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Data Security DATA SECURITY Asst.Prof.Dr. Ali Kadhim Data Security 2 Asst.Prof.Dr. Ali Kadhim Chapter 2. Elementary Cryptography In this chapter Concepts of encryption Cryptanalysis: how encryption systems are "broken" Symmetric (secret key) encryption and the DES and AES algorithms Asymmetric (public key) encryption and the RSA algorithm Key exchange protocols and certificates Digital signatures Cryptographic hash functions Cryptography secret writing is the strongest tool for controlling against many kinds of security threats. Well-disguised data cannot be read, modified, or fabricated easily. Cryptography is rooted in higher mathematics: group and field theory, computational complexity, and even real analysis, not to mention probability and statistics. Fortunately, it is not necessary to understand the underlying mathematics to be able to use cryptography. We begin this chapter by examining what encryption does and how it works. We introduce the basic principles of encryption with two simple encryption methods: substitution and transposition. Next, we explore how they can be expanded and improved to create stronger, more sophisticated protection. Because weak or flawed encryption provides only the illusion of protection, we also look at how encryption can fail. We analyze techniques used to break through the protective scheme and reveal the original text. Three very popular algorithms are in use today: DES, AES, and RSA. We look at them in some detail to see how these and other algorithms can be used as building blocks with protocols and structures to perform other computing tasks, such as signing documents, detecting modification, and exchanging sensitive data. Chapter 12 offers a deeper analysis of encryption techniques and algorithms, including their mathematical bases, the mechanisms that make them work, and their limitations. Most users of cryptography will never invent their own algorithms, just as most users of electricity do not build their own power generators. Still, deeper knowledge of how cryptography works can help you use it effectively, just as deeper knowledge of energy issues helps you understand the environmental and cost trade-offs among different energy sources. This chapter offers you a rudimentary understanding of what cryptography is; but we encourage you to study the details in Chapter 12 to better understand the implications of each choice of 2.1. Terminology and Background Consider the steps involved in sending messages from a sender, S, to a recipient, R. If S entrusts the message to T, who then delivers it to R, T then becomes the transmission medium. If an outsider, O, wants to access the message (to read, change, or even destroy it), we call O an interceptor or intruder. Any time after S transmits it via T, the message is vulnerable to exploitation, and O might try to access the message in any of the following ways: Block it, by preventing its reaching R, thereby affecting the availability of the message. Intercept it, by reading or listening to the message, thereby affecting the confidentiality of the message. Modify it, by seizing the message and changing it in some way, affecting the message's integrity. Fabricate an authentic-looking message, arranging for it to be delivered as if it came from S, thereby also affecting the integrity of the message. Data Security 3 Asst.Prof.Dr. Ali Kadhim As you can see, a message's vulnerabilities reflect the four possible security failures we identified in Chapter 1. Fortunately, encryption is a technique that can address all these problems. Encryption, probably the most fundamental building block of secure computing, is a means of maintaining secure data in an insecure environment. (It is not the only building block, however.) In this book, we study encryption as a security technique, and we see how it is used in protecting programs, databases, networks, and electronic communications. Terminology Encryption is the process of encoding a message so that its meaning is not obvious; decryption is the reverse process, transforming an encrypted message back into its normal, original form. Alternatively, the terms encode and decode or encipher and decipher are used instead of encrypt and decrypt.