts was to enlighten the minds of the people about the socio-political situation in the country. The only thing which we would like to add here is the role that they played in the process of revolution when people rebelled against the Shah's regime.

During the years 1971 to 1976, the Shah's SAVAK was very active, so that, almost all leaders of the revo­ lutionary groups were either executed, forced to go to jail or were exiled.

One of the basic demands of the demonstrators in the year 1978 was the release of political prisoners.

This was fulfilled and political prisoners got released almost some months before the victory of the revolution.•*•

The released political prisoners, joined the demon­ strators immediately. They played a crucial role in giving them training in guerrilla tactics, in the battle against the royal guard.

3) The Development of Education on Western Lines

Education has always been looked upon as a major instrument of bringing about social change in the 20th century.

The development of education from I960 to 1975 415 resulted in an increase in literacy standards. The majority of these newly educated people came from middle class families. They had very great aspirations about the higher education at the university, which was invariably a hotbed of political activities and protests, strikes, and social movements. University students formed a major group and it was very active in organizing the political opposition blocs that the Shah's regime had to contend with.

On this background, the regime seemed to operate with double standards in regard to the crucial decisions about developing educational institutions in the country.

While the Shah had reason to fear university students, he tried to limit their number as far as it was possible. On the other hand, he had to declare free education and give some facilities to the people to proceed for further education, in order to reduce social tensions.

4) Wrong and Misdirected Policies of the Shah*s Regime in the Land datorm Programme As has been repeatedly noted, land reforms were introduced with a great deal of propaganda fanfare by the regime, they created false hopes of improving the «conomic conditions of the peasants, bettering their life-style and freeing them from the yoke and tyranny of the feudal lords. But the whole programme failed to bring about any basic change in the socio-economic structure. Peasants, therefore, realized that everything was only propaganda/ the landlord was still the master and the peasants th« 416 servants, and the regime was a supporter of landlords and not peasants. This realization, more or less, awakened the peasants. Consequently, this major section of the population which at the beginning of the land reforms had supported the regime (that is what the Shah had planned for), gradually turned against it.

Another very interesting point is this; we are analysing the impact of land reforms in the political awakening of the peasants. It is to be noted that the main role in the peasants' uprising against the Shah was played principally by their religious orientation. There was no political ideology, but religion, which governed their actions, convictions, and the consequential support.

5) Effects of Oil Boom The large affluence of oil money besides its direct economic, social, and political effects, also had several indirect effects. National Geographic reports Iran's oil revenue to have been as fantastically large as 187 |2 million every hour of every day in the year 1974 (i.e. in total, nearly 20 billion dollars for the same year).

The oil money, however, went Into the pockets of only a particular section of the upper class strata. An unequal distribution of oil money increased inflation and aggravated the economic problems for most of the people at a time when they were expecting some structural changes 417 towards the betterment of their economic life-conditions, which was very broadly reflected in per capita, and national income. This situation v/as one of the contri­ butory causes of the existing problems of injustice and inequality in the Iranian social structure, which was based predominantly on a rigid class system. This system of the status quo was the design of the royal family and the upper strata and elite of the Iranian society. The most important point is that the Islamic ideology was also instrumental for a revolt against the social and economic injustice,

6) Economic Problems. Political Pressures. and ^ocial Suffocation These three are significant forces behind the Iranian revolution according to many social thinkers. But, here, it may be observed that these three forces were fused with the moral perspective and the passionate love of Islam. Another point of suggestive significance was that there was a subtle shift in the authoritarian policy of the Shah in his confrontation with the intellectuals. The Shah started a policy of, more or less, liberalization 188 towards intellectuals as advised by President Garter's administration.

