The Learning of Political Symbols in Chinese Culture

RICHARD W. WILSON

Princeton University, Princeton, U.S.A.

RECENT EVIDENCE from the mainland of indicates that the most frenzied period of the Great Proletarian has passed and a time ofre-assessment and consolidation has commenced. No one doubts that serious problems remain for the Maoist leadership group nor that the most lasting repercussions from the "Revolution" are yet to be seen. Nevertheless a period of quiet moderation is now clearly noticeable, both with regard to the internal situation and to Peking's activities on the diplomatic front. Perhaps this is but the eye of the storm, an uneasy moment of calm while new surges generate. Considering the difficulties of assessment that China "experts" have so recently experienced, competent observers are undoubtedly correct in their cautious appraisals of the new situation. While the calm remains, however, an opportunity presents itself for less hurried analysis of these past events. Undoubtedly the fervor of the , the seeming ease with which millions of young people were swept into often violent political participation, remains the most striking feature of the Cultural Revolution. Less apparent but not therefore less important was the revelation of a political system, long thought to be a virtual model for solidarity among top leadership, disintegrating into an often obscure tangle of factional dispute. For what was observed was not merely a struggle for power among the top echelons of authority but also considerable political infighting at local levels between less exalted opponents. One striking feature of this chaos, a situation both puzzling and intriguing, was the continuing lack - or seeming lack - of coordination among the anti­ Maoist forces. So significant is this feature, in fact, that one wonders if we have not been misled by our own labeling of these forces, i.e., the anti-Maoists in many important respects may not have been anti-Mao at all and in any case can hardly be lumped together under such an inclusive and simplifYing rubric. (Indeed, much local struggle was between groups all of which claimed the mantle of pro-.) From this niggling doubt is born the question of why lack of coordination among the so-called anti-Maoists existed and why no mass mobilization of the opposition occurred, even presuming that such an event was possible. More theoretically the question arises as to what particular political symbols are available in the Chinese cultural milieu around which 242 JOURNAL OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN STUDIES forces of opposition may coalesce and which may serve as foci of loyalty. An analysis of such questions may lead to an understanding both of how political energies in China are focused and released and also, on the contrary, of how forces of deepseated hostility and opposition may be fragmented and dissipated. Clearly before beginning an analysis of such questions it would be helpful to have in hand some evaluation of the relative strength of the opposing forces in the Cultural Revolution. For the Mao-Lin group were challenged by no mere handful of "bandits." Heading the list of opponents are the President of the People's Republic, Liu Shao-ch'i, and the General Secretary of the Com­ munist Party, Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Scattered beneath them throughout the country are a host of lesser individuals, many occupying positions of consider­ able power. It has been estimated that only one quarter of the provinces are under firm Maoist control. Continuing unrest and bloody strife are reported in Canton. During the height of the Cultural Revolution the Jen-min Jih-pao spoke of battles all over the country between the Maoists and the anti-Maoists. Perhaps nowhere was the strength of the opposition more noticeable, however, than in the now well-publicized incident. There Hsieh Fu-chih and , high party officials and leading members of the Cultural Revolution Group, were seized, beaten, and humiliated. Opposition to the Mao-Lin faction may be fragmented and uncoordinated, but evidence reveals it has been often composed of powerful men controlling significant resources. Such people, even unaided, would unquestionably possess the capacity to establish or seize radio broadcasting stations or to establish local newspapers that would print material more favorable to their own cause. That they have not done so is, in my opinion, less because the Maoists control the public communications media than because such actions are deemed by the Maoist opponents to serve no useful purpose. Evidently the control of propa­ ganda organs and mass communication media is considered to be of slight value as an asset, either because alternate means of communication are available or because no real way is seen of utilizing these devices to gain or maintain sup­ port. Several of the factors favorable for the Mao-Lin faction lie in the unique nature of the Cultural Revolution itself. In fact, in only a limited sense of the word have we any right to call the movement a "revolution" at all. There was no welling of discontent from below, bursting into organized resistance to established authority; the initiative for disorder came from the highest echelons. To borrow an analogy from Chinese tradition, the struggle has not been characterized by any impetus to change the "mandate of heaven" but rather by how to further implement the existing mandate. Furthermore the situation is very much affected by the internal struggle in the world communist move­ ment and by the rise in the past decades of a passionate Chinese nationalism. The need to maintain a common "anti-foreign" front has tended to lessen the effectiveness of any challenge posed in terms of Soviet or other non-Chinese communist doctrine or practice. While actual Maoist control of the public communications media is not