Coming Full Circle with Boyd's OODA Loop Ideas
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Boyd's Real OODA Loop
Boyd’s OODA Loop (It’s Not What You Think) Chet Richards J. Addams & Partners, Inc. [email protected] March 21, 2012 Abstract Although the strategic ideas of John Boyd encompass much more than the well known OODA loop, the loop does provide a concise framework for improving competitive power throughout an organization. Much of this power will be lost, however, if people use the most common version. Fortunately, Boyd only drew one sketch of the OODA loop, which bears little resemblance to the popular misconception, and that one is the key to his entire body of work. [An earlier version of this paper was published in the Proceedings of the Lean Software & Systems Conference 2011, E. Willeke, ed., Sequim, WA: Blue Hole Press, pp. 127-136.] © 2012 by Chet Richards, but please feel free to disseminate with customary attribution. 2 Introduction: A Non-school of Strategy The late USAF Colonel John R. Boyd (1927 – 1997) was hard on ideologues: “Don’t be a member of Clausewitz’s school because a lot has happened since 1832,” he would warn his audiences, “and don’t be a member of Sun Tzu’s school because an awful lot has happened since 400 BC.” We should not be members of Boyd’s school, either: “If you’re going to regard this stuff as dogma,” he would say at some point in his briefings, “you’d be better served to take it out and burn it.” Why, then, spend time studying his works today? Boyd’s (1987a) answer was not to memorize the specific principles of any strategy— including his—but to follow his larger example, to achieve what he called “intuitive competence” in creating, employing and dealing with the novelty that permeates human life (Boyd, 1992). -
Strategic Culture, Ooda Loops, and Decision-Making by the U.S
THE COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH HELL: STRATEGIC CULTURE, OODA LOOPS, AND DECISION-MAKING BY THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DURING THE BOSNIAN WAR Justin Bingham Pullen A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of the Arts in the Transatlantic Masters Program in the Department of Political Science. Chapel Hill 2014 Approved by: Robert Jenkins Milada Vachudova John Stephens © 2014 Justin Bingham Pullen ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Justin Pullen: The Committee to Abolish Hell: Strategic Culture, OODA Loops, and Decision-Making by the U.S. National Security Council During the Bosnian War (Under the direction of Robert Jenkins) How are important policy decisions made? There are multiple heuristics that have been employed by political scientists, but few of them make use of contemporary control theory heuristics to analyze decision cycles at the national level. However, the difficulty of applying control theory is that it tends to promote rationalistic models that often do not take into account cultural and emotional factors that may strongly shape the actual decision. To bridge these gaps, this thesis seeks to examine the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop postulated by John Boyd as a decision-making model and integrate it with strategic culture theory, which provides a means of understanding the non-rational influences that shape decisions. The United States National Security Council’s decision to deploy ground troops in support of the Dayton Peace Agreement is used as a case study. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... -
The Cult of the Lightweight Fighter: Culture and Technology in the U.S. Air Force, 1964-1991
The Cult of the Lightweight Fighter: Culture and Technology in the U.S. Air Force, 1964-1991 by Michael Wayne Hankins B.A., University of North Texas, 2007 M.S., University North Texas, 2013 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2018 Abstract In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, military aviation technology grew expensive and politically divisive, and this is not without precedent. In the 1960s and 1970s, the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Falcon represented a controversial shift both in the cost of development and in tactical doctrine for the United States Air Force (USAF), yet the motivating factors that influenced their design are not fully understood. Most of the literature either has focused on a teleological exploration of technical evolution or has held to a “genius inventor” paradigm, lionizing individual engineers and planners. Other works have focused on these aircraft as factors that changed the Air Force's tactical approach to warfighting or have simply evaluated their combat performance. Although these approaches are valuable, they do not account for the effect that institutional culture and historical memory had on the F-15 and F-16 programs. This dissertation argues that the culture of the fighter pilot community was based on a constructed memory of World War I fighter combat, idealizing a heroic, romanticized image of “Knights of the Air.” This fighter pilot community attempted to influence the F-15 and F-16 programs to conform to their vision of an idealized past. -
A Discourse on Winning and Losing