Another factor which forced the Shah to accept this policy was the focus of Amnesty International on the poli­ tical suppression, political prisoners' condition, and 41S

tyranny of the SAVAK which introduced the Shah and his regime as one of the most harsh ones in the world. ^ The Shah was compelled to change his image as a ruthless authoritarian dictator in Iran as well as in the foreign countries. However, this liberalization was neither genuine nor enlightened in the correct sense of the term. It was a move on the political international chess-board made with a cold calculating mind. And in any case there was oi course his SAVAK which would have always stood in any crisis of political upheaval.

On the other hand, the Shah's religious and inte­ llectual opponents were always eagerly anxious to pounce upon any chance to breathe. Although, it might have been a very small pause, they did not lose it this time. The signs of the very conscious, alert, and elaborate movements of the intellectuals of different shades can be seen in the associations formed by them. For example, we can cite: "Writers' Association", "Lawyers' Association", "Iranian Committee for the Defence of Freedom and Human Rights", and "National Organization of University Teachers". 190

The first manifestation of these associations and groups was clearly reflected in the open letters which were issued by some of these groups and addressed either directly to the Shah himself or to the Prime Minister, Hoveydau A .19 1

By and large, these systematic designs and activities 419

of the various intellectual groups were also possible partly due to the Shah's policy of marginal liberalization. It is undeniable that these covered mainly the educated strata, university students, and the youn^^er generation. All this evidence points unmistakably to: (1) the crisis of national identity, and (2) a deep urge to express it as a distinctive Muslim force. It was during one of the poetry nights on 19 November 1977 in the Iranian-German Cultural Society that while some of the intellectuals, members of these newly formed opposi­ tion groups, were reading revolutionary poems, SAVAK and police attacked the large audience of nearly 10,000 which was mainly of University students. Consequently clashes started between the audience and the police. One person was killed, many were injured, and some hundreds were 192 arrested. -^ This event was the first spark of the revo­ lution. Next day the University students went on a strike in support of students and intellectuals. These and similar events in 1977 were the forces behind the causes of unrests and the protest movements of the educated social strata which was fired by the religious impulse; and then came the twilight of the revolution.

To sum up, a brief look at the Iranian revolution shows that in totality following were the causes: 1) Dissatisfaction of the people because of increasing economic misery, economic exploitation, and political and socio­ economic inequality. 420

2) Efforts of the middle class educated people and elites to grasp political power and their consequent disappointments and failures. 3) The Shah's dictatorship. 4) Activities of SAVAK. 5) Political repression of the people. 6) Lack of freedom and political liberty, 7) Failure of the Shah in his reforms. 8) Oil boom and its lop-sided character. 9) Rejection of the system of dependent capitalism and American system by people.

According to Davies's hypothesis, "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short 193 period of sharp reversal". On the basis of this hypo­ thesis Karabiz Afrachteh concludes that Iran has success- fully demonstrated the validity of this hypothesis. 194 However, we look at this hypothesis as only one of the factors in Iranian revolution.

Why People United Under the Banner of Islam It is undeniable fact that Islam has a deep-rooted institutional basis in Iranian society. It is mixed with each and every aspect of the social and private life of every member of the society. There are two main reasons that contributed to political unity of Iranians under the banner of Islam in the 1979 revolution. (1) As a result of the inextricable tie of religion and life, the Iranians 421 feel that they have a distinct identity. No Iranian can say or clarify how much of his/her life is based on Persian culture (excluding religion); they, therefore, just cannot conceive Persian culture without Islam, Hence, to say that Islam gives identity to Iranians is not an irrelevant claim.

There is another crucial point; every Iranian distinguishes himself from Arab Muslims or those of any other Muslim nations by stating that though a Muslim his Iranian culture makes him different from Muslims of other Islamic nations. His Persian cultural past is unique and far too different. On the one hand he is a Persian, on the other he is a member of the international community of Muslims, i.e. Ummah.

(2) Iranian Muslim intellectuals think that the potentials of development, progress, and modernization are rich in the Islamic religious tradition. The conten­ tion of these intellectuals is that Islam is the only decisive mobilizing and unifying force of Modernization, They are confident that Islam would meet all the obstacles in the way of modernization of their country.