[1] That is, we say that we encode, encrypt, or encipher the original message to hide its meaning. Then, we decode, decrypt, or decipher it to reveal the original message. A system for encryption and decryption is called a cryptosystem. [1] There are slight differences in the meanings of these three pairs of words, although they are not significant in this context. Strictly speaking, encoding is the process of translating entire words or phrases to other words or phrases, whereas enciphering is translating letters or symbols individually; encryption is the group term that covers both encoding and enciphering. The original form of a message is known as plaintext, and the encrypted form is called ciphertext. This relationship is shown in Figure 2-1. For convenience, we denote a plaintext message P as a sequence of individual characters P = <p1, p2, …, pn>. Similarly, ciphertext is written as C = <c1, c2, …, cm>. For instance, the plaintext message "I want cookies" can be denoted as the message string <I, ,w,a,n,t, , c,o,o,k,i,e,s>. It can be transformed into ciphertext <c1, c2, …, c14>, and the encryption algorithm tells us how the transformation is done. Figure 2-1. Encryption. We use this formal notation to describe the transformations between plaintext and ciphertext. For example, we write C = E(P) and P = D(C), where C represents the ciphertext, E is the encryption rule, P is the plaintext, and D is the decryption rule. What we seek is a cryptosystem for which P = D(E(P)). In other words, we want to be able to convert the message to protect it from an intruder, but we also want to be able to get the original message back so that the receiver can read it properly. Encryption Algorithms The cryptosystem involves a set of rules for how to encrypt the plaintext and how to decrypt the ciphertext. The encryption and decryption rules, called algorithms, often use a device called a key, denoted by K, so that the resulting ciphertext depends on the original plaintext message, the algorithm, and the key value. We write this dependence as C = E(K, P). Essentially, E is a set of encryption algorithms, and the key K selects one specific algorithm from the set. We see later in this chapter that a cryptosystem, such as the Caesar cipher, is keyless but that keyed encryptions are more difficult to break. This process is similar to using mass-produced locks in houses. As a homeowner, it would be very expensive for you to contract with someone to invent and make a lock just for your house. In addition, you would not know whether a particular inventor's lock was really solid or how it compared with those of other inventors. A better solution is to have a few well-known, well- respected companies producing standard locks that differ according to the (physical) key. Then, you and your neighbor might have the same model of lock, but your key will open only your Data Security 4 Asst.Prof.Dr. Ali Kadhim lock. In the same way, it is useful to have a few well-examined encryption algorithms that everyone could use, but the differing keys would prevent someone from breaking into what you are trying to protect. Sometimes the encryption and decryption keys are the same, so P = D(K, E(K,P)). This form is called symmetric encryption because D and E are mirror-image processes. At other times, encryption and decryption keys come in pairs. Then, a decryption key, KD, inverts the encryption of key KE so that P = D(KD, E(KE,P)). Encryption algorithms of this form are called asymmetric because converting C back to P involves a series of steps and a key that are different from the steps and key of E. The difference between symmetric and asymmetric encryption is shown in Figure 2-2. Figure 2-2. Encryption with Keys. A key gives us flexibility in using an encryption scheme. We can create different encryptions of one plaintext message just by changing the key. Moreover, using a key provides additional security. If the encryption algorithm should fall into the interceptor's hands, future messages can still be kept secret because the interceptor will not know the key value. Sidebar 2-1 describes how the British dealt with written keys and codes in World War II. An encryption scheme that does not require the use of a key is called a keyless cipher. The history of encryption is fascinating; it is well documented in Kahn's book [KAH96]. Encryption has been used for centuries to protect diplomatic and military communications, sometimes without full success. The word cryptography means hidden writing, and it refers to the practice of using encryption to conceal text. A cryptanalyst studies encryption and encrypted messages, hoping to find the hidden meanings. Both a cryptographer and a cryptanalyst attempt to translate coded material back to its original form. Normally, a cryptographer works on behalf of a legitimate sender or receiver, whereas a cryptanalyst works on behalf of an unauthorized interceptor. Finally, cryptology is the research into and study of encryption and decryption; it includes both cryptography and cryptanalysis. Data Security 5 Asst.Prof.Dr. Ali Kadhim Sidebar 2-1: Silken Codes Marks [MAR98] describes the life of a code-maker in Britain during World War II. That is, the British hired Marks and others to devise codes that could be used by spies and soldiers in the field. In the early days, the encryption scheme depended on poems that were written for each spy and relied on the spy's ability to memorize and recall them correctly.
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