Surgically Precise but Kinematically Abstract Patent Claims Andrew Chin University of North Carolina School of Law, [email protected]
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Notice Failure and Notice Externalities
Journal of Legal Analysis Advance Access published January 3, 2013 NOTICE FAILURE AND NOTICE EXTERNALITIES Peter S. Menell and Michael J. Meurer1 Downloaded from ABSTRACT The emergence of intangible resources, such as intellectual property illuminates a pre- viously unrecognized market failure: what we call a “notice externality.” The incentives http://jla.oxfordjournals.org/ of those claiming intellectual property diverge from the social interest. Inventors and creators can sometimes benefit from obfuscating the scope of rights and keeping others in the dark about their intellectual property. This article explores the principal causes of notice failure in the development of intangible resources and offers a multifaceted framework for diagnosing, preventing, internalizing, and ameliorating its adverse effects. 1. INTRODUCTION at UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY on January 11, 2013 The institution of private property addresses a prime resource allocation con- cern in market-based economies: appropriability (Even 2009). Property rights encourage investment in resource development by granting property owners rights to exclude and develop their resources, which can enhance owners’ ability to derive value from their investments. The right to exclude encourages farmers to cultivate crops by ensuring that they, and not interlopers, will be able to reap the harvest. It also encourages land developers to build homes knowing that they can prevent squatters from occupying the dwellings. In these ways, the 1 Peter S. Menell, Robert L. Bridges, Professor of Law and Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, University of California at Berkeley School of Law; Michael J. Meurer, Abraham and Lillian Benton Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, E-mail: pmenell@ law.berkeley.edu. -
Library Start Your Business: Draft a Patent Application
Library Start Your Business: Draft a Patent Application Azalea Ebbay Librarian, San Diego Public Library Roya Bagheri Staff Attorney, San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program, Inc. Paul Yen Primary Examiner, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office June 10, 2020 Library Overview • Patent and Trademark Resource Center with Azalea Ebbay • San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program, Inc. with Roya Bagheri • Learn How to Draft a Patent Application with Paul Yen Library Patent and Trademark Resource Center • Provide free access to patent and trademark resources provided by the USPTO • Direct you to information and explain the application process and fee schedule • Demonstrate how to use patent and trademark search tools • Show you a directory of local patent attorneys and agents who are licensed to practice before the USPTO • Assists with patent searches for an ancestor’s inventions • Offers free educational programs Note: We cannot provide business or legal advice. We cannot perform patent or trademark 2019 Start Your Business event searches. with San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program, Inc. and Procopio Library Teaching patents to high school students for UCSD Rady School of Management’s LaunchPad Kid’s Invent It Month, a program children’s themed program Library You can borrow free small business eBooks with your library card on CloudLibrary. You can also pick up your holds at select San Diego Public Library locations. Library Our Final Event with the U.S.P.T.O. Trademark Application Walk-through with Jason Lott Date: June 17th Time: 2-3:30 p.m. PST Registration website: https://sandiego.librarymarket.com/events/start-your-business-trademark-application-w alk-through-webex-event Any questions? Azalea Ebbay, San Diego Public Library [email protected] (619) 238-6683 San Diego Volunteer Lawyer Program, Inc. -
Retooling the Patent-Antitrust Intersection: Insights from Behavioral Economics
9 LIM (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2017 11:26 AM RETOOLING THE PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION: INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS Daryl Lim* I. Introduction ............................................................................125 II. Does The “Light of Reason” Work in IP Cases? ...................132 A. Patents on a Pendulum ....................................................135 B. Dynamic Efficiency via Patent Deference: A Call to Inaction? ..........................................................................139 III. The Supreme Court Speaks, Twice ........................................148 A. Actavis: Toward a Unified Whole ...................................149 B. Kimble: Beyond Tautology .............................................152 IV. Behavioral Economics & Patent-Antitrust Law ....................155 A. Answering the Critics ......................................................156 1. Irrationality and Willful Blindness ............................157 2. Predictability ..............................................................162 3. Generalizability ..........................................................169 B. Anticompetitive Harm and Procompetitive Justifications ....................................................................171 1. Microsoft and Rambus ...............................................172 2. Actavis and Kimble Revisited ....................................175 3. A Word on Procompetitive Justifications ..................179 C. Intent: Valuing the Conscious .........................................180 -