Dr. Sanjabi and Engineer Bazargan, who had leading positions in the revolutionary struggle, met Ayatullah Khomeini in Paris separately. After their visit, they declared that Islam is the only factor which could unite 195 Iranians against tyranny of the Shah. 422

In the words of Karabiz Afrachteh: "Islam was the only viable alternative to the monarchy." 196 Because of the "absence of any other major and independent institu­ tional basis from which a challenge to the monarch could 197 be mounted". These words have a high sociological significance.

S,^. Eisenstadt writes: "We may distinguish first between a generally positive as against a negative atti­ tude to change, that is, acceptance of changing situations and their possibilities, or, conversely, resistance to them. Second of great importance in the analysis of reactions to change is the question of presence or absence, within any given society or sector thereof, of some organizational and institutional capacities to deal with the problems emerging out of such changing situations.

A combination of these two major attitudes to change and different levels of organizational capacity gives rise to various concrete types of response to change."

Eisenstadt distinguishes four types of responses to changes as important alternatives. According to him, these four types are:

"1) A totally passive negative attitude, often resulting in the disappearance of weakening of such resisting groups. 2) An active, organized resistance to change. /.23

an organized 'traditionalistic' response, which attempts to impose at least some of the older values on the new setting.

3) Different types of adaptability to change.

4) What can be called a transformative capacity, that is, the capacity not only to adapt to new, changing internal or international conditions, but also to forge out or crystalize new institutional frameworks in general and new centers in particular. Such transformative capacity may vary according to the extent of coercion which evolves from it."199

Of these four possible types of responses to change it is arguable that the second and the fourth apply to the

Iranian revolution.

During the process of Iranian revolution, the atti­ tude of the intellectuals and educated people was to preserve their identity along with their religious values while building up new institutions, settings, and structures.

However, certain important questions arise:

1) Has the Iranian revolution succeeded or not?

2) Will the original basic aims and goals of the elites, intellectuals, and the people who participated in 1979 revolution be achieved?

3) Is the new transformation capable of preserving the national and cultural identity on one hand, and build up new and 424

modern institutional structures as demanded by the challenge of change? In other words, what are the full sociological implications of the very concept of Islamic national and cultural identity?

4) In what direction would the Iranian society move?

These are very complex questions. In a way, all Third World countries have to face this central sociological problem. That is, however, beyond the ambit of the present work. It is a formidable task for another research project with a big and different analytical framework.

Conclusion

1) Iranian society has always been a religious society. Religion has very deep-roots in the structure of Iranian society.

2) Zoroastrianism, the first monotheistic religion, emerged in Iran.

3) Since the split up of Islam into two main sects, i.e. Shi'ism and Sunnisra, Iranians have followed the Shi'iah branch of Islam.

4) Although force and economic pressures were sometimes used for Islamization of Iran, the main factor behind the mass acceptance of this religion was the values of equality, justice, and the higher concept of God that Islam has in its system. 425

5) Theological principles of Islam (Shi'ism) are five: (a) Tawhid, (b) Nubuwwah, (c) Iraamah, (d) 'Adle, and (e) Maad.

6) While studying Islam and its potentials of change we find that Islam encourages unity and integra­ tion. Unity with Ummah and submission to Allah is a principle in Islam.

7) Islam is not an authoritarian religion. It has a democratic value system in which equality and freedom can be found.

8) Islam as a religion emphasizes equal propor­ tion both spiritual and material aspects of life.

9) Islam is a religion of Achievement. Even salvation should be 'Achieved*.

10) Islam encourages education. To acquire know­ ledge is regarded as the religious duty of every Muslim male or female.

11) Islam is not against secularization. It has important built-in components of secularism.

12) Women are considered to be equal to men accord­ ing to the original teachings of Islam.