A Discourse on Winning and Losing Col John R. Boyd, USAF, Retired Edited and Compiled by Dr. Grant T. Hammond Air University Press Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education Maxwell AFB, Alabama March 2018 Content Editor Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data James S. Howard Copy Editor Names: Boyd, John, 1927–1997, author. | Hammond, Grant Tedrick, Tammi K. Dacus 1945- editor. | Air University (U.S.). Press, publisher. Title: A discourse on winning and losing / John R. Boyd ; edited Cover Art, Book Design, and Illustrations and compiled by Grant T. Hammond. Daniel Armstrong Description: First edition. | Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama : Composition and Prepress Production Air University Press, [2017]. | Includes bibliographical references Nedra O. Looney and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017039845 | ISBN 978585662791 (paperback) Print Preparation and Distribution Subjects: LCSH: Military art and science. | Strategy. | Command Diane Clark of troops. Director and Publisher Classification: LCC U162 .B76 2017 | DDC 355.001—dc23 | Dr. Ernest Allan Rockwell SUDOC D 301.26/6:D 63 LC record available at https://lccn. loc.gov/2017039845 Air University Press 600 Chennault Circle, Bldg. 1405 Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6010 http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/AUPress/ Published by Air University Press in March 2018 Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/AirUnivPress and Twitter: https://twitter.com/aupress Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the organizations with which they are associated or the views of the Air University Press, Air University, United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. -
Boyd's OODA Loop
Necesse 2020, Vol 5, Issue 1, 142-165 Copyright 2020, Sjøkrigsskolen Peer reviewed article Boyd’s OODA Loop Chet Richards Abstract: The concepts of the late US Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd have influenced military thought in profound ways, from the design of modern fighter aircraft to the tactics used by the US Marine Corps in both Gulf Wars. This paper describes the best known aspect of his strategic thought, the OODA “loop,” and how practitioners in war and business can use the loop to implement a framework that has proven successful since the time of Sun Tzu. John Richard Boyd (1927-1997) was a United States Air Force fighter pilot and Pentagon consul- tant of the late 20th century. His theories have been highly influencial in the military, business, sports and litigation fields. 142 Summary Although the strategic ideas of John Boyd encompass much more than the well known OODA loop, the loop does provide a concise framework for improving competitive power throughout an organization. Much of this power will be lost, however, by regarding the loop as a simple, sequential, and circular pattern. The one sketch of the OODA loop that Boyd drew in any of his works, however, bears little resemblance to this popular misconception. That one is the key to his entire philosophy of conflict. This paper is intended primarily for those who lead teams in conflict, i.e., zero- sum interactions against other groups where independence or even survival itself is at stake. The OODA loop provides them with a comprehensive, if highly con- densed, framework for achieving Boyd’s strategic goal, which might be described as “creativity under fire” by their teams. -
Boyd's OODA Loop
Boyd’s OODA Loop (It’s Not What You Think) Chet Richards J. Addams & Partners, Inc. [email protected] September 28, 2012 Abstract Although the strategic ideas of John Boyd encompass much more than the well known OODA loop, the loop does provide a concise framework for improving competitive power throughout an organization. Much of this power will be lost, however, if people use the most common version. Fortunately, Boyd only drew one sketch of the OODA loop, which bears little resemblance to the popular misconception, and that one is the key to his entire body of work. [An earlier version of this paper was published in the Proceedings of the Lean Software & Systems Conference 2011, E. Willeke, ed., Sequim, WA: Blue Hole Press, pp. 127-136.] © 2012 by Chet Richards, but please feel free to disseminate with customary attribution. 2 Introduction: A Non-school of Strategy The late USAF Colonel John R. Boyd (1927 – 1997) was hard on ideologues: “Don’t be a member of Clausewitz’s school because a lot has happened since 1832,” he would warn his audiences, “and don’t be a member of Sun Tzu’s school because an awful lot has happened since 400 BC.” We should not be members of Boyd’s school, either: “If you’re going to regard this stuff as dogma,” he would say at some point in his briefings, “you’d be better served to take it out and burn it.” Why, then, spend time studying his works today? Boyd’s (1987a) answer was not to memorize the specific principles of any strategy— including his—but to follow his larger example, to achieve what he called “intuitive competence” in creating, employing and dealing with the novelty that permeates human life (Boyd, 1992).