Open Source Paradigm: Beyond the Solution to the Software Patentability Debate
THE JOHN MARSHALL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OPEN SOURCE PARADIGM: BEYOND THE SOLUTION TO THE SOFTWARE PATENTABILITY DEBATE GIOVANNA MASSAROTTO ABSTRACT Around 300 BCE, a Greek mathematician, Euclid discovered a theorem on which modern geometry and a fundamental algorithm is based. Euclid’s theorem represents a method for calculating the greatest common divisors between two integers. Since 300 BCE, both Euclid’s Theorem and algorithm have been applied in many fields, including algebra and geometry. But what would have happened if Euclid’s Theorem had been patented? The issue is not whether we can continue to use Euclid’s Theorem without paying royalties, but if software and algorithms underlying the software are patentAble. Although software is based on algorithms similar to the algorithm discovered by Euclid, in the United States software is generally patented. Open source paradigm, explored here, could resolve the software patentability issue, in addition to representing the best economic/social paradigm to apply in the technology industry. Android, Google’s open source operating system, for example, is installed in more than eighty percent of worldwide smartphones, showing that open source strategy is workable. The Web, developed by Tim Berners-Lee, is another of these examples. If the Web had been pAtented, innovation and the development of technology would inevitably have been compromised. Instead of patent protection, the United States legislature could guarantee software an adequate legal protection through copyrights. Copyright © 2016 The John Marshall Law School Cite as Giovanna Massarotto, Open Source Paradigm: Beyond the Solution to the Software Patentability Debate, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. -
Business Method Patents: Characters in Search of Legal Protection
Business Method Patents: Characters in Search of Legal Protection Giuseppina Claudia Coniglione A thesis submitted to the University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Centre for Commercial Law Studies (CCLS) Queen Mary, University of London United Kingdom September 2017 I, Giuseppina Claudia Coniglione, confirm that the research included within this thesis is my own work or that where it has been carried out in collaboration with, or supported by others, that this is duly acknowl- edged below and my contribution indicated. Previously published material is also acknowledged below. I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third party’s copyright or other Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential material. I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection soft- ware to check the electronic version of the thesis. I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a degree by this or any other university. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author. Signature: Date: 22 September 2017 1 Abstract The aim of this research is to investigate the phenomenon of business method patents in Europe. Not only the issue of patentability of busi- ness methods is discussed, but also the possible strategic use of these patents and patent applications is explored. For this purpose, a data set has been specifically created, including all the applications submitted in the class G06Q (namely data processing systems or methods, specially adapted for administrative, commercial, financial, managerial, supervi- sion or forecasting purpose) at the EPO. -
Pirates, Hydras, Trolls, And... Authors? on the Authorial Capacities of Digital Media Piracy
Pirates, Hydras, Trolls, and... Authors? On the Authorial Capacities of Digital Media Piracy Thomas MacDonald A Thesis in The Department of Sociology and Anthropology Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (Social and Cultural Anthropology) at Concordia University Montreal, Quebec, Canada April 2018 © Thomas MacDonald, 2018 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY School of Graduate Studies This is to certify that the thesis prepared By: Thomas MacDonald Entitled: Pirates, Hydras, Trolls, and... Authors? On the Authorial Capacities of Digital Media Piracy and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Social and Cultural Anthropology) complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality. Signed by the final Examining Committee: Chair Dr. Amy Swiffen Examiner Dr. Fenwick Mckelvey Examiner Dr. Martin French Supervisor Dr. Maximilian Forte Approved by ___________________________________________________ Dr. Amy Swiffen, Graduate Program Director 18 May 2018 _____________________________________________ Dr. André Roy, Dean of Faculty ABSTRACT Pirates, Hydras, Trolls, and... Authors? On the Authorial Capacities of Digital Media Piracy Thomas MacDonald In this thesis, I undertake a positive analysis of digital media piracy to examine the movement’s authorial capacities. Proposed by James Meese as a way of looking beyond the traditional “piracy is theft” framework, this perspective offers new insights about how the increasingly mundane act of downloading and sharing media files can incite social change. I begin by examining what it means to be a digital media pirate, and how that question is part of the construction of the piracy movement. -