13) Islam encourages monogamy. Polygamy is per­ mitted under certain specific and exceptional conditions. 14) Divorce is permitted but not as an arbitrary privilege of men. 426

15) Wearing of veil is not originally an Islamic custom. It is a custom which has been practised in the name of religion.

16) There is no compulsion in the sphere of reli­ gion. Contrary to the widespread assumption, force and compulsion to convert people to Islam are emphatically rejected by the wuran.

17) Though the records of history show that some­ times force was used in converting people to Islam, from which some people concluded that Islam is a religion of the sword, in reality Islam is fundamentally a religion of peace. The heart of the matter is that Islam has been much misunderstood and misinterpreted. Islam should not be evaluated on the bases of these distorted cases.

18) Under-development is a general characteristic of contemporary Islamic societies.

19) Islam is capable of change for modernizing society. It is not an obstacle in the way of moderniza­ tion. If contemporary Islamic societies are not modern and are backward, it is not because of Islam but because of the political and economic factors.

20) Keligion in Iran has very close relations with the structure of the political authority, i.e. the State,

21) All great social movements in Iranian society have reflected a religious complexion which in turn has a mass character. 427

22) As we have noted, Islam has the required poten­ tialities that could pave the way to modernization. In the Muslim world it is a section of Muslims that is inca­ pable of accepting change and trying to maintain a condition of status quo. 428

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23. Ibid., p. 153.

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39. G. Parrinder. An Illustrated History of the World's Religions, op.cit., p. 469. 40. G.E. Von Grunebaum. Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, England, 1955, p. 2.

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45. h.k. Pihoury. Islam and Modernization in the Middle East, op.cit., p. 87. 46. 3.H.H. Tabatabai. Shi'ite Islam, op.cit., pp. I46 and 147. 47. G.E. Von Grunebaum. Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity. The Near Eastern Centre, University of California Press, Los Angeles, U.S.A., 1962, p. I83.

48. A. Besant. Seven Great Religions. The Theosophical Publishing House, Madras, India, 1972, p. 199.

49. Ibid. , p. 209.

50. A. Besant. Beauties of Islam, op.cit., p. I3. 51. K. Frischler. Imam Hussain Va Iran (Lit, Imam Hussain and Iran) (in Persian Language). Translated to Persian by Zabihullah Mansoury. Javidan Publications, Tehran, Iran, I36O (1981), pp. 436-464. $2. S.H. Nasr. Ideals and Realities of Islam, op.cit., p. 153. 53. H.A.rt. Gibb. Islam: A Historical Survey, op.cit., p. 15. 54. T.W. Arnold. The Preaching of Islam, op.cit., p. 1. 55. H.A.H. Gibb. Islam: A Historical Survey, op.cit., p. 36. 56. A.A. Engineer. "Social Dynamics and Status of Women in Islam," Islamic Perspective (Biennial Journal, Institute of Islamic Studies), Vol. I, Issue 1, Bombay, India, January 1984, p. 77. 57. Ibid., p. 90.

58. B. Puri. "Personal Law and Muslim Identity," Islamic Perspective (Biennial Journal, Institute of Islamic Studies), Vol. I, Issue 1, Bombay, India, January 1984, p. 104. 432

59. A. Besant. Seven Great Religions, op.cit., p. 217. 60. Ibid., p. 227. 61. h.A. Khoury. Islam and Modernization in the Middle East, op.cit., p. 103. 62. B. Sheik Ali. Islam: A Cultural Orientation. Macmillan India Limited, New Delhi, India, 1981, p. 80. 63. G.E. Von Grunebaum. Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition, op.cit., p. 96. 64. A.B. Shah. Religion and Society in India. Somaiya Publications Pvt.Ltd., Bombay, India, 1981, p. 96. 65. Ibid., p. 96. 66. S.H. Nasr. Science and Civilization in Islam, op.cit., p. 22. 67. B. Sheik Ali. Islam: A Cultural Orientation, op.cit., p. 80. 68. W.A. Khoury. Islam and Modernization in the Middle East, op.cit., p. 112. 69. M. Qutb. Islam: The Misunderstood Religion. The Board of Islamic Publications, Jama Masjid, Delhi, India, 1968, pp. I58-I64. 70. Ibid., pp. 160 and Ibl. 71. B. Sheik Ali. Islam: A Cultural Orientation, op.cit., p. 14. 72. N.A. Khoury. Islam and Modernization in the Middle East, op.cit., p. 96. 73. Ibid., p. 96. 74. The Quran (in Arabic Language) published by Sanaee Library and Dar-al-Quran-e-Karim, Tehran, Iran, 75. M. Abdul-Rauf. The Islamic View of the Women and the 433