Patent Prior Art and Possession
William & Mary Law Review Volume 60 (2018-2019) Issue 1 Article 4 10-15-2018 Patent Prior Art and Possession Timothy R. Holbrook Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons Repository Citation Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Prior Art and Possession, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 123 (2018), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol60/iss1/4 Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr PATENT PRIOR ART AND POSSESSION TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK* ABSTRACT Prior art in patent law defines the set of materials that the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and courts use to determine whether the invention claimed in a patent is new and non- obvious. One would think that, as a central, crucial component of patent law, prior art would be thoroughly theorized and doctrinally coherent. Nothing could be further from the truth. The prior art provisions represent an ad hoc codification of various policies and doctrines that arose in the courts. This Article provides coherency to this morass. It posits a prior art system that draws upon property law’s conception of possession. Possession operates when an actor asserts dominion over a resource or object in a way that communicates that assertion to third parties. In this way, public availability becomes the key lodestar to prior art. In the prior art context, the possession framework would divide prior art into two categories: prior art generated by third parties and prior art generated by the patent applicant herself. -
Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: Operating Company Patent Transfers
theantitrustsource Ⅵ www.antitrustsource.com Ⅵ A p r i l 2 0 1 3 1 The Antitrust Source, April 2013. © 2013 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: Operating Company Patent Transfers Mark S. Popofsky and Michael D. Laufert The power of a patent can depend on its holder. In one set of hands, a patent might play a defen- sive role, warding off suits by similarly armed competitors. But when placed in another’s, the same patent can serve as a weapon for extracting royalties from inadvertent infringers or for raising rivals’ costs. In short, much like the theory of relativity, the ability and incentive to assert a patent can turn on the positions rights holders and enforcement targets occupy. The ease with which patents change hands, and the eruption of new business models focused on patent monetization, amplify the importance of understanding the consequences of this TEinsteinian patent/antitrust twist. Today, a vibrant market exists for patent rights.1 Buyers of patents frequently include “patent trolls,” which, like the Federal Trade Commission, we call Patent Assertion Entities or “PAEs.” PAEs typically do not make or sell products. Rather, their business model is to make money from monetizing patent rights, typically by licensing or suing Operating Companies (firms that practice patents). In this article, we survey certain antitrust issues presented by an emerging trend: the out- sourcing by Operating Companies of patents to PAEs, a phenomenon some commentators describe as “privateering.”2 Operating Company transfers of patents to PAE proxies can raise competitive concerns. -
European Patent Convention
No. 16208 MULTILATERAL Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) (with Implementing Regulations, Protocol on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Deci sions in Respect of the Right to the Grant of a Euro pean Patent, Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European Patent Organisation, Protocol on the Centralisation of the European Patent System and on its Introduction, and Protocol on the Interpretation of article 69 of the Convention). Concluded at Munich on 5 October 1973 Authentic texts: German, English and French, Registered by the Federal Republic of Germany on 11 January 1978. MULTILATERAL Convention sur la délivrance de brevets européens (Con vention sur le brevet européen) [avec Règlement d'exécution, Protocole sur la compétence judiciaire et la reconnaissance de décisions portant sur le droit à l'ob tention du brevet européen, Protocole sur les privilèges et immunités de l'Organisation européenne des brevets, Protocole sur la centralisation et l'introduction du système européen des brevets, et Protocole interprétatif de l'article 69 de la Convention]. Conclue à Munich le 5 octobre 1973 Textes authentiques : allemand, anglais et français. Enregistrée par la République fédérale d'Allemagne le 11 janvier 1978. Vol. 1065,1-16208 1978 United Nations — Treaty Series • Nations Unies — Recueil des Traités 255 CONVENTION1 ON THE GRANT OF EUROPEAN PATENTS (EURO PEAN PATENT CONVENTION) CONTENTS Preamble Art. 18. Examining Divisions Part I. General and institutional provisions Art. 19. Opposition Divisions Art. 20. Legal Division Chapter I. General provisions Art. 21. Boards of Appeal Art. 1. European law for the grant of Art. 22. Enlarged Board of Appeal patents Art. -