Family. Robert Speller and Sons, Publishers Inc., New York, U.S.A., 1977, p. 21. 76. M. Mazheruddin Siddiqi. Women in Islam. The Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore, Pakistan, 1952, p. 17. 77. Ibid., p. 20. 78. S.T. Lokhandwalla. "The Position of Women Under Islam," Islamic Perspective (Biennial Journal, Institute of Islamic Studies, Bombay, India), Vol. I, Issue 1, January 19^4, pp. 10 and 11. 79. Ibid., p. 17. 80. N.A. Khoury. Islam and Modernization in the I«liddle East, op.cit., p. 123. 81. A.A. Engineer. "Social Dynamics and Status of Women in Islam," Islamic Perspective, op.cit., p. 79. 82. N.A. Khoury. Islam and Modernization in the Middle East, op.cit., p. 124. 83. A.A. Engineer. "Social Dynamics and Status of Women in Islam," Islamic Perspective, op.cit., p. 92. 84. Ibid., p. 92. 85. Ibid., p. 94. 86. J.L. Esposito (Ed.). Islam and Development: Heligion and Social Change. Syracuse University Press, New York, U.S.A., I98O, pp. 31 and 32. 87. M.M. Pickthall. The Glorious Koran, op.cit., p. 58. ^^, Ibid., p. 58. 89. Ibid., p. 59. 90. D.I. Eggenberger (Editor in Chief). The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of World Biography, Vol. 1. McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, U.S.A., 1973, pp. 306-308. 434

91. A. Besant. Beauties of Islam, op.cit., p. 37. 92. A.Y, Al-Hassan. "Science and Technology in Islam," Culture, Vol. VII, No. i+. The Unesco Press and La Baconniere, Paris, France, 19^0, p. 89. 93. Ibid., pp. 89-91. 94. G»E. Von Grunebaurn. "Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition," The American Anthropologist [Robert iiedfield and Milton Singer (i^ditors). The American Anthropological Association], Vol. 57, No. 2, Part 2, Memoir No. 81, April 1955, p. 111. 95. 3.H. Nasr. Science and Civilization in Islam, op.cit., p. 65. 96. Ibid., p. 65. 97. Ibid., p. 65. 98. A. Besant. Beauties of Islam, op.cit., p. 32. 99. A.Besant. Seven Great Religions, op.cit., p. 224. 100. A. Besant. Beauties of Islam, op.cit., p. 34. 101. B. Sheik Ali. Islam: A Cultural Orientation, op.cit., p. 93. 102. G.E, Von Grunebaum. "Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition," The American Anthropologist, op.cit., p. B8. 103. N. Berkes. "Historical Background of Turkish Secularism," in Richard N. Frye (Ed.). Islam and the V/est. Mouton and Co., 'S-Gravenhage, The Netherlands, 1957, p. 44. 104. S.H. Nasr. Iran (Persia): A Glimpse of Its History and Culture, op.cit., p. 44. 435

105. H. Askari. "Islam and Modernity," in S.T. Lokhandwalla (Ed.). India and Contemporary Islam. Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, India, 1971, p. 22V.