Secret Prior Art – Time for Another Look Secret Prior Art –Time for by Andrew Berks* Another Look
A Publication of the New York Intellectual Property Law Association April/May 2017 The Report In This Issue Secret Prior Art – Time for Another Look Secret Prior Art –Time for By Andrew Berks* Another Look ......................1,4-7 ecret prior art” refers to a pat- files the application, even if the other President’s Corner ......................2-3 “Sent application that is effective person’s work was totally unknown to as a prior art reference as of its filing the inventor, then the subject invention In Memoriam date, even though it does not become fails the novelty test and should not be MARY RICHARDSON .............. 3 known to the public until its publi- entitled to a patent. cation date.1 These types of prior art But as a form of public disclosure, A Statistical Look at PTAB references, falling within the scope there is a special class of patent Post-Grant Proceedings .........8-11 of 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (or pre-AIA applications that may qualify as prior § 102(e)), have long been surrounded art: those that were filed before but PTAB Developments by controversy in obviousness-type published after the subject patent Involving CRISPR- invalidity arguments.2 This paper ex- application was filed. These so-called Cas9 Gene Editing amines the nature and history of this “secret prior art” patent applications Technology .........................12-15 problem and proposes a solution. are an artifact of the inherent delays in patent office procedures. For 95thAnnual Dinner in I. Conditions for Patentability example, in the United States, prior Honor of the Federal It is axiomatic under modern to 2000, patent applications were Judiciary .............................16-17 patent law systems that a patent claim kept secret until they issued. -
European Patent Procedure Explained
European Patent Procedure Explained Patents in Europe When protecting an invention in Europe, you can either file a single European patent application covering 40 member states, or you can file individual national patent applications in each separate European state where you require patent protection. In general, if you require patent protection in more than a single national European state, it is likely to be more cost effective to file a European patent application under the European Patent Convention. European patent applications can take quite a long time to process. The average prosecution from filing to a decision on grant is around 44 months. Prosecution can be quicker in some individual national states. This is particularly true in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland. Additionally, short term patents (known as petty patents, or utility models), where there is generally a novelty requirement and either no inventive step requirement, or a lower level of inventive step requirement than for a European patent or a standard national patent, are available in some European states, for example Germany and Italy. These may have a cost or speed advantage over a standard national patent, or a European patent. However, for most inventions originating outside Europe, the European patent under the European Patent Convention, is the primary form of protection. European Patent - Overall Procedure From filing to grant, the stages are: - Filing the application: A full description, claims, abstract and where appropriate drawings, must be supplied at the point of filing. An application fee and search fee are also due on filing. The application can be filed in any official language of a member state, but a translation into English, French or German, the three official languages of the European Patent Convention, must be supplied shortly after filing. -
Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’S Historical Survivors
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 26, Number 2 Spring 2013 PATENT PRIVATEERS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT’S HISTORICAL SURVIVORS John M. Golden* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 546 II. PATENTS AS CREATURES OF THE PRE-WESTPHALIAN STATE ............................................................................................ 553 III. PRIVATEERING IN THE AGE OF SAIL ........................................... 557 A. Privateering Basics .................................................................. 557 B. Privateering’s Golden Age ....................................................... 561 C. Privateering’s Costs and Substantial but Imperfect Regulation .............................................................................. 564 D. Privateering’s Lessons and Demise ........................................ 570 IV. QUI TAM LITIGATION .................................................................. 572 A. Qui Tam Basics ........................................................................ 572 B. Qui Tam Litigation in England ................................................ 573 C. Qui Tam Litigation in the United States .................................. 577 1. General History ..................................................................... 577 2. Qui Tam’s Survival and Repeated Recalibration Under the False Claims Act ....................................................... 578 3. Boom and Bust for Qui Tam Suits Alleging False Patent Marking