106. M. Ivlazheruddin Siddiqi. Women in Islam, op.cit., p. 132. 107. N.A. Khoury. Islam and Modernization in the I^liddle East: Muhammad Abduh, An Ideology of Development, op.cit., p. 137. lOB. M. Jameela. Islam Versus the West. Kitab Bhavan, Delhi, India, 1969, p. 115.

109. M. Abdul-Rauf. The Islamic View of Women and the Family, op.cit., p. 34.

110. M. Shakir. "Women in Muslim Society," Islamic Perspective (Biennial Journal, Institute of Islamic Studies, Bombay, India), Vol. I, Issue 1, January 1984, p. 111. 111. Ibid., p. 115. 112. Ibid., p. 115.

113. M. Abdul-Rauf. The Islamic View of Women and the Family, op.cit., pp. 34 and 35.

114. Ibid., p. 142.

115. A.B. Shah. "Islam and Humanism," New Quest [A.B.Shah and M.V. Namjoshi (Editors), Indian Association for Cultural Freedom, India],No. 24, November-i^ecember 1980, p. 339. 116. Quran-e-Karim (Lit. The Bounteous Wuran). Elmiyeh-e- Eslamiyeh, Shirazi Bazaar, Tehran, Iran, 1337 Hegira (195B), p. 47. 117. M. Abdul-Rauf. The Islamic View of Women and the Family, op.cit., p. II8. 436

118. S.T. Lokhandwalla. "The Position of Women Under Islam," Islamic Perspective, op.cit., pp. 44 and 45. 119. Ibid., p. 44. 120. M. Abdul-Kauf. The Islamic View of Women and the Family, op.cit., p. 41. 121. J. Abdoh. "Impact of Science and Technology on the Political, Legal, Economic and Social Development in the Society in Iran," in S. T. Lokhandwalla (Ed.), India and Contemporary Islam. Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, India, 1971, p. 302. 122. B. Puri. "Personal Law and Muslim Identity," Islamic Perspective, (Biennial Journal, Institute of Islamic Studies, Bombay, India), Vol. I, Issue 1, January 1984, p. 109. 123. A.A. Engineer. 'Book Review,' Islamic Perspective (Biennial Journal, Institute of Islamic Studies, Bombay, India), Vol. I, Issue 1, January 1984, pp. 128 and 129. 124. S.T. Lokhandwalla. "The Position of Women Under Islam," Islamic Perspective, op.cit., p. 60. 125. Ibid., pp. 60 and 61. 126. M, Shakir. "Women in Muslim Society," Islamic Perspective, op.cit., pp. 114 and 115. 127. M.M. Pickthall (Translated to English). The Glorious Quran, op.cit., p. 57. 128. Ibid., p. 57. 129. M. Abul Kalam Azad. The Tarjuman al-Quran (Edited and tendered into English by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif). Asia Publishing House, Bombay, India, Vol. II, 1967, pp. 121 and 122. 130. T.W. Arnold. The Preaching of Islam, op.cit., p. 209. 437

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153• M. Shakir. "Women in Muslim Socidty," Islamic Perspective, op.cit., pp. 117 and 118. 154. Ibid., p. 118.

155. Ibid., p. 118.

156. K. Frischtler. Imam Hussain Va Iran (Lit. Imam Hussain and Iran) (in Persian Language), op.cit., pp. 5, 12, 150, 200.

157. li. Abrahamian. Iran: Between Two Hevolutions. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A., 1982, pp. 52 and 53.

158. Ibid., pp. 73 and 74.

159. Ibid., p. 75.

160. Ibid., pp. 81-101.

161. Ibid., p. 152.

162. Ibid., p. 57.

163. A.H.A. Nadwi. Western Civilization: Islam and Muslims. Translated from Urdu Version by Dr. M. Asif Kidwai. Academy of Islamic Research and Publications, Lucknow, India, 1969, pp. 124 and 125. 164. F. Rahman. Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, U.S.A., 1982, pp. 105 and 106.

165. a) S.A.A. Rizvi. Iran: Royalty, Religion and Revolu­ tion. I'larifat Publishing House, Canbera, Australia, 1980, p. 213. b) N.R. Keddie. Iran: Religion Politics and Society. Biddies Ltd., Guildford, Surrey, Great Britain, 1980, p. 99.

166. a) E. Abrahamian. Iran: Between Two Revolutions, op.cit., pp. I46-I65. 439

b) A. Banani. The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, U.S.A., 1961, p. 59. c) H. Batra. Muslim Civilization and the Crisis in Iran. Punjabi Press, New Delhi, India, 19^0, p. 174. 167. H.K. Ghhabra. The History of T-todern World, 1919 to 1945. Surjeet Publications, Delhi, India, 1983, p.249. 168. a) E. Abrahamian, Iran: Between Two Revolutions, op.cit. , p. 497. b) E. Kedourie and G.H. Sylvia. Towards A Modern Iran. Frank Cass and Company Ltd., London, England, 1980, p. 260.

169. Merip Reports. (Mddle East Research and Information Project). Published nine times a year by the Middle East Research and Information Project Inc., Washington D.C., New York, U.S.A., No. 85, February 1980, p. 10.

170. a) M.H. Heikal. The iieturn of the Ayatullah. Andre' Deutsch Limited, London, England, 1981, pp. 117, 118, 120. b) R. Batra. Muslim Civilization and the Crisis in Iran, op.cit., pp. 179 and 180.

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171. K. Afrachteh. "Iran," in M. Ayoob (Ed.). The Politics of Islamic Reassertion. Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, India, 1982, pp. 96 and 97.

172. Merip Reports, op.cit.. No. 85, February 1980, p. 10. 173. N.R. Keddie. Iran: Roots of Revolution: An Interpre­ tative History of Modern Iran. Yale University Press, New Haven, U.S.A., 1981, p. 167. 440

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181. a) N.R. Keddie. Iran: Roots of Revolution, op.cit., p. 253. b) M.H. Heikal. The Return of the Ayatullah, op.cit., p. 169. 182. M.H. Heikal. The Return of the Ayatullah, op.cit., p. 168. 183. E. Abrahamian. Iran: Between Two Revolutions, op.cit., p. 526. 184. International Press, Vol. 18, No. 49, December 29, 1980, p. 1369. 441

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187. W. Graves. "Iran: Dej^ert Miracle," National Geographic (published by National Geographic Society, Washington D.C., U.S.A.), Vol. 147, No. 1, January 1975, p. 29. 188. 3. Zabih. Iran Since the Revolution. Groom Helm Ltd., London, England, 1982, p. 4.

189. a) M. Laing. The Shah. Sidgwick and Jackson, London, England, 1977, p. 211.

b) R. Batra. Muslim Civilization and the Crisis in Iran, op.cit., p. 179. c) M. Ciordon. Conflict in the Persian Gulf. The Macrnillan Press Ltd., London, England/Kingsport Press, U.S.A., 1981, p. 103.

190. E. Abrahamian. Iran: Between Two Revolutions, op.cit., pp. 502 and 503. 191. Ibid., pp. 501 and 502.

192. Ibid., p. 505.

193. K. Afrachteh. "Iran," in M. Ayoob (Ed.). The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, op.cit., pp. 97 and 9^. 194. Ibid., p. 98.

195. a) E. Abrahamian. Iran: Between Two Revolutions, op.cit., p. 520.

b) N.R. Keddie. Iran: Roots of Revolution, op.cit., p. 252. 442

196. K. Afrachteh. "Iran," in M. Ayoob (Ed.). The Politics of I.slamic Reassertion, op.cit., p. 99.

197. Ibid., p. 99.

193. 3.N. Eisenstadt. Tradition, Change, and Modernity. John Wiley and Sons, New York, U.S.A., 1973, p. 329.

199. Ibid., p. 